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jiiiiiLiW  en)  is^fo 


THE 


FEDERALIST. 


A  COMMENTARY 


ON  THE 


CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

BY 

ALEXANDER  HAMILTON, 

JAY  AND   MADISON. 

A.LSO 

^bj  ©onttncntalist  anb  Stiver  Sapors, 

BY 

HAMILTON. 

EDITED  BY 

JOHN    C.    HAMILTON, 

AUTHOR  OF  THB  HI8T0RT  OF  THE  REPCBUC  OF  THE   UNITED  STAnS. 


PHIL AD  BLPHI a: 

J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT    COMPANY, 
1904. 


Ent<>red,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1864.  hy 
JOHN  C.  HAMILTON, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern  District 

of  New  York. 


Copyright,  1892,  by  CHAiti,ui'TE  A.  HAMILTON. 


CONTENTS. 


Ttmn 

BisTORiCAL  Notice ix 

Kesolution  for  a  General  Convention  of  the  States,  passed  by  the 

Legislature  of  New  York,  Sunday,  July  21,  1782 1 

Hamilton  to  Governor  Clinton,  Philadelphia,  May  14,  1783 3 

Resolution  for  a  General  Convention,  1783 4 

Annapolis  Convention,  Address  of,  September  14,  1786 8 

Speech  on  the  Impost  Grant 11 

Resolution  for  an  Act  by  Congress  Recommending  the  Holding  a 

Convention,  February  17,  1787 25 

Resolution  for  the  Appointment  by  New  York  of  Delegates  to  thrt 

General  Convention,  February  26,  1787 25 

Articles  of  Confederation 26 

Hamilton's  First  Plan  of  Government 3] 

The  Federal  Constitution,  as  agreed  upon  by  the  Convention,  Sep- 
tember 17,  1787 39 

K  UMBER 

I.  Introduction 49 

II.  Concerning  Dangers  from  Foreign  Force  and  Influence 54 

III.  The  same  Subject  continued 60 

IV.  The  same  Subject  continued 65 

V.  The  same  Subject  continued 71 

VI.  Concerning  Dangers  from  War  between  the  States 76 

VII.  The  Subject  continued,  and  Particular  Causes  Enumerated  83 

VIII.  The  Effects  of  Internal  War  in  Producing  Standing  Armies, 

and  other  Institutions  unfriendly  to  Liberty 90 

IX.  The  Utility  of  the  Union  as  a  Safeguard  against  Domestic 

Faction  and  Insurrection 97 

X.  The  same  Subject  continued 104 

XI.  The  Utility  of  the  Union  in  respect  to  Commerce  and  a 

Navy 113 


IV  CONTENTS. 

KUHBER  PAOB 

XII.  The  Utility  of  the  Union  in  respect  to  Revenue 121 

XIII.  The  same  Subject  continued,  with  a  View  to  Economy..  128 

XIV.  An   Objection    drawn    from    the    Extent    of   Country 

answered 131 

XV.  Concerning  the  Defects  of  the  Present  Confederation, 
in  Relation  to  the  Principle  of  Legislation  for  the 
States  in  their  Collective  Capacities 138 

XVI.  The  same  Subject  continued,  in  Relation  to  the  same 

Principles 147 

XVII.  The  Subject  continued,  and  Illustrated  by  Examples,  to 
show  the  Tendency  of  Federal  Governments,  rather 
to  Anarchy  among  the  Members,  than  Tyranny  in 
the  Head 153 

XVIII.  The  Subject  continued,  with  farther  Examples 158 

XIX.  The  Subject  continued,  with  farther  Examples 165 

XX.  The  same  Subject  continued,  with  farther  Examples 172 

XXI.  Further  Defects  of  the  Present  Constitution 178 

XXII.  The  same  Subject  continued  and  concluded 184 

XXIII.  The  Necessity  of  a  Government  at  least  equally  Ener- 

getic with  the  one  proposed 195 

XXIV.  The  Subject  continued,  with  an  Answer  to  an  Objection 

concerning  Standing  Armies 201 

XXV.  The  Subject  continued,  with  the  same  View 207 

XXVI.  The  Subject  continued,  with  the  same  View 213 

XXVII.  The  Subject  continued,  with  the  same  View 225 

XXVIII.  The  same  Subject  continued 235 

XXIX.  Concerning  the  Militia 239 

XXX,  Concerning  Taxation 240 

XXXI.  The  same  Subject  continued 243 

XXXII.  The  same  Subject  continued 248 

XXXIII.  The  same  Subject  continued 258 

XXXIV.  The  same  Subject  continued 259 

XXXV.  The  same  Subject  continued 263 

XXXVI.  The  same  Subject  continued 273 

XXXVII.  Concerning  the  Difficulties  which  the  Convention  must 

have  experienced  in  the  Formation  of  a  Proper  Plan..  282 


CONTENTS.  r 

trUMBEB  PASa 

XXXVIII.  The  Subject  continued,  and  the  Incoherence  of  the  Ob- 
jections to  the  Plan  exposed 291 

XXXI X.  The  Conformity  of  the  Plan  to  Republican  Principles: 
An  Objection  in  Respect  to  the  Powers  of  the  Con- 
vention examined 

XL.  The  same  Objection  further  examined 309 

XLI.  General  View  of  the  Powers  proposed  to  be  Vested  in 

the  Union 318 

XLII.  The  same  View  continued 329 

XLIII.  The  same  View  continued 338 

XLIV.  The  same  View  continued  and  concluded 349 

XLV.  A  further  Discussion  of  the  Supposed  Danger  from  the 

Powers  of  the  Union  to  the  State  Governments 358 

XLVI.  The  Subject  of  the  Last  Paper  resumed ;  with  an 
Examination  of  the  Comparative  Means  of  Influence 
of  the  Federal  and  State  Governments 365 

XLVII.  The  Meaning  of  the  Maxim,  which  requires  a  Separation 
of  the  Departments  of  Power,  examined  and  ascer- 
tained   373 

XLVIII.  The  same  Subject  continued,  with  a  View  to  the  Means 

of  giving  Efficacy  in  Practice  to  that  Maxim 382 

XLIX.  The  same  Subject  continued,  with  the  same  View 388 

L.  The  same  Subject  continued,  with  the  same  View 393 

LI.  The  same  Subject  continued,  with  the  same  View,  and 

concluded 397 

LII.  Concerning  the  House  of  Representatives,  with  a  View 
to  the  Qualifications  of  the  Electors  and  Elected,  and 
Time  of  Service  of  the  Members 403 

LIU.  The  same  Subject  continued,  with  a  View  of  the  Term 

of  Service  of  the  Members 409 

LIV.  The  same  Subject  continued,  with  a  View  to  the  Ratio 

of  Representation 416 

LV.  The  same  Subject  continued,  in  Relation  to  the  total 

Number  of  the  Boay 422 

LVI.  The  same  Subject  continued,  in  Relation  to  the  same 

Point 420 

LVII.  The  same  Subject  continued,  in  Relation  to  the  Sup- 
posed Tendency  of  the  Plan  of  the  Convention  to 
Elevate  the  Few  abcve  the  Many 434 


VI  CONTENTS. 

KUVBER  'ASl 

LVIII.  The  same  Subject  continued,  in  Relation  to  the  Future 

Augmentation  of  the  Members 441 

LIX.  Concerning  the  Regulation  of  Elections 448 

LX.  The  same  Subject  continued 454 

LXI.  The  same  Subject  continued  and  concluded 461 

LXII,  Concerning  the  Constitution  of  the  Senate,  with  Regard 
to  the  Qualifications  of  the  Members ;  the  Manner  of 
Appointing  them  ;  the  Equality  of  Representation ;  the 
Number  of  the  Senators,  and  the  Duration  of  their 
Appointments , 466 

.  LXIII.  A  further  View  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Senate,  in  Re- 
gard to  the  Duration  of  the  Appointments  of  its  Mem- 
bers   474 

LXIV.  A  further  View  of   the  Constitution   of  the  Senate,  in 

Regard  to  the  Power  of  Making  Treaties 483 

LXV.  A  further  View  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Senate,  in 
Relation  to  its  Capacity  as  a  Court  for  the  Trial  of 
Impeachments 490 

LXVI.  The  same  Subject  continued 496 

LXVII.  Concerning  the  Constitution  of  the  President:  A  Gross 
Attempt  to  Misrepresent  this  Part  of  the  Plan  de- 
tected   503 

LiXVIII.  The  View  of  the  Constitution  of  the  President  con- 
tinued, in  Relation  to  the  Mode  of  Appointment 508 

LXIX.  The  same  View  continued,  with  a  Comparison  between 
the  President  and  the  King  of  Great  Britain  on  the 
one  Hand,  and  the  Governor  of  New  York  on  the 
other 513 

LXX.  The  same  View  continued,  in  Relation  to  the  Unity  of 
the  Executive,  with  an  Examination  of  the  Project 
of  an  Executive  Council 522 

LXXI.  The  same  View  continued,  in  Regard   to   the  Duration 

of  the  Office 532 

LXXII.  The  same  View  continued,  in  Regard  to  the  Re-eligibility 

of  the  President 538 

LXXIII.  The  same  View  continued,  in  Relation  to  the  Provision 

concerning  Support,  and  the  Power  of  the  Negative...  545 

LXXI"^'^.  The  same  View  continued,  in  Relation  to  the  Command 

of  the  National  Forces,  and  the  Power  of  Pardoning..    552 


CONTENTS.  Til 

LXXV.  The  same  View  continued,  in  Relation  to  tie  Power  of 

Making  Treaties ; 556 

LXXVI.  The  same  View  continued,  in  Relation  to  the  Appoint- 
ment of  the  Officers  of  the  Government 562 

LXXVII.  The  View  of  the  Constitution  of  the  President  con- 
cluded, with  a  further  Consideration  of  the  Power  of 
Appointment  and  a  Concise  Examination  of  his  Re- 
maining Powers 568 

LXXVIII.  A  View  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Judicial  Department, 

in  Relation  to  the  Tenure  of  Good  Behaviour 574 

LXXIX.  A  further  View  of  the  Judicial  Department,  in  Relation 
to  the  Provisions  for  the  Support  and  Responsibility 
of  the  Judges 583 

LXXX.  A  further  View  of  the  Judicial  Department,  in  Relation 

to  the  Extent  of  its  Powers 587 

LXXXI.  A  further  View  of  the  Judicial  Department,  in  Relation 

to  the  Distribution  of  its  Authority 595 

LXXXII.  A  further  View  of  the  Judicial  Department,  in  Reference 

to  some  Miscellaneous  Questions 605 

LXXXIII.  A  further  View  of  the  Judicial  Department,  in  Relation 

to  the  Trial  by  Jury 611 

LXXXIV.  Concerning  several  Miscellaneous  Objections 627 

LXXXV.  Conclusion 639 

Collated  Texts 647 

PHILO  PUBLIUS,  by  William  Dcer. 

Number  1 655 

Number  II 658 

Number  III 659 


N.B. — In  frequent  instances  quotations  are  italicized  to  point  attention  where  thera 
ara  no  italics  in  the  original. 


HISTORICAL  NOTICE. 


Some  time  since,  the  intention  was  announced  of  publishing 
an  edition  of  the  Federalist,  which  would  *'  state  all  the  evi- 
dence known  to  exist,  to  designate  the  respective  contributions 
of  its  authors."* 

The  great  Rebellion  which,  while  imperilling,  has  developed 
the  power  of  our  Government,  and  by  its  suppression  will  esta- 
blish the  Unity  of  the  American  Empire,  has  been  a  sufficient 
cause  of  delay;  independent  of  those  personal  interests  which 
have  irresistibly  drawn  the  mind  from  the  study  to  the  camp 
and  to  the  battle-fields.     This  task  is  now  performed. 

As  Alexander  Hamilton  is  known  to  have  been  chiefly  instru- 
mental in  the  series  of  measures  which  finally  resulted  in  the 
establishment  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States — was  its 
principal  expounder — and  as  he  had  a  large  share  in  the  prac- 
tical exposition  of  its  powers,  under  the  Presidency  of  Washing- 
ton and  of  his  successor,  I  have  permitted  myself  to  believe,  that 
a  preliminary  exhibition  of  his  progressive  opinions  and  acts 
— onward  toward  the  goal  of  his  great  desires  and  hopes — the 
organization  of  a  firm  National  Government,  resting  directly  on 
the  shoulders  of  the  American  people;  acting  directly  upon 
them  as  individuals ;  and  pervading  the  entire  limits  of  their 
country,  might  not  be  without  interest  or  instruction.  And,  in  no 
other  mode  could  this  be  more  effectually  done  than  by  including 
in  this  volume — precedent  to  the  Federalist — certain  papers 
from  his  pen,  which  have  hitherto  had  a  very  limited  publicity 
together  with  some  elucidatory  observations. 

In  a  retrospect  of  the  rise  of  the  British  Provinces  in  North 
America,  from  their  Colonial  condition  to  that  of  an  Independent 

*  History  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States  of  America  as  traced  in  the 
writings  of  Alexander  Hamilton  and  of  his  cotemporaries.     iii.  371.  1859. 


X  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

ponrer  among  the  Nations  of  the  "World;  what  that  condit  on 
was,  has  at  different  periods  been  much  discussed.  At  first,  it 
was  treated  as  a  question  of  the  rights  and  duties  of  these  Colo- 
nies in  reference  to  the  parent  Government ;  later,  it  has  been 
more  often  investigated  as  a  question,  of  the  relation  of  the 
Colonies  to  their  Sovereigns,  and  to  each  other,  in  regard  to 
the  relations  which  have  existed  and  now  truly  exist,  between 
the  particular  States  within  the  Union  and  the  whole  United 
States;  or  between  the  People  of  each  of  those  States  and 
the  whole  People  of  the  United  States,  ordaining  and  establish- 
ing a  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America.  The  De- 
claration of  Independence  disposed  of  the  first  of  these  ques- 
tions, the  latter  has  a  living  interest.  In  the  second  of  his 
early  productions,*  Hamilton  touches  this  great  question.  To- 
tally denying  the  claim  of  parliamentary  supremacy  over  the 
British  Colonies,  except  as  conceded  by  them,  be  remarks,  •'  In 
order  to  form  one  State,  that  is,  a  number  of  individual  societies, 
or  bodies  politic  united  under  one  common  head,  there  must 
indeed  be  some  connecting,  pervading  principle.  This  is  found 
in  the  person  and  prerogative  of  the  King.  He  it  is  that  con- 
joins all  these  individual  societies  into  one  great  body  politic." 
"  He  is  King  of  America,  by  virtue  of  the  compact  between  us 
and  the  Kings  of  Great  Britain."  Their  claim  to  allegiance  was 
founded  upon  the  title  derived  from  the  Crown  to  the  lands  in 
A.meriea,  and  on  the  King's  being  "the  supreme  protector  of 
the  Empire,"  and  having  bestowed  that  protection.  As  fellow 
subjects  of  one  common  Sovereign,  the  Colonists  had  the  common 
rights  of  British  subjects,  those  rights  which  are  the  natural 
rights  of  every  human  being,  except  as  limited  by  statutes. 
These  common  rights  extended  over  the  whole  territory  of 
Great  Bntain  in  North  America.  The  colonists  of  each  Colony 
bad"  the  rights  of  trafiic  with,  of  migration  to ;  of  residence  in, 
and  of  inheritance  by  descent  of  real  estate  situate  in,  every 
other  Colony.  To  secure  which  common  rights  the  local  legis- 
lation of  all  the  Colonies  was  required  to  be  in  accordance  with 
the  laws  of  England. 

Thus,  the  British  colonists  of  North  America,  were,  in  chief 
respects,  "  one  people,"f  and  as  such,  the  delegates  chosen  to 

♦Hamilton's  Works,  ii.  55,  Februarys,  1775.  "The  Farmer  Refuted"— 
written  in  his  eighteenth  year. 

f  Story's  Commentaries,  i.  §  163,  165,  2  Dallas  Reports,  470.  Opiai«n  of 
(!hief  Justice  Jay. 


DECLARATION  OF  INDEPENDEN JE.  Xl 

the  first  "American  Continental  Congress,"  were  (.'hosen,  and 
declare  themselves  chosen  by  "the  good  people  of  the  several 
Colonies"  there  represented.  The  powers  exerted  by  it  weie 
exerted  for  their  common  protection ;  and  the  Union  of  the 
Colonies  was  symbolized  to  the  world  by  that  of  "  The  Great 
Union  Plag,"  in  which  they  still  recognized  their  common  aK 
legiance  to  the  crown.* 

Notwithstanding  this  still  recognized  allegiance,  Congress 
representing  the  power  of  the  United  people,  became,  in  place 
of  the  King,  their  "supreme  Protector;"  and  ere  long,  on  this 
protection  being  withdrawn  from  its  subjects  by  the  Crown,  that 
allegiance  was  likewise  withdrawn,  and  was  transferred  to  the 
whole  people  of  the  United  Colonies  represented  in  that  Con- 
gress. Thus,  the  Declaration  of  Independence  by  the  Conti- 
nental Congress,  as  the  act  of  "  one  people,"  about  "to  assume 
among  the  powers  of  the  earth,"  a  "  separate  and  equal  station" 
— AS  ANATION — and  "in  the  name  and  by  the  authority  of  the 
good  people  of  these  colonies,"  declares,  "that  these  United  Colo- 
nies are,  and  of  right,  ought  to  be  free  and  independent  States;" 
and,  as  such,  "  have  full  power  to  levy  war,  conclude  peace,  con- 
tract alliances,  establish  commerce,  and  to  do  all  other  acts  and 
things  which  independent  States  may  of  right  do." 

This  manifestly  was  the  joint  act  of  all  the  people  of  the 
United  colonies  of  North  America,  not  a  single  colony  being 
named.  It  was  a  Declaration  of  the  Independence  of  the  United 
colonies — of  Great  Britain — not  of  an  independence  of  each 
colony  of  the  other  colonies — it  was  a  declaration  of  the  sove- 
reignty of  the  people  of  the  United  States  conjointly,  not  of  the 
sovereignty  of  any  one  colony,  for  the  colonial  condition  then 
ceased ;  not  of  the  sovereignty  of  any  one  State,  for  no  State 
Government,  with  a  view  to  permanence,  had  then  been  formed. 
Hamilton  accurately  pronounced,  before  the  present  Constitu- 

*  A  flag  combining  the  Crosses  of  St.  George  and  St.  Andrew  united  (the 
distinctive  Emblem  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain)  with  a  Field  com- 
posed of  thirteen  stripes  alternate  red  and  white,  the  combination  of  the  Flags 
previously  used  in  the  camp,  on  the  cruisers  and  the  floating  batteries  of  the 
Colonies,  was  adopted  for  this  purpose,  ("the  declaration  of  their  union  under 
a  common  sovereign")  and  called  the  "Great  Union  Flag." — "  T'Ae  National 
Flag  of  the  United  States,"  p.  80-85,  by  Captain,  since  Major  General  Schuyler 
Hamilton.  The  change  from  this  flag  to  that  of  the  flag  of  the  United  States 
was  ordered  by  a  Resolution  of  Congress  June  14,  1777,  thus  providing  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  crosses  of  St.  George  and  St.  Andrews,  that — "the  Union  be 

irteen  stars,  white  in  a  Blue  Field — representing  a  new  conttellatio*i." 


Xll  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

tion  \ru8  established,  such  to  be  the  true  political  condition 
"  The  Union  and  Independence  of  these  States  are  blended  and 
incorporated  in  one  and  the  same  act"* — the  Declaration  of 
Independence.  "  The  sovereignty  and  independence  of  the 
people,"  he  declared,  "began  by  &  federal  act.  The  Declaration 
of  Independence  was  the  fundamental  Constitution  of  every 
State."  "  Congress  had  complete  sovereignty."  "  Its  constitu- 
tional powers  are  not  controllable  by  any  State. "f 

In  prosecution  of  the  great  purpose  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence — the  establishment  of  a  nation  of  free  men — Con- 
gress proceeded  in  the  exertion  of  many  of  the  sovereign  powers 
necessary  to  that  purpose — powers  of  action  and  of  prohibition. 
They  had  exerted  and  continued  to  exert  the  powers  of  levying^ 
war  on  land  and  on  sea,  pledging  the  whole  property  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  twelve  Colonies  for  the  redemption  of  their 
joint  debt;  and  they  had  prohibited  exportations  to  the  British 
dominions,  with  certain  exceptions;  the  receipt  and  negotiation 
of  British  government  bills  by,  or  supplies  of  money  to,  British 
officers;  and  of  necessaries  to  the  British  army  and  navy  in 
Massachusetts,  or  transports  in  their  service,J  acting  directly 
upon  the  people  of  the  United  States  for  many  purposes,  and 
through  the  agency  of  the  States  when  organized,  for  other 
purposes. 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  a  people  keenly  jealous  of  their 
liberties  would  long  be  content  with  the  large  discretionary 
powers  Congress  was  exercising;  and,  in  midsummer  of  seven- 
teen hundred  and  seventy-five,  Benjamin  Franklin  submitted  to 
Congress  a  sketch  of  "  Articles  of  Confederation,"  in  the  name 
of  "  The  United  Colonies  of  North  America."  These  articles 
declared  their  purpose  to  be  "  common  defence — the  securities 
of  their  liberties  and  properties — the  safety  of  their  persons  and 
families — and  their  mutual  and  general  welfare."  They  were  to 
"  be  proposed  to  the  several  provincial  Conventions  or  Assem- 
blies," for  their  approval  and  ratification ;  and  "  the  Union 
thereby  established,"  was  .to  continue  firm  until  a  reconciliation 
with  Great  Britain  ;  but,  "  on  failure  thereof,"  the  Confederation 
was  "to  be  perpetual."  Conferring  upon  Congress  the  power 
of  making  "such  General  Ordinances  as  though  necessary  to  the 
general  welfare,  particular  assemblies  cannot  be  competent  tj" 
— they  declared,  "  that  each  Colony  shall  enjoy  and  retain  as 

»  Hamilton's  Works,  ii.  358.  f  Hist.  Rep.  iii.  16. 

X  Journal  of  Congress,  June  2,  1775. 


FRAMES    OF    GOVERNMENTS.  XU' 

much  as  it  may  think  fit  of  its  own  present  laws,  cu8toni.s,  rights, 
privileges,  and  peculiar  jurisdictioris  within  its  own  limits;  ana 
may  amend  its  own  Constitution,  as  shall  seem  best  to  its  own 
assembly  or  convention."*  Viewed  as  a  merely  temporary  pro- 
ject, this  scheme  was  in  accordance  with  the  existing  condition 
of  affairs ;  but  regarded  in  its  future,  as  a  plan  "  to  be  perpetual," 
it  wanted  the"  comprehensiveness  and  reach  which  that  future 
must  demand.     It  was  not  acted  upon. 

The  next  step  in  our  political  organization  was,  a  recommend- 
ation to  the  Colonies  to  form  themselves  into  Grovernments — 
first  temporarily,  then  permanently.  The  terms  of  this  recom- 
mendation are  very  significant — to  "  adopt  such  Government 
as  shall  best  conduce  to  the  happiness  and  safety  of  their  con- 
stituents, in  particular,  and  to  America  in  general." 

The  People  of  the  several  Colonies,  now  emerged  from  their 
colonial  condition,  proceeded  under  this  recommendation,  though 
at  long  intervals,  to  the  formation  of  State  Constitutions.  In 
all  these  constitutions  are  seen  a  recognition  of  the  then  existing 
Congress  by  provisions  for  its  continuance,  and  a  reservation,  as 
States,  of  the  powers  and  rights  incident  and  necessary  to  the 
guardianship  of  their  particular  interests. 

A  month  later,f  a  Declaration  of  Independence  having  been 
ordered  to  be  prepared,  a  draft  of  the  form  of  a  confederation 
octween  the  Colonies  was  the  next  day  directed  to  be  made 
Articles  of  confederation  were  soon  after  proposed,  in  the  name 
of  "  The  United  States  of  America,"  the  second  of  which  declared, 
that  the  Colonies  "  unite  themselves  so  as  never  to  be  divided 
by  any  act  whatever,"  and  enter  into  a  firm  league  of  friendship 
with  each  other  for  "'their  common  defence,  the  security  of  their 
liberties  and  their  mutual  and  general  welfare."!  This  draft 
having  undergone  frequent  modifications — after  discussions 
chiefly  affecting  the  representative  power  of  each  State — the 
measure  of  its  contributions,  and  their  separate  or  joint  interest 
in  the  public  lands,  the  "Articles  of  Confederation"  became 
operative,  by  the  final  ratification  of  them  on  the  first  of  March, 
1781,  by  the  State  of  Maryland. 

A  comparison  of  the  Articles  ratified  with  those  wh^'ch  pre- 
ceded them,  evince  a  growing  jealousy  as  to  the  deposit,  extent, 
and  exercise  of  the  general  powers,  necessary  to  "  the  mutual 
*nd  general  welfare."     While  in  the  earlier  draft  the  reserva- 

*  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  i.  283,  July  21,  1775. 

+  June  10,  1776.  J  Secret  Journal,  July  12,  1776. 


XIV  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

tion  wa8  simply  "of  the  sole  and  exclusive  regulation  and 
government  of"  the  "  internal  police  in  all  matters  which  shall 
not  interfere  with  the  Articles  of  the  Confederation" — as  a 
provision  secondary  to  the  general  league — in  the  later  and  in 
the  ratified  Articles,  the  primary  declaration  is,  that  "  each  State 
retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom,  and  independence,  and  every 
power,  jurisdiction,  and  right  which  is  not  by  thi&  confederation 
expressly  delegated  to  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled." 
Even,  for  a  "  Council  of  State"  to  be  appointed  by  Congress, 
and  to  act  during  its  sitting  and  in  its  recess — "  with  power  to 
direct  military  operations  by  sea  or  land" — was  substituted  a 
"  Committee  of  Congress"  to  sit  only  during  its  recess ;  and  it 
was  provided,  that  no  person  be  allowed  to  serve  in  the  office  of 
President  "  of  Congress  more  than  one  year  in  any  term  of 
three  years." 

Instead  of  a  National  Government  of  undefined  powers,  u 
had  dwindled  down  to  a  league  of  States  with  limitations  incon- 
sistent with  the  great  purposes  and  ends  of  a  general  govern- 
ment J  and  more  in  the  spirit  of  a  penal  statute.  It  had  become 
a  mere  league  of  States,  disproportionate  in  territorial  dimen- 
sions, in  wealth,  in  population — each  having  an  equal  vote  in 
their  general  Council,  and  of  these  equal  votes,  nine  requisite  to 
the  exercise  of  many  of  the  most  important  powers  conferred — 
several  of  those  powers  of  questionable  authority  because  of 
the  intercipient  reservations  of  powers  in  the  States,  and  with- 
out any  common  exponent;  and  it  fixed  a  measure  of  contribu- 
tion unequal,  impracticable,  and  therefore  never  carried  into 
effect — with  a  process  of  requisitions,  not  of  impositions — 
without  legislative  departments,  without  a  Judiciary,  without  ai- 
Executive — without  any  direct  relation  to,  or  civil  power  over 
the  People  as  individuals,  whose  general  welfare  was  committed 
to  it,  and  with  a  debated  question  as  to  whom  allegiance  was 
due.  "  The  Union,"  in  the  words  of  Hamilton,  originally  had 
"  complete  sovereignty."  "  The  Confederation  was  an  abridge- 
ment of  this  original  sovereignty."*  Although  not  binding 
upon  any  of  the  States  until  its  ratification  by  the  whole,  the 
influence  on  the  public  mind  of  this  very  imperfect  contrivance 
was  prominent  in  the  proceedings  of  Congress  and  of  the  States 
— delaying,  and  imperilling,  during  several  years  of  the  revolu- 
tionary contest,  the  independence  and  sovereignty  it  professed 
to  assure. 

*  Hamilton's  Works,  i.  858. 


IMBECILE    CONDITION   OF   THE    COUNTRY.  XV 

The  Congress  issued  pledges  for  money  it  h^d  no  means  to 
\)&y,  called  for  soldiers  it  had  no  means  to  support,  entered  into 
treaties  it  could  not  fulfil;  while  States  endangered  and  did 
injustice  to  their  associate  States,  by  disproportionate,  inade- 
quate, contributions  of  men  and  money  ;*  by  the  assumption  of 
powers  inconsistent  with  a  community  of  rights ;  and  by  the 
refusal  of  powers  essential  to  the  preservation  of  those  rights.f 

In  Virginia  it  was  proposed  to  abolish  all  private  commerce 
and  to  establish  commercial  companies  including  a  State,  or 
parts  of  a  State  in  districts.  Their  commercial  operations  were 
to  be  represented  by  stock ;  the  price  of  every  article  to  be  fixed 
by  the  companies ;  and  the  power  to  be  conferred  upon  them 
•■'  of  taking  private  goods  into  their  custody ;" — called  a  plan 
•'  for  appreciating  the  currency  and  reducing  the  price  of  neces- 
saries," An  embargo  of  provisions  followed.  And  the  day  after 
Jefferson's  election  as  Governor — the  second  of  June,  1779 — 
fearful  of  the  breaking  up  of  the  Confederacy,  and  to  secure  u 
strong  foreign  protector;  a  resolution  unanimously  passed  her 
legislature,  by  which,  "  the  treaties  of  Alliance  and  Commerce 
between  France  and  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  were 
ratified,  confirmed,  and  declared  binding;  so  far  as  in  the  power 
of  this  Commonwealth."  A  special  favor  from  France  wa» 
granted  to  her. 

The  sufferings  in  Virginia  were  a  type  of  the  general  condi- 
tion of  this  country.  "  The  enemy,"  Washington  wrote  in 
November  seventy-nine,  "are  in  great  hopes  of  terminating  the 
war  in  their  favor  in  another  campaign,  as  they  expect  confidently 
the  entire  ruin  of  our  money  and  a  failure  of  provisions  for  the 
supply  .of  our  army."     In  the  following  month,  he  again  wrote 

•  Th«  ineflSciency  of  Virginia,  the  then  most  populous  State  of  the  Confede- 
racy, is  thus  exposed  by.its  Governor  Patrick  Henry: — "Public  spirit  seems 
to  have  taken  its  flight  from  Virginia.  It  is  too  much  the  case;  for  the  quota 
of  OUT  troops  is  not  half  made  up,  and  no  chance  seems  to  remain  for  com- 
pleting it.  Great  bounties  are  offered.  But  I  fear  the  only  effect  will  be  to 
expose  our  State  to  contempt,  for,  I  believe  no  soldiers  will  enlist,  especially 
in  the  Infantry.  Can  you  credit  it?  No  effort  was  made  for  supporting  or 
restoring  public  credit.  I  pressed  it  warmly  on  some,  but  in  vain.  This  is 
the  reason  you  get  no  soldiers.  Let  not  Congress  rely  on  Virginia  for  soldiers. 
I  tell  you  my  opinion — they  will  not  be  got  here,  until  a  different  spirit  pre- 
vails."—ifmoir  of  R.  H.  Lee,  i.  195.  1778. 
Washington  soon  after  wrote,   "At  present  they  are  but  a  handful,  oom- 

ared  to  the  quota  they  should  furnish,  and  unless  something  is  done,  thlB 

andful  will  dwindle  to  nothing." — Hist.  Repub.  i.  559. 


<V1  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

I  find  our  prospects  are  infinitely  worse  than  they  have  been, 
jtt  any  period  of  the  war,  and  unless  some  expedient  can  be 
nstantly  adopted,  a  dissolution  of  the  army  for  the  want  of 
subsistence  is  unavoidable.  *  *  *  We  have  never  experienced 
a  like  extremity  at  any  period  of  the  war."  Well  might  be 
feared  "  the  entire  ruin  of  the  money."  The  bills  in  circulation 
amounted  to  the  enormous  sum  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  millions 
of  dollars — and  the  total  product  of  the  taxes  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  was  only  three  millions. 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  this  chaotic  confusion,  this  vast  dis- 
tress, so  discouraging  to  the  people,  and  so  encouraging  to  the 
enemy — five  years  of  indecisive  war  having  nearly  elapsed — 
that  Hamilton  (Washington's  "  principal  and  most  confidential 
aid,")  familiar  with  all  his  embarrassments  and  intimate  with  all 
the  wants  of  the  army  and  of  the  country,  at  the  age  of  twenty- 
two,  soon  after  the  army  entered  winter  quarters  at  Morristown, 
is  seen  to  "have  projected  an  enlarged  plan  for  the  restoration  of 
the  public  credit,  proposing  an  indispensable  change  in  the 
whole  administration  of  the  public  affairs.  After  an  argued 
exposition  of  this  plan,  ho  wrote,  "  Congress  have  too  long 
neglected  to  organize  a  good  scheme  of  administration  and  to 
throw  public  business  into  proper  Executive  Departments. 
For  commerce,  I  prefer  a  Board,  but  for  most  other  things 
single  men.  We  want  a  Minister  of  War,  a  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  a  Minister  of  Finance,  and  a  Minister  of  Marine.  There 
is  always  more  decisioTi,  more  dispatch,  more  secrecy,  more 
responsibility,  where  single  men,  than  where  bodies  are  con- 
cerned. By  a  plan  of  this  kind  we  should  blend  the  advan- 
tages of  a  Monarchy  and  a  Eepublic  in  a  happy  and  beneficial 
Union."* 

The  adoption  of  this  plan  was  not  immediate,  but  the  almost 
desperate  situation  of  affairsf  prompted  acfd  induced  Congress, 
though  reluctantly,  to  vest  certain  executive  powers  in  a  com 
mittee  of  its  own  body.  The  immediate  motive  to  this  measure 
was  an  occurrence  which  was  of  great  immediate  benefit,  but 
was  afterwards  productive  of  most  deleterious   consequenoAo 

*  History  of  Republic,  i.  577.    1779. 

f  Ibid.  ii.  11,  February  25,  1780.  "  Re-inforcements  are  expected — General 
iiagan  is  within  a  few  miles.  The  Virginia  troops  are  somewhere !  Assistance 
from  that  sister  State  has  been  expected  these  eighteen  months."  Colonel  Laurens 
to  General  Lincoln — who,  for  want  of  this  aid,  was  compelled  to  surrender 
Charleston. 


FOREIGN    AID — FOREIGN    INFLUENCE.  XVU 

The  American  people,  instead  of  the  glory  of  achieving  theii 
final  victorj'  by  their  own  unassisted  valor,  were  obliged  to  ask 
foreign  aid.  Foreign  arms  now  came ;  and  subsequently  abusing 
its  gratitude,  foreign  influence,  for  a  time,  poisoned  the  councils 
of  this  yet  infant  nation.  "  It  appears  to  me,"  Hamilton  wrote 
by  the  order  and  in  the  name  of  "Washington,  "  of  the  greatest 
importance,  and  even  of  absolute  necessity  that  a  small  com- 
mittee should  be  immediately  appointed  to  reside  near  Head 
Quarters,  vested  with  all  the  powers  Congress  have,  so  far  as 
respects  the  purpose  of  a  full  co-operation  with  the  French  fleet 
and  army  on  the  continent.  Their  authority  should  be  plenipo- 
tentiary J  to  draw  out  men  and  supplies  of  every  kind  and  to 
give  their  sanction  to  any  operations  which  the  commander  in 
chief  may  not  think  himself  at  liberty  to  undertake  without  it, 
as  well  beyond  as  within  the  limits  of  these  States.  This  com- 
mittee can  act  with  dispatch  and  energy.  The  conjuncture  is 
one  of  the  most  critical  and  important  we  have  seen.  All  our 
prudence  and  exertions  are  required  to  give  it  a  favorable  issue. 
Hesitancy  and  delay  would,  in  all  probability,  ruin  our  affairs."* 
A  committee  was  appointed,  but  its  powers  were  far  short  of 
those  suggested  in  this  letter.  Critical  as  was  the  state  of  the 
public  affairs,  no  adequate  remedy  had  been  provided.  The 
Emissions  of  credit  bills  were  almost  valueless.  This  accumula- 
tion of  promisesf  fell  to  the  ground;  and  Congress  at  last 
adopted  the  measures  proposed  by  Hamilton  the  preceding  year, 
— by  a  pledge  to  reimburse  the  subscribers  to  a  Bank,  and  by 
the  sending  a  commissioner  to  Europe  to  negotiate  a  Loan. 
The  continental  paper  money  had  "been  a  substitute  for  Eevenue. 
This  failing,  the  fate  of  the  Eevolution  was  cast  on  the  voluntary 
action  of  twelve  States  ungoverned  by  a  common  government, 
untied  by  any  other  tie  than  their  common  necessities.  This 
was  the  natural  and  necessary  consequence  of  the  impotence 
which  had  prevailed.  The  repeated  recommendations  of  Con- 
gress without  power  to  enforce  them,  were  as  repeated  procla- 
mations of  weakness.  The  influence  of  a  lavish  treasury,  ceasing 
with  the  cessation  of  the  emissions  of  bills  of  credit,  Congress 
was  almost  without  weight ;  and  the  patriotism  of  many  was 
seen  to  sink  in  an  equal  ratio  with  the  scale  of  the  paper  depre- 
ciation. The  actual  power  being  in  the  States,  this  portion  of 
society  turred  towards  them,  and  gave  to  their  real  an  artificial, 

*  History  of  Republic,  ii.  17,  April  28,  1780.  -f  Ibid.  77. 

2 


X.V111  HISTOKICAL    NOTICE. 

baneful  preponderance — "  Congress,"  to  use  the  words  of  a 
member,*  "  gradually  surrendering  or  throwing  iipon  the  several 
States  the  exercise  of  powers  they  should  have  retained,  and  to 
their  utmost  have  exercised  themselves,  until  at  length  they 
have  scarce  a  power  left,  but  such  as  concerns  foreign  transac- 
tions." The  repeated  recommendations  to  the  States  were  not 
the  only  public  admissions  of  weakness.  All  the  measures  to 
impart  a  temporary  force  to  the  action  of  Congress  were  equally 
acknowledgments  of  its  want  of  power.  The  dictatorial  au- 
thority conferred  upon  "Washington  was  the  most  objectionable 
form  national  necessities  could  assume.  Thus,  every  motive  of 
experience,  of  justice,  of  honor,  of  reputation,  of  interest,  of 
safety — demanded  a  Government  of  the  People  of  the  United 
States,  a  general  will  and  a  general  united  power  to  direct, 
express  and  enforce  that  will — in  Hamilton's  words,  "  a  solid 
COERCIVE  Union." 

The  great  industrial  interests  of  New  England  early  felt  and 
early  suggested  a  concert  of  action ;  and  by  successive  conven- 
tions prepared  the  way  for  this  great  measure  of  political  salva- 
tion. A  Convention  held  at  Providence  in  'seventy-six  was 
followed  by  another  at  Springfield  of  the  four  New  England 
States  and  of  New  York,  in  'seventy-seven.  A  third  convention 
met  at  New  Haven  in  'seventy-eight,  where  New  Jersey  and 
Pennsylvania  are  stated  also  to  have  been  present;  and  a  fourth 
at  Hartford  in  'seventy-nine.  The  earlier  conventions  had  in 
view  limited  but  important,  though,  in  part,  impracticable, 
objects.  The  last  convention  shewed  a  great  advance  in  public 
opinion.  Massachusetts,  at  that  time,  the  first  of  the  States  in 
active  power  and  large  intelligence,  instructed  her  delegates, 
not  only  to  consult  as  to  measures  to  prevent  a  further  depre- 
ciation of  the  money  medium,  but  "  to  agree  on  a  mode  of  inter- 
nal trade  and  commerce  in  consistency  with  the  general  welfare;" 
and  invited  a  larger  meeting  of  Commissioners.  This  fifth  Con- 
vention was  held  at  Philadelphia  on  the  twenty-ninth  of  January , 
'eighty,  at  which  were  present  the  New  England  States,  New 
Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  Maryland.  New  York  was 
unavoidably  absent,  her  legislature  not  having  met  to  appoint 
commissioners ;  and  Virginia  was  not  represented.  The  objec- 
tion to  her  conferring  on  Congress  a  power  of  taxation — that 
such  taxes  would  fall  upon  the  owners  of  lands  was  soon  after 

*  John  Matthews,  of  S/»n»h  Carolina. 


INCREASED    POWERS    TO    CONGRESS    RECOMMENDIilJ.  XIX 

urged  Eesolved  to  ascertain  definitely  her  views,  the  President 
of  this  convention  was  directed  to  request  the  Governor  of  that 
State,  "  to  give  the  earliest  notice  of  her  determination'  as  to 
meeting  the  other  States  in  Convention.  Waiting  her  concur- 
rence, it  adjourned  first  until  February,  and  then  to  April;  when 
a  call  was  made  for  a  meeting  in  August.  At  this  Sixth  con 
vention  the  only  States  represented  were  Massachusetts,  Con- 
necticut and  New  Hampshire. 

Wise  resolutions  as  to  finance  were  there  passed;  and  the 
great,  much  to  be  desired  result,  an  invigoration  of  the  power 
of  the  general  Government,  was  approached.  "  They  conceived 
it,"  they  declared,  "  to  be  essential  to  our  final  safety,  that  the 
Union  of  these  States  be  fixed  in  a  more  solid  and  permanent 
manner, — that  the  power  of  Congress  be  more  clearly  ascer- 
tained and  defined, — and  that  the  important  national  concerns 
of  the  United  States  be  under  the  superintendency  and  direction 
of  one  Supreme  head — that  the  proper  estimates  of  our  public 
wants  be  seasonably  made  ;  and  the  necessary  resources  drawn 
forth  and  expended."  With  this  purpose,  the  States  were 
recommended  "  to  invest  their  Delegates  in  Congress  with 
powers  competent  for  the  Government  and  direction  of  all  those 
common  and  national  affairs,  whioh  do  not,  nor  can  come  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  particular  States;"  urging  "  a  permanent 
system — establishing  proper  Boards,  oflScers,  and  regulations 
for  the  direction  of  the  several  Departments  necessary  to  be 
executed  under  Congress." — To  carry  this  proposal  into  effect, 
a  new  confederation  was  to  be  acceded  to  by  the  States. 

Insufficient  as  these  suggestions  were,  Hamilton  grasped  at 
them  as  a  promise  of  greater  good.  The  powers  proposed  to 
be  conferred  would  indeed  be  only  revocable  grants,  at  the 
mercy  of  any  State;  and  as  the  public  mind  then  was,  the  pro- 
bability that  the  States  would  concur  in  conferring  them  was 
small.  But  these  proceedings  proved,  that  the  necessity  of  a 
change  was  widely  felt ;  and  he  resolved  to  endeavor  by  his 
counsels  to  rescue  the  great  cause  of  American  liberty  from  its 
present,  its  menacing,  and  menaced  dangers. 

An  inaccurate  statement  of  the  proceedings  of  this  Convention 
reached  him  by  the  twenty  eighth  of  August ;  and  on  the  third  of 
September,  seventeen  hundred  and  eighty,  in  conformity  with  a 
previous  promise,  he  communicated  to  a  member  of  Congress,  the 
grave  thoughts  with  which  his  mind  long  had  laboured.  The 
enquiry  during  his  non-age,  written  in  his  company  pay-book, 


TX  HISTORICAL   NOIICE. 

• 

"Would  it  not  be  advisable  to  let  all  taxes,  even  those  imposed 
by  the  States,  be  collected  by  persons  of  Congressional  appoint- 
ment" ?*  indicates  the  early  direction  of  his  views;  and  he  subse- 
quently wrote,  "  it  has  ever  been  my  opinion  that  Congress  ought 
to  have  complete  sovereignty  in  all  but  the  mere  municipal  law  of 
each  State."  This  opinion  is  expatiated  upon  in  this  communica- 
tion, very  important  in  itself  and  most  important  in  all  its  conse- 
quences,! generally  admitted  to  be  the  first  proposal  made  in 
this  country  of  a  Convention  to  frame  a  National  Government. 

"  The  fundamental  defect,"  Hamilton  observed.  "  is  a  want  of 
power  in  Congress.  It  is  hardly  worth  while  to  show  in  what 
this  consists  as  it  seems  to  be  universally  acknowledged ;  or  to 
point  out,  how  it  has  happened,  as  the  only  question  is,  how  to 
remedy  it.  It  may  however  be  said,  that  it  has  originated  from 
three  causes — an  excess  of  the  spirit  of  liberty,  which  has  made 
the  particular  States  show  a  jealousy  of  all  power  not  in  their 
own  hands ;  and  this  jealousy  has  led  them  to  exercise  a  right 
of  judging  in  the  last  resort,  of  the  measures  recommended  by 
Congress,  and  of  acting  according  to  their  own  opinions  of  their 
propriety  or  necessity, — a  diffidence  in  Congress  of  their  own 
powers,  by  which  they  have  been  timid  and  indecisive  in  their 
resolutions,  constantly  making  concessions  to  the  States,  till 
they  have  scarcely  left  themselves  the  shadow  of  power : — a 
want  of  sufficient  means  at  their  disposal  to  answer  the  public 
exigencies,  and  of  vigor  to  draw  forth  those  means,  which  have 
occasioned  them  to  depend  on  the  States  individually  to  fulfil 
their  engagements  with  the  army,  the  consequence  of  which 
has  been  to  ruin  their  influence  and  credit  with  the  army,  to 
establish  its  dependance  on  each  State  separately,  rather  than 
on  them — that  is  than  on  the  whole  collectively.  It  may  be 
pleaded  that  Congress  had  never  any  definitive  powers  granted 
them ;  and  of  course  could  exercise  none — could  do  nothing  more 
than  recommend.  The  manner  in  which  Congress  was  appointed 
would  warrant,  and  the  public  good  required,  that  they  should 
have  considered  themselves ;  as  vested  with  full  power  to  pre- 
serve the  Republic  from  harm. 

"  They  have  done  many  of  the  highest  acts  of  sovereignty, 
which  were  always  cheerfully  submitted  to — the  declaration  of 
independence, — the  declaration  of  war, — the  levying  an  army. — 
creating   a   navy, —  emitting  money, —  making    alliances   witn 

*  Hist.  Repub.  i.  pp.  4,  7. 

f  Ibid.  ii.  86.     Humilton  to  James  Duane,  Sept.  8,  ITbC- 


INEFFICIENCY    OF    THE    CONFEDERATION.  XXl 

Foreign  powers — appointing  a  Dictator,  etc.  All  tliese  were 
implications  of  a  complete  sovereignty,  were  never  disputed 
and  ought  to  have  been  a  standard  for  the  conduct  of  adminis- 
tration. Undefined  powers  are  discretionary  powers,  limited 
only  by  the  object  for  which  they  were  given ; — in  the  present 
case,  the  independence  and  freedom  of  America.  The  Confede- 
ration made  no  difference;  for  as  it  has  not  been  generally 
adopted,  it  had  no  operation. 

*'  But,  from  what  I  recollect  of  it.  Congress  have  even  de- 
scended from  the  authority  which  the  spirit  of  that  act  gives 
them,  while  the  particular  States  have  no  farther  attended  to  it, 
than  as  it  suited  their  pretensions  and  convenience.  It  would 
take  too  much  time  to  enter  into  particular  instances,  each  of 
which  separately  might  appear  inconsiderable,  but  united  are 
of  serious  import.     I  only  mean  to  remark,  not  to  censure. 

"But,  the  Confederation  itself  is  defective  and  requires  to  be 
altered.  It  is  neither  fit  for  war,  nor  peace.  The  idea  of  an 
uncontrollable  sovereignty  in  each  State,  over  its  internal 
police,  will  defeat  the  other  powers  given  to  Congress,  and 
make  our  Union  feeble  and  precarious.  There  are  instances 
without  number,  where  acts  necessary  for  the  general  good, 
and  which  rise  out  of  the  powers  given  to  Congress  must 
interfere  with  the  internal  police  of  the  States;  and  there 
are  as  many  instances  in  which  the  particular  States  by  ar- 
rangements of  internal  police  can  effectually,  though  indirectly, 
counteract  the  arrangements  of  Congress.  You  have  already 
had  examples  of  this,  for  which  I  refer  you  to  your  own 
memory. 

"  The  Confederation,"  he  proceeds,  "  gives  the  States  indivi- 
dually too  much  influence  in  the  affairs  of  the  army.  They 
should  have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  The  entire  formation  and 
disposal  of  our  military  forces  ought  to  belong  to  Congress.  It 
is  an  essential  cement  of  the  Union ;  and  it  ought  to  be  the 
policy  of  Congress  to  destroy  all  ideas  of  State  attachments  in 
the  army  and  make  it  look  up  to  them.  The  Confederation  too, 
gives  the  powers  of  the  purse  too  entirely  to  the  State  legisla- 
tures. It  should  provide  perpetual  funds  in  the  disposal  of  Coc 
gress  by  a  land-tax,  poll  tax,  or  the  like.  All  Imposts  upon 
commerce  ought  to  be  laid  by  Congress  and  appropriated  to 
their  own  use.  For  without  certain  revenues,  a  Government 
can  have  no  power.  That  power  which  holds  the  purse  strings 
absolutely  must  rule.     This  seems  to  be  a  medium  which  with- 


XXll  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

out  making  Congress  altogether  independent  will  tend  to  givo 
reality  to  its  authority.  Another  defect  in  ovtr  system  is  want 
of  method  and  energy  in  the  administration.  This  has  partly 
resulted  from  the  other  defect,  but,  in  a  great  degree,  from 
prejudice  and  the  want  of  a  proper  Executive.  Congress 
have  kept  the  power  too  much  in  their  own  hands,  and  have 
meddled  too  much  with  details  of  every  sort.  Congress  is  pro- 
perly a  deliberative  corps ;  and  it  forgets  itself  when  it  attempts 
to  play  the  Executive."  Passing  on  from  particular  errors,  ho 
advanced  to  a  fuller  statement.  "  The  Confederation,  in  my 
opinion,  should  give  Congress  complete  sovereignty ;  except  as 
to  that  part  of  internal  police  which  relates  to  the  rights  of  pro- 
perty and  life  among  individuals,  and  to  raising  money  by 
internal  taxes.  It  is  necessary,  that  every  thing  belonging  to 
this  should  be  regulated  by  the  State  legislatures.  Congres.«i 
should  have  complete  sovereignty  in  all  that  relates  to  war. 
peace,  trade,  and  finance,  and  to  the  management  of  foreign 
affairs;  the  right  of  declaring  war,  of  raising  armies,  officer- 
ing, paying  them,  directing  their  motions  in  every  respect ;  of 
equipping  fleets,  and  doing  the  same  with  them ;  of  building 
fortifications,  arsenals,  magazines  &c.  &c. ;  of  making  peace  on 
such  conditions  as  they  think  proper;  of  regulating  Trade, 
determining  with  what  countries  it  shall  be  carried  on,  grantiny 
indulgences,  laying  prohibitions  on  all  the  articles  of  export  or 
import:  imposing  duties,  granting  bounties,  and  premiums  for 
raising,  exporting  or  importing ;  and  applying  to  their  own  use 
the  product  of  these  duties,  only  giving  credit  to  the  State  on 
whom  they  are  raised  in  the  general  account  of  revenues  and 
expense;  instituting  Admiralty  Courts,  &c. ;  of  coining  money, 
establishing  Banks,  on  such  terms  and  with  such  privileges  as 
they  think  proper;  appropriating  funds,  and  doing  whatever 
else  relates  to  the  operations  of  finance,  transacting  every 
thing  with  foreign  nations ;  making  alliances,  offensive  and 
defensive,  treaties  of  commerce  &c.  &c." 

"  The  Confederation  should  provide  certain  perpetual  revenuew, 
productive  and  easy  of  collection  ;  a  land  tax — poll  tax — or  the 
like,  which,  together  with  the  duties  on  trade,  and  the  unlocated 
lands,  would  give  Congress  a  substantial  existence  ;  and  a  stable 
foundation  for  their  schemes  of  finance."  The  next  step  recom- 
mended by  him,  was,  a  repetition  of  that  of  the  previous  year— 
the  appointment  of  Five  "  great  officers  of  State."  Another  step 
was,  the  recruiting  of  the  Army  for  the  war,  or  at  least  lor  three 


HAMILTON    URGES    A    CONVENTION.  XXIU 

years — and  eventually  a  draft — and  the  placing  the  officers  on 
half  pay.  "  The  providing  supplies,"  he  added,  "  is  the  pivot  of 
every  thing  else;"  and  four  ways  to  be  united  are  mentioned — 
"  a  foreign  loan — heavy  pecuniary  taxes — a  tax  in  kind — and  a 
Bank  founded  on  public  and  private  credit." 

Having  stated  the  want  in  Congress  of  powers,  competent  to 
the  public  exigencies,  he  observed  as  to  the  remedy;  "This 
may  happen  in  two  ways :  one  by  resuming  and  exercising  the 
discretionary  powers,  I  suppose  to  have  been  originally  vested 
in  them  for  the  safety  of  the  States,  and  resting  their  conduct 
on  the  candor  of  their  countrymen  and  the  necessity  of  the  con- 
juncture ; — the  other  by  calling  immediately  a  Convention  of 
all  the  States  with  full  authority  to  conclude  finally  upon  a 
general  confederation  ;  stating  to  them  beforehand  explicitly 
the  evils  arising  from  a  want  of  power  in  Congress  and  the  im- 
possibility of  supporting  the  contest  on  its  present  footing ;  that 
tbe  Delegates  may  come  possessed  of  proper  sentiments,  as  well 
as  proper  authority  to  give  efficacy  to  the  meeting."  ..."  The 
reasons  for  which  I  require  them  to  be  vested  with  plenipoten- 
tiary authority  are,  that  the  business  may  suffer  no  delay  in  the 
execution,  and  may  in  reality  come  into  effect.  A  Convention 
may  agree  upon  a  Confederation,  the  States  individually  never 
will.  We  must  have  one  at  all  events,  and  a  vigorous  one ;  if 
we  mean  to  succeed  in  the  contest  and  be  happy  hereafter.  1 
am  persuaded  a  solid  confederation,  a  permanent  army,  a  reason- 
able prospect  of  subsisting  it  would  give  us  treble  consideration 
ill  Europe  and  produce  a  peace  this  winter.  If  a  Convention  is 
called,  the  minds  of  all  the  States  and  the  people  ought  to  be 
prepared  to  receive  its  determinations  by  sensible  and  popular 
writings  which  should  conform  to  the  views  of  Congress.".  .  . 
"  The  measure  of  a  convention  would  revive  the  hopes  of  the 
People,  and  give  a  new  direction  to  their  passions,  which  may 
be  improved  in  carrying  points  of  substantial  utility." 

Six  days  after  the  date  of  this  remarkable  letter,  New  York, 
in  the  person  of  General  Schuyler,  who  was  in  intimate  com- 
munion with  Hamilton,  in  answer  to  a  message  from  its  Gov- 
ernor, avowed  its  strong  convictions.*  "  Our  embarrassments 
'n  the  prosecution  of  the  war,"  Governor  Clinton  then  declared, 
"  are  chiefly  to  be  attributed  to  a  defect  of  power  in  those  who 
ought  to  exercise  a  Supreme  jurisdiction;  for  while  Congress 

*  Hist.  Repub.  ii.  110,  111,  112. 


CUV  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

only  recommend,  and  the  different  States  deliberate  upon  the 
propriety  of  the  recommendation,  we  cannot  expect  a  union  of 
force  or  council."  "  We  perceive,"  Schuyler  answered  in  behalf 
of  the  Senate,  "  the  defects  in  the  present  system  and  the  neces- 
sity of  a  supreme  and  coercive  power  m  the  government  of  these 
States  ;  and  are  persuaded,  that  unless  Congress  ai'e  authorized 
to  direct  uncontrollably  the  operations  of  war,  and  enabled  to 
enforce  a  compliance  with  their  requisitions,  the  common  force 
can  never  be  properly  united." 

This  idea  of  enforcing  States  seemed  at  these  critical  times  to 
be  the  only  remedy  in  view ;  and  in  fact,  in  such  a  confedera- 
tion, force  was  the  only  possible  sanction  for  the  laws.  Beside 
contemplating  the  appointment  of  a  Dictator,  with  a  Vice  Dic- 
tator in  each  State,  to  be  recommended  by  a  seventh  convention 
about  to  meet  at  Hartford,  New  York,  by  a  unanimous  vote,  in- 
structed her  delegates  to  it,  "  to  propose  and  agree,  that  Con- 
gress, during  the  present  war  or  until  a  perpetual  Confederation 
shall  be  completed,  should  be  explicitly  authorized  and  em- 
powered to  exercise  every  power  which  they  may  deem  neces- 
sary for  the  effectual  prosecution  of  the  war ;"  and  that,  when- 
ever it  shall  appear  to  them  that  any  State  is  deficient  in  its 
contributions,  they  should  "  direct  the  Commander  in  Chief 
without  delay  to  march  the  army,  or  such  part  of  it  as  may  be 
requisite  in  such  State;  and,  by  military  force,  compel  it  to 
furnish  its  deficiency." 

Eash  as  this  proposal  was,*  it  was  only  a  proposal  to  carry 
into  effect  upon  a  more  extended  scale  a  recent  precedent  in 
Pennsylvania;  where,  a  few  months  before,  martial  law  was 
proclaimed,  to  enable  the  State  officers  to  procure  supplies  for 
the  army — ;  Nor  was  this  substitution  of  the  arbitrary  violence 
of  military  law  for  the  regular  and  mild  processes  of  civil  gov- 
ernment, only  approved  in  the  Middle  States.  In  the  following 
month,  a  leading  delegate  to  Congress  from  Virginia,  among  his 
first  essaysf  in  that  body,  proposed  as  an  expedient,  that  the 
requisite  supplies  for  the  army  "  be  impressed  with  vigor  and 
impartiality,  and  paid  for  in  certificates  not  transferable ;  and  to 
be  redeemable  at  some  period  subsequent  to  the  war,  at  specie 
value,  and  bearing  an  intermediate  interest."  The  advantages 
promised   were — an   anticipation   "of  the  future  revenues   of 

*  Hist.  Rep.  ii.  112,  1780. 

f  By  James  Madison — Madison  Papers,  i.  6t>.     October  1780. 


DANGEKS    OF    AX   UNBALANCED    GOVERNMENT.  XXV 

peace," — "  the  compelling  the  people  to  lend  the  public  their  com 
modities ;  and  that  it  would  be  a  'permanent  resource  by  whicn 
the  war  might  be  supported  as  long  as  the  earth  would  yield  its 
increase."  It  was  to  be  a  system  of  impress — of  forced  loans — 
which,  merely  as  an  occasional  resort,  Hamilton  had  recently 
condemned  as  "  violent,  unequal,  oppressive  and  odious." 

Such  are  the  dangers  of  an  unbalanced  government.  It 
threatened,  as  Hamilton  afterwards  deprecated,  that  "  anarchy 
would  shoot  into  monarchy."  Defeat  and  disaster  following, 
only  called  forth  the  powers  of  Hamilton's  mind,  in  repeated 
calls  by  him  for  increased  governmental  energies,  but  all  were 
to  be  the  energies  of  an  adequately  constituted  government. 
"  But,  above  all  things,"  he  wrote,  "  let  us  have  without  delay  a 
vigorous  government,  and  a  well  constituted  army  for  the  war."* 
"  We  must  have  an  administration  distinct  from  Congress,  and 
in  the  hands  of  single  men,  under  their  orders."f  "  I  am  sorry 
to  find,"  referring  to  his  recent  letter  of  September,  "we  do  not 
seem  to  agree  in  the  proper  remedies  to  our  disorders,  at  least 
in  the  practicability  of  applying  those  which  are  proper.  Con- 
vinced, as  I  am,  of  the  absolute  insufficiency  of  our  present 
system  to  our  safety,  if  I  do  not  despair  of  the  Eepublic,  it  is 
more  the  effect  of  constitution  than  of  judgment. "|  The  disasters 
which  pressed  at  this  time,  were  occurring  at  the  South,  whence 
General  Greene  wrote  to  him ;  "  There  is  nothing  but  murders 
and  devastations  in  every  quarter.  Government  here  is  much 
more  popular  than  to  the  northward;  and  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  national  character  or  national  sentiment.  The  inhabit- 
ants are  numerous,  but  they  would  be  rather  formidable  abroad 
than  at  home.  There  is  a  great  spirit  of  enterprize  among  the 
black  people,  and  those  that  come  out  as  volunteers  are  not  a  little 
formidable  to  the  enemy. "§  On  the  twelfth  of  December  pre- 
vious, a  circular  from  the  Convention,  which  had  met  at  Hart- 
ford, addressed  to  the  several  States,  was  presented  to  Congress. 
This  Convention  proposed,  "  that  the  several  States  should  make 
the  necessary  provisions  by  law,  to  enable  Congress  to  levy  and 
collect  such  taxes,  and  duties  within  them  respectively,  as  Con- 
gress should  call  for ;"  and  that  the  delegates  thereto  should  be 
authorized  to  pledge  the  faith  of  their  respective  States  that 
they  will  pass  the  requisite  laws  for  that  purpose.     The  States 

*  Hist.  Kep.  ii.  124 — Hamilton  to  Duane. 

t  Ibid.  134,  to  Isaac  Sears,  Oct.  12,  1780.  %  Ibid.  135,  to  Duane. 

2  Hist.  Rep.  ii.  164,  Greene  to  HamiHon,  January  10,  1781. 


JCXVI  HISTORICAL    NOTICE, 

were  called  upon  to  sink  their  full  quotas  of  the  continental 
bills ;  and  were  to  call  "  for  a  return  of  the  number  of  persons, 
blacks  as  well  as  whites,  in  each  State,"  as  the  basis  of  a  rule 
of  contribution.*  This  circular  boldly  urged  the  necessity  of 
these  grants.  "  Our  present  embarrassments,  we  imagine  to 
arise  in  a  great  measure  from  a  defect  in  the  present  government 
of  the  United  States.  All  government  supposes  the  power  of 
coercion.  This  power,  however,  in  the  general  government  of 
the  Continent  never  did  exist ;  or  which  has  produced  equally 
disagreeable  consequences,  never  has  been  exercised.  By  the 
expulsion  of  the  enemy  we  may  be  emancipated  from  the 
tyranny  of  Great  Britain.  "We  shall  however,  be  without  a 
solid  hope  of  peace  and  freedom,  unless  we  are  properly  ce- 
mented among  ourselves ;  and,  although  we  feel  the  calamities 
of  war,  yet  we  have  not  sufficient  inducements  to  wish  a  period 
to  them,  until  our  distresses,  if  other  means  cannot  effect  it, 
have,  as  it  were,  forced  us  into  a  Union."  In  pursuance  of  its 
suggestion,  a  Continental  Judicature  was  ere  long  appointed  by 
Congress,  "  for  the  trial  and  determination  of  all  causes,  in 
relation  to  offences  committed  against  the  United  States  in  the 
civil  departments  thereof."f 

These  departments  were  soon  after  constituted.  On  the  tenth 
of  January,  seventeen  hundred  and  eighty  one,  Hamilton's 
proposal  of  "  an  Administration  by  single  men"  was  brought 
before  Congress  ;J  and  subsequently  a  Secretary  of  Foreign 
affairs — a  Superintendent  of  Finance — a  Secretary  of  Marine — 
and  a  Secretary  of  War  were  appointed,  with  defined  powers. 
Hamilton  was  in  contemplation  as  head  of  the  finance,  but 
Robert  Morris  was  wisely  elected. § 

This  measure  gave  much  alarm,  yet  in  despite  of  factions 
jealousies  and  opposition.  Congress  recommended  to  the  States, 
"  as  indispensably  necessary  to  vest  Congress  with  a  power  to 
levy  for  the  use  of  the  United  States,"  a  duty  on  imports,  and 
on  condemned  prizes  and  prize  goods.  Wiser  and  more  honest 
counsels  had  now  begun  to  prevail ;  and  this  body,  being  without 
power  to  provide  any  means  for  their  redemption,  declared  that 
their  bills  of  credit,  should  not  be  a  tender,  in  any  other  manner, 
than  at  their  current  value  compared  with  gold  and  silver  ;||  and 

*  Hist.  Rep.  ii.  198.  t  Ibid.  ii.  199. 

X  Duane,  to  whom  Hamilton  had  proposed  this  measure,  was  of  this  Com 
inittee.     Ibid.  ii.  200. 
i  Ibid.  201  II  February  3,  1781. 


HAMILTON   AGAIN    URGES    A    CONVENTION.  XXVU 

recommended  the  States,  where  laws  making  paper  bills  a  teudei 
still  existed,  to  repeal  those  laws.*  But  the  dominant  jealousy 
yet  prevailed  j  and  a  proposal  to  vest  Congress  with  the  exclu- 
sive right  of  laying  duties  on  all  imports,  and  that  these  duties 
should  be  uniform,  was  rejected.  Hamilton,  nevertheless,  with 
unfailing  purpose,  soon  after  renewed  his  financial  suggestions, 
and  again  urged  a  Convention.  "  'Tis,  in  a  National  bank,  alone," 
he  wrote,  "  that  we  can  find  the  ingredients  to  constitute  a 
wholesome,  solid,  and  beneficial  paper  credit."  "  Congress 
must,"  he  added,  ''  demand  an  instant,  positive,  and  perpetual 
investiture  of  an  Impost  on  trade,  a  land  tax,  and  a  poll  tax  to 
be  collected  by  their  own  agents.  This  Act  to  become  a  part  of  tho 
Confederation.  It  has  ever  been  my  opinion,  that  Congress 
ought  to  have  complete  sovereignty  in  all,  but  the  mere  munici- 
pal law  of  each  State ;  and  I  wish  to  see  a  Convention  of  all 
THE  States,  with  full  power  to  alter  and  amend,  finally  and 
irrevocably,  the  present  futile  and  senseless  Confederation."f 
Ere  the  end  of  the  following  month,  a  bank  was  chartered  by 
Congress-! 

Hamilton's  plan  of  a  national  bank  was,  it  is  seen,  but  a  part 
of  that  larger  system  of  measures  on  which  his  mind  was  fixed. 
His  proposed  Convention  of  all  the  States  to  establish  a  Consti- 
tution of  Government,  met  with  little  countenance  in  Congress. 
The  Articles  of  Confederation  were  to  them  a  new,  and  an 
untried  experiment.  Not  alive  to  the  dangers  of  unbalanced 
power,  they  were  content  to  seek  relief  to  the  public  necessities, 
in  solicitations  to  the  States,  to  vest  them  with  new  powers. 
"With  this  view,  a  grand  committee,  as  it  was  called,  of  the 
States ;  after  frequent  deliberations,  presented  a  report  to  Con- 
gress late  in  July  1781,  nearly  three  months  subsequent  to 
Hamilton's  letter  to  Morris.  After  enumerating  the  instances 
in  which  the  Confederation  needed  execution,  it  recommended  a 
grant  by  the  States  of  certain  specified  powers; — a  grant  of 
powers,  from  their  very  nature,  certain  to  be  refused.  Of  these 
proposed  powers,  one  was  "  to  prescribe  rules  for  impressing 
property  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  during  the  present 
war;"  another  was,  "to  distrain  the  property  of  a  State  delinquent 
in  its  assigned  proportion  of  men  or  money;"  with  which  wore 

*  A  short  time  before,  Virginia  enacted  a  law  rendering  her  paper  a  legtu 
tenatr.     Eamund  Pendleton  to  Madison,  Dec.  4,  1780. 
•    1  Hist.  Rep.  ii.  224.     Hamilton  to  Robert  Morris,  April  80,  1781. 

t  Ibid.  227,  May  26,  1781. 


XXVm  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

Others  of  obvious  utility — to  appoint  collectors  of,  and  direct  the 
mode  of  accounting  for  taxes  imposed,  to  admit  into  the  Union 
any  part  or  more  of  the  dismembered  States,  to  stipulate  in 
treaties  with  foreign  nations  for  the  establishment  of  consular 
powers  without  reference  to  the  States  individually ;  to  vary  the 
rules  of  suffrage  in  Congress ;  adding  the  paralysing  limitation 
"  to  require  a  concurrence  of  two  thirds  of  the  States"  in  the 
exercise  of  the  most  urgent  powers — those,  "  of  emitting  bills  of 
credit,  or  of  borrowing  money;  the  regulating  the  value  of 
coin;  determining  the  total  number  of  land  and  sea  forces,  and 
allotting  to  each  State  its  quota  of  men  or  money;  fixing  the 
number  and  force  of  vessels  of  war,  and  appointing  a  commander 
in  chief  of  the  army  and  navy." 

The  proposition  to  the  States  to  impart  to  Congress  the  power 
of  distraint  upon  them  in  case  of  delinquency — and  the  proposed 
limitations  on  several  general  and  necessary  powers,  are  among 
the  most  remarkable  incidents  in  the  political  history  of  this 
country;  yet  New  York  had  urged  the  grant  of  this  power  of 
distraint,  and  it  had  been  vindicated  by  a  delegate  from  Vir- 
ginia, on  the  ground,  that,  "  as  the  confederation  now  stands,  and 
according  to  the  nature  even  of  alliances  much  less  intimate, 
there  is  an  implied  right  of  coercion  against  the  delinquent  party, 
and  the  exercise  of  it  by  Congress,"  "  whenever  a  palpable  ne- 
cessity occurs,  will  probably  be  acquiesced  in."* 

*  Madison  to  Jefferson,  April  16,  1781 — Madison  papers,  i.  87.  Jefferson 
sustained  this  right  subsequently  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  necessary  to 
give  Congress  that  power  expressly,  "<Aey  have  it  by  the  law  of  nature.'^  Jef- 
ferson's writings,  ii.  203.  The  proposed  report  is  in  these  words;  "It  is 
understood  and  hereby  declared  in  case  one  or  more  of  the  Confederated  States 
shall  refuse  or  neglect  to  abide  by  the  determinations  of  Congress,  and  to  observe 
all  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  as  required  by  the  13th  Article,  the  said 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled  are  fully  authorized  to  employ  the  force 
of  the  United  States,  as  well  by  sea  as  by  land,  to  compel  such  State  or  Statet 
to  fulfil  their  federal  engagements ;  and  particularly  to  make  distraint  on  any 
of  the  effects,  vessels,  and  merchandizes  of  such  State  or  States,  or  of  any  of 
the  citizens  thereof,  wherever  found;  and  to  prohibit  and  prevent  their  trade  and 
intercourse  as  well  with  any  other  of  the  United  States  and  the  citizens  thereof 
as  with  any  foreign  State,  and  as  well  by  land  as  by  sea;  until  full  compensa- 
tion or  compliance  be  obtained  with  respect  to  all  requisitions  made  by  th» 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  in  pursuance  of  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation." This  new  article  was  "to  be  binding  on  all  the  States  not  actually 
In  possession  of  the  enemy,  as  soon  as  the  same  shall  be  acceded  to  and  ratified 
by  each  of  the  said  States."  Report  to  Congress  for  consideration — Madison 
Papers,  i.  89 


HAMILTON    WRITES    "  THE    CONTINENTALIST".  Xxix 

What  the  probability  of  this  acquiescence  was,  may  be  judged 
from  the  past  history  of  this  country ;  for  this  tremendous  power, 
the  analogy  to  which  is  seen  in  the  worst  feature  of  the  ancient 
confederacies,  proving  fatal  to  them ;  contemplated  the  delinquency 
of,  and  distraint  not  merely  of  one,  but  of  "one  or  more  States." 
Well  might  Hamilton  pronounce  it  a  proposition  to  enact  a 
civil  war  I  That,  in  war,  Government  should  rise  with  plume 
and  mighty  arms  to  the  exertion  of  all  the  energies  which  war 
demands,  is  at  times,  the  great  necessity,  the  very  condition  o*" 
its  existence;  but  that  these  energies  should  be  so  exerted  as  to 
cause  the  least  unnecessary  sacrifice  of  public  and  private  rights, 
and  interests ;  and  that  in  peace.  Government  by  itb  manly 
prudence,  avoiding  war,  should  by  its  policy  render  peace  truly 
a  blessing,  these  Hamilton  felt,  were  objects  worthy  all  a  States- 
man's care.  Looking  also,  upon  the  States  as  essential  parts  of 
a  compound  Federal  system,  he  never  forgat,  that  they  were 
''  artificial  beings" — existing  and  to  exist  for  certain  limited 
purposes;  but  regarding  first  and  most  the  all  involving  genera] 
interests,  before  his  clear  view  ever  was  present  the  grand  per- 
spective of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  as  one  nation. 
And  thus,  it  was,  the  steady  aim  of  his  whole  life,  that  this 
Unity  should  be  perpetuated,  not  merely  by  parchment  forms 
and  artificial  ties,  but  by  the  lasting  ties  of  a  great  brotherhood 
of  mutual  aff'ections  and  interests  under  paternal  counsels,  able 
not  only  to  direct  but  to  protect.  To  him  nothing  was  more 
distasteful  than  an  irregular  and  unnecessary  exercise  of  power. 
Order  working  by  its  proper  means  to  secure  and  enlarge  the 
sphere  of  order,  was  all  his  favorite  thought — Moderation  in  the 
selection  and  use  of  means,  his  favorite  practice.  To  effect  a 
permanent  system  of  order,  was  with  him  as  yet,  only  a  hope ; 
but  to  aid  in  securing  the  present  means,  by  which  that  hope 
might  become  a  certainty,  was  a  duty.  He  felt  it  to  be  such. 
Hitherto  he  had  confined  himself  to  private  instances.  Now  he 
came  forward,  and  opened  his  embassy  of  great  truths  to  all  the 
people.  Having  temporarily  retired  from  active  service  in  the 
army ;  while  Congress  were  engaged  in  preparing  the  recom- 
mendations to  the  States,  previously  mentioned,  he  wrote  a 
series  of  essays,  "  to  confirm  an  opinion  already  pretty  gene- 
rally received,  that  it  was  necessary  to  augment  the  powers  of 
riie  Confederation ;"  and  to  fix  the  public  judgment  definitely 
on  the  points  which  ought  to  compose  that  augmentation. 
These  Essays — the  precursors  of  the  Federalist, — he  entitled,  as 


XXX  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

a  term  most  expressive  of  their  purpose — "■  The  Continentalist," 
the  first  of  which  was  published  on  the  twelfth  of  July  seven- 
teen hundred  and  eighty  one.  They  open  in  a  tone  of  kind 
persuasion,  well  adapted  to  conciliate  and  to  enlighten  the 
prevailing  doubts,  and  fears,  and  prejudices.  Then,  stating  the 
object  of  his  remarks — to  shew  "  a  want  of  power  in  Congress," 
thej'  jjroceed.  "  History  is  full  of  examples,  where  in  coutesta 
for  liberty,  a  jealousy  of  power  has  either  defeated  the  attempts 
to  recover  or  preserve  it  in  the  first  instance,  or  has  afterwards 
subverted  it  by  clogging  the  government  with  too  great  precau- 
tions for  its  felicity,  or  by  leaving  too  wide  a  door  for  sedition 
and  popular  licentiousness.  In  a  government  framed  for  durable 
liberty,  not  less  regard  must  be  paid  to  giving  the  Magistrate  a 
proper  degree  of  authority  to  make  and  execute  the  laws  with 
vigor,  than  to  guard  against  encroachments  upon  the  rights  of 
the  community.  As  too  much  power  leads  to  despotism,  too 
little  leads  to  anarchy ;  and  both  eventually  to  the  ruin  of  the 
people.  ...  If  the  Federal  government  is  too  weak  at  first,  it 
will  continually  grow  weaker.  The  ambition  and  local  interests 
of  the  respective  members,  will  be  constantly  undermining  and 
usurping  upon  its  prerogatives,  till  it  comes  to  a  dissolution  ;  if  a 
partial  combination  of  some  of  the  more  powerful  ones  does  not 
bring  it  to  a  more  speedy  and  violent  end." 

Having,  in  the  succeeding  numbers,  strongly  marked  the  dis- 
tinctive dangers  proper  to  a  single  State  and  to  a  Confederacy  ; 
and,  from  a  comparison  of  the  different  situations  of  the  United 
States  with  those  of  the  European  Confederacies,  drawn  the 
conclusion,  that,  "  if  the  Federal  government  should  lose  its 

AUTHORITY,"  CIVIL  WarS  '*  WOULD    CERTAINLY  FOLLOW,"  he   poiutS 

to  the  probability  of  the  larger  States,  in  a  short  time  become 
"prosperous,  rich,  and  powerful,  being  inspired  with  ambition 
and  nourishing  ideas  of  separation  and  independence."  "  Though, 
it  will  ever  be  their  true  interest  to  preserve  the  Union,  their 
vanity  and  self  importance  will  be  very  likely  to  overpower 
that  motive;  and  make  them  seek  to  place  themselves  at  the 
head  of  particular  confederacies,  independent  of  the  general 
one.  A  schism  once  introduced,  competitions  of  boundary  and 
rivalships  of  commerce  will  easily  afford  pretexts  for  war."  The 
prostrate  condition  of  this  country;  not  from  a  deficiency  of 
resources,  but  from  a  wart  of  governmental  power  to  employ 
them,  is  the  next,  and  a  most  fertile  and  instructive  topic; 
teaching   the   conclusion ;    that  "  we   ought,  without   delay,  tc> 


WANT    OF    A    POWER    TO    REGULATE    TRADE.  XXXi 

enlarge  the  powers  of  Congress.  Everj^  plan,  of  which  this  is 
not  the  foundation,  will  be  illusory.  The  separate  exertions  of 
the  States  will  never  suffice.  Nothing  but  a  well  proportioned 
exertion  of  the  resources  of  the  whole  under  the  direction  of  a 
Common  Council,  with  power  sufficient  to  give  efficacy  to  their 
resolutions,  can  preserve  us  from  being  a  conquered  people  now, 
or  can  make  us  a  happy  people  hereafter."  From  these  general 
views,  he  proceeds  to  a  specification  "  of  the  points  which  ought 
to  compose  the  contemplated  augmentation  of  these  powers." 
Primarily  is  stated,  "the  power  of  regulating  trade,"  preceding 
a  specification  of  the  sources  of  revenue  to  be  granted,  "  in 
perpetuity,"  to  Congress ;  together  with  the  power  "  of  disposa' 
of  all  unlOcated  lands  for  the  benefit  of  the  United  States  and 
the  appointment  of  all  land  as  well  as  naval  officers  of  every 
rank."  Having  argued  the  necessity  of  permanent  revenues  as 
the  basis  of  loans,  and  the  policy  of  funding  the  debt,  he  dwells 
at  some  length  on  the  necessity  "  of  authorizing  the  Federal 
Government  to  regulate  the  trade  of  these  States." 

In  the  frame  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  nothing  is  more 
remarkable  than  the  absence  of  an  express  power  of  regulating 
the  external  commerce  of  this  country — a  power  which  had 
been  conceded  to  the  British  parliament  by  the  Congress  of 
1775,  "  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  commercial  advantages 
of  the  whole  empire  to  the  mother  country,  and  the  commercial 
benefits  of  its  respective  members."  In  vain,  did  New  Jersey,  when 
consulting  of  the  Confederation,  avow  her  opinion ;  that  "  the 
sole  and  exclusive  power  of  regulating  the  trade  of  the  United 
States  with  foreign  nations  ought  to  be  clearly  vested  in  the 
Congress ;  and  that  the  revenues  therefrom  ought  to  be  appro- 
priated to  such  public  and  general  purposes  as  to  Congress  shall 
seem  proper,  and  for  the  common  benefit  of  the  States ;  thereby 
deriving  "  a  great  security  to  the  Union  from  the  establishment 
of  a  common  and  mutual  interest."  Her  proposal  was  rejected 
by  two  thirds  of  the  voting  States.  And  the  Articles  of*  the  Con- 
federation provided,  that  "  the  free  inhabitants  of  each  of  the 
States  shall  be  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
free  citizens  in  the  several  States,"  and  "shall  enjoy  therein  all 
the  privileges  of  trade  and  commerce,  subject  to  the  same  duties, 
impositions,  and  restrictions  as  the  inhabitants  thereof  respect- 
ively." They  provided,  that  "  no  State,  without  the  consent  of 
the  United  States  in  Congress,  shall  enter  into  any  conference, 
agreement,  alliance,  or  treaty  with  any  King,  Prince,  or  State." 


XXXll  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

They  provided,  that,  "  no  two  or  more  States  shall  enter  into 
any  treaty,  confederation,  or  alliance  whatever  between  them, 
without  the  consent  of  the  United  States  in  Congress."  They 
gave  to  Congress  the  power  of,  "  entering  into  treaties  and 
alliances,"  declaring  that  "  no  State  shall  lay  any  imposts  or 
duties  which  may  interfere  with  stipulations  in  such  treaties ;" — 
but  they  also  provided,  that,  "  no  treaty  of  commerce  shall  be 
made  whereby  the  legislative  power  of  the  respective  States 
shall  be  restrained  from  imposing  such  imposts  and  duties  on 
foreigners  as  their  own  people  are  subjected  to,  or  from  pro- 
hibiting the  exportation  or  importation  of  any  species  of  goods 
or  commodities  whatever."  They  provided,  "  for  regulating 
the  trade  with  the  Indians ;"  but,  by  their  previous  limitations, 
they  withheld  the  necessary  plenary  power  "  to  regulate  com- 
merce with  foreign  nations  and  among  the  several  States." 

The  wise  proposition  of  New  Jersey — closed  up  among  the 
secret  proceedings  of  Congress — was  made  in  1778.  Two  years 
later,  Hamilton  is  seen  urging  the  conferring  upon  Congress 
this  great  power,  with  all  those  incidents  which  look  to  the  pro- 
tection and  encouragement  of  domestic  industry.  The  following 
year,  New  Jersey,  again,  in  the  person  of  a  distinguished  dele- 
gate,* proposed  to  vest  Congress  with  a  right  "  of  superintend- 
ing the  commercial  regulations  of  every  State,"  and  "  with  the 
exclusive  right  of  laying  uniform  duties  on  all  imported  articles." 
A  proposal,  to  vest  in  it  the  power  of  appropriating  these  duties 
permanently,  was  rejected. 

To  impress  on  the  public  mind  the  necessity  of  imparting  this 
important  power  to  Congress  in  all  its  extent  was  the  next  and 
the  most  labored  argument  of  "  the  Continentalist."  The  source 
of  the  general  prejudice  against  its  being  granted  is  there  stated ; 
and  next,  those  comprehensive  and  economical  views,  which  have 
since,  in  the  main,  governed  the  policy  of  this  country,  are  deve- 
loped with  decisive  force.  But  Hamilton's  views  did  not  stop  here. 
It  was  a  "part  of  his  plan,  that  Congress  should  have  the  power 
"  of  appointing  all  oflScers  of  the  Customs,"  thereby,  in  fact, 
combined  with  the  power  of  appointment  of  all  land  (as  well  as 
naval  oflScers)  of  every  rank,  to  constitute  a  Government  of 
self-sustaining  properties.  That  this  defect  of  a  power  to  regu- 
late their  commerce  should  have  continued  until  the  Confede- 
ration (roftsed  to  exist,  among  a  people,  which,  in  three  quarters 

*  Dr.  Witherspoon. 


NEW    YORK    PASSES    FIRST    ACT    FOR    A    CONVENTION.  XXXUi 

of  a  century,  has  risen  to  be  the  second,  and  soon  must  be  the 
first  commercial  nation  of  the  world ;  is  only  another  instance 
of  the  obstinacy  of  local  systems,  often  seen,  not  merely  in 
confederacies  but  in  single  kingdoms,  of  which  each  member  or 
province  had  differing  rates  of  duties,  and  differing  modes  of 
collection. 

The  latest  of  the  Essays  of  the  "  Continentalist"  was  published 
on  the  fourth  of  July  1782.  It  closes  with  this  fine  peroration. 
"  There  is  something  noble  and  magnificent  in  the  perspective 
of  a  Great  Federal  Eepublic.  closely  linked  in  the  pursuit  of  a 
common  interest,  tranquil  and  prosperous  at  home — respectable 
abroad  ;  but  there  is  something  proportionately  diminutive  and 
contemptible  in  the  prospect  of  a  number  of  petty  States,  with 
the  appearance  only  of  Union,  jarring,  jealous,  and  perverse, 
without  any  determined  action,  fluctuating  and  unhappy  at 
home,  weak  and  insignificant  by  their  dissensions  in  the  eyes  of 
other  nations.  Happy  America,  if  those  to  whom  thou  hast 
entrusted  the  guardianship  of  thy  infancy,  know  how  to  provide 
for  thy  future  repose,  but  miserable  and  undone,  if  their  negli- 
gence or  ignorance  permits  the  spirit  of  discord  to  erect  her 
banner  on  the  ruins  of  thy  tranquility ! !" 

The  true,  the  only  remedy  was  a  total  change  of  system.  To 
commence  it  by  means  of  a  Convention,  Hamilton  is  seen  to  have 
been  the  foremost  to  have  proposed ;  and  only  seventeen  days 
elapsed  after  the  publication  of  this  essay,  when  he  effected  a  pur- 
pose, to  be  classed  among  the  most  memorable  acts  of  his  short 
but  variously  and  widely  useful  life.  In  the  autumn  of  'eighty, 
Hamilton,  when  recommending  the  appointment  by  Congress 
of  a  Superintendent  of  Finance,  had  also  intimated  the  import- 
ance of  appointing  in  each  State  a  "  Continental  Superintend- 
ent." This  appointment  was  conferred  upon  him;  and  a  few 
months  after  on  the  thirteenth  of  July  'eighty  two  he  attended 
the  legislature  of  New  York,  then  in  session  at  PoughkeejDsie, 
to  consult  with  it  on  the  financial  measures  deemed  necessary. 
This  body  had,  late  in  the  preceding  year,  declared  j  '*  their 
readiness  to  comply  with  any  measures  to  render  the  Union  of 
these  United  States  more  intimate."  This  emphatic  decla- 
ration had  been  preceded  by  an  Act  granting  to  Congress  a 
revenue  from  the  customs;  by  the  authorization  of  a  census; 
by  the  levy  of  a  tax  chiefly  for  continental  use;  and,  by  a  de- 
claration, in  order  to  secure  exclusive  privileges  to  the  recently 
established  bank  of  North  America,  that  no  bank  should  be 


XXXlV  HISTOBICAL   NOTICE. 

established  within  the  State  of  New  York.  It  was  now  con- 
vened in  extra  session,  at  the  express  instance  of  a  Committee 
of  Congress,  to  provide  "  for  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war." 
Three  days  after  Hamilton's  arrival,  on  the  motion  of  General 
Schuyler,  the  Senate,  of  which  he  was  still  the  leader,  resolved 
itself  into  a  Committee,  "  to  take  into  consideration  the  state  of 
the  Nation."  The  next  day,  the  most  important  resolutions 
then  proposed  in  this  country,  excepting  those  declaring  its 
Independence,  were  reported.  They  were  unanimously  con- 
curred in,  the  following  day — Sunday  the  twenty  first  of  July 
1782 — and  were  approved  by  the  Governor,  who  was  requested 
to  transmit  them  to  Congress,  and  to  the  Executive  of  each  of 
the  States.  These  Resolutions  were  from  the  pen  of  Hamilton, 
embodying  much  that  had  appeared  in  the  "  Contineutalist." 
After  a  series  of  resolutions  stating  the  importance  and  neces- 
sity of  the  measure,  the  closing  Resolution,  declared,  "  that  it  is 
essential  to  the  common  welfare  that  there  should  be  as  soon  as 
possible  a  conference  of  the  whole"  of  the  States  on  the  subject, 
and  that  it  would  be  advisable  for  this  purpose  to  propose  to  Con- 
gress "  to  recommend,  and  to  each  State  to  adopt  the  measure 
of  assembling  a  General  Convention  of  the  States,  specially 
authorized  to  revise  and  amend  the  Confederation,  reserving  a 
right  to  the  respective  Legislatures  to  ratify  the  same."  Thus 
a  legislative  sanction  was  given  to  the  great  conception,  he  had, 
nearly  two  years  before,  first  suggested.  By  almost  all  his- 
torical writers,  under  the  enthralment  which  the  slave  power 
seemed  to  have  imposed  upon  the  mind  of  this  country,  the  pre- 
cedence in  this  great  movement  has  been  ascribed  to  Virginia. 
But,  acting  upon  the  examples*  given  in  the  previous  New 
England  Conventions,  to  which  New  York  had  been  a  frequent 
party,  this  precedence  unquestionably  belongs  to  New  York.f 
This  procedure,  Hamilton  announced  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Finance.  I  think  this  "  a  very  eligible  step,  though  I  doubt  of 
the  concurrence  of  the  other  States,  but  I  am  certain  without  it 
they  never  will  be  brought  to  co-operate  in  any  reasonable  or 
effective  plan.  Urge  reforms  or  exertions ;  and  the  answer  con- 
stantly is,  what  avails  it  for  one  State  to  make  them  without  the 

*  History  of  Repub.  ii.  108. 

■}•  Kent's  Commentaries,  i.  228,  note.  Adverting  to  this  statement,  "there 
is  no  doubt,  that  Colonel  Hamilton  .  .  .  was  the  distinguished  individual,  who 
by  his  wisdom  suggested,  and  by  his  influence  promoted,  that  earliest  authorit/p- 
tive  measure  taken  for  a  general  Convention  of  the  States." 


DISCORDANT   COUNSELS    OF   THE    STATES.  XXXV 

consent  of  the  others  ?  It  is  in  vain  to  expose  the  futility  of 
this  reasoning.  It  is  founded  on  all  those  passions  which  have 
the  strongest  influence  on  the  human  mind."  The  day  after  the 
passage  of  these  resolutions,  General  Schuyler  retired  from  the 
canvass  to  make  room  for  Hamilton.  He  was  elected  a  delegate 
to  Congress.  Ere  long,  he  replied  to  his  friend  Colonel  Laurens, 
announcing  his  election,  "Peace  made,  my  dear  friend,  a  new 
scene  opens.  The  object  then  will  be  to  make  our  Independence 
a  blessing.  To  do  this  we  must  secure  our  Union  on  solid  found- 
ations, an  herculean  task ;  and  to  effect  which  mountains  of 
prejudice  must  be  levelled.  Come  to  Congress.  We  know  each 
other's  sentiments.  Our  views  are  the  same.  "We  have  fought 
side  by  side  to  make  America  free,  let  us,  hand  in  hand,  struggle 
to  make  her  happy."  To  expedite  this  great  plan  of  a  national 
re-organization,  a  meeting  of  public  creditors  was  held  at 
Albany,  at  which  a  State  delegation  to  a  general  convention 
was  appointed. 

Hamilton's  doubts  "  of  the  concurrence  of  the  other  States," 
in  this  great  measure,  were  too  well  founded.  Instead  of 
a  spirit  of  union,  a  spirit  of  jealous  discord  prevailed.  The 
question  of  territorial  rights  had  delayed  the  ratification  of 
the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  was  attended  with  circum- 
stances most  unpropitious.  The  charters  of  some  of  the  Colo- 
nies extended  their  bounds  to  the  South  sea  ;  and  these  Colonies, 
now  States,  claimed  that,  on  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
the  property  and  jurisdiction  of  the  crown  lands  passed  from 
the  crown  to  these  Colonies.  A  jealousy  of  these  claims  early 
prompted  a  proposition,  that  "  to  render  the  Union  and  Confe- 
deracy firm  and  perpetual;  it  was  essential  that  the  limits  of 
each  respective  territorial  jurisdiction  should  be  ascertained  by 
the  Articles  of  Confederation."  This  proposition  was  rejected. 
A  second,  asserting  to  the  United  States  the  sole  and  exclusive 
power  of  ascertaining  this  boundary,  was  also  rejected.  This 
proposition  being  repeated  the  next  year,  met  with  the  same 
fate.  It  was  founded  on  the  opinion,  that,  as  "  from  the  crown, 
of  Great  Britain,  the  sovereignty  of  its  territory  passed  to  the 
people,  the  unappropriated  lands,  which  belonged  to  the  crown, 
passed,  not  to  the  people  of  the  Colony  or  State  within  whose 
limitp  they  were  situated,  but  to  the  whole  "  people  of  the 
United  States."* 

*  Opinion  of  Jay,  Chief  Justice.     3  Dallas  Rep.  419. 


XXXVl  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

Under  this  conviction,  a  bounty  in  the  public  lands — as  an 
inducement  to  enlistments — was  offered  by  Congress,  in  the 
second  year  of  the  war.  Averse  to  this  measure,  Maryland 
suggested  the  substitution  of  a  money  bounty.  Two  years 
later,  Virginia  passed  a  law,  opening  offices  for  the  sale  of  her 
lands.  Congress  urged  her  to  "  forbear."  New  Jersey,  Dela- 
ware, Maryland,  each  asserted  its  common  right  in  these  lands. 
In  her  true  solicitude  for  the  preservation  and  peace  of  the 
Union,  New  York,  though  with  a  strong  conviction  of  her 
territorial  rights,  ceded  them  to  the  United  States  "  to  enure  to 
their  use  and  benefit." — Virginia  did  not  willingl}-  yield  any 
part  of  her  wide  domain,  but  adopted  a  remonstrance  to  Con- 
gress, asserting  "  her  exclusive  rights  of  sovereignty  and  jui-is- 
diction  within  her  own  territory ;"  until,  affrighted  by  the  inva- 
sion of  her  State,  and  the  occupation  by  Arnold  of  her  unde- 
fended Capital,  at  that  very  moment,*  she  also  passed  a  vote  ot 
cession.  This  cession  was  clogged  with  conditions,  which  Con- 
gress pronounced  "  incompatible  with  the  honor,  interest  and 
peace  of  the  Union." 

To  ascertain  what  territory  belonged  to  the  United  States, 
and  to  establish  a  plan  for  the  disposal  of  it,  in  order  to  a  dis- 
charge of  the  national  debts,  was  soon  after  proposed  in  Con- 
gress. But,  Virginia,  now  freed  from  the  presence  of  an  enemy 
by  the  victory  at  Yorktown,  resumed  her  pretensions;  protested 
against  the  proposed  action  of  Congress;  refused  to  give  evi- 
dence of  her  title ;  and  looked  to  a  civil  war  in  support  of  her 
claims.f  In  Congress  the  advocates  of  a  national  policy,  again 
reported  a  recommendation  to  the  States,  of  the  cessions  of  the 
late  crown  lands — as  "  an  important  fund  for  the  discharge  of 
the  National  debt."  On  the  final  vote,  this  report  was  lost  by  a 
geographical  division — the  States  North  of  the  Potomac  being 
unanimous  in  favor  of  it,  and  the  four  Southern  States,  with  the 
exception  of  two  members|  opposing  it.     Powerless  as  Virginia 

*  January  2,  1781. 

f  Hist.  Repub.  ii.  327.  Madison  writes — "  We  are  very  anxious  to  bring 
the  matter  to  an  issue,  that  the  State  may  know  what  course  their  hcmor  and 
tecurity  require  them  to  take." — Nov.  1,  1780.  Again, '"  Considering  the  exten- 
sive interests  and  claims  which  Virginia  has  and  the  enemies  and  calumnies 
which  these  very  claims  form  against  her,  she  is  perhaps  under  the  strongest 
obligation  of  any  State  in  the  Union  to  preserve  her  military  contingent  on  a 
respectable  footing ;  and  unhappily,  her  line  is,  perhaps  of  all,  in  the  most  dis- 
graceful condition."     April  1782.     Madison  Papers,  vol.  i.  pp.  99,  101,  117. 

J  Colonel  Bland,  of  Virginia,  and  Izard,  of  South  Carolina. 


NAVIGATION    OF    THE    MISSISSIPPI,  RIGHT    OF    ASSERTED.  XXXV I, 

was  in  money,  in  arms,  in  discipline,  Congress  had  declared,  m 
an  address  to  the  several  States,  while  the  integrity  of  the 
Union  was  thus  being  menaced,  ""We  possess  no  funds  which  do 
not  originate  with  you.  We  can  command  no  levies  which  are 
not  raised  under  your  own  acts." 

The  same  spirit  was  shewn  by  Virginia  in  reference  to  a 
matter  of  much  gi'cater  interest  to  the  whole  people  of  the 
United  States — the  right  of  navigating  the  Mississippi.  During 
the  pending  negotiations  with  Spain,  Virginia  instructed  her 
delegates  in  Congress  "  to  use  their  utmost  endeavors  to  obtain 
an  express  stipulation  in  favor  of  the  United  American  States 
for  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  to  the  sea,  with  a  free 
port  and  other  privileges  at  its  mouth."*  With  the  same  affright 
under  which  she  had  tremblingly  thrown  up  her  claim  to  the 
late  "  crown  lands,"  she  authorized  our  negotiator  "  to  recede 
from  his  former  instructions;  aijd,  if  Spain  unalterably  insisted 
on  it,  to  content  himself  with  a  grant  of  its  navigation  to  the 
thirty-first  degree  of  North  latitude."  Thus,  was  the  Unity  of  this 
great  Empire  in  the  enjoyment  of  this  great  national  right, 
trifled  with  by  the  then  most  populous  of  the  States.  Jay  dis- 
regarded the  timid  instruction,  and  Hamilton,  as  Chairman  of  a 
Committee  of  Congress  subsequently  reported,  "  that  the  free 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  is  a  clear  and  essential  right  of  the 
United  States,  and  that  the  same  ought  to  be  considered  and 
supported  as  such."f  These  were  questions  of  the  future,  but 
the  urgency  of  the  present  necessities  was  most  grievously 
shown.  Congress  was  compelled  to  pass  a  resolution,  suspend- 
ing the  payment  of  the  interest  on  the  loan  office  certificates. 
The  wide  spread  public  and  private  distress  resulting,  and  the 
impending  pressing  dangers,  from  the  want  of  an  efficacious 
government,  at  last  drew  forth  from  Hamilton  this  melancholy 
sentence — "  The  more  I  see,  the  more  I  find  reason  for  those 
who  love  this  country  to  weep  over  its  blindness." 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  an  almost  hopeless  national  bank- 
ruptcy, that  he  took  his  seat  in  Congress. |  In  the  proceedings 
of  that  body  he  had  a  large  share ;  and,  it  will  be  remarked, 
the  Articles  of  Confederation  having  then  been  ratified  by  all 
the  States ;  that,  while  he  interpreted  their  provisions  so  as  to 
give  to  them  their  full  scope,  he  guardedly  and  strictl}'  observed 
their  limitations.      A  compliance  by  all  of  the  Statej  with  th« 

*  Nov.  5,  1779.  t  Sept.  16,  1788.  J  Nov.  25,  178?. 


XXXVm  HISTORICAL    NOTICE 

past  requisitions  for  money  was  the  first  urgency — to  provido 
for  the  immediate  demands  of  the  public  service — to  secure 
additronal  aids,  and  to  fulfil  the  public  obligations.  The  cry  for 
justice  by  the  public  creditors  was  a  loud,  and  indignant,  and 
remonstrating  wailing.  Among  these  creditors  were  the  suffer- 
ing army  about  to  be  disbanded.  Hamilton  deeply  felt  their 
wrongs;  and,  soon  after  he  had  taken  his  seat  in  Congress, 
moved  a  resolution,  directing  the  Superintendent  of  Finance  to 
represent  to  the  States,  the  indispensable  necessity  of  their  com- 
plying with  the  last  requisition,  "  assuring  them,  that  they  were 
determined  to  make  the  fullest  justice  to  the  public  creditors  an 
invariable  object  of  their  counsels  and  exertions."  His  resolu- 
tion embraced  the  appointment  of  a  deputation  to  Ehode  Island 
to  urge  a  grant  of  the  impost — "  as  a  measure  essential  to  the 
safet}'-,  and  reputation  of  these  States."  In  vindication  of  her 
refusal,  that  State  communicated,  through  her  Governor,  her 
reasons  to  Congress.  These  reasons  involved  in  their  principles 
and  in  their  policy  the  existence  of  the  Confederacy;  and 
Hamilton  forthwith  came  forward,  as  the  champion  of  the 
Union  against  the  contumacy  of  a  State.  Ho  prepared  a 
Ileport,  the  first,  on  the  journals  of  Congress,  which  discussed 
at  length,  the  relations  of  the  States,  to  the  Confederation;  and 
explained  and  vindicated  its  powers.  Having  primarily  com- 
bated the  objection  of  the  unequal  bearing  of  the  Impost  on  the 
Commercial  States,  he  met  that  founded  on  its  alleged  invasion 
of  "  the  Constitution  of  the  State."  He  asserted,  that  a  State 
had  "  a  discretionary  power  of  appointing  officers,  not  expressly 
known  to  its  Constitution ;"  including  "  that  of  authorizing  the 
federal  government  to  make  the  appointments,  in  cases  where 
the  general  welfare  may  require  it ;"  and  also,  that  such  a  dis- 
cretionary power  existed  in  the  Confederation.  '*  No  federal 
constitution,"  he  averred,  "  can  exist,  without  powers,  that  in 
their  exercise,  affect  the  internal  police  of  the  component  mem- 
bers. All  that  is  required  is,  that  the  Federal  government  confine 
its  appointments  to  such  as  it  is  empowered  to  make,  by  the 
original  act  of  Union,  or  by  the  subsequent  consent  of  the 
parties.  Unless  there  should  be  express  words  of  exclusion  in 
the  constitution  of  a  State,  there  can  be  no  reason  to  doubt, 
that  it  is  within  the  compass  of  legislative  discretion,  to  com- 
municate that  authority."  The  propriety  of  so  doing  was  next 
urged.  The  inadequacy  of  the  revenue  to  be  raised  within  f,he 
States   rendering  loans   necessary;    "the   next  resource,"    he 


HAMILTON    DRGES    POWER    Of    COLLECTING    REVENUE.      XXXi> 

remarked,  "is  to  borrow."  We  must  not  only  stipulate  a  proper 
compensation  for  what  "  is  lent,"  "  but  we  must  give  security 
for  the  performance."  "  We  must  pledge  an  ascertained  fund, 
simple  and  productive  in  its  nature,  general  in  its  principle,  and 
at  the  disposal  of  a  single  will."  "  This  will  not  be  the  case, 
unless  the  collection  as  well  as  the  appropriation,  is  under  the 
control  of  the  United  States." — They  "  have  a  common  interest 
in  a  uniform  and  equally  energetic  collection;  and  not  only 
policy  but  justice  to  all  the  parties  of  the  Union,  designate  the 
utility  of  lodging  the  power  of  making  it  where  the  interest  is 
common."  *  *  *  "  J3y  the  Confederation,  Congress  have  an 
absolute  discretion  in  determining  the  quantum  of  revenue 
requisite  for  the  national  expenditure.  When  this  is  done, 
nothing  remains  for  the  States,  sepai'ately,  but  the  mode  of 
raising.  'No  State  can  dispute  the  obligation  to  pay  the  sum 
demanded,  without  a  breach  of  the  Confederation  ;  and  when  the 
money  comes  into  the  treasury,  the  appropriation  is  the  exclu- 
sive province  of  the  Federal  Grovernment."  The  strong  motive 
for  tlie  compliance  with  the  requisition,  that  of  funding  the 
debt;  and  that,  thereby,  "the  national  credit  would  revive  and 
stand  hereafter  on  a  secure  basis,"  having  been  stated;  Hamil- 
ton closed  this  paper  with  these  observations — "  There  is  a 
happy  mean  between  too  much  confidence  and  excessive  jea- 
lousy, in  which  the  health  and  prosperity  of  a  State  consist. 
Either  extreme  is  a  dangerous  vice.  The  first  is  a  temptation 
to  men  in  power  to  arrogate  more  than  they  have  a  right  to ; 
the  latter  enervates  Government,  prevents  system  in  the  admi- 
nistration ;  defeats  the  most  salutary  measures ;  breeds  confu- 
sion in  the  State,  disgusts  and  discontents  among  the  people ; 
and  may  eventually  prove  as  fatal  to  liberty  as  the  opposite 
temper."  To  this  Eeport  was  appended,  the  first  public  pledge 
to  establish  a  Sinking  Fund. 

An  estimate  now  made  by  him  showed  that  the  probable 
receipts  from  the  Impost  would  be  insufficient.  Before  the 
assent  of  the  States  to  an  increase  could  be  obtained,  it  was 
necessary  to  remove  their  discontents  as  to  the  late  requisitions. 
With  this  view ;  and  with  the  much  higher  view,  of  keeping  the 
public  faith,  he  moved  the  appointment  of  a  Committee  to 
report  the  further  provision  necessary  ''  for  discharging  the 
interest  on  the  loan  office  certificates,  and  other  liquidated 
debts;  to  revise  the  existing  requisitions,  and  to  report,  whether 
they  should  be  continued  or  altered."     One  great  cause  of  thes^ 


Xl  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

discontents  was  the  absence  of  a  practical  rule  for  the  appor- 
tionment of  the  public  burthens :  and  while  the  demands  for 
revenue  were  being  considered,  feeling  the  obligation  of  an 
etfort  to  act  upon  the  existing  provision  of  the  Confederation — 
a  valuation  of  the  land  within  the  States, — Hamilton  offered  a 
resolution  *'  in  order  to  enable  Congress  to  form  an  eventual 
plan  towards  carrying  it  into  execution."  In  obedience  also  to 
his  sense  of  the  importance  of  unswerving  fidelity  to  the  public 
engagements,  he  sought  to  make  provision  for  the  Continental 
bills,  of  which  the  people  of  New  England  were  large  holders. 
In  this  he  failed,  the  Southern  States  being  much  opposed  to 
their  redemption.  But  there  were  other  interests  that  could 
not  be  wantonly  disregarded.  The  main  army  presented  a 
memorial  to  Congress,  setting  forth  its  claims.  In  strict  justice, 
these  claims  had  no  precedence  over  those  of  other  public  cre- 
ditors ;  and  Hamilton  reported  a  declaration  by  Congress,  that 
the  troops  of  the  United  States,  *'  in  common  with  all  their  cre- 
ditors, have  an  undoubted  right  to  expect  security  for  their 
claims;"  and  that  Congress  will  make  every  effort  in  its  power 
to  obtain  from  the  respective  States,  substantial  funds,  adequate 
to  the  object  of  funding  the  whole  debt  of  the  United  States ;  and 
will  enter  upon  an  immediate  and  full  consideration  of  the  nature 
of  such  funds,  and  the  most  likely  mode  of  obtaining  them." — 
To  fulfil  this  pledge,  he  presented  a  resolution,  "  that  it  is  the 
opinion  of  Congress,  that  complete  justice  cannot  be  done  to  the 
creditors  of  the  United  States,  nor  the  restoration  of  public 
credit  be  effected,  or  the  future  exigencies  of  the  war  be  pro- 
vided for,  but  by  the  establishment  of  permanent  and  adequate 
funds,  to  operate  generally  throughout  the  United  States,  to  be 
collected  by  Congress."* 

This  great  advance  towards  an  effective  general  Government 
acting  upon  individuals,  Virginia  had  recently  barred.  In  the 
previous  month  of  October,  she  passed  a  resolution  ;  not  merely 
in  opposition  to  the  grant  to  Congress  of  the  power  of  levying 
an  impost,  but  formally  and  utterly  hostile  to  the  grant  of  any 
power  to  Congress  of  raising  a  national  revenue.  Its  terms  are, 
"  Whereas  the  permitting  any  power,  other  than  the  general 
Assembly  of  this  Commonwealth,  to  levy  duties  or  taxes  upon 
the  citizens  of  this  State  within  the  same,  is  injurious  to  its  sove- 
reignty;  may  prove  destructive  of  the  rights  and  liberty  of  tho 

*  Hist.  Rep.  ii.  30 


VALUATION  OF  LANDS RULE  OF  CONTRIBUTION.     xh 

people ;  and,  so  far  as  Congress  might  exercise  the  same,  is  con- 
travening the  spirit  of  the  Confederation  in  the  eighth  article 
thereof;"*  therefore  the  act  previously  passed  granting  it  was 
repealed.  Unpropitious  as  this  procedure  of  Virginia  was, 
Hamilton  adhered  to  his  purpose  ;  and,  declared  by  a  resolutiou 
of  Congress,  "  notwithstanding  the  discouraging  obstacles  they 
have  hitherto  encountered,  they  conceive  it  a  duty  to  themselves 
and  their  constituents,  to  persevere  in  their  intentions  to  renew 
and  extend  their  endeavors  to  procure  the  establishment  of 
I'evenues  equal  to  the  purpose  of  funding  all  the  debts  of  the 
United  States."  Immediately  after  this  renewed  pledge,  the 
mode  of  valuing  the  public  lands — the  rule  of  contribution — was 
considered.  The  plan  approved  by  Congress  he  deemed  very 
objectionable.  It  was  acceded  to  by  others  from  a  persuasion 
that  "  some  plan  was  expected  by  the  States,  and  that  none 
better  could  be  fallen  upon."  Hamilton  did  not  concur.  His 
reasons  detailed  in  a  letter  to  the  Governor  of  New  York,  have 
great  weight.  "  A  leading  rule,"  he  wrote  at  the  close  of  this 
letter,  "  which  I  have  laid  down  for  the  direction  of  my  conduct 
is  this;  that,  while  I  would  have  a  just  deference  for  the  expecta- 
tions of  the  States,  I  would  never  consent  to  amuse  them  by 
attempts  which  must  either  fail  in  the  execution  or  be  produc- 
tive of  evil.  I  would  rather  incur  the  negative  inconveniences 
of  delay,  than  the  positive  mischiefs  of  injurious  expedients. 
*  *  *  There  should,  in  my  opinion,  be  a  character  of  wisdom  and 
efficiency  in  all  the  measures  of  the  federal  council — the  oppo- 
site of  a  spirit  of  temporizing  expedients.  Every  part  of  a 
business  which  is  of  so  important  and  universal  concern  should 
be  transacted  on  uniform  principles,  and  under  the  direction  of 
that  body  which  has  a  common  interest. ...  I  regard  the  present 
moment,  probably  the  dawn  of  peace,  as  peculiarly  critical;  and 
the  measures  which  it  should  produce,  as  of  great  importance 
to  the  future  welfare  of  these  States." 

Having  urged  that  the  proposed  plan  should  be  deferred ;  he 
offered  a  pledge,  that  an  accurate  valuation  of  the  land  should 
be  made  by  Commissioners,  appointed  by  Congress  and  acting 
under  their  authority.  Though  this  pledge  was  supported  by  a 
majority  of  members,  it  was  lost  by  a  vote  of  States ;  and  the 
plan  he  opposed  was  then  rejected ;  and  was  never  adopted. 

The  consideration  of  the  Financial  policy  was  long  interrupted 

*  Henning's  Statutes,  xi.  171. 


Xlii  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

by  a  diBCUSHion  cf  the  claims  of,  and  the  provision  made  for  the 
array;  the  necessity  of  adequate  and  permanent  funds,  having 
beon  declared  by  Congress.  This  subject  was  at  last  delibe- 
rately resumed;  and  on  the  motion  of  Madison,  a  proposition 
was  made  re-asserting  the  principle — the  necessity  of  perma- 
nent and  adequate  funds ;  but  omitting  the  provision  in  Hamil- 
ton's previous  resolution,  that  these  funds  should  be  collected  by 
Congress.  This  fatal  concession  to  State  prejudices  was  followed 
by  another.  It  was  the  limitation  of  the  grant  of  these  funds 
to  a  period  of  twenty  Jive  years,  defeating  the  intended  purpose — 
the  making  them  a  basis  for  loans.*  In  vain,  did  Hamilton 
attempt  by  a  modification  of  his  plan,  which  gave  to  Congress 
the  nomination  of  the  officers  of  collection,  but  left  the  approval 
and  appointment  of  them  to  the  States,  to  secure  his  primary 
objects.  His  proposal  was  defeated  ;  and  a  report  was  adopted, 
inviting  the  States  to  confer  on  Congress  the  power  of  levying, 
for  the  use  of  the  United  States,  specific  duties  on  certain 
enumerated  articles,  and  an  ad  valorem  duty  on  others — the 
duties  to  be  continued  for  twenty  five  years ; — the  Collectors  to 
be  appointed  by  the  States,  removable  by  and  amenable  to  Con- 
i^ress;  with  power,  in  case  a  State  omitted  to  appoint,  to  make 
the  appointment.  Hamilton  persisted  in  withholding  his  vote 
from  this  plan  as  being  violative  of  his  principles;  but  ex- 
pressed "  the  hope,  that  New  York  would  consent  to  it,"  upon 
special  and  general  considerations.  A  similar  plane  of  thought 
and  system  of  principles  are  manifest  in  the  several  other  plans 
submitted  by  him  to  Congress  ;  among  which  is  his  report  of  a 
continental  peace  Establishment,  land  and  naval.  These  plans, 
though  not  adopted  by  this  negative  Congress,  were  important, 
not  only  for  the  principles  set  forth  as  to  the  construction  of  the 
powers  of  the  Confederacy,  but  as  preliminary  to  the  measures 
of  a  later  period.  Nor  was  his  influence  then  unfelt  as  to  the 
foreign  policy  of  this  country.  The  terms  of  a  treaty  of  peace 
with  Great  Britain  long  and  much  agitated  its  counsels,  these 
agitations  chieflj'-  proceeding  from  the  subservience  of  Virginia 
to  the  views  of  France;  from  the  questions  which  arose  as  to 
the  national  boundaries ;  and  from  the  firmnesls  of  the  negotia- 
tors of  this  treaty,  shewn  in  the  insisting  upon  the  common 

*  This  limitation  was  in  consequence  of  the  opposition  of  Massachusetts, 
New  Hampshire,  Connecticut,  and  Virginia — (Madison,  Lee,  and  Mercer,  voting 
for  it.  Colonel  Bland  against  it.)  A  similar  limitation,  much  urged  by  Madison 
in  1790,  was  then  decisively  rejected,  and  Hamilton's  view  prevailed. 


RESOLUTIONS   lY    HAMILTON    FOR   A    CONVENTION.        xlllV 

rights  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  the  American 
fisheries.  As  to  all  these  matters  Hamilton's  policy  is  seen  to 
have  been  comprehensive  and  steadfast ;  nor  were  his  efforts 
less  strenuous  to  give  a  fair  construction  to  the  terms  of  this 
treaty,  when  concluded;  and  to  persuade  honest  and  moderate 
counsels  in  the  execution  of  those  of  its  provisions,  as  to  which 
unhappy  opinions  had  prevailed,*  and  existed. 

Having  prepared  the  instrument  of  ratification  of  this  treaty, 
Hamilton  wrote  to  Jay — its  chief  and  most  able  negotiator, 
"We  have  now  concluded  the  great  work  of  independence,  but 
much  remains  to  be  done  to  reap  the  fruits  of  it.  Our  prospects 
are  not  flattering.  Every  day  proves  the  inefiicacy  of  the 
present  Confederation.  Yet  the  common  danger  being  removed, 
we  are  receding  instead  of  advancing  in  a  disposition  to  amend 
its  defects.  The  road  to  popularity  in  each  State  is,  to  inspire 
jealousies  of  the  power  of  Congress;  though  nothing  can  be 
more  apparent,  than  that  they  have  no  power;  and,  that  for 
the  want  of  it  the  resources  of  the  country  during  the  war  could 
not  be  drawn  out ;  and  we  at  this  moment  experience  all  the 
mischief  of  a  bankrupt  and  ruined  credit.  It  is  to  be  hoped, 
that  when  prejudice  and  folly  have  run  themselves  out  of  breath; 
we  may  return  to  reason  and  correct  our  errors." 

Discouraging  as  this  view  is,  Hamilton  resolved,  before  re- 
tiring from  Congress  to  make  another  effort  to  retrieve  by  a 
great  public  act,  the  public  affairs.  The  proposal  made  by  New 
York  to  the  other  States  to  unite  in  a  General  convention  to 
amend  the  Confederation,  framed  by  himself,  had  met  with  no 
response.  He  well  knew,  that  it  was  not  easy  to  relieve  the 
atrophy  of  a  nation.  Nevertheless,  though  disappointed  in  his 
exertions  to  recover  it  to  health,  full  of  apprehensions  as  to  the 
continuance  of  the  Union,  he  felt  that  it  was  a  high  duty  to  the 
people  of  this  young  country,  while  yet  united  in  a  general 
Confederacy,  again,  to  appeal  to  them  in  their  own  behalf, 
through  their  several  States,  to   save  that  Union.     With  this 

*0n  the  17th  December  1781  Virginia  passed  resolutions,  directing  the  Com- 
missioners at  Paris ;  "  neither  to  agree  to  any  restituticn  of  property  confiscated 
by  the  State;  nor  to  submit  that  the  laws  made  by  any  independent  State  of  the 
Union  be  subjected  to  the  adjudication  of  any  power  or  powers  on  Earth."  Con- 
gress resolved  "that  this  stipulation  could  not  be  retracted,  without  a 
violation  of  the  national  faith;  and  that  the  honor  and  interest  of  these  United 
States  require  that  it  should  be  substantially  complied  with."  Hist.  Rep.  ii  531. 
532. 


XllV  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

paramount  object  in  view,  he  framed  a  series  of  Eesolutions, 
setting  forth  in  much  detail  the  defects  of  the  Articles  of  tho 
Confederation,  enumerating  briefly  the  injurious  consequences 
of  these  defects;  declaring  the  necessity  of  "a  Government, 
capable,  both  in  peace  and  war,  of  making  every  member  of  the 
Union,  contribute  in  just  proportion  to  the  common  necessities; 
and  of  combining  and  directing  the  forces  and  wills  of  the 
several  parts  to  a  general  end ;"  and  recommending  to  the  States, 
"to  appoint  a  Conventio*\  to  meet  on  a  fixed  day;  with  full 
powers  to  revise  the  Confederation;  and  to  adopt  and  propose 
such  alterations,  as  to  them  shall  appear  necessary  to  be  finally 
approved  or  rejected  by  the  States  respectively." 

On  the  draft  of  these  resolutions  Hamilton  recorded  the  fact, 
that  they  "  were  intended  to  be  submitted  to  Congress,  biit 
abandoned  for  want  of  support."  Full  of  an  equal  apprehension 
as  to  the  continuance  of  the  Union,  Washington,  on  the  eighth 
of  June  on  the  disbanding  of  the  army,  addressed  a  circular 
letter  to  the  Governors  of  all  the  States.  In  this  parting  appeal, 
he  urged,  "  as  essential  not  only  to  the  well  being,  but  to  the 
existence  of  the  United  States  as  an  independent  power,  an 
indissoluble  union  of  the  States  under  one  common  head;"  "a 
sacred  regard  to  justice ;  the  adoption  of  a  proper  peace  estab- 
lishment," and  "the  prevalence  of  that  pacific  and  friendly  dis- 
position among  the  people  of  the  United  States,  which  will 
induce  them  to  forget  their  local  prejudices  and  policies,  to  make 
those  mutual  concessions,  which  are  requisite  to  the  general 
prosperity;  and,  in  some  instances,  to  sacrifice  their  individual 
advantages  to  the  interest  of  the  community." 

deferring  to  these  paternal  counsels,  Hamilton  thus  addressee 
his  late  commander  in  chief. 

"In  a  letter  which  I  wrote  to  you  several  months  ago,  I  inti- 
mated that  it  might  be  in  your  power  to  contribute  to  the 
establishment  of  our  federal  Union  upon  a  more  solid  basis.  I 
have  never  since  explained  myself  At  the  time,  I  was  in  hopes 
Congress  might  have  been  induced  to  take  decisive  ground ;  t^ 
inform  their  constituents  of  the  imperfections  of  the  present 
system,  and  of  the  impossibility  of  conductingthe  public  affairs 
with  honor  to  themselves  and  advantage  to  the  community; 
with  powers  so  disproportioned  to  their  responsibility ;  and 
having  done  this  in  a  full  and  forcible  manner,  to  adjourn,  the 
moment  the  definitive  treaty  was  ratifie  1.  In  retiring  at  the 
same  juncture,  I  wished  you,  in  a  solemn  manner,  to  declare  to 


VIRGINIA    REJECTS    THE    FINANCIAL    PLAN.  xl\ 

the  people,  3'our  intended  i*etreat  from  public  concerns;  your 
opinion  of  the  present  Government,  and  of  the  absolute  neces- 
sity of  a  change.  Before  I  left  Congress,  I  despaired  of  the 
first;  and  j-our  circular  letter  to  the  States  had  anticipated  the 
last.  I  trust  it  will  not  be  without  effect ;  though  I  am  per- 
suaded it  would  have  had  more,  combined  with  what  I  have 
mentioned.  At  all  events,  without  compliment,  sir,  it  will  do 
you  honor  with  the  sensible  and  well  meaning;  and  ultimately 
it  is  to  be  hoped,  with  the  people  at  large ;  when  the  present 
epidemic  frenzy  has  subsided."* 

That  frenzy  did  not  soon  subside;  and  the  interval  between 
the  ratification  of  the  Provisional  treaty  of  Peace  with  Great 
Britain;  and  the  operative  influence  of  the  present  Constitution, 
exhibits  an  unvarying  scene  of  national  degradation  and  un- 
relieved distress.  The  compromising  spirit  which  had  induced 
the  concessions  b}^  Congress  in  the  financial  policy  of  seventeen 
hundred  and  eighty  three  failed  wholly  of  its  purpose.  Sur- 
rendering all  that  could  commend  these  concessions  to  the  con- 
fidence of  true  national  views,  they  retained  too  much  to  satisfy 
the  distrusts  of  opposite  opinions.  This  twilight  soon  passed 
into  utter  darkness.  Not  more  than  six  months  had  elapsed 
since  the  conclusion  of  the  Definitive  treaty  of  peace  cheered 
the  public  heart ;  and  now,  at  the  time  that  Congress,  insulted 
by  a  contemptible  party  of  mutinous  soldiers,  clamoring  foi 
their  pay,  abandoned,  under  their  menaces,  the  seat  of  Govern 
ment,  the  rejection  by  Virginia  of  the  recent  financial  plan, 
reprobating  the  principles  enunciated  by  Hamilton  in  his  reply 
to  Ehode  Island,  was  announced.f  Blind  as  was  this  jealousy  • 
under  an  impression  that  she  had  contributed  disproportionately 
to  the  general  treasury ;  a  few  months  later,  Virginia  passed  a 
resolution,  in  precise  conformity  with  the  previously  expressed 
views  of  Madison ;  "  declaring  that  Congress  ought  to  enforce 
the  payment  of  the  balances  due  from  any  of  the  States  by  dis- 
tress" on  the  property  of  the  defaulting  States  or  of  their  citi- 
zens. J  Virginia  had  offensively  rejected  the  recent  financial 
plan,  chiefly  on  the  ground  of  the  assertion  of  the  safe  and 
necessarily  implied  power  of  the  Confederation  to  impose  and 
levy  duties  on  imports;  and  she  now  urged  the  exertion  of  a 
power — founded  solely  on  a  dangerous  implication  of  that  power, 

*  Hamilton's  Works,  i.  402. 

t  Joseph  Jones  to  Madison,  June  14,  1783. — Madison  Papers. 

X  Journal  of  House  of  Delegates  of  Virginia,  11,  12.     May  1784. 


Xm  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

as  incidental  to  a  league.  This  resolution — addressed  to  a  Con- 
gress whose  army  numbered  only  eighty  men — fell  lifeless  before 
the  Councils  of  the  Country,  now  called  upon  to  consult  the 
great  interests  which  peace  had  just  opened  to  its  view.  A  general 
power  in  Congress  to  regulate  commerce,  as  previously  stated, 
was  not  embraced  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation ;  and  though 
proposed  to  be  after  granted  was  not  conferred;  and  the 
measures  resorted  to  by  the  separate  States  only  proved  their 
utter  incapacity  of  self  protection.  Fully  aware  of  this  weak- 
ness, an(J  sore  at  her  defeats;  England,  by  a  proclamation  issued 
in  1783,  the  first  act  of  her  commercial  policy  towards  her  recent 
subjects;  closed  her  West  Indies  to  all  American  vessels;  and 
prohibited  in  her  own  vessels  the  introduction  there  of  fish  and 
other  articles.  Virginia,  smarting  under  recent  disgraces,  re- 
solved to  rush  into  a  peaceful  war  of  commercial  restrictions — 
long  the  after  favorite  policy  of  her  leaders.  At  the  next 
session  of  her  Legislature,  in  early  winter,  she  recommended 
Congress  to  prohibit  all  intercourse  with  England,  until  the 
restrictions  upon  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  were  re- 
moved. Congress,  now  composed  of  inferior  men,  recommended 
to  the  States  to  invest  them  with  powers  of  commercial  retalia- 
tion, for  a  limited  term.  These  powers,  though  again  asked, 
were  never  imparted  to  the  Confederation.  The  lessons  of  a 
short  experience  told  upon  Virginia,  as  they  did  upon  the  other 
States.  Ere  two  years  had  elapsed;  she  proposed  to  authorize 
Congress  to  regulate  the  foreign  and  internal  trade  of  the  States, 
and  to  collect  the  revenue  therefrom,  but  for  a  limited  term,  two 
thirds  of  the  States  concurring;  superadding  other  limitations. 
She,  at  the  same  time  refused  authority  to  collect  an  Impost. 
A  year  more  intervened,  when  Virgmia  passed  a  countervailing 
law ;  and  an  Act  giving  preference  of  duties  to  her  own  citizens. 
Nor  in  these  effete  measures  was  she  alone.  Instead  of  one 
general,  uniform,  commercial  policy  to  pervade  the  whole  Union, 
are  beheld,  similar  inchoations  of  strenuous  weakness — the  con- 
flicting laws  of  conflicting  States,  each  bidding  for  preferences  by 
rival  tariffs;  each  seeking  to  compel,  by  countervails  and  pro- 
hibitions, the  advantages  which  those  preferences  did  not  obtain 
The  results  of  these  commercial  rivalries  taught  the  needed 
lesson.  Pennsylvania,  while  enacting  a  restrictive  law,  pointed 
10  the  true  remedy — a  grant  to  Congress  of  one  of  the  powers, 
which  Hamilton  had  so  earnestly  urged  should  be  engrafted  on 
the   Confederation.     She   declared,  that  "  the   privilege  in  the 


A   CONVENTION    URGED.  xh^l 

degree  retained  by  the  States  individually,  of  controlling  and 
regulating  their  own  trade  was  no  longer  compatible  with  the 
general  interest  and  welfare  of  the  United  States."  Connecticut, 
tired  of  vain  experiments,  under  the  same  conviction,  at  last 
passed  an  Act  "vesting  Congress  with  power  to  regulate  the 
commerce  of  the  United  States )'  and  Massachusetts  wearied  of 
the  narrow  counsels  which  had  too  long  prevailed  there,  also 
asserted,  through  her  Governor,*  the  duty  of  vesting  in  Con- 
gress the  power  of  regulating  the  trade  of  the  whole  country. 
Nor  did  this  enlightened  person  stop  here.  "  It  is  of  great  im- 
portance," he  proclaimed,  "  and  the  happiness  of  the  United 
States  depends  upon  it,  that  Congress  should  be  vested  with  all 
the  powers  necessary  to  preserve  the  Union,  to  manage  the 
general  concerns  of  it,  and  promote  its  common  interest."  With 
this  intent,  he  proposed  a  convention,  whose  agreement,  when 
confirmed  by  the  States,  would  comprehend  these  powers.  The 
approving  legislature,  declaring  that  the  powers  of  Congress 
were  "  not  fully  adequate  to  the  great  purposes  they  were 
originally  designed  to  effect,"  urged  Congress  to  recommend, 
"  a  Convention  from  all  the  States,  to  revise  the  Confederation ; 
and  report  to  Congress,  how  far  it  may  be  necessary  in  their 
opinion,  to  alter  or  enlarge  the  same,  in  order  to  secure  and 
■perpetuate  the  primary  objects  of  the  Union."  This  resolution 
was  not  submitted  to  Congress  by  her  delegates;  under  an  im- 
pression that  the  proposed  powers  ought  only  to  be  *'  temporary, 
until  approved  by  experience ;"  and,  that,  if  a  Convention  was 
necessary,  its  members,  should  be  limited  in  their  authority, 
and  confined  to  the  revision  of  such  parts  of  the  Confedera- 
tion, as  are  supposed  defective;  and  not  be  intrusted  with  a 
general  revision  of  the  articles,  and  a  right  to  report  a  ''  plan 
of  federal  government  essentially  different  from  the  Eepublican 
form,  now  administered."  In  consequence,  a  resolution  passed, 
declaring  that  no  further  proceedings  be  had  for  revising  the 
Confederation.  A  sterner  will  was  at  this  time  curbing  New 
York. 

An  enlargement  of  the  powers  of  Congi'ess  to  countervail 
Great  Britain  was  there  proposed, — not  granted;  but  a  discri- 
minating duty  against  British  vessels  was  imposed  by  her  legis- 
lature. The  next  year,  Congress  were  vested  by  this  body  with 
the  retaliatory  commercial  powers  it  had  asked ;  but  were  ex 

♦  Message  of  Governor  Bowdoin.     May  31,  1785.     Hist.  Rep.  iii    136 


Xlviii  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

pressly  forbidden  collecting  any  revenue  within  the  State  without 
its  sanction.  The  declaring  her  bills  of  credit  a  legal  tender  fol- 
lowed, a  vicious  example — forthwith  copied  by  North  Carolina 
and  Georgia,  and  enforced  in  Rhode  Island,  by  penal  laws. 
Amid  this  wide  distemperature,  an  abdication  of  the  Union  by 
New  England  became  a  current  topic;  and  disaffection  was 
exasperated  into  violence  among  large  bodies  of  their  people, 
by  the  honest  vigor  of  Massachusetts,  and  of  New  Hampshire, 
maintaining  the  obligations  of  their  public  faith.  This  threat- 
ened collapse  was  prevented  there.  But  in  the  two  chief  plant- 
ing States,  where  the  tone  of  the  public  pulse  was  weaker,  and 
the  necessary  vigor  of  government  was  suspended ;  all  was  tend- 
ing to  an  early  dismemberment.  Kentucky  broke  from  unresist- 
ing Virginia.  North  Carolina  was  dissevered,  and  a  fragment 
of  her  domain  was  forming  into  an  independent  State;  while 
the  vast  Western  region  of  the  United  States, — the  present  seat 
of  mighty  opulence  and  patriotic  power,  seemed  sliding  off  from 
the  feeble  hold  of  a  dissolving  league.  In  the  midst  of  this 
huge  discord,  the  basis  of  a  concentrated  vigorous  government 
might  have  been  laid  in  the  region  extending  from  the  St.  Croix 
to  Maryland;  but  below,  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  physical  obsta- 
cles are  seen  in  many  an  aspect.  Virginia,  though  looming 
with  pride  at  her  vast  interior  space,  early  felt  the  impossibility 
of  a  total  isolation ;  and  in  the  second  year  of  Independence, 
sought  a  compact  with  Maryland  to  arrange  the  jurisdiction  of 
their  confluent  wtiters,  and  common  Estuary.  In  the  first  year 
of  peace;  she  again  appointed  a  commission  of  conference, 
which  was  renewed  the  following  year,  when  her  Commissioners 
met  at  Mount  Vernon  with  those  of  Maryland.  There  they 
agreed  upon  an  Act,  regulating  the  commercial  intercourse 
through  the  Potomac  and  Chesapeake,  and  defining  the  juris- 
diction of  each  State.  But,  at  the  moment  of  framing  this  com- 
pact, these  commissioners  deemed  it  necessary  to  extend  its 
provisions,  so  as  to  authorize  the  establishment  of  a  naval  force 
to  protect  their  intervenient  waters,  and  the  formation  of  a 
mutual  tariff.  This  compact,  by  the  Articles  of  Confederation, 
required  the  previous  consent  of  Congress.  To  obviate  this 
difficulty,  these  deputies  recommended  to  their  respective  States, 
the  appointment  of  other  Commissioners  with  enlarged  powers, 
to  whose  proceedings  the  permission  of  Congress  was  to  be  soli- 
cited. In  the  first  month  of  the  ensuing  year,*  Virginia  passed 
*  January  13,  1786. 


VIRGINIA   PROPOSES   A   COMMERCIAL   CONVENTION.         xlix 

resolutions  for  an  uniformity  of  duties  between  the  two  States; 
and  that  Commissioners  be  chosen  to  meet  annually,  if  required, 
to  regulate  their  mutual  commercial  interests.  A  few  days 
after,*  she  directed  the  projected  arrangement  to  be  communi- 
cated to  all  the  other  States,  inviting  a  general  meeting  of 
deputies  for  the  precise  purpose  of  considering,  "  how  far  a  uni- 
form system  of  taxation  in  their  commercial  intercourse  and 
regulations  might  be  necessary  to  their  common  interest  and 
permanent  harmony;  and  to  report  to  the  several  States,  such 
an  act  relative  to  this  great  object,  as  when  unanimously  rati- 
fied by  them;  will  enable  the  United  States  in  Congress  assem- 
bled, effectually  to  provide  for  the  same."f  A  circular  letter, 
transmitting  this  resolution,  named  Annapolis,  as  the  place  of 
meeting  in  the  following  September.  This  procedure  merely 
contemplated  a  commercial  arrangement,  far  short  of  the  pre- 
vious proposals — first  of  New  York,  then  of  Massachusetts. 

It  is  the  province  of  the  highest  order  of  minds,  to  see  in  the 
embryo  of  events,  the  fruits  that  are  being  born,  and  that  may 
ripen  to  a  rich  maturity.  By  the  intelligent  interests  of  the 
navigating  States,  Hamilton  felt  almost  assured,  that  every 
obstacle  to  the  organization  of  an  efficacious  Government,  would 
yield  to  wise  persuasions ;  but  so  far  the  planting  States, slow  to 
learn  and  obstinate  in  their  prejudices, had  given  no  promise  of 
enlightened  convictions.  This  proposition  was  their  first  great 
advance ;  and  he  seized  with  delight  the  opportunity  of  earnest 
necessities  that  would  not  long  be  baffled.  The  first  thing  was 
to  accomplish  the  co-operation  of  New  York.  While  the  com- 
mercial strifes  of  the  several  States  were  going  on,  the  grant 
to  Congress  of  the  long  sought  power  of  raising  a  revenue  from 
imports  was  still  deferred, — ^partly  owing  to  the  fallacious 
schemes  of  1784  and  1785 ;  but  chiefly  to  the  non  compliance  of 
the  two  Central  States, — Pennsylvania  and  New  York. 

Hemmed  in  by  these  great  States,  jealous  of  their  commercial 
superiority,  and  disappointed  in  her  efforts  to  induce  a  liberal 
general  policy.  New  Jersey  now  took  a  decisive  step.  She 
passed  a  resolution,  reciting,  as  a  reason  for  it,  the  delinquency 
of  other  States,  refusing  a  compliance  with  the  requisition  of 
Congress  for  her  quota;  "  until  all  the  States  in  the  Union  had 
complied  with  the   revenue   system  of  seventeen  hundred  and 

*  Hist.  Repub.  iii.  160. 

t  Moved  by  John  Tyler,  father  of  a  late  President    f  the  U.  S. 


1  HISTORICAL    NOTICE, 

eighty  three;  or  until,  States  having  peculiar  commercial  ad- 
vantages, should  forbear  a  system  of  partial  legislation."  Yield- 
ing to  wise  influences  she  rescinded  this  resolution ;  but  declared, 
that  the  requisition  had  no  binding  force.  There  was  reason  to 
expect  that  Pennsylvania  would  perform  her  federal  duty,  and 
would  enlarge  the  federal  powers ;  but  that  New  York  would 
depart  from  her  then  selfish  and  obnoxious  policy,  there  was 
little  ground  of  hope.  The  improvident  importations  made  on 
the  return  of  peace  had  poured  into  her  coffers  a  large  revenue, 
increased  by  the  navigation  acts  of  other  States ;  rendering  her 
the  entrepot  of  the  region  east  of  the  Delaware.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  was  not  difficult  to  inculcate  a  persuasion, 
"that  the  commercial  advantage  of  the  State  depended  upon 
retaining  the  power  to  collect  her  own  revenues."*  Thus  cupi- 
dity, and  ambition,  and  pride  were  all  united  in  blinding  her  to 
exterior  dangers;  in  giving  her  an  undue  sense  of  her  own  im- 
portance ;  and  in  rendering  her,  for  the  time,  a  jealous  advocate 
of  State  sovereignty  !  This  was  seen  in  all  her  recent  persistent 
legislation.  An  act  passed,  in  accordance  with  the  first  recom- 
mendation of  Congress,  in  seventeen  hundred  and  eighty  one,  of 
the  grant  of  power  to  raise  an  impost,  giving  them  the  fullest 
authority  to  levy,  and  collect  it  by  their  own  officers,  was  re- 
pealed ;  and,  although  the  grant  was  renewed,  the  duties  were  to 
be  collected  by  the  officers,  and  under  the  authority  of  the  State.  The 
second  recommendation  of  Congress,  in  seventeen  hundred  and 
eighty  three,  was  rejected  by  the  two  successive  legislatures  of 
seventeen  hundred  and  eighty  four,  and  eighty  five;  and  in 
eighty  six,  though  a  power  of  raising  a  revenue  by  an  impost 
was  granted,  "  the  sole  power  of  levying  and  collecting  the 
duties"  was  reserved  to  the  State.  Thus  denied  all  virility, 
Congress  eoald  only  implore.  Hamilton  felt  that  it  was  now 
time  to  bring  to  a  definite  issue,  the  pregnant  question  in  her 
policy,  of  granting  or  refusing  the  means  of  maintaining  the 
Union;  if  refused  by  her,  of  her  entering  into  a  concert  in 
a  general  arrangement  embracing  leading  national  objects.f 

*  Curtis — History  of  the  Constitution,  i.  344.  In  opposition  to  tlie  adoption 
of  the  present  Constitution  was  a  busy  organization  called  "  The  Republican 
Club,"  the  most  active  person  of  which  in  his  correspondence  with  the  oppo- 
nents of  it  in  other  States,  was  the  Collector  of  the  New  York  Customs 
Becrge  Mason  agreed  to  act  as  chairman  of  the  "  Republican  Society"  in  Vir 
ginia. — Life  of  John  Lamb. 

■f  "Hamilton,"  Colonel  Troup  relates,  *' had  no  idea  that  the  legislature 
could  be  prevailed  on   to  adopt   tlie  system  as  recommended  by  Congress; 


Hamilton's  report  from  annapolib  li 

Massachusetts,  checked  for  a  time  in  her  forward  action,  was 
now  again  in  motion.  Her  Governor,  after  descanting  upon  the 
importance  of  conferring  the  requisite  powers  upon  Congress, 
placed  before  her  legislature  the  grave  enquiiy — "  Shall  the 
Union  cease  to  exist  ?" ;  and,  as  soon  as  he  received  the  Circular 
of  Virginia,  recommended  an  appointment  of  Commissioners  to 
the  contemplated  Commercial  Convention,  which  was  made. 
New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  and  Delaware  united  with  Virginia 
in  the  mission  to  Annapolis,  where  Benson,  the  Attorney  Gene- 
ral.  and  Hamilton,  two  of  the  representatives  appointed  by  the 
legislature  of  New  York,  arrived  on  the  seventh  of  September. 
After  some  delay,  awaiting  the  deputies  from  other  States  who 
did  not  appear,  this  assemblage  of  only  twelve  persons,  ap- 
pointed a  committee  to  prepare  a  report,  which  being  accepted, 
the  Convention  adjourned. 

The  draft  of  this  report  was  by  Hamilton,  though  not  formally 
one  of  the  Committee.*  In  this  draft,  as  originally  framed, 
Hamilton  exhibited  at  large,  the  condition  of  the  country,  and 
the  necessity  of  an  efficient  national  Government.  But,  from 
the  opinions  he  met  there,  and  from  the  lukewarmness  mani- 
fested by  the  non-attendance  of  the  delegates  of  most  of  the 
States,  it  was  thought,  that  his  statements  were  too  full,  and 
explicit;  and  he  reduced  the  report  to  the  form  in  which  it  was 
issuedf  on  the  fourteenth  of  September  seventeen  hundred  and 
eighty  six.  It  was  addressed  to  the  five  States  there  repre- 
sented ;  and  copies  of  it  were  transmitted  to  Congress  and  to  the 
executives  of  the  other  States.  The  terms  of  this  Address  are 
seen  to  have  been  very  carefully  guarded,  so  as  to  be  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  thirteenth  of  the  articles  of  the  Confedera- 

neither  had  he  any  partiality  for  a  commercial  convention,  otherwise  than  aa 
a  stepping  stone  to  a  general  convention,  to  form  a  General  Constitution.  In 
pursuance  of  his  plan,  Mr.  Duer,  the  late  Colonel  Malcolm  and  myself,  were 
sent  to  the  State  legislature,  as  part  of  the  city  delegation,  and  we  were  to 
make  every  possible  effort  to  accomplish  Hamilton's  objects.  *  *  *  We  went 
all  our  strength  in  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  attend  the  commercial 
convention,  in  which  we  were  successful — Hamilton  was  appointed  one  of 
them.  Thus  it  was,  that  he  was  the  principal  instrument  to  turn  the  State  to 
a  course  of  policy  that  saved  our  country  from  incalculable  mischiefs,  if  not 
from  ruin." 

*  Memoir  published  by  Judge  Benson. 

■^  Edmund  Randolph,  Governor  of  Virginia,  objected  to  the  Report  as  first 
framed;  Madison  then  observed  to  Hamilton,  "You  had  better  yield  to  this 
arm.  otherwise  all  Virginia  will  be  against  you." 


.11  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

tion,  which  required  that,  "any  alteration  of  them  should  be 
agreed  to  in  Congress,  and  confirmed  by  the  legislature  of  every 
State  ;"  while  the  latitude  with  which  the  object  of  the  proposed 
Convention  is  expressed — "  to  devise  such  further  provisions  as 
shall  appear  to  them  necessary  to  render  the  Constitution  of  the 
federal  government  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the  Union,"  in- 
dicates clearly  Hamilton's  determined  purpose  to  endeavor  to 
establish  a  well  organized  National  Government.  The  con- 
templated general  Convention  was  asked  to  meet  at  Philadel- 
phia on  the  second  Monday  of  the  coming  May. 

This  interval  was  momentous.  The  insurrection  in  New 
England,  suppressed  by  a  local  force,  raised  without  waiting  the 
sanction  of  Congress,  which  the  Articles  of  Confederation  re- 
quired, proved  the  want  of  the  peace  establishment  which  Hamil- 
ton in  vain,  had  planned  and  urged ;  and  New  York,  in  stolid  stub- 
bornness, was  defying  everj'^  appeal  to  her  better  reason,  to  her 
great  interests,  and  to  her  highest  duty.  The  other  States  had  at 
length  gi'anted  to  Congress,  power  to  levy  and  collect  an  imjDOst. 
These  grants,  the  last  act  of  New  York  in  relation  to  it,  rendered 
nugatory.  In  this  great  emergency,  Congress  requested  her 
Governor  to  convene  an  extra  session  of  her  legislature.  Clinton 
refused  on  the  ground,  that  his  power  to  convene  it  was  limited, 
to  "  extraordinary  occasions."  Congress,  then  sitting  at  New 
York,  declared  that  the  act  of  New  York  was  not  a  compliance 
with  the  general  plan — that  "  the  present  critical  and  embar- 
rassed state  of  the  finances  was  such  as  to  require  that  the 
system  of  impost  should  be  carried  into  immediate  effect;"  that 
they  consider  this  as  "  an  occasion  sufficiently  important  and 
extraordinary"  for  the  convening  of  the  legislature,  and  earnestly 
recommended  that  it  should  be  immediately  called.  Clinton  was 
deaf  to  this  most  earnest  appeal.  The  friends  of  the  Union  in 
New  York  were  roused  with  indignation.  They  resolved  to 
endeavour  to  redeem  their  State  from  such  misguiding.  General 
Schuyler  had  again  been  elected  to  its  Senate.  Hamilton,  though 
opposed  by  the  men  whose  cupidity  he  had  exposed  in  'eighty 
four,  and  who  were  among  the  chief  adherents  of  Clinton,  was 
chosen  by  the  City  of  New  York,  one  of  its  members  of  Assem- 
bly. His  services  in  this  body  have  left  a  marked  impress  on 
the  legislative  code  of  this  State;  but  these  were  secondary  to 
the  influence  he  was  enabled  to  exert  upon  the  counsels  of  the 
Confederacy.  The  question  before  it,  which  rose  in  magnitudo 
above  all  others,  was — that  of  the  grant  to  Congress  of  tbo 


Hamilton's  speech  on  grant  of  impost.  Hh 

power  to  raise  an  Impost.  In  behalf  of  this  grant,  Hamilton 
made  an  effort  of  argument  and  of  eloquence  not  below  the 
momentous  topic — the  union  and  general  welfare  of  a  free 
people.  Around  him  were  standing  the  few  disheartened  mem- 
bers of  an  anxious  Congress  ;  and  most  of  the  most  distinguished 
men  of  the  State.  His  effort,  though  thwarted,  was  not  in  vain, 
for  he  then  and  there  established  an  influence,  which,  perhaps, 
it  may  not  be  erroneously  stated,  established  the  Federal  con- 
stitution. What  force  of  mind  he  displayed  is  seen  in  the  fact, 
that  not  one  of  the  numerous  opposition  ventured  a  reply.  The 
resolution  for  the  grant  was  defeated  by  a  silent  vote — as  was 
said — "  the  Impost  was  strangled  by  a  band  of  mutes."  This  vote 
was  given  on  the  fifteenth  of  February  1787  while  Congress 
were  still  hesitating  their  approval  of  the  proposed  General  Con- 
vention. Though  outvoted  in  this  measure,  Hamilton  felt  that 
in  all  this  exertion  of  his  powers,  his  gracious  temper  had 
rightly  touched  the  temper  of  the  Assembly ;  and,  the  day  after 
this  vote,  a  notice  was  given  of  an  intended  motion  for  an  in- 
struction to  Congress  to  recommend  the  call  of  a  general  Con- 
vention. This  proposed  instruction  was  expressive  of  the  great 
purpose  in  Hamilton's  thoughts; — that  "of  revising  the  Articles 
of  Confederation  and  perpetual  Union,  by  such  alterations  and 
amendments,  as  a  majority  of  the  representatives  shall  judge 
proper  and  necessary  to  render  them  adequate  to  the  preserva- 
tion and  government  of  the  Union."  Had  this  insti'uction  as 
thus  framed  passed,  the  present  civil  conflict  would  not  have 
taken  place,  and  the  question  of  the  duration  of  this  Govern- 
ment would  not  continue  to  agitate  thoughtful  minds.  Though 
injuriously  modified  in  its  terms  by  the  State  party  in  the  House, 
this  Instruction  passed ;  and  through  the  influence  of  Schuyler, 
at  an  urgent  moment,  was  adopted  by  the  Senate,  by  a  majority 
of  07ie  vote.  The  next  day,  Hamilton's  Report  from  Annapolis, 
was  called  up  in  Congress.  By  some  it  was  supposed  their 
sanction  of  the  Convention  might  stimulate ;  by  others  it  waa 
alleged,  that  it  would  impede  the  action  of  the  States.  Some 
looked  with  jealousy  at  a  body  so  formed,  others  doubted  its 
"  legality."  Amid  this  perplexity — at  this  critical  moment — the 
instruction  of  New  York  was  presented  to  them  and  determined 
their  action.  Its  precise  instruction  failed,  though  supported  by 
Massachusetts  and  Virginia.  A  new  resolution,  offered  by  a 
member  of  the  former  state,  being  amended,  passed. 

Referring  to  the  provision  for  their  alteration,  in  the  Articles 


llV  .  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

of  the  Confederation,  and  to  "  the  instructions  of  several  States ; 
and  particularly  the  State  of  New  York;"  and  declaring  it  to  be 
"  the  most  probable  means  of  establishing  in  these  States  a  firm 
national  Government,"  it  sanctioned  the  contemplated  Conven- 
tion, for  the  purpose  "  of  revising"  the  Confederation,  and  re- 
porting to  Congress  and  to  the  several  States  "  such  alterations 
and  provisions  therein,  as  shall,  when  agreed  to  by  Congress,  and 
confirmed  by  the  States,  render  the  Federal  Constitution,  ade- 
quate to  the  exigencies  of  government  and  the  preservation  of 
the  Union.''  One  great  barrier,  Hamilton  had  now  removed. 
Congress  had  surrendered  its  exclusive  right  to  innovate  upon 
the  Articles  of  the  Confederation.  His  great  purpose  was  at- 
tained— the  calling  of  a  Convention  to  be  composed  of  men  of 
the  highest  intellect,  and  the  longest  and  largest  experience  ir. 
this  country, — by  Congress,  thus  giving  its  sanction  to  this 
new  body  when  convened — and  trusting  to  the  indeterminate 
commissions  of  its  members,  to  organize  a  government  fully 
capable  of  promoting  and  perpetuating  the  welfare  of  a  great 
nation.  Nor  was  this  all.  The  existing  Government  was,  by 
this  act,  made  auxiliary  to  its  own  modification,  or  even  subver- 
sion, by  the  substitution  of  another  government,  without  vio- 
lating the  constitutional  provisions  of  the  Confederation ;  and, 
still  looking  to  every  contingency,  the  ligaments  of  the  imper- 
fect league  were  preserved ;  until,  perhaps,  the  coming  of  some 
more  favorable  moment  for  its  reconstruction.  This  may  be 
pronounced  a  masterly  achievement. 

Having  thus  successfully  exerted  the  influence  of  this  act  of 
reluctant  New  York  upon  the  reluctant  Congress;  Hamilton 
was  eager  to  derive  the  benefit  of  the  influence  of  this  recom- 
mendation of  Congress  upon  that  State  ;  and  five  days  after,  he 
presented  a  resolution  to  the  assembly  of  New  York,  conform- 
ing to  that  recommendation,  for  the  appointment  of  five  com- 
missioners to  meet  in  the  General  Convention.  The  proposed 
number  was  reduced  to  three ;  and  a  proviso  was  urged,  that 
the  alterations  and  provisions  of  the  Confederation  "  should  be 
not  repugnant  to,  or  inconsistent  with  the  Constitution  of  this 
State."*  This  proviso  was  lost  by  the  vote  of  the  presiding 
officer  of  the  Senate.  Hamilton's  resolution  was  passed ;  and 
on  the  eighth  of  March,  Hamilton,  Lansing  and  Yates  were  ap- 
pointed the  three  commissioners.     As  the  rule  of  the  Confedera- 

*  Proposed  by  Chief  Justice  Yates. 


GENERAL  COXVENTION  MEETS.  Iv 

tion  of  voting  by  States,  probably  would  be  adopted ;  and  as  his 
colleagues  differed  from  him  in  their  views,  Hamilton  proposed, 
near  the  end  of  the  session,  to  add  two  delegates.  This  motion 
prevailed  in  the  assembly,  but  was  defeated  in  the  Senate. 
Happily  for  his  fame,  this  result  did  not  prevent  his  assuming, 
finally,  a  responsibility  from  which  he  did  not  shrink,  and  which 
proved  of  large  benefit  to  the  American  people.  Vii'ginia,  New 
Tersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  and  North  Carolina  appointed 
their  Commissioners,  not  \yaiting  the  sanction  of  Congress. 
This  sanction  being  given,  each  of  the  other  States,  Rhod'^ 
Island  excepted,  also  chose  a  deputation. 

Amid  a  great  diversity  of  opinions,  and  of  interests,  the 
Federal  Convention  met  at  Philadelphia  on  the  fourteenth  of 
May  seventeen  hundred  and  eighty  seven,  when,  a  majority  of 
States  not  being  represented,  it  adjourned  to  the  twenty-fifth 
of  that  mouth.  It  is  an  evidence  of  the  uncertain  anticipations 
of  the  result  of  its  consultations,  that  Washington  long  hesi- 
tated becoming  a  member  of  it ;  and  that  Connecticut  deferred 
the  choice  of  her  delegation  to  it  until  May ;  and  New  Hamp- 
shire until  the  following  June.  Nine  States  having  appeared 
on  the  day  to  which  it  had  adjourned,  they  gave  to  its  proceed- 
ings all  the  weight  and  influence  of  "Washington's  great  cha- 
racter and  popularity,  by  electing  him  to  preside.  To  secure  to 
its  deliberations  the  utmost  freedom  from  external  pressure, 
these  deliberations  were  ordered  to  be  secret. 

Four  days  later,  on  the  twenty  ninth  of  May,  a  series  of 
propositions  for  a  National  government  were  submitted  for 
consideration  to  a  committee  of  the  whole  body*  by  Edmund 
Randolph,  of  Virginia,  and  having  been  discussed  and  amended, 
were  reported  to  the  House  on  the  thirteenth  of  June.  They 
were  called  "  the  Virginia  Plan."  Two  days  after,  a  number 
of  resolves,  framed  by  several  of  the  representatives  of  States, 
especially  sedulous  for  a  large  retention  of  power  in  the  States, 
were  presented.  They  were  called  "  The  Jersey  Plan."  These 
being  referred  to  a  Committee  of  the  whole  House,  the  Virginia 
resolutions  were  recommitted. 

The  broad  question,  whether  "  a  national  government  ought 
to  be  established,  consisting  of  a  Supreme  legislative,  executive* 

*  A  plan  of  Government  was  submitted  by  Charles  Pinckney,  not  that  on  thb 
Journal,  but  that  stated  in  "No.  2687  of  Select  Tracts  of  New  York  Historioal 
Society."     It  does  not  appear  to  haye  gained  any  special  attention. 


ivi  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

and  judiciary,"  or  the  Articles  of  Confederation  with  enlarged 
powers,  was  now  before  the  Convention.  The  Virginia  plan, 
as  essentially  modified,  proposed  a  National  Legislature  to  con- 
sist of  two  branches — the  first  "to  be  elected  by  the  people  of 
the  several  States  for  the  term  of  three  years" — the  second,  "  by 
the  individual  legislatures;" — and  it  was  resolved,  that  this 
legislature  so  organized,  "  ought  to  be  empowered  to  enjoy  the 
legislative  rights  vested  in  Congress  by  the  Confederation ;" 
and,  moreover,  "  to  legislate  on  all  cases  to  which  the  separate 
States  are  incompetent,  or  in  which  the  harmony  of  the  United 
States  may  be  interrupted  by  the  exercise  of  individual  legisla- 
tion; and  to  negative  all  laws  passed  by  the  several  States 
contravening  in  the  opinion  of  the  national  legislature  the  arti- 
cles of  union,  or  any  treaties  subsisting  under  the  authority  of 
the  Union."  It  was  declared,  that  the  right  of  suffrage  in  the 
first  branch  ought  to  be  "in  proportion  to  the  whole  number 
of  white  and  other  free  citizens  and  inhabitants  of  every  age> 
sex,  and  condition,  including  those  bound  to  servitude  for  a 
term  of  years,  acd  three  fifths  of  all  other  persons  not  compre- 
hended in  the  foregoing  description,  except  Indians,  not  paying 
taxes  in  each  State;"  and,  that  the  right  of  suffrage  in  the 
second  branch  ought  to  be  according  to  the  same  rule ; — that  a 
National  Executive  be  instituted  to  consist  of  one  person,  to  be 
chosen  by  the  National  legislature,  for  the  term  of  seven  years, 
with  power  to  carry  into  execution  the  National  laws;  to 
appoint  to  offices  in  cases  not  otherwise  provided  for;  to  be  in- 
eligible a  second  time;  to  be  removable  on  impeachment  and 
conviction  of  malpractice  or  neglect  of  duty;  and  to  receive  a 
fixed  stipend  from  the  national  treasury,  with  a  veto  on  any 
legislative  act,  unless  afterwards  passed  by  two  thirds  of  each 
branch  of  the  legislature ; — and  that  a  National  Judiciary  be 
established;  to  consist  of  one  Supreme  tribunal,  appointed  by 
the  second  branch  of  the  legislature,  to  hold  ofiice  during  good 
behaviour,  with  fixed  compensations,  unalterable  as  to  the  in- 
cumbents— with  power  to  the  National  legislature  to  appoint 
inferior  tribunals.  The  judicial  jurisdiction  was  to  extend  to 
all  cases  respecting  "the  collection  of  the  National  revenue, 
impeachments  of  any  National  officers;  and  questions  which 
involve  the  National  peace  and  harmony."  The  several  depart- 
ments being  thus  organized  and  their  powers  expressed ;  a  pro- 
vision was  added,  for  "  the  admission  of  States  lawfully  arising 
without  the  limits  of  the  U  aited  States."    A  provision  was  also 


JERSEY  PLAN  OF  GOVERNMENT.  Ml 

made,  for  the  continuance  of  Congress  and  its  authorities  until 
a  given  day  after  the  reform  of  the  Articles  of  Union  shall  be 
adopted,  and  for  the  completion  of  all  their  engagements. 
Likewise,  a  resolution,  that  a  republican  constitution  and  its 
existing  laws,  ought  to  be  guaranteed  to  each  State  by  the 
United  States — another  resolution,  that  provision  ought  to  be 
made  for  the  amendment  of  the  Articles  of  Union — and  that 
the  legislative,  executive  and  judiciary  powers  ought  to  be 
bound  by  oath  to  support  the  Articles  of  Union ; — and  a  final 
resolution,  that  the  amendments  "offered  by  the  Convention, 
ought,  after  the  approbation  of  Congress,  to  bo  submitted  to  an 
assembly  or  assemblies  of  representatives,  recommended  by  the 
several  legislatures,  to  be  expressly  chosen  by  the  people,  to  con- 
sider and  decide  thereon." 

"The  Jersey  planj"  in  direct  contrast  with  that  originating 
with  Virginia,  proposed;  "  that  the  Articles  of  Confederation  be 
BO  revised,  corrected  and  enlarged,  as  to  render  the  federal  con- 
stitution adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  government  and  the  pre- 
servation of  the  Union."  In  addition  to  the  existing  powers, 
were  proposed  those  of  levying  certain  revenue  duties  and  of 
regulating  commerce — retaining  the  system  of  requisitions — 
numbers  being  substituted  as  the  measure  of  contribution; — 
retaining  a  single  legislative  body  with  the  command  of  the 
purse  and  of  the  sword,  deriving  its  authority  from  the  States ; 
and  with  equality  of  suffrage  by  the  States ;  but  giving  no  nega- 
tive upon  the  States.  It  contemplated  a  plural  Executive,  with 
authority  to  execute  the  federal  acts,  to  appoint  federal  oflScers, 
and  to  direct  all  military  operations ;  removable  for  misconduct, 
on  application  by  a  majority  of  the  executives  of  the  several  States; 
and  without  a  negative  on  the  acts  of  this  single  legislative 
body.  It  proposed  also,  a  federal  judiciary  to  consist  of  a 
Supi*eme  tribunal ;  to  be  appointed  by  the  Executive,  and  to 
hold  during  good  behaviour;  authorized  to  hear  appeals  in 
several  specified  cases,  and  to  try  impeachments  of  federal 
officers,  without  any  other  original  jurisdiction,  and  without 
providing  for  inferior  tribunals.  It  was  likewise  resolved; 
"  that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary  powers  within  the 
respective  States,  ought  to  be  bound  by  oath  to  support  the 
Articles  of  Union;"  and  that  Acts  of  Congress,  "lawfully  made, 
and  all  treaties  made  and  ratified  under  the  authority  of  the 
United  States,  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  respective  States, 
as  far  as  those  acts  and  treaties  ghall  relate  to  the  said  States  or 


/viii  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

to  thiir  citizens;"  and  that  the  State  judiciaries  shall  Ov.  bound 
therel)y.  To  this  impotent  system,  was  superadded  an  express 
power  to  the  federal  executive  "  to  call  forth  the  powers  of  the 
Confederated  States  to  enforce  and  compel"  by  States  or  indi- 
vidual bodies,  an  obedience  to  the  acts  of  the  Confederacy  or  an 
observance  of  its  treaties.  It  also  provided  for  the  admission  of 
new  States,  and  for  the  hearing  and  decision  of  territorial 
disputes. 

It  is  seen,  that  this  plan  proposed  merely  a  modification  of  the 
Articles  of  Confederation ;  and  in  most  respects  a  modification 
embracing  the  several  propositions  made  to  Congress,  from  time 
to  time,  prior  to  the  call  of  the  Convention.  It  was  in  accord- 
ance with  the  policy  of  its  advocates,  to  place  themselves  on  the 
ground  of  a  strict  observance  of  the  terms  of  their  Commissions 
from  their  several  States.  The  resolutions  of  Virginia,  even 
much  as  they  had  been  amended,  presented  features  little  less 
objectionable.  With  the  undefined  powers  given  to  the  national 
legislature,  it  was  also  empowered  "  to  negative  all  laws  passed 
by  the  several  States,  contravening,  in  the  opinion  of  the  na- 
tional legislature,  the  articles  of  Union,  or  any  treaties  subsist- 
ing under  its  authority;"  superadding  the  election  of  the  Execu- 
tive b}'  the  general  legislature,  and  the  choice  of  the  Judiciary  by 
the  second  branch  of  this  legislature.  A  Government  so  consti- 
tuted could  not  have  been  established ;  or  if  established,  could  not 
have  maintained  itself,  without  constant  collisions  with  the  States, 
early  fatal  to  its  existence,  or  without  resulting  in  an  intolerable 
tyranny.  The  two  plans  before  the  Convention  were  hopelessly 
irreconcilable.  A  dissolution  of  the  Convention,  and  a  dissolu- 
tion of  the  frail  union  were  impending — almost  instant. 

Hamilton,  though  by  the  uniting  controlling  voice  of  his  two 
colleagues  from  New  York,  without  a  vote,  resolved  to  present  a 
plan — himself  free  from  any  weak  reserves — in  the  approach  to 
which  might  be  framed  a  Government,  resting  entirely  on  the 
free  voice  and  power  of  the  American  people.  Aware  of  the  ex- 
isting heresy,  that  "  a  party  to  a  compact  has  a  right  to  revoke 
that  compact" — the  very  heresy  upon  which  the  existing  rebellion 
places  its  vindication,  asserting  that  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  is  a  mere  compact  of  several  sovereign  States ; — 
he  fully  saw  "  the  necessity  of  laying  the  foundations  of  the 
National  Government  deeper  than  in  the  mere  sanction  of 
delegated  authority."  "  The  fabric  of  the  American  Empire," 
are  his  words,  "  ought  to  rest  on  the  solid  basis  of  the  consent 


RIGHTS    OF    SUFFRAGE.  llX 

OF  THE  People."  "  The  streams  of  national  power  ought  to 
flow  immediately  from  that  pure  original  fountain  of  all  legiti 
mate  authority."  This  elementary,  leading  principle  of  his 
policy  was  avowed  by  him,  on  the  first  da}^  of  the  deliberations 
of  the  Convention.  The  initial  proposition  of  Virginia  in  the 
formation  of  a  new  Government  was ;  "  that  the  right  of  suffrage 
in  the  National  legislature,  ought  to  be  proportioned  to  the 
quotas  of  contribution,  or  to  the  number  of  free  inhabitants,  as 
the  one  or  the  other  may  seem  best  in  different  cases."  Hamilton 
met  the  open  question  at  once  by  a  resolution,  "that  the  rights 
of  suffrage  in  the  National  legislature  ought  to  be  proportioned 
to  the  number  of  free  inhabitants."*  This  principle  having 
been  adopted,  as  to  the  first  branch  of  the  legislature,  was, 
with  his  concurring  vote,  extended  to  the  second  branch  ;f  and, 
upon  a  motion  for  the  choice  of  the  Executive  by  electors  to  be 
chosen  by  the  people  in  districts,  as  the  vote  of  New  York 
was  divided  ;];  (its  other  representatives  strictly  adhering  to  the 
theory  of  a  State  corporate  vote) ;  and  as  this  was  the  mode  of 
election  provided  for  in  his  plan  of  a  Constitution,  it  cannot  be 
doubted,  that  Hamilton  voted  for  it.  Thus,  did  he  propose  to 
stamp  upon  the  new  system  its  primary  essential  character  in 
his  view,  that  of  an  Institution  founded  in  the  free  voice  of  the 
whole  people  of  the  United  States ;  and  deriving  all  the  depart- 
ments of  government  from  them; — confronting  at  the  same  time 
— at  the  very  outset, — in  the  foreground, — the  theory  of  the 
separate,  controlling  sovereignty  of  the  mere,  "artificial  beings" 
— the  States ;  and  restoring  to  all  the  "  free  inhabitants  of  the 
United  States" — "as  one  people,"  in  Union,  the  united  sove- 
reignty and  united  independence  they  had  asserted  to  them- 
selves in  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  when  assuming, 
"  among  the  powers  of  the  earth,  a  separate  and  equal  station." 
Thus,  did  he  carry  into  effect  his  own  pregnant,  explicit,  never 
to  be  forgotten  attestation,  that  "the  sovereignty  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  People  began  by  a  federal  act" — that,  "  the  de- 
claration of  Independence  was  the  fundamental  Constitution  ot 
every  State" — "that  the  Union  and  Independence  of  these 
States  are  blended  and  incorporated  in  one  and  the  same  act." 
The  Convention  had  unanimously  pledged  themselves  to  esta- 

*  Journal  of  the   Federal   Convention,  p.  83.     The   resolution   moved   by 
Hamilton,  seconded  by  Spaight,  May  30,  1787. 
f  Ibid.  112.     Moved  by  Wilson,  seconded  hj  Hamilton.     June  11,  1787. 
X  Ibid   92. 


IX  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

blish  a  republican  Government.  The  only  question,  tnerefoio, 
which  remained,  was,  what  form  that  republican  government 
(»ught  to  take  ?  The  first  resolution  of  the  States  right,  or  "New 
Jersey  Plan" — is  seen  to  have  been,  "  that  the  Articles  of  the 
Confederation  ought  to  be  so  revised,  enlarged  and  corrected,  as 
to  render  the  federal  constitution  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  govern- 
ment, and  the  preservation  of  the  Union."  To  declare  a  purpose 
beyond  this;  and  to  open  the  whole  subject  of  the  best  form  of 
Government  to  be  framed,  this  resolution  was  postponed ;  and  it 
was  now  resolved; — "that  the  Articles  of  the  Confederation 
ought  to  be  revised  and  amended,  so  as  to  render  the  government 
of  the  United  States  adequate  to  the  exigencies,  the  preservation, 
and  the  prosperity  of  the  Union." 

At  this  moment  of  most  critical,  deepest,  emergent  interest, 
Hamilton  took  the  floor.  After  stating*  the  importance  of  the 
occasion,  he  urged  the  obligation  of  adopting  "a  Bo\\&plan  with- 
out regard  to  temporary  opinions" — that  "  if  an  ineffectual  plan 
were  again  proposed,  it  will  beget  despair ;  and  no  Government 
will  grow  out  of  the  consent  of  the  people — ;  that  there  seemed 
to  be  but  three  lines  of  conduct — ;  a  league  offensive,  a  treaty 
of  commerce,  and  an  apportionment  of  the  public  debts — ;  an 
amendment  of  the  existing  Confederation,  by  adding  such 
powers  as  the  public  mind  deems  nearest  being  matured  to 
grant — ;  or,  the  forming  a  new  government  to  pervade  the  whole" 
country,  "  with  decisive  powers,"  in  short,  "  with  complete  sove- 
reignty." The  last,  he  stated,  seemed  to  be  the  prevailing  senti- 
ment, and  he  therefore  fully  examined  its  practicability.  He 
next  exposed  at  much  length  "  the  objections"  to  the  existing 
Confederation,  concluding,  that  it  could  not  be  amended,  unless 
the  most  important  powers  were  given  to  Congress,  constituted 
as  they  were,  shewing  that  this  would  be  liable  to  all  the  objec- 
tions against  any  fotm  of  general  government,  with  the  addition 
of  "  the  want  of  checks."  On  this  point  his  speech  took  a  large 
scope;  setting  forth  "the  principles  of  Civil  obedience,"  and  the 
absence  of  their  operation  in  such  a  plan  ;  and  stating  in  succes- 
Bion,  the  causes  of  opposition  to  it  which  would  exist,  and  would 
be  active,  as  the  necessary  consequences  of  su<jh  a  scheme;  sus- 
taining his  positions  by  a  full  exhibition  from  history,  of  the 
fate  of  ancient  and  modern  Confederacies.  The  result,  he  de- 
clared, would  be,  "  dismemberment,"  promoted  by  "  foreign 
influence;"  followed  by  "standing  armies,"  and  "domesiu 
*  Hist.  Rep.  iii.  275.     June  18,  1787. 


SPEECH    OF   HAMILTON,  PRlisENTING    HIS    PLAN.  1x1 

factions;"  ending  in  "monarchy  in  the  Southern  States'  — ;  the 
jeopardy  of  "  federal  rights,"  especially,  the  "  fisheries,"  and 
the  loss  of  their  great  natural  "  advantages" — that,  "  foreign 
nations"  would  not  respect  our  rights,  nor  grant  us  reciprocity ; 
and  would  reduce  us  to  a  passive  commerce, — that  the  fisheries, 
the  navigation  of  the  lakes — of  the  Mississippi ;  and  the  protec- 
tion and  power  of  a  fleet — would  all  be  hazarded  or  lost.  That 
to  prevent  all  these  evils,  and  to  secure  permanently  the  national 
happiness;  the  treneral  Government,  must  not  only  have  a 
.strong  soul,  but  strong  organs  "  by  which  that  soul  is  to  operate." 
What  that  Government  ought  to  be  was  the  great  question. 
Here  he  gave  his  "  sentiments  of  the  best  form  of  Government 
— not  as  a  thing  attainable  by  us,  but  as  a  model  which  we 
ought  to  approach  as  near  as  possible."  That  the  "  British  Con- 
stitution was  the  best  form" — was  the  conclusion  of  the  in- 
quiries of  the  wisest  philosophic  investigators  of  the  nature  and 
characteristics  of  government, — of  Aristotle,  of  Cicero,  Mon- 
tesquieu, and  Neckar.  The  advantages  of  this  form  of  Govern- 
ment were  next  fully  pourtrayed ;  the  difficulties  of  establishing 
a  republican  government  with  adequate  checks  were  shewn,  and 
its  defects  exposed.  The  results  of  this  wide  survey  were,  thai 
it  was  "  impossible  to  secui'e  the  Union  bj"  any  modification  of 
federal  government" — that,  "  a  league  offensive  and  defensive 
was  full  of  certain  evils,  and  greater  dangers;"  and  that  the 
organization  of  "  a  General  Government  was  very  difiicult,  if  not 
impracticable,"  and  liable  to  various  "  objections." — "  What,"  he 
asked,  "  is  to  be  done?  Balance  inconveniences  and  dangers,  and 
choose  that  which  seems  to  have  the  fewest  objections."  He 
then  "  read  his  plan  of  a  Constitution,  as  illustrative  of  his  views, 
not  as  a  project,  but  so  prepared  that  it  might  have  gone  into 
immediate  effect  if  it  had  been  adopted."* 

Some  of  the  objections  to  such  a  plan  were  then  adverted  to 
and  met — the  apprehended  increase  of  expense,  by  the  fact, 
that  the  expences  "  of  the  State  Governments  will  be  propor- 
tionably  diminished" — that  "  the  interference  of  officers  would 
not  be  so  great,  because  the  objects  of  the  General  Government 
and  the  particular  ones  would  not  be  the  same" — that  the 
finances  would  be  the  care  of  the  former — the  administration 
of  private  justice  that  of  the  States ; — and  that  energy  would 

*  Hist.  Rep.  iii.  .301.  Statement  by  Madison,  that  this  plan  "was  a  full 
plan  as  long  as  the  present  Constitution ;  and  so  prepared,  that  it  might  hay« 
gone  into  immediate  effect,  if  it  bad  been  adopted." 


bdi  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

not  be  wanting  in  essential  points  because  the  administration 
of  private  justice  will  be  carried  home  to  men's  doors  by  the 
particular  governments,  and  that  the  revenues  might  be  col- 
lected from  imposts,  excises,  &c.,  and,  if  necessary  to  go  further, 
the  general  government  may  make  use  of  the  particular  govern- 
ments. The  objection  as  to  the  non-attendance  of  members — 
a  frequent  and  most  serious  embarrassment  in  Congress — is 
answered,  by  stating,  that  the  Government  must  be  so  consti- 
tuted as  to  offer  strong  motives  to  exercise  its  powers — in  short, 
"  to  interest  all  the  passions  of  individuals  and  to  turn  them  into 
that  channel." 

Having  stated,  without  reserves,  his  theoretical  opinions  of 
the  different  kinds  of  Government;  Hamilton  declared,  "that 
the  republican  theory  ought  to  be  adhered  to  in  this  country,  as 
long  as  there  was  any  chance  to  its  success — that  the  idea  of  a 
perfect  equality  of  political  rights  among  the  citizens,  exclusive 
of  all  permanent  or  hereditary  distinctions,  was  of  a  nature  to 
engage  the  good  wishes  of  every  good  man,  whatever  might  be 
his  theoretic  doubts;  that  it  merited  his  best  efforts  to  give 
success  to  it  in  practice ; — that,  hitherto,  from  an  incompetent 
structure  of  the  government,  it  had  not  had  a  fair  trial;  and 
that  the  endeavor  ought  then  to  be  to  secure  to  it  a  better 
chance  of  success,  by  a  government  more  capable  of  energy  and 
order."* 

The  plan  of  Government  read  by  him  commences  with  a  pre- 
amble, brief,  simple,  comprehensive,  fully  expressive  of  its  pur- 
pose. "  The  People  of  the  United  States  of  America,  do  ordain 
and  establish  this  Constitution  for  the  government  of  themselves 
and  their  posterity."  It  consists  of  ten  articles,  each  divided 
into  sections. 

The  first  of  these  declared  that  the  legislative  power  should 
be  vested  in  an  assembly  and  senate,  subject  to  a  negative ;  the 
executive  power,  with  specified  qualifications,  in  a  president  of 
the  United  States;  and  the  supreme  judicial  authority,  with 
certain  exceptions,  in  a  supreme  court,  to  consist  of  not  loss 
than  six,  nor  more  than  twelve,  judges. 

The  assembly  of  representatives  were  (by .the  second  article) 
to  be  chosen  by  the  free  male  citizens  and  inhabitants  of  the 
several  states  in  the  union,  all  of  whom,  of  the  age  of  twenty 
one  years  and  upwards,  were  to  be  entitled  to  an  equal  vote. 
TIjc  first  assembly  was  to  consist  of  one  hundred  members 
*  His     Rep.  iii.  283. 


Hamilton's  frame  of  government.  Ixiii 

which  were  apportioned  an  ong  the  states — the  most  populous 
state,  Virginia,  having  sixteen,  and  the  least  populous,  Dela- 
ware, having  two  representatives.  The  whole  number  was 
never  to  be  less  than  one  hundred,  nor  more  than  a  given  num- 
ber, which  was  not  fixed,  to  be  apportioned  among  the  states  by 
a  decennial  census  of  the  whole  number  of  free  persons,  except 
Indians  not  taxed,  and  three-fifths  of  all  other  persons :  the  terra 
of  service  was  to  be  determined  by  the  legislature,  but  was  not 
to  exceed  three  years,  and  to  commence  and  end  the  same  day. 
It  was  to  choose  its  own  officers,  to  judge  and  decide  on  the  quali- 
fications and  elections  of  its  members,  and  to  have  the  exclusive 
power  of  impeachment;  but  the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  was 
necessary  to  impeach  a  senator. 

Revenue  bills  and  appropriations  for  the  support  of  fleets  and 
armies,  and  for  the  salaries  of  the  officers  of  government,  were 
to  originate  in  this  body,  but  might  be  altered  or  amended  by 
the  senate.  The  acceptance  of  office  under  the  United  States, 
vacated  a  seat  in  it.  Thus,  in  the  constituency  of  this  branch 
of  the  government,  (all  the  citizens  and  inhabitants  of  the 
union,)  the  principle  of  universal  suffrage  was  recognised, 
and  the  democratic  interests  were  fully  represented.  Its  power 
over  the  purse,  the  sword,  and  over  impeachments,  gave  it  the 
means  to  resist  usurpation,  and  rendered  it  an  efficient  counter- 
poise to  the  more  durable  members  of  the  government,  and  the 
natural  guardian  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people. 

The  third  article  related  to  the  second  branch  of  the  legisla- 
ture. The  senate  were  also  representatives  of  the  people,  but 
under  the  modifications  that  the  senators  were  to  be  chosen  by 
electors  elected  in  districts  of  the  states  for  that  purpose,  and 
only  by  persons  who  had  an  estate  in  land  for  life,  or  for  an 
unexpired  term  of  not  less  than  fourteen  years.  The  first 
senate  was  to  be  apportioned  among  the  states  as  the  conven- 
tion should  decide.  For  the  purpose  of  future  elections,  the 
states  which  had  more  than  one  senator,  were  to  be  divided  by 
the  act  of  the  general  legislature  into  convenient  districts  to 
which  the  senators  were  to  be  apportioned;  a  state  having  one 
senator,  to  be  a  district  In  case  of  death,  resignation,  or  the 
removal  of  a  senator  from  office,  his  place  was  to  be  supplied  by 
a  new  election  in  the  district  from  which  he  came;  and  upon 
each  election  there  were  to  be  not  less  than  six  nor  more  than 
twelve  electors  chosen  in  a  district.  The  senate  was  never  to 
consist  of  less  than  forty  members,  nor  was  any  state  to  have  a 


IXIV  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

less  number  than  that  originally  allotted  to  it;  but  the  number 
might  be  increased  in  proportion  to  the  whole  number  of  repre- 
sentatives in  the  ratio  of  forty  to  one  hundred ;  the  increase  to 
be  apportioned  among  the  states  according  to  the  respective 
numbers  of  their  representatives.  The  senators  were  to  hold 
during  good  behaviour,  removable  only  by  conviction  on  im- 
peachment for  some  crime  or  misdemeanor,  and  might  vote  by 
proxy,  but  no  senator  present  was  to  hold  more  than  two 
proxies.  To  the  senate,  thus  representing  the  numbers  and 
property  of  the  country,  composing  a  not  numerous  body,  and 
removed  from  immediate  popular  influences  and  passions,  were 
confided  the  sole  power  of  declaring  war,  and  a  control  over  the 
patronage  of  the  government,  by  requiring  its  consent  to  exe- 
cutive appointments,  which  consent  was  also  necessary  to  the 
ratification  of  treaties. 

By  the  fourth  article,  the  president  was  to  be  elected  by 
electors  chosen  by  electors  chosen  by  the  people  in  election 
districts.  The  first  electors  of  each  state  were  to  be  equal  in 
number  to  the  whole  number  of  senators  and  representatives  of 
such  state  in  the  national  legislature.  They  were  to  be  chosen 
by  its  citizens  having  an  estate  of  inheritance,  or  for  three  lives 
in  land,  or  a  clear  personal  estate  of  the  value  of  a  thousand 
Spanish  dollars  of  the  then  standard.  These  first  electors  of 
each  state,  meeting  together,  were  to  vote  for  a  president  by 
ballot,  not  being  one  of  their  own  number.  Then  they  were  to 
nominate  openly  two  persons  as  second  electors;  and  out  of  the 
nominees  having  the  four  highest  numbers,  were  to  choose  by 
ballot,  by  plurality  of  votes,  two  who  were  to  be  the  second 
electors  of  each  state.  These  second  electors,  neither  of  whom 
could  be  voted  for  as  president,  were  to  meet  on  an  appointed 
day,  and  in  the  presence  of  the  chief-justice,  or  of  a  senior  judge 
of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  were  to  open  the  lists 
of  the  persons  voted  for  by  the  first  electors.  The  person  having 
a  majority  of  the  whole  number,  was  to  be  president.  If  there 
was  not  a  majority,  then  the  second  electors  were  to  vote  foi 
one  of  the  three  persons  having  the  highest  number  of  the  votes 
of  the  first  electors;  and  the  person  having  a  number  of  votes 
equal  to  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  the  second  electorb 
chosen,  was  to  be  the  president.  But  if  no  such  second  choice 
should  be  made,  then  the  person  having  the  highest  number  of 
votes  of  the  first  electors,  was  to  be  president.  By  this  compli- 
cated process,  it  was  hoped  to  obtain  a  corrected  expression  of 


hAxMilton's  frame  of  government.  1x\ 

thv,  public  wishes  in  the  choice  of  the  chief  magistrate,  who  was 
8till  the  representative  of  the  people. 

The  president  was  to  take  an  oath,  "faithfully  to  execute  his 
office,  and  to  the  utmost  of  his  judgment  and  power  to  protect 
the  rights  of  the  peoj)le,  and  preserve  the  constitution  inviolate." 
He  was  to  hold  his  office  during  good  behaviour,  removable  only 
by  conviction  upon  impeachment  of  some  ci'ime  or  misdemeanor. 
He  was  to  have  power  to  convene  and  to  prorogue  the  legislature; 
to  have  a  negative  on  the  acts  and  resolutions  of  the  assembly 
and  senate;  to  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed: 
to  be  commander-in-chief  of  the  army,  navy,  and  militia;  and 
to  have  the  direction  of  war  when  commenced,  but  not  to  take 
the  actual  command  in  the  field  without  the  consent  of  the 
senate  and  assembly;  to  have  the  absolute  appointment  of  the 
chief  officers  of  the  four  great  executive  departments,  and  the 
nomination,  and,  with  the  advice  of  the  senate,  the  appointment 
of  all  other  officers,  except  such  as  were  dififerently  provided  for 
by  the  constitution,  reserving  to  the  legislatures  the  power  of 
appointing  by  name,  in  their  laws,  persons  to  execute  special 
trusts,  and  leaving  to  ministerial  officers  the  appointment  of 
their  deputies.  He  might  fill  vacancies  temporarily  in  the 
recess  of -the  senate,  and  could  pardon  all  offences,  except 
treason,  which  required  the  assent  of  the  senate  and  assembly. 
He  might  be  impeached  by  two-thirds  of  the  legislature,  two- 
thirds  of  each  house  concurring.  If  convicted,  to  be  removed 
from  office,  and  then  tried  and  punished  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  law.  His  impeachment  was  to  operate  as  a  suspension,  until 
determined.  His  compensation  was  to  be  fixed,  and  not  to  be 
increased  or  diminished  during  his  term  of  service.  If  he 
departed  the  United  States,  his  office  was  abdicated. 

The  president  of  the  senate  was  to  be  vice-president;  to  exer- 
cise all  the  powers  of  the  president  in  case  of  his  death,  resigna- 
tion, impeachment,  removal  from  office,  or  absence  from  the 
United  States,  until  another  was  chosen. 

The  chief-justice,  and  other  judges  of  the  supreme  court,  were 
{by  the  fifth  article)  to  hold  during  good  behaviour,  removable 
by  impeachment  and  conviction.  They  were  to  have  original 
jurisdiction  in  all  causes  in  which  the  United  States  shall  be  a 
party;  in  all  controversies  between  the  United  States  and  a 
particular  state,  or  between  two  or  more  states,  except  questions 
of  territory;  in  all  cases  affecting  foreign  ministers,  consuls, 
and  agents:  and  an  appellate  jurisdiction,  both  as  to  law  and 

5 


LXVI  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

fact,  in  all  cases  concerning  the  citizens  of  foreign  nations;  in 
all  questions  between  the  citizens  of  different  states,  and  in  all 
others  in  which  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  constitution  were 
involved,  subject  to  specified  exceptions,  and  to  the  regulations 
of  the  legislature.  The  judges  of  all  courts  which  might  be 
constituted  by  the  legislature,  were  also  to  hold  during  good 
behaviour,  removable  by  impeachment,  and  were  to  have  com- 
petent salaries,  to  be  paid  at  stated  times,  and  not  to  be  dimin- 
ished during  their  continuance  in  oflS^cej  but  the  legislatures 
might  abolish  the  courts  themselves. 

All  crimes,  except  on  impeachment,  were  to  be  tried  by  a 
jury  of  twelve  men,  in  the  state  where  committed;  and  all  civil 
causes  arising  under  the  constitution,  before  triable  by  jury  in 
the  states,  were  also  to  be  tried  by  jury,  unless  two-thirds  of 
the  national  legislature  should,  in  special  cases,  concur  in  a  dif- 
ferent provision. 

When  offices  were  of  such  duration  as  good  behaviour,  it 
was  felt  to  be  highly  important  to  provide  an  efficacious  and 
independent  tribunal  of  impeachment;  and  as  not  only  the 
rights  of  the  nation,  but  of  the  states,  were  to  be  guarded,  to 
have  reference  in  its  constitution  to  the  general  and  particular 
governments. 

With  this  view,  a  court  of  impeachment  was  to  be  instituted, 
by  which  the  president,  vice-president,  the  senators,  governors, 
and  presidents  of  the  states,  the  principal  officers  of  the  great 
executive  departments,  ambassadors  and  other  like  public 
ministers,  judges  of  the  supreme  court,  generals  and  admirals  of 
the  navy,  were  to  be  tried.  This  court  was  to  consist  of  the 
judges  of  the  supreme  court,  and  of  the  chief-justice,  or  first  or 
senior  judge,  of  the  supreme  court  of  law  of  each  state,  of  whom 
twelve  were  to  compose  a  court,  and  a  majority  might  convict. 
All  other  persons,  when  impeached,  were  to  be  tried  by  a  court 
to  consist  of  the  judges  of  the  supreme  court  and  six  senators^ 
drawn  by  lot,  a  majority  of  whom  might  convict.  Provisions 
were  made  for  conducting  these  impeachments.  Such  was  to 
have  been  the  permanent  structure  of  this  government. 

The  danger  of  collisions  between  the  states,  arising  out  of 
conflicting  claims  of  territory,  had  been  presented  to  Hamilton, 
in  the  progress  of  the  controversy  between  New- York  and 
Vermont.  Other  claims  were  unsettled.  He  proposed  (m  a 
sixth  article)  that  a  court  should  be  formed,  when  territorial 
controversies  should  arise,  of  persons  to  be  nominated  by  the 


Hamilton's  frame  of  government.  Ixvii 

controverting  states,  not  their  own  citizens,  double  the  number 
of  the  judges  of  the  supreme  court,  one-half  of  whom,  elected 
by  the  senate,  should,  with  the  judges  of  that  court,  decide  the 
appeal. 

In  the  resolutions  prepared  by  Hamilton  in  seventeen  hundred 
and  eighty-three,  it  is  seen  that  the  leading  defect  of  the  con- 
federation proposed  to  be  corrected  by  him  was,  its  "  confining 
the  federal  government  within  too  narrow  limits;  withholding 
from  it  that  efficacious  authority  and  influence  in  all  matters  of 
general  concern,  which  are  indispensable  to  the  harmony  and 
welfare  of  the  whole ;  embarrassing  general  provisions  by  un- 
necessary details  and  inconvenient  exceptions,  incompatible 
with  their  nature,  tending  only  to  create  jealousies  and  disputes 
respecting  the  proper  bounds  of  the  authority  of  the  United 
States,  and  that  of  the  particular  states,  and  a  mutual  inter- 
ference of  the  one  with  the  other." 

It  was  a  settled  maxim  in  his  mind,  "  that  a  government  ought 
to  contain  within  itself  every  power  requisite  to  the  full  accom- 
plishment of  the  objects  committed  to  its  care,  and  to  the  com- 
plete execution  of  the  trusts  for  which  it  is  responsible;  free 
from  every  other  control  but  a  regard  for  the  public  good,  and 
to  the  sense  of  the  people," 

Another  maxim  was,  "that  every  power  ought  to  be  com- 
mensurate with  its  object;  that  there  ought  to  be  no  limitation 
of  a  power  destined  to  affect  a  purpose  which  is  of  itself  in- 
capable of  limitation."  Applying  these  enlarged  and  obvious 
principles,  and  having  sought  to  guard,  in  the  structure  of  the 
government,  against  an  abuse  of  its  powers,  he  declared,  in  the 
seventh  article  of  this  constitution,  that  "  the  legislature  of  the 
United  States  shall  have  power  to  pass  all  laws  which  they  shall 
judge  necessary  to  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  of 
the  union." 

As  a  check  upon  this  power,  every  act,  bill,  or  resolution,  was 
to  have  the  assent  of  the  president,  which,  if  not  given  within 
ten  days  after  such  act  being  presented  to  him,  was  to  become  a 
law,  of  which  the  enacting  style  was  to  be,  that  it  was  "  enacted 
by  the  people  of  the  United  States  of  America;"  thus  recog- 
nising in  every  exercise  of  legislative  power  the  sovereignty  and 
unity  .of  the  American  people.  This  general  power  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  declaration  of  a  few  general  restrictions  in  the 
nature  of  a  bill  of  rights,  either  suggested  by  the  experience  of 


iXVlH  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

ihis  country,  or  having  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  govern- 
ment. 

The  danger  of  legislative  tyranny,  and  of  retrospective  laws, 
not  only  to  the  domestic  peace,  but  to  the  foreign  relations  of 
the  country,  had  been  too  immediately  before  him  not  to  have 
commanded  his  attention.  To  provide  an  efficient  check  to  such 
pernicious  proceedings,  he  framed  a  clause  declaring  "  that  no 
bill  of  attainder  or  ex  post  facto  law  shall  be  passed  3"  and 
adopting  the  language  of  the  articles  of  the  confederation,  and 
thus  adding  guards  to  the  republican  system,  he  provided  that 
no  title  of  nobility  should  be  granted  by  the  United  States,  or 
either  of  them,  and  that  no  person  holding  any  office  or  trust 
under  the  United  States  should,  without  permission  of  the  legis- 
lature, accept  any  present,  emolument,  office,  or  title,  from  a 
foreign  prince  or  state.  "  The  prohibition  of  titles  of  nobility,"  he 
said,  "may  truly  be  denominated  the  corner-stone  of  republican 
government;  for,  so  long  as  titles  of  nobility  are  excluded,  there 
can  never  be  serious  danger  that  the  government  will  be  any 
other  than  that  of  the  people." 

To  preclude  the  recurrence  of  such  an  attempt  as  he  had 
recently  defeated  in  the  assembly  of  New-York,  and  carry- 
ing out  the  principle  which  is  seen  in  his  system  of  public 
instruction,  he  embodied  in  the  constitution  the  proviso,  so 
important  to  the  interests  of  religion,  to  freedom  of  opinion, 
and  to  the  peace  of  society,  "  nor  shall  any  religious  sect,  or 
denomination,  or  religious  test  for  any  office  or  place,  be  ever 
established  by  law." 

In  forming  a  government  founded  upon  a  full  recognition  of 
the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  it  is  seen  that  he  had  apportioned 
the  representation  to  the  number  of  free  persons,  except  Indians 
not  taxed,  and  three  fifths  of  all  other  persons;  thus  following 
this  great  principle  to  its  appropriate  result.  So  in  apportioning 
the  direct  contributions  of  the  states  to  the  public  treasury, 
there  being  no  common  measure  of  a  nation's  wealth,  he  took 
the  same  basis,  which,  in  the  peculiar  condition  of  this  country, 
promised  a  nearer  approach  to  equality  than  any  other.  "  Taxes 
on  lands,  houses,  and  other  real  estate,  and  capitation  taxes, 
were  to  be  proportioned  in  each  state  to  the  whole  number  of 
free  persons,  except  Indians  not  taxed,  and  three-fifths  of  all 
other  persons." 

As  the  command  over  the  purse  of  the  nation  was  intended 
by  him  to  be  a  real  check  upon  the  action  of  the  government, 


HAMILTON'S    FRAME    OF    GOVERNMENT.  IxiX 

and  with  this  view  the  originating  revenue  bills  had  been  given 
to  the  popular  branch,  he  provided  "that  the  two  houses 
might  by  joint  ballot  appoint  a  treasurer  of  the  United  States," 
thus  securing  the  custody  of  the  revenues  of  the  nation  to 
the  department  it  had  intrusted  with  raising  and  appropri- 
ating them. 

A  government  performing  its  great  office  of  providing  for  the 
common  defence  and  safety,  and  for  the  general  welfare,  by  its 
own  comprehensive  organs,  acting  upon  individuals,  the  only 
proper  objects  of  governm(;nt,  would  perhaps  have  possessed 
a  sufficiently  central  power  to  have  maintained  its  due  ascend- 
en'  y.  But  as  the  state  governments  were  to  continue,  in  order 
to  prevent  a  collision,  it  was  declared  that  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  treaties  made  under  the  articles  of  the  con- 
federation, and  to  be  made  under  the  constitution,  were  to  be 
the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  to  be  so  construed  by  the 
several  courts  of  the  several  states.  The  legislature  was  to 
convene  once  in  each  year,  which,  unless  otherwise  provided  for 
by  law,  should  be  on  the  first  Monday  in  December;  to  receive 
a  reasonable  compensation  fixed  by  law,  no  succeeding  assembly 
to  increase  its  own  compensation. 

The  preceding  injunction,  that  the  laws  and  treaties  of  the 
United  States  "  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,"  obliga- 
tory on  all  the  courts,  guarded  against  conflicts  with  the  legisla- 
tion of  the  states,  and  in  theory  secured  the  necessary  supre- 
macy to  the  judiciary  power  of  the  general  government ;  but 
that  power  might  be  rendered  nugatory  by  a  defective  execu- 
tion of  those  laws.  The  position  of  New  York  at  that  moment 
indicated  the  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  the  executive 
trust  of  the  states  being  independent  of  the  government  of  the 
union. 

To  provide  against  both  these  evils,  he  declared  (m  the  eighth 
article)  that  the  governor  or  president  of  each  state  shall  be 
appointed  by  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  shall  have  a 
negative  on  all  laws  about  to  be  passed  in  the  state  of  which 
he  shall  be  governor  or  president,  subject  to  such  regulations 
as  the  legislature  of  the  United  States  shall  prescribe,  but  in 
iill  other  respects,  except  as  to  the  appointment  of  the  officers 
of  the  militia,  to  have  the  same  powers  the  constitution  of 
the  states  then  did  or  should  allow.  Each  governor  or  presi- 
dent of  a  state  was  to  hold  his  office  until  a  successor  was 
actually  appointed,  which   could   not  be  during  the  recess  of 


IXX  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

the  stnatft,  "unless  he  died,  resigned,  or  was  removed  on  im 
peachment." 

The  officers  of  the  militia  might  be  appointed  nnder  the  au 
thority  of  the  United  States,  unless  its  legislature  authorized 
their  appointment  by  the  governors  or  presidents  of  the  states ; 
and,  to  avoid  any  obstruction  from  that  source,  the  governors 
and  presidents  of  the  states  at  the  time  of  the  ratification  of  the 
constitution,  were  to  continue  in  office  in  the  same  manner,  and 
with  the  same  powers,  as  if  they  had  been  appointed  by  the 
president  and  senate  of  the  United  States. 

"  If  it  be  possible,"  Hamilton  observed,  "  to  construct  a  fede- 
ral government  capable  of  regulating  the  common  concerns, 
and  preserving  the  general  tranquillity,  it  must  carry  its  agency 
to  the  persons  of  its  citizens.  It  must  stand  in  need  of  no 
intermediate  legislations,  but  must  itself  be  empowered  to  em- 
ploy the  arm  of  the  ordinary  magistrate  to  execute  its  own 
resolutions.  The  majesty  of  the  national  authority  must  be 
manifested  through  the  medium  of  the  courts  of  justice.  The 
government  of  the  union,  like  that  of  each  state,  must  be  able 
to  address  itself  immediately  to  the  hopes  and  fears  of  indivi- 
duals, and  to  attract  to  its  support  those  passions  which  have 
the  strongest  influence  upon  the  human  heart.  It  must,  in 
short,  possess  all  the  means,  and  have  a  right  to  resort  to  all  the 
methods,  of  executing  the  powers  with  which  it  is  intrusted, 
that  are  possessed  and  exercised  by  the  governments  of  parti- 
cular states." 

Under  this  important  provision  as  to  the  appointments  of 
these  governors  and  presidents,  the  administration  of  the  gene- 
ral government,  pervading  the  states,  would  have  executed 
itself,  while  their  legislatures  would  have  retained  the  control 
of  that  part  of  internal  police  which  relates  "  to  the  rights  of 
property  and  life  among  individuals,  the  administration  of  jus- 
tice, the  supervision  of  agriculture,  and  of  such  things  as  are 
proper  for  local  legislation."  The  advantages  would  thus  have 
been  attained  of  the  reproductiveness  of  the  civil  power,  and 
of  its  diffusive  force  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  the  re- 
public, and  the  state  legislatures  would  havfe  acted  as  sentinels 
to  warn  against  the  first  approach  of  usurpation. 

The  ninth  article  provided  that  the  president  must  then  be  "  a 
citizen  of  one  of  the  states,  or  hereafter  be  born  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States;"  that  senators  and  representatives  must  be  citi- 
zens and  inhabitants  of  the  state  in  which  they  were  chosen. 


Hamilton's  frame  of  goverxmext.  Ixxi 

Prompted  by  the  recent  proceedings  in  New- York,  he  also 
provided  that  no  person  eligible  as  president,  or  to  the  legisla- 
ture, shall  be  disqualified  but  by  the  conviction  of  some  offenco 
for  which  the  law  shall  have  previously  ordained  the  punishment 
of  disqualification;  but  that  the  legislature  might  provide  by 
law  that  persons  holding  offices  under  the  United  States,  or 
either  of  them,  shall  not  be  eligible  to  the  assembly,  and  "  shall 
be,  during  their  continuance  in  office,  suspended  from  sitting  in 
the  senate."  The  citizens  of  each  state  were  to  be  entitled  to 
all  the  immunities  of  citizens  of  other  states,  and  full  faith  and 
credit  was  to  be  given  to  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial 
proceedings  of  each;  fugitives  from  justice  were  to  be  delivered 
up ; — provisions  taken  from  the  articles  of  confederation.  No 
new  state  was  to  be  formed  without  the  concurrent  consent 
of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  states  concerned;  but  new 
states  might  be  admitted  by  the  general  legislature  into  the 
union.  The  United  States  were  "  declared  bound  to  guarantee 
a  republican  form  of  government  to  each  state,  and  to  protect 
it  as  well  against  domestic  violence  as  against  foreign  inva- 
sion ;"  a  provision  drawn  from  the  propositions  of  Randolph, 
but  essentially  enlarged — supplying,  as  Hamilton  observed, 
"  a  capital  imperfection"  in  the  articles  of  the  confederation. 

All  treaties,  contracts,  and  engagements  under  those  articles, 
were  to  have  equal  validity  under  the  constitution ;  no  state 
could  enter  into  a  treaty  or  alliance  with  another,  or  with  a 
foreign  power,  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States.  The 
members  of  the  legislature  of  the  United  States  and  of  each 
state,  and  all  officers,  executive  and  judicial,  were  to  take  an 
oath  or  affirmation  to  support  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States. 

Though  a  change  of  government  would  not  have  dissolved 
existing  treaties  not  inconsistent  with  its  principles,  yet  Hamil- 
ton's knowledge  of  the  distinctions  of  international  law  would 
teach  him  the  importance  of  a  full  and  explicit  declaration  on 
this  important  subject,  as  a  guard  of  the  interests  and  of  the 
faith  of  the  nation.  In  the  absolute  prohibition  of  treaties  by 
the  states  with  foreign  powers,  the  restrictive  clause  of  the 
confederation  was  extended,  and  the  requisition  of  an  oath  to 
support  the  constitution  was  a  useful  additional  bond.  Amend- 
ments to  it  were  to  be  proposed  by  two-thirds  of  both  houses, 
to  be  ratified  by  the  legislatures  or  conventions  in  two-thirds 
of  the  states. 


LXXH  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

Ti'mally,  to  secure  the  immediate  operation  of  the  new  system, 
and  to  give  it  the  solemn  sanction  of  the  people,  it  was  provided 
(in  the  tenth  article)  that  the  constitution  should  be  submitted  to 
conventions  of  the  People  of  each  state,  by  their  deputies,  chosen 
under  the  direction  of  their  respective  legislatures;  that  each 
convention  ratifying  the  constitution  should  appoint  the  first 
representatives  and  senators  from  such  state,  the  representatives 
so  appointed  to  continue  in  office  only  one  year. 

"When  the  constitution  shall  have  been  duly  ratified,  congress 
were  to  give  notice  of  a  day  and  place  of  meeting  of  the  senators 
and  representatives  from  the  several  states ;  a  majority  of  whom, 
when  assembled,  it  was  provided,  shall,  by  plurality  of  voices  in 
joint  ballot,  elect  a  president  of  the  United  States,  "  and  the 
constitution,  thus  organized,  shall  be  carried  into  effect." 

From  this  abstract  it  will  be  seen,  though  Hamilton  would 
have  made  use  of  the  state  governments  for  certain  purposes, 
thus  completely  refuting  the  allegation  that  he  contemplated 
their  abrogation,  yet  it  was  his  desire  to  have  established  a 
simple  government  pervading  the  whole  union  and  uniting  its 
inhabitants  as  one  people.  As  it  was  necessary  that  "  each  de- 
partment should  have  a  will  of  its  own,"  this  government  was 
so  constituted  that  the  members  of  each  had  no  agency  in  the 
appointment  of  the  others,  and,  with  the  exception  of  the  judi- 
ciary, each  was  "  drawn  from  the  same  fountain  of  authority, 
the  people,  and  through  channels  having  no  communication 
whatever  with  one  another."  "In  the  constitution  of  the  judi- 
ciary in  particular,"  Hamilton  remarked,  "it  might  be  inexpe- 
dient to  insist  rigorously  on  the  principle ;  because  peculiar 
qualifications  being  essential  in  the  members,  the  primary  con- 
sideration ought  to  be  to  select  that  mode  of  choice  which  best 
secures  these  qualifications,  and  because  the  permanent  tenure 
by  which  the  appointments  are  held  in  that  department  must 
soon  destroy  all  sense  of  dependence  on  the  authorit}^  conferring 
them." 

"  It  is  equally  evident,"  he  observed,  "  that  the  members  of 
each  department  should  be  as  little  dependent  as  possible  on 
those  of  the  others,  for  the  emoluments  annexed  to  their  offices :" 
hence  is  seen  the  provision  that  the  compensation  of  the  execu- 
tive and  the  judiciary  should  be  fixed  by  law ;  that  of  the  judges 
not  to  be  diminished  during  their  term,  and  to  guard  against 
executive  influence,  that  of  the  president  to  be  neither  increased 
nor   diminished.        In   framing   a  government  which   is   to  be 


HAMILTON'S    FRAME    OF    GOVERNMENT.  IxXlU 

adrainisterea  by  men  over  men,  the  great  difficulty,"  he  said, 
"lies  in  this — ^j'ou  must  first  enable  the  government  to  control 
the  governed,  and,  in  the  next  place,  oblige  it  to  control  itself. 
A  dependence  on  the  people  is,  no  doubt,  a  primary  control  on 
the  government;  but  experience  has  taught  mankind  the  neces- 
sity of  auxiliary  precautions."  Of  these,  the  chief  was  "in  the 
distribution  of  the  supreme  powers  of  the  state."  "  But  it  is  not 
possible,"  he  observed,  "  to  give  to  each  department  an  equal 
power  of  self-defence.  In  republican  governments,  the  legisla- 
tive authority  necessarily  predominates.  The  remedy  for  this 
inconvenience  is,  to  divide  the  legislature  into  different  branches; 
and  to  render  them  by  different  modes  of  election,  and  different 
principles  of  action,  as  little  connected  with  each  other  as  the 
nature  of  their  common  functions  and  their  common  dependence 
on  the  society  will  admit."  "With  these  views,  in  the  structure 
of  this  government,  while  by  the  frequent  choice  of  the  popular 
branch  elected  by  universal  suffrage,  the  democratic  influence 
was  to  be  constantly  renewed  and  invigorated,  in  the  duration 
of  the  senate  and  executive  chosen  by  constituents  with  property 
qualifications,  he  hoped  to  secure  eflScient  and  enduring  checks 
on  the  impetuosity  and  instability  of  the  many.  The  power  of 
the  people  was  to  be  kept  up  by  a  constitutional  augmentation 
of  the  number  of  these  representatives ;  and  thus  the  barrier 
against  executive  usurpation,  if  attempted,  was  steadily  strength- 
ened; and  "as  the  weakness  of  the  executive,"  he  remarked, 
"may  require  that  it  should  be  fortified,"  he  gave  him  an  "abso- 
lute negative  on  the  legislature,  as  the  natural  defence  with 
which  the  executive  magistrate  should  be  armed." 

Having  provided  these  precautions,  by  the  deposit  of  the 
national  trusts  with  representatives  of  different  interests  freely 
chosen  by  the  people,  and  holding  by  a  responsible  and  defeasi- 
ble tenure,  governed  by  the  great  maxims  previously  stated,  he 
empowered  the  legislature  "  to  pass  all  laws  necessary  to  the 
common  defence  and  safety,  and  to  the  general  welfare  of  the 
union." 

The  speech  of  Hamilton  accompanying  the  presentation  of 
this  plan,  was  soon  followed  by  a  decisive  procedure.  This  was 
a  resolution,  which  passed  the  next  day,  by  the  votes  of  seven 
States,  rejecting  the  Jersey  plan,  and  for  the  reconsideration  of 
the  amended  resolutions  from  Virginia. 

After  the  interval  of  one  day,*  Dr.  Johnson  of  Connecticut 

*.Iune  21.     Secret  rebates,  p.  147 


IXXiv  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

was  the  first  to  take  the  floor  j  and  in  the  course  of  his  remarks 
made  a  suggestion,  which  being  subsequently  adopted,  gave  a 
leading  character  to  the  Constitution. 

"  It  appears  to  me,"  he  observed,  "  that  the  Jersey  plan  has 
for  its  principal  object,  the  preservation  of  the  State  Govern- 
ments. So  far  it  is  a  departure  from  the  plan  of  Virginia,  which 
although  it  concentres  in  a  distinct  national  government,  it  is 
not  totally  independent  of  that  of  the  States.  A  gentleman 
from  New  York,  with  boldness,  and  decision,  proposed  a  system 
totally  different  from  both ;  and  though  he  has  been  praised  by 
every  body,  he  has  been  supported  by  none.  How  can  the  State 
governments  be  secured  on  the  Virginia  plan?  I  could  have 
wished  that  the  supporters  of  the  Jersey  system  could  have 
satisfied  themselves  with  the  principles  of  the  Virginia  plan ; 
and  that  the  individuality  of  the  States  could  be  supported.  It 
is  agreed  on  all  hands,  that  a  portion  of  government  is  to  be  left 
to  the  States.  How  can  this  be  done  ?  It  can  be  done  by  joining 
the  States  in  their  legislative  capacity  with  the  right  of  appointing  the 
second  branch  of  the  legislature  to  represent  the  States  individually." 

The  discussions  which  followed  this  important  suggestion, 
naturally  related  to  the  principle  of  representation.  The  Con- 
vention having  decided,  that  the  first  branch  of  the  national 
legislature  should  be  chosen  by  the  people,  whence  the  Senate 
was  to  be  derived  was  the  great  question  ?  The  advocates  of  a 
purely  National  government  again  urged  its  election,  directly, 
or  indirectly  through  the  medium  of  electors  by  the  people; 
those  of  a  Federal  government  by  the  legislatures  of  the  States. 
In  support  of  the  first  system,  Madison  and  Hamilton  were  con- 
spicuous. The  former  urged  the  necessity  of  protecting  the 
landed  interest.  "  Landholders,"  he  remarked,  "  ought  to  have 
a  share  in  the  government  to  support  these  valuable  interests, 
and  to  balance  and  check  the  other.  They  ought  to  be  so  con- 
stituted, as  to  protect  the  majority  of  the  opulent  against  the 
minority.  The  Senate  ought  to  be  this  body ;  and  to  answer  the 
purpose  ought  to  have  permanency  and  stability.  Various  have 
been  the  propositions;  but  my  opinion  is  the  longer'they  continue 
in  office  the  better  will"  this  "  view  be  answered."*  Eoger  Sher- 
man replied,  that,  "  a  bad  Government  was  the  worse  for  being 
long,  that  frequent  elections  give  security  and  permanency." 
Hamilton  answered — "  This  question  has  already  been  considered 
in  several  points  of  view.  We  are  now  forming  a  npublican 
*  Secret  Debates,  p.  169. 


COMMITTEE    OF    COMPROMISE.  IxXV 

government.  Eeal  liberty  is  neither  found  in  despotism,  nor  in 
the  extremes  of  democracy,  but  in  moderate  governments. 
Those  who  mean  to  fonn  a  solid  republican  government  ought  to 
proceed  to  the  confines  of  another  government.  As  long  as 
oifices  are  open  to  all  men;  and  no  constitutional  rank  is  esta- 
blished, it  is  pure  republicanism.  But  if  we  incline  too  much  to  de- 
mocracy we  shall  soon  shoot  into  a  monarchy.  The  difference  of 
property  is  already  great  among  us.  Commerce  and  Industry 
will  still  increase  the  disparity.  Your  Government  must  meet 
this  state  of  things;  or  combinations,  in  process  of  time,  will 
undermine  your  system."* 

At  the  close  of  this  debate,  the  question  was  more  broadly 
discussed,  of  the  representation  of  the  people,  or  of  the  States, 
resulting  in  an  equal  division  of  the  votes  by  States — five  to  five 
— except  the  State  of  Maryland,  whose  vote  was  divided.^ 

It  was  now  obvious,  that  some  accommodation  must  be  made, 
or  that  the  Convention  must  break  up.  To  meet  the  emer- 
gency, a  committee  of  compromise,  consisting  of  one  member 
from  each  State,  was  appointed;  whose  report  declared,  that 
the  first  branch  of  the  legislature  should  represent  the  people, 
and  that,  in  the  s^  'ond  "  each  State  shall  have  an  equal  vote," 
which  passed  in  the  affirmative.  The  decisive  manifestations 
that  followed,  of  a  purpose  to  depart  from  a  purely  federal  to  a 
compound  government,  determined  the  course  of  Hamilton's 
colleagues  from  New  York.  They  both  abandoned  the  Conven- 
tion.|  The  advocates  of  a  national  Government  had  reluctantly 
yielded,  in  part.  The  friends  of  a  Federal  system  sought  to 
secure  to  it  other  advantages.  Amid  great  alarms,  successive 
propositions  were  discussed,  until  late  in  July,  when  a  commit- 
tee of  detail  was  appointed  who  reported  the  outline  of  a  Con- 
stitution on  the  sixth  of  August.  This  outline  was  discussed, 
not  in  Committee,  but  in  the  house,  until  the  eighth  of  Septem- 
ber; when  many  of  its  articles  having  been  approved,  it  was 
referred  to  a  Committee  appointed  by  ballot,  to  "  revise  its  style 
and  to  arrange  its  articles."  Of  this  Committee  Hamilton  was 
second  to  Johnson  of  Connecticut, §  who,  it  is  seen,  at  a  moment 
of  great  discordance,  first  proposed  the  great  compromise  of  a 
representation  of  the  people  in  one  branch  of  the  legislature  and 
of  the  States  in  the  other.     This  distinguished  man  remarked, 

*  Secret  Debates,  p.  170.  f  July  2,  1787.    Journal  of  the  ConTention. 

I  July  10,  1787. 

§  The  other  members  were  James  Madison,  Gouverneur  Morris,  Bufus  King 


IXXVl  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

"If  the  Constitution  did  not  succeed  on  trial,  Hamilton  was  less 
responsible  for  the  result  than  any  other  member,  for  he  fully 
and  frankly  pointed  out  to  the  Convention  what  he  apprehended 
were  the  infirmities  to  which  it  was  liable.  And,  if  it  answered 
the  fond  expectations  of  the  public,  the  community  would  be 
more  indebted  to  Hamilton  than  to  any  other  member;  for, 
after  its  essential  outlines  were  agreed  to,  he  labored  most  inde- 
fatigably  to  heal  those  infirmities;  and  to  guard  against  the 
evils  to  which  they  might  expose  it."*  Owing  to  the  mutilation 
of  the  Journal  of  the  Convention  at  late  stages  of  its  proceedings, 
it  is  not  possible  to  state  some  of  the  important  modifications 
which,  it  is  ascertained  from  other  sources,  were  proposed.  Two 
very  important  changes,  however,  demand  notice.  The  twenty- 
second  article  of  the  plan  reported  by  "the  Committee  of 
Detail,"  on  the  sixth  of  August,  declared,  that  the  Constitution 
"  shall  be  laid  before  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled, 
for  their  approbation;  and  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  Convention, 
that  it  should  be  afterwards  submitted  to  a  Convention  chosen 
in  each  State,  under  the  recommendation  of  its  legislature,  in 
order  to  receive  the  ratification  of  such  Convention."  This 
article,  had  it  been  adopted,  would  probably  have  proved  fatal ; 
for  from  the  temper  the  Congress  had  shown,  its  "  approbation" 
was  not  to  have  been  expected.  Hamilton's  plan  of  a  Constitu- 
tion anticipated  this  dangerous  contingency.  It  provided,  in  its 
tenth  article,  that  "  the  Constitution  shall  be  submitted  to  the 
consideration  of  Conventions  in  the  several  States,  the  members 
whereof  sAaZZ  be  chosen  by  the  people  of  such  States  respectively, 
under  the  direction  of  their  respective  legislatures,"  the  ratifica- 
tion of  each  convention  being  final,  with  power  to  each  conven- 
tion, to  appoint  the  first  representatives  and  senators  from  such 
State ;  who,  when  the  Constitution  was  duly  ratified,  "  shall  by 
joint  ballot,  by  plurality  of  votes,  elect  a  I^resident  of  the 
United  States;  and  the  Constitution  thus  organized  shall  be 
carried  into  effect."  By  this  provision,  the  establishment  of 
the  Constitution  would  have  been  ensured.  Its  ratification,  by 
the  Conventions  of  several  of  the  States,  was  certain;    and   a 

•  The  distinguished  person  Guizot  remarks, — "Hamilton  must  be  classed 
among  the  men  who  have  best  known  the  vital  principles  and  fundamental 
conditions  of  a  government ;  not  of  a  government  such  as  this,  but  of  a  gov- 
ernment worthy  of  its  mission  and  of  its  name.  There  is  not  in  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  an  element  of  order,  of  force,  of  duration,  which  he 
baa  not  powerfullt/  contributed  to  introduce  into  it  and  to  cause  to  predominatb. 


MODES    OF    AMENDING    CONSTITUTION.  IxXVU 

Government  ineipiently  organized  by  them  would  inevitably 
have  drawn  to  it  the  concurrence  of  the  other  States,  instead  of 
leaving  its  fate  to  the  very  dubious  contingencies  which  existed 
But,  what  would  be  the  practical  operation  of  so  new  a  system, 
what  the  state  of  public  opinion  in  respect  to  it  might  perma 
nently  be,  or  what  new  circumstances  might  arise  to  indicate 
the  necessity  of  a  change,  were  open  questions.  The  nineteenth 
article  of  the  plan  reporteii  by  the  Committee  looked  wholly  to 
the  action  of  the  States  in  the  provision  for  these  possibilities, 
and  placed  a  change  in  the  system  entirely  in  their  power.  It 
declared,  that,  "  on  the  applicatioa  of  the  legislatures  of  two 
thirds  of  the  States  in  the  Union,  for  an  amendment  of  this  Con- 
stitution, the  legislature  of  the  United  States  shall  call  a  con- 
vention for  that  purpose."  Hamilton,  in  consistency  with  all 
his  views,  regarded  the  national  legislature — representing  the 
whole  people  of  the  United  States  in  one  body  politic — as  the 
safest  judges,  whether  any  and  what  alterations  should  be  made 
in  the  national  charter.  Under  this  conviction,  and  with  this 
intent,  his  plan  confided  the  proposal  of  alterations  and  amend- 
ments solel}^  to  that  bod}',  two  thirds  concurring, — such  altera- 
tions or  amendments  to  be  ratified  by  the  legislatures  of,  or  by 
conventions  chosen  by  the  people  in  two  thirds  of  the  States 
composing  the  Union.  The  Constitution  as  adopted,  confided 
the  power  of  proposing  amendments  to  two  thirds  of  Congress, 
or  to  a  Convention  applied  for  by  two  thirds  of  the  States,  which 
when  ratified  by  the  legislatures  of,  or  by  conventions  in  three 
fourths  of  the  States  were  to  be  valid  as  pai't  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. Thus  the  initiation  of  changes  in  the  system  was  confided 
either  to  the  national  legislature,  or  to  the  States,  while  the 
facility''  of  a  change  was  diminished  by  requiring  the  final  ratifi- 
cation of  a  larger  number  of  the  States.  How  far  this  substitute 
was  wise  may  be  deemed  problematical.  The  Report  of  the 
Committee  of  revision  was  made  on  the  twelfth  of  September, 
which  having  been  corrected  still  further  in  style;  amended,  and 
engrossed,  was  on  the  seventeenth  of  September,  signed  by 
Washington — "President  and  Deputy  from  Virginia;"  and  at- 
tested by  the  Secretary,  which  attestations  were  followed  by  the 
signatures  of  all  the  members  present,  with  three  exceptions.* 

*  The  exceptions  were  Gerry  of  Massachusetts — Mason  and  Randolph  of 
Virginia  The  importance  of  the  services  of  Madison  and  of  Marshall  in  the 
convention  of  their  State  which  adopted  the  Constitution  and  the  great  infla- 
snce  .if  Washington's  approval  may  be  the  more  estimated  by  the  fact  that  Id 


IxXViil  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

The  single  name  of  "Alexander  Hamilton,"  as  representing 
New  York,  speaks  his  position  in  this  body.*  This  plan  of  a 
Constitution  was  submitted  to  the  President  of  Congress,  in  a 
letter,  which  stated  it  to  be,  "the  result  of  a  spirit  of  amity  and 
of  that  mutual  deference  and  concession  which  the  peculiarity 
of  our  political  situation  rendered  indispensable.  That  it  will 
meet  the  full  and  entire  approbation  of  every  State  is  not  per- 
haps to  be  expected ;  but  each  will  doubtless  consider,  that  had 
her  interests  alone  been  considered,  the  consequences  might 
have  been  particularly  disagreeable  or  injurious  to  others  : — that 
it  is  liable  to  as  few  exceptions  as  could  reasonably  have  been 
expected,  we  hope  and  believe ;  that  it  may  promote  the  lasting 
welfare  of  that  country  so  dear  to  us  all,  and  secure  her  freedom 
and  happiness,  is  our  most  ardent  wish." 

Uniting  heartily  and  sincerely  as  Washington  did  in  recom- 
mending the  adoption  of  the  Constitution ;  it  is  evident,  that  he 
accepted  it  with  reserves.  He  had  previously  stated,  "  Per- 
suaded I  am,  that  the  primarj^  cause  of  all  our  disorders  lies  in 
the  different  State  Governments,  and  in  the  tenacity  of  that 
power  which  pervades  their  whole  system." — But,  after  the  Con- 
stitution had  been  submitted  to  the  people,  he  wrote,  "there  are 
some  things  in  the  new  form,  I  will  readily  acknowledge,  which 
never  did,  and  I  am  persuaded  never  will,  obtain  my  cordial 
approbation;  but  I  do  now  most  firmly  believe,  that,  in  the 
aggregate,  it  is  the  best  Constitution  that  can  be  obtained  at 
this  epoch;  and,  that  this,  or  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  awaits 
our  choice ;  and  is  the  only  alternative  before  U8."f  Jay,  was 
also  the  advocate  of  a  strong  government :  "  Might  we  not 
have,"  he  wrote,  to  "Washington,  "  a  governor-general  limited  in 

that  State  evidence  exists  that  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  was  regarded 
as  a  measure  of  temporary  expedience.  April  5,  1790.  R.  B.  Lee,  the  uncle 
of  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  present  rebel  army  wrote  a  letter  recently 
found  in  the  dwelling  of  General  Stuart — also  of  Virginia.  "The  Southern 
States  are  too  weak  at  present  to  stand  by  themselves;  and  a  General  Govern- 
ment will  certainly  be  advantageous  to  us,  as  it  produces  no  other  effect 
than  protection  from  hostilities  and  uniform  commercial  regulations.  And 
when  we  shall  attain  our  natural  degree  of  population, .  I  flatter  myself  that 
we  shall  have  the  power  to  do  ourselves  justice,  with  dissolving  the  bond  which  bin  is 
us  together.  It  is  better  to  put  up  with  these  little  inconveniences  than  to  run 
the  hazard  of  greater  calamities." 

*  The  signatures  of  the  members  were  set  opposite  their  respective  States ; 
The  name  of  each  of  the  States  is  in  the  handwriting  of  Hamilton. 

f  Washington's  Writings,  ix.  297. 


JAY    URGES   ADOPTION    OF    CONSTITUTION.  Ixxix 

his  prerogatives  and  duration  ?  Might  not  Congress  be  divided 
mto  an  upper  and  lower  house — the  former  appointed  for  life, 
the  latter  annually;  and  let  the  governoi'-general,  (to  preserve 
the  balance),  with  the  advice  of  a  Council,  formed  for  that  only 
purpose,  of  the  great  judicial  officers,  have  a  negative  on  their 
acts  ?  *  *  *  What  powers  should  be  granted  to  the  government 
so  constituted  is  a  question  which  deserves  much  thought.  I 
think  the  more  the  better^  the  States  retaining  only  so  much  as 
may  be  necessary  for  domestic  purposes;  and  all  their  principal 
officers,  civil  and  military,  being  commissioned,  and  removable 
by  the  national  government." 

"  I  am  not  sure,"  he  wrote  to  Washington  as  soon  as  the  plan 
of  the  Constitution  reached  him,  "  I  am  not  sure,  that  the  new 
government  will  be  found  to  rest  on  principles  sufficiently  stable 
to  produce  a  uniform  adherence  to  what  justice,  dignity,  and 
liberal  policy  may  require." — But,  while  the  Constitution  was 
before  the  People,  admitting  its  imperfections,  he  addressed 
them,  urging  its  adoption. — "  Is  it  probable,"  he  asked,  "  a  better 
plan  can  be  obtained  ?  If  attainable,  is  it  likely  to  be  in  season  ? 
What  would  be  your  situation,  if,  after  rejecting  this,  all  the 
efforts  to  obtain  a  better  should  prove  fruitless?"  Madison 
avowed,  "  I  hold  it  for  a  fundamental  point,  that  an  individual 
independence  of  the  States  is  utterly  irreconcilable  with  an 
aggregate  sovereignty.  I  think  at  the  same  time,  that  a  con- 
solidation of  the  States  into  a  single  republic  is  not  less  unat- 
tainable, than  it  would  be  inexpedient.  Let  it  be  tried,  whether 
any  middle  ground  cannot  be  taken  which  will  support  a  due 
supremacy  of  the  national  authority,  and  leave  in  force  the  local 
authorities,  so  far  as  they  can  be  subordinately  useful."  With 
this  view,  he  proposed,  tbat  the  general  government  should 
"  have  a  negative  in  all  cases  lohatsoever  on  the  legislative  acts  of 
the  States  as  the  King  of  Great  Britain  had.  This  I  conceive  to 
be  essential,  and  the  least  positive  abridgment  of  the  State 
sovereignties."  "  The  right  of  coercion  should  be  expressly 
declared."  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  he  voted  in  the 
Convention,  for  a  President  to  hold  office  during  good  behaviour.* 
G-eneral  Washington,  and  Madison,  Hamilton  stated,  "  entirely 
concurred  in  his  views  regarding  the  plan  which  he  submitted 
to  the  Convention,  as  not  exceeding  in  stability  and  strength 
what  the  exigencies  of  the  country  required."    He  added,  "  that 

*  Journal  of  Convention,  p.  186. 


IXXX  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

his  final  opinion  was  against  an  Executive  during  good  beha- 
viour on  account  of  the  increased  danger  to  the  public  tran- 
quillity incident  to  the  election  of  a  magistrate  of  this  degree 
of  permanency."*  Though  entertaining  doubts  similar  to,  but 
probably  stronger  than  those,  of  these  other  distinguished  men ; 
Hamilton  remarked,  "  the  truth  is,  the  plan  in  all  its  parts,  was 
a  plan  of  accommodation;"  and  he  declared, — "  I  am  persuaded, 
it  is  the  best  which  our  political  situation,  habits  and  opinions 
will  admit,  and  superior  to  any  the  revolution  has  produced. 
Though  it  may  not  be  perfect  in  every  part,  it  is,  upon  the  whole, 
a  good  one ;  is  the  best  the  present  situation  and  circumstances 
of  the  country  will  permit."  Still  the  ominous  future  was  before 
him,  and  he  recorded  in  pi'ivate,  his  hopes,  his  fears,  and  his 
expectation.  "  If  the  government  be  adopted,"  this  solemn 
minute  states,  "  it  is  probable.  General  Washington  will  be  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States.  This  will  ensure  a  wise  choice  of 
men  to  administer  the  government,  and  a  good  administration 
A.  good  administration  will  conciliate  the  confidence,  and  affec- 
tion of  the  people;  and,  perhaps,  enable  the  Government  to 
acquire  more  consistency  than  the  proposed  Constitution  seems  to 
promise  for  so  great  a  country.  It  may  then  triumph  altogether 
over  the  State  governments;  and  reduce  them  to  an  entire 
subordination,  dividing  the  larger  States  into  smaller  districts. 
The  organs  of  the  general  government  may  also  acquire  addi- 
tional strength.  If  this  should  not  be  the  case,  in  the  course  of  a 
few  years,  it  is  probable  that  the  contests  about  the  boundaries 
•of  power  between  the  particular  governments  and  the  general 
Government;  and  the  momentum  of  the  larger  States  in  such 
contests  will  produce  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  This,  after  all, 
seems  to  be  the  most  likely  result.  But,  it  is  almost  arrogance 
in  so  complicated  a  subject,  depending  so  entirely  on  the  incal- 
culable fluctuations  of  the  human  passions,  to  attempt  even  a 
conjecture  about  the  event." 

Were  these  doubts  of  these  eminent  persons  without  founda- 
tion ?  Let  the  history  of  this  young  country  give  the  answer. 
Ere  the  first  decade  of  the  existence  of  the  present  Constitution 
had  expired,  the  doctrine  of  Nullification  was  avowed  and 
approved  by  the  legislatures  of  two  of  the  planting  States — that 
a  State  had  a  right  to  decide  as  to  the  measure  of  its  obedience 
to  "the  supreme  law  of  the  land ;"  and  at  its  will  to  annul  that 

*  Hist.  Rep.  iii.  845 — note. 


INCIPIENT    REBELLION.  AND    EXISTING    REBELLIONS.    IxXXl 

law.  This  incipient  Rebellion  was  avoided  bj-  the  elevation  of 
the  party,  originally  hostile  to  the  Constitution,  to  the  supreme 
power  of  this  nation,  and  by  the  election  to  the  Presidency  of 
the  person  who  was — the  author,  the  advocate,  the  abettor  of 
this  treasonable  doctrine.  Ere  the  second  decade  of  its  exist- 
ence had  elapsed,  another  incipient  Rebellion  was  prevented, 
within  six  months  after  he  had  established  the  liberty  of  the 
Press,  by  the  self  sacrifice  of  Hamilton's  life  in  behalf  of  the 
Union.  "If  they  break  this  Union,"  were  among  his  latest 
words,  "  they  Avill  break  my  heart."  This  rebellion  was  menaced 
by  two  of  the  Commercial  States.  Ert  a  third  decade  had 
elapsed,  another  Rebellion,  also  by  Commvjrcial  States  denying 
to  the  national  government  the  command  of  their  militia,  was 
avoided  by  the  timely  conclusion  of  a  peace,  terminating  a  war 
begun  in  the  interests  of  a  foreign  despot — a  peace  the  result  of 
an  event  over  which  this  country  had  no  control — the  dethrone- 
ment of  that  despot.  After  an  interval  of  murmuring  discon- 
tents— of  nullification  become  an  act — of  menaced  hostilities ; 
in  the  fifth  decade  of  the  Constitution,  another  incipient  Rebel- 
lion was  prevented  by  the  firmness  of  a  successful  soldier 
wielding  by  his  popularity  a  power  dangerously  strong — de- 
nouncing NULLIFICATION,  and  proclaiming  and  maintaining  the 
supreme  power  of  the  national  government.  The  seventh  de- 
cade had  only  closed,  when,  aided  by  the  imbecility  of  the 
Chief  Magistrate  of  the  Union,  denying  to  it  the  right  of  coer- 
cion— of  self  defence;  and  rejecting  the  wise  monitions  of  a 
great  patriotic  soldier,  while  a  conspiracy  was  being  plotted 
under  his  eyes  in  the  Senate  house,  the  existing  Rebellion  began, 
unparalleled  in  might  and  in  extent.  A  million  of  lives  well 
sacrificed  and  millions  of  treasure  expended  tell  the  sublime 
patriotism  of  the  loyal  American  people — assuring  their  triumph. 
But  when  suppressed  will  this  Rebellion  leave  no  unremoved 
evil  ?  Do  the  results  of  other  Rebellions  teach  no  lessons  and 
promise  no  compensations  ?  Is  the  history  of  our  progenitors 
an  empty  page  ?  The  insurrections  against  William  the  Con- 
queror resulted  in  the  establishment  in  England  of  the  feudal 
system  and  of  the  master  power  of  the  great  military  barons 
After  two  centuries  of  the  vassalage  of  her  people  another  Re- 
bellion took  place,  when  these  barons  rose  in  arms ;  and  in  the 
presence  of  hostile  encampments  at  Runnemede,  extorted  from 
the  King  the  great  deed  of  Magna  Charta,  granting  or  securing 
most  "important   liberties   and    privileges   to   e^ery  order  of 


IXXXll  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

men  m  the  kingdom — to  the  clergy,  to  the  barons,  and  to  the 
people."* 

Before  half  a  century  had  elapsed,  another  Eebellion  resulted 
in  the  establishment  of  the  House  of  Commons,  one  of  the  most 
useful  and,  in  process  of  time,  one  of  the  most  powerful  members 
of  the  National  Constitution.f  Centuries  of  discord  ensued, 
until  the  great  Eebellion  terminated  in  a  Convention  which 
settled  the  crown  on  a  new  dynasty, J  annexing  "  a  declaration 
of  rights,"  which  circumscribed  and  defined  the  powers  of  the 
royal  prerogative,  and  established  over  the  British  people  a 
limited  government ;  the  ecclesiastical  independence  of  England 
having  been  in  the  mean  time  secured,  the  Protestant  religion 
established,  and  every  British  subject  clothed  with  an  absolute 
security  against  arbitrary  imprisonment  by  the  act  of  Habeas 
Corpus. 

Another  and  the  last  important  Rebellion  gave  birth  to  us  as 
a  nation  of  freemen. 

All  these  rebellions  were  waged  by  subjects  in  their  own 
cause  of  liberty.  The  existing  Eebellion  is  waged  by  rebel 
States  in  the  cause  of  Slavery ! — alone  in  the  history  of  man — a 
rebellion  against  a  righteous  unoffending  Government  to  secure 
and  perpetuate  the  lash  and  the  fetters  of  human  bondage.  And 
here  again  will  be  seen  ere  long  the  compensating  result — the 
universal  emancipation  of  an  unfortunate  race  continued  in 
chains  by  the  heathen  barbarism  that  made  captives  in  war  the 
property  of  the  captors.  But  in  the  full  broad  aspect  of  our 
Constitutional  System,  with  the  great  good  thus  gained  is  there 
not  to  be  seen  a  great  remaining  evil  ?  All  the  incipient  rebel- 
lions and  the  existing  Eebellion  have  been  within  three  quarters 
of  a  century  of  this  nation's  life.  Such  a  life,  so  soon,  so  often, 
so  much  imperilled,  ought  no  longer  to  be  at  hazard.  All  these 
menaced  and  this  existing  Eebellion  are  seen  to  have  been  begun 
by  an  array  of  State  governments  against  a  General  Govern- 
ment dependent,  by  its  very  structure,  upon  the  acts  of  States,  of; 
minor  bodies  politic  too  weak  to  protect  themselves  and  entitled 
to  its  guarantee,  too  strong  to  be  effectually  controlled  and  to 
render  that  guarantee  a  thing  of  value.  As  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution now  is,  "  a  republican  form  of  government"  cannot  be 
permanently  secured  to  the  people  as  a  nation,  nor  to  any  part 
of  the  people  as  States.     Where  is  the  remedy?    It  is  found  in 

♦  Hume'8  History  of  England,  i.  106.        t  Ibid.  i.  265.        t  Ibid.  ii.  648. 


Hamilton's  plan  of  a  true  national  government.  Ixxxni 

the  precedent  of  Hamilton's  plan  of  a  Constitution,  providing 
that  the  President  and  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  be  in- 
directly, and  the  Eepresentatives  be  directly  chosen  by  the 
people,  divided  into  districts  by  Congress  from  time  to  time 
according  to  their  numbers — by  rendering  the  National  Gov- 
ernment self  existent  and  self  sustaining  as  are  the  governments 
of  the  several  States.  An  eventual  "  dissolution  of  the  Union" 
Hamilton  apprehended  as  the  probable  result  of  the  imperfect 
structure  of  our  system.  If  prevented,  it  will  be  either  by  the 
usurping  power  of  the  sword,  or  by  the  consenting  reason  of 
the  whole  American  people,  restored  to  all  the  rights  and  powers 
and  sovereignty  which  their  own  Declaration  of  Independence 
asserted  to  them.  Let  those  who  read  the  comments  on  the 
present  Constitution  by  Hamilton's  hand,  when  commending  it 
to  the  favour  of  the  public,  perceive  how  strong  though  veiled 
were  his  apprehensions,  apprehensions  in  which  Jay  and  "Wash- 
ington concurred.  "  The  men,"  he  earnestly  wrote  to  Hamilton, 
then  temporarily  absent  from  the  Convention — "  The  men  who 
oppose  a  strong  and  energetic  government  are,  in  my  opinion, 
narrow  minded  politicians,  or  are  under  the  influence  of  local 
views.     I  am  sorry  you  went  away.     I  wish  you  were  back." 

The  Constitution  is  a  reform  of  the  Confederation.  In  the 
words*  of  the  friend  of  Cromwell,  the  immortal  penman, — 
•'  Eeform  the  Eeformation." — Establish  the  Constitution  on  its 
proper  basis — not  as  a  Federal,  but  as  a  National  Grovernment — 
and  this  done — "  Go  on  hand  in  hand,  O  nation,  never  to  be  dis- 
united, be  the  praise  and  heroic  song  of  all  posterity;  merit  this, 
but  seek  only  virtue,  not  to  extend  your  limits,  but  to  settle  the 
pure  worship  of  God  in  his  Church  and  justice  in  the  State  :  then 
shall  the  hardest  difficulties  smooth  out  themselves  before  ye; 
envy  shall  sink  to  hell,  craft  and  malice  be  confounded,  whether 
it  be  HoiMEBRED  Mischief  or  Outlandish  Cunning;  yea,  other 
nations  will  then  covet  to  serve  ye,  for  lordship  and  victory  are 
but  the  pages  of  justice  and  virtue.  Commit  securely  to  true 
wisdom  the  vanquishing  and  uncasing  of  craft  and  subtlety, 
which  are  but  her  two  runagates ;  join  your  invincible  might  to 
do  worthy  and  godlike  deeds ;  and  then  he  that  seeks  to  break 
YOUR  Union,  a  cleaving  curse  be  his  inheritance  to  all  genera- 
tion? " 

*  of  Reformation  in  England.     The  Proae  Works  of  John  Milton,  i.  26. 


ijklXXlV  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 


PART  SECOND. 


The  great  question  now  was,  would  this  plan  of  government 
be  adopted  by  the  people.  After  stating  the  influences  "  in 
favor  of  its  success,  and  against  its  success;"  Hamilton  ob- 
served— "  It  is  difficult  to  form  any  judgment  whether  the  plan 
will  be  adopted  or  rejected.  It  must  be  essentially  matter  of 
conjecture.  The  present  appearances  and  all  other  circum- 
Rtances  considered,  the  probability  seems  to  be  on  the  side  of  its 
adoption.  But  the  causes  operating  against  its  adoption  are 
powerful,  and  there  will  be  nothing  astonishing  in  the  con- 
trary." To  secure  its  adoption  was  now  the  chief  care  of  the 
able  men,  who,  surrendering  their  doubts  and  preferences,  had 
united  in  framing  it.  No  where,  except  in  Rhode  Island,  were 
the  obstacles  so  great,  or  was  the  opposition  so  stubborn  as  in 
the  State  of  New  York.  The  abandonment  of  the  Convention 
by  Yates  and  Lansing,  was  in  itself  an  act  certain  to  alarm  the 
great  body  of  its  people.  This  alarm  would  be  the  greater, 
because  of  the  grounds  on  which  they  publicly  declared  they 
had  retired ; — the  refusal  of  their  "  assent  to  measures,"  they 
conceived  "  destructive  to  the  political  happiness  of  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States ;"  their  "  conviction  of  the  impracticability 
of  establishing  a  general  government  pervading  every  part  of 
the  United  States  and  extending  essential  benefits  to  all ;"  and 
the  duty,  under  their  instructions,  to  preserve  "  the  individual 
States,  in  their  uncontroulled  constitutional  rights."  Its  "  gov- 
ernment," Hamilton  wrote,  had  already  discovered  strong  marks 
of  disapprobation ;  and  its  adherents  "  were  constantly  employed 
in  disseminating  opinions  unfavorable  to  its  reception."  Ere 
long  these  opinions  were  promulgated  in  several  series  of 
hostile  essays.* 

*  Washington  wrote — Nov.  30,  1787 — *'I  have  hardly  seen  one''  publication, 
"that  is  not  addressed  to  the  passions  of  the  people,  and  obviously  calculated 
to  alarm  their  fears." — Writings  of  Washington,  ix.  283. 


ORIGIN   OF   THE    FEDERALIST.  IXXXV 

Private  influences  were  not  easy  to  be  met,  but  an  appeal  tc 
the  public  reason  Hamilton  welcomed.  It  was  through  the 
Press  he  had  acquired  his  earliest  title  to  distinction,*  as  by  its 
after  defence  he  secured  to  it  for  ever,  its  proper  liberty .f 
Indeed,  he  has  been  seen  in  his  first  suggestions  of  a  new 
system  of  government  to  have  contemplated  such  an  appeal. 
"  If  a  convention  is  called,"  he  wrote  to  Duane  in  seventeen 
hundred  and  eighty,  "the  minds  of  all  the  States,  and  the 
people,  ought  to  be  prepared  to  receive  its  determinations  by 
sensible  and  popular  writings."  This  expedient  he  had  resorted 
to  in  tlie  numbers  of  •'  The  Continentalist ;"  and  he  now  resolved 
to  write  a  Vindication  of  the  Constitution.  This  purpose  gave 
birth  to  the  Essays — entitled  "  The  Federalist" — over  the  signa- 
ture of  "Publius,"  which  Hamilton  had  used  in  seventy  eight, 
exposing  the  gi*ave  misconduct  of  a  member  of  Congress.  To 
give  to  the  country  the  united  benefit  of  the  talent  and  influence 
of  two  persons,  both  of  whom  at  that  time  concurred  in  his 
opinions,  he  proposed  to  Jay,  then  Secretary  of  Foreign  Aff'airs, 
and  to  Madison,  to  take  part  with  him;  and  also  to  "William 
Duer,  recently  a  useful  member  of  the  Ts^ew  York  legislature.^ 
The  eff'orts  of  Madison  in  the  general  Convention  had  shewn 
his  ability;  and  Jay,  though  excluded  therefrom  by  the  anta- 
gonists of  a  truly  National  government,  enjoyed  a  wide  and  well 
founded  confidence. §  The  first  number  of  this  "Work  was  written 

*  Hamilton's  Works,  i.  1-140.  f  Hist.  Rep.  vii.  736. 

X  "The  undertaking,"  Madison  states,  "was  proposed  by  Alexander  Hamil- 
ton to  James  Madison  with  a  request  to  join  him  and  Mr.  Jay  in  carrying  it 
into  eflFect.  William  Duer  was  also  included  in  the  original  plan;  and  wrote 
two  or  more  papers,  which,  though  intelligent  and  sprightly,  were  not  conti- 
nued, nor  did  they  make  a  part  of  the  printed  collection." — Unpublished  paper, 
in  the  State  Department,  by  Madison,  entitled  "  The  Federalist.^' 

2  When  Hamilton  proposed  to  add  two  delegates  to  the  number  chosen  to  re- 
present New  York  in  the  Convention,  he  observed,  "I  think  it  proper  to  apprise 
the  house  of  the  gentlemen  on  some  of  whom  I  wish  their  choice  to  fall,  and  with 
a  view  to  which  I  bring  forward  the  present  motion.  Their  abilities  and  expe- 
rience in  the  general  affairs  of  the  country  cannot  but  be  useful  on  such  an  occa- 
sion. I  mean  Mr.  Chancellor  Livingston,  Mr.  Duane,  Mr.  Benson,  and  Mr.  Jay  ; 
the  particular  situation  of  the  latter,  may  require  an  observation.  His  being  a 
servant  of  Congress  might  seem  an  objection  to  the  appointment ;  but  surely 
this  objection,  if  it  had  any  weight,  would  apply  with  equal  force  to  a  member 
of  that  body.  In  the  case  of  Mr.  Lansing,  the  two  houses  appear  to  have 
thought  there  was  no  force  in  it,  and  I  am  persuaded  there  can  be  no  reason  to 
apply  a  different  rule  to  Mr.  Jay.  His  knowledge,  abilities,  tried  integrity 
aui  abundant  experience  in  the  aflFairs  of  the  country,  foreign  and  domestic, 


IxXXVi  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

by  Hamii  ion  in  the  cabin  of  a  sloop,  as  he  was  descending  the 
Hudson.  On  the  nineteenth  of  October,  he  transmitted  it  to 
Washington.  "  The  Constitution  proposed,"  he  wrote.  "  has  in 
this  State  warm  friends  and  warm  enemies.  The  first  impres- 
sions every  where  are  in  its  favor,  but  the  artillery  of  its  oppo- 
nents makes  some  impression.  The  event  cannot  yet  be  fore- 
seen. The  inclosed  is  the  first  number  of  a  series  of  papers  to 
be  written  in  its  defence." 

This  number  was  published  in  the  "  Independent  Journal," 
issued  in  the  city  of  New  York,  on  the  twenty  seventh  of 
October,  1787,  and  was  announced  as  "  The  Federalist,  addressed 
to  the  People  of  the  State  of  New  York."  After  the  publica- 
tion of  the  seventh  number,  it  was  advertised,  "  in  order,  that 
the  whole  subject  of  the  papers  may  be,  as  soon  as  possible,  laid 
before  the  public,  it  is  proposed  to  publish  them  four  times  a 
week."*  And  it  will  be  remarked  in  their  dates,  that,  with  the 
exception  of  the  interval  between  the  fourth  of  Aprilf  and  the 
seventeenth  of  June,  during  which  period,  in  part  owing  to  the 
pendency  of  the  election  of  the  delegates  to  the  State  Conven- 
tion of  New  York,  and  in  part  to  Hamilton's  professional  en- 
gagements, the  publication  by  numbers  was  suspended,  these 
Essays  usually  appeared  at  an  interval  of  three  days,  two  num- 
bers being  generally  published  at  a  time.  Originally  intended  to 
be  comprised  within  twenty  or  at  most  twentj^  five|  numbers, 
they  were  extended  to  a  series  of  eighty  five  Essays. 

will  not  permit  us  to  allow  any  weight  to  any  objection  which  would  imply  a 
want  of  confidence  in  a  character  that  has  every  title  to  the  fullest  confidence  '' 
—Hist.  Rep.  iii.  242. 

*  Madison  states,  "the  haste  with  which  many  of  the  papers  were  penned 
in  order  to  get  through  the  subject  whilst  the  Constitution  was  before  the 
public,  and  to  comply  with  the  arrangement,  by  which  the  printer  was  to  keep 
his  paper  open  for  four  numbers  every  week,  was  such,  that  the  performance 
must  have  borne  a  very  different  aspect  without  the  aid  of  historical  and  other 
notes  which  had  been  used  in  the  Convention,  and  without  the  familiarity  with 
the  whole  subject  produced  by  the  discussions  there.  It  frequently  happened, 
that,  whilst  the  printer  was  putting  into  types  parts  of  a  number,  the  following 
parts  were  under  the  pen  and  to  be  furnished  in  time  for  the  press." — Paper 
by  Madison  in  the  State  Department,  entitled  "  llie  Federalist." 

f  Hamilton  to  Madison — April  3,  1788. — "  I  send  you  the  Federalist  from 
the  beginning  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Commentary  on  the  executive  branches. 
If  our  suspicions  of  the  author  be  right,  he  must  be  too  much  engaged  to  raake 
a  rapid  progress  in  what  remains.  The  Court  of  Chancer}/,  and  a  Circuit  Court 
are  now  sitting." 

X  Archibald  McLean,  one  of  the  proprietors  of  the  "  Independent  Journal,' 


FIRST    EDITION    OF   THE   FEDERALIST.  Ixxxvij 

Having  caused  the  earlier  numbers,  as  they  appeared,  to  be. 
published  in  several  gazettes,  on  the  first  of  January,  1788,  an 
edition  of  The  Federalist,  together  with  "  Philo  Publius,"  was 
announced  for  publication.  And,  on  the  twenty  second  of 
March,  in  order  that  these  Essays  might  reach  other  States, 
where  the  question  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  was 
pending,  a  duodecimo  volume,  containing  the  first  thirty  six 
numbers,  was  issued  with  a  preface,  dated  the  seventeenth  of 
March,  and  a  syllabus  or  table  of  contents  from  the  pen  of 
Hamilton.  Tiie  title  page  to  this  edition  is  in  these  words. 
"  The  Federalist :  A  Collection  of  Essays,  written  in  favor 
of  the  NEW  CONSTITUTION,  AS  AGEEED  UPON  BY  THE 
FEDEEAL  CONVENTION,  September  17,  1787,  IN  TWO 
VOLUMES,  Volume  i.  NEW  YOEK.  Printed  &  sold  by  J  and 
A  MCLEAN  No  41  Hanover  Square  1788." 

The  Pi'eface  states, — 

"  It  is  supposed  that  a  collection  of  the  papers  which  have 
made  their  appearance  in  the  Gazettes  of  this  City,  under  the 
Title  of  the  Federalist,  may  not  be  without  effect  in  assisting  the 
public  judgment  on  the  momentous  question  of  the  Constitution 
for  the  United  States,  now  under  the  consideration  of  the  people 
of  America.  A  desire  to  throw  full  light  upon  so  interesting  a 
subject  has  led,  in  a  great  measure  unavoidably,  to  a  more 
copious  discussion  than  was  at  first  intended.  And  the  under- 
taking not  being  yet  completed,  it  is  judged  advisable  to  divide 
the  collection  into  two  Volumes,  of  which  the  ensuing  Numbers 
constitute  the  first.  The  second  Volume  will  follow  as  speedily 
as  the  Editor  can  get  it  ready  for  publication. 

"  The  particular  circumstances  under  which  these  papers  have 

wrote  to  Colonel  Robert  Troup,  "  When  I  engaged  to  do  the  work  it  was  to 
consist  of  twenty  numbers,  or  at  the  utmost  twenty-five,  which  I  agreed  to  print 
for  thirty  pounds — five  hundred  copies.  I  made  my  calculations  accordingly, 
and  issued  out  proposals,  each  subscriber  to  pay  six  shillings." — Madison 
wrote  to  Edmund  Randolph  from  New  York — December  2,  1787,  "The  enclosed 
paper  contains  two  numbers  of  the  Federalist.  This  paper  was  begun  about 
three  weeks  ago.  It  proposes  to  go  through  the  subject.  I  have  not  been  able  to 
collect  all  the  numbers,  since  my  return  from  Philadelphia,  or  I  would  have  sent 
them  to  you.  I  have  been  the  less  anxious,  as  I  understand  the  printer  means 
to  make  a  pamphlet  of  them,  when  I  can  give  them  to  you  in  a  more  convenient 
form.     You   will   probably  discover  marks  of  diflFerent  pens.     I  am  not  at 

iberty  to  give  you  any  other  key,  than,  that  I  am  in  myself  for  a  few  numbers; 
and   that   one,  besides   myself,  was  a  member  of  the  Convention." — Maduon 

Papers,  ii.  655. 


IXXXVlll  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

been  written,  have  rendered  it  impracticable  to  avoid  violations 
of  method  and  repetitions  of  ideas  which  cannot  but  displease 
a  critical  reader.  The  latter  defect  has  even  been  intentionally 
indulged,  in  order  the  better  to  impress  particular  arguments 
which  were  most  material  to  the  general  scope  of  the  reasoning. 

"Respect  for  public  opinion,  not  anxiety  for  the  literary 
character  of  the  performance,  dictates  this  remark.  The  great 
wish  is,  that  it  may  promote  the  cause  of  truth,  and  lead  to  a 
right  judgment  of  the  true  interests  of  the  community."  . 

The  residue  of  the  Essays  was  completed  early  in  May,  and 
on  the  twenty  eighth  of  that  month  was  published  in  a  second 
volume,  also  with  a  table  of  Contents.  The  publication  of  them 
in  the  Gazettes  was  resumed  on  the  seventeenth  of  June,  and 
was  concluded  on  the  fifteenth  of  August.  Two  days  before, 
Hamilton  wrote  to  Washington,  "  I  have  delivered  to  Mr.  Madi- 
son, to  be  forwarded  to  you,  a  set  of  the  papers  under  the  signa- 
ture of  Publius,  neatly  enough  bound  to  be  honored  with  a 
place  in  your  library.  I  presume  you  have  understood  that  the 
writers  of  these  papers  are  chiefly,  Mr.  Madison  and  myself,  with 
some  aid  from  Mr.  Jay."  On  the  28th  of  August,  Washington 
acknowledged  them,  observing — "When  the  transient  circum- 
stances and  fugitive  performances  which  attended  this  crisis 
shall  have  disappeared,  that  work  will  merit  the  notice  of  pos- 
terity, because  in  it  are  candidly  discussed  the  principles  of 
Freedom  and  the  topics  of  government,  which  will  always  be 
interesting  to  mankind,  so  long  as  they  shall  be  connected  in 
civil  society." 

No  other  edition  was  published  in  the  United  States  until  the 
year  eighteen  hundred  and  two,  three  or  more  translations — the 
first  in  seventeen  hundred  and  ninety  two — having,  in  the  mean- 
time, appeared  in  Paris,  during  the  exciting  discussions  which 
then  occupied  the  minds  of  the  people  of  France.  Talleyrand 
appreciating  it,  said  to  the  Due  D'Aj-anda,  envoy  at  the  French 
Court  from  Spain — "  Yous  avez  lu  Le  Federaliste  ?" — "  Non," 
replied  D'Aranda. — "  Lisez  done — lisez," — was  the  significant 
answer.  Guizot,  another  distinguished  statesman  of  France,  ob- 
served, "  In  the  application  of  elementary  principles  of  govern- 
ment to  practical  administration,  it  was  the  greatest  work 
known  to  him."  I  am  not  aware  of  any  edition  of  this  work 
having  been  published  in  Great  Britain,  though  it  was  noticed 
in  two  leading  Eeviews.     One  of  these  remarks,  in  an  article  on 


OPINIONS    OF    THE    FEDERALIST.  IxXXLX 

a  proposed  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States."* 
The  Federalist,  "  written  principally  by  the  late  General  Hamil- 
ton— a  work  little  known  in  Europe — but  which  exhibits  an 
extent  and  precision  of  information,  a  profundity  of  research, 
and  an  acuteness  of  understanding  which  would  have  done  honor 
to  the  most  illustrious  statesmen  of  ancient  or  modern  times." 
Another,f  of  a  later  period,  observes,  "  The  Federalist,  which 
may  be  called  seriously,  reverently,  the  Bible  of  Eepublicanism. 
It  18  a  work  altogether,  which  for  comprehensiveness  of  design, 
strength,  clearness,  and  simplicity  has  no  parallel.  We  do  not 
even  except  or  overlook  those  of  Montesquieu  and  Aristotle 
among  the  writings  of  men." 

The  estimate  of  it  in  American  minds  could  not  be  less.  Chan- 
cellor Kent  states — "  I  know  not,  indeed,  of  any  work  on  the 
principles  of  free  government  that  is  to  be  compared  in  instruc- 
tion and  in  intrinsic  value,  to  this  small  and  unpretending 
volume  of  the  Federalist :  not  even  if  we  resort  to  Aristotle, 
Cicero,  Machiavel,  Montesquieu,  Milton,  Locke,  or  Burke.  It  is 
equally  admirable  in  the  depth  of  its  wisdom,  the  comprehen- 
siveness of  its  views,  the  sagacity  of  its  reflections,  and  the  fear- 
lessness, patriotism,  candor,  simplicity,  and  elegance  with  which 
its  truths  are  uttered  and  recommended."  The  late  Judge  Story, 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  has  made  it  "  the 
basis  of  his  Commentary  on  the  Constitution ;"  and  the  author 
of  a  recent  History  of  the  Constitution  remarks — "  As  soon  as 
the  Constitution  was  promulgated,  Hamilton  came  forward  and 
placed  himself  in  the  foremost  rank  of  its  advocates;  making 
himself,  for  all  future  time,  one  of  the  chief  of  its  authoritative 
expounders.  He  was  very  ably  assisted  in  the  Federalist  by 
Madison  and  Jay ;  but  it  was  from  him  that  the  Federalist  de- 
rived the  w^eight  and  the  power  which  commanded  the  careful 
attention  of  the  country,  and  carried  conviction  to  the  great 
body  of  intelligent  men  in  all  parts  of  the  Union.  The  extraor- 
dinary forecast  with  which  its  luminous  discussions  anticipated 
the  operation  of  the  new  institutions,  and  its  profound  elucida- 
tion of  their  principles,  gave  birth  to  American  constitutional 
law,  which  was  thus  placed  at  once  above  the  field  of  arbitrary 
construction,  and  in  the  domain  of  legal  truth.  They  made  it  a 
science;  and  so  long  as  the  Constitution  shall  exist,  they  will 
continue  to  be  resorted  to  as  the  most  important  source  of  co- 

*  Edinburgh  Review,  No.  24. 

f  Blackwood's  Magazine,  January,  1825. 


XC  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

temporaneous  interpretation  which  the  annals  of  this  country 
afford.* 

On  the  thirteenth  of  January,  eighteen  hundred  and  two,  pro- 
posals for  the  publication  of  the  second  American  edition  of  this 
work,  were  advertised  in  the  city  of  New  York  by  George  F. 
Hopkins.  These  proposals  stated,  that  the  whole  would  be  "  re- 
vised and  corrected ;^^  and  mentioned  that  Hamilton  was  the 
principal  writer  of  it,  adding  that  "  two  other  gentlemen  of  dis- 
tinguished talents  occasionally  contributed  some  essays,  which 
will  be  marked  in  the  publication" — Madison  and  Jay.  This 
edition  was  in  two  octavo  volumes.  Instead  of  the  title  page 
to  the  first,  and  at  that  time  the  only,  American  edition,  the 
title  page  to  this  edition  is—"  THE  FEDEEALIST,  ON  THE 
NEW  CONSTITUTION.  BY  PUBLIUS.  Written  in  1788; 
to  which  is  added,  Pacificus  on  the  Proclamation  of  Neutrality." 
— ^^  Revised  and  Corrected."  The  preface  to  this  revised  edition 
states,  that,  "  in  presenting  to  the  public  a  new  edition  of  this 
work,  the  object  has  been  to  render  it  correct,  as  well  as  neat. 
Some  verbal  alterations  will  accordingly  be  found,  though  they 
have  been  made  with  caution  j  and  in  such  instances  only  as  are 
supposed  to  have  escaped  the  writers  in  the  hurry  of  composi- 
tion, or  to  have  arisen  from  the  manner  of  the  first  publication." 
Though  announced  in  January,  owing  probably  to  the  time 
which  could  be  spared  in  making  and  revising  these  alterations, 
it  was  not  published  until  the  following  December.  In  neither 
of  these  two  editions  is  any  designation  given  of  the  authors  of 
the  respective  numbers.  "  It  was  at  first  intended,"  the  preface 
to  this  revised  edition  states,  "to  mark  the  numbers  distinctly 
which  were  written  by  each;  but  considerations  have  since 
occurred  which  would  perhaps  render  this  measure  improper." 

A  public  disclosure  of  the  authorship  of  the  several  numbers 
having  been  made  after  Hamilton's  decease,  three  volumes,  en- 
titled "The  Works  of  Hamilton,"  were  published  in  eighteen 
hundred  and  ten.  Two  of  these  volumes  embrace  "  The  Fede- 
ralist," in  which  there  is  a  designation  of  the  respective  authors.f 
Other  editions  followed,  until  the  year  eighteen  hundred  and 
eighteen,  when  the  work  was  published  in  one  octavo  volume,  of 
which  the  title  page  states — "the  numbers  written  by  Madison" 
are  "  corrected  by  himself"     It  included  the  "  Letters  of  Paci 

*  History  of  the  Constitution,  by  George  Ticknor  Curtis,  i.  417,  419. 
^  By  Williams  &  Wliiting,  New  York. 


FEDERALIST    REVISED    BY    HAMILTON.  XCl 

ficus"  by  Hamilton,  and  the  reply  entitled,  "  The  Letters  of 
Helvidius,"  by  Madison.  This  is  known  as  Crideon's  Edition  ;* 
the  name  of  the  publisher.  In  its  preface  it  states,  that  the 
numbers  of  Madison,  as  previously  published,  "  contained  many 
inaccuracies.'"  Frequent  other  editions  have  been  since  published. 
It  is  from  the  text  of  that  of  Hopkins  published  in  eighteen 
hundred  and  two,  revised  and  corrected,  by  John  Wells,  an  eminent 
barrister  of  New  York,  and  supervised  by  Hamilton,  as  to  the 
numbers  claimed  by  him ;  and  from  the  text  of  that  of  eighteen 
hundred  and  ten,  corrected  by  Madison  as  to  the  numbers  claimed 
by  him,  that  the  present  edition  has  been  printed.  Having  in 
view  a  republication  of  The  Federalist,  to  complete  an  edition 
of  Hamilton's  "  Works,"  which  I  had  then  been  engaged  in  pre- 
paring for  the  Press,  an  enquiry  was  made  by  me  on  the  sixth 
of  February,  eighteen  hundred  and  forty  seven,  of  Mr.  Hopkins 
— the  publisher  of  the  second  edition  of  this  work — for  informa- 
tion respecting  it.  Mr.  Hopkins  made  a  verbal  statement  to 
me,  which  on  the  same  day  I  reduced  to  writing  on  the  fly  leaf 
of  the  first  volume  of  this  edition.  "  Mr.  Hopkins  informed  me 
to-day  that  this  edition  was  in  the  first  instance  corrected  by 
John  Wells,  who  compared  it  with  the  original  edition,  published 
by  M°Lean  in  1788 ;  and  that  it  was  subsequently  revised  by 
my  father,  at  whose  casual  suggestion  Pacificus  was  printed 
with  it.  New  York,  February  6,  1847."t  At  this  interview,  1 
requested  him  to  address  me  a  note  on  the  subject,  which  1 
received  two  days  after. 

"New York,  Feb.  8,  1847 
"  Dear  Sir  : 

"  In  reply  to  your  inquiries  concerning  the  edition  of  the  Fede- 
ralist, that  I  published  in  1802  (being  the  first  octavo  edition  of  the 

*  Jacob  Gideon. 

\  Hist,  of  Rep.  1859,  toI.  iv.  433.  The  editor  is  indebted  to  Thomas  L. 
Wells,  Esqr.,  son  of  John  Wells,  for  this  note,  dated  February  16,  18G4.  "In 
reply  to  your  letter  respecting  the  early  editions  of  the  Federalist,  I  can  only 
say  that  I  was  told  by  Mr.  Hopkins,  now  deceased,  that  an  edition  of  the  Fede- 
ralint  had  been  published  under  the  care  and  revision  of  my  father,  the  late 
John  Wells,  but  I  do  not  remember  to  have  heard  my  father  say  any  thing  on 
the  subject.  I  have  always  understood  that  an  edition  of  that  work  was  put 
to  press  under  his  examination,  and  suppose  Mr.  Hopkins,  who  was  a  printer, 
referred  to  the  edition  published  by  him  in  New  York.  There  were  a  number 
of  letters,  notes,  and  communications  in  the  handwriting  of  ynur  father, 
addressed  to  my  father,  which  he  told  me  were  in  the  handwriting  of  Gen. 
Hamilton,  and  which,  I  very  much  regret,  were  destroyed  by  fire." 


XOll  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

^ork),  your  father's  attention  was  called  to  the  subject  through 
the  urgent  solicitude  of  two  respectable  professional  gentlemen, 
both  of  whom  have  long  since  departed  this  life.  Your  father^ 
it  appeared,  did  not  regard  the  work  with  much  partiality ;  but, 
nevertheless,  consented  to  its  republication  on  condition  that 
it  should  undergo  a  careful  revision  by  one  of  the  gentlemen 
above  alluded  to.  Accordingly  the  work  (two  coarse  duodecimo 
volumes,  abounding  with  errors)  was  obtained  with  some  diffi- 
culty, and  placed  in  his  hands  for  correction.  Having  per- 
formed his  duty,  he  put  the  volumes  into  the  hands  of  your 
father,  who  examined  the  numerous  corrections,  most  of  which 
he  sanctioned,  and  the  work  was  then  put  to  press.  Here, 
I  deem  it  proper  to  remark,  that  the  most  scrupulous  delicacy 
was  observed  in  relation  to  any  alterations  in  the  numbers 
written  by  Mr.  Madison;  so  much  so,  indeed,  that  the  alteration 
of  one  word  (a  favorite  one  with  Mr.  M.)  having  escaped  notice, 
that  part  of  the  work  was  required  to  be  re-printed  and  the 
original  word  restored. 

"  It  was  proposed,  that  the  name  of  the  writer  should  be  pre- 
fixed to  each  number;  but  this,  as  I  was  told,  met  with  your 
father's  decided  disapprobation.  But,  after  the  publication  ap- 
peared, the  Hon.  Egbert  Benson  gave  me  in  writing,  a  key  to 
the  respective  numbers,  which  I  understood  he  had  previously 
received  from  your  father;  and  which  I  kept  for  many  years. 
This  key  was  subsequently  made  use  of  in  an  edition  published 
by  Williams  and  Whiting  of  this  city,  in  three  volumes,  to 
which  was  appended  the  official  Eeports  made  by  him  to  Con- 
gress, while  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 

"  The  letters  of  Pacificus  were  added  at  your  father's  sugges- 
tion ;  and  corrected  with  his  own  hand.  He  remarked  to  me, 
at  the  time;  that  '  some  of  his  friends  had  pronounced  them  to 
be  his  best  performance.' 

"  With  sincere  respect  I  am  your  ob  serv*. 

"  Gr.  F.  Hopkins.* 
"  John  C.  Hamilton,  Esq." 

*  On  the  28th  March,  1817,  a  publication  was  made  in  "The  New  York 
Evening  Post" — a  paper  then  of  large  and  leading  influence,  by  the  editor, 
William  Colman,  a  gentleman  of  eminent  literary  ability,  in  reference  to  the 
subject  of  the  authorship  of  the  respective  numbers  of  the  Federalist.  He 
mentions,  as  his  motive,  the  "duty"  he  felt  he  owed  "to  the  revered  memory 
of  the  great  and  good  man  who  honored  him"  during  seven  years  with  hip 
"friendship."     This  editorial  article  states,  "In  the  year  1802,  Mr.  Hopkins 


ENUMERATION    OF    THE    ESSAYS.  XClll 

In  this  edition,  the  syllabus  which  was  printed  in  the  first 
edition — that  of  eighty-eight — as  tha  table  of  "  Contents,"  is  alao 
printed  as  the  table  of  "Contents"  to  it;  and  in  addition,  the 
subject  of  each  number,  copied  from  the  table  of"  Contents,"  is 
prefixed  to  the  pi'oper  number  which  treats  of  it  precisely  as 
was  done  in  the  first  edition  of  the  work.  No  dates  of  the  time 
of  publication  of  these  essays  are  given  in  either  of  these  edi- 
tions. These  will  be  seen  at  the  head  of  each  essay,  with  a 
designation  of  the  author  of  it.  The  dates  of  the  first  thirty 
of  these  numbers,  I  have  taken  from  a  file  of  the  "  Independent 
Journal,"  in  which  they  were  first  published.  Not  having  had 
access  to  the  residue  of  this  file,  of  which  I  have  found  no  com- 
plete copy  in  this  city,  I  have  taken  the  dates  of  the  residue 
of  the  essays,  with  one  exception,  from  another  gazette — "  The 
New  York  Packet."  A  comparison  of  the  numbers  of  the  edi- 
tion of  eighty-eight,  which  are  in  Eomati  characters,  with  the 
numbers,  as  printed  in  the  two  gazettes  (those  in  the  Inde- 
pendent Journal  being  also  Roman  numerals,  and  those  in  the 
Packet  being  in  Arabic  figures),  shews  a  material  variance  in 
the  numbering. 

Before  this  edition  passed  from  Hamilton's  hands  to  distant 
points,  a  new  enumeration  of  these  Essays  was  made.  The 
numbers,  as  printed  in  the  two  gazettes,  were  prefixed  to  those 
in  the  first  volume,  until  the  number  of  which  the  head  is  "  Con- 
ceniing  the  Militia."  This  number  was  not  published  until  after 
the  number,  thirty-foxir  (XXXIY) ;  and  was  printed  in  the 
gazettes,  as  number  thirty-five  (XXXV),  at  the  end  of  a  series 
of  essays  immediately  preceding  it,  of  which  the  subject  is 
totally  different — taxation.  In  the  first  edition — that  of  1788 — 
it  is  transferred,  and  is  placed  next  after  number  twenty-eight 
(XXYIII),  being  "  concerning  the  Militia,"  following  in  its 
appropriate  place  the  essays  which  relate  to  the  military 
force.  The  number  printed  thirty-four  (XXXIV)  in  the  news- 
paper is  consequently  designated  in  this  edition,  as  number 
thirty-five  (XXXV),  being  a  continuation  of  the  subject  of"  taxa- 

printer  of  this  city,  intending  to  publish  a  new  edition  of  The  Federalist,  took 
this  opportunity  to  apply  to  Gen.  Hamilton,  and  solicit  him  to  correct  and 
revise  the  numbers ;  and,  so  far  succeeded,  as  to  obtain  his  consent  to  assist  in  the 
revisal,  provided  a  gentleman  of  competent  literary  talents  would  undertake  to  make 
the  first  verbal  corrections,  for  the  original  idea  was  to  be  strictly  adhered  to. 
He  then  examined  the  whole  with  his  own  eye,  previous  to  its  being  committed  ta 
the  press,  and  saw  that  it  was  free  from  literary  blemishes." 


XCIV  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

lion."  Another  variance  is  to  be  seen  as  printed  in  the  "  ori- 
ginal text."  The  closing  paragraph  in  the  original  number, 
thirty-five  (XXXY),  when  transferred  and  placed  in  its  proper 
order  as  number  twenty-nine  (XXIX),  is  omitted;  and  a  new 
paragraph  beginning  with  a  few  words  in  this  original  closing 
paragraph  of  thirty-five  (XXXV);  but  otherwise  of  entirely 
different  and  more  fitting  purport,  is  added  to  the  number 
thirty-four,  as  numbered  in  the  newspaper;  but  which  is  enume- 
rated, when  collected  in  the  volume,  as  thirty-six  (XXXVI). 
This  number  completes  the  Essays  "  concerning  taxation," 
closing  this  first  volume;  the  new  additional  paragraph  forming 
an  appropriate  termination  of  it.  This  change,  obviously,  is 
the  work  of  the  admitted  author  of  both  these  Essays — Hamil- 
ton— before  this  volume  passed  finally  through  his  hands  from 
the  press  to  the  public.  Another  variance  is  to  be  noted.  In 
the  first  volume  of  this  first  edition,  the  number  printed  in  the 
"  Independent  Journal,"  as  number  (XXXI)  is  published,  as 
divided  into  two  numbers,  designated  (XXXII)  and  (XXXIII)  ; 
a  new  sentence  being  introduced  at  the  beginning  of  number 
XXXIII,  to  mark  more  distinctly  the  reply  to  an  objection,  in 
respect  to  taxation,  ingrafted  on  certain  specified  "  clauses"  of 
the  Constitution.  The  effect  of  this  division  is,  to  render  each 
subsequent  number  in  this  volume,  and  in  the  second  volume, 
including  number  (LXXVII),  one  number  higher  in  the  enu- 
meration than  the  numbers  of  the  essays,  as  printed  in  the 
gazettes.  Another  consequence  of  this  change  is  seen.  The 
number  (LXXVII)  in  the  second  volume  concludes  the  view  of 
"the  constitution  of  the  President;"  and  was  printed  in  "the 
Packet,"  on  the  fourth  of  April  and  called  76 — and  when  the 
publication  in  this  gazette  was  resumed  in  June,  with  the 
number  LXXVIII  printed  from  the  second  volume* — this  essay 


*  It  has  been  previously  mentioned  that  the  second  volume  of  the  first  edi- 
tion was  published  on  the  28th  of  May,  1788.  On  the  19th  of  that  month 
Hamilton  wrote  to  Madison,  "  I  executed  your  commands  respecting  the  first 
volume  of  the  Federalist.  I  sent  forty  of  the  common  copies  and  twelve  of  the 
finer  ones  to  Governor  Randolph.  The  printer  announces  the  second  volume 
in  a  day  or  two,  when  an  equal  number  of  the  two  kinds  shall  also  be  for- 
warded." To  preserve  the  incognito,  he  adds,  "  he  informs,  that  the  '  Judicial 
Department'— ' Trial  by  Jury'— 'Bill  of  Rights,'  &c.,  is  discussed  in  some 
additional  papers,  which  have  not  yet  appearedin  the  gazettes."  On  the  8th  of  June 
Hamilton  again  wrote  to  Madison,  "The  number  of  the  volumes  of  the  Fede- 
ralist which  you  desired  have  been  forwarded,  as  well  the  second  as  the  fir-Jt 


RESPECTIVE    AUTHORS    OF    FEDERALIST.  XCV 

18  also  printed  in  "  the  Packet"  by  the  same  number  78 ;  and  T 
find  no  number  seventy  seven  in  its  series.  The  enumeration 
with  the  syllabus  in  the  first  edition  of  this  work,  published  by 
M'Lean  in  1788,  was  retained  in  the  second  edition  published 
by  Hopkins  in  1802,  and  is  that,  I  believe,  used  in  all  the  subse- 
quent copies,  including  that  sanctioned  by  Madison,  with  one 
exception.  It  ought  manifestly  to  be  retained  to  prevent  much 
confusion  in  the  frequent  references  to  the  numbers  of  these 
essays  above  the  twenty  eighth,  heretofore  made  in  the  published 
adjudications  of  the  Courts,  and  by  the  writers  on  subjects  per- 
taining to  the  Constitution.  The  enumeration  of  the  essays,  as 
printed  in  the  "  original  text,"  from  which  the  departure  in  the 
volumes  is  seen  to  have  had  a  sufficient  motive,  can  only  embar- 
rass for  general  use ;  a  remark  which  also  applies  to  a  reprint 
"  from  the  original  text,  for  which  no  sufficient  motive  will  be 
seen  to  exist."* 

The  attribution  which  is  seen  to  have  been  made  to  Hamilton, 
both  in  Europe  and  in  America,  of  the  principal  and  character- 
izing share  in  the  production  of  "  the  Federalist,"  may  have 
proceeded,  either  from  a  conviction  of  the  superior  merit  of  the 
Essays  of  which  he  was  the  undisputed  author;  or  from  a 
political  affinity  or  bias  towards  his  political  opinions ;  or  from 
the  unlimited  confidence  of  Washington  which  he  enjoyed,  and 
his  large  participation  in  his  administration ;  or  because  of  his 
ascription  to  himself,  long  unquestioned,  of  the  authorship  of 
much  the  larger  portion  of  this  work.  How  far  this  ascription 
is  well  founded,  it  is  my  purpose  to  examine,  hoping  to  explain 
and  to  correct  the  errors  into  which  "  the  fallibility  of  memory" 
has  led. 

The  total  number  of  these  essays  by  Hamilton's  enumeration, 
approved  by  Madison,  is  seen  to  be  eighty-five.  Of  this  enume- 
ration, an  abbreviated  copy  by  Hamilton  from  his  original 
minute,  both  in  Hamilton's  autograph,  ascribes  to  himself  the 
sole  authorship  of  sixty  three  numbers,  and  the  joint  authorship 
w  ith  Madison  of  three  numbers,  leaving  to  the  latter  the  sole 
authorship  of  fourteen  numbers ;  and  to  Jay,  of  Jive  numbers. 

In  November  eighteen  hundred  and  seven,  three  years  after 

to  Governor  Randolph.      It  was   impossible   to  correct   a   certain   error."- 
Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  i.  454,  455. 

*  The  alterations  in  Numbers  29  &  36  have  been  referred  to.  So  in  Number 
83,  also  by  Hamilton,  there  is  an  omission  in  his  revised  edition  of  superfluous 
nviitf  er 


XCVl  HISTOKICAL    NOTICE. 

Hamilton's  decease,  a  publication  was  made,*  which  gave  a  list 
being  a  copy  of  the  memorandum  made  by  him.  Tbis  list  was 
not  disputed  until  the  year  eighteen  hundred  and  fifteen ;  when, 
in  a  sketch  of  the  life  of  Jay,f  the  number  sixty  four  was 
ascribed  to  him.  In  the  same  work,  in  a  biographical  notice 
of  Hamilton,  a  copy  of  the  list  published  in  eighteen  hundred 
and  seven  was  republished.  Early  in  the  year  following  this 
notice,  the  accuracy  of  this  list  was  denied;  and  a  list  was 
published,!  heing  a  copy  of  a  memorandum  "in  Madison's 
handwriting,"  in  which  Madison  appropriated  to  himself,  thirty 
numbers ;  to  Jay,  four  numbers,  and  to  Hamilton,  the  residue — 
fifty  one  numbers.  Three  other  lists  were  subsequently  pub- 
lished, each  of  which  gives  a  designation  hy  Madison  of  the 
authors  of  the  respective  numbers.  In  one  of  these  lists,  Madi- 
son ascribes  twenty  nine  numbers  to  himself— j^ue  to  Jay,  and 
fifty  two  to  Hamilton.  In  the  other  two,  the  same  total  number 
is  apportioned  to  each  writer  with  those  in  the  two  first  of  the 
Madison  lists.  The  variance,  where  it  exists  in  these  two  lists, 
is  seen  in  the  designation  of  the  respective  writers. 

Two  statements  are  also  traced  to  Jefferson's  knowledge. 
One  of  these  ascribes  thirty  numbers  to  Madison,  five  to  Jay, 
and  fifty  to  Hamilton.  The  other  ascribes  fourteen  to  Madison 
solely;  three  to  Madison  and  Hamilton  jointly, /ue  to  Jay,  and 
sixty  three  to  Hamilton. 

A  more  minute  comparison  of  these  several  statements  will 
not  be  without  interest.  As  to  the  paper  left  with  Benson  by 
Hamilton,  two  days  previous  to  his  decease,  it  is  stated  that,  he 
called  at  the  office  of  Judge  Benson,  where  he  found  his  nephew 
Eobert  Benson,  who  relates,  "I  was  then  a  student  in  the  office 
and  well  known  to  the  General,  and  enquired  for  the  Judge.  I 
replied  that  he  had  left  the  city  with  Mr.  King.  The  General 
in  his  usual  manner  then  went  to  the  book  case  and  took  down 
a  book  which  he  opened  and  soon  replaced,  and  left  the  office. 
Some  time  after  the  General's  death,  a  memorandum  in  his  own 
handwriting  was  found  in  a  volume  of  Pliny's  letters,  I  think, 

*  The  Port  Folio,  Nov.  14,  1807.  f  Delaplaine's  Repository. 

I  National  Intelligencer,  March  20,  1817,  "Corrector,"  and  May  3,  1817, 
"Corrector."  In  the  former  of  these,  it  is  stated  by  the  writer,  that  he  had 
"been  for  several  years  in  possession  of  the  information  upon  which  this  state- 
ment is  predicated;"  and  he  adds,  "if  it  be  doubted  or  denied,  I  will  venture 
to  appeal  to  the  papers  of  General  Hamilton  for  the  confirmation  of  my  asser- 
tion."—Dated  March  10,  1817. 


HAMILTON  S    DESIGNATION    OF   AUTHORS.  XCVll 

which,  I  believe,  was  the  book  he  took  down,  and  which  memo- 
randum was  afterwards  wafered  by  the  Judge  in  the  inside  of 
the  cover  of  the  first  volume  of  the  Federalist,  and  where  it 
remained  for  several  years.  He  subsequently  removed  it,  and, 
as  I  understood,  gave  it  to  some  public  library."  It  was 
accompanied  with  a  certificate  that  it  was  in  the  handwriting 
of  Hamilton.  This  list  and  this  certificate  remained  in  "  The 
New  York  Society  Library"  until  the  year  eighteen  hundred 
and  eighteen,  but  has  been  purloined.  This  paper  was,  as 
stated,  a  designation  of  the  names  of  the  respective  authors 
of  each  number  of  the  Federalist  when  written  by  one  person, 
and  of  the  authors  of  certain  numbers  when  written  conjointly, 
of  which  designation  a  copy  was  taken  and  preserved  by 
Benson.  "  The  marks  of  the  wafers  still  remain  in  the  volume, 
and  above  them  in  Judge  Benson's  handwriting  is,  what  is  pre- 
sumed, and  I  believe  to  be,  a  copy  of  the  General's  memoran- 
dum  above  referred  to,  and  is  as  follows — 

»  Nos.  2,  3,  4,  5,  54,  by  J. 

"  Nos.  10,  14,  37  to  48  inclusive,  M. 

"  Nos.  18,  19,  20,  M.  and  H.  jointly. 

•'All  the  others  by  H."* 

Some  time  after  Hamilton's  decease,  it  appears  from  a  publi- 
cation in  1807,  that  a  copy  of  the  Federalist  was  deposited  in 
the  New  York  Society  Library,  in  which  were  designated  in  his 
own  handwriting  the  parts  of  it  written  by  himself,  as  well  as 
those  contributed  by  Madison  and  Jay. 

This  minute  is — 

"  Nos.  2,  3,  4,  5,  54,  Mr.  Jay. 

"  Nos.  10,  14,  37  to  48  inclusive,  Mr.  Madison. 

"  Nos.  18,  19,  20,  by  Mr.  Hamilton  and  Mr.  Madison  jointly. 

— All  the  rest  by  Mr.  Hamilton." 

A  copy  of  this  list  was  published  previously  to  this  copy  of 
the  Federalist  being  purloined  from  this  Library.  This  desig 
nation  was  copied  by  me  in  the  Federalist  in  my  childhood,  at 
the  request  of  my  father.| 

*  Copy  of  a  statement  in  my  possession  made  for  me  by  Egbert  Benson,  Esq., 
a  nephew  of  Judge  Benson. 

•}•  In  a  letter  addressed  to  me  by  Philip  Church,  a  nephew,  and  previously 
an  Aide  de  Camp  of  General  Hamilton,  he  states:  "Some  time  in  the  years,  I 
believe,  of  1802,  or  1803,  I  am  inclined  to  believe  in  the  latter  year,  I  handed 
out  of  our  Library,  to  your  father,  the  two  volumes  of  the  Federalist;  and 
asked  him  to  designate  the  authors  of  the  different  numbers.     He  promised  to 

7 


XCVm  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

Of  tho  four  several  statements  of  Madison,  one  was  published, 
as  previously  mentioned,  in  the  National  Intelligencer  of  the 
twentieth  of  March  eighteen  hundred  and  seventeen ;  and  stated 
to  be  from  "  indubitable  authority."  It  was  copied  from  "  a 
pencilled  memorandum  in  the  handwriting  of  Madison."*  This 
memorandum  appropriates  to  Madison  the  Nos.  10,  14,  18,  19, 
20,  37,  38,  39,  40,  41,  42,  43,  44,  45,  46,  47,  48,  49,  50,  51,  52,  53, 

54,  55,  56,  57,  58,  62,  63,  and  64— Nos.  2,  3,  4,  and  5,  to  Jay,— 
and  the  residue  to  Hamilton.  Thus,  Madison  by  this  list, 
ascribes  to  himself  thirty  numbers ;  to  Jay  four  numbers ;  to 
Hamilton  yz/ify  one  numbers. 

Another  designation  by  Madison  exists,  in  his  handwriting, 
in  a  copy  of  the  Federalist  which  belonged  to  Riehai'd  Eush 
deceased,  a  member  of  Madison's  Cabinet.f  The  attribution 
in  this  designation,  by  Madison,  to  himself  is,  10,  14,  18,  19,  20, 
37,  38,  39,  40,  41,  42,  43,  44,  45,  46,  47,  48,  49,  50,  51,  52,  53,  54, 

55,  56,  57,  58,  62,  63,— to  Jay ;  2,  3,  4,  5,  64,— to  Hamilton;  1,  6, 
7,  8,  9,  11,  12,  13,  15,  16,  17,  21,  22,  23,  24,  25,  26,  27,  28,  29,  30, 
31,  32,  33,  34,  35,  36,  59,  60,  61,  65,  66,  67,  68,  69,  70,  71,  72,  73, 
74,  75,  76,  77,  78,  79,  80,  81,  82,  83,  84,  85.  Thus,  it  is  seen,  that 
in  this  list,  Madison  ascribes  to  himself  twenty  nine  numbers,  to 
J&y  five,  and  to  Hamilton  ^/it?/  one  numbers. 

On  the  fifteenth  of  December,  1817,  "  The  City  of  Washington 
Gazette"  published  another  designation,  *'  furnished  by  Madison 
himself."  This  designation  is  very  detailed — stating  the  number 
— the  topic  and  the  name  of  the  writer.  In  it,  Madison  ascribes 
to  himself,  Nos.  10,  14,  17,  18,  19,  21,  37,  38,  39,  40,  41,  42,  43,  44, 
45,  46,  47,  48,  49,  50,  51,  52,  53,  54,  55,  56,  57,  58,  62  and  63—;  to 
Jay— 2,  3,  4,  5,  64— to  Hamilton  1,  6,  7,  8,  9, 11, 12, 13, 15,  16,  20, 

do  80,  saying  he  would  employ  you  as  his  amanuensis.     The  edition  is  printed 
by  J.  and  A.  M^Clean,  New  York.      The  following  is  an  exact  copy  of  the 
memorandum  on  the  blank  page  of  one  volume. 
"Nos.  2,  3,  4,  5,  54,  John  Jay. 

10,  14,  37  to  48  inclusive — James  Madison 
18,  19,  20,  Hamilton  and  Madison. 
••All  the  rest  by  Alexander  Hamilton. 

JOHN  jC.  HAMILTON." 
"Angelica,  July  25,  1834." 
*  National  Intelligencer,  April  18,  1817. 

f  This  memorandum  in  the  handwriting  of  Mr.  Rush  is  on  a  fly  leaf  of  the 
second  volume  of  the  Federalist  which  was  shewn  by  Mr.  Rush  at  Paris  to  an 
American  gentleman  now  residing  in  this  vicinity;  and  is  now  in  Philadelphia, 
in  the  possession  of  one  of  his  sons. 


MADISON  S    DESIGNATION    OF    AUTHORS.  ^CIX 

22,  23,  24,  25,  26,  27,  28,  29,  30,  31,  32,  33,  34,  35,  36,  59,  60, 61, 
65,  66,  67,  68,  69,  70,  71,  72,  73,  74,  75,  76,  77,  78,  79,  80,  81,  82^ 
83,  84,  85,  to  Hamilton.  Thus,  in  this  list  he  ascribes  thirty  num- 
bers to  himself,  ^ye  to  Jay,  and  fifty  to  Hamilton.  In  the  follow- 
ing year,  1818,  another,  the  fourth  list,  by  Madison,  was  pub- 
lished, in  an  edition  in  which  the  numbers  whereof  he  claimed 
to  be  the  author  were  "  corrected  by  himself,"  and  the  names  of 
the  resj)ective  writers  were  furnished  by  him.  In  this  specifica- 
tion, Madison  assigns  to  AmseZ/Nos.  10, 14,  18,  19,  20,  37,  38,  39, 
40,  41,  42,  43,  44,  45,  46,  47,  48,  49,  50,  51,  62,  53,  54,  55,  56,  57, 
58,  62  and  63 — to  Jay,  Nos.  2,  3,  4,  5,  64 — to  Hamilton,  numbers 

I,  6,  7,  8,  9,  11,  12,  13,  15,  16,  17,  21,  22,  23,  24,  25,  26,  27,  28,  29, 
30,  31,  32,  33,  34,  35,  36,  37,  59,  60,  61,  65,  66,  67,  68,  69,  70,  71. 
72,  73,  74,  75,  76,  77,  78,  79,  80,  81,  82,  83,  84  and  85. 

To  number  XVIII  this  note  is  seen,  by  Madison.  "  The  sub- 
ject of  this  and  the  two  following  numbers  happened  to  be  taken 
up  by  both  Mr.  H.  and  Mr.  M.  What  had  been  prepared  by  Mr. 
H.,  who  had  entered  more  briefly  into  the  subject,  was  left  with 
Mr.  M.  on  its  appearing  that  the  latter  was  engaged  in  it,  with 
larger  materials,  and  with  a  view  to  a  more  precise  delineation, 
and  from  the  pen  of  the  latter  the  several  papers  went  to  press."* 

Of  the  two  statements  traced  to  Jefferson's  knowledge,  the 
first  is  to  be  seen  in  his  handwriting  in  a  copy  of  the  earliest 
edition  of  the  Federalist,  now  in  the  Library  of  Congress.  In 
this  minute,  Nos.  10,  14,  17,  18,  19,  21,  37,  38,  39,  40,  41,  42,  43,. 
44,  45,  46,  47,  48,  49,  50,  51,  52,  53,  54,  55,  56,  57,  58,  62  and  63, 
are  attributed  to  Madison, — 2,  3,  4,  5,  64  to  Jay,  and  1,  6,  7,  8,  9, 

II,  12,  13,  15,  16,  20,  22,  23,  24,  25,  26,  27,  28,  29,  30,  31,  32,  33, 
34,  35,  36,  59,  60,  61,  65,  66,  67,  68,  69,  70,  71,  72,  73,  74,  75,  76, 
77,  78,  79,  80,  81,  82,  83,  84  and  85  to  Hamilton.  This  state-' 
ment  agrees  precisely  with  that  furnished  by  Madison  "  in  the 
City  of  Washington  Gazette."  The  other  statement  is  in  a 
copy  of  the  Federalist,  formerly  belonging  to  Gideon  Granger,  a 
member  of  Jefferson's  Cabinet.  This  minute  is  in  the  hand- 
writing of  Granger,  who  states,  that,  "  it  was  made  upon  inform- 
ation derived  from  Jefferson."-f    In  this  minute  Nos.  2,  3,  4,  5, 

*  It  is  added  at  foot,  "Note  by  Madison  written  on  the  margin  of  the  leaf 
commencing  with  the  present  number,  in  the  copy  of  the  Federalist  loaned  by 
him  to  the  publisher." 

^  For  this  information  the  Editor  is  indebted  to  Lieutenant-Governor  Franoia 
Granger  of  Canandaigua,  in  a  letter  to  him  of  the  7th  July,  1855. 

•  The  memorandum  in  the  first  volume  *of  the  Federalist,'  is  in  these  words 


C  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

54,  are  attributed  to  Jay.  Nos.  10,  14,  37,  88,  39,  40,  41,  42,  43, 
44,  45,  46,  47,  48,  to  Madison.  Nos.  18,  19,  20,  to  Madison  and 
Hamilton  jointly — and  all  the  rest  to  Hamilton. 

An  unpublished  paper  prepared  by  Madison — entitled  "  The 
Federalist,"  now  in  the  Department  of  State  at  Washington, 
gives  these  remarks. 

"The  particular  papers  assigned  to  each  of  the  writers  have 
been  diflferently  presented  to  the  public.  The  statement  from  a 
memorandum  left  by  Mr.  Hamilton  with  Mr.  Benson  just  before 
his  death,  is  very  erroneous,  owing  doubtless  to  the  hurry  in 
which  the  memorandum  was  made  out.  Besides  the  consider- 
able number  of  papers  written  by  J.  M.,  and  in  the  lump  classed 
with  those  written  by  himself,  he  ascribes  to  himself  No.  14 
written  by  Mr.  Jay,  and  to  Mr.  Jay  No.  written  not  by 

himself  but  by  J.  M.  (See  Life  of  Mr.  Jay  by  Delaplaine.)  The 
paper  No.  49  also,  in  which  Mr.  Jefferson  is  painted  in  such 
strong  colours,  was  not  likely  to  be  even  approved  by  Mr.  H., 
and  the  paper  No.  54  on  the  subject  of  the  negroes  as  comprised 
in  the  ratio  of  representation,  was  most  likely  to  be  within  the 
share  executed  by  the  Southern  member  of  the  club.  *  *  *  A 
true  distribution  of  the  numbers  of  the  Federalist  among  the 
three  writers  is  contained  in  the  Edition  of  that  work  by  Jacob 
Gideon.  It  was  furnished  to  him  by  me,  with  a  perfect  know- 
ledge of  its  accuracy,  as  it  relates  to  myself,  and  a  full  confi- 
dence in  its  equal  accuracy  as  it  relates  to  the  two  others." 

It  will  be  observed,  that  in  this  comment  prepared  by  Madi- 
son, notwithstanding  the  variation  of  his  several  statements 
had  been  publicly  and  pointedly  criticised,  there  is  no  attempt 
to  reconcile  them  nor  to  explain  the  inaccuracy.  That  this 
criticism  came  to  Madison's  knowledge  may  be  inferred  from  the 
fact,  that  a  part  of  the  exposition  and  vindication  published  in 
the  National  Intelligencer  immediately  under  his  eye,  is  jjlaced 
precisely  on  the  same  ground  with  that  taken  by  Madison  in  his 
comment  as  to  Number  49.* 

» The  authors  of  the  following  work  were  as  follows  :  Nos.  2,  8,  4,  5,  54,  Mr. 
Jay.  10,  14,  37,  38,  39,  40,  41,  42,  43,  44,  45,  46,  47,  48,  Mr.  Madison.  Nos.  18, 
19,  20,  Madison  and  Hamilton  jointly.  All  the  rest  were  from  the  pen  of  Alex- 
ander Hamilton.'  This  entry  is  in  the  handwriting  of  my  father,  who  in- 
formed me,  that  it  was  made  upon  information  derived  from  Mr.  Jefferson; 
and,  according  to  my  recollection, /rowi  a  memorandum  furnished  by  him." 

*  The  quotation  from  No.  49  goes  far  to  prove  that  Mr.  Madison  wrote  it. 
Mr.  Jefferson  is  there  referred  to  in  terms  of  distinguished  approbation.    None 


AUTHORS    OF   THE    FEDERALIST.  ci 

As  to  the  variations  in  the  several  statements  of  MaditsOt.,  it 
will  be  noticed,  that  in  the  enumeration  by  him  in  the  volume 
possessed  by  Eush,  and  likewise  in  that  in  the  "  National  Intelli- 
gencer" also  made  by  him,  number  seventeen  (XVII)  is  not 
claimed  by  him,  but  is  conceded  to  Hamilton ;  while  in  "  The 
City  of  Washington  Gazette,"  made  not  long  after  that  made  to 
Eush,  and  published  the  same  year  with  that  in  the  "  National 
Intelligencer,"  this  same  number  seventeen  (XVII)  is  claimed  by 
Madison ;  and  is  also  ascribed  to  him  in  one  of  Jefferson's  lists, 
and  is  not  claimed  in  the  list  furnished  by  Madison  to  Gideon  for 
publication,  but  is  conceded  to  Hamilton  in  that  list,  and  is  also 
ascribed  to  Hamilton  in  the  other  Jefferson  list.  In  the  three 
designations  made  by  Madison  of  numbers  XVIII  and  XIX; 
in  that  for  Eush  ;*  in  that  in  "  The  Intelligencer ;"  in  that  in 
"  The  City  of  Washington  Gazette,"  and  that  in  one  of  the 
Jefferson  lists,  the  sole  title  to  the  numbers  eighteen  (XVIII) 
and  nineteen  (XIX)  is  claimed  by  Madison,  but  in  the  list 
furnished  by  him  to  Gideon,  there  is  a  memorandam  by  Madison 
shewing  a  joint  contribution  to  these  numbers  by  Hamilton,^  as 
is  seen  in  the  other  Jefferson  list.  As  to  number  twenty  (XX) ; 
though  the  sole  title  to  it  is  claimed  by  Madison  in  his  list,  made 
for  Eush,  and  also  in  his  list  in  "  The  National  Intelligencer,"  it 
is  not  claimed,  but  is  conceded  by  him  to  Hamilton  in  "  The  City 
of  Washington  Gazette ;"  and  in  Gideon's  edition  the  memoran- 
dum by  Madison  also  shews  a  joint  contribution  to  this  Numbei' 

but  a  zealous  friend  would  have  expressed  such  an  unqualified  eulogium  oa 
him  ;  and  it  is  well  known,  that  Mr.  Madison  has  always  manifested  the  most 
unbounded  regard  to  that  gentleman." 

*  In  the  statement  by  Richard  Rush,  he  says,  "Number  XVIII  according  to 
the  printed  designation  appears  to  be  by  Mr.  Hamilton  and  Mr.  Madison.  But 
the  pen  is  drawn  over  the  word  '  Mr.  Hamilton  and,'  leaving  the  printed  desig- 
nation to  read  simply  '  By  Mr.  Madison,'  the  manuscript  initials  'J.  M.'  occupy- 
ing the  usual  place  to  the  right  of  the  number.  Precisely  the  same  remark 
applies  to  numbers  XIX  and  XX,  of  which,  therefore,  we  have  Mr.  Madison's 
authority  for  saying  that  he  was  himself  the  sole  author,  equally  as  to  number 
XVIIl." 

f  "The  subject  of  this  and  the  two  following  numbers  happened  to  be  taken 
up  by  both  Mr.  H.  and  Mr.  M.  What  had  been  prepared  by  Mr.  H.,  who  had 
entered  more  briefly  into  the  subject,  was  left  with  Mr.  M.,  on  its  appearing 
that  the  latter  was  engaged  in  it,  with  larger  materials  and  with  a  view  to  a 
more  precise  delineation ;  and  from  the  pen  of  the  latter  the  several  papers 
went  to  the  press." — ^ote  by  Madison  written  in  the  margin  of  the  leaf  com- 
mencing with  the  present  numbei  in  the  copy  of  the  Federalist  loaned  by  him 
to  the  publisher. 


Sll  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

by  jiariilton,  while  in  both  the  Jefferson  lists  this  number  is 
solely  ascribed  to  Hamilton. 

Number  twenty  one  (XXI)  is  conceded  to  Hamilton  by  Madi- 
son in  the  list  made  by  him  for  Eush,  and  in  the  list  by  him  in 
"  The  National  Intelligencer,"  and  also  in  his  list  in  Gideon's 
edition ;  but  in  the  list  in  "  The  City  of  Washington  Gazette"  it 
is  claimed  by  Madison.  In  one  of  the  Jefferson  lists  it  is  ascribed 
to  Madison,  and  to  Hamilton  in  the  other.  As  to  numbers,  forty 
eight  (XLYIII)  to  fifty  eight  (LYIII),  both  inclusive,  the  sole 
authorship  to  these  essays  is  claimed  by  Hamilton  in  his  desig- 
nation, and  by  Madison  in  all  his  lists,  with  the  exception  of  fifty 
four.  As  to  this  number,  the  designation  made  by  Madison  in 
Eush's  Copy — the  edition  of  1810 — has  this  feature.  This  num- 
ber in  the  printed  designation  of  this  copy  is  ascribed  to  Hamil- 
ton. There  the  memorandum  of  Eush  states,  "  the  pen"  of 
Madison  "  is  drawn  across  Mr.  Hamilton's  name,"  and  the  manu- 
script initials  "  J.  M."  substituted,  "  showing  Mr.  Madison  to 
have  been  the  writer."  "  The  single  number  LIV  shows  the 
name  '  Jay'  in  manuscript,  near  those  initials,  over  which  the 
pen  has  been  again  drawn  leaving  the  manuscript  initials  '  J.  M.' 
as  before." 

As  to  numbers  sixty  two  and  sixtj'^  three  (LXII  and  LXIII) 
the  sole  title  to  each  of  them  is  claimed  by  Hamilton  in  his  list, 
and  by  Madison  in  all  his  lists;  and  is  ascribed  to  Hamilton  in 
one  of  Jefferson's  lists  and  to  Madison  in  the  other.  Number 
sixty-four — LXIV — in  the  three  lists,  that  of  Eush,  that  in 
*'  The  City  of  Washington  Gazette"  and  in  the  Gideon  edition 
is  assigned  by  Madison  to  Jay,  but  in  the  memorandum  by 
Madison  published  in  "  The  National  Intelligencer,"  it  is  claimed 
by  Madison  to  himself.  In  one  of  the  Jefferson  lists  it  is  ascribed 
to  Hamilton,  in  the  other  to  Jay. 

In  the  inquiiy  which  it  is  now  proposed  to  enter  upon  in  orde» 
to  throw  some  light  on  the  subject  of  the  authorship  of  certain 
numbers  of  the  Federalist,  or  of  separate  parts  of  them  it  is 
deemed  proper  to  indicate  the  spirit  in  which  it  is  the  aim  of  the 
editor  to  pursue  it.  Hamilton's  principal  agency  in  the  sugges- 
tion, preparation  and  superintendence  of  thts  work  has  never 
been  a  matter  of  controversy,  nor  that  Jay  and  Madison  were 
efficient  co-operators  with  him  in  the  contributions  to  it,  greater 
or  less.  The  supervision  of  the  series  fell  to  Hamilton;  and  it 
was  so  much  under  his  control,  both  from  the  place  of  publica- 
tion, and  his  priority  and  prominence  in  the  plan  or  scheme  oi' 


AUTHORS    OF    THE    FEDERALIST.  ciii 

argument,  that  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  any  part  of  it  had 
gone  to  press,  without  his  inspection  or  such  previous  conference 
or  correspondence  with  his  associates,  as  insured  his  assent  to 
what  was  submitted  to  the  public.  His  intimacy  with  the  whole 
work  in  the  course  of  its  publication  must  have  been  complete, 
— more  so  certainly  than  that  of  Jay,  whose  proportion  of  it  was 
the  least  in  quantity,  and  probably  more  so  than  Madison's. 
There  can  be  no  doubt,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  whole  work — 
passing  under  the  signature  of  "Publius,"  and  prepared  by  each 
of  the  writers  with  the  common  object  of  promoting  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution  by  the  people  in  the  several  States,  had 
the  united  sanction  of  all  of  them.  It  therefore  is,  and  ought  to 
be  regarded,  in  this  sense,  as  their  joint  work. 

That  Hamilton  was  particularly  appreciative  of  his  separate 
part  of  it,  or  was  particularly  sensitive  to  the  just  distribution 
of  public  approbation  between  himself  and  his  coadjutors,  on 
that  account,  is  believed  to  be  without  the  least  foundation  in 
point  of  fact,  whoever  may  have  said  or  written  it.  His  state 
of  mind  and  feeling  is  believed  to  be  just  the  reverse.  After  the 
work  was  consummated  by  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
and  especially  after  a  great  divergency  had  occurred  between 
himself  and  Madison  in  regard  to  the  administration  of  it, 
curiosity  was  probably  awakened  to  discover  their  respective 
contributions  to  it;  but  it  is  seen,  that  when  the  revision  of  an 
edition  was  proposed  to  him  in  1802,  and  a  designation  of  the 
respective  authors  was  requested  of  him  for  this  object,  he  ex- 
pressly declined  assenting  to  the  request,  while  he  at  the  same 
time  only  conditionally  favored  a  revision  of  it  by  some  compe 
tent  editor.  He  seemed  indeed  to  doubt  whether  such  an  edi- 
tion of  it  was  desirable  ;*  and  when  the  new  edition  appeared, 
it  was  without  any  key  to  indicate  the  respective  writers ;  and 
its  preface,  with  the  utmost  delicacy  to  his  known  wishes,  stated 
as  to  the  papers  of  Jay  and  Madison,  "  that,  as  far  as  it  has  been 
practicable  to  discriminate  their  productions,  theyare  not  unequal 
in  merit  to  those  which  are  solely  from  the  pen  of  Hamilton." 

After  the  publication  of  this  edition  in  1802  by  George  F. 
Hopkins,  the  curiosity  of  personal  friends  doubtless  often  so- 

*  Mr.  Hopkins  relates,  when  Hamilton  hesitated  his  consent,  that  he  re- 
marked to  him,  '^Heretofore  I  have  given  the  people  milk;  hereafter  I  will  give 
them  meat:"  words  indicating  his  formed  purpose — to  write  a  treatise  upon 
government.  Experienoe  is  teaching  us  the  solemn  lessons  he  did  not  live  to 
incoloate 


CiV  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

licited  from  Hamilton  the  same  information  as  to  the  respective 
authors,  but,  except  in  the  instances  now  seen,  it  was  always 
met  with  the  same  reserve.  The  only  instance  in  which  he  gave 
it  under  his  own  pen,  was  that  previously  stated,  to  his  venerable 
and  very  confidential  friend,  the  late  Egbert  Benson,  who  was  a 
joint  delegate  with  him  to  the  Convention  at  Annapolis.  This 
was  probably  in  answer  to  Judge  Benson's  request,  by  leaving  a 
small  slip  of  paper  at  a  morning  call  in  a  volume  of  his  library. 
It  is  from  this  memorandum,  made  public  after  Hamilton's 
decease,  we  first  obtain  his  representation  of  the  authorship  of 
the  respective  numbers  of  the  Federalist. 

No  particular  sanctity  will  be  claimed  for  this  brief  memo- 
randum. The  pendency,  at  the  time  it  was  left  in  Judge  Ben- 
son's ofiice,  of  a  personal  controversy  which  might  terminate 
bis  life,  may  have  been  his  reason  for  then  performing  a  promise 
which  he  might  not  afterwards  be  able  to  perform,  but  the  per- 
formance may  have  been,  and  probably  was,  a  mere  incident  to 
a  visit  to  a  personal  friend  made  for  other  reasons.  It  were  an 
unreasonable  supposition  that  such  a  memorandum  was  intended 
in  the  mind  of  Hamilton  to  be  invested  with  any  of  the  charac- 
ters of  sanctity  or  dignity,  which  an  ultimate  act  in  toe  life  of 
a  man  is  commonly  thought  to  impart.  It  was  written  and  left, 
no  doubt,  in  perfect  good  faith,  as  a  true  representation  of  the 
writer's  knowledge  or  recollection,  with  the  minute  exception  of 
a  single  figure  which  admits  of  explanation;  but  the  entire  memo- 
randum will  be  regarded,  and  ought  to  be  regarded,  only  as  the 
averment  of  an  upright  and  honorable  man,  meaning  to  state 
what  he  knew  or  believed  to  be  true ;  and  believing  also  that  he 
had  truly  expressed  what  he  knew. 

The  paper  purports  no  more  than  to  be  a  memorandum.  It 
wants  the  essential  forms  of  a  record.  It  has  neither  expressed 
description  nor  signature.  It  is  simply  a  collection  of  Arabic 
numerals  in  three  lines,  with  the  abbreviated  word  numero — No. 
— prefixed  to  each,  the  first  line  ending  with  the  capital  letter  J; 
the  second  line  ending  with  the  capital  letter  M ;  and  the  third 
line  with  the  capitals  M  and  H  jointly — a  fourth  line  contains 
the  words  "  all  the  rest  by  H." 

The  original  cause  of  an  apparent  error  of  statement  in  Ham- 
ilton's memorandum,  in  his  own  copy  of  the  Federalist,  may 
have  arisen  from  a  mere  slip  of  his  pen  or  from  a  peculiarity  in 
the  formation  of  a  single  figure,  writing  with  his  usual  rapidity, 
and  ^specially  of  a  figure  which,  in  the  cursive  hand  of  manv 


AUTHORS  OF  THE  FEDERALIST.  CV 

writers,  looks  much  like  another  figure,  that  might  embody  an 
unobserved  or  supposed  mistake.  His  private  letters  shew  in 
his  formation  of  three  consecutive  figures,  that  there  is  no  break 
or  raising  of  the  pen  from  the  paper,  but  that  they  are  formed 
by  a  continuous  movement  of  his  hand.  This  may  be  regarded 
as  the  true  solution  of  the  only  mistake  supposed  to  exist  in 
Hamilton's  designation,  and  it  is  in  reference  to  this  supposed 
mistake  that  the  succeeding  observations  are  made.  The  printed 
numbers  of  the  Federalist  in  "  the  Independent  Journal"  in 
which  they  first  appeared,  are  in  Eoman  characters.  The 
numerals  of  the  minute  by  Hamilton,  copied  by  myself  from  his 
manuscript,  and  also  in  the  minute  left  with  Benson,  are  in 
Arabic  characters.  The  minute  prefixes  the  figures  2 — 3 — 4 — 5 
— 54  before  the  name  of  Jay,  implying,  of  course,  that  Jay  was 
the  writer  of  the  papers  of  the  Federalist  numbered  2 — 3 — 4 — 5 
— 54.  Mr.  Jay  was  incontestably  the  writer  of  numbers  2 — 3 — 
4 — 5  and  64.  The  mistake  is  in  the  figure  5  instead  of  6.  In 
the  total  number  of  papers  ascribed  by  Hamilton  to  Jay  there  is 
no  mistake.  Jay  was  but  the  author  of  five  numbers.  If  the 
topic  of  number  64  had  been  adverted  to,  the  mistake  could  not 
have  occurred,  for  No.  64  is  a  paper  on  the  power  of  making 
treaties — a  subject  from  his  previous  services  and  then  official 
station  with  which  Jay  was  familiar,  while  the  topic  of  number 
54, — the  apportionment  of  representation  among  the  States — 
with  the  mixed  basis  of  property  and  persons — persons  free  and 
persons  regarded  as  property — was  one  with  which  Jay  had  no 
special  relation,  while,  it  will  be  seen,  that  Hamilton  had  in 
relation  to  it  exerted  a  most  important  agency.  Hamilton  could 
not  possibly  have  confounded  these,  but  in  bringing  Roman 
numerals  into  Arabic,  an  erroneous  glance  of  the  eye,  and  either 
a  slip  or  blur  of  the  pen,  might  easily  pervert  a  figure.  As  the 
memorandum  does,  in  no  part  of  it,  allot  the  number  64  to  either 
Jay  or  Madison,  or  to  Madison  and  Hamilton  jointly,  and  does 
allot  all  the  non  enumerated  essays  to  Hamilton,  it  follows  more- 
over that  if  the  subjects  of  the  two  papers  54  and  64  had  been 
the  basis  of  enumeration,  a  double  consciousness  of  the  writer 
of  the  memorandum  must  have  guided  his  pen  aright — that  of 
his  being  the  author  of  No.  54,  and  of  his  not  being  the  author 
of  No.  64.  It  was  the  error  of  a  figure  simply.  That  such  was 
the  case,  is  shewn  by  a  statement*  in  which  it  appears,  that 

•  StnteiTK^nt  by  Judge  Kent — more  minutely  referred  to  hereafter. 


CVl  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

Haniii  ;on  did  ascribe  No.  64  to  Jay,  retaining  54  to  /limself. 
The  aVibreviated  copy  by  Hamilton  of  his  original  minute  in  the 
same  formation  of  figures  shows  the  haste  in  which  it  was  made 
the  day  before  he  received  the  wound  which  terminated  his  life. 
The  statement  or  allotment  by  Madison  published  in  the  Na 
tional  Intelligencer  differs  in  this  respect.  It  ascribes  to  himself 
both  54  and  64,  to  the  latter  of  which  numbers  he  subsequently 
relinquished  his  claim. 

Having  explained  Hamilton's  supposed  single  mistake  in  the 
ascription  of  the  respective  numbers,  it  is  now  proposed  to  pro- 
ceed to  a  more  minute  investigation  of  the  subject.  But  in 
what  has  been  already  adduced  as  evidence  of  error  by  Madi- 
son, or  may  be  adduced  in  confirmation  of  Hamilton's  accuracy, 
the  editor  deems  it  proper  to  disclaim  any  intention  to  impute 
premeditated  error  in  either  or  in  any  of  the  statements  which 
have  appeared  on  this  subject — nor  does  he  claim  to  settle  or 
to  demonstrate  any  thing  that  will  leave  any  imputation  upon 
any  one  in  regard  to  the  subject.  His  long  since  declared  inten- 
tion to  publish  an  edition  of  the  Federalist,  which  would  "  state 
all  the  evidence  known  to  exist  to  designate  the  respective  con- 
tributions of  its  authors,"*  gives  the  purport  of  this  notice.  As 
a  question  of  mere  literary  interest,  and  also  of  comparative 
accuracy  or  probability  in  the  respective  sources  of  information, 
the  subsequent  remarks  must  pass  for  what  they  are  worth. 
Not  withholding,  as  will  be  seen,  his  own  conviction  on  the 
subject,  both  from  the  evidence  which  exists  and  from  a  com- 
parison of  the  numbers  in  question  with  those  which  are  of  the 
acknowledged  authorship  of  either  writer,  he  does  not  affect  to 
regard  what  he  may  adduce  as  conclusive — or  as  taking  from 
the  reader  the  fullest  liberty  of  forming  from  the  same  or  any 
other  sources  his  own  free  judgment. 


As  to  number  XYII  claimed  by  Madison  in  "  The  Washington 
City  Gazette,"  though  disclaimed  by  him  in  his  other  distribu- 
tions, a  marked  similarity,  both  of  thought  and  of  expression, 
will  be  seen  with  those  of  the  brief  of  Hamilton's  leading  speech 
in  the  Federal  convention. 

In  this  number  it  is  remarked;  "  It  is  a  known  fact  in  human 
nature  that  its  affections  are  commonly  weak  in  proportion  to  the  diS' 
tance  or  diffusiveness  of  the  object."f 

*  Hist.  Rep.  iii.  371  ;  1869.  f  Federalist,  page  154. 


AUTHORS  OF  THE  FEDERALIST.  CVl . 

In  this  Brief,*  "  Distance  has  a  ■physical  effect  on  vien's  minds  ;'^ 
and  in  Hamilton's  MSS.  notes,  commenting  on  an  observation 
of  Madison,  he  ohserves,  "  The  human  mind  is  prone  to  limit 
its  view  to  near  and  local  objects."  In  this  number,  "  The  variety 
of  more  minute  interests"f  is  adverted  to  as  giving  influence  to 
the  local  administrations.  In  Hamilton's  MSS.  notes  a  similar 
phraseology  is  found,  connected  with  the  same  idea,  "  If  more 
raiuute  links  are  wanting  others  will  supply  them."  In  this 
number|  it  is  stated,  that  "  the  operations  of  the  National 
government  will  be  less  likely  to  inspire  a  habitual  sense  of  obli- 
gation;" and  the  advantage  of  the  States  is  said  to  consist  in 
"  the  ordinary  administration  of  criminal  and  civil  justice."  In 
this  brief;  among  the  "  supports  of  government"  is  enumerated 
an  "§  habitual  sense  of  obligation." 

Number  XYIII  is  stated  in  his  list  by  Hamilton  to  have  been  a 
joint  production  with  Madison — a  particularity  which  shews  the 
accuracy  of  his  recollection.  It  was  claimed,  as  his  sole  production, 
by  Madison  in  all  of  his  lists ;  until  the  publication  of  Hamilton's 
statement,  that  it  was  a  joint  production,  being  publicly  urged, 
when  it  was  in  the  list  furnished  by  Madison  to  Gideon,  first  quali- 
fiedly  admitted  by  him  also,  to  have  been  a  "joint  production." 

The  object  or  purport  of  this  essay  is,  in  continuation  of  the 
preceding  number,  to  "  show  the  tendency  of  Federal  Govern- 
ments, rather  to  anarchy  among  the  members  than  tyranny  in 
the  head" — "  with  farther  examples."  In  this  essay,  it  is  stated  j 
"  II  Athens,  as  we  learn  from  Demosthenes,  was  the  arbiter  of  Greece 
seventy  three  years.  The  Lacedemonians  next  governed  it  twenty- 
nine  years:  at  a  subsequent  period  after  the  battle  of  Leuctra  the 
Thebans  had  their  turn  of  domination."  In  Hamilton's  brief ;^ 
are  seen  these  notes :  "  Grecian  Republics  j  Demosthenes  says 
— Athens  seventy  three  years — Lacedsemon  twenty  seven — The- 
bans after  battle  of  Leuctra."  In  this  number  this  passage  is  also 
seen  j**  "  The  Phocians  having  ploughed  up  some  consecrated 
ground  belonging  to  the  temple  of  Apollo,  the  Amphyctionic 
Council  according  to  the  superstition  of  the  age  imposed  a  fine 
on  the  sacrilegious  offenders."  "  The  latter  *  *  *  invited  the 
assistance  of  Philip."  In  Hamilton's  briefff  are  these  notes; 
'*  Phocians — consecrated  ground — Philip,  &c." 

*  History  of  Republic  of  United  States,  iii.  276. 

t  Federalist,  p.  155.  %  Ibid.  ?  Hist.  Repub.  iii.  277. 

;!  Federalist,  p.  159.  ^  Hist.  Repub.  iii.  278. 

**  Federalist,  p.  160.  ft  Hist.  Repub.  278 


evil]  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

In  number  (XIX)  also  claimed  solely  by  Madison  in  all  his 
A)ur  lists,  though  with  the  admission  in  Gideon's  edition  quali- 
fiedly  that  it  was  &  joint  production,  the  same  subject  is  treated  ;^ 
and  there  is  seen  a  similar  coincidence.  In  this  number  thifi 
example  is  cited;*  "  The  first  which  presents  itself  is  the  Ger- 
manic body.**  In  Hamilton's  brief,f  "  The  Germanic  Empire.'^ 
Subsequently  in  this  number,  this  sentence  is  seen;  ^^Charle- 
magne and  his  immediate  descendants^  possessed  the  reality."  In 
Hamilton's  brief; — ^^Charlemagne  and  his  successors." 

Of  this  same  number,  the  powers  of  "  the  diet,"%  and  the  council 
formed  by  "  the  electors,"  are  the  subjects.  In  Hamilton's  brief  ^ 
^^  Diet — recesses — Electors,  now  seven,  excluding  others."  In 
this  same  number|] — the  example  of  "  the  Swiss  Cantons"  is 
adduced.  In  Hamilton's  brief,^  "  Swiss  cantons."  In  this  num- 
ber it  is  stated** — "  The  Protestant  and  Catholic  cantons  have 
since  had  their  separate  diets — where  all  the  most  important  con- 
cerns are  adjusted,  and  which  have  left  the  general  diet  little 
other  business  than  to  take  care  of  the  common  bailiages."  In 
the  brief;  "  two  diets."  In  this  number  the  separation  resulting^ 
in  opposite  alliances  with  foreign  powers — "  of  Berne  and  of  Lu- 
zerne," is  stated.  In  Hamilton's  brief;  ^^  opposite  alliances — 
Berne — Luzerne."  Some  evidence  as  to  Hamilton's  title  to  a  par- 
ticipation in  these  two  numbers  is  also  to  be  seen  in  the  papers 
of  "  The  Continentalist"  published  by  him  in  the  years  1781-82. 
Having  therein  briefly  alluded  to  the  examples  of  the  conten- 
tions of  the  Grecian  Eepublics — of  Sparta  and  of  "  Athens"  and 
having  also  instanced  the  impotence  of  " the  Germanic  Diet"  he 
passes  on  to  the  example  of  "  the  Helvetic  league"  adverts  to 
'*  their  powerful  neighbours," — and  states  that  "  the  Protestants 
and  Catholics  have  had  separate  diets  to  manage  almost  all  matters 
of  importance  ;  so  that  in  fact  the  general  diet  is  only  kept  up  to  regu- 
late the  affairs  of  the  common  bailiages."  The  coincidence  of  this 
passage  with  that  previously  quoted  from  the  Federalist;  and 
near  its  close,  was  not  casual. 

As  to  the  number  (XX).  It  is  seen  to  be  claimed  by  Madison 
in  his  two  first  lists,  not  claimed  by  him  but  conceded  to  Hamil- 
ton in  his  third  list,  and  again  qualifiedly  claimed  in  his  fourth 
list; — and  that  it,  also  in  his  list,  is  stated  by  Hamilton  to  have 

*  Federalist,  p.  165.  f  Hist.  Rep.  iii.  278 

X  Ibid.  p.  166.  §  Federalist,  168. 

II  Fedc  ralist,  p.  170.  f  Hist.  Rep.  iii.  278 

**  Federalist,  p.  171. 


AUTHORS    OF    THE    FIvDERALIST.  CIX 

been  a,  joint  production.  The  analogy  of  this  essay  w/th  Hamil- 
ton's brief,  is  less  marked  than  in  the  previous  instances ;  but 
by  referring  to  his  letter  to  Duane,  the  similarity  in  the  train 
of  thought  is  quite  perceptible.  In  this  number,*  "  the  weight 
and  influence"  of  the  Stadtholder  in  "  The  United  Netherlands," 
from  his  general  power  and  prerogatives,  and  "  his  influence  in 
the  individual  provinces,"  are  stated  to  have  been  the  only  pre- 
ventatives "of  anarchy;"  and  it  is  added,  "fAe  surrounding 
powers  impose  an  absolute  necessity  of  union  to  a  certain  degree." 
In  Hamilton's  letter  to  Duanef  in  1780,  as  to  "  the  United 
Provinces."  "  But  the  family  of  the  Stadtholder,  whose  authority  is 
interwoven  with  the  whole  Government,  has  been  a  strong  link  of 
union  between  them.  Their  physical  necessities  and  the  habits 
founded  upon  them  have  contributed  to  it."  So  in  the  "  Conti- 
nentalist,"!  Hamilton  observes  of  ^'the  United  Provinces,"  "  The 
authority  of  the  Stadtholder  pervades  the  whole  frame  of  the  He- 
public,  and  is  a  kind  of  common  link  by  which  the  provinces  are 
bound  together."  "  The  inconsiderableness  of  each  province  sepa- 
rately, and  the  imminent  danger  to  which  the  whole  would  be  exposed 
of  being  over-run  by  their  neighbours,  in  case  of  disunion,  is  a 
further  preservation  against  the  phrenzy  of  hostility."  Tho 
closing  paragraph  of  this  number,§  stating  the  "  important  truth" 
resulting  from  these  examples — that  "  a  sovereignty  over  sove- 
reignties, a  government  over  governments,  a  legislation  for  com- 
munities, as  contradistinguished  from  individuals,  is  a  solecism 
in  theory" — adds,  "  so  in  practice  it  is  subversive  of  the  order 
and  ends  of  civil  polity,  by  substituting  violence  in  place  of  law, 
or  the  destructive  coercion  of  the  sword,  in  place  of  the  mild  and 
salutary  coercion  of  the  Magistracy."  A  coercion  by  the  sword, 
it  has  been  seen,  was  proposed  by  Madison  in  seventeen  hun- 
dred and  eighty.  Hamilton  in  his  brief,||  enumerating  among, 
"  the  supports  of  Government"  force,  remarks,  "  Force  of  two 
kinds — coercion  of  laws — coercion  of  arm^.  First  does  not  exist 
— and  the  last  useless.  Attempt  to  use  it,  a  war  between  the 
States  j"  and  in  Hamilton's  brief,  it  is  urged  among  the  objec- 
tions to  the  Confederation  that  it  "  legislates  upon  communities." 

The  number  Twenty  one  (XXI)  not  claimed  by  Madison  in  the 
first,  second,  and  fourth  of  his  enumerations,  is  claimed  by  him 
in  his  third.      It  is  claimed  by  Hamilton  in  his  list.      In  this 

*  Federalist,  p.  173.  f  Hamilton's  Works,  i.  158, 

X  Continentalist,  No.  2.  |  Federalist,  p.  176. 

y  Hist.  Repub.  iii.  276. 


ex  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

number  it  is  stated — "The  next  most  palpable  defect  of  the 
existing  Confederation  is  the  total  want  of  a  sanction  to  its 
laws."  In  Hamilton's  brief,  among  the  objections  to  the  Con- 
federation, is  stated  this,  ^'J^o  sanction."  In  this  number,  this 
passage  is  seen  :*  The  wealth  of  nations  depends  upon  an  infinite 
variety  of  causes.  Situation,  soil,  climate,  the  nature  of  the  produc- 
tions— the  nature  of  the  Government — the  genius  of  the  citizens — the 
degree  of  information  they  possess — the  state  of  commerce,  of  arts,  of 
industry — these  circumstances  and  many  more  too  complex,  minute, 
or  adventitious,  to  admit  of  a  particular  specification,  occasion 
differences  hardly  conceivable  in  the  relative  opulence  and  riches 
of  different  countries.  The  consequence  clearly  is,  that  there 
can  be  no  common  measure  of  national  wealth.  There  is  no 
method  of  steering  clear  of  this  inconvenience  but  by  author- 
izing the  national  Government  to  raise  its  own  revenues  in  its 
own  way." 

In  a  letter  from  Hamiltonf  to  Clinton  of  February  24,  1783, 
this  observation  is  to  be  seen.  "  The  truth  is,  the  ability  of  a 
country  to  pay  taxes  depends  on  infinite  combinations  of  physical 
and  moral  causes,  which  can  never  be  accommodated  to  any 
general  rule ;  climate,  soil,  productions,  advantages  for  naviga- 
tion, government,  genius  of  the  people,  progress  of  arts,  and  in- 
dustry, and  an  endless  variety  of  circumstances.  The  diversities 
are  sufficiently  great,  in  these  States,  to  make  an  infinite  dif- 
ference in  their  relative  wealth,  the  proportion  of  which  can 
never  be  found  by  any  common  measure  whatever.  The  only 
possible  way,  then,  of  making  them  contribute  to  the  general 
expense,  in  an  equal  proportion  to  their  means,  is  by  general 
taxes  imposed  under  continental  authority." 

The  next  Essay  in  question  is  number  XLIX  misprinted  in 
the  head  of  this  number  in  the  first  or  M'Lean  edition  of  1788 
— as  "  Number  LXIX — that  is  69  instead  of  49.  It  is  claimed 
by  Hamilton  in  his  list  and  by  Madison  in  all  of  his  lists,  is 
ascribed  to  Madison  in  one  of  the  Jefferson  lists  and  to  Hamil- 
ton in  the  other.  In  relation  to  this  number  Madison  remarks 
"  the  paper  number  49  also,  in  which  Mr.  Jefferson  is  painted  in 
such  strong  colors  was  not  likely  to  be  even  approved  by  Mr. 
Hamilton."  To  this  observation,  the  counter  remark  is  suggested 
by  the  essay,  that  its  objections  to  Jefferson's  project,  pointed 
ar  d  studied  as  they  are,  were  not  to  be  expected  from  Madison, 

»  Federalist,  p.  181.  f  Hamilton's  Works,  i.  382. 


AUTHORS  OF  THE  FEDERALIST.  CXI 

Lis  most  intimate  and  perhaps  most  unquestioning  friend.  The 
contrast  is  to  be  observed  between  this  and  the  preceding  number 
48  admitted  to  be  Madison's.  In  48,  the  allusion  to  Jefferson  is 
simple  commendation.  In  49,  there  is  seen  indeed  warm  com- 
mendation, but  followed  by  a  careful,  elaborate,  and  very  expli- 
citly stated  disapproval  throughout  the  essay.  But  the  reason 
assigned  by  Madison  for  rejecting  Hamilton's  claim  to  this 
number,  founded  on  a  fact  as  existing  at  the  time  this  essay 
was  written,  is  not  a  fact.  On  the  fifth  of  September,  1785, 
Jefferson  writes,  "  I  would  advise  him  to  apply  to  Colonel 
Hamilton,  who  was  aid  to  General  "Washington,  and  is  now 
very  eminent  at  the  bar,  and  much  to  be  relied  on."  And  on 
the  10th  of  October,  1792,  Hamilton  writes  to  General  Pinckney 
of  Jefferson — "  that  gentleman  whom  I  once  very  much  esteemed* 
but  who  does  not  permit  me  to  retain  that  sentiment  for  him,  is 
certainly  a  man  of  sublimated  and  paradoxical  imagination,  en- 
tertaining and  propagating  opinions  inconsistent  with  dignified 
and  orderly  Government."  As  this  and  the  following  number 
relate  to  a  topic  as  to  which  no  similar  project  had  ever  come 
under  Hamilton's  view,  no  analogy  was  to  be  expected  in  his 
writings.  It  is  a  proposition  quoted  from  Jefferson's  "  Notes  on 
the  State  of  Virginia,"f  that,  "  whenever  any  two  of  the  three 
branches  of  Government  shall  concur  in  opinion,  each  by  the 
voices  of  two  thirds  of  their  whole  number,  that  a  Convention 
is  necessary  for  altering  the  Constitution,  or  correcting  breaches 
of  it,  a  Convention  shall  be  called  for  the  purpose."  Could  any 
project  be  more  "  paradoxical"  than  this,  or  more  "  inconsistent 
with  orderly  government?"  Could  there  be  a  project  presented 
that  would  more  be  in  conflict  with  Hamilton's  urgency  for  a 
stable  government  ? 

Some  passages  in  this  number,  are  not  without  similitude  to 
other  of  Hamilton's  papers.  "  If  it  be  true,"  this  essay  remarks,| 
"  that  all  governments  rest  on  opinion ;"  "  The  most  rational 
government  will  not  find  it  a  superfluous  advantage  to  have  the 
prejudices  of  the  community  on  its  side."  "  The  passions  ought  to 
be  controuled  and  regulated  by  the  Government."     In  Hamilton's 

*  Hamilton's  Works,  v.  533. 

f  "Notes  on  the  State  of  Virginia,  written  by  Thomas  JeflFerson,  Philadel- 
phia, 1788," — of  which  a  copy,  formerly  in  Hamilton's  library,  is  in  my  poa- 
session. 

J  Federalist,  p.  390. 


CXll  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

letter  to  Duane,*  urging  a  change  of  government,  he  remarks 
"  men  are  governed  by  opinion."  In  his  brief ;f  among  the 
"  supports  of  government"  is  stated,  an  "  opinion  of  utility  and 
necessity."  "  To  effect  any  thing  passions  must  be  turned  towards 
general  government."  "  The  Government  must  be  so  constituted 
as  to  offer  strong  motives,  in  short,  to  interest  all  the  passions  of 
individuals."! 

*  Hamilton's  Works,  i.  168.  f  Hist.  Repub.  iii.  277,  278,  283. 

X  A  statement  has  recently  been  made  public  taken  from  an  entry  by  Chan- 
cellor Kent,  in  a  volume  of  the  Federalist  of  the  edition  of  1788.  Nothing  would 
more  have  grieved  this  distinguished  and  devoted  friend  of  Hamilton  during 
his  life,  and  to  his  memory  since  his  decease,  as  often  manifested,  and  entitling 
him  to  the  most  respectful  gratitude  of  the  editor,  who  had  the  honor  of  his 
friendship,  had  he  supposed  that  any  minute  of  his  would  be  used  prejudi- 
cially. From  a  copy  of  this  entry,  in  my  possession,  it  appears  that  Hamil- 
ton represented  "  2,  3,  4,  5  and  64  as  written  by  Mr.  Jay — 10-14,  37  to  49 
both  inclusive  and  63  by  James  Madison,  Junr. — numbers  18,  19,  20  by 
Messrs.  Madison  and  Hamilton  jointly — all  the  rest  by  Mr.  Hamilton."  "Mr. 
Hamilton  told  me  that  Mr.  Madison  wrote  No.  48  and  49 — from  pa.  101  to  112 
of  vol.  2d — N.B.  I  showed  the  above  mem.  to  Gen.  Hamilton  in  my  ofifice  in 
Albany,  and  he  said  that  it  was  correct,  himself  seeing  the  correction  above 
made."  The  note  by  Kent  above  quoted,  that  Nos.  2,  3,  4,  5  and  64  were 
Jay's,  "  has  no  correction  in  it.  It  stands  exactly  as  it  was  written"*  by  Judge 
Kent;  and  as  to  the  minute  that  this  note  or  memorandum  was  shown  to 
General  Hamilton  indicating  the  pages  "  from  101  to  112  of  vol.  2d,"  it  is  certain 
that  this  minute  was  made  some  long  time  after  the  interview  of  Hamilton 
with  Kent,  for  the  reasen  that  a  letter  of  Judge  Kent  to  William  Coleman — 
dated  Albany,  May  12,  1817,  states  a  number  differently.  "The  note  which  I 
now  possess" — that  which  states  a  number  diflFerently — "written  in  one  of 
the  volumes  of  the  Federalist  and  which  was  there  in  February,  1804,  and 
which  I  am  certain  received  the  correction  and  sanction  of  General  Hamilton, 
I  have  annexed  below."  The  corrections  made  by  Judge  Kent  are  these,— 
"  The  numbers  64,  49 — 48  and  49  have  been  written  over  other  numbers — 64 
over  64 — 49  over  48 — 48  over  68 — 49  over  69."  Here  are  two  numbers  49, 
written  over  different  numbers.  The  correction  of  49  over  48  must  have  re- 
ferred to  the  number  48  as  printed  in  the  "Packet,"  and  when  this  number 
was  referred  to  by  its  topic,  Hamilton  would  of  course  ascribe  it  to  Madison ; 
for  the  49  in  the  volume  copy  is  the  48  of  the  "Packet,"  which  Hamilton 
ascribes  to  Madison  in  his  own  list.  The  correction  of  the  same  number  twice 
cannot  be  explained  in  any  other  way.  The  correction  of  48  over  68 — and 
the  second  correction  of  49  over  69 — are  thus  explained.  They  are  correc- 
tions of  misprints  in  the  volumes  of  1788  and  carelessly  repeated  in  the 
volumes  of  1802  by  the  printer.  The  number  48  in  both  these  editions  is 
printed  in  Roman  numerals  as  LXYIII — 68 — and  the  number  49  is  printed 
also  in  both  editions  in  Roman  numerals  as  LXIX — 69,  but  why  64  is  writtes 

*  James  Kent  to  the  editor,  kindly  giving  exact  trauBcripts  of  the  entries  in  the  volames  uf  b<« 
grandfather  with  explanatory  statements.    Feb.  6  and  11th.  1864. 


AUTHORS    OF   THE   FEDERALIST.  CXll! 

In  number  L.,  claimed  by  Hamilton  in  his  list  and  by  Madison 
in  all  his  lists,  the  same  topic  is  pursued,  and  after  some  general 
observations,  the  jjrecedent  of  Pennsylvania  in  her  "  Council  of 
Censors"  is  canvassed.  As  to  this,  as  well  as  to  the  scheme 
of  Jefferson,  an  analogy  in  Hamilton's  writings — for  the  same 
reason,  that  no  such  project  had  ever  come  before  him,  was  not 
to  be  expected.  In  number  Fifty  one  (LI.),  claimed  by  Hamil- 
ton in  his  list  and  by  Madison  in  all  his  lists,  the  necessity  there 
stated,  that,  "in  order  to  lay  a  due  foundation  for  a  separate  and 
distinct  exercise  of  the  different  powers  of  government,  each 
department  should  have  a  will  of  its  own,"  is  seen  to  be  a  primary 
object  in  Hamilton's  plan  of  a  National  Government, — read 
before  the  Federal  Convention.  In  his  brief,  he  notes.*  "  The 
general  government  must  not  only  have  a  strong  soul,  but  strong 
organr.  by  which  that  soul  is  to  operate."  In  his  resolutions  of 
1783,f  for  a  General  Convention ;  he  states  among  the  great 
defects  of  the  Confederation — "  its  confounding  legislative,  and 
executive  powers,  in  a  single  body."  In  his  brief,  he  pointedly 
remarks,!  "  the  want  of  checks."  This  want  was  distinctly  stated, 
as  one  of  the  chief  sources  of  his  solicitude ;  and  in  the  struc- 
ture of  a  Government,  which  he  planned — he  carried  the  prin- 
ciple as  far  as  could  be  deemed  wise — of  drawing ;  as  this  essay 
approves, §  "  all  the  appointments  from  the  same  fountain  of 
authority — the  people,  through  channels  having  no  communication 
whatever  with  one  another"  adding  with  his  own  plan  in  his  mind ; 
"Perhaps,  such  a  plan  of  constructing  the  several  departments 
would  be  less  difficult  in  practice  than  it  may  in  contemplation 
appear."  This  Essay,  after  indicating  the  means  of  providing 
security  against  "  a  gradual  concentration  of  power,"  proceeds, 
"  ambition  must  be  made  to  counteract  ambition.  The  interest 
of  the  man  must  be  connected  with  the  constitutional  rights  of 
the  place.     It  may  be  a  reflection  on  human  nature  that  such 

OTer  54,  the  number  LIV  being  accurately  printed  is  not  explained,  nor  ex- 
plicable. Nor  is  the  error  of  Judge  Kent  as  to  53  to  be  explained  in  any 
Bimilar  way,  for  53  is  correctly  printed  in  both  editions — LIII.  A  list  re- 
cently published  as  "  Chancellor  Kent's  MSS.  Notes,"  is  merely  a  copy  in 
the  Chancellor's  handwriting,  and  stated  there  as  "  copied  from  the  news- 
paper extract"  of  the  "  list  furnished  by  Mr.  Madison  himself,"  the  inaccuracy  of 
which  it  has  been  seen,  was  subsequently  admitted  by  Madison  in  the  Gideon 
edition  of  1810.  No  weight  can  be  attached  to  this  mere  copy  of  an  erroneous 
list  in  Kent's  hand,  as  being  "Chancellor  Kent's  MSS.  Notes." 

*  History  of  Repub.  iii.  280.  f  Hamilton's  Works,  ii.  269 

X  Hist.  Rep.  iii.  278  I  Fed.  p.  398. 


•CXlV  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

devices  should  be  necesnary  to  control  the  abuses  of  government 
But  what  is  government  itself  but  the  greatest  of  all  reflections  on 
human  nature?  If  men  were  angels,  no  government  would  be 
necessary."* 

This  tone  of  thought  and  of  expression  warrant  the  belief 
that  these  sentences  flowed  from  Hamilton's  pen.  They  speak 
the  independence  of  mind  shown  by  him  in  the  Federal  Conven- 
tion which  gained  him  a  large  place  in  its  confidence,  and  which 
he  maintained  in  every  stage  of  his  responsible  life.  In  the 
brief,  of  his  great  speech  in  that  body,  he  quotes  the  pregnantly 
fallacious  phrase — "  Vox  populi — Vox  Dei," — "  The  voice  of  the 
people  is  the  voice  of  God" — and  there  meets  it  by  a  remark, 
equivalent  to  this — "  If  men  were  angels,  no  government  would  be 
necessary" — "  Source  of  Government — the  unreasonableness  of  the 
people."1[ 

In  this  essay  it  is  also  remarked ;  "  Different  interests  necessarily 
exist  iji  different  classes  of  citizens."  So  he  had  recently  remarked 
in  the  New  York  legislature.  Whence  can  this  danger — "  to  the 
liberties  of  the  people" — arise  ?  "  The  members  of  Congres , 
are  annually  chosen"  (under  the  Confederation)  "  by  the  mera- 
bers  of  the  several  legislatures.  They  come  together  with  dif- 
ferent habits,  prejudices  and  interests.  They  are,  in  fact,  continu- 
ally changing."  It  is  observed  in  this  Essay — "  It  is  of  great  in} 
portance  in  a  Eepublic,  not  only  to  guard  the  society  against  the 
oppression  of  its  rulers;  but  to  guard  one  part  of  the  society 
against  the  injustice  of  the  other  part."  In  his  brief  ;|  Hamilton 
observes,  ^'■Society  naturally  divides  itself  into  two  political  divi- 
sions— the  few  and  the  many.  If  government  in  the  hands  of  the 
few,  they  will  tyrannize  over  the  many  ;  if  in  the  hands  of  the 
many  they  will  tyrannize  over  the/ew.  It  ought  to  be  in  the 
hands  of  both,  and  they  should  be  separated."  The  scheme  of 
Charles  Pinckney§  and  the  resolutions  of  Virginia  submitteu 
to  the  Federal  Convention — wholly  disregarded  this  principle — 
both  deriving  the  Senate  and  the  Executive  from  the  more 
numerous  branch  of  the  legislature. 

In  this  number,  in  the  provision  to  fortify  the  Executive,  it  ib 
stated — "  An  absolute  negative,  on  the  legislature,  appears  at  first 
view  to  be  the  natural  defence  with  which  the  executive  magis- 
trate should  be  armed.  But,  perhaps  it  would  be  neither  alto- 
gether safe  nor  alone  sufficient. "||    The  analogy  of  this  opinion 

*  Fed.  398.  f  Hamilton's  Works,  ii.  414. 

X  Hist.  Rep.  iii.  280.  ?  Ibid.  260.  ||  Federalisl,  390. 


AUTHORS  OF  THE  FEDERALIST.  CXV 

with  Hamilton's  course  in  the  Fedei*al  Convention  cannot  escape 
observation.  He  contended  for  the  power  of  an  absolute  veto  ir 
the  President,  providing  effective  checks  in  the  other  provisions 
of  his  plan  of  a  Constitution.  Madison  declared  in  the  Con- 
vention, "  To  give  such  a  prerogative,"  an  absolute  negative, 
"  would  certainly  be  obnoxious  to  the  temper  of  this  country — its 
present  temper  at  least."*  It  is  not  probable,  that,  in  respect 
to  a  Constitutional  provision  as  to  which  he  had  avowed  so 
earnest  an  objection,  he  would  have  thus  qualified  that  opiniop 
by  a  ^^  perhaps,"  while  on  the  other  hand,  the  doubt  was  clearly 
in  Hamilton's  mind,  apprehending  and  indicating  as  he  did,  the 
dangers  of  the  engrossing  and  controlling  influence  of  the  legis- 
lature. 

From  these  "  more  general  enquiries,"  the  Federalist  passes 
"  to  a  more  particular  examination  of  the  several  parts  of  the 
government."  The  first  topic  was  the  plan  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  as  it  related  to  "  the  qualifications  of  the  electors 
and  the  elected."  This  is  the  subject  of  number  fifty  two  (LII.) 
claimed  by  Hamilton  in  his  list  and  by  Madison  in  all  his  lists. 
That  Hamilton  would  have  preferred  to  treat  of  this  subject 
may  reasonably  be  inferred  from  the  uniform  current  of  his 
thoughts  and  from  the  marked  position  in  which  he  stood  in 
relation  to  it.  He  is  seen  to  have  argued  in  the  first  of  his 
political  essays  with  great  force  the  right  of  representation. 
"  Thef  right  of  Colonists  to  exercise  a  legislative  power  is  an 
inherent  right."  "  The  foundation  of  the  English  Constitution 
rests  upon  the  principle;  that  no  laws  have  any  validity  or 
binding  force,  without  the  consent,  and  approbation  of  the  people, 
given  in  the  persons  of  their  representatives,  periodically  elected 
by  themselves."  "  This  constitutes  the  democratical  part  of  the 
Government."  "  A|  share  in  the  sovereignty  of  the  State,"  he 
subsequently  wrote,  "which  is  exercised  by  the  citizens  at  large, 
in  voting  at  elections,  is  one  of  the  most  important  rights  of  the 
subject ;  and  in  a  Republic  ought  to  stand /oremos/  in  the  estima- 
tion of  the  law.  It  is  that  right  by  which  we  exist  a  free  people." 
In  conformity  with  this  maxim,  it  is  stated  in  this  number, 
"The  definition  of  the  right  of  sufirage  is  very  justly  regarded 
as  a  fundamental  article  of  republican  government."^  And  in  de- 
Icnoe  of  this  right  he  had  very  recently  remarked  in  the  legisla- 

*  Madison  Papers,  ii.  786.  f  Hamilton's  Works,  ii   G2.  1776 

+  Hamilton's  Works,  ii.  315.  |  Fed.  p.  403. 


CXV]  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

ture  of  J^ew  York.  "  The*  qualifications  both  of  the  electors  and 
the  elected  ought  to  he  fundamental  in  a  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment, not  liable  to  be  varied  or  added  to  by  the  legislature,  and 
they  should  forever  remain  where  the  Constitution  left  them." 

His  theoretical  opinions  on  this  subject  were  the  very  opposite 
of  those  of  Madison,  whose  birth  and  education  were  in  a  plant- 
ing State,  the  Constitution  whereof  he  had  an  agency  in  forming, 
and  which  limited  the  suffrage  to  persons  having  an  interest  in 
real  estate.  Viewing  the  subject  on  its  merits  alone,  Madison 
remarked,  "  the  freeholders  of  the  country  would  be  the  safest 
aepositories  of  American  liberty."f  Hamilton,  on  the  contrary, 
duly  measuring  the  tendencies  of  opposite  interests,  earnestly 
observed,  "  It  is  essential  to  the  democratic  rights  of  the  com- 
munity, that  this  branch  be  directly  elected  by  the  people. "^  The 
second  article  of  his  plan  of  a  Constitution  is  seen  to  have  em- 
bodied this  principle  ;§  and  in  all  his  successively  developed  opi- 
m'ons,  he  has  been  seen  seeking  to  limit  the  power  of  the  State 
Governments,  and  to  organize  a  National  Government  self  exist- 
ing and  self  supporting — a  National  Government  deriving  its 
power  directly  from  the  people,  and  acting  directly  upon  them 
as  individuals,  a  system  equally  important  in  the  preservation 
of  the  Constitution,  and,  if  temporarily  suspended  by  civil  war 
— in  the  restoration  of  its  powers — the  only  theory  consistent 
with  the  natural  and  constitutional  rights  of  a  free  people. 

The  term  of  office  of  the  Representatives  in  Congress  is  the 
next  topic  of  this  number.  In  respect  to  this,  the  Essay  ob- 
serveslj — "As  it  is  essential  to  liberty,  that  the  government  in 
general  should  have  a  common  interest  with  the  people.,  so  it  is 
particularly  essential  that  the  branch  of  it  under  consideration 
should  have  an  immediate  dependence  on,  and  an  intimate  sym- 
pathy with  the  people."  So,  in  a  recent  speech  on  granting  the 
power  of  levying  an  impost  to  the  Confederation,  he  remarks — 
"  The  truth  is,  the  security  intended  to  the  general  liberty  in 
the  Confederation,  consists  in  the  frequent  election,  and  in  the 
rotation  of  the  members  of  Congress,  by  which  there  is  a  con- 
Btant  and  an  effectual  check  upon  them.  This  is  the  security 
which  the  people  in  every  State  enjoy  against  the  usurpations 
of  their  internal  governments;  and  it  is  the  true  source  of  se- 
curity in  a  representative  republic."   A  vindication  of  "  biennial 

*  Hist,  of  Repub.  iii.  207.  f  Madison  Papers,  ii.  786. 

X  Secret  Debates,  149.  g  Hamilton  s  Works,  ii.  396 

II  Federalist,  p.  404. 


AUTHORS    OF    THE    FEDERALIST.  CXvil 

elections"  is  drawn  from  the  previous  "  history  of  this  branch 
of  the  English  Constitution" — from  that  of  Ireland ; — and  from 
that  of  the  several  States  when  Colonies.  When  referrintj  to 
Virginia,  the  author  of  this  number*  observes — "  In  Virginia, 
nevertheless,  if  I  have  not  been  misinformed,  elections  under  the 
former  Government  were  septennial."  Such  might  be  the 
language  of  a  person,  residing  at  a  distance  from  that  State 
with  which  the  communications  were  then  infrequent;  probably 
without  the  means  of  recurring  to  her  colonial  records;  who 
had  passed  his  early  life  in  the  camp,  and  much  of  his  after  life 
under  pressing  professional  engagements.  But  such  an  expres- 
sion was  not  to  be  expected  from  Madison,  a  member  of  the 
Convention  in  1775  which  framed  the  first  Constitution  of  that 
State, — in  1776  a  member  of  her  legislature — in  1777  a  mem- 
ber of  her  "  Council  of  State ;"  and  in  1779  chosen  one  of  her 
delegates  to  Congress — speaking  of  the  term  of  office  in  her 
recent  Colonial  legislature. 

In  this  number,f  the  change  in  England  from  triennial  to  sep- 
tennial elections  is  justly  disapproved.  "  The  last  change  from 
three  to  seven  years,  is  well  known  to  have  been  introduced  -pretty 
early  in  the  present  century  under  an  alarm  for  the  Hanoverian  suc- 
cession." Hamilton's  previous  language  is  equally  explicit.  "  The 
EnglishWhigs,  after  the  Revolution,"  he  remarks,;}:  "from  an  over- 
whelming dread  of  Popery,  and  of  the  Pretender,  from  triennial, 
voted  the  Parliament  septennial.  They  have  been  trying  ever 
since  to  undo  this  false  step  in  vain,  and  repenting  the  effects  of 
their  folly  in  the  overgrown  power  of  the  new  family." 

Number  Fifty  three  (LIII)  is  claimed  by  Hamilton  in  his  list, 
and  by  Madison  in  all  of  his  lists — is  ascribed  to  Madison  in  one 
of  the  Jefferson  lists,  and  to  Hamilton  in  the  other.  It  is  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  subject  last  treated  of  in  the  preceding  number 
— the  duration  of  the  term  of  office  of  the  members  of  the  House 
of  Eepresentatives.  From  what  is  shown,  there  can  exist  little 
doubt,  that  Madison  was  not  the  author  of  number  fifty  two.  It 
is  seen  to  have  derived  its  defence  of  the  provision  for  biennial 
elections  from  historical  examples.  In  this  succeeding  number 
Fifty  three  (LIII),  after  an  allusion  to  the  periods  established 
in  certain  of  the  United  States,  this  subject  is  considered  on 
broader  grounds.  "  The  natural  alarm  in  the  votaries  of  free 
government,  of  which  the  frequency  of  elections   is  the  corner 

*  Fed.  p.  407.  t  ^^^-  P-  ^06- 

X  Hamilton's  Works,  ii.  289.— «'Phocion,"  1784. 


CXVlll  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

stone,"*  is  he»*e  stated  to  have  resulted  from  the  instances  in  tlie 
acts  of  the  IJritish  Parliament,  prolonging  their  term  of  office. 
This   "frequency  of  elections,"  he  stated    in  the  reference    in 
the  preceding  number — to  have  been — "the  security  of  liberty ;" 
and  this  essay  meets  this  objection  to  the  Constitution  decidedly. 
by  referring  to  "  the  important  distinction  so  well  understood  in 
America  between  a  Constitution  established  by  the  people,  and  un- 
alterable by  the  Government,  and  a  law  established  by  the  govern- 
ment, and  alterable  by  the  Government." ■\     This  "  important  dis- 
tinction" had  been  brought  pressingly  before  Hamilton  by  the 
violent  bigotry  and  selfish  proscription,  shewn,  in  New  York  in 
1778,  by  the  party  whose  leaders  were  now  opposing  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution  by  that  State.     It  was,  while  opposing 
legislative  discriminations  violative  of  the  Constitution  that  ho 
asserted  its  supremacy.     "  If  the  Constitution,"  he  wrote, |  "  de- 
clares that  persons   possessing  certain  qualifications  shall    bo 
entitled  to  certain  rights,  while  that  Constitution  remains  in 
force,  the  Government,  which  is  the  mere  creature  of  the  Consti- 
tution, can  divest  no  citizen,  who  has  the  requisite  qualifications, 
of  his  corresponding  rights."    "Happily  for  us  in  this  country, 
the  position  is  not  to  be  controverted,  that  the  Constitution  is 
the  creature  of  the  people ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  they  are 
not  bound  by  it,  while  they  suffer  it  to  continue  in  force;  nor 
does  it  follow  that  the  legislature,  which  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
creature  of  the  Constitution,  can  depart  from  it,  on  any  pre- 
sumption of  the  contrary  sense  of  the  people.     The  Constitution 
is  the  compact  made  between  the  society  at  large  and  each  in- 
dividual."   "All  the  authority  of  the  legislature  is  delegated  to 
them  under  the  Constitution ;  their  rights  and  powers  are  there 
defined  ;  if  they  exceed  them,  it  is  a  treasonable  usurpation  upon 
the  power  and  majesty  of  the  people ;  aj^  by  the  same  rule 
that  they  may  take  away  from  a  single  individual  the  rights  he 
claims  under  the  Constitution,  they  may  erect  themselves  into 
perpetual  dictators."    "  The  second  question,"  it  is  stated  in  this 
number,  is,  "  whether  biennial  elections  be  necessary  or  useful ;" 
and  in  reference  to  this,  "  the  requisite  knowledge"  of  the  repre- 
sentative is  considered.     "  Some  knowledge  of  the  affairs,  and 
even  of  the  laws  of  all  the  States  ought  to  be  possessed  by  the 
members  from  each  of  the  States.     How  can  foreign  trade  be 
properly  regulated  by  uniform  laws  without  some  acquaintance 

*  federalist,  p.  411.  f  ^^id.  410.        %  Hamilton's  Works,  ii  319,  322. 


AUTHORS    OF   THE   FEDERALIST.  CXIX 

with  the  commerce,  the  ports,  the  usages,  and  the  regulations 
of  the  different  States  ?  How  can  the  trade  between  the  differ- 
ent States  be  duly  regulated,  without  some  knowledge  of  their 
relative  situations  in  these  and  other  points  ?  How  can  taxes 
be  judiciously  imposed  and  effectually  collected,  if  they  be  not 
accommodated  to  the  different  laws  and  local  circumstances  re- 
lating to  these  objects  in  the  different  States  ?  How  can  uniform 
regulations  for  the  militia  be  duly  provided  without  a  similar 
knowledge  of  some  internal  circumstances  by  which  the  States 
are   distinguished    from   each   other?     These   are  the  principal 

objects  of  federal   legislation." "A   branch   of  knowledge 

which  belongs  to  the  acquirements  of  a  federal  representative, 
and  which  has  not  been  mentioned,  is  that  of  foreign  affairs." 
How  much  these  observations  are  in  accordance  with  the  habit- 
ual themes  of  thought  in  Hamilton's  mind  is  seen  in  his  various 
writings  and  in  the  topics  which  he  had  selected  for  his  own 
pen  in  the  numbers  of  this  work.  They  are  summed  up  in  a  single 
sentence  of  one  of  his  early  concise  productions,  also  entitled 
"  Publius."*  Speaking  of  the  high  office  of  a  representative  In 
Congress — "  to  form  useful  alliances  abroad — to  establish  a  wue 
government  at  home — to  improve  the  internal  resources  Sindi  finances 
of  the  nation — would  be  the  generous  objects  of  his  care."  This 
number  concludes  by  pointing  briefly  to  the  objections  "  of  less 
importance,"  to  annual  elections.  Hamilton  had  recently  re- 
marked in  the  Federal  Convention.  "There  is  a  medium  in 
every  thing.  I  confess  three  3-ears  is  not  too  long."-}-  This  was 
the  term  of  office  in  his  plan  of  a  Constitution. 

Number  Fifty  four  (LIV)  is  ascribed  by  Hamilton  in  his  list 
to  Jay.  Of  the  mistake  in  this  ascription  an  explanation  has 
been  given,  and  from  Hamilton's  statement,  designating  the 
numbers  by  Madison  and  not  including  this,  it  is  to  be  ascribed  on 
Hamilton's  authority  to  himself.  Madison  in  all  his  lists  claims 
this  number  to  himself,  although  the  minute  of  Eush  previously 
quoted  would  indicate  some  uncertainty  in  his  own  mind. 
"  The  single  number  LIY,"  this  minute  states,  "  shows  the  name 
of  '  Jay'  in  manuscript,  near  those  initials  over  which  the  pen 
has  been  again  drawn,  leaving  the  manuscript  initials  *  J.  M.'  as 
before.  In  one  of  the  Jefferson  lists  it  is  ascribed  to  Madison,  in 
the  other  to  Jay.  In  support  of  his  claim  to  this  number  Madi< 
«nn  remarks — ''  The  paper  No.  54  on  the  subject  of  the  Negroes, 

*  Hamilton's  Works,  ii.  161.  \  Secret  Debates,  161. 


CXX  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

as  comprized,  in  the  ratio  of  representation,  was  most  likely  to 
be  within  the  share  executed  by  the  southern  member  of  the 
club."  In  a  survey  of  all  the  circumstances  connected  with 
the  interesting  subject  of  this  paper,  the  probability  is  in  the 
opposite  direction.  The  representation  of  three  fifths  of  the 
negroes  was  a  reluctant  concession  to  the  Southern  States^ 
"  whose  unfortunate  situation,"  Hamilton  subsequently  remarked 
in  the  New  York  Convention,  "  it  is  1o  have  a  great  part  of  their 
population  as  well  as  property  in  blacks."  The  regulation 
eomplained  of,  he  said,  "  was  one  result  of  the  spirit  of  ac- 
commodation which  governed  the  Convention,  and  without  this 
indulgence  no  Union  could  possibly  have  been  formed."  But 
imperative  as  this  concession  was,  it  was  only  the  result  of 
frequent  negotiation  in  the  Convention;  and  was  a  subject  of 
shai-p  animadversion  when  the  plan  of  the  Constitution  was 
made  public.  Of  this  animadversion,  Hamilton  was  the  espe- 
cial object.  "  The  delegate  from  this  State" — Hamilton — (it  is 
charged  upon  him)  "  acceded  to  it  alone  on  the  part  of  the 
State.  With  what  right  they  know  best  who  deputed  him; 
and  as  the  legislature  are  now  convened,  to  them  I  refer  him 
for  the  present,  only  observing,  that  if  he  had  not  the  most 
full  and  ample  power  for  what  he  didj  (and  I  never  heard 
it  pretended  that  he  had)  I  cannot  help  thinking  it  a  most 
daring  insult  offered  to  the  freemen  and  freeholders  of  this  State, 
besides  being  an  unparalleled  departure  from  his  duty  to  this 
State,  as  well  as  to  the  United  States."* 

The  peculiar  form  in  which  this  subject  is  presented  in  this 
essay  is  not  a  little  confirmatory  of  the  probability  that  it  is 
the  production  of  a  delegate  to  the  General  Convention  from  a 
Northern  State.  It  sustains  the  provision  for  the,  representa- 
tion of  the  colored  people  by  stating  the  argument,  as  it  "might" 
be  urged  "  by  one  of  our  Southern  brethren."  And  at  the  close 
of  this  hypothetical  view,  adds — "  Such  is  the  reasoning  which 
an  advocate  for  the  Southern  interests  might  employ  on  this 
subject.  And  although  it  may  appear  to  be  a  little  strained  in 
some  points,  on  the  whole  I  must  confess,  that  it  fully  reconciles  me 
to  the  scale  of  representation  which  the  Convention  have  estab- 
lished." These  qualifying  expressions  do  not  seem  to  be  the 
natural  or  probable  language  of  a  delegate  from  Virginia.  They 
aro  the  terms  which  would  naturally  and  probably  be  used  by  & 

*  Expositor,  No.  1,  Februiyry  7,  1788. 


AUTHORS    OF   THE    FEi^ERALIST.  3XX1 

delegate  from  New  York,  aware  of  the  force  and  extent  of  the 
Northern  popular  sentiment,  jealous  of  the  assuming  temper  of 
the  Southern  States,  and  especially  jealous  of  the  admission  of 
any  portion  of  the  slave  population,  as  the  basis  of  representa- 
tion, when  the  Southern  field  for  the  extension  of  slave  labor 
was  so  disproportionately  large,  and  the  cession  of  a  part  of  it 
to  the  Union  had  been  so  long,  so  tenaciously,  and  so  offensively 
withheld. 

If  the  probability  be,  that  the  vindication  of  this  provision 
of  the  Constitution  would  more  naturally  have  proceeded  from 
the  representative  in  the  Convention  of  a  Northern  State?  If  it 
was  to  be  expected,  that  the  sole  delegate  from  New  York  who 
signed  the  Constitution,  must  have  felt  the  strong  and  difficult 
necessity  of  meeting  and  soothing,  as  to  this  new  unexpected 
feature  of  the  Constitution,  the  earnest  prejudices  of  the  free- 
men of  this  State  at  that  time  holding  slaves,  there  is  nothing 
in  the  opinions  or  in  the  political  action  of  Hamilton  at  any 
time  to  diminish,  but  every  thing  to  increase,  this  probability. 
In  the  earliest  preserved  production  of  his  pen,  when  at  the 
age  of  seventeen,  writing  "  A  Full  Vindication"  of  the  mear 
sures  of  Congress,  warm  with  his  great  theme — "  the  natural 
rights  of  mankind"  and  the  value  of  "  civil  liberty" — he  de- 
clares, *'  All  men  have  one  common  original,  they  participate 
in  one  common  nature,  and  consequently  have  onci  common 
right.  No  reason  can  be  assigned  why  one  man  should  exer- 
cise any  power  or  pre-eminence  over  his  fellow  creatures  more 
than  another,  unless  they  have  voluntarily  vested  him  with  it." 
"  I  consider  civil  liberty,  in  a  genuine  unadulterated  sense,  as 
the  greatest  of  terrestrial  blessings.  I  am  convin(!ed,  that  the 
WHOLE  HUMAN  race  is  entitled  to  it;  and  that  it  cannot  be  wi'ested 
from  them  without  the  blackest  and  most  aggravated  guilt."* — 
"  Civil  liberty  is  only  natural  liberty,  modified  and  secured  by 
the  sanctions  of  civil  society.  It  is  not  a  thing  in  its  own 
nature,  precarious  and  dependent  on  human  will  and  caprice,  but 
it  is  conformable  to  the  constitution  of  man,  as  well  as  necessary 
to  the  well  being  of  Society."  He  meant  "  the  vim  le  human 
RACE,"  and  looked  to  the  emancipation  of  the  blacks  as  part  of 
the  great  sacrifice  to  be  laid  by  the  American  jeople  on  the 
Altar  of  Freedom.  When  urging  upon  the  Continantal  Con- 
gress in  1779,  the  raising  of  several  battalions  of  negroes  with 

*  Hamilton's  Works,  toI   i.  p.  3. 


CXXU  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

the  assistance  of  th(.  Grovernment  of  South  Carolina,  and  avow- 
ing  his  opinion,  that  "the  negroes  will  make  very  excellent  soldiers, 
with  proper  management,"  Hamilton  uses  words  that  cannot 
soon  be  unremembered.  "  The  contempt,"  he  writes  to  the 
President  of  Congress,*  "  we  have  been  taught  to  entertain  for 
the  blacks,  makes  us  fancy  many  things  that  are  founded  neither 
in  reason  nor  experience;  and  an  unwillingness  to  part  with 
property  of  so  valuable  a  kind,  will  furnish  a  thousand  argu- 
ments to  show  the  impracticability  or  pernicious  tendency  of  a 
scheme  which  requires  such  sacrifices.  .  .  .  An  essential  part  of  the 
plan  is  to  give  them  their  freedom  with  their  swords.  This  will 
secure  their  fidelity,  animate  their  courage  and  I  believe,  will 
have  a  good  influence  upon  those  who  remain  by  opening  a 
door  to  their  emancipation.  This  circumstance,  I  confess,  has 
no  small  weight  in  inducing  me  to  wish  the  success  of  the 
project,  for  the  dictates  of  humanity  and  true  policy  equally  in- 
terest me  in  favor  of  this  unfortunate  class  of  men."  Fifteen 
days  after  the  date  of  this  letter.  Congress  met  its  suggestions 
by  recommending  to  South  Carolina  (whence  a  delegate  was 
present  urging  the  measure)  and  to  Georgia  "  immediately  the 
raising  three  thousand  able  bodied  negroes"  to  be  commanded 
by  white  officers;  by  assuring  a  "provision  for  paying  the  pro- 
prietors of  the  enlisted  negroes  a  full  compensation ;"  and  by 
declaring,  that  "  every  negro  who  shall  well  and  faithfully 
serve  as  a  soldier  to  the  end  of  the  present  war,  and  shall 
then  return  his  arms,  be  emancipated;"  and  receive  a  small 
reward. f  The  negro  population  of  this  country  had  rarely  been 
a  special  subject  of  consideration  during  the  several  periods  of 
the  war  of  the  Revolution,  except  in  fixing  the  ratio  of  contri- 
bution by  the  several  States.  In  the  project  of  a  Confederation, 
submitted  by  Franklin  in  1775,  he  proposed  that  the  ratio  of 
contribution  should  be  the  number  of  "  male  polls  between 
sixteen  and  sixty  years  of  age."  In  the  first  draft  of  the  Con- 
federation, submitted  in  1776,  "  the  number  of  inhabitants  of 
every  age,  sex,  and  quality,  except  Indians  not  paying  taxes 
in  any  State,"  was  proposed  to  be  the  rule.  For  this  was  sub- 
stituted, a  proposition  made  in  1777,  that  "  the  value  of  all  land 
within  each  State  granted  to  or  surveyed  for  any  person"  should 
be  the  rule — which  was  adopted  in  "  The  Articles  of  Confedera- 

*  Hamilton's  Works,  i.  61.     Ibid.  76,  77.     Hamilton  to  John  Jay,  President 
•f  Congress,  March  14,  1779. 
f  Secret  Journals,  i.  109. 


AUTHORS    OF    THE    FEDERALIST.  CXXlll 

iion."  The  difficulties  of  such  a  valuation  led  to  a  proposvjl,  as 
the  basis  of  contribution — of  the  proportion  of  numbers  as  early 
contemplated;  but,  in  this  estimate,  a  compound  of  freemen  and 
slaves  was  suggested.  The  number  of  slaves  to  be  embraced  be- 
came the  disputed  question.  A  vote  was  at  last  taken  on  the 
ratio  "  of  free  inhabitants  and  three  fifths  of  all  other  inhabitants 
of  every  sex  and  condition,  excepting  untaxed  Indians;"*  when 
owing  to  Hamilton's  temporary  absence  from  Congress,  the  vote 
of  New  York  was  lost.  But,  three  days  after,  on  his  motion  for 
a  reconsideration,  an  amendment,  offered  by  him,  passed;  de- 
claring that  the  supplies  to  Congress  by  the  States  should  be 
"in  proportion  to  the  whole  number  of  white  and  other  free  in- 
habitants of  every  age,  sex,  and  condition,  including  those  bound 
to  servitude  for  a  term  of  years,  and  three  fifths  of  all  other 
-persons,  not  comprehended  in  the  foregoing  description,  except 
Indians  not  paying  taxes  in  each  State, "f  the  numbers  to  be  tri- 
ennially  taken.  For  the  word  ^'■inhabitants"  the  word  ^^  persons'" 
was  thus  carefully  substituted ;  and  from  this,  it  is  seen,  that  the 
first  express  recognition  by  Congress  of  the  slaves  as  '■'■persons" 
was  at  the  instance  of  Hamilton,  a  proud  and  memorable  fact  in 
his  history.  This  resolution  was  the  first  step  towards — in  fact, 
laid  the  basis  of — the  recognition  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  of  the  people  of  African  descent  within  the  United  States 
— as  "persons,"  having  representative  rights,  for  Hamilton  then 
saw,  as  he  subsequently  declared  in  the  New  York  Convention, 
that  "  representation  and  taxation  go  together,  and  one  uniform 
rule  ought  to  apply  to  both."  In  the  plan  of  a  Constitution  re- 
ported by  the  committee  of  detail,  the  measure  of  taxation,  pro- 
vided in  the  resolution  of  Hamilton  passed  in  1783,  was  incor- 
porated as  that  measure.  In  his  plan  of  a  Constitution,  he 
provided,  that  the  direct  and  capitation  taxes  should  be  "  pro- 
portioned in  each  State  by  the  whole  number  of  free  persons, 
except  Indians  not  taxed,  and  by  three  fifths  of  all  other  per- 
sons," thus  expunging  the  term  "white;"  and,  in  the  plan  re- 
ported by  the  committee  of  revisal,  this  provision  of  his  plan  of 
d.  Constitution,  in  its  precise  terms,  was  made ;  and  became  a  part 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  in  apportioning  "  the 
representatives  and  direct  taxes  among  the  several  States."!  A 
ftnal  change  in  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  with  respect  to 

«  Journal  of  Congress,  viii.  166,  March  28,  1783. 

+  Ibid.  171,  April  1,  1783.  J  Art.  1.  Sec.  2. 


eXXlV  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

fugitives  marks  the  sense  of  the  general  Convention.  The  plan 
last  reported  that  "  no  person  legally  held  to  service  or  labor  in 
one  State,  escaping  to  another,  shall,  in  consequence  of  any 
regulations  subsisting  therein,  be  discharged  from  such  service 
or  labor,"  was  so  amended  as  to  declare,  instead  of  the  terms — 
no  person  ^Hegally  held  to  service" — no  person  "held  to  service 
or  labor  in  one  State  under  the  laws  thereof."  "  The  laws  of  a  State 
might  hold,"  but  the  Convention  refrained  from  declaring,  that 
such  holding  was  "  legal.^' 

Nor  are  the  facts  which  have  been  stated  the  only  facts  in 
evidence  of  Hamilton's  view  of  the  great  and  since  momentous 
political  problem — the  condition  of  the  people  of  African  descent 
— the  phrase  habitually  used  by  him  when  speaking  in  private 
of  this  "  unfortunate  race."  In  the  same  spirit  of  liberty  which 
had  asserted  with  pen  and  sword  the  Union  and  Independence 
of  the  whole  people  of  the  United  States  in  their  individual 
capacities,  having  retired  from  the  cabinet  of  Washington  retain- 
ing all  his  confidence,  at  his  instance  writing  on  the  subject  of 
the  treaty  of  peace  of  1783,  Hamilton  used  these  pregnant  ex- 
pressions to  show  that  the  freedom  once  proclaimed  and  pro- 
mised to  slaves  never  could  be  revoked.  The  last  royal  Governor 
of  Virginia,  Lord  Dunmore,  had  proclaimed  freedom  to  its 
slaves  who  should  join  his  standard.  England  had  freed  and 
deported  numbers  of  these  slaves.  She  refused  to  pay  for  them. 
Tfie  Virginian  member*  of  Washington's  cabinet  urged  this  as  an 
objection  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain  of 
1795,  which  made  no  provision  for  such  payment.  In  answer 
to  this  objection,  when  commenting  on  this  refusal,  Hamilton 
remarked  as  to  the  freedom  promised  to  the  slave — "  The  grant 
was  irrevocable.  Nothing  in  the  law  of  nations  or  in  those  of 
Great  Britain  will   authorize   the   resumption  of  liberty  once 

granted  to  a  human  being." "In  the  interpretation  of 

treaties  things  odious  or  immoral  are  not  to  be  presumed.  The 
abandonment  of  Negroes  who  had  been  induced  to  quit  their 
masters  on  the  faith  of  Official  Proclamations  promising  them 
liberty,  to  fall  again  under  the  yoke  of  their  masters  and  into 
slavery,  is  as  odious  and  immoral  a  thing  as  can  be  conceived.  It 
is  odious  not  only  as  it  imposes  an  act  of  perfidy  on  one  of  the 
contracting  parties,  but  as  it  tends  to  bring  back  to  servitude 
men  once  made  free.     The  general  interests  of  humanity  conspire 

*  Edmund  Randolph. 


AUTHORS    OF    THE    FEDERALIdT.  CXXV 

With  the  obligation  which  Great  Britain  had  contracted  towards 
the  negroes  to  repel  this  construction  of  the  treaty,  if  anothei 
can  be  found."  The  President  of  these  United  States  has  pro 
mised  freedom  to  the  slaves  of  rebels ;  by  an  "  official  Proclama- 
tion" he  has  granted  to  them  that  freedom.  They  are  no  longer 
slaves.  "  The  grant"  is  "  irrevocable."  That  Proclamation — the 
great  event  of  modern  history — is  "  a  contract"  which  it  were 
**  an  act  of  perfidy"  not  to  perform.  The  wide  door  to  Emanci- 
pation— the  universal  emancipation  of  the  oppressed  colored 
race  from  a  cruel  bondage,  has  been  opened.  That  door  never 
can  be,  never  will  be,  closed.  It  has  been  opened  by  the  law  by 
which  we  exist  as  a  nation — the  righteous  law  of  self-defence — , 
the  law  of  "  common  defence"  proclaimed  by  the  Constitution 
mandatorily  to  be  "  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,"  a  law  acknow- 
ledged, interpreted,  and  recognized  in  its  full  extent  by  the  most 
intelligent  of  its  then  adversaries  in  Virginia. 

"  It  has  been  repeatedly  said  here,"  is  the  language  of  Patrick 
Henry,  addressing  the  Convention  of  that  State,  called  to  con- 
sider the  Constitution,  "  It  has  been  repeatedly  said  here,  that 
the  great  object  of  a  National  Government  was  national  defence." 
"  If  the}'^  give  power  to  the  General  Government  for  the  general 
defence,  the  means  must  be  commensurate  to  the  end.  All  the 
means  in  the  possession  of  the  people  must  be  given  to  the  Gov- 
ernment which  is  intrusted  with  the  public  defence.  ...  If  the 
Northern  States  shall  be  of  opinion,  that  our  Slaves  are  number- 
less, they  may  call  forth  every  national  resource.  May  Congress 
not  say,  that  every  black  man  must  fight  f  ....  Have  they  not 
power  to  provide  for  the  general  defence  and  welfare  ?  May 
they  not  think  that  these  call  iorthe  abolition  of  slavery?  May 
they  not  pronounce  all  slaves  free,  and  will  they  not  be  war- 
ranted by  that  power?  This  is  no  ambiguous  implication  or 
logical  deduction.  The  paper"  (the  Constitution)  "  speaks  to 
the  point.  They  have  the  power  in  clear,  unequivocal  terms, 
and  will  clearly  and  certainly  exercise  it."  It  has  been  exercised 
under  this  very  power  of  "  common  defence,"  and  ere  long  the 
feet  of  no  slave  will  stain  our  soil. 

This  number  of  the  Federalist  also  relates  to  the  apportion- 
ment of  the  members  of  the  house  of  representatives  among  the 
several  States  by  the  same  rule  with  that  of  direct  taxes.  Re- 
cognizing expressly  the  fitness  of  the  number  of  the  people  being 
*'  the  standard  for  regulating  the  proportion  of  those  who  arc  to 
represent  the  people  of  a  State ;"  and  adverting  to  it  as  the 


CXXVl  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

standard  of  contribution,  this  remark  is  to  be  noticed.  "  In  the 
latt*?r,  it  has  reference  to  the  proportion  of  wealth,  of  which  it  is 
in  no  case  a  precise  measure,  and  in  ordinary  cases  a  very  unfit 
one."  This  observation  is  in  accordance  with  the  opinions  before 
expressed  by  Hamilton  as  to  a  subject  which  he  had  well  exa- 
mined. In  his  previously  quoted  letter  to  G-overnor  Clinton  in 
]783,  he  remarks,  "The  proportion  of  the  relative  wealth  in 
these  States  can  never  be  found  by  any  common  m.easure  what- 
ever." *  *  *  «'  If  a  general  standard  must  be  fixed,  numbers  were 
preferable  to  land.  *  *  Both  these  measures  have  the  common 
disadvantage  of  being  no  equal  representative  of  the  wealth  of  the 
^people,  but  one  is  more  simple,  definite,  and  certain  than  the 
other."  Still,  it  is  remarked  in  this  number;  "  notwithstanding 
the  imperfection  of  the  rule,  as  applied  to  the  relative  wealth  and 
contributions  of  the  States,  it  is  evidently  the  least  exception- 
able among  those  that  are  practicable;  and  had  too  recently 
obtained  the  general  sanction  of  America  not  to  have  found  a 
ready  preference  with  the  Convention."  The  objection  is  then 
stated,  "it  does  not  follow  from  an  admission  of  numbers  for  the 
measure  of  representation,  or  of  slaves  combined  with  free 
citizens  as  a  ratio  of  taxation,  that  slaves  ought  to  be  included 
in  the  numerical  rule  of  representation.  Slaves  are  considered 
SiB  property,  not  us  persons.  They  ought  therefore  to  be  compre- 
hended in  estimates  of  taxation  which  are  founded  on  property; 
and  to  be  excluded  from  representation  which  is  regxilated  by  a 
census  of  persons."  Without  denying  this  distinction,  the  answer 
is  given,  as  expressing  the  views  which  would  be  preferred  by 
the  South — denying  that  slaves  are  considered  merely  as  pro- 
perty and  in  no  respect  whatever  as  persons.  "  The}^  partake 
of  both  these  qualities,  being  considered  by  our  laws,  in  some 
respects,  as  persons,  and  in  other  respects  as  property."  "  The 
Federal  Constitution  therefore  decides  with  great  propriety  on 
the  case  of  our  slaves,  when  it  views  them  in  the  mixed  charac- 
ter of  persons  and  property."  "Would  the  Convention  have 
been  impartial  or  consistent,  if  they  had  rejected  the  slaves  from 
the  list  of  inhabitants,  when  the  shares  of  representation  were 
to  be  calculated;  and  inserted  them  on  the  lists  when  the  tariff 
of  contributions  was  to  be  adjusted?  Could  it  be  reasonably 
expected  that  the  Southern  States  would  concur  in  a  system 
which  considered  their  slaves  in  some  degree  as  men  when  bur- 
dens were  to  be  imposed,  but  refused  to  consider  thera  in  the 
same  light  when  advantages  were  to  be  conferred?     M  ght  not 


AUTHORS  OF  THE  FEDERALIST.  CXXVU 

eome  surprise  also  be  expressed,  that  those  who  reproach  the 
Southern  States  with  the  barbarous  policy  of  considering  as 
property  a  part  of  their  human  brethren,  should  themselves 
contend  that  the  Government,  to  which  all  the  States  are  to  be 
parties,  ought  to  consider  this  unfortunate  race  more  completely 
in  the  unnatural  light  of  property,  than  the  very  laws  of  which 
they  complain '/"  .  .  .  .  "  Let  the  compromising  expedient  of  the 
Constitution  be  mutually  adopted,  which  regards  them  as  in- 
habitants, but  as  debased  by  servitude  below  the  equal  level  of 
free  inhabitants,  which  regards  the  slave  as  divested  of  two  fifths 
of  the  man."  Another  reason  is  suggested,  that  "the  votes, 
allowed  in  the  federal  legislature  to  the  people  of  each  State, 
ought  to  bear  some  proportion  to  the  comparative  wealth  of  the 
State."  It  may  be  seen,  in  the  debates  of  the  Convention  of 
New  York  which  soon  followed,  that  one  of  the  earliest  urged 
objections  taken  was  to  "  the  three  fifths"  compromise,  and  the 
answer  by  Hamilton  is  almost  in  the  words  of  this  essay.  "  The 
best  writers  on  Government  have  held  that  representation  should 
be  compounded  of  persons  and  property,"  *  *  *  *  « it  will,  how- 
ever, be  by  no  means  admitted,  that  the  slaves  are  considered 
altogether  as  property,  they  are  men  though  degraded  to  the 
condition  of  slavery.  They  are  persons  known  to  the  municipal 
laws  of  the  States  which  they  inhabit,  as  well  as  to  the  laws  of 
nature.  But  representation  and  taxation  go  together,  and  one 
uniform  rule  should  be  applied  to  both.  Would  it  be  just  to 
compute  those  slaves  in  the  assessment  of  taxes  and  discard 
them  from  the  estimate  in  the  apportionment  of  representatives  ? 
Would  it  be  just  to  impose  a  singular  burthen  without  conferring 
some  adequate  advantage?" 

The  number  of  which  the  House  of  Eepresentatives  was  to 
consist  is  the  topic  of  the  fifty  fifth  (LV)  essay ;  claimed  also  by 
Hamilton  in  his  list ;  and  by  Madison  in  all  his  lists.  It  is  here 
stated  ;*  "  that  no  political  problem  is  less  susceptible  of  a  precise 
solution,  than  that  which  relates  to  the  number  most  convenient 
for  a,  representative  legislature,  nor  is  there  any  point  in  which 
the  policy  of  the  several  States  is  more  at  variance."  A  marked 
coincidence  with  this  passage  is  seen  in  another  of  Hamilton's 
briefs.  It  is  there  stated — '^nothing  more  difficult  than  to  fix  the 
degree  of  numbers  requisite.  Constitutions  of  States  differ."  In  this 
number,  it  is  also  observed  ;f  "  that  the  ratio  between  the  repre- 

»  Federalist,  p.  422.  f  Ibid.  p.  423. 


CXXVlll  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

oentatives  and  the  people  ought  not  to  be  the  same,  where  the 
latter  are  very  numerous,  as  where  they  are  very  few."  In  this 
brief,  it  is  said;  "  Ratio  ought  not  to  he  the  same  in  a  large  as  in  a 
small  nation."  In  this  number,  it  is  remarked;*  "In  all  very 
numerous  assemblies,  of  whatever  characters  composed,  passion 
never  fails  to  wrest  the  sceptre  from  reason.  Had  every  Athe- 
nian been  a  Socrates ;  every  Athenian  assembly  would  still  have 
been  a  mob."  So  in  Hamilton's  manuscript  notes  ;f  "  The  assem- 
bly when  chosen  will  meet  in  one  room,  if  they  are  drawn  from 
half  the  globe,  and  will  be  liable  to  all  the  passions  of  popular 
assemblies."  In  this  number  it  is  also  observed ;  "  At  the  expi- 
ration of  twenty  five  years,  according  to  the  computed  rate  of 
increase,  the  number  of  representatives  will  amount  to  two 
hundred ;  and  of  fifty  years  to  four  hundred."^  In  Hamilton's 
brief,  "  The  first  Census  100—25  years,  200—50  years,  400." 

In  the  Fifty  Sixth  (LYI)  number;  also  claimed  by  Hamilton 
in  his  list,  and  by  Madison  in  all  his  lists,  it  is  observed,§  "  What 
are  to  be  the  objects  of  federal  legislation  ?  Those  which  are 
of  most  importance,  and  which  seem  most  to  require  local  know- 
ledge, are  commerce,  taxation,  and  the  militia;"  (a  repetition  of 
the  same  observation  in  number  Fifty  three),  and  it  is  added, || 
"  the  representatives  of  each  State  will  not  only  bring  with  them, 
a  considerable  knowledge  of  its  laws,  and  a  local  knowledge  of 
their  respective  districts."  In  Hamilton's  brief  are  found  these 
heads;  ^^  Knowledge  of  local  circumstances — Objects  to  be  con- 
sidered. These — Commerce — Taxation."  "As  to  taxation — State 
Systems." 

In  essay  number  Fifty  seven  (LVII)  ;  also  claimed  by  Hamil- 
ton in  his  list,  and  by  Madison  in  all  his  lists,  this  passage  is 
seen  ;^  •'  Let  me  now  ask,  what  there  is  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  that  violates  the  principles  of  Eepuh- 
lican  government,  or  favors  the  elevation  of  the  few  on  the  ruins 
of  the  many  ?"  "  Who  are  to  be  the  electors  *  * — Not  the  rich 
more  than  the  poor."  "  No  qualification  of  wealth — of  birth,"  &c. 
In  Hamilton's  brief, — "  Elevation  of  few.  First — No  qualifications 
either  for  electors  or  elected."  It  is  also  stated  in  this  number  ;** 
"  This  cannot  be  said  without  maintaining,  that  five  or  six 
thousand  citizens,  are  less  capable  of  choosing  a  fit  representative, 
or  more  liable  to  be  corrupted  by  an  unfit  one,  than  five  or  six 

*  Federalist,  p.  424,  f  Hamilton's  MSS.  vol.  i.  p.  66. 

i  Federalist,  p.  426.  ^  Ibid.  430. 

II  Ibid.  431.  T  Ibid.  485.  **  Ibid.  488. 


AUTHORS    OF   THE    FEDERALIST.  CXXIX 

hundred."     In  Hamilton's  brief  3  "  Five  thousand  not  less  Jit  to 
choose  than  five  hundred — not  so  easily  corrupted." 

Nor  ought  this  remark  as  to  New  York,  to  be  unnoticed. 
"  The  members  of  Assembly,  for  the  cities  and  counties  of  New 
York  and  Albany,  are  elected  by  very  nearly  as  many  voters  as 
will  be  entitled  to  a  representative  in  Congress,  calculating  on 
the  number  of  sixty  five  representatives  only."*  The  least  re- 
flection will  pronounce,  that  it  is  not  probable,  but  that  it  is 
indeed  extremely  improbable,  that  so  minute  a  knowledge  of 
such  a  matter  as  the  number  of  voters  in  two  distant  localities 
of  a  distant  State,  should  have  been  so  positively  stated — or 
even  adverted  to  at  all,  by  Madison — a  resident  of  Virginia 
'Jhat  Hamilton  was  familiar  with  these  facts  is  to  be  ascribed  to 
nis  residence  both  in  New  York,  and  in  Albany;  and  to  the 
Hcveral  questions  which  necessarily  presented  themselves  to  him 
..aring  his  very  recent  service  in  the  legislature  of  New  York.f 

The  Fifty  eighth  (LYIII)  number,  claimed  by  Hamilton  in 
his  list,  and  by  Madison  in  all  of  his  lists — answers  a  supposition 
"  that  the  number  of  members  of  the  House  of  Eepresentatives, 
will  not  be  augmented  from  time  to  time,  as  the  progress  of  popula- 
tion may  demand  ;"|  and  it  is  inferred,  "  that  the  larger  States  will 
be  strenuous  advocates  for  increasing  the  number  and  weight  of 
that  part  of  the  legislature  in  which  their  influence  predomi- 
nates," from  the  fact  that  this  branch  of  the  legislature  is  a 
representation  of  citizens,  and  consequently  the  larger  States 
will  in  it  have  most  weight. 

In  Hamilton's  brief  this  note  is  seen ;  "  Numbers  will  not  be 
augmented;"  and  the  objection  is  answered,  ^^ Large  States  to 
increase  influence  will  be  for  increasing  representatives."  How 
solicitous  his  convictions  were  on  the  importance  of  an  ade- 
quately large  representation  of  the  people  in  one  branch  of  the 
legislature,  may  be  seen  in  a  report  of  a  recent  debate  in  the 
Federal  Convention. §  Hamilton  "  expressed  himself  with  great 
earnestness  and  anxiety  in  favor  of  the  motion,"  to  increase  its 
numbers.  "  He  avowed  himself  a  friend  to  a  vigorous  govern- 
ment, but  would  declare  at  the  same  time,  he  held  it  essential 
that  the  popular  branch  of  it  should  be  on  a  broad  foundation.  He 
was  seriously  of  opinion,  that  the  House  of  Representatives  was 

*  Federalist,  p.  439. 

f  He  was  in  1787,  a  member  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means. — Htat, 
Rep.  iii.  21 1. 
J  Federalist,  441.  \  Madison  Papers,  iii.  1531. 

9 


CXXX  HISTORICAL,     NOTICE. 

ou  SO  narrow  a  scale,  as  to  be  really  dangerous;  and  to  warrant 
a  jealousy  in  the  people,  for  their  liberties.  He  remarked,  that 
the  connection  between  the  President  and  Senate  would  tend  to 
perpetuate  him,  by  corrupt  influence.  It  was  the  more  neces- 
sary on  this  account,  that  a  numerous  representation  in  the 
other  branch  of  the  legislature  should  be  established."  The 
limitation  in  the  Constitution,  "  that  the  number  of  representa- 
tives shall  not  exceed  one  for  every  thirty  thousand,"  instead  of 
forty  thousand,  persons,  was  the  last  act  of  the  convention 
previous  to  the  vote  for  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and 
was  made  at  the  request  of  Washington  from  his  seat  as  Presi- 
dent of  the  body. 

The  Sixty  second  (LXII)  and  Sixty  third  (LXIII)  essays,  are 
the  now  remaining  numbers  in  question.  Hamilton  claims  them 
in  his  list,  and  Madison  in  iall  of  his  lists.  These  numbers  treat 
of  "  the  constitution  of  the  Senate  with  regard  to  the  qualifica- 
tions of  the  members;  the  manner  of  appointing  them;  the 
equality  of  representation ;  the  number  of  the  Senators,  and  the 
duration  of  their  appointments." 

The  first  head  of  this  subject  is  briefly  noticed; — and  the  two 
others,  admitted  to  have  been  the  results  of  an  unavoidable  com- 
promise between  the  larger  and  the  smaller  States,  are  not  dwelt 
upon.  The  "number  of  the  Senators  and  the  duration  of  their 
appointments"  are  more  fully  discussed  in  the  several  points  c' 
view  in  which  the  utility  of  the  second  branch  of  the  legislative 
department  would  present  themselves.  It  may  be  observed, 
that  Madison's  original  view  was,  that  the  second  branch  should 
be  chosen  by  the  first  branch  of  the  legislature.  Hamilton  from 
the  outset  contended  for  an  independent  body  of  men  to  be 
chosen  by  electors  to  be  chosen  by  the  people.  Madison,  how- 
ever, felt  the  importance  of  its  consisting  "  of  a  more  select 
number,  holding  their  appointments  for  a  longer  term"  than  the 
members  of  the  other  branch,  and  "  going  out  in  rotation,"  pre- 
cautions the  more  necessary  as  he  then  thought  of  lodging  in 
this  branch  a  "  negative  on  the  State  laws."  Hamilton's  plan 
of  a  Constitution  was  in  accordance  with  his  earliest  opinion, 
and  he  is  seen  to  have  urged  on  the  General-  Convention,  as  to 
the  second  branch  of  the  legislature,  that  "  their  duration  should 
be  the  earnest  of  wisdom  and  stability."  Both  these  character 
istics  are  considered  in  the  discussion  in  these  two  numbers  ot 
this  head  of  the  subiect. — "  the  duration  of  the  Senate  ?"    "  With- 


AUTHORS  OF  THE  FEDERALIST.  CXXAl 

out  a  select  and  stable  member  of  the  government,*  the  esteem 
of  foreign  powers  will  be"  forfeited.  This  idea  is  expressed  by 
him  in  the  Convention.  "  Foreigners  are  jealous  of  our  increas- 
ing greatness,  and  would  rejoice  in  our  distractions.  Those  who 
have  had  opportunities  of  conversing  with  foreigners  respecting 
sovereigns  in  Europe,  have  discovered  in  them  an  anxiety  for 
the  preservation  of  our  democratic  Governments,  probably  for 
no  other  reason  but  to  keep  us  weak.  Unless  your  government 
is  respectable,  foreigners  will  invade  your  rights,  and  to  main- 
tain tranquillity  it  must  be  respectable — even  to  observe  neu- 
trality you  must  have  a  strong  government."  To  maintain  this 
tranquillity,  his  plan  of  government  provided  that,  "  the  Senate 
shall  exclusively  possess  the  power  of  declaring  war" — and  that 
"  no  treaty  shall  be  made  without  their  advice  and  consent." 

The  value  of  a  Senate  in  insuring  the  other  important  cha- 
racteristic— "  stability" — in  the  policy  of  a  government  is  fully 
stated.  "  The  objects  of  government  may  be  divided  into  two 
general  classes;  the  one  depending  on  measures  which  have 
singly  an  immediate  and  sensible  operation;  the  other  depending 
on  a  succession  of  well  chosen  and  well  connected  measures,  which 
have  a  gradual  and  perhaps  unobserved  operation.  The  im- 
portance of  the  latter  description  to  the  collective  and  per- 
manent welfare  of  every  country  needs  no  explanation.  And 
yet  it  is  evident,  that  an  assembly  elected  for  so  short  a  term  as 
to  be  unable  to  provide  more  than  one  or  two  links  in  a  chain  of 
measures,  on  which  the  general  welfare  may  essentially  depend, 
ought  not  to  be  answerable  for  the  final  result.  The  proper 
remedy  for  this  defect,  must  be  an  additional  body  in  the  legis- 
lative department,  which,  having  a  suflScient  permanency  to  pro- 
vide for  such  objects  as  require  a  continued  attention  and  a  train 
of  measures,  may  be  justly  and  effectually  answerable  for  the 
attainment  of  those  objects."  "  The  necessity  of  a  Senate,"  it  is 
stated,  "  is  not  less  indicated  by  the  propensity  of  all  single  and 
numel'ous  assemblies  to  yield  to  the  impulse  of  sudden  and 
violent  passions  and  to  be  seduced  hj  factious  leaders  into  intem- 
perate and  pernicious  counsels."  This  objection  to  a  single  body 
has  been  quoted  from  Hamilton's  MSS.  notes,  and  the  dangers 
from  "  factious  leaders"  is  pointed  to  in  his  brief  in  the  General 
Convention,  that  ^^  demagogues  will  generaWj  prevail."  The  im- 
portauce  of  a  Senate,  as  "  a  defence  to  the  people  against  their 
own  temporary  errors  and  delusions"  is  also  set  forth  in  conformity 
*  Federalist,  p.  474. 


CXXXU  HISTORICAL   NOTICE. 

With  the  language  of  his  brief.  ''  There  ought  to  be  a  principle 
in  Government  capable  of  resisting  the  popular  current;"  and  it 
is  here  added,  "  There  are  particular  moments  in  public  affairs, 
when  the  people,  stimulated  by  some  irregular  passion,  or  some 
illicit  advantage,  or  misled  by  the  artful  representations  of  inte- 
rested men,  will  call  for  measures  which  they  themselves  will 
afterwards  be  the  most  ready  to  lament  and  condemn."  In  his 
brief,*  it  is  stated — "  Popular  assemblies  governed  by  a  few  in- 
dividuals— the  most  popular  branch  will  acquire  an  influence 
over  the  other.  The  other  may  check  in  ordinary  cases,  in 
which  there  is  no  strong  public  passion,  but  it  will  not  in  cases 
where  there  is."  Most  happily  for  the  people  of  this  country, 
under  the  guidance  of  Washington,  with  the  systematic  counsels 
of  Hamilton,  the  "  irregular  passions  of  the  people  misled  by 
the  artful  representations  of  interested  men,"  calling  "for  mea- 
sures which  they  themselves  have  afterwards  been  the  most 
ready  to  lament  and  condemn,"  were  checked  by  "the  inter- 
ference of  a  temperate  and.  respectable  body  of  citizens" — by  the 
"  wisdom  and  stability"  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 

Number  Sixty  four  (LXIV.)  is  the  last  of  the  numbers  as  to 
which  there  have  been  discrepant  claims.  In  the  second  of 
Madison's  lists,  he  claims  this  number  to  himself,  reducing  the 
contributions  of  Jay  to  four  numbers,  but,  after  the  publication  of 
a  life  of  Jay,  which  ascribes  to  him  this  number,  as  previously 
stated;  Madison  relinquished  this  claim ;f  and  in  his  other  lists 
adds  it  to  the  numbers  by  Jay.  Hamilton  in  his  list  gives  to 
Jay  his  full  number  of  five  essays,  but  attributes  to  him,  by  a 
mistake  of  the  pen  as  explained,  fifty  four  instead  of  sixty  four, 
of  which  the  evidence  that  Jay  was  the  author  has  been  recently 
ascertained. J     The   enquiry  may  arise  how  it  happened   that, 

*  Hamilton's  Works,  ii.  414. 

f  In  the  paper  entitled  The  Federalist,  by  Madison,  previously  quoted,  is 
this  passage — "He"  (Hamilton)  "ascribes  to  himself  No.  64,  written  by  Mr. 
Jay,  and  to  Mr.  Jay  No.  (the  blank  is  there),  written  not  by  himself, 

but  by  J.  M.     [See  Life  of  Mr.  Jay  by  Delaplaine."] 

J  In  reply  to  a  note  of  November  27th,  1863,  addressed  by  me  to  Mr.  John 
Jay,  a  grandson  of  Governor  Jay,  stating,  if  there  were  "any  family  papers  re- 
lating to  the  Federalist  which  you  would  desire  me  to  use  in  my  edition,  you 
will  oblige  me  by  an  early  note."  He  answered,  December  1,  1863,  "  The  other 
day  I  chanced  upon  a  bundle  of  miscellaneous  papers  which  contained  Jay's 
numbers  of  the  Federalist,  or  three  of  them  in  his  own  hand,  and  these  I  will 
get  for  you  in  a  day  or  two."  The  draughts  were  of  two  of  the  early  papers 
and  of  No.  64. 


AUTHORS    OF   THE   FEDERALIST.  CXXXlll 

after  80  long  an  interval  between  the  last  of  the  numbers  from 
the  pen  of  Jay,  he  should  have  been  the  author  of  only  one  more 
number.  That  he  offered  to  write  this  number,  is  not  to  be 
supposed.  The  probability  is,  its  topic  being  the  constitutional 
deposit  and  office  of  the  treaty  power,  that  it  was  written  by 
him  at  the  request  of  Hamilton,  made  in  deference  to  his  distin- 
guished services  as  the  chief  negotiator  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
with  Great  Britain,  whose  great  conduct  on  that  occasion  Ham- 
ilton had  defended  in  Congress. 

The  investigation  of  the  authorship  of  the  several  essays 
having  been  finished,  and  the  pledge  "  to  state  all  the  evidence 
known  to  exist  to  designate  the  respective  contributions  to  it," 
being  fulfilled,  I  will  not  in  closing  this  paper  withhold  the  re- 
newed declaration  of  my  conviction  that  the  attribution  by 
Hamilton  of  its  numbers  to  the  respective  writers  of  them  is, 
with  one  exception,  entirely  correct.  This  being  so,  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  parts  of  each  individual  in  the  several  topics  of  the 
work  were  these.  Hamilton  wrote  the  first  essay,  which,  after 
an  avowal  of  his  solicitude  for  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
and  an  indication  of  the  apprehended  sources  of  opposition  to  it, 
gives  a  programme  of  the  work.  The  interesting  particulars 
proposed  to  be  discussed  are  stated — "  The  utility  of  the  Union 
to  your  political  prosperity :  The  insufficiency  of  the  present  confede- 
ration to  'preserve  that  Union :  The  necessity  of  a  government  at  least 
equally  energetic  with  the  one  proposed  to  the  attainment  of  that  object:' 
The  conformity  of  the  proposed  Constitution  to  the  true  principles  of 
republican  government :  Its  analogy  to  your  own  State  Constitution  : 
and  lastly,  the  additional  security  which  its  adoption  will  afford  to 
the  preservation  of  that  species  of  government, — to  liberty  and  to 
property." 

It  is  seen ;  that  Jay  in  the  four  succeeding  numbers,  exhibited 
"  the  dangers  from  foreign  force  and  influence,"  and  that  his  re- 
maining number  relates  to  the  treaty  power — these  being  the 
topics  with  which,  as  Embassador  to  Spain  and  to  France,  and 
as  then  Secretary  of  foreign  affairs,  he  would  be  familiar.  Madi- 
son took  a  larger  and  more  varied  part;  some  of  his  essays 
being  supplementary  to  those  by  Hamilton — one.  on  the  dangers 
of  faction  and  the  provisions  against  it,  continued  from  a  pre- 
vious number  by  Hamilton — another  on  a  distinct  topic,  being 
an  answer  to  "  an  objection  drawn  from  the  extent  of  country" 
—a  joint  contribution  with  Hamilton  in  three  numbers,  on  the 
enhject  of  the   tendency  of    Federal    governments    rather  to 


cxxaiv  historical  notice. 

anarchy  among  the  members  than  tyranny  in  the  liead;  these 
three  numbers  merely  adducing  historical  examples  to  confirm 
this  view — two  numbers,  "  concerning  the  difficulties  which  the 
Convention  must  have  experienced  in  the  formation  of  a  proper 
plan  ;" — two  numbers,  shewing  "the  conformity  of  the  plan  to 
republican  principles,  with  an  answer  to  an  objection  in  respect 
to  the  powers  of  the  Constitution" — four  numbers,  giving  "  a 
general  view  of  the  powers  proposed  to  be  vested  in  the  Union ;" 
— two  numbers,  being  "a  discussion  of  the  supposed  danger 
from  the  powers  of  the  Union  to  the  State  governments,  with 
an  examination  of  the  comparative  means  of  influence  of  the 
Federal  and  State  governments" — and  two;  his  last  numbers, 
on  "  the  meaning  of  the  maxim  which  requires  a  separation  of 
the  departments  of  power  with  a  view  of  the  means  of  giving 
efficacy  in  practice  to  that  maxim" — in  the  whole,  three  conjoint 
and  fourteen  other  numbers.  The  residue,  being  the  great  body 
of  the  work,  is  Hamilton's.  His  essays,  beside  a  delineation  of 
its  scope  and  leading  topics,  are  directed  to  their  primary  object 
— a  comprehensive  manifestation  of  the  value  of  the  Union — of 
the  union  of  the  People  of  the  United  States  under  one  firm 
National  Government.  They  commence,  with  an  exposition  of 
the  causes  which  would  induce  the  States,  if  disunited,  to  make 
war  upon  each  other,  followed  by  a  detail  of  the  consequences 
which  would  attend  such  a  situation  ; — the  "  producing  standing 
armies  and  other  institutions  unfriendly  to  liberty" — and  by  an 
argued  presentation  of  "  the  utility  of  the  Union  as  a  safeguard 
against  domestic  faction  and  insurrection" — of  its  "  utility  in 
respect  to  Commerce  and  a  Navy,"  and  of  "  its  tendency  to  pro- 
mote the  interests  of  revenue,  and  as  connected  with  it — that  of 
economy."  Then  follows  the  great  topic,  in  contrast,  so  long 
the  burthen  of  his  thoughts  and  previous  writings — a  full  ex- 
hibition of  the  "Defects  of  the  Confederation,  in  relation  to  the 
Principle  of  legislation  for  the  States  in  their  collective  capa- 
cities," illustrated  by  examples  to  shew  "  the  tendency  of  Fede- 
ral Governments  rather  to  anarchy  among  the  members  than  to 
tyranny  in  the  head" — a  subject  commenced  by  Hamilton  and 
jointly  illustrated  by  Madison.  Its  other  defects  are  next  poui- 
trayed;  "the  total  want  of  a  sanction  to  its  laws" — "the  want 
of  a  mutual  guarantee  of  the  St.ate  governments" — "  the  prin- 
ciple of  regulating  the  contributions  of  the  States  to  the  common 
treasury  by  Quotas,"  with  observations  to  prove  "  the  import- 
ance and   advantage  of  authorizing  the  national   government 


I 


AUTHORS    OF    THE    FEDERALIST.  CXXXV 

to  raise  its  own  revenues  in  its  own  way" — "  the  want  of  h 
power  to  regulate  commerce" — "the  want  of  a  direct  and  efiFect- 
ive  power  of  raising  armies" — "  the  right  of  equal  suffrage  among 
the  States,"  condemned  by  "  every  idea  of  proportion  and  everj 
rule  of  fair  representation,"  and  exposing  the  government  to  be 
"  obstructed  at  critical  seasons" — the  crowning  defect — "  the 
want  of  a  Judiciary  power" — the  "  improper  organization  of 
Congress — as  a  single  body" — and  the  absence  of  "a  ratification 
of  the  existing  Federal  system  by  the  People."  The  exposure 
of  these  defects  is  naturally  followed  by  a  large  and  powerful 
argument  of  "  the  necessity  of  a  government  at  least  equally 
energetic,"  and  by  "  an  answer  to  the  objection  concerning 
standing  armies,"  shewing  the  necessity  of  a  government  having 
within  itself  the  means  of  national  defence,  and  exhibiting 
"the  securities  to  liberty  provided  in  the  Constitution,  and 
those  also  resulting  from  the  less  frequent  necessity  of  using 
force,  than  would  be  that  of  separate  Confederacies;  and  from 
the  checks  to  aggressions  upon  it  in  the  power  of  the  State 
Governments." 

This  discussion  is  appropriately  succeeded  by  an  argument  of 
the  necessary  "  power"  in  a  Government  charged  with  the  com- 
mon defence  "  of  regulating  the  militia."  The  natural  sequence 
to  this  argument  is,  the  evincing  the  necessity  of  "  the  power  of 
taxation  to  provide  for  the  support  of  the  national  forces,"  by 
procuring  revenue  to  the  full  extent  of  the  national  exigencies, 
leaving  to  the  States  "  an  independent  and  uncontrollable 
authority  to  raise  their  own  revenues  for  the  supply  of  their 
own  wants,"  which  involved  an  expobition  of  the  interesting 
topic — the  extent  of  the  alienation  under  the  Constitution  of 
the  "  rights  of  State  sovereignty," — the  great  and  tangent  diflft- 
culty  of  that  and  of  all  future  time  until  the  Constitution,  unless 
amended,  shall  expire, — and  a  refutation  of  the  alleged  conflict 
with  State  rights  in  the  grant  of  power  to  the  general  govern- 
ment "  to  make  all  laws  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into 
execution  the  powers  vested  in  it  by  the  Constitution,"  and  of 
the  provision,  "that  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  made  in  pursuance  of  it,  and  the  treaties  made  by  its 
authority  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land."  A  defence  of 
the  grant  of  a  general  power  of  taxation,  as  least  burthensome 
to  the  people  in  its  economical  operation,  and  least  likely  to  be 
»>avried  to  excess,  closes  the  first  original  volume  of  the  series, 
ending  with  its  thirty  sixth  number. 


CX>'X.Vl  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

Having  next  exhibited  the  impolicy  of  the  project  in  Virginia 
and  of  tlie  provision  in  Pennsylvania,  for  altering  or  correcting 
breaches  of  a  Constitution  by  occasional  or  periodical  conventions, 
Hamilton  proceeds  to  show — instead  of  "  exterior  provisions  for 
maintaining  in  practice  the  necessary  partition  of  power  among 
the  several  departments"  of  a  government — that  the  true  mode 
is  •'  by  so  contriving  its  interior  structure,  as  that  its  several 
constituent  parts  may,  by  their  mutual  relations,  be  the  means 
of  keeping  each  other  in  their  proper  places."  The  elucidation 
of  this  view,  in  the  symmetrical  stages  of  this  discussion,  led  to 
"  a  more  particular  examination  of  the  eeveral  parts  of  the 
government,"  beginning  with  the  House  of  Representatives, 
followed  by  a  view  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Senate — of  that 
of  the  President,  and  closing  with  that  of  the  judicial  depart- 
ment— the  last  number  relative  thereto  being  an  answer  to  "  an 
objection  raised  against  the  Constitution  with  most  success" — 
its  "want  of  a  constitutional  provision  for  the  trial  by  jury  in 
civil  cases."  These  examinations  are  much  extended,  and  are 
pregnant  with  a  practical  philosophy,  of  which  the  conclusions 
are  regarded  in  this  country  as  maxims,  and  have  served  as  early 
controlling  guides  in  the  formation  of  subsequent  State  Consti- 
tutions, since  not  always  followed. 

It  has  been  seen,  that  "  the  commentary  on  the  Executive 
branch  of  the  Government"  was  completed  by  Hamilton  and 
published  on  the  fourth  of  April,  1788.  The  intelligence  soon 
after  received  from  South  Carolina  shewed  that  the  policy  re- 
sorted to  in  Massachusetts  to  induce  there  an  unconditional 
adoption  of  the  Constitution — the  promise  of  subsequent  amend- 
ments— had  also  been  resorted  to  in  that  Southern  State.  One 
of  the  chief  grounds  of  objection  to  be  removed  by  such  amend- 
ments was  the  want  of  a  formal  "  bill  of  rights."  This  objection 
is  answered  in  the  last  essay  but  one ;  by  a  recital  of  various 
provisions  of  the  Constitution, — especially,  "  the  establishment 
of  the  writ  of  Habeas  Corpus— the  prohibition  of  ex  post  facto 
laws,  and  of  titles  to  nobility" — and  by  declaring  that  "  the 
Constitution  is  in  itself  in  every  rational  sense,  and  to  every 
useful  purpose — A  Bill  of  Rights."  The  vindication  of  the 
Constitution  is  concluded  by  Hamilton  with  this  brief  summary 
— "  The  additional  securities  to  republican  government,  to 
liberty  and  to  property,  to  be  derived  from  the  adoption  of  the 
plan  under  consideration,  consist  chiefly  in  the  restraints  which 
the  PRESERVATION  of  the  Union  will  impose  on  local  factions  and 


AUTHORS   OF   THE    FEDERALIST,  CXXXVU 

insurrections,  and  on  the  ambition  of  powerful  individuals  in 
single  States,  who  might  acquire  credit  and  influence  enough 
from  leaders  and  favorites,  to  become  the  despots  of  the  people; 
in  the  diminution  of  the  opportunities  to  foreign  intrigue,  which 
the  dissolution  of  the  Confederacy  would  invite  and  facilitate ; 
in  the  prevention  of  extensive  military  establishments,  which 
could  not  fail  to  grow  out  of  wars  between  the  States  in  a  dis- 
united situation ;  in  the  express  guarantee  of  a  republican  form 
of  Government  to  each;  in  the  absolute  and  universal  exclusion 
of  titles  of  nobility ;  and  in  the  precautions  against  the  repe- 
tition of  those  practices  on  the  part  of  the  State  governments, 
which  have  undermined  the  foundations  of  property  and  credit, 
have  planted  mutual  distrust  in  the  breasts  of  all  classes  of 
citizens,  and  have  occasioned  an  almost  universal  prostration  of 
morals." 

Having  "  thus  executed  the  task "  of  the  Federalist,  these 
Essays  conclude  with  a  decisive  argument  "of  the  extreme  im- 
prudence of  insisting  upon  amendments  previous  to  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution,"  thus,  "  to  prolong  the  precarious  state  of  the 
national  affairs,  and  to  expose  the  Union  to  the  jeopardy  of 
successive  experiments,  in  the  chimerical  pursuit  of  a  perfect 
plan,"  and  with  a  solemn  appeal  "against  hazarding  anarch}- — 
Civil  War — a  perpetual  alienation  of  the  States  from  each 
other,  and  perhaps  the  military  despotism  of  a  victorious  dema- 
gogue, in  the  pursuit  of  what  they  are  not  likely  to  obtain,  but 
from  TiriE  and  Experience."  "  I  dread  the  more,"  Hamilton 
declares  in  the  last  words  of  the  Federalist,  addressed  to  the 
People  of  the  State  of  New  York,  "I  dread  the  more  the 
consequences  of  new  attempts,  because  I  KNOW  that  POWEK- 
FTJL  INDIYIDUALS,  in  this  and  other  States,  are  enemies  to 
a  General  National  Government,  in  every  possible  shape." 

A  critical  analysis  of  this  work  is  not  within  the  province  of 
this  notice,  but  it  cannot  escape  observation,  in  addition  to  the 
contributions  of  its  other  eminent  writers,  how  much  of  its 
varied  value  must  be  ascribed  to  the  varied  properties  of  the 
mind  of  Hamilton — the  headspring — as  a  scholar,  a  soldier,  a 
jurist,  a  legislator,  a  political  economist,  and  a  statesman,  each 
uniting  its  tributes  in  singular  harmony  to  the  great  argument 
of  the  proposed  grand  result — the  inducing  the  institution  of  a 
free,  vigorous,  yet  moderate  Government,  to  bind  together  in  an 
indissoluble  bond  the  people  of  the  United  States,  by  a  Consti- 
tution ordained  and  established  by  themselves. 


CXXXVlll  HISTORICAL    NOTICE. 

*■  A  Nation  without  a  National  Government  is,  in  my  view," 
he  declared,  "  an  awful  spectacle.  The  establishment  of  a  Con- 
stitution, in  time  of  profound  peace,  by  the  voluntary  consent 
of  a  whole  people,  is  a  PRODIGY,  to  the  completion  of  which 
I  look  forward  with  trembling;  anxiety." 


THE   CONTINENTALIST. 


NUMBER  I. 


JULY  12,  1781. 


It  would  be  the  extreme  of  vanity  in  us,  not  to  be  sensible,  that  we 
began  this  revolution  with  very  vague  and  confined  notions  of  the 
practical  business  of  government.  To  the  greater  part  of  us  it  was  a 
novelty ;  of  those  who  under  the  former  constitution  had  had  opportu- 
nities of  acquiring  experience,  a  large  proportion  adhered  to  the  opposite 
side,  and  the  remainder  can  only  be  supposed  to  have  possessed  ideas 
adapted  to  the  narrow  colonial  sphere,  in  which  they  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  move,  not  of  that  enlarged  kind  suited  to  the  government  of 
an  independent  nation. 

There  were,  no  doubt,  exceptions  to  these  observations ;  men  in  all 
respects  qualified  for  conducting  the  public  affairs  with  skill  and  advan- 
tage; but  their  number  was  small — they  were  not  always  brought 
forward  in  our  councils ;  and  when  they  were,  their  influence  was  too 
commonly  borne  down  by  the  prevailing  torrent  of  ignorance  and 
prejudice. 

On  a  retrospect,  however,  of  our  transactions,  under  the  disadvantages 
with  which  we  commenced,  it  is  perhaps  more  to  be  wondered  at  that 
we  have  done  so  well,  than  that  we  have  not  done  better.  There  are, 
indeed,  some  traits  in  our  conduct,  as  conspicuous  for  sound  policy,  as 
others  for  magnanimity.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  must  also  be 
confessed,  there  have  been  many  false  steps,  many  chimerical  projects 
and  Utopian  speculations,  in  the  management  of  our  civil  as  well  as  of 
our  military  affairs.  A  part  of  these  were  the  natural  effects  of  the 
spirit  of  the  times,  dictated  by  our  situation.  An  extreme  jealousy  of 
power  is  the  attendant  on  all  popular  revolutions,  and  has  seldom  been 
without  its  evils.  It  is  to  this  source  we  are  to  trace  many  of  the  fatal 
mistakes,  which  have  so  deeply  endangered  the  common  cause ;  par- 
ticularly that  defect  which  will  be  the  object  of  these  remarks — A  want 
of  power  in  Congress. 

The  present  Congress,  respectable  for  abilities  and  integrity,  by  expe- 
rience convinced  of  the  necessity  of  change,  are  preparing  several 
imoortani  articles    lo  be  submitted  to  the  respective  States,  for  aug 


CXl  THE    CONTINENTALIST. 

menting  the  powers  of  the  Confederation.  But  though  there  is  hardly 
at  this  time  a  man  of  information  in  America,  who  will  not  acknowledge, 
as  a  general  proposition,  that  in  its  present  form,  it  is  unequal,  either  to 
a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  or  to  the  preservation  of  the  Union 
in  peace ;  yet  when  the  principle  comes  to  be  applied  to  practice,  there 
seems  not  to  be  the  same  agreement  in  the  modes  of  remedying  the 
defect ;  and  it  is  to  be  feared  from  a  disposition  which  appeared  in  some 
of  the  States,  on  a  late  occasion,  that  the  salutary  intentions  of  Congress 
may  meet  with  more  delay  and  opposition,  than  tho  critical  posture  of 
the  States  will  justify. 

It  will  be  attempted  to  show,  in  a  course  of  papers,  what  ought  to  be 
done,  and  the  mischiefs  of  a  contrary  policy. 

In  the  first  stages  of  the  controversy,  it  was  excusable  to  err.  Good 
intentions,  rather  than  great  skill,  were  to  have  been  expected  from  us. 
But  we  have  now  had  sufficient  time  for  reflection,  and  experience  as 
ample  as  unfortunate,  to  rectify  our  errors.  To  persist  in  them  becomes 
disgraceful,  and  even  criminal,  and  belies  that  character  of  good  sense, 
and  a  quick  discernment  of  our  interests,  which,  in  spite  of  our  mistakes, 
we  have  been  hitherto  allowed.  It  will  prove,  that  our  sagacity  is 
limited  to  interests  of  inferior  moment,  and  that  we  are  incapable  of 
those  enlightened  and  liberal  views,  necessary  to  make  us  a  great  and 
flourishing  people. 

History  is  full  of  examples,  where  in  contests  for  liberty,  a  jealousy  of 
power  has  either  defeated  the  attempts  to  recover,  or  preserve  it,  in  the 
first  instance,  or  has  afterwards  subverted  it  by  clogging  government 
with  too  great  precautions  for  its  felicity,  or  by  leaving  too  wide  a  door 
for  sedition  and  popular  licentiousness.  In  a  government  framed  for 
durable  liberty,  not  less  regard  must  be  paid  to  giving  the  magistrate  a 
proper  degree  of  authority,  to  make  and  execute  the  laws  with  vigor, 
than  to  guard  against  encroachments  upon  the  rights  of  the  community. 
As  too  much  power  leads  to  despotism,  too  little  leads  to  anarchy,  and 
both,  eventually,  to  the  ruin  of  the  people.  These  are  maxims  well 
known,  but  never  suflBciently  attended  to,  in  adjusting  the  frames  of 
governments.  Some  momentary  interest  or  passion  is  sure  to  give  a 
wrong  bias,  and  pervert  the  most  favorable  opportunities. 

No  friend  to  order  or  to  rational  liberty,  can  read  without  pain  and 
disgust,  the  history  of  the  Commonwealths  of  Greece.  Generally 
speaking,  they  were  a  constant  scene  of  the  alternate  tyranny  of  one 
part  of  the  people  over  the  other,  or  of  a  few  usurping  demagogues  over 
the  whole.  Most  of  them  had  been  originally  governed  by  kings,  whose 
despotism  (the  natural  disease  of  monarchy)  had  obliged  their  subjects 
to  murder,  expel,  depose,  or  reduce  them  to  a  nominal  existence,  and 
institute  popular  governments.  In  these  governments,  that  of  Sparta 
excepted,  the  jealousy  of  power  hindered  the  people  from  trusting  out 
of  their  own  hands  a  competent  authority,  to  maintain  the  repose  and 
stability  of  the  commonwealth ;  whence  originated  the  frequent  revolu- 
tions and  civil  i^roils,  with  which  they  were  distracted.     This,  and  the 


THE    CONTINENTALIST.  Cxil 

want  of  a  solid  federal  union  to  restrain  the  ambition  and  rivalship  o-*" 
the  different  cities,  after  a  rapid  succession  of  bloody  wars,  ended  in 
their  total  loss  of  liberty,  and  subjugation  to  foreign  powers. 

In  comparison  of  our  governments  with  those  of  the  ancient  republics, 
we  must,  without  hesitation,  give  the  preference  to  our  own ;  because 
every  power  with  us  is  exercised  by  representation,  not  in  tumultuary 
assemblies  of  the  collective  body  of  the  people,  where  the  art  or  impu- 
dence of  the  Orator  or  Tribune,  rather  than  the  utility  or  justice  of  the 
measure  could  seldom  fail  to  govern.  Yet,  whatever  may  be  the 
advantage  on  our  side,  in  such  a  comparison,  men  who  estimate  the 
value  of  institutions,  not  from  prejudices  of  the  moment,  but  from 
experience  and  reason,  must  be  persuaded  that  the  same  jealousy  of 
power  has  prevented  our  reaping  all  the  advantages,  from  the  examples 
of  other  nations,  which  we  ought  to  have  done,  and  has  rendered  our 
Constitutions  in  many  respects  feeble  and  imperfect. 

Perhaps  the  evil  is  not  very  great  in  respect  to  our  State  Constitu- 
tions; for  notwithstanding  their  imperfections,  they  may,  for  some 
time,  be  made  to  operate  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  answer  the  purposes 
of  the  common  defence,  and  the  maintenance  of  order ;  and  they  seem 
to  have  in  themselves,  and  in  the  progress  of  society,  among  us,  the 
seeds  of  improvement. 

But  this  is  not  the  case  with  respect  to  the  Federal  Government ;  if 
it  is  too  weak  at  first,  it  will  continually  grow  weaker.  The  ambition 
and  local  interests  of  the  respective  members,  will  be  constantly  under- 
mining and  usurping  upon  its  prerogatives,  till  it  comes  to  a  dissolution ; 
if  a  partial  combination  of  some  of  the  more  powerful  ones  does  not  bring 
it  t^  a  more  speedy  and  violent  end. 


:xlii  THE    CONTINENTALIST. 


THE  CONTINENTALIST. 


NUMBER  II. 


JULY  19,  1781. 


In  a  single  state,  where  the  sovereign  power  is  exercised  by  delega- 
tion, whether  it  be  a  limited  monarchy  or  a  republic,  the  danger  most 
commonly  is,  that  the  sovereign  will  become  too  powerful  for  his  con- 
stituents ;  in  foederal  governments  where  different  states  are  represented 
in  a  general  council,  the  danger  is  on  the  other  side — that  the  members 
will  be  an  overmatch  for  the  common  head;  or  in  otner  words,  thai  it 
will  not  have  suflBcient  influence  and  authority  to  secure  the  obedience 
of  the  several  parts  of  the  Confederacy. 

In  a  single  state,  the  sovereign  has  the  whole  legislative  power  as  well 
as  the  command  of  the  national  forces,  of  course  an  immediate  controul 
over  the  persons  and  property  of  the  subjects, — every  other  power  is  sub- 
ordinate and  dependent.  If  he  undertakes  to  subvert  the  constitution, 
it  can  only  be  preserved  by  a  general  insurrection  of  the  people.  The 
magistrates  of  the  provinces,  counties,  or  towns,  into  which  the  state  is 
divided,  having  only  an  executive  and  police  jurisdiction,  can  take  no 
decisive  measures  for  counteracting  the  first  indications  of  tyranny ;  but 
must  content  themselves  with  the  ineffectual  weapon  of  petition  and 
remonstrance.  They  cannot  raise  money,  levy  troops,  nor  form  alli- 
ances. The  leaders  of  the  people  must  wait  till  their  discontents  have 
ripened  into  a  general  revolt,  to  put  them  in  a  situation  to  confer  the 
powers,  necessary  for  their  defence.  It  will  always  be  difficult  for  this 
to  take  place;  because  the  sovereign  possessing  the  appearance  and 
forms  of  legal  authority,  having  the  forces  and  revenues  of  the  state  at 
his  command,  and  a  large  party  among  the  people  besides,  which  with 
those  advantages  he  can  hardly  fail  to  acquire — he  will  too  often  be  able 
to  baffle  the  first  motions  of  the  discontented,  and  prevent  that  union 
and  concert  essential  to  the  success  of  their  opposition. 

The  security  therefore  of  the  public  liberty,  laust  consist  in  such  a 
distribution  of  the  sovereign  power,  as  will  make  it  morally  impossible 
for  one  part  to  gain  an  ascendency  over  the  others,  or  for  the  whole  to 
unite  in  a  scheme  of  usurpation. 

In  foederal  Governments,  each  member  has  a  distinct  sovereignty, 


iHE    CONTINENTALIST.  CXliii 

makes  and  executes  laws,  imposes  taxes,  distributes  justice,  and  exer- 
cises every  other  function  of  government.  It  has  always  within  itself 
the  means  of  revenue.  And  on  an  emergency  can  levy  forces.  If  the 
common  sovereign  should  meditate  or  attempt  any  thing  unfavourable 
to  the  general  liberty,  each  member  having  all  the  proper  organs  of 
power,  can  prepare  for  defence  with  celerity  and  vigour.  Each  can 
immediately  sound  the  alarm  to  the  others,  and  enter  into  leagues  for 
mutual  protection.  If  the  combination  is  general,  as  is  to  be  expected, 
the  usurpers  will  soon  find  themselves  without  the  means  of  recruiting 
their  treasury,  or  their  armies ;  and  for  want  of  continued  supplies  of 
men  and  money,  must,  in  the  end  fall  a  sacrifice  to  the  attempt.  If  the 
combination  is  not  general,  it  will  imply  that  some  of  the  members  are 
interested  in  that  which  is  the  cause  of  dissatisfaction  to  others,  and  this 
cannot  be  an  attack  upon  the  common  liberty,  but  upon  the  interests 
of  one  part  in  favour  of  another  part ;  and  it  will  be  a  war  between  the 
members  of  the  foederal  union  with  each  other,  not  between  them  and 
the  foederal  government.  From  the  plainest  principles  of  human 
nature,  two  inferences  are  to  be  drawn,  one,  that  each  member  of  a 
poUtical  confederacy,  will  be  more  disposed  to  advance  its  own  authority 
upon  the  ruins  of  that  of  the  confederacy,  than  to  make  any  improper 
concession  in  its  favour,  or  support  it  in  unreasonable  pretensions — the 
other,  that  the  subjects  of  each  member,  will  be  more  devoted  in  their 
attachments  and  obedience  to  their  own  particular  governments,  than 
to  that  of  the  union. 

It  is  the  temper  of  societies  as  well  as  of  individuals  to  be  impatient 
of  constraint,  and  to  prefer  partial  to  general  interest.  Many  cases  may 
occur,  where  members  of  a  confederacy  have,  or  seem  to  have  an  advan- 
tage in  things  contrary  to  the  good  of  the  whole,  or  a  disadvantage  in 
others  conducive  to  that  end.  The  selfishness  of  every  part  will  dispose 
each  to  believe,  that  the  public  burdens  are  unequally  apportioned,  and 
that  itself  is  the  victim.  These,  and  other  circumstances,  will  promote 
a  disposition  for  abridging  the  authority  of  the  foederal  government : 
and  the  ambition  of  men  in  office  in  each  state,  will  make  them  glad  to 
encourage  it.  They  think  their  own  consequence  connected  with  the 
power  of  the  government  of  which  they  are  a  part:  and  will  endeavour 
to  increase  the  one  as  the  mean  of  increasing  the  other. 

The  particular  governments  will  have  more  empire  over  the  minds  of 
their  subjects  than  the  general  one,  because  their  agency  will  be  more 
direct,  more  uniform,  and  more  apparent.  The  people  will  be  habitu- 
ated to  look  up  to  them  as  the  arbiters  and  guardians  of  their  personal 
concerns,  by  which  the  passions  of  the  vulgar,  if  not  of  all  men  are  most 
strongly  affected ;  and  in  every  difference  with  the  confederated  body 
will  side  with  them  against  the  common  sovereign. 

Experience  confirms  the  truth  of  these  principles. — The  chief  cities 
of  Greece  had  once  their  council  of  Amphyctions,  or  States-general, 
with  authority  to  decide  and  compose  the  differences  of  the  several 
cities ;  and  to  transact  many  other  important  matters  relative  to  the 


•TxliV  THE   CONTINENTALIST. 

common  interest  and  safety.  At  their  first  institution,  they  had  great 
weight  and  credit ;  but  never  enough  to  preserve  efiectually  the  balance 
and  harmony  of  the  confederacy  ;  and  in  time  their  decrees  only  served 
as  an  additional  pretext  to  that  side,  whose  pretentions  they  favoured. 
When  the  cities  were  not  engaged  in  foreign  wars,  they  were  at  per- 
petual variance  among  themselves.  Sparta  and  Athens  contended 
twenty-seven  years  for  the  precedence,  or  rather  dominion  of  Greece, 
till  the  former  made  herself  mistress  of  the  whole;  and  till  in  subse- 
quent struggles,  having  had  recourse  to  the  pernicious  expedient  of 
calling  in  the  aid  of  foreign  enemies ;  the  Macedonians  first,  and  after- 
wards the  Romans  became  their  masters. 

The  German  diet  had  formerly  more  authority  than  it  now  has,  though 
like  that  of  Greece  never  enough  to  hinder  the  great  potentates  from 
disturbing  the  repose  of  the  empire,  and  mutually  wasting  their  own 
territories  and  people. 

The  Helvetic  league  is  another  example.  It  is  true  it  has  subsisted 
nearly  five  hundred  years ;  but  in  that  period  the  cantons  have  had 
repeated  and  furious  wars  with  each  other,  which  would  have  made 
them  an  easy  prey  to  their  more  powerful  neighbours,  had  not  the 
reciprocal  jealousy  of  these  prevented  either  from  taking  advantage  of 
their  dissentions.  This  and  their  poverty  have  hitherto  saved  them 
from  total  destruction,  and  kept  them  from  feeling  the  miseries  of 
foreign  conquest,  added  to  those  of  civil  war.  The  foederal  government 
is  too  weak  to  hinder  their  renewal,  whenever  the  ambition  or  fanaticism 
of  the  principal  cantons  shall  be  disposed  to  rekindle  the  flame.  For 
some  time  past  indeed,  it  has  been  in  a  great  measure  nominal ;  the 
Protestants  and  Catholics  have  had  separate  diets,  to  manage  almost  all 
matters  of  importance ;  so  that  in  fact,  th«  general  diet  is  only  kept  up 
to  regulate  the  affairs  of  the  common  bailliages  and  preserve  a  sem- 
blance of  union  ;  and  even  this,  it  is  probable  would  cease,  did  not  the 
extreme  weakness  of  the  cantons,  oblige  them  to  a  kind  of  coalition. 

If  the  divisions  of  the  United  Provinces  have  not  proceeded  to  equal 
extremities,  there  are  peculiar  causes  to  be  assigned.  The  authority  of 
the  Stadt-h older  pervades  the  whole  frame  of  the  republic,  and  is  a  kind 
of  common  link  by  which  the  provinces  are  bound  together.  The 
jealousy  of  his  progressive  influence,  in  which  more  or  less  they  all 
agree,  operates  as  a  check  upon  their  ill-humors  against  one  another. 
The  inconsiderableness  of  each  province  separately,  and  the  imminent 
danger  to  which  the  whole  would  be  exposed  of  being  overrun  by  their 
neighbors,  in  case  of  disunion,  is  a  further  preservative  against  the 
phrenzy  of  hostility  ;  and  their  importance  and  even  existence  depend- 
ing entirely  upon  frugality,  industry  and  commerce;  peace,  both  at 
home  and  abroad,  is  of  necessity  the  predominant  object  of  their  policy. 


THE    CONTTNENTAIJST.  cxb 


THE  CONTINENTALIST. 


NTJMHKR  III. 


AUGUST  9,  1781. 


The  situation  of  these  states  is  very  unlike  that  of  the  United  Pro- 
vinces. Remote  as  we  are  from  Europe,  in  a  little  time  we  should  fancy 
ourselves  out  of  the  reach  of  attempts  from  abroad,  and  in  full  liberty, 
at  our  leisure  and  convenience  to  try  our  strength  at  home.  This  might 
not  happen  at  once ;  but  if  the  Fcederal  Government  shocld  lose  its 
Authority  it  would  certainly  follow.  Political  societies,  in  close 
neighbourhood,  must  either  be  strongly  united  under  one  government 
or  there  will  infallibly  exist  emulations  and  quarrels.  This  is  in  human 
nature;  and  we  have  no  reason  to  think  ourselves  wiser,  or  better  than 
other  men.  Some  of  the  larger  states,  a  small  number  of  years  hence, 
will  be  in  themselves  populous,  rich  and  powerful,  in  all  those  circum- 
stances calculated  to  inspire  ambition  and  nourish  ideas  of  separation  and 
independence.  Though  it  will  ever  be  their  true  interest  to  preserve 
the  union,  their  vanity  and  self  importance,  will  be  very  Hkely  to  over- 
power that  motive,  and  make  them  seek  to  place  themselves  at  the 
head  of  particular  confederacies,  independent  of  the  general  one.  A 
schism  once  introduced,  competitions  of  boundary  and  rivalships  of 
commerce  will  easily  afford  pretexts  for  war. 

European  powers  may  have  many  inducements  for  fomenting  these 
divisions  and  playing  us  off  against  each  other :  But  without  such  a  dis- 
position in  them,  if  separations  once  take  place,  we  shall,  of  course, 
embrace  different  interests  and  connections.  The  particular  confedera- 
cies, leaguing  themselves  with  rival  nations,  will  naturally  be  involved 
in  their  disputes;  into  which  they  will  be  the  more  readily  tempted  by 
the  hope  of  making  acquisitions  upon  each  other,  and  upon  the  colonies 
of  the  powers  with  whom  they  are  respectively  at  enmity. 

We  already  see  symptoms  of  the  evils  to  be  apprehended.  In  the 
aaidst  of  a  war  for  our  existence  as  a  nation ;  in  the  midst  of  dangers  too 
•erious  to  be  trifled  with,  some  of  the  states  have  evaded,  or  refused, 

10 


CKlVl  THE    CONTINENTALIST. 

compliance  witli  the  demands  of  Congress  in  points  of  the  greatest 
moment  to  the  common  safety.  If  they  act  such  a  part  at  this  perilous 
juncture,  what  are  we  to  expect  in  a  time  of  peace  and  security  ?  Is  it 
not  to  be  feared  that  the  resolutions  of  Congress  would  soon  become 
like  the  decisions  of  the  Greek  Amphyctions,  or  like  the  edicts  of  a 
Grerman  diet? 

But  as  these  evils  are  at  a  little  distance,  we  may  perhaps  be  insensi- 
ble and  short-sighted  enough  to  disregard  them.  There  are  others  that 
threaten  our  immediate  safety.  Our  whole  system  is  in  disorder;  our 
currency  depreciated,  till  in  many  places  it  will  hardly  obtain  a  circula- 
tion at  all — public  credit  at  its  lowest  ebb — our  army  deficient  in  num- 
bers and  unprovided  with  every  thing — the  government  in  its  present 
condition,  unable  to  command  the  means  to  pay,  clothe,  or  feed  their 
troops — the  enemy  making  an  alarming  progress  in  the  southern  states, 
lately  in  complete  possession  of  two  of  them,  though  now  in  part  rescued 
by  the  genius  and  exertions  of  a  General  without  an  army — a  force 
under  Cornwall  is  still  formidable  to  Virginia. 

AVe  ought  to  blush  to  acknowledge  that  this  is  a  true  picture  of  our 
situation,  when  we  reflect,  that  the  enemy's  whole  force  in  the  United 
States,  including  their  American  levies  and  the  late  reinforcement,  is 
little  more  than  fourteen  thousand  effective  men ; — that  our  population, 
by  recent  examination,  has  been  found  to  be  greater,  than  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  war — that  the  quantity  of  our  specie  has  alp^ 
increased — that  the  country  abounds  with  all  the  necessaries  of  life,  and 
has  a  sufliiciency  of  foreign  commodities,  with  a  considerable  and  pro- 
gressive commerce — that  we  have  beyond  comparison  a  better  stock  of 
war-like  materials,  than  when  we  began  the  contest,  and  an  ally,  as 
willing,  as  able,  to  supply  our  further  wants.  And  that  we  have  on  the 
spot  five  thousand  auxiliary  troops,  paid  and  subsisted  by  that  ally,  to 
assist  in  our  defence. 

Nothing  but  a  General  disaffection  of  the  people,  or  mismanagement 
in  their  rulers,  can  account  for  the  figure  we  make,  and  for  the  dis- 
tresses and  perplexities  we  experience,  contending  against  so  small  a 
force. 

Our  enemies  themselves  must  now  be  persuaded  that  the  first  is  not 
the  cause,  and  we  know  it  is  not.  The  most  decided  attachment  of  the 
people  could  alone  have  made  them  endure,  without  a  convulsion,  the 
successive  shocks  in  our  currency,  added  to  the  unavoidable  inconve- 
niences of  war.  There  is  perhaps  not  another  nation  in  the  world,  that 
would  have  shown  equal  patience  and  perseverance  in  similar  circum- 
stances. The  enemy  have  now  tried  the  temper  of  almost  every  part  of 
America;  and  they  can  hardly  produce  in  their  ranks  a  thousand  men, 
who,  without  their  arts  and  seductions,  have  voluntarily  joined  their 
standard.  The  miseries  of  a  rigorous  captivity,  may  perhcps  have  added 
half  as  many  more  to  the  number  of  the  American  levies,  at  this  time  in 
their  armies.     This  small  accession  of  force  is  the  more  extraordinary. 


THE    CONTINENTALIST.  Cxlvn 

as  they  have  at  some  periods,  been  apparently  in  the  full  tide  of  success, 
while  every  thing  wore  an  aspect  tending  to  infuse  despondency  into 
the  people  of  this  country.  This  has  been  remarkably  the  case  in  the 
southern  states. 

They  for  a  time  had  almost  undisturbed  possession  of  two  of  them ; 
and  Cornwallis,  after  overrunning  a  great  part  of  a  third ;  after  two  vic- 
torious battles,  only  brought  with  him  into  Virginia  about  two  hundred 
tories — in  the  state  where  he  thought  himself  so  well  established,  that 
he  presumptuously  ventured  to  assure  the  minister,  there  was  not  a 
rebel  left,  a  small  body  of  continental  troops,  have  been  so  eflFectually 
seconded  by  the  militia  of  that  vanquished  country,  as  to  have  been 
able  to  capture  a  number  of  his  troops  more  than  equal  to  their  own, 
and  to  repossess  the  principal  part  of  the  state. 

As  in  the  explanation  of  our  embarrassments  nothing  can  be  alledged 
to  the  disaffection  of  the  people,  we  must  have  recourse  to  the  other 
cause — of  impolicy  and  mismanagement  in  their  rulers. 

Wliere  the  blame  of  this  may  lie  is  not  so  much  the  question  as  what 
are  the  proper  remedies ;  yet  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  remark  that  too 
large  a  share  has  fallen  upon  Congress.  That  body  is  no  doubt  charge- 
able with  mistakes ;  but  perhaps,  its  greatest  has  been  too  much  readi- 
ness to  make  concessions  of  the  powers  implied  in  its  original  trust. 
This  is  partly  to  be  attributed  to  an  excessive  complaisance  to  the  spirit, 
which  has  evidently  actuated  a  majority  of  the  states, — a  desire  of 
monopolizing  all  power  in  themselves.  Congress  have  been  responsible 
for  the  administration  of  alfaii's,  without  the  means  of  fulfilling  that 
responsibility. 

It  would  be  too  severe  a  reflection  upon  us  to  suppose,  that  a  disposi- 
tion to  make  the  most  of  the  friendship  of  others,  and  to  exempt  our- 
selves from  a  full  share  of  the  burthens  of  the  war  has  had  any  part  in 
the  backwardness,  which  has  appeared  in  many  of  the  states,  to  confer 
powers  and  adopt  measures  adequate  to  the  exigency.  Such  a  senti- 
ment would  neither  be  wise,  just,  generous  nor  honourable;  nor  do  I 
believe  the  accusation  would  be  well  founded,  yet  our  conduct  makes 
us  liable  to  a  suspicion  of  this  sort.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  too 
sanguine  expectations  from  Europe  have  unintentionally  relaxed  our 
efforts,  by  diverting  a  sense  of  danger,  and  begetting  an  opinion  that 
the  inequality  of  the  contest  would  make  every  campaign  the  last. 

We  did  not  consider  how  difficult  it  must  be  to  exhaust  the  resources 
of  a  nation  circumstanced  like  that  of  Great  Britain;  whose  government 
has  always  been  distinguished  for  energy,  and  its  people  for  enthusiasm. 
Nor  did  we  in  estimating  the  superiority  of  our  friends  make  sufficient 
allowance  for  that  want  of  concert,  which  will  ever  characterize  the 
operations  of  allies,  or  for  the  immense  advantage  to  the  enemy,  of 
having  their  forces,  though  inferior,  under  a  single  direction. 

Finding  the  rest  of  Europe  either  friendly  or  pacific,  we  never  calcu- 
lated the  coi*'ngencies  which  might  alter  that  disposition:  nor  reflected 


cxJviii  THE    CONTINENTALIST. 

that  the  death*  of  a  single  prince,  the  change  or  caprice  of  a  single 
minister,  was  capable  of  giving  a  new  face  to  the  whole  system. 

We  are  at  this  time  more  sanguine  than  ever.  The  war  with  the 
Dutch,  we  believe,  will  give  such  an  addition  of  force  to  our  side  as  will 
make  the  superiority  irresistible.  No  person  can  dispute  this,  if  things 
remain  in  their  present  state ;  but  the  extreme  disparity  of  the  contest 
is  the  very  reason,  why  this  cannot  be  the  case.  The  neutral  powers 
will  either  eflfect  a  particular,  or  a  general  accommodation,  or  they  will 
take  their  sides.  There  are  three  suppositions  to  be  made ;  one,  that 
there  will  be  a  compromise  between  the  united  provinces  and  England ;  for 
which  we  are  certain  the  mediation  of  Austria  and  Russia  have  been 
offered — another  a  pacification  between  all  the  belligerent  powers,  for 
which  we  have  reason  to  believe  the  same  mediation  has  been  offered — 
the  third  a  rejection  of  the  terms  of  mediation  and  a  more  general  war. 

Either  of  these  suppositions  is  a  motive  for  exertion — the  first  will 
place  things  in  the  same,  probably  in  a  worse  situation,  than  before  the 
declaration  of  the  war  against  Holland.  The  composing  of  present  dif- 
ferences may  be  accompanied  with  a  revival  of  ancient  connections : 
and  at  least  would  be  productive  of  greater  caution  and  restraint  in  a 
future  intercourse  with  us. 

The  second,  it  is  much  to  be  dreaded,  would  hazard  a  dismember- 
mentf  of  a  part  of  these  states ;  and  we  are  bound  in  honor,  in  duty 

*  The  death  of  the  Empress  Queen  has  actually  produced  a  change :  Her  politics,  if 
not  friendly  to  our  connections,  were  at  least  pacific;  and  while  she  lived  no  hostile 
interference  of  the  House  of  Austria  was  to  be  expected.  The  Emperor,  her  son,  by 
her  death,  left  more  at  liberty  to  pursue  his  inclinations,  averse  to  the  aggrandisement 
of  France,  of  course  afraid  of  the  abasement  of  England,  has  given  several  indications 
of  an  unfriendly  disposition.  It  should  be  a  weighty  consideration  with  us,  that 
among  the  potentates  which  we  look  upon  as  amicable,  three  of  the  principal  ones  are 
at  a  very  advanced  stage  of  life,  The  King  of  Spain,  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  the 
Empress  of  Russia.     We  know  not  what  may  be  the  politics  of  successors. 

f  Perhaps  not  expressly  and  directly,  but  virtually,  under  the  plausible  form  of  a 
new  arrangement  of  limits. 

If  we  are  determined,  as  we  ought  to  be  with  the  concurrence  of  our  allies,  not  to 
accept  such  a  condition,  then  we  ought  to  prepare  for  the  third  event,  a  more  general 
•nd  more  obstinate  war. 

Should  this  take  place  a  variety  of  new  interests  will  be  involved,  and  the  affairs  of 
America  may  cease  to  be  of  primarv  importance.  In  proportion  as  the  objects 
and  operations  of  the  war  become  complicated  and  extensive,  the  final  success  must 
become  uncertain;  and  in  proportion  as  the  interests  of  others  in  our  concerns. may  be 
weakened,  or  supplanted  by  more  immediate  interests  of  their  own,  ought  our  atten- 
tion to  ourselves,  and  exertions  in  our  own  behalf  to  be  awakened  and  augmented. 

We  ought  therefore,  not  only  to  strain  every  nerve  for  complying  with  the  requisi- 
tions, to  render  the  present  campaign  as  decisive  as  possible ;  but  we  ought  without 
delay,  to  enlarge  the  powers  of  Congress.  Every  plan  of  which  this  is  not  the 
foundation  will  be  illusory.  The  separate  exertions  of  the  states  will  never  sufSce. — 
Nothing  but  a  well  proportioned  exertion  of  the  resources  of  the  whole,  under  ine 
direction  of  a  common  council,  with  power  sufficient  to  give  efficacy  to  their  resolu 
tions,  can  preserve  us  from  being  a  conquered  people  now,  or  can  make  us  a  HApr> 
PEOPLE  hereafter. 


THE    CONTINENTALIST.  CXl    * 

and  ill  interest,  to  employ  every  effort  to  dispossess  the  enemy  of  whal 
they  hold.  A  natural  basis  of  the  negociation  with  respect  to  this  con- 
tinent, will  be,  that  each  party  shall  retain  what  it  possesses  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  treaty,  qualified  perhaps  by  a  cession  of  particular  points 
for  an  equivalent  elsewhere.  It  is  too  delicate  to  dwell  on  the  motives 
to  this  apprehension;  but  if  such  a  compromise  sometimes  terminates 
the  disputes  of  nations  originally  independent,  it  will  be  less  extraordi- 
nary where  one  party  was  originally  under  tne  dominion  of  the  other. 


Cl  THE   CONTINENTALIST. 


THE   CONTINENTALIST. 


NUMBER  IV. 


AUGUST  30,  1781. 


The  preceding  numbers  are  chiefly  intended  to  confirm  an  opinion, 
already  pretty  generally  received,  that  it  is  necessary  to  augment  the 
powers  of  the  confederation.  The  principal  difficulty  yet  remains  to 
fix  the  public  judgment  definitively  on  the  points  which  ought  to  com- 
pose that  augmentation. 

It  may  be  pronounced  vrith  confidence  that  nothing  short  of  the  fol- 
lowing articles  can  suffice. 

1st — The  Power  of  Regulating  Trade,  comprehending  a  right  of 
granting  bounties  and  premiums  by  way  of  encouragement,  of  imposing 
duties  of  every  kind  as  well  for  revenue  as  regulation,  of  appointing  all 
officers  of  the  customs,  and  of  laying  embargoes  in  extraordinary  emer- 
gencies. 

2nd — ^A  moderate — levied  tax,  throughout  the  United  States,  of  a 
specific  rate  per  pound  or  per  acre,*  granted  to  the  Federal  Government 
in  perpetuity ;  and  if  Congress  think  proper,  to  be  levied  by  their  own 
collectors. 

3d — A  moderate  capitation-taxf  on  every  male  inhabitant  above  fifteen 
years  of  age,  exclusive  of  common  soldiers,  common  seamen,  day 
laborers,  cottagers,  and  paupers,  to  be  also  vested  in  perpetuity,  and 
with  the  same  condition  of  collection. 

4th — The  disposal  of  all  unlocated  land  for  the  benefit  of  the  United 
States  (so  far  as  respects  the  profits  of  the  first  sale  and  the  quit  rents), 
thft  "irisdiction  remaining  to  the  respective  States  in  whose  limits  they 
n-e  contained. 

5th — A  certain  proportion  of  the  product  of  all  miiies  discovered,  or 
to  be  discovered,  for  the  same  duration,  and  with  the  same  right  of 
collection  as  in  the  second  and  third  articles, 

*  Two  pence  an  acre  on  cultivated,  and  a  halfpenny  on  uncultivated  land,  would 
answer  the  purpose,  and  would  be  so  moderate  as  not  to  be  felt — a  small  tax  on  uncul- 
tivated land  would  have  the  good  effect  of  obliging  the  proprietor  either  to  cultiv«tf 
It  himself,  or  to  dispose  of  it  to  some  persons  that  would  do  it. 

t  Suppose  a  dollar,  or  even  half  a  dollar  per  head. 


THE    CONTINENTALIST,  cH 

6th — The  appointment  of  all  land  (as  well  as  naval)  officers  of  es  ery 
rank. 

The  three  first  articles  are  of  IMMEDIATE  NECESSITY ;  the  three 
last  would  be  of  great  present,  but  of  much  greater  future  utility ;  the 
wliole  combined  would  give  solidity  and  permanency  to  the  Union. 

The  great  defect  of  the  Confederation  is,  that  it  gives  the  United 
States  no  property ;  or,  in  other  words,  no  revenue,  nor  the  means  of 
acquiring  it,  inherent  in  themselves  and  independent  on  the  temporary 
pleasure  of  the  diflferent  members.  And  power  without  revenue,  in 
political  society,  is  a  name.  While  Congress  continue  altogether  de- 
pendent on  the  occasional  grants  of  the  several  States,  for  the  means  of 
defraying  the  expenses  of  the  Federal  Government,  it  can  neither  have 
dignity,  vigor,  nor  credit.  Credit  supposes  specific  and  permanent 
funds  for  the  punctual  payment  of  interest,  with  a  moral  certainty  of 
the  final  redemption  of  the  principal. 

In  our  situation,  it  will  probably  require  more,  on  account  of  the 
general  diffidence  which  has  been  excited  by  the  past  disorders  in  our 
finances.  It  will  perhaps  be  necessary,  in  the  first  instance,  to  appro- 
priate funds  for  the  redemption  of  the  principal  in  a  determinate  period, 
as  well  as  for  the  payment  of  interest. 

It  is  essential  that  the  property  in  such  funds  should  be  in  the  con- 
tractor himself,  and  the  appropriation  dependent  on  his  own  will. 

If,  instead  of  this,  the  possession  or  disposal  of  them  is  dependent  on 
the  voluntary  or  occasional  concurrence  of  a  number  of  different  wills 
not  under  his  absolute  control,  both  the  one  and  the  other  will  be  too 
precarious  to  be  trusted.  The  most  wealthy  and  best  established  nations 
are  obliged  to  pledge  their  funds  to  obtain  credit,  and  it  would  be  the 
height  of  absurdity  in  us,  in  the  midst  of  a  revolution,  to  expect  to  have 
it  on  better  terms.  This  credit  being  to  be  procured  through  Congress, 
the  funds  ought  to  be  provided,  declared,  and  vested  in  them.*  It  is  a 
fact  that  verifies  the  want  of  specific  funds — a  circumstance  which 
operates  powerfully  against  our  obtaining  credit  abroad  is,  not  a  distrust 
of  our  becoming  independent,  but  of  our  continuing  united ;  and  with 
our  present  confederation  the  distrust  is  natural.  Both  foreigners  and 
the  thinking  men  among  ourselves,  would  have  much  more  confidence 
in  the  duration  of  the  Union,  if  they  were  to  see  it  supported  on  tho 
foundation  here  proposed. 

There  are  some  among  us  ignorant  enough  to  imagine,  that  the  war 
may  be  carried  on  without  credit,  defraying  the  expenses  of  the  year 
with  what  may  be  raised  within  the  year.  But  this  is  for  want  of  a 
knowledge  of  our  real  resources  and  expenses. 

It  may  be  demonstrated,  that  the  whole  amount  of  the  revenue,  which 

•  It  might,  indeed,  be  a  good  restraint  upon  the  spirit  of  running  in  debt,  with 
which  governments  are  too  apt  to  be  infected,  to  make  it  a  condition  of  the  grants  to 
Congress,  that  they  shall  be  obliged,  in  all  their  loans,  to  appropriate  funds  for  tha 
payment  of  principal  as  well  as  interest,  and  such  a  r»«*~ction  might  be  serviceable 
\o  public  credit. 


Clh  THE    CONTINENTALIST. 

these  States  are  capable  of  afibrding,  will  be  deficient  annually,  five  or 
six  millions  of  dollars  for  the  support  of  civil  government  and  of  the  war. 

This  is  not  a  conjecture  hazarded  at  random,  but  the  result  of  experi- 
ment and  calculation  ;  nor  can  it  appear  surprising,  when  it  is  considered 
that  the  revenues  of  the  United  Provinces,  equal  to  these  States  in 
population,  beyond  comparison  superior  in  industry,  commerce,  and 
riches,  do  not  exceed  twenty  five  millions  of  guilders,  or  about  nine 
millions  and  a  half  of  dollars.  In  times  of  war,  they  have  raised  a  more 
considerable  sum,  but  it  has  been  chiefly  by  gratuitous  combinations  of  rich 
individuals,  a  resource  we  cannot  employ,  because  there  are  few  men  of 
large  fortunes  in  this  country,  and  these  for  the  most  part  in  land.  Taxes 
in  the  United  Provinces  are  carried  to  an  extreme  which  would  be  im- 
practicable here.  Not  only  the  living  are  made  to  pay  for  every  neces- 
sary of  life,  but  even  the  dead  are  tributary  to  the  public  for  the  liberty 
of  interment  at  particular  hours.  These  considerations  make  it  evident 
that  we  could  not  raise  an  equal  amount  of  revenue  in  these  States. 
Yet,  in  '76,  when  the  currency  was  not  depreciated.  Congress  emitted, 
for  the  expenses  of  the  year,  fourteen  millions  of  dollars.  It  cannot  be 
denied,  that  there  was  a  want  of  order  and  economy  in  the  expenditure 
of  public  money,  nor  that  we  had  a  greater  military  force  to  maintain 
at  that  time  than  we  now  have ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  allowing  for 
the  necessary  increase  in  our  different  civil  lists,  and  for  the  advanced 
prices  of  many  articles,  it  can  hardly  be  supposed  possible  to  reduce  our 
annual  expense  very  much  below  that  sum.  This  simple  idea  of  the 
subject,  without  entering  into  details,  may  satisfy  us,  that  the  deficiency 
which  has  been  stated  is  not  to  be  suspected  of  exaggeration. 

Indeed,  nations  the  most  powerful  and  opulent  are  obliged  to  have 
recourse  to  loans  in  time  of  war,  and  hence  it  is  that  most  of  the  States 
of  Europe  are  deeply  immersed  in  debt.  France  is  among  the  number, 
notwithstanding  her  immense  population,  wealth,  and  resources.  Eng- 
land owes  the  enormous  sum  of  two  hundred  millions  sterling.  The 
United  Provinces  with  all  their  prudence  and  parsimony,  owe  a  debt  of 
the  generality  of  fifty  millions,  besides  the  particular  debts  of  each 
province.  Almost  all  the  other  powers  are  more  or  less  in  the  same 
circumstances. 

While  this  teaches  us  how  contracted  and  uninformed  are  the  views 
of  those  who  expect  to  carry  on  the  war  without  running  in  debt.  It 
ought  to  console  us  with  respect  to  the  amount  of  that  which  we  now 
owe,  or  may  have  occasion  to  incur,  in  the  remainder  of  the  war.  The 
whole,  without  burthening  the  people,  may  be  paid  off  in  twenty  years 
after  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

The  principal  part  of  the  deficient  five  or  six  millions  must  be  pro- 
cured by  loans  from  private  persons  at  home  and  abroad.  Every  thing 
may  be  hoped  from  the  generosity  of  France,  which  her  means  will 
permit,  but  she  has  full  employment  for  her  revenues  and  credit  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  on  her  own  part.  If  we  judge  of  the  future  by 
the  past,  the  pecuniary  succours  from  her  must  continue  to  be  far  short 


THE    COXTINENTALIST.  cIllJ 

of  our  wants  ;  and  the  contingency  of  a  war  on  the  cont  nent  of  Europe 
makes  it  possible  that  they  may  diminish  rather  than  increase. 

We  have  in  a  less  degree  experienced  the  friendship  of  Spain  in  this 
article. 

The  government  of  the  United  Provinces,  if  disposed  to  do  it,  can 
give  us  no  assistance.  The  resources  of  the  Republic  are  chiefly  mort- 
gaged for  former  debts.  Happily,  it  has  extensive  credit,  but  it  will 
have  occasion  for  the  whole  to  supply  its  own  exigencies. 

Private  men,  either  foreigners  or  natives,  will  not  lend  to  a  large 
amount,  but  on  the  usual  security  of  funds  properly  established.  This 
security  Congress  cannot  give,  till  the  several  States  vest  them  with 
revenU'3,  or  the  means  of  revenue,  for  that  purpose. 

Coiagress  have  wisely  appointed  a  Superintendent  of  their  finances — a 
man  of  acknowledged  abihties  and  integrity,  as  well  as  of  great  })ersonal 
credit  and  pecunia-ry  influence. 

It  was  impossible,  that  the  business  of  finance  could  be  ably  conducted 
by  a  body  of  men  however  well  composed  or  well  intentioned.  Order 
in  the  future  manfigement  of  our  moneyed  concerns,  a  strict  re^rd  to 
the  p(!rformance  of  public  engagements,  and  of  course  the  restoration 
of  pubUc  credit,  raay  be  reasonablj"^  and  confidently  expected  from  Mr. 
Morris.'s  administration,  if  he  is  furnished  with  materials  upon  which  to 
operate;  that  is,  if  the  Federal  Government  can  acquire  funds  as  the 
basin  of  Irs  arrangements.  He  has  very  judiciously  proposed  a  National 
Banfe,  which,  by  uniting  the  interest  and  influence  of  the  moneyed 
men  witl:  the  resources  of  Government,  can  alone  give  it  that  durable 
and  exte  isive  credit  of  which  it  stands  in  need.  This  is  the  best  expe- 
dient h(  could  have  devised  for  relieving  the  public  embarrassments ; 
but  to  give  success  to  the  plan,  it  is  essential  that  Congress  should  have 
it  in  their  power  to  support  him  with  unexceptionable  funds.  Had  we 
begu  n  the  practice  of  funding  four  years  ago,  we  should  have  avoided 
that  depreciation  of  the  currency  which  has  been  pernicious  to  the 
morals  and  to  the  credit  of  the  nation;  and  there  is  no  other  method 
than  -his  to  prevf  nt  a  continuance  and  multrplication  of  the  evils  flowing 
from  *^hat  prolific  -ource. 


CllV  THE    CONTINENTALIST. 


THE   CONTINENTALIST. 


NUMBER  V. 


APRIL  18,  1782. 


[The  saooeeding  numbers  of  the  Continentalist  were  written  last  fall,  but  aooident- 
aUy  got  out  of  the  possession  of  the  writer.  He  has  lately  recovered  them,  and  he 
gives  them  to  the  public  more  to  finish  the  developement  of  his  plan,  than  from  any 
hope  that  the  temper  of  the  times  will  adopt  his  ideas.] 

The  vesting  Congress  with  the  power  of  regulating  trade  ought  to  have 
been  a  principal  object  of  the  confederation  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  It 
is  as  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  commerce  as  of  revenue.  There  are 
some  who  maintain  that  trade  will  regulate  itself,  and  is  not  to  be  bene- 
fitted by  the  encouragements,  or  restraints  of  government.  Such  per- 
sons will  imagine,  that  there  is  no  need  of  a  common  directing  power. 
This  is  one  of  those  wild  speculative  paradoxes,  which  have  grown  into 
credit  among  us,  contrary  to  the  uniform  practice  and  sense  of  the  most 
enlightened  nations. 

Contradicted  by  the  numerous  institutions  and  laws,  that  exist  every 
where  for  the  benefit  of  trade,  by  the  pains  taken  to  cultivate  particular 
branches  and  to  discourage  others,  by  the  known  advantages  derived 
from  those  measures,  and  by  the  palpable  evils  that  would  attend  their 
discontinuance — it  must  be  rejected  by  every  man  acquainted  with 
commercial  history.  Commerce,  like  other  things,  has  its  fixed  princi- 
ples, according  to  which  it  must  be  regulated :  if  these  are  understood 
and  observed,  it  will  be  promoted  by  the  attention  of  government,  if 
unknown,  or  violated,  it  will  be  injured — but  it  is  the  same  with  every 
other  part  of  administration. 

To  preserve  the  balance  of  trade  in  favour  of  a  nation  ought  to  be  a 
leading  aim  of  its  policy.  The  avarice  of  individuals  may  frequently 
find  its  account  in  pursuing  channels  of  traflBc  prejudicial  to  that 
balance,  to  which  the  government  may  be  able  to  oppose  effectual 
impediments.  There  may,  on  the  other  hand,  be  a  possibility  of  open- 
ing new  sources,  which,  though  accompanied  with  great  diflBculties  in 
the  commencement,  would  in  the  event,  amply  reward  the  trouble  and 
expense  of  bringing  them  to  perfection.  The  undertaking  may  often 
exceed  the  influnnce  and  capitals  of  individuals,  and  may  require  no 


TEIE    CONTINENT ALIST.  CiV 

email  assistance,  as  well  from  the  revenue  as  from  the  authority  of  the 
state. 

The  contrary  opinion,  which  has  grown  into  a  degree  of  vogue  among 
us,  has  originated  in  the  injudicious  attempts  made  at  different  times 
to  efifect  a  REGULATION  of  PRICES.  It  bccamc  a  cant  phrase  among  the 
opposers  of  these  attemjjts,  that  trade  must  regulate  itself;  by  which 
at  first  was  only  meant  that  it  had  its  fundamental  laws,  agreeable  to 
which  its  general  operations  must  be  directed ;  and  that  any  violent 
attempts  in  opposition  to  these  would  commonly  miscarry.  In  this 
sense  the  maxim  was  reasonable;  but  it  has  since  been  extended  to 
militate  against  all  interference  by  the  sovereign ;  an  extreme  as  little 
reconcileable  with  experience,  or  common  sense,  as  the  practice  it  was 
first  framed  to  discredit. 

The  reasonings  of  a  very  ingenious  and  sensible  writer,*  by  being 
misapprehended,  have  contributed  to  this  mistake.  The  scope  of  his 
argument,  is  not,  as  by  some  supposed,  that  trade  will  hold  a  certain 
invariable  course  independent  on  the  aid,  protection,  care  or  concern  of 
government;  but  that  it  will,  in  the  main,  depend  upon  the  compara- 
tive industry,  moral  and  physical  advantages  of  nations;  and  that 
tliough,  for  a  while,  from  extraordinary  causes,  tliere  may  be  a  wrong 
balance  against  one  of  them,  this  will  work  its  own  cure,  and  things  will 
ultimately  return  to  their  proper  level.  His  object  was  to  combat  that 
excessive  jealousy  on  this  head,  which  has  been  productive  of  so  many 
unnecessary  wars,  and  with  which  the  British  nation  is  particularly 
infected;  but  it  was  no  part  of  his  design  to  insinuate  that  the  regu- 
lating hand  of  government  was  either  useless  or  hurtful.  The  nature 
of  a  government,  its  spirit,  maxims  and  laws,  with  respect  to  trade,  are 
among  those  constant  moral  causes,  which  influence  its  general  results, 
and  when  it  has  by  accident  taken  a  wrong  direction,  assist  in  bringing 
it  back  to  its  natural  course.  This  is  every  where  admitted  by  all 
writers  upon  the  subject;  nor  is  there  one  who  has  asserted  a  contrary 
doctrine. 

Trade  may  be  said  to  have  taken  its  rise  in  England  under  the 
auspices  of  Elizabeth ;  and  its  rapid  progress  there  is  in  a  great  measure 
to  be  ascribed  to  the  fostering  care  of  government  in  that  and  succeed- 
ing reigns. 

From  a  different  spirit  in  the  government,  with  superior  advantages, 
France  was  much  later  in  commercial  improvements,  nor  would  her 
trade  have  been  at  this  time  in  so  prosperous  a  condition,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  abilities  and  indefatigable  endeavours  of  the  great  Colbert. 
He  laid  the  foundation  of  the  French  commerce,  and  taught  the  way  to 
his  successors  to  enlarge  and  improve  it.  The  establishment  of  the 
woolen  manufacture,  in  a  kingdom,  where  nature  seemed  to  have 
denied  the  means,  is  one  among  many  proofs,  how  much  may  be 
effected  in  favour  of  commerce  by  the  attention  and  patronage  of  a  mse 
administration. 

»  Hume's  Essay — Jealousy  of  Trade. 


ClV"  THE    CONTINENTALIST. 

The  number  of  useful  edicts  passed  by  Louis  the  14th,  and  since  his 
time,  in  spite  of  frequent  interruptions  from  the  jealous  enmity  of  Great 
Britain,  has  advanced  that  of  France  to  a  degree  which  has  excited  the 
envy  and  astonishment  of  its  neighbours. 

The  Dutch,  who  may  justly  be  allowed  a  preeminence  in  the  know- 
ledge of  trade,  have  ever  made  it  an  essential  object  of  state.  Their 
commercial  regulations  are  more  rigid  and  numerous,  than  those  of  any 
other  country ;  and  it  is  by  a  judicious  and  unremitted  vigilance  of 
government,  that  they  have  been  able  to  extend  their  irafic  to  a  degree 
so  much  beyond  their  natural  and  comparative  advantages. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  thought,  that  the  power  of  regulation  will  be  best 
placed  in  the  governments  of  the  several  states,  and  that  a  general 
superintendence  is  unnecessary.  If  the  states  had  distinct  interests, 
were  unconnected  with  each  other,  their  own  governments  would  then 
be  the  proper,  and  could  be  the  only  depositories  of  such  a  power ;  but 
as  they  are  parts  of  a  whole  with  a  common  interest  in  trade,  as  in  other 
things,  there  ought  to  be  a  common  direction  in  that  as  in  all  other 
matters.  It  is  easy  to  conceive,  that  many  cases  may  occur,  in  which  it 
would  be  beneficial  to  all  the  states  to  encourage,  or  suppress  a  particu- 
lar branch  of  trade,  while  it  would  be  detrimental  to  either  to  attempt 
it  without  the  concurrence  of  the  rest,  and  where  the  experiment  would 
probably  be  left  untried  for  fear  of  a  want  of  that  concurrence. 

No  mode  can  be  so  convenient  as  a  source  of  revenue  to  the  United 
States.  It  is  agreed  that  imposts  on  trade,  when  not  immoderate,  oi 
improperly  laid,  are  one  of  the  most  eligible  species  of  taxation.  They 
fall  in  a  great  measure  upon  articles  not  of  absolute  necessity,  and  being 
partly  transferred  to  the  price  of  the  commodity,  are  so  far  impercepti- 
bly paid  by  the  consumer.  It  is  therefore  that  mode  which  may  be 
exercised  by  the  foederal  government  with  least  exception  or  disgust. 
Congress  can  easily  possess  all  the  information  necessary  to  impose  the 
duties  with  judgment,  and  the  collection  can  without  difiiculty  be  made 
by  their  own  officers. 

They  can  have  no  temptation  to  abuse  this  power,  because  the  motive 
of  revenue  will  check  its  own  extremes.  Experience  has  shown  that 
moderate  duties  are  more  productive  than  high  ones.  When  they  are 
low,  a  nation  can  trade  abroad  on  better  terms — its  imports  and  exports 
will  be  larger — the  duties  will  be  regularly  paid,  and  arising  on  a  greater 
quantity  of  commodities,  will  yield  more  in  the  aggregate,  than  when 
they  are  so  high  as  to  operate  either  as  a  prohibition,  or  as  an  induce- 
ment to  evade  them  by  illicit  practices. 

It  is  difficult  to  assign  any  good  reason  why  Congress  should  be  more 
liable  to  abuse  the  powers  with  which  they  are  intrusted  than  the  state- 
assemblies.  The  frequency  of  the  election  of  the  members  is  a  full 
security  against  a  dangerous  ambition,  and  the  rotation  established  by 
the  confederation  makes  it  impossible  for  any  state,  by  continuing  the 
same  men,  who  may  put  themselves  at  the  head  of  a  prevailing  faction 
to  maintain  for  any  length  of  time  an  undue  influence  in  the  national 


THE    CONTINENTALIST.  clvij 

councils.  It  is  to  be  presumed,  that  Congress  will  be  in  general  better 
composed  foi  abilities,  and  as  well  for  integrity  as  any  assembly  on  the 
continent. 

But  to  take  away  any  temptation  from  a  cabal  to  load  particular 
articles,  which  are  the  principal  objects  of  commerce  to  particular 
Btates,  with  a  too  great  proportion  of  duties,  to  ease  the  others  in  tho 
general  distribution  of  expense :  let  all  the  duties,  whether  for  regula- 
tion or  revenue,  raised  in  each  state,  be  credited  to  that  state,  and  let  it 
in  like  manner,  be  charged  for  all  the  bounties  paid  within  itself  for  the 
encouragement  of  agriculture,  manufactures  or  trade.  This  expedient 
will  remove  the  temptation ;  for  as  the  quotas  of  the  respective  states 
are  to  be  determined  by  a  standard  of  land,  agreeable  to  the  eighth 
article  of  the  confederation,  each  will  have  so  much  the  less  to  contri- 
bute otherwise,  as  it  pays  more  on  its  commerce.  An  objection  has 
been  made  in  a  late  instance  to  this  principle.  It  has  been  urged,  that 
as  the  consumer  pays  the  duty,  those  states  which  are  not  equally  well 
situated  for  foreign  commerce,  and  which  consume  a  great  part  of  the 
imports  of  their  neighbours,  will  become  contributers  to  a  part  of  their 
taxes.     This  objection  is  rather  specious  than  solid. 

The  maxim,  that  the  consumer  pays  the  duty,  has  been  admitted  in 
theory  with  too  little  reserve ;  frequently  contradicted  in  practice.  It 
is  true,  the  merchant  will  be  unwilling  to  let  the  duty  be  a  deduction 
fi-om  his  profits,  if  the  state  of  the  market  will  permit  him  to  incorpo- 
rate it  with  the  price  of  his  commodity.  But  this  is  often  not  practi- 
cable. It  turns  upon  the  quantity  of  goods  at  market  in  proportion  to 
the  demand.  When  the  latter  exceeds  the  former,  and  the  competition 
is  among  the  buyers,  the  merchant  can  easily  increase  his  price,  and 
make  his  customers  pay  the  duty.  When  the  reverse  is  the  case,  and 
the  competition  is  among  the  sellers,  he  must  then  content  himself  with 
smaller  profits  and  lose  the  value  of  the  duty  or  at  least  a  part  of  it. 
When  a  nation  has  a  flourishing  and  well  settled  trade  this  more  com 
monly  happens  than  may  be  imagined,  and  it  will,  many  times,  be 
found  that  the  duty  is  divided  between  the  merchant  and  the  consumer. 

Besides  this  consideration  which  greatly  diminishes  the  force  of  the 
objection,  there  is  another  which  entirely  destroys  it.  There  is  a  strong 
reciprocal  influence  between  the  prices  of  all  commodities  in  a  state,  by 
which  they,  sooner  or  later,  attain  a  pretty  exact  balance  and  propor- 
tion to  each  other.  If  the  immediate  productions  of  the  soil  rise,  the 
manufacturer  will  have  more  for  his  manufacture,  the  merchant  for  his 
goods;  and  the  same  will  happen  with  whatever  class  the  increase  of 
price  begins.  If  duties  are  laid  upon  the  imports  in  one  state,  by  which 
the  prices  of  foreign  articles  are  raised,  the  products  of  land  and  labour 
within  that  state  will  take  a  proportionate  rise:  and  if  a  part  of  those 
articles  are  consumed  in  a  neighbouring  state,  it  will  have  the  same 
mfluence  there  as  at  home.  The  importing  state  must  allow  an 
advanced  price  upon  the  commodities,  which  it  receives  in  exchange 
iVom  its  neighbour,  in  a  ratio  to  the  increased  price  of  the  article  it 


civiil  THE    CONTINEXTALIST. 

nells.  To  know  then  which  is  the  gainer  or  loser,  we  must  examine 
how  the  general  balance  of  trade  stands  between  them.  If  the  import- 
ing state  takes  more  of  the  commodities  of  its  neighbour  than  it  gives  in 
exchange,  that  will  be  the  loser  by  the  reciprocal  augmentation  of  prices, 
it  will  be  the  gainer  if  it  takes  less,  and  neither  will  gain  or  lose  if  the 
barter  is  carried  on  upon  equal  terms.  The  balance  of  trade,  and  con- 
sequently the  gain,  or  loss,  in  this  respect,  will  be  governed  more  by  the 
relative  industry  and  frugality  of  the  parties,  than  by  their  relative 
advantages  for  foreign  commerce. 

Between  separate  nations  this  reasoning  will  not  apply  with  full  force, 
because  a  multitude  of  local  and  extraneous  circumstances  may  counter- 
act the  principle ;  but  from  the  intimate  connections  of  these  states,  the 
similitude  of  governments,  situations,  customs,  manners,  political  and 
commercial  causes  will  have  nearly  the  same  operation  in  the  inter- 
course between  the  states,  as  in  that  between  the  different  parts  of  the 
same  state.  If  this  should  be  controverted,  the  objection  drawn  from 
the  hypothesis  of  the  consumer  paying  the  duty  must  fall  at  the  same 
time :  For  as  far  as  this  is  true  it  is  as  much  confined  in  its  application 
to  a  state  within  itself  as  the  doctrine  of  a  reciprocal  proportion  of 
prices. 

General  principles  in  subjects  of  this  nature  ought  always  to  be 
advanced  with  caution:  in  an  experimental  analysis  there  are  found 
such  a  number  of  exceptions  as  tend  to  render  them  very  doubtful : 
and  in  questions  which  affect  the  existence  and  collective  happiness  of 
these  states,  all  nice  and  abstract  distinctions  should  give  way  to  plainer 
interests,  and  to  more  obvious  and  simple  rules  of  conduct. 

But  the  objection  which  has  been  urged  ought  to  have  no  weight  on 
another  account.  Which  are  the  states  that  have  not  suflBcient  advan- 
tages for  foreign  commerce,  and  that  will  not  in  time  be  their  own 
carriers?  Connecticut  and  Jersey  are  the  least  maritime  of  the  whole; 
yet  the  sound  which  washes  the  coast  of  Connecticut,  has  an  easy  outlet 
to  the  ocean,  affords  a  number  of  harbours  and  bays,  very  commodious 
for  trading  vessels.  New  London  may  be  a  receptacle  for  merchants 
men  of  almost  any  burthen :  and  the  fine  rivers  with  which  the  state  is 
intersected,  by  facilitating  the  transportation  of  commodities  to  and 
from  every  part,  are  extremely  favourable  both  to  its  domestic  and 
foreign  trade. 

Jersey,  by  way  of  Amboy  has  a  shorter  communication  with  the 
ocean,  than  the  city  of  New  York.  Prince's  bay,  which  may  serve  as? 
an  out  port  to  it,  will  admit  and  shelter  in  winter  and  summer  vessels 
of  any  size.  Egg-harbour  on  its  southern  coast  is  not  to  be  despised. 
The  Delaware  may  be  mAde  as  subservient  to  its  commerce  as  to  that  of 
Pennsylvania,  Gloucester,  Burlington,  and  Trenton,  being  all  conve- 
niently situated  on  that  river.  The  United  Provinces  with  inferior 
advantages  of  position  to  either  of  these  states,  have  for  centuries  held 
the  first  rank  among  commercial  nations. 

The  want  of  large  trading  c  ties  has  been  sometimes  objected  as  an 


THE    CONTINENTALIST.  <:.h\ 

obstacle  to  the  commerce  of  these  states ;  but  this  is  a  temporary 
deficiency  that  will  repair  itself  with  the  increase  of  population  and 
riches.  The  reason  that  the  states  in  question  have  hitherto  carried  on 
little  foreign  trade,  is  that  they  have  found  it  equally  beneficial  to  pur- 
chase the  commodities  imported  by  their  neighbours.  If  the  imposts 
on  trade  should  work  an  inconvenience  to  them,  it  will  soon  cease  by 
making  it  their  interest  to  trade  abroad. 

It  is  too  much  characteristic  of  our  national  temper  to  be  ingenious 
in  finding  out  and  magnifying  the  minutest  disadvantages,  and  to  reject 
measures  of  evident  utility,  even  of  necessity,  to  avoid  trivial  and  some- 
times imaginary  evils.  We  seem  not  to  reflect,  that  in  human  society, 
there  is  scarcely  any  plan,  however  salutary  to  the  whole  and  to  every 
part,  by  the  share  each  has  in  the  common  prosperity,  but  in  one  way, 
or  another,  and  under  particular  circumstances,  will  operate  more  to 
the  benefit  of  some  parts  than  of  others.  Unless  we  can  overcome  this 
narrow  disposition  and  learn  to  estimate  measures  by  their  general 
tendencies,  we  shall  never  be  a  great  or  a  happy  people,  if  we  remain  a 
p'Hjple  at  all. 


CIX  THE   CONTINENTALIST. 


THE  CONTINENTALIST. 


NUMBEF  VI. 


JULY  12,  1781. 


Let  us  see  what  will  be  the  consequences  of  not  authorizing  tne 
Federal  Grovemment  to  regulate  the  trade  of  these  States.  Besides  the 
want  of  revenue  and  of  power,  besides  the  immediate  risk  to  our  inde- 
pendence, the  dangers  of  all  the  future  evils  of  a  precarious  Union, 
besides  the  deficiency  of  a  wholesome  concert,  and  provident  superin- 
tendence to  advance  the  general  prosperity  of  trade,  the  direct  conse- 
quence will  be  that  the  landed  interest  and  the  laboring  poor,  will  in 
the  first  place  fall  a  sacrifice  to  the  trading  interest;  and  the  whole 
eventually  to  a  bad  system  of  policy,  made  necessary  by  the  want  of 
such  regulating  power. 

Each  State  will  be  afraid  to  impose  duties  on  its  commerce,  lest  the 
other  States,  not  doing  the  same,  should  enjoy  greater  advantages  than 
itself,  by  being  able  to  afford  native  commodities  cheaper  abroad,  and 
foreign  commodities  cheaper  at  home. 

A  part  of  the  evils  resulting  from  this  would  be,  a  loss  to  the  revenue 
of  those  moderate  duties,  which,  without  being  injurious  to  commerce, 
are  allowed  to  be  the  most  agreeable  species  of  taxes  to  the  people. 
Articles  of  foreign  luxury,  while  they  would  contribute  nothing  to  the 
income  of  the  State,  being  less  dear  by  an  exemptiom  from  duties,  would 
have  a  more  extensive  consumption. 

Many  branches  of  trade,  hurtful  to  the  common  interest,  would  be 
continued  for  want  of  proper  checks  and  discouragements.  As  revenues 
must  be  found  to  satisfy  the  public  exigencies  in  peace  and  in  war,  too 
great  a  proportion  of  taxes  will  fall  directly  upon  land,  and  upon  the 
necessaries  of  life — the  produce  of  that  land. 

The  influence  of  these  evils  will  be  to  render  landed  property  fluctu- 
ating and  less  valuable — to  oppress  the  poor  by  raising  the  prices  of 
necessaries — to  injure  commerce  by  encouraging  the  consumption  of 
foreign  luxuries,  by  increasing  the  value  of  labor — by  lessening  the 
quantity  of  home  productions,  enhancing  their  prices  at  foreign  markets, 
of  course  obstructing  their  sale,  and  enabling  other  nations  to  supplant  us. 

Particular  caution  ought  at  present  to  be  observed  in  this  country 


THE    CONTINENTALIST.  clxi 

not  to  burthen  the  soil  itself  and  its  productions  with  heavy  impositions 
because  the  quantity  of  unimproved  land  will  invite  the  husbandmen 
to  abandon  old  settlements  for  new  :  and  the  disproportion  of  our  popu- 
lation for  some  time  to  come  will  necessarily  make  labor  dear,  to  reduce 
which,  and  not  to  increase  it,  ought  to  be  a  capital  object  of  our  policy. 

Easy  duties,  therefore,  on  commerce,  especially  on  imports,  ought  to 
lighten  the  burthens  which  will  unavoidably  fall  upon  land.  Though  it 
may  be  said  that,  on  the  principle  of  a  reciprocal  influence  of  prices, 
whereon  the  taxes  are  laid  in  the  first  instance,  they  will  in  the  end  be 
borne  by  all  classes,  yet  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  no  one 
should  sink  under  the  immediate  pressure. 

The  great  art  is  to  distribute  the  public  burthens  well,  and  not  sufFei 
them,  either  first  or  last,  to  fall  too  heavily  on  parts  of  the  community ; 
else,  distress  and  disorder  must  ensue — a  shock  given  to  any  part  of  the 
political  machine  vibrates  through  the  whole. 

As  a  suflicient  revenue  could  not  be  raised  from  trade  to  answer  the 
public  purposes,  other  articles  have  been  proposed.  A  moderate  land 
and  poll  tax  being  of  easy  and  unexpensive  collection,  and  leaving 
nothing  to  discretion,  are  the  simplest  and  best  that  could  be  devised. 

It  is  to  be  feared,  the  avarice  of  many  of  the  landholders  will  be 
opposed  to  a  perpetual  tax  upon  land,  however  moderate.  They  will 
ignorantly  hope  to  shift  the  burthens  of  the  national  expense,  from 
themselves  to  others — a  disposition  as  iniquitous  as  it  is  fruitless — the 
public  necessities  must  be  satisfied  ;  this  can  only  be  done  by  the  con- 
tributions of  the  whole  society.  Particular  classes  are  neither  able  nor 
will  be  willing  to  pay  for  the  protection  and  security  of  the  others,  anxi 
where  so  selfish  a  spirit  discovers  itself  in  any  member,  the  rest  of  the 
community  will  unite  to  compel  it  to  do  its  duty. 

Indeed,  many  theorists  in  political  economy  have  held,  that  all  taxes, 
wherever  they  originate,  fall  upon  land,  and  have  therefore  been  of 
opinion,  that  it  would  be  best  to  draw  the  whole  revenue  of  the  State 
immediately  from  that  source,  to  avoid  the  expense  of  a  more  diversified 
collection,  and  the  accumulations  which  will  be  heaped  in  their  several 
stages,  upon  the  primitive  sums  advanced  in  those  stages  which  are 
imposed  on  our  trade.  But  though  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  this 
theory  has  been  carried  to  an  extreme,  impracticable  in  fact ;  yet  it  is 
evident,  in  tracing  the  matter,  that  a  large  part  of  all  taxes,  however 
remotely  laid,  will,  by  an  insensible  circulation  come  at  last  to  settle 
upon  land — the  source  of  most  of  the  materials  employed  in  commerce. 

It  appears  from  a  calculation  made  by  the  ablest  master  of  political 
arithmetic,  about  sixty  years  ago,  that  the  yearly  product  of  all  the 
lands  in  England  amounted  to  £42,000,000  sterling ;  and  the  whole 
annual  consumption  at  that  period,  of  foreign  as  well  as  domestic  com- 
modities, did  not  exceed  £49,000,000,  and  the  surplus  of  the  exportation 
above  the  importation  £2,000,000,  on  which  sums  arise  all  the  revenues 
in  whatever  shape,  which  go  into  the  treasury. 

11 


CIXU  THE    CONTINENTALIST. 

It  is  easy  to  infer  from  this,  how  large  a  part  of  them  must,  directly 
or  indirectly,  be  derived  from  land. 

Nothing  can  be  more  mistaken,  than  the  collision  ana  rivalship  wnicb 
almost  always  subsist  between  the  landing  and  trading  interests,  for  the 
truth  is  they  are  so  inseparably  interwoven  that  one  cannot  be  injured 
without  injury  nor  benefited  without  benefit  to  the  other.  Oppress 
trade,  lands  sink  in  value  ;  make  it  flourish,  their  value  rises ;  incumber 
husbandry,  trade  declines,  encourage  agriculture,  commerce  revives. 
The  progress  of  this  mutual  reaction  might  be  easily  delineated,  but  it 
is  too  obvious  to  every  man,  who  turns  his  thoughts,  however  superfi- 
cially, upon  the  subject,  to  require  it.  It  is  only  to  be  regretted,  that  it 
is  too  often  lost  sight  of,  when  the  seductions  of  some  immediate  advan- 
tage or  exemption  tempt  us  to  sacrifice  the  future  to  the  present. 

But  perhaps  the  class  is  more  numerous  of  those,  who,  not  unwilling 
to  bear  their  share  of  public  burthens,  are  yet  averse  to  the  idea  of 
perpetuity,  as  if  there  ever  would  arrive  a  period  when  the  State  would 
cease  to  want  revenues ;  and  taxes  become  unnecessary.  It  is  of  import- 
ance to  unmask  this  delusion,  and  open  the  eyes  of  the  people  to  the 
truth.  It  is  paying  too  great  a  tribute  to  the  idol  of  popularity,  to 
flatter  so  injurious  and  so  visionary  an  expectation.  The  error  is  too 
gross  to  be  tolerated  any  where  but  in  the  cottage  of  the  peasant. 
Should  we  meet  with  it  in  the  Senate  House,  we  must  lament  the  igno- 
rance or  despise  the  hypocrisy  on  which  it  is  ingrafted.  Expense  is  in 
the  present  state  of  things  entailed  upon  all  governments ;  though,  if 
we  continue  United,  we  shall  be  hereafter  less  exposed  to  wars  by  land 
than  most  other  countries ;  yet  while  we  have  powerful  neighbors  on 
either  extremity,  and  our  frontier  is  embraced  by  savages,  whose  alliance 
they  may  without  difficulty  command,  we  cannot,  in  prudence,  dispense 
with  the  usual  precautions  for  our  interior  security.  As  a  commercial 
people,  maritime  power  must  be  a  primary  object  of  our  attention,  and 
a  navy  cannot  be  created  or  maintained  without  ample  revenues.  The 
nature  of  our  popular  institutions  requires  a  numerous  magistracy,  for 
whom  competent  provision  must  be  made,  or  we  may  be  certain  our 
affairs  will  always  be  committed  to  improper  hands,  and  experience  will 
teach  us  that  no  government  costs  so  much  as  a  bad  one. 

"We  may  preach,  till  we  are  tired  of  the  theme,  the  necessity  of  dis- 
interestedness in  republics,  without  making  a  single  proselyte.  The 
virtuous  declaimer  will  neither  persuade  himself  nor  any  other  person 
to  be  content  with  a  double  mess  of  pottage,  instead  of  a  reasonable 
stipend  for  his  services.  We  might  as  soon  reconcile  ourselves  to  the 
Spartan  community  of  goods  and  wives,  to  their  iron  coin,  their  long 
beards,  or  their  black  broth.  There  is  a  total  dissimilarity  in  the  cir- 
cumstances, as  well  as  the  manners  of  society  among  us,  and  it  is  as  ri- 
diculous to  seek  for  models  in  the  small  ages  of  Greece  and  Rome,  as  it 
would  be  to  go  in  quest  of  them  among  the  Hottentots  and  Laplanders. 

The  public,  for  the  different  purposes  that  have  been  mentioned, 
must  always  have  large  demands  upon  its  constituents,  and  the  only 


*  THE    CONTINENTALIST.  clxili 

question  is,  whether  these  shall  be  satisfied  by  annual  grants,  perpetually 
renewed  by  a  perpetual  grant,  once  for  all,  or  by  a  compound  of  perma- 
nent and  occasional  supplies.  The  last  is  the  wisest  course.  The  Federal 
Government  should  neither  be  independent  nor  too  much  dependent. 
It  should  neither  be  raised  above  responsibility  or  control ;  nor  should 
it  want  the  means  of  maintaining  its  own  weight,  authority,  dignity, 
and  credit.  To  this  end,  permanent  funds  are  indispensable ;  but  they 
ought  to  be  of  such  a  nature,  and  so  moderate  in  their  amount  as  never 
to  be  inconvenient.  Extraordinary  supplies  can  be  the  objects  of  extra- 
ordinary emergencies ;  and  in  that  salutary  medium  will  consist  our 
true  wisdom. 

It  would  seem  as  if  no  mode  of  taxation  could  be  relished,  but  the 
worst  of  all  modes,  which  now  prevails  by  assessment.  Every  proposal 
for  a  specific  tax  is  sure  to  meet  with  opposition.  It  has  been  objected 
to  a  poll  tax  at  a  fixed  rate,  that  it  will  be  unequal,  and  the  rich  will 
pay  no  more  than  the  poor.  In  the  form  in  which  it  has  been  offered 
in  these  papers  the  poor,  properly  speaking,  are  not  comprehended, 
though  it  is  true,  that  beyond  the  exclusion  of  the  indigent,  the  tax  has 
no  reference  to  the  proportion  of  property,  but  it  should  be  remembered 
that  it  is  impossible  to  devise  any  specific  tax  that  will  operate  equally 
on  the  whole  community.  It  must  be  the  province  of  the  Legislature 
to  hold  the  scales  with  a  judicious  hand,  and  balance  one  by  another. 
The  rich  must  be  made  to  pay  for  their  luxuries,  which  is  the  only 
proper  way  of  taxing  their  superior  wealth. 

Do  we  imagine  that  our  assessments  operate  equally  ?  Nothing  can 
be  more  contrary  to  the  fact.  Wherever  a  discretionary  power  is  lodged 
in  any  set  of  men  over  the  property  of  their  neighbors,  they  will  abuse 
it.  Their  passions,  prejudices,  partialities,  dislikes,  will  have  the  prin- 
cipal lead  in  measuring  the  abilities  of  those  over  whom  their  power 
extends  ;  and  assessors  will  ever  be  a  set  of  petty  tyrants,  too  unskilful, 
if  honest,  to  be  possessed  of  so  delicate  a  trust ;  and  too  seldom  honest 
to  give  them  the  excuse  of  want  of  skill. 

The  genius  of  liberty  reprobates  every  thing  arbitrary  or  discretionary 
in  taxation.  It  exacts  that  every  man,  by  a  definite  and  general  rule, 
should  know  what  proportion  of  his  property  the  State  demands. 
Whatever  liberty  we  may  boast  in  theory,  it  cannot  exist  in  fact  while 
assessments  continue. 

The  admission  of  them  among  us  is  a  new  proof,  how  often  hiunan 
conduct  reconciles  the  most  glaring  opposites ;  in  the  present  case,  the 
most  vicious  practice  of  despotic  governments,  with  the  freest  constitu- 
tions and  the  greatest  love  of  liberty. 

The  establishment  of  permanent  funds  would  not  only  answer  the 
public  purposes  infinitely  better  than  temporary  supplies,  but  it  would 
be  the  most  effectual  way  of  easing  the  people. 

With  this  basis  for  procuring  credit,  the  amount  of  present  taxes 
might  be  greatly  diminished.  Large  sums  of  money  might  be  borrowed 
abroad,  at  a  low  interest,  and  introduced  into  the  country,  to  defray  the 


clxiv  THE    CONTINENTALIST. 

current  expenses  and  pay  the  public  debts;  which  would  not  onlv 
lessen  the  demand  for  immediate  supplies,  but  would  throw  more 
money  into  circulation,  and  furnish  the  people  with  greater  means  of 
paying  the  taxes. 

Though  it  be  a  just  rule  that  we  ought  not  to  run  in  debt  to  avoid 
present  expense,  so  far  as  our  faculties  extend ;  yet  the  propriety  of 
doing  it  cannot  be  disputed,  when  it  is  apparent  that  these  are  incompe- 
tent to  the  public  necessities.  Efforts  beyond  our  abilities  can  only  tend 
to  individual  distress  and  national  disappointment.  The  product  of  the 
three  foregoing  articles  will  be  as  little  as  can  be  required,  to  enable 
Congress  to  pay  their  debts,  and  restore  order  into  their  finances.  In 
addition  to  them — 

The  disposal  of  the  unlocated  lands  will  hereafter  be  a  valuable  source 
of  revenue,  and  an  immediate  one  of  credit.  As  it  may  be  liable  to  the 
same  condition  with  the  duties  on  trade, — that  is,  the  product  of  the 
sales  within  each  State  to  be  credited  to  that  State,  and  as  the  rights  of 
jurisdiction  are  not  infringed,  it  seems  to  be  susceptible  of  no  reasonable 
objection. 

Mines  in  every  country  constitute  a  branch  of  the  revenue.  In  this, 
where  nature  has  so  richly  impregnated  the  bowels  of  the  earth,  they 
may  in  time  become  a  valuable  one ;  and  as  they  require  the  care  and 
attention  of  government  to  bring  them  to  perfection,  this  care  and  a 
share  in  the  profits  of  it  will  very  properly  devolve  upon  Congress.  All 
the  precious  metals  should  absolutely  be  the  property  of  the  Federal 
Government,  and  with  respect  to  the  others  it  should  have  a  discretion- 
ary power  of  reserving,  in  the  nature  of  a  tax,  such  part  as  it  may  judge 
not  inconsistent  with  the  encouragement  due  to  so  important  an  object. 
This  is  rather  a  future  than  a  present  resource. 

The  reason  of  allowing  Congress  to  appoint  its  own  officers  of  the 
customs,  collectors  of  the  taxes,  and  military  officers  of  every  rank,  is  to 
create  in  the  interior  of  each  State,  a  mass  of  influence  in  favor  of  the 
Federal  Government.  The  great  danger  has  been  shown  to  be,  that  it 
will  not  have  power  enough  to  defend  itself,  and  preserve  the  Union, 
not  that  it  will  ever  become  formidable  to  the  general  liberty.  A  mere 
regard"  to  the  interests  of  the  confederacy  will  never  be  a  principle  suf- 
ficiently active  to  crush  the  ambition  and  intrigues  of  difi^erent  members. 
Force  cannot  effect  it.  A  contest  of  arms  will  seldom  be  between  the 
common  sovereign,  and  a  single  refractory  member,  but  between  distinct 
combinations  of  the  several  parts  against  each  other..  A  sympathy  of 
situations  will  be  apt  to  produce  associates  to  the  disobedient.  The 
application  of  force  is  always  disagreeable — the  issue  uncertain.  It  will 
be  wise  to  obviate  the  necessity  of  it,  by  interesting  such  a  number  of 
individuals  in  each  State,  in  support  of  the  Federal  Government,  as  will 
be  counterpoised  to  the  ambition  of  others,  and  will  make  it  diflScult 
for  them  to  unite  the  people  in  opposition  +o  the  first  and  necessary 
measures  of  the  Union. 

There  is  something  noble  and  magnificent  in  the  perspective  of  a 


THE    CONTINENTALIST.  ClxV 

great  Federal  Republic,  closely  linked  in  the  pursuit  of  a  common 
interest,  tranquil  and  prosperous  at  home — respectable  abroad ;  but 
there  is  something  proportionably  diminutive  and  contemptible  in  the 
prospect  of  a  number  of  petty  States,  with  the  appearance  only  of 
Union,  jarring,  jealous,  and  perverse,  without  any  determined  direction, 
fluctuating  and  unhappy  at  home,  weak  and  insignificant  by  their  dis- 
sensions in  the  eyes  of  other  nations. 

Happy  America,  if  those  to  whom  thou  hast  intrusted  the  guardian- 
ship of  thy  infancy,  know  how  to  provide  for  thy  future  repose,  but 
miserable  and  undone,  if  their  negligence  or  ignorance  permits  the  spirit 
of  discord  to  erect  her  banner  on  the  ruins  of  thy  tranquillity  I 


HAMILTON  S  KESOLUTION  FOR  A  GENERAL  CONVENTION 


RESOLUTION    FOR    A    GENERAL    CONVENTIOK    OF 
THE    STATES. 

Passed  by  the  Legislature  of  New  York,  Sunday,  July  21st,  1782. 

Resolved,  That  it  appears  to  this  Legislature  —  after  full  and  solemn  con- 
sideration of  the  several  matters  communicated  by  the  Honorable  the  Com- 
mittee of  Congress,  relative  to  the  present  posture  of  our  affairs,  foreign 
and  domestic,  and  contained  in  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  respecting  the  former,  as  well  as  of  the  representations,  from  time 
to  time  made  by  the  Superintendent  of  the  Finances  of  the  United  States, 
relative  to  his  particular  department  —  that  the  situation  of  these  States  is 
in  a  peculiar  manner  critical,  and  affords  the  strongest  reason  to  appre- 
hend, from  a  continuance  of  the  present  constitution  of  the  continental 
Government,  a  subdivision  of  the  public  credit,  and  consequences  highly 
dangerous  to  the  safety  and  independence  of  these  States. 

Resolved,  That  while  this  Legislature  are  convinced  by  the  before 
mentioned  communications,  that,  notwithstanding  the  generous  intentions 
of  an  Ally,  from  whom  we  have  experienced,  and  doubtless  shall  still 
experience  all  possible  support ;  exigencies  may  arise  to  prevent  our 
receiving  pecuniary  succors  hereafter,  in  any  degree  proportioned  to  our 
necessities.  They  are  also  convinced  from  facts  within  their  own  know- 
ledge, that  the  provisions  made  by  the  respective  States  for  carrying  on 
the  war,  are  not  only  inadequate  to  the  end,  but  must  continue  to  be  so, 
while  there  is  an  adherence  to  the  principles  which  now  direct  the  operation 
of  public  measures. 

Resolved,  That  it  is  also  the  opinion  of  this  Legislature,  that  the  present 
plan,  instituted  by  Congress,  for  the  administration  of  their  Finances,  is 
founded  in  wisdom  and  sound  policy.  That  the  salutary  effects  of  it  have 
already  been  felt  in  an  extensive  degree ;  and  that  after  so  many  violent 
shocks  sustained  by  the  public  credit,  a  failure  in  this  system,  for  want  of 
the  support  which  the  States  are  able  to  give,  would  be  productive  of  evils 
too  pernicious  to  be  hazarded. 

Resolved,  That  it  appears  to  this  Legislature,  that  the  present  British 
ministry,  with  a  disposition  not  less  hostile  than  that  of  their  predecessors, 
taught  by  experience  to  avoid  their  errors ;  and  assuming  the  appearance 
of  moderation,  are  pursuing  a  scheme  calculated  to  conciliate  in  Europe, 
and  seduce  in  America.  That  the  economical  arrangements  they  appear 
to  be  adopting,  are  adapted  to  enlarging  the  credit  of  their  Government, 
and  multiplying  its  resources,  at  the  same  time  that  they  serve  to  confirm 
the  prepossessions  and  confidence  of  the  people ;  and  that  the  plan  of  a 
defensive  war  on  this  Continent,  while  they  direct  all  their  attention  and 
resources  to  the  augmentation  of  their  Navy,  is  that  which  may  be  pro- 
ductive of  consequences  ultimately  dangerous  to  the  United  States. 

Resolved    That  it  is  the  opinion  of  this   Legislature,   that  the  present 


2  lIAMILTON'ji  RESOLUTION  FOR  A  GENERAL  CONVENIION. 

system  of  these  States,  exposes  the  common  cause  to  a  precarious  issue, 
and  leaves  us  at  the  mercy  of  events  over  vrhich  we  have  no  influence  — ■ 
a  conduct  extremely  unwise  in  any  nation,  and  at  all  times;  and  to  a 
change  of  which,  we  are  impelled  at  this  juncture,  by  reasons  of  peculiar 
and  irresistible  weight ;  and  that  it  is  the  natural  tendency  of  the  weak- 
ness and  disorders  in  our  national  measures,  to  spread  diffidence  and 
distrust  among  the  people ;  and  prepare  their  minds  to  receive  the  im- 
pressions the  enemy  wish  to  make. 

Resolved,  That  the  general  state  of  European  affairs,  as  far  as  they  have 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  this  Legislature,  affords,  in  their  opinion,  reason- 
able ground  of  confidence,  and  assures  us,  that  with  judicious,  vigorous 
exertion  on  our  part,  we  may  rely  on  the  final  attainment  of  our  object: 
but  far  from  justifying  indifference  and  security,  calls  upon  us  by  every 
motive  of  honor,  good  faith,  and  patriotism,  without  delay,  to  unite  in  some 
system  more  effectual,  for  producing  energy,  harmony,  and  consistency  of 
measures,  than  that  which  now  exists ;  and  more  capable  of  putting  the 
common  cause  out  of  the  reach  of  contingencies. 

Resolved,  That  in  the  opinion  of  this  Legislature,  the  radical  source  of 
most  of  our  embarrassments  is,  the  want  of  sufficient  power  in  Congress, 
to  effectuate  that  ready  and  perfect  co-operation  of  the  different  States,  on 
which  their  immediate  safety  and  future  happiness  depend  —  that  ex- 
perience has  demonstrated  the  confederation  to  be  defective  in  several 
essential  points,  particularly  in  not  vesting  the  Federal  Government  either 
with  a  power  of  providing  revenue  for  itself,  or  with  ascertained  and  pro- 
ductive funds,  secured  by  a  sanction  so  solemn  and  general  as  would 
inspire  the  fullest  confidence  in  them,  and  make  them  a  substantial  basi? 
of  credit — that  these  defects  ought  to  be  without  loss  of  time  repaired,  the 
powers  of  Congress  extended,  a  solid  security  established  for  the  payment 
of  debts  already  incurred ;  and  competent  means  provided  for  futvire  credit, 
and  for  supplying  the  current  demands  of  the  war. 

Resolved,  That  it  appears  evidently  to  this  Legislature,  that  the  annual 
income  of  these  States,  admitting  the  best  means  were  adopted  for  drawing 
out  their  resources,  would  fall  far  short  of  the  annual  expenditure ;  and 
that  there  would  be  a  large  deficiency  to  be  supplied  on  the  credit  of  the 
States,  which,  if  it  should  be  inconvenient  for  those  powers  to  afford,  on 
whose  friendship  we  justly  rely,  must  be  sought  for  from  individuals,  to 
engage  whom  to  lend,  satisfactory  securities  must  be  pledged  for  the 
punctual  payment  of  interest,  and  the  final  redemption  of  the  principal. 

Resolved,  That  it  appears  to  this  Legislature,  that  the  foregoing  im- 
portant ends  can  never  be  attained  by  partial  deliberations  of  the  States 
aeparately ;  but  that  it  is  essential  to  the  common  welfare,  that  there 
should  be  as  soon  as  possible  a  conference  of  the  whole  on  the  subject ;  and 
that  it  would  be  advisable  for  this  purpose  to  propose  to  Congress  to  recom- 
mend, and  to  each  State  to  adopt  the  measure  of  assembling  A  GENERAL 
CONVENTION  OF  THE  STATES,  specially  authorized  to  revise  and 
amend  the  Confederation,  reserving  a  right  to  the  respective  Legislatures 
to  ratify  their  determinations. 


HAMILTON    ON    FINANCIAL    PLAN. 


HAMILTON   TO  GOVERNOR   CLINTON. 

Philadelphia,  May  14,  1783. 

i'he  president  of  congress  will  of  course  have  transmitted  to  your  ex- 
cellency the  plan  lately  adopted  by  congress  for  funding  the  public  debt. 
This  plan  was  framed  to  accommodate  it  to  the  objections  of  some  of  the 
states ;  but  this  spirit  of  accommodation  will  only  serve  to  render  it  less 
efficient,  without  making  it  more  palatable.  The  opposition  of  the  state  of 
Rhode  Island,  for  instance,  is  chiefly  founded  upon  these  two  consider- 
ations: the  merchants  are  opposed  to  any  revenue  from  trade;  and  the 
state,  depending  almost  wholly  on  commerce,  wants  to  have  credit  for  the 
amount  of  th  \  duties. 

Persuaded  hat  the  plan  now  proposed  will  have  little  more  chance  ol 
succeiis  than  i  better  one,  and  that  if  agreed  to  by  all  the  states  it  will  in  a 
great  measure  fail  in  the  execution,  it  received  my  negative. 

My  principal  objections  were — First,  that  it  does  not  designate  the  funds 
(except  the  impost)  on  which  the  whole  interest  is  to  arise  ;  and  by  which 
(selecting;  the  capital  articles  of  visible  property)  the  collection  would  have 
been  easy,  the  funds  productive,  and  necessarily  increasing  with  the 
increafie  of  the  country.  Secondly,  that  the  duration  of  the  funds  is  not 
coextensive  with  the  debt,  but  limited  to  twenty-five  years,  though  there  is 
a  moral  certainty  that  in  that  period  the  principal  will  not,  by  the  present 
provisi)n,  be  fairly  extinguished.  Thirdly,  that  the  nomination  and 
appoin  ment  of  the  collectors  of  the  revenue  are  to  reside  in  each  state, 
instead  of,  at  least,  the  nomination  being  in  the  United  States ;  the  conse- 
quence if  which  will  be,  that  those  states  which  have  little  interest  in  the 
funds,  by  having  a  small  share  of  the  public  debt  due  to  their  own  citizens, 
will  take  care  to  appoint  such  persons  as  are  the  least  likely  to  collect  the 
revenue. 

The  evils  resulting  from  these  defects  will  be,  that  in  many  instances  the 
objects  of  the  revenue  will  be  improperly  chosen,  and  will  consist  of  a 
multitude  of  little  articles,  which  will,  on  experiment,  prove  insufficient; 
that,  for  want  of  a  vigorous  collection  in  each  state,  the  revenue  will  be 
unproductive  in  many,  and  will  fall  chiefly  on  those  states  which  are 
governed  by  most  liberal  principles  ;  that  for  want  of  an  adequate  security, 
the  evidences  of  the  public  debt  will  not  be  transferable  for  any  thing  like 
their  value.  That  this  not  admitting  an  incorporation  of  the  creditors  in 
the  nature  of  banks,  will  deprive  the  public  of  the  benefit  of  an  increased 
circulation,  and  of  course  will  disable  the  people  from  paying  the  taxes 
for  want  of  a  sufficient  medium.  I  shall  be  happy  to  be  mistaken  in  my 
apprehensions,  but  the  experiment  must  determine. 

I  hope  our  state  will  consent  to  the  plan  proposed ;  because  it  is  her 
interest,  at  all  events,  to  promote  the  payment  of  the  public  debt  in  con- 
tinental funds,  independeat  of  the  general  considerat'ons  of  vnion  and 
propriety.     I  am  much  mistaken,  if  the  debts  di  '  from  '^e  Dnitv  ^  .*^tatcg 


4  HAMII  DON  S  RESOLUTIONS  FOR  A  GENERAL  CONVENTION. 

to  the  citizens  of  the  state  of  New- York  do  not  considerably  exceed  its 
proportion  of  the  necessary  funds ;  of  course  it  has  an  immediate  interest 
that  there  should  be  a  continental  provision  for  them.  But  there  are 
superior  motives  that  ought  to  operate  in  every  state  —  the  obligations  of 
national  faith,  honour,  and  reputation. 

Individuals  have  been  too  long  already  sacrificed  to  the  public  con- 
venience. It  will  be  shocking,  and,  indeed,  an  eternal  reproach  to  this 
country,  if  we  begin  the  peaceable  enjoyment  of  our  independence  by  a 
violation  of  all  the  principles  of  honesty  and  true  policy. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  at  least  four-fifths  of  the  domestic  debt  are 
due  to  the  citizens  of  the  states  from  Pennsylvania  inclusively  northward. 

P.  S.  —  It  is  particularly  interesting  that  the  state  should  have  a  repre- 
sentation here.  Not  only  many  matters  are  depending  which  require  a  full 
representation  in  congress,  and  there  is  now  a  thin  one,  but  those  matters 
are  of  a  nature  so  particularly  interesting  to  our  state  that  we  ought  not  to 
be  without  a  voice  in  them.  I  wish  two  other  gentlemen  of  the  delegation 
may  appear  as  soon  as  possible,  for  it  would  be  very  injurious  to  me  to 
remain  much  longer.  Having  no  future  views  in  public  life,  I  owe  it  to 
myself  without  delay  to  enter  upon  the  care  of  my  private  concerns  in 
earnest. 

RESOLUTIONS  FOR  A  GENERAL  CONVENTION,  1783. 

"  Whereas,  in  the  opinion  of  this  congress,  the  confederation  of  the 
United  States  is  defective  in  the  following  essential  points. 

"  First,  and  generally,  in  confining  the  foederal  government  within  too 
narrow  limits  ;  withholding  from  it  that  efficacious  authority  and  influence 
in  all  matters  of  general  concern,  which  are  indispensable  to  the  harmony 
and  welfare  of  the  whole ;  embarrassing  general  provisions  by  unnecessary 
details  and  inconvenient  exceptions  incompatible  with  their  nature,  tend- 
ing only  to  create  jealousies  and  disputes  respecting  the  proper  bounds  of 
the  authority  of  the  United  States,  and  of  that  of  the  particular  states,  and 
a  mutual  interference  of  the  one  with  the  other. 

"  Secondly — In  confounding  legislative  and  executive  powers  in  a  single 
body ;  as  that  of  determining  on  the  number  and  quantity  of  force,  land 
and  naval,  to  be  employed  for  the  common  defence,  and  of  directing  their 
operations  when  raised  and  equipped;  with  that  of  ascertaining  and  making 
requisitions  for  the  necessary  sums  or  quantities  of  money  to  be  paid  by 
the  respective  states  into  the  common  treasury,  contrary  to  the  most 
approved  and  well-founded  maxims  of  free  government,  which  require  that 
the  LEGISLATIVE,  EXECUTIVE,  and  JUDICIAL  authorities  should  be  deposited 
in  distinct  and  separate  hands. 

"  Thirdly — In  the  want  of  a  Federal  Judicature,  having  cognizance  of 
all  matters  of  general  concern  in  the  last  resort,  especially  those  in  which 
foreign  nations  and  their  subjects  are  interested ;  from  which  defect,  by 
the  interference  of  the  local  regulations  of  particular  states  militating, 
directly  or  indirectly,  against  the  powers  vested  in  the  union,  the  na^^ioiial 


HAMILTON  S  RESOLUTIONS  FOR  A  GENERAL  CONVENTION.         0 

trcjitifes  will  be  liable  to  be  infringed,  the  national  faith  to  be  violated,  and 
the  public  tranquillity  to  be  disturbed. 

"Fourthly  —  In  vesting  the  United  States,  in  congress  assembled,  with 
the  power  of  general  taxation,  comprehended  in  that  '  of  ascertaining  the 
necessary  sums  of  money  to  be  raised  for  the  common  defence,  and  of 
appropriating  and  applying  the  same  for  defraying  the  public  expenses ;' 
and  yet  rendering  that  power,  so  essential  to  the  existence  of  the  union, 
nugatory,  by  withholding  from  them  all  control  over  either  the  imposition 
or  the  collection  of  the  taxes  for  raising  the  sums  required,  whence  it 
happens  that  the  inclinations,  not  the  abilities,  of  the  respective  states  are, 
in  fact,  the  criterion  of  their  contributions  to  the  common  expense,  and 
the  public  burden  has  fallen,  and  will  continue  to  fall,  with  very  unequal 
weight. 

"  Fifthly  —  In  fixing  a  rule  for  determining  the  proportion  of  each  state 
towards  the  common  expense,  which,  if  practicable  at  all,  must  in  the 
execution  be  attended  with  great  expense,  inequality,  uncertainty,  and 
difficulty. 

"Sixthly  —  In  authorizing  congress  'to  borrow  money,  or  emit  bills,  on 
the  credit  of  the  United  States,'  without  the  power  of  establishing  funds 
to  secure  the  repayment  of  the  money  or  the  redemption  of  the  bills 
emitted,  from  which  must  result  one  of  these  evils  —  either  a  want  of  suffi- 
cient credit  in  the  first  instance  to  borrow,  or  to  circulate  the  bills  emitted, 
whereby  in  great  national  exigencies  the  public  safety  may  be  endangered, 
or,  in  the  second  instance,  frequent  infractions  of  the  public  engagements, 
disappointments  to  lenders,  repetitions  of  the  calamities  of.  depreciating 
paper,  a  continuance  of  the  injustice  and  mischiefs  of  an  unfunded  debt, 
and,  first  or  last,  the  annihilation  of  public  credit.  Indeed,  in  authorizing 
congress  at  all  to  emit  an  unfunded  paper  as  the  sign  of  value ;  a  resource, 
which,  though  useful  in  the  infancy  of  this  country,  indispensable  in  the 
commencement  of  the  revolution,  ought  not  to  continue  a  formal  part  of 
the  constitution,  nor  ever  hereafter  to  be  employed,  being  in  its  nature 
pregnant  with  abuses,  and  liable  to  be  made  the  engine  of  imposition  and 
fraud,  holding  out  temptations  equally  pernicious  to  the  integrity  of  govern- 
ment and  to  the  morals  of  the  people. 

"Seventhly  —  In  not  making  proper  or  competent  provision  for  interior 
or  exterior  defence :  for  interior  defence,  by  leaving  it  to  the  individual 
states  to  appoint  all  regimental  officers  of  the  land  forces,  to  raise  the  men 
in  their  own  way,  to  clothe,  arm,  and  equip  them,  at  the  expense  of  the 
United  States ;  from  which  circumstances  have  resulted,  and  will  hereafter 
result,  great  confusion  in  the  military  department,  continual  disputes  of 
rank,  languid  and  disproportionate  levies  of  men,  an  enormous  increase  of 
expense  for  want  of  system  and  uniformity  in  the  manner  of  conducting 
them,  and  from  the  competitions  of  state  bounties ;  —  by  an  ambiguity  in 
the  fourth  clause  of  the  sixth  article,  susceptible  of  a  construction  which 
would  devolve  upon  the  particular  states  in  time  of  peace  the  care  of  their 
own  defence  both  by  sea  and  land,  and  would  preclude  the  United  States 
fri)m  '•aising   a  single  regiment  or  building  a  single  ship  before  a  declara- 


b  HAMILTON  S  RESOLUTIONS  FOR  A  GENERAL  CONVENTION. 

tion  of  war,  or  an  actual  commencement  of  hostilities  ;  a  principle  danj^orous 
to  the  confederacy  in  different  respects,  by  leaving  the  United  States  at  all 
times  unprepared  for  the  defence  of  their  common  rights,  obliging  them  to 
begin  to  raise  an  army  and  to  build  and  equip  a  navy  at  the  moment  they 
would  have  occasion  to  employ  them,  and  by  putting  into  the  hands  of  a 
few  states,  who  from  their  local  situations  arc  more  immediately  exposed, 
all  the  standing  forces  of  the  country,  thereby  not  only  leaving  the  care  of 
the  safety  of  the  whole  to  a  part,  which  will  naturally  be  both  unwilling 
and  unable  to  make  effectual  provision  at  its  particular  expense,  but  also 
furnishing  grounds  of  jealousy  and  distrust  between  the  states,  unjust  in 
its  operation  to  those  states  in  whose  hands  they  are,  by  throwing  the 
exclusive  burden  of  maintaining  those  forces  upon  them,  while  their  neigh- 
bours immediately,  and  all  the  states  ultimately,  would  share  the  benefits 
of  their  services ;  for  exterior  defence,  in  authorizing  congress  '  to  build 
and  equip  a  navy,'  without  providing  any  means  of  manning  it,  either  by 
requisitions  of  the  states,  by  the  power  of  registering  and  drafting  the  sea- 
men in  rotation,  or  by  embargoes  in  cases  of  emergency,  to  induce  them  to 
accept  employment  on  board  the  ships  of  war ;  the  omission  of  all  which 
leaves  no  other  resource  than  voluntary  enlistment;  a  resource  which  haa 
been  found  ineffectual  in  every  country,  and  for  reasons  of  peculiar  force, 
in  this. 

"Eighthly  —  In  not  vesting  in  the  United  States  a  general  superin- 
tendence OF  TRADE,  equally  necessary  in  the  view  of  revenue  and  i^egu- 
lation:  of  revenue,  because  duties  on  commerce,  when  moderate,  are 
among  the  most  agreeable  and  productive  species  of  it  which  cannot  with- 
out great  disadvantages  be  imposed  by  particular  states,  while  others 
refrain  from  doing  it,  but  must  be  imposed  in  concert,  and  by  laws  ope- 
rating upon  the  same  principles,  at  the  same  moment,  in  all  the  states ; 
otherwise  those  states  which  should  not  impose  them  would  engross  the 
commerce  of  such  of  their  neighbours  as  did:  of  regulatio?i,  because  by 
general  prohibitions  of  particular  articles,  by  a  judicious  arrangement  of 
duties,  sometimes  by  bounties  on  the  manufacture  or  exportation  of  certain 
commodities,  injurious  branches  of  commerce  might  be  discouraged,  favour- 
able branches  encouraged,  useful  products  and  manufactures  promoted ; 
none  of  which  advantages  can  be  effectually  attained  by  separate  regu- 
lations without  a  general  superintending  power ;  because,  also,  it  is  essen- 
tial to  the  due  observance  of  the  commercial  stipulations  of  the  United 
States  with  foreign  powers,  an  interference  with  which  will  be  unavoid- 
able if  the  different  states  have  the  exclusive  regulation  of  their  own  trade, 
and  of  course  the  construction  of  the  treaties  entered  into. 

"Ninthly  —  In  defeating  essential  powers  by  provisoes  and  limitations 
inconsistent  with  their  nature,  as  the  power  of  making  treaties  with  foreign 
nations,  *  provided  that  no  treaty  of  commerce  shall  be  made  whereby  the 
legislative  power  of  the  respective  states  shall  be  restrained  from  imposing 
euch  imposts  and  duties  on  foreigners  as  their  own  people  are  subjected  to, 
or  from  prohibiting  the  importation  or  exportation  of  any  species  of  goods 
or  commodities  whatever  ;'  a  proviso  susceptible  of  an  interpretation  whi^.b 


HAMILTON  S  RESOLUllONS  FOR  A  GENERAL  CONVENTION.  7 

includes  a  constitutional  possibility  of  defeating  the  treaties  of  commerce 
entered  into  by  the  United  States.  As  also  the  power  'of  regulating  the 
trade,  and  managing  all  affairs  with  the  Indians,  not  members  of  any 
states ;  provided,  that  the  legislative  right  of  any  state  within  its  own  limit8 
be  not  infringed  or  violated,'  and  others  of  a  similar  nature. 

"  Tenthly — In  granting  the  United  States  the  sole  power  'of  regulating 
the  alloy  and  value  of  coin  struck  b}'  their  own  authority,  or  Vjy  that  of  the 
respective  states,'  without  the  power  of  regulating  foreign  coin  in  circu- 
lation, though  one  is  essential  to  the  due  exercise  of  the  other,  as  there 
ought  to  be  such  proportions  maintained  between  the  national  and  foreign 
coin,  as  will  give  the  former  a  preference  in  all  internal  negotiations ;  and 
without  the  latter  power,  the  operations  of  government,  in  a  matter  of 
primary  importance  to  the  commerce  and  finances  of  the  United  States, 
will  be  exposed  to  numberless  obstructions. 

"Eleventhly  —  In  requiring  the  assent  of  nine  states  to  matters  of 
principal  importance,  and  of  seven  to  all  others,  except  adjournments  from 
day  to  day,  a  rule  destructive  of  vigour,  consistency,  or  expedition,  in  the 
administration  of  affairs,  tending  to  subject  the  sense  of  the  majority  to 
that  of  the  minority,  by  putting  it  in  the  power  of  a  small  combination  to 
retard  and  even  to  frustrate  the  most  necessary  measures,  and  to  oblige 
the  greater  number,  in  cases  which  require  speedy  determinations,  as 
happens  in  the  most  interesting  concerns  of  the  community,  to  come  into 
the  views  of  the  smaller ;  the  evils  of  which  have  been  felt  in  critical  con- 
junctures, and  must  always  make  the  spirit  of  government  a  spirit  of  com- 
promise and  expedience,  rather  than  of  system  and  energy. 

"Twelfthly — In  vesting  in  the  fcederal  government  the  sole  direction  of 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  in  their  intercourse  with  foreign  nations, 
without  empowering  it  to  pass  all  general  laws  in  aid  and  support  of  the 
laws  of  nations  ;  for  the  want  of  which  authority,  the  faith  of  the  United 
States  may  be  broken,  their  reputation  sullied,  and  their  peace  interrupted, 
by  the  negligence  or  misconception  of  any  particular  state. 

"And  whereas  experience  hath  clearly  manifested  that  the  powers 
reserved  to  the  union  in  the  confederation,  are  unequal  to  the  purpose  of 
effectually  drawing  forth  the  resources  of  the  respective  members,  for  the 
common  welfare  and  defence;  whereby  the  United  States  have,  upon  several 
occasions,  been  exposed  to  the  most  critical  and  alarming  situations  ;  have 
wanted  an  army  adequate  to  their  defence,  and  proportioned  to  the  abilities 
of  the  country ;  have  on  account  of  that  deficiency  seen  essential  posts 
reduced — others  imminently  endangered — whole  states,  and  large  parts  of 
others,  overrun  and  ravaged  by  small  bodies  of  the  enemy's  forces ;  have 
been  destitute  of  sufficient  means  of  feeding,  clothing,  paying,  and  appoint- 
ing that  array,  by  which  the  troops,  rendered  less  eflBcient  for  military 
operations,  have  been  exposed  to  sufferings,  which  nothing  but  unparalleled 
patience,  perseverance,  and  patriotism  could  have  endured.  Whereas 
also,  the  United  States  have  been  too  often  compelled  to  make  the  adminis- 
tration of  their  affairs  a  succession  of  temporary  expedients,  inconsistent 
ivith  order,   economy,   energy,  or  a  scrupulous   adherence  to  the  public 


8  ANNAPOLIS    CONVENTION. 

•ragageuifnts,  and  now  find  themselves,  at  the  close  of  a  glorious  struggle 
for  indeppndence,  without  any  certain  means  of  doing  justice  to  those  who 
have  been  its  principal  supporters  —  to  an  army  which  has  bravely  fought, 
and  patiently  suffered — to  citizens  who  have  cheerfully  lent  their  money — 
and  to  others  who  have  in  different  ways  contributed  their  property  and 
their  personal  service  to  the  common  cause ;  obliged  to  rely  for  the  only 
effectual  mode  of  doing  that  justice  by  funding  the  debt  on  solid  securities, 
on  the  precarious  concurrence  of  thirteen  distinct  deliberatives,  the  dissent 
of  either  of  which  may  defeat  the  plan,  and  leave  these  states,  at  this  early 
period  of  their  existence,  involved  in  all  the  disgrace  and  mischiefs  of 
violated  faith  and  national  bankruptcy.  And  whereas,  notwithstanding 
we  have,  by  the  blessing  of  Providence,  so  far  happily  escaped  the  com- 
plicated dangers  of  such  a  situation,  and  now  see  the  object  of  our  wishes 
secured  by  an  honourable  peace,  it  would  be  unwise  to  hazard  a  repetition 
of  the  same  dangers  and  embarrassments,  in  any  future  war  in  which  these 
states  may  be  engaged,  or  to  continue  this  extensive  empire  under  a 
government  unequal  to  its  protection  and  prosperity.  And  whereas,  it  is 
essential  to  the  happiness  and  security  of  these  states,  that  their  union 
should  be  established  on  the  most  solid  foundations,  and  it  is  manifest  that 
this  desirable  object  cannot  be  effected  but  by  a  government,  capable,  both 
in  peace  and  war,  of  making  every  member  of  the  union  contribute  in  just 
proportion  to  the  common  necessities,  and  of  combining  and  directing  the 
forces  and  wills  of  the  several  parts  to  a  general  end ;  to  which  purposes, 
in  the  opinion  of  congress,  the  present  confederation  is  altogether  inade- 
quate. And  whereas,  on  the  spirit  which  may  direct  the  councils  and 
measures  of  these  states,  at  the  present  juncture,  may  depend  their  future 
safety  and  welfare — Congress  conceive  it  to  be  their  duty,  freely  to  state  to 
their  constituents  the  defects  which,  by  experience,  have  been  discovered 
in  the  present  plan  of  the  foederal  union,  and  solemnly  to  call  their 
attention  to  a  revisal  and  amendment  of  the  same.  Therefore  resolved, 
That  it  be  earnestly  recommended  to  the  several  states  to  appoint  a  Con- 
vention, to  meet  at on  the day  of ,  with  full  powers  to  revise 

the  confederation,  and  to  adopt  and  propose  such  alterations  as  to  them 
shall  appear  necessary,  to  be  finally  approved  or  rejected  by  the  states 

respectively  —  and  that  a  committee  of be  appointed  to  prepare  an 

address  upon  the  subject." 

ANNAPOLIS  CONVENTION. 

Annapolis,  September  14th,  1786. 

"  To  the  honourable  the  legislatures  of  Virginia,  Delaware,  Pennsylvania, 
New-Jersey,  and  New- York. 
"The  commissioners  from  the  said  states  respectively  assembled  at 
Annapolis,  humbly  beg  leave  to  report.  That  pursuant  to  their  several 
appointments,  they  met  at  Annapolis,  in  the  state  of  Maryland,  on  the 
eleventh  day  of  September,  instant,  and  having  proceeded  to  a  communi- 
cation of  their  powers,  they  found  that  the  states  of  New-York,  Pennsyi- 


ANNAPOLIS    CONVENTION.  b 

vania,  and  Virginia,  had  in  substance,  and  nearly  in  the  same  ternia, 
authorized  their  respective  commissioners  to  meet  such  commissioners  as 
were  or  might  be  appointed  by  the  other  states  in  the  union,  at  such  time 
and  place  as  should  be  agreed  upon  by  the  said  commissioners,  to  take 
into  consideration  the  trade  and  commerce  of  the  United  States,  to  consider 
how  far  an  uniform  system  in  their  commercial  intercourse  and  regulations 
might  be  necessary  to  their  common  interest  and  permanent  harmony,  and 
to  report  to  the  several  states  such  an  act  relative  to  this  great  object,  as, 
when  unanimously  ratified  by  them,  would  enable  the  United  States  in 
congress  assembled  effectually  to  provide  for  the  same. 

"  That  the  state  of  Delaware  had  given  similar  powers  to  their  commis- 
sioners ;  with  this  difference  only,  that  the  act  to  be  framed  in  virtue  of 
these  powers,  is  required  to  be  reported  '  to  the  United  States  in  congress 
assembled,  to  be  agreed  to  by  them,  and  confirmed  by  the  legislature  of 
every  state.' 

"  That  the  state  of  New-Jersey  had  enlarged  the  object  of  their  appoint- 
ment, empowering  their  commissioners  '  to  consider  how  far  an  uniform 
system  in  their  commercial  regulations,  and  other  important  matters,  might 
be  necessary  to  the  common  interest  and  permanent  harmony  of  the  several 
states ;  and  to  report  such  an  act  on  the  subject,  as,  when  ratified  by  them, 
would  enable  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled  effectually  to  pro- 
vide for  the  exigencies  of  the  union.' 

"  That  appointments  of  commissioners  have  also  been  made  by  the  states 
of  New-Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  and  North  Carolina, 
none  of  whom,  however,  have  attended.  But  that  no  information  has  been 
received  by  your  commissioners  of  any  appointment  having  been  made  by 
the  states  of  Connecticut,  Maryland,  South  Carolina,  or  Georgia.  That 
the  express  terms  of  the  powers  to  your  commissioners  supposing  a  depu- 
tation from  all  the  states,  and  having  for  their  object  the  trade  and  com- 
merce of  the  United  States,  your  commissioners  did  not  conceive  it  advisable 
to  proceed  to  the  business  of  their  mission  under  the  circumstance  of  so 
partial  and  defective  a  representation. 

"Deeply  impressed,  however,  with  the  magnitude  and  importance  of  the 
object  confided  to  them  on  this  occasion,  your  conmiissioners  cannot  forbear 
to  indulge  an  expression  of  their  earnest  and  unanimous  wish  that  speedy 
measures  may  be  taken  to  effect  a  general  meeting  of  the  states  in  a  future 
convention  for  the  same,  and  such  other  purposes,  as  the  situation  of  public 
affairs  may  be  found  to  require. 

"  If  in  expressing  this  wish,  or  intimating  any  other  sentiment,  your 
commissioners  should  seem  to  exceed  the  strict  bounds  of  their  appoint- 
ment, they  entertain  a  full  confidence  that  a  conduct  dictated  by  an  anxiety 
for  the  welfare  of  the  United  States  will  not  fail  to  receive  a  favourable 
construction.  In  this  persuasion,  your  commissioners  submit  an  opinion 
that  the  idea  of  extending  the  powers  of  their  deputies  to  other  objects 
than  those  of  commerce,  which  had  been  adopted  by  the  state  cf  New- 
Jersey,  was  an  improvement  on  the  original  plan,  and  will  deserve  to  be 
incorporated  into  that  of  a  future  convention.    They  are  the  more  naturally 


10  ANNAPOLIS    CONVENTION. 

led  to  this  conclusion,  as,  in  the  course  of  their  reflections  on  Zt  »  subject, 
they  havt!  been  induced  to  think  that  the  power  of  regulatiuj;  \  fide  is  of 
such  comprehensive  extent,  and  will  enter  so  far  into  the  generr.l  sj  stem 
of  the  federal  government,  that  to  give  it  efficacy,  and  to  ob^^iate  questions 
and  doubts  concerning  its  precise  nature  and  limits,  may  r  jquii  e  a  corre- 
spondent adjustment  of  other  parts  of  the  federal  system.  That  there  are 
important  defects  in  the  system  of  the  federal  government,  is  acknow- 
ledged by  the  acts  of  all  those  states  which  have  concurred  in  the  present 
meeting;  that  the  defects,  upon  a  closer  examination,  may  be  found  greater 
and  more  numerous  than  even  these  acts  imply,  is  at  least  so  ."ar  probable, 
from  the  embarrassments  which  characterrze  the  present  state  of  our 
national  affairs  foreign  and  domestic,  as  may  reasonably  be  supposed  to 
merit  a  deliberate  and  candid  discussion  in  some  mode  which  will  unite 
the  sentiments  and  councils  of  all  the  states. 

"  In  the  choice  of  the  mode,  your  commissioners  are  of  the  opinion  that 
a  CONVENTION  of  deputies  from  the  different  states  for  the  special  and  sole 
purpose  of  entering  into  this  investigation,  and  digesting  a  plan  of  supply- 
ing such  defects  as  may  be  discovered  to  exist,  will  be  entitled  to  a  prefer- 
ence, from  considerations  which  will  occur  without  being  particularized. 
Your  commissioners  decline  an  enumeration  of  those  national  circum- 
stances on  which  their  opinion  respecting  the  propriety  of  a  future  con- 
vention with  those  enlarged  powers  is  founded,  as  it  would  be  an  intrusion 
of  facts  and  observations,  most  of  which  have  been  frequently  the  subject 
of  public  discussion,  and  none  of  which  can  have  escaped  the  penetration 
of  those  to  whom  they  would  in  this  instance  be  addressed. 

"  They  are,  however,  of  a  nature  so  serious,  as,  in  the  view  of  your  com- 
missioners, to  render  the  situation  of  the  United  States  delicate  and  critical, 
calling  for  an  exertion  of  the  united  virtue  and  wisdom  of  all  the  members 
of  the  confederacy.  Under  this  impression,  your  commissioners  with  the 
most  respectful  deference  beg  leave  to  suggest  their  unanimous  conviction, 
that  it  may  effectually  tend  to  advance  the  interests  of  the  union,  if  the 
states  by  which  they  have  been  respectively  delegated  would  concur  them- 
selves, and  use  their  endeavoujs  to  procure  the  concurrence  of  the  other 
states,  in  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  meet  at  Philadelphia  on  the 
second  Monday  in  May  next,  to  take  into  consideration  the  situation  of  the 
United  States,  to  devise  such  further  provisions  as  shall  appear  to  them 
necessary  to  render  the  constitution  of  the  federal  government  adequate  to 
the  exigencies  of  the  union,  and  to  report  such  an  act  for  that  purpose  to 
the  United  States  in  congress  assembled,  as,  when  agreed  to  by  them,  and 
afterwards  confirmed  by  the  legislature  of  every  state,  will  effectually  pro- 
vide for  the  same. 

"  Though  your  commissioners  could  not  with  propriety  address  these 
observations  and  sentiments  to  any  but  the  states  they  have  the  honovir  to 
represent,  they  have  nevertheless  concluded,  from  motives  of  respect,  to 
transmit  copies  of  this  report  to  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled, 
and  to  the  executives  of  the  other  States." 


SPEECH    ON    THE    IMPOST    GRANT.  11 


SPEECH  ON  THE  IMPOST  GRANT. 

The  first  objection  (and  that  which  is  supposed  to  have  the  greatest  force) 
against  the  principles  of  the  bill,  is,  that  it  would  be  unconstitutional  to 
delegate  legislative  power  to  Congress.  If  this  objection  be  founded  in 
truth,  there  is  at  once  an  end  of  the  enquiry.  God  forbid  that  we  should 
violate  that  Constitution  which  is  the  charter  of  our  rights !  But  it  is  our 
duty  to  examine  dispassionately  whether  it  really  stands  in  our  way.  If  it 
does  not,  let  us  not  erect  an  ideal  barrier  to  a  measure  which  the  public 
good  may  require. 

The  first  ground  of  the  objection  is  deduced  from  that  clause  of  the  Con- 
stitution which  declares  "  that  no  power  shall  be  exercised  over  the  people 
of  this  state  Vjut  such  as  is  granted  by  or  derived  from  them." 

This,  it  is  plain,  amounts  to  nothing  more  than  a  declaration  of  that  fun- 
damental maxim  of  republican  governments,  "that  all  power,  mediately  oi 
immediately,  is  derived  from  the  consent  of  the  people,"  in  opposition  to 
those  doctrines  of  despotism  which  uphold  the  divine  right  of  kings,  or  lay 
the  foundations  of  government  in  force,  conquest,  or  necessity.  It  does  not 
at  all  affect  the  question  how  far  the  legislature  may  go  in  granting  power  to 
the  United  States.  A  power  conferred  by  the  representatives  of  the  people, 
if  warranted  by  the  Constitution  under  which  they  act,  is  a  power  derived 
from  the  people.  This  is  not  only  a  plain  inference  of  reason,  but  the 
terms  of  the  clause  itself  seem  to  have  been  calculated  to  let  in  the  prin- 
ciple. The  words,  "  derived  from,"  are  added  to  the  words,  "  granted  by," 
as  if  with  design  to  distinguish  an  indirect  derivation  of  power  from  an 
immediate  grant  of  it.  This  explanation  is  even  necessary  to  reconcile  the 
Constitution  to  itself,  and  to  give  effect  to  all  its  parts,  as  I  hope  fully  to 
demonstrate  in  its  proper  place. 

The  next  clause  of  the  Constitution  relied  upon,  is  that  which  declares 
that  •'  the  supreme  legislative  power  within  this  state  shall  be  vested  in  a 
Senate  and  Assembly."  This,  it  is  said,  excludes  the  idea  of  any  other 
legislative  power  operating  within  the  state.  But  the  more  obvious  con- 
struction of  this  clause,  and  that  which  best  consists  with  the  situation  and 
views  of  the  country  at  this  time,  with  what  has  been  done  before  and 
since  the  formation  of  our  Constitution,  and  with  those  parts  of  the  Consti- 
tution itself  which  acknowledge  the  Federal  Government,  is  this — "  In  the 
distribution  of  the  different  parts  of  the  sovereignty  in  the  particular 
government  of  this  state,  the  legislative  authority  shall  reside  in  a  Senate 
and  Assembly,"  or,  in  other  words,  "  the  legislative  authority  of  the  par- 
ticular (government  of  the  State  of  New  York  shall  be  vested  in  a  Senate 
and  Assembly." 

The  framers  of  the  Constitution  could  have  had  nothing  more  in  view 

than  to  delineate  the  different  departments  of  power  in  our  own  State 

government,  and  never  could  have  intended  to  interfere  with  the  formation 

of  such  a  Constitution  for  the  Union  as  the  safety  of  the  whole  might 

require. 

12 


12  SPEECH    ON   THE    IMPOST   GRANT. 

The  jui?tn«'ss  of  this  construction  Mnll  be  further  elucidated  by  that  part 
of  the  Constitution  -which  prescribes  that  "the  supreme  executive  authority 
of  the  state  shall  be  vested  in  a  governor."  If  the  former  clause  excludes 
the  grant  of  legislative  povrer,  this  must  equally  exclude  the  grant  of 
executive  power.  And  the  consequence  would  be  that  there  would  be  no 
Federal  Government  at  all. 

It  will  be  of  no  avail  to  say  that  there  is  a  difference  in  the  two  case*;  in 
the  mode  of  expression ;  that,  in  one,  the  terms  of  description  are  "  within 
the  state,"  in  the  other,  "of  the  state."  In  grammar,  or  good  sense,  the 
difference  in  the  phrases  constitutes  no  substantial  difference  in  the  mean- 
ing, or,  if  it  does,  it  concludes  against  the  objection  ;  for  the  words,  within 
this  state,  which  are  applied  to  the  legislative  power,  have  a  certain  pre 
cision  that  may  be  supposed  to  intend  a  distinction  between  that  legislative 
power  which  is  to  operate  within  the  state  only,  and  that  which  is  to  operate 
upon  this  state  in  conjunction  with  the  others.  But  I  lay  no  stress  on  this 
observation.  In  my  opinion  the  legislative  power  "  within  this  state"  or 
the  legislative  power  "of  this  state,"  amount  in  substance  to  the  same 
thing.  And  therefore  (as  has  been  already  observed)  if  the  Constitution 
prohibits  the  delegation  of  legislative  power  to  the  Union,  it  equally  pro- 
hibits the  delegation  of  Executive  power — and  the  Confederacy  must  then 
be  at  an  end ;  for  without  legislative  or  executive  power,  it  becomes  a 
nullity. 

Unfortunately  for  the  objection,  if  it  proves  anything  it  proves  too  much 
— It  proves  that  the  powers  of  the  Union  in  their  present  form  are  an 
usurpation  on  the  Constitution  of  this  State.  This  will  appear  not  only 
from  the  reasoning  adduced,  but  from  this  further  consideration, — that  the 
United  States  are  already  possessed  of  legislative  as  well  as  Executive 
authority.  The  objects  of  Executive  power  are  of  three  kinds,  to  make 
treaties  with  foreign  nations,  to  make  war  and  peace,  to  execute  and  inter- 
pret the  laws.  This  description  of  the  executive  power  will  enable  us  the 
more  readily  to  distinguish  the  legislative  ;  which  in  general  may  be  defined 
the  power  of  prescribing  rules  for  the  community. 

The  United  States  are  authorized  to  require  from  the  several  states  as 
much  money  as  they  judge  necessary  for  the  general  purposes  of  the  union, 
and  to  limit  the  time  within  which  it  is  to  be  raised :  to  call  for  such  a 
number  of  troops  as  they  deem  requisite  for  the  common  defence  in  time 
of  war — to  establish  rules  in  all  cases  of  capture  by  sea  or  land — to  regu- 
late the  alloy  and  value  of  coin,  the  standard  of  weights  and  measures, 
and  to  make  all  laws  for  the  government  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the 
union.  All  these  are  powers  of  the  legislative  kind,  and  are  declared  by 
the  confederation  to  be  binding  upon  all  the  states. 

The  first  is  nothing  less  than  a  power  of  taxing  the  states  in  gross 
though  not  in  detail ;  and  the  last  is  the  power  of  disposing  of  the  liberty 
and  lives  of  the  citizens  of  this  state,  when  in  arms  for  the  common  defence. 
That  the  powers  enumerated  are  all,  or  most  of  them  of  a  legislative 
nature,  will  not  be  denied  by  the  law  members  on  the  other  side  of  the 
question.     If  the  Constitution  forbids  the  grant  of  legislative  power  to  the 


SPEECH  ON  THE  IMPOST  GRANT.  13 

Union,  all  those  authorities  are  illegal  and  unconstitutional,  and  ought  to 
be  resumed. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  those  authorities  were  properly  granted,  then  it  fol- 
lows that  the  Constitution  does  not  forbid  the  grant  of  legislative  power, 
and  the  objection  falls  to  the  ground;  for  there  is  nothing  in  the  Constitu- 
tion permitting  the  grant  of  one  kind  of  legislative  authority,  and  forbid- 
ding that  of  another.  The  degree  or  nature  of  the  powers  of  legislation 
which  it  might  be  proper  to  confer  upon  the  federal  government  would  in 
this  case  be  a  mere  question  of  prudence  and  expediency  to  be  determined 
by  general  considerations  of  utility  and  safety. 

The  principle  of  the  objection  under  consideration  would  not  only  sub- 
vert the  foundation  of  the  Union  as  now  established  —  would  not  only 
render  it  impossible  that  any  federal  government  could  exist ;  but  would 
defeat  some  of  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  itself.  This  last  idea 
deserves  particular  attention. 

The  nineteenth  clause  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  Governor  "  to  correspond 
with  the  continental  Congress."  The  twentieth  provides  "that  the  judges 
and  chancellor  shall  hold  no  other  ofiBce  than  delegate  to  the  general  Con- 
gress ;"  and  the  thirtieth  directs  "  that  delegates  to  represent  this  state  in  the 
general  Congress  of  the  United  States  of  America  shall  be  annually 
appointed." 

Now,  Sir,  I  ask,  if  Congress  were  to  have  neither  executive  nor  legisla- 
tive authority,  to  what  purpose  were  they  to  exist?  To  what  purpose  were 
delegates  to  be  annually  appointed  to  that  body  ?  To  what  purpose  were 
these  delegates  to  represent  this  state  ?  Or  how  could  they  be  said  to 
represent  it  at  all  ? 

Is  not  the  plain  import  of  this  part  of  the  Constitution,  that  they  were 
to  represent  this  state  in  the  general  assembly  of  the  United  States,  for  the 
purpose  of  managing  the  common  concerns  of  the  union  ?  And  does  not 
this  necessarily  imply  that  they  were  to  be  clothed  with  such  powers  as 
should  be  found  essential  to  that  object?  Does  it  amount  to  a  constitutional 
warrant  to  the  legislature  to  confer  those  powers  of  whatever  kind  they 
might  be  ? 

To  answer  these  questions  in  the  negative  would  be  to  charge  the  Consti- 
tution with  the  absurdity  of  proposing  to  itself  an  end,  and  yet  prohibitino 
the  means  of  accomplishing  that  end. 

The  words  "to  represent  this  state"  are  of  great  latitude,  and  are  of 
themselves  sufficient  to  convey  any  power  necessary  to  the  conduct  and 
direction  of  its  afiFairs  in  connection  with  the  other  parts  of  the  confederacy. 

In  the  interpretation  of  laws  it  is  admitted  to  be  a  good  rule  to  resort  to 
the  co-existing  circumstances  and  collect  from  thence  the  intention  of  the 
framers  of  the  law.     Let  us  apply  this  rule  to  the  present  case. 

In  the  commencement  of  the  revolution  delegates  were  sent  to  meet  in 
Congress  with  large  discretionary  powers — In  short,  generally  speaking, 
Tith  full  power  "to  take  care  of  the  republic."  In  the  whole  of  this 
transaction  the  idea  of  an  Union  of  the  colonies  was  carefully  held  up. — 
U  pervaded  aU  our  public  acts. 


1-ii  SPEECH    ON   THE    IMPOST    GRANT. 

In  the  declaration  of  independence  we  find  it  continued  and  confirmed. 
That  declaration,  after  setting  forth  its  motives  and  causes,  proceeds  thus — 
"  We,  therefore,  the  representatives  of  the  United  States  of  America  in 
general  Congress  assembled,  appealing  to  the  Supreme  Judge  of  the  vForld 
for  the  rectitude  of  our  intentions,  do  in  the  name  and  by  the  authority  of 
the  good  people  of  these  colonies,  solemnly  publish  and  declare,  that  these 
United  Colonies  are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent  states; 
that  they  are  absolved  from  all  allegiance  to  the  British  Crown,  and  that 
all  political  connection  between  them  and  the  State  of  Great  Britain  is  and 
ought  to  be  totally  dissolved ;  and  that  as  free  and  independent  states  they 
have  full  power  to  levy  war,  conclude  peace,  contract  alliances,  establish 
commerce,  and  do  all  other  acts  and  things  that  independent  states  may  of 
right  do." 

Hence  we  see  that  the  Union  and  Independence  of  these  States  are 
blended  and  incorporsited  in  one  and  the  same  act;  which  taken  together, 
clearly  imports  that  the  United  States  had  in  their  origin  full  power  to  do 
all  acts  and  things  which  Independent  States  may  of  right  do ;  or,  in  other 
words,  full  power  of  sovereignty. 

Accordingly,  we  find  that  upon  the  authority  of  that  act  only  approved 
by  the  several  states,  they  did  levy  war,  contract  alliances,  and  exercise 
other  high  powers  of  sovereignty  even  to  the  appointment  of  a  dictator, 
prior  to  the  present  confederation. 

In  this  situation,  and  with  this  plenitude  of  power,  our  Constitution 
knows  and  acknowledges  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  and  pro- 
vides for  the  annual  appointment  of  delegates  to  represent  this  state  in  that 
body ;  which  in  substance  amounts  to  a  constitutional  recognition  of  the 
Union  with  complete  sovereignty. 

A  government  may  exist  without  any  formal  organization  or  precise  defi- 
nition of  its  powers.  However  improper  it  might  have  been,  that  the 
federal  government  should  have  continued  to  exist  with  such  absolute  and 
undefined  authority,  this  does  not  militate  against  the  position  that  it  did 
possess  such  authority.  It  only  proves  the  propriety  of  a  more  regular 
formation  to  ascertain  its  limits.  This  was  the  object  of  the  present 
confederation,  which  is,  in  fact,  an  abridgement  of  the  original  sovereignty 
of  the  Union. 

It  may  be  said,  (for  it  has  been  said  upon  other  occasions,)  that  though 
the  Constitution  did  consider  the  United  States  in  the  light  I  have  described, 
and  left  the  legislature  at  liberty  in  the  first  instance  to  have  organized  the 
FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  in  such  a  manner  as  they  thought  proper,  yet  that 
liberty  ceased  with  the  establishment  of  the  present  confederacy.  The  dis 
cretion  of  the  legislature  was  then  determined. 

This,  upon  the  face  of  it,  is  a  subtilty,  uncountenanced  by  a  single  prin 
ciple  of  government,  or  a  single  expression  of  the  Constitution.  It  is  say 
ing  that  a  general  authority  given  to  the  legislature  for  the  permanent 
preservation  and  good  of  the  community,  has  been  exhausted  and  spent  by 
the  exercipe  of  a  part  of  that  authority.  The  position  is  the  more  destitute 
of  colour ;  because  the  confederation,  by  the  express  terms  of  the  compact. 


SPEECH    ON    THE    IMPOST    GRANT.  15 

preserves  and  continues  this  power.  The  last  clause  of  it  authorises  Con- 
gress to  propose,  and  the  states  to  agree  to  such  alterations  as  might  he 
afterwards  found  necessary  or  expedient. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  the  Constitution  knows  and  acknowledges  the 
United  States  in  Congress ;  that  it  provides  for  the  annual  appointment  of 
.delegates  to  represent  this  state  in  that  body  without  prescribing  the  objects 
or  limits  of  that  representation.  That  at  the  time  our  Constitution  was 
framed,  the  Union  existed  with  full  sovereignty ;  and  that  therefore  the 
idea  of  sovereignty  in  the  Union  is  not  incompatible  with  it.  We  see,  fur- 
ther, that  the  doctrine  contained  in  the  objection  against  granting  legisla- 
tive power,  would  equally  operate  against  granting  executive  power,  would 
prove  that  the  powers  already  vested  in  the  union  are  illegal  and  unconsti- 
tutional, would  render  a  confederacy  of  the  states  in  any  form  impractica- 
ble, and  would  defeat  all  those  provisions  of  our  own  Constitution  which 
relate  to  the  United  States.  I  submit  it  to  the  committee,  whether  a  doc- 
trine pregnant  with  such  consequences  can  be  true — whether  it  is  not  as 
opposite  to  our  Constitution  as  to  the  principles  of  national  safety  and 
prosperity — and  whether  it  would  not  be  lamentable  if  the  zeal  of  opposi- 
tion to  a  particular  measure  should  carry  us  to  the  extreme  of  imposing 
upon  the  Constitution  a  sense  foreign  to  it ;  which  must  embarrass  the 
national  councils  upon  future  occasions,  when  all  might  agree  in  the  utility 
and  necessity  of  a  different  construction. 

If  the  arguments  I  have  used  under  this  head  are  not  well  founded,  let 
gentlemen  come  forward  and  show  their  fallaci/.  Let  the  subject  have  a 
fair  and  full  examination,  and  let  truth,  on  whatever  side  it  may  be, 
prevail  I 

Fluttering  myself  it  will  appear  to  the  committee  that  the  Constitution 
at  least  offers  us  no  impediment,  I  shall  proceed  to  the  topics  of  objection. 
The  next  that  presents  itself  is  a  supposed  danger  to  liberty  from  grant- 
ing legislative  power  to  Congress. 

But  before  I  enter  upon  this  subject,  to  remove  the  aspersions  thrown 
upon  that  body,  I  shall  give  a  short  history  of  some  material  facts  relating 
to  the  origin  and  progress  of  the  business.  To  excite  the  jealousies  of  the 
people,  it  has  been  industriously  represented  as  an  undue  attempt  to  acquire 
un  increase  of  power.  It  has  been  forgotten  or  intentionally  overlooked, 
that,  considering  it  in  the  strongest  light  as  a  proposal  to  alter  the  confede- 
ration, it  is  only  exercising  a  power  which  the  confederation  has  in  direct 
terms  reposed  in  Congress,  who,  as  before  observed,  are  by  the  13th  article, 
expressly  authorised  to  propose  alterations. 

But  so  far  was  the  measure  from  originating  in  improper  views  of  that 
body,  that,  if  I  am  rightly  informed,  it  did  not  originate  there  at  all.  It 
was  first  suggested  by  a  convention  of  the  four  Eastern  states,  and  New 
York,  at  Hartford,  and  I  believe  was  proposed  there  by  the  deputies  of  this 
state.  A  gentleman  on  our  bench,  unconnected  with  Congress,  who  now 
hears  me,  (I  mean  Judge  Hobart,)  was  one  of  them.  It  was  dictated  by  a 
Drinciple  which  bitter  experience  then  taught  us,  and  which  in  peace  or  war 
will  always-  be  found  true — that  adequate  supplies  to  the  federal  treasury 


I*)  SPEECH  ON  THE  IMPOST  GKANl. 

ean  never  flow  from  any  system  which  requires  the  intervention  of  thirteen 
delibertatives  l^etween  the  call  and  the  execution. 

Congress  agreed  to  the  measure  and  recommended  it.  This  state  complied 
without  hesitation.  All  parts  of  the  government,  senate,  assembly,  and 
council  of  revision  concurred  —  neither  the  Constitution  nor  the  public 
liberty  presented  any  obstacle.  The  diflBculties  from  these  sources  are  a 
recent  discovery. 

So  late  as  the  first  session  of  the  legislature  after  the  evacuation  of  this 
city,  the  Governor  of  the  state  in  his  speech  to  both  houses,  gave  a  decided 
countenance  to  the  measure — this  he  does,  though  not  in  express  terms,  yet 
by  implications  not  to  be  misunderstood. 

The  leading  opponents  of  the  impost,  of  the  present  day,  have  all  of 
them  at  other  times,  either  concurred  in  the  measure  in  its  most  excep- 
tionable form,  and  without  the  qualifications  annexed  to  it  by  the  proposed 
bill,  or  have  by  other  instances  of  conduct  contradicted  their  own  hypothe- 
sis on  the  Constitution  which  professedly  forms  the  main  prop  of  their 
opposition. 

The  honorable  member  in  my  eye  (  )  at  the  last  session  brought 

in  a  bill  for  granting  to  the  United  States  the  power  of  regulating  the  trade 
of  the  union.  This  surely  includes  more  ample  legislative  authority 
than  is  comprehended  in  the  mere  power  of  levying  a  particular  duty.  It 
indeed  goes  to  a  prodigious  extent  much  farther  than  on  a  superficial  view 
can  be  imagined.  Can  we  believe  that  the  constitutional  objection,  if  well 
founded,  would  so  long  have  passed  undiscovered  and  unnoticed?  or  is  it 
fair  to  impute  to  Congress  criminal  motives  for  proposing  a  measure  which 
was  first  recommended  to  them  by  five  states,  or  from  persisting  in  that 
measure,  after  the  unequivocal  experience  they  have  had  of  the  total  ineffi- 
cacy  of  the  mode  provided  in  the  confederation  for  supplying  the  treasury 
of  the  union  ? 

I  leave  the  answer  to  these  questions  to  the  good  sense  and  candor  of  the 
committee,  and  shall  return  to  the  examination  of  the  question,  how  far  the 
power  proposed  to  be  conferred  upon  Congress  would  be  dangerous  to  the 
liberty  of  the  people.     And  here  I  ask, 

Whence  can  this  danger  arise?  The  members  of  Congress  are  annually 
chosen  by  the  members  of  the  several  legislatures.  They  come  together 
with  diflFerent  habits,  prejudices,  and  interests.  They  are  in  fact  continu- 
ally changing.  How  is  it  possible  for  a  body  so  composed  to  be  for- 
midable to  the  liberties  of  States,  several  of  which  are  large  empires  iis 
themselves  ? 

The  subversion  of  the  liberty  of  these  states  could  not  be  the  business  of 
a  day.  It  would  at  least  require  time,  premeditation,  and  concert.  Can  it 
be  supposed  that  the  members  of  a  body  so  constituted  would  be  unanimous 
in  a  scheme  of  usurpation  ?  If  they  were  not,  would  it  not  be  discovered 
and  disclosed  ?  If  we  could  even  suppose  this  unanimity  among  one  set  of 
men,  can  we  believe  that  all  the  new  members  who  are  yearly  sent  from  one 
state  or  another  would  instantly  enter  into  the  same  views?  Would  there 
not  be  found  one  honest  man  to  warn  hie  country  of  the  danger  ? 


SPEECH  ON  THE  IMPOST  GRANT.  17 

Suppose  the  worst — suppose  the  combination  entered  into  and  continued. 
The  execution  would  at  least  announce  the  design  ;  and  the  means  of  defence 
would  be  easy.  Consider  the  separate  power  of  several  of  these  states,  and 
the  situation  of  all.  Consider  the  extent,  populousness,  and  resources  ot 
Massachusetts,  Virginia,  Pennsylvania  ;  I  might  add  of  New  York,  Con- 
necticut, and  other  states.  Where  could  Congress  find  means  sufficient  to 
subvert  the  government  and  liberties  of  either  of  these  states !  or  rather, 
where  find  means  sufficient  to  effect  the  conquest  at  all  ?  If  an  attempt  is 
made  upon  one,  the  others  from  a  sense  of  common  danger,  would  make  com- 
mon cause  ;  and  they  could  immediately  unite  and  provide  for  their  joint 
defence. 

There  is  one  consideration  of  immense  force  in  this  question  not  suffi- 
ciently attended  to.  It  is  this,  that  each  state  possesses  in  itself  the  full 
powers  of  government,  and  can  at  once  in  a  regular  and  constitutional 
way,  take  measures  for  the  preservation  of  its  rights.  In  a  single  King- 
dom or  state,  if  the  rulers  attempt  to  establish  a  tyranny,  the  people  can 
only  defend  themselves  by  a  tumultuary  insurrection  ;  they  must  run  to 
arms  without  concert  or  plan ;  while  the  usurpers  clothed  with  the  forms 
of  legal  authority  can  employ  the  forces  of  the  state  to  suppress  them  in 
embryo ;  and  before  they  can  have  time  or  opportunity  to  give  system  to 
their  opposition.  With  us  the  case  is  widely  different.  Each  state  has  a 
government  completely  organized  in  itself;  and  can  at  once  enter  into  a 
regular  plan  of  defence.  With  the  forces  of  the  community  at  its  command 
it  can  immediately  form  connections  with  its  neighbors,  or  even  with  for- 
eign powers,  if  necessary. 

In  a  contest  of  this  kind,  the  body  of  the  people  will  always  be  on  the 
side  of  the  state  governments.  This  will  not  only  result  from  their  love  of 
liberty  and  regard  to  their  own  safety ;  but  from  other  strong  principles 
of  human  nature.  The  state  governments  operate  upon  those  immediate 
familiar  personal  concerns  to  which  the  sensibility  of  individuals  is  awake. 
The  distribution  of  private  justice  belonging  to  them,  they  must  always 
appear  to  the  senses  of  the  people  as  the  immediate  guardians  of  their 
rights — they  will  of  course  have  the  strongest  hold  on  their  attachment, 
respect  and  obedience.  Another  circumstance  will  contribute  to  the  same 
end.  Far  the  greatest  number  of  offices  and  employments  are  in  the  gift 
of  the  states  separately — the  weight  of  official  influence  will  therefore  be 
in  favor  of  the  state  governments ;  and  with  all  these  advantages  they  can- 
not fail  to  carry  the  people  along  with  them  in  every  contest  with  the  gen- 
eral government  in  which  they  are  not  palpably  in  the  wrong,  and  often 
when  they  are.  What  is  to  be  feared  from  the  efforts  of  Congress  to  estab- 
lish a  tyranny  with  the  great  body  of  the  people  under  the  direction  of 
their  state  governments  combined  in  opposition  to  their  views?  Must  not 
their  attempts  recoil  upon  themselves,  and  terminate  in  their  own  ruin  and 
disgrace?  or  rather,  would  not  these  considerations,  if  they  were  insensi- 
ble to  other  motives,  forever  restrain  them  from  making  such  attempts  ? 

The  causes  taken  notice  of  as  securing  the  attachment  of  the  people  to 
their  local  governments,  present  us  with  another  important  truth  —  th» 


18  SPEECH    ON    THE    IxMPOST    GRANT. 

natural  imbecility  of  federal  governments,  and  the  danger  that  they  will 
never  be  able  to  exercise  power  enough  to  manage  the  general  affairs  of 
the  Union.  Though  the  States  will  have  a  common  interest,  yet  they  will 
also  have  a  particular  interest.  For  example,  as  a  part  of  the  Union,  it 
will  be  the  interest  of  every  State  to  pay  as  little  itself,  and  to  let  its  neigh- 
bors pay  as  much  as  possible.  Particular  interests  have  always  more 
influence  upon  men  than  general.  The  federal  States,  therefore,  consulting 
their  immediate  advantage,  may  be  considered  as  so  many  eccentric  powers 
tending  in  a  contrary  direction  to  the  government  of  the  Union  ;  and  as 
they  will  generally  carry  the  people  along  with  them,  the  confederacy  will 
be  in  continual  danger  of  dissolution.  This,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  the  real 
rock  upon  which  the  happiness  of  this  country  is  likely  to  split — this  is  the 
point  to  which  our  fears  and  cares  should  be  directed ;  to  guard  against 
thi^,  and  not  to  terrify  ourselves  with  imaginary  dangers  from  the  spectre 
of  power  in  Congress,  will  be  our  true  wisdom. 

But  let  us  examine  a  little  more  closely  the  measure  under  consideration. 
What  does  the  bill  before  us  require  us  to  do  ?  Merely  to  grant  duties  on 
imposts  to  the  United  States  for  the  short  period  of  twenty-five  years  —  to 
be  applied  to  the  discharge  of  the  principal  and  interest  of  the  debts  con- 
tracted for  the  support  of  the  late  war ;  the  collection  of  which  duties  is  to 
be  made  by  officers  appointed  by  the  State,  but  accountable  to  Congress, 
according  to  such  general  regulations  as  the  United  States  shall  establish  ; 
subject  to  these  important  checks,  that  no  citizen  shall  be  carried  out  of 
the  State  for  trial ;  that  all  prosecutions  shall  be  in  our  own  courts ;  that  no 
excessive  fines  or  penalties  shall  be  imposed  ;  and  that  a  yearly  account  of 
the  proceeds  and  application  of  the  revenue  shall  be  rendered  to  the  legis- 
lature, on  failure  of  which  it  reserves  to  itself  a  right  of  repealing  its 
grant. 

Is  it  possible  for  any  measure  to  be  better  guarded  ?  or  is  it  possible  that 
a  grant  for  such  precise  objects,  and  with  so  many  checks,  can  be  dangerous 
to  the  public  liberty  ? 

Having  now  as  I  trust  satisfactorily  shown  that  the  Constitution  offers  no 
obstacle  to  the  measure,  and  that  the  liberty  of  the  people  cannot  be 
endangered  by  it,  it  remains  only  to  consider  it  in  the  view  of  revenue. 

The  sole  question  left  for  discussion  is  whether  it  be  an  eligible  mode  for 
supplying  the  Federal  treasury  or  not? 

The  better  to  answer  this  question,  it  will  be  of  use  to  examine  how  far 
the  mode  by  quotas  and  requisitions  has  been  found  competent  to  the 
public  exigencies. 

The  universal  delinquency  of  the  States  during  the  war  shall  be  passed 
over  with  the  bare  mention  of  it.  The  public  embarrassments  were  a 
plausible  apology  for  that  delinquency,  and  it  was  hoped  the  peace  would 
have  produced  greater  punctuality.  The  experiment  has  disappointed  that 
hope  to  a  degree  which  confounds  the  least  sanguine.  A  comparative  view 
of  the  compliances  of  the  several  States,  for  the  five  last  years,  will  furnish 
a  striking  result. 

During  that  period,  as  appears  by  a  statement  on  our  files,  New  Hamo- 


SPEECH    ON    THE    IMPOST    GRANT.  19 

ihire,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia,  have  paid  nothing.  1 
say  nothing,  because  the  only  actual  payment  is  the  trifling  sum  of  about 
seven  thousand  dollars  by  New  Hampshire.  South  Carolina  indeed  has 
credits,  but  these  are  merely  by  way  of  discount,  on  the  supplies  furnished 
by  her  during  the  war,  in  consideration  of  her  peculiar  suiferings  and 
exertions,  while  the  immediate  theatre  of  it. 

Connecticut  and  Delaware  have  paid  about  one-third  of  their  requisitions. 
Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  and  Maryland,  about  one-half.  Virginia, 
about  three-fifths,  Pennsylvania,  nearly  the  whole,  and  New  York,  more 
than  her  quota. 

These  propoi-tions  are  taken  on  the  specie  requisitions,  the  indents  have 
been  very  partially  paid,  and  in  their  present  state  are  of  little  account. 

The  payments  into  the  federal  treasury  have  declined  rapidly  each  year. 
The  whole  amount  for  three  years  past  in  specie  has  not  exceeded  1,400,000 
dollars,  of  which  New  York  has  paid  one  hundred  per  cent  more  than  her 
proportion.  This  sum,  little  more  than  400,000  dollars  a  year,  it  will 
readily  be  conceived,  has  been  exhausted  in  the  support  of  the  civil  esta- 
blishments of  the  Union,  and  the  necessary  guards  and  garrisons  at  public 
arsenals,  and  on  the  frontiers;  without  any  surplus  for  paying  any  part  of 
the  debt,  foreign  or  domestic,  principal  or  interest. 

Things  are  continually  growing  worse,  the  last  year  in  particular  pro- 
duced less  than  two  hundred  thousand  dollars,  and  that  from  only  two  or 
three  States.  Several  of  the  States  have  been  so  long  unaccustomed  to  pay, 
that  they  seem  no  longer  concerned  even  about  the  appearances  of  com- 
pliance. 

Connecticut  and  New  Jersey  have  almost  formally  declined  paying  any 
longer.  The  ostensible  motive  is  the  non-concurrence  of  this  State  in  the 
impost  system.     The  real  one  must  be  conjectured  from  the  fact. 

Pennsylvania,  if  I  understand  the  scope  of  some  late  resolutions,  means 
to  discount  the  interest  she  pays  upon  her  assumption  to  her  own  citizens ; 
in  which  case  there  will  be  little  coming  from  her  to  the  United  States. 
This  seems  to  be  bringing  matters  to  a  crisis. 

The  pecuniary  support  of  the  Federal  government  has  of  late  devolved 
almost  entirely  upon  Pennsylvania  and  New  York.  If  Pennsylvania 
refuses  to  continue  her  aid,  what  will  be  the  situation  of  New  York  ?  Are 
we  willing  to  be  the  Atlas  of  the  Union  ?  or  are  we  willing  to  see  it  perish  ? 

This  seems  to  be  the  alternative.  Is  there  not  a  species  of  political 
knight-errantry  in  adhering  pertinaciously  to  a  system  which  throws  tht 
whole  weight  of  the  Confederation  upon  this  state,  or  upon  one  or  two 
more?  Is  it. not  our  interest,  on  mere  calculations  of  state  policy,  to  pro- 
mote a  measure,  which,  operating  under  the  same  regulations  in  every 
State,  must  produce  an  equal,  or  nearly  equal,  effect  everywhere,  and  oblige 
all  the  States  to  share  the  common  burthen  ? 

If  the  impost  is  granted  to  the  United  States,  with  the  power  of  levying 
it,  it  must  have  a  proportionate  effect  in  all  the  States,  for  the  same  mode 
of  collection  everywhere  will  have  nearly  the  same  return  everywhere. 

What  mus-t  be  the  final  issue  of  the  present  state  of  things?     Will  tha 


2V)  SPEECH  UN  THE  IMPOST  GRANT. 

few  States  that  now  contribute  be  willing  to  contribute  much  longjr?  Shall 
we  ourselves  be  long  content  with  bearing  the  burthen  singly?  will  not 
our  zeal  for  a  particular  system  soon  give  way  to  the  pressure  of  so  unequal 
a  weight?  and  if  all  the  States  cease  to  pay,  what  is  to  become  of  the 
Union  ?  It  is  sometimes  asked,  why  do  not  Congress  oblige  the  States  to  do 
their  duty ;  but  where  are  the  means  ?  Where  are  the  fleets  and  armies, 
where  the  Federal  treasury  to  support  those  fleets  and  armies,  to  enforce 
the  requisitions  of  the  Union?  All  methods  short  of  coercion  have  re- 
peatedly been  tried  in  vain. 

Let  us  now  proceed  to  another  most  important  inquiry.  How  are  we  to 
pay  our  foreign  debt  ?  This,  I  think,  is  estimated  at  about  7,000,000  of 
dollars ;  which  will  every  year  increase  with  the  accumulations  of  interest. 
If  we  pay  neither  principal  nor  interest,  we  not  only  abandon  all  preten- 
sions to  character  as  a  nation,  but  we  endanger  the  public  peace.  However 
it  may  be  in  our  power  to  evade  the  just  demands  of  our  domestic  creditors, 
our  foreign  creditors  must  and  will  be  paid. 

They  have  power  to  enforce  their  demands,  and  sooner  or  later  they  may 
be  expected  to  do  it.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  endeavour  to  excite  the 
apprehensions  of  the  committee,  but  I  would  appeal  to  their  prudence. 
A  discreet  attention  to  the  consequences  of  national  measures  is  no  im- 
peachment of  our  firmness. 

The  foreign  debt,  I  say,  must  sooner  or  later  be  paid,  and  the  longer  pro 
vision  is  delayed,  the  heavier  it  must  fall  at  last. 

We  require  about  1,600,000  dollars  to  discharge  the  interest  and  instal- 
ments of  the  present  year,  about  a  million  annually  upon  an  average  for  ten 
years  more,  and  about  300,000  dollars  for  another  ten  years. 

The  product  of  the  impost  may  be  computed  at  about  a  million  of  dollars 
annually.  It  is  an  increasing  fund.  This  fund  would  not  only  suflBce  for 
the  discharge  of  the  foreign  debt,  but  important  operations  might  be  in- 
grafted upon  it,  towards  the  extinguishment  of  the  domestic  debt. 

Is  it  possible  to  hesitate  about  the  propriety  of  adopting  a  resource  so 
easy  in  itself,  and  so  extensive  in  its  eflfects  ? 

Here  I  expect  I  may  be  told  there  is  no  objection  to  employing  this 
resource.  The  act  of  the  last  session  does  it.  The  only  dispute  is  about 
the  mode.  We  are  willing  to  grant  the  money,  but  not  the  power  required 
from  us.     Money  will  pay  our  debts ;  power  may  destroy  our  liberties. 

It  has  been  insinuated  that  nothing  but  a  lust  of  power  would  have  pre- 
vented Congress  from  accepting  the  grant  in  the  shape  it  has  already 
passed  the  legislature.  This  is  a  severe  charge;  if  true,  it  ought  un- 
doubtedly to  prevent  our  going  a  step  further.  But  it  is  easy  to  show  that 
Congress  could  not  have  accepted  our  grant  without  removing  themselves 
further  from  the  object  than  they  now  are.  To  gain  one  State  they  must 
have  lost  all  the  others.  The  grants  of  every  State  are  accompanied  with  a 
condition,  that  similar  grants  be  made  by  the  other  States.  It  is  not  denied 
that  our  act  is  essentially  different  from  theirs.  Their  acts  give  the  United 
States  the  power  of  collecting  the  duty.  Ours  reserves  it  to  the  state,  and 
makes  it  receivable  in  paper  money. 


SPEECH    ON   THE    IMPOST    GRANT.  21 

Tlie  immediate  consequences  of  accepting  our  grant  w  uld  be  a  relin- 
quishment of  the  grants  of  other  States ;  they  must  take  the  matter  up 
anew,  and  do  the  work  over  again,  to  accommodate  it  to  our  standard.  In 
order  to  anchor  one  state,  would  it  have  been  wise  to  set  twelve,  or  at  least 
eleven  others,  afloat  ? 

It  is  said,  that  the  States  which  have  granted  more  would  certainly  be 
willing  to  grant  less.  They  would  easily  accommodate  their  acts  to  that 
of  New  York,  as  more  favorable  to  their  own  power  and  security. 

But  would  Massachusetts  and  Virginia,  which  have  no  paper  money  nf 
their  own,  accede  to  a  plan  that  permitted  other  States  to  pay  in  paper, 
while  they  paid  in  specie?  Would  they  consent  that  their  citizens  should 
pay  twenty  shillings  in  the  pound,  while  the  citizens  of  Rhode  Island  paid 
only^w^r,  the  citizens  of  North  Carolina  ten,  and  of  other  States  in  different 
degrees  of  inequality,  in  proportion  to  the  relative  depreciation  of  their 
paper?  Is  it  wise  in  this  State  to  cherish  a  plan  that  gives  such  an  advan- 
tage to  the  citizens  of  other  States  over  its  own  ? 

The  paper  money  of  the  State  of  New  York,  in  most  transactions,  is 
equal  to  gold  and  silver ;  that  of  Rhode  Island  is  depreciated  to  five  for 
one ;  that  of  North  Carolina  to  two  for  one ;  that  of  South  Carolina  may 
perhaps  be  worth  fifteen  shillings  in  the  pound. 

If  the  States  pay  the  duties  in  paper,  is  it  not  evident  that  for  every 
pound  of  that  duty  consumed  by  the  citizen  of  New  York,  he  would  pay 
twenty  shillings,  while  the  citizen  of  South  Carolina  would  pay  fifteen 
shillings,  of  North  Carolina,  ten  shillings,  and  Rhode  Island,  only  four! 

This  consideration  alone  is  sufiicient  to  condemn  the  plan  of  our  grant 
of  last  session,  and  to  prove  incontestably  that  the  States  which  are  averse 
to  emitting  a  paper  currency,  or  have  it  in  their  power  to  support  one  when 
emitted,  would  never  come  into  it. 

Again,  would  those  States,  which  by  their  public  acts  demonstrate  a  con- 
viction that  the  powers  of  the  union  require  augmentation ;  which  are 
conscious  of  energy  in  their  own  administration — would  they  be  willing  to 
concur  in  a  plan  which  left  the  collection  of  the  duties  in  the  hands  of 
each  State,  and  of  course  subject  to  all  the  inequalities  which  a  more  or 
less  vigorous  system  of  collection  would  produce  ? 

This  too  is  an  idea  which  ought  to  have  great  weight  with  us.  We  have 
better  habits  of  government  than  are  to  be  found  in  some  of  the  States, 
and  our  constitution  admits  of  more  energy  than  the  constitutions  of  most 
of  the  other  States.  The  duties,  therefore,  would  be  more  effectually  col- 
lected with  us  than  in  such  States,  and  they  would  have  a  similar  effect  to 
the  depreciation  of  the  money,  in  imposing  a  greater  burthen  on  the  citizens 
of  this  State. 

If  any  State  should  incline  to  evade  the  payment  of  the  duties,  having 
the  collection  in  its  own  hands,  nothing  would  be  easier  than  to  effect  it, 
and  without  materially  sacrificing  appearances. 

It  is  manifest  from  this  view  of  the  subject,  that  we  have  the  strongest 
reasons  as  a  State,  to  depart  from  our  own  act,  and  that  it  would  have  been 
nighly  injudicio\i8  in  Congress  to  have  accepted  it. 


22  SPEECH    ON    THE    IMPOST    GRANT. 

If  there  even  had  been  a  prospect  of  the  concurrence  of  the  other  States 
in  the  plan,  how  inadequate  would  it  have  been  to  the  public  exigencies, 
fettered  with  the  embarrassments  of  a  depreciating  paper! 

It  is  to  no  purpose  to  say,  that  the  faith  of  the<State  was  pledged  by  the 
act  to  make  the  paper  equal  to  gold  and  silver,  and  that  the  other  States 
would  be  obliged  to  do  the  same.  What  greater  dependence  can  be  had  on 
the  faith  of  the  States  pledged  to  this  measure,  than  on  the  faith  they 
pledged  in  the  confederation,  sanctioned  by  a  solemn  appeal  to  heaven  ? 
If  the  obligation  of  faith  in  one  case  has  had  so  little  influence  upon  their 
conduct  in  respect  to  the  requisitions  of  Congress,  wl:  at  hope  tan  there  be 
that  they  would  have  greater  influences  in  respect  to  the  deficiencies  of  the 
paper  money? 

There  yet  remains  an  important  light  in  which  to  consider  the  subject  in 
the  way  of  revenue.  It  is  a  clear  point  that  we  cannot  carry  the  duties 
upon  imports  to  the  same  extent  by  separate  arrangements  as  by  a  general 
plan.  We  must  regulate  ourselves  by  what  we  find  done  in  the  neigboring 
States.  While  Pennsylvania  has  only  two  and  a  half  per  cent,  on  her 
importations,  we  cannot  greatly  exceed  her.  To  go  much  beyond  it  would 
injure  our  commerce  in  a  variety  of  ways,  and  would  defeat  itself — While 
the  ports  of  Connecticut  and  New  Jersey  are  open  to  the  introduction  of 
goods  free  from  duty,  and  the  conveyance  from  them  to  us  is  so  easy — 
While  they  consider  our  imposts  as  an  ungenerous  advantage  taken  of 
them,  which  it  would  be  laudable  to  elude,  the  duties  must  be  light,  or 
they  would  be  evaded.  The  facility  to  do  it  and  the  temptation  of  doing 
it  would  be  both  so  great,  that  we  should  collect  perhaps  less  by  an  in- 
crease of  the  rates  than  we  do  now.  Already  we  experience  the  effects  of 
this  situation.  But  if  the  duties  were  to  be  levied  under  a  common 
direction,  with  the  same  precautions  everywhere  to  guard  against  smuggling, 
they  might  be  carried  without  prejudice  to  trade  to  a  much  more  consider- 
able height. 

As  things  now  are,  we  must  adhere  to  the  present  standard  of  duties, 
without  any  material  alterations.  Suppose  this  to  produce  fifty  thousand 
pounds  a  year.  The  duties  to  be  granted  to  Congress  ought,  in  proportion, 
to  produce  double  that  sum.  To  this  it  appears  by  a  scheme  now  before 
us,  that  additional  duties  might  be  imposed  for  the  use  of  the  State,  on 
certain  enumerated  articles,  to  the  amount  of  thirty  thousand  pounds. 
This  would  be  an  augmentation  of  our  national  revenue  by  indirect  taxa- 
tion to  the  extent  of  eighty  thousand  pounds  a  year ;  an  immense  object 
in  a  single  State,  and  which  alone  demonstrates  the  good  policy  of  the 
measure. 

It  is  no  objection  to  say  that  a  great  part  of  this  fund  will  be  dedicated 
to  the  use  of  the  United  States.  Their  exigencies  must  be  supplied  in 
some  way  or  other.  The  more  is  done  towards  it  by  means  of  the  impost, 
the  less  will  be  to  be  done  in  other  modes.  If  we  do  not  employ  tha*^ 
resource  to  the  best  account,  we  must  find  others  in  direct  taxation.  And 
to  this  are  opposed  all  the  habits  and  prejudices  of  the  community.  There 
is  not  a  farmer  in  the  state  who  would  not  pay  a  shilling  in  the  voluntarv 


SPEECH    ON    THE    IMPOST    GRANT.  23 

consumption  ol  articles  on  which  a  duty  is  paid,  rather  than  a  penny 
imposed  immediately  on  his  house  and  land. 

There  is  but  one  objection  to  the  measure  under  consideration  that  has 
come  to  my  knowledge,  which  yet  remains  to  be  discussed.  I  mean  the 
effect  it  is  supposed  to  have  upon  our  paper  currency.  It  is  said,  the  diver- 
sion of  this  fund  would  leave  the  credit  of  the  paper  without  any  effectual 
support. 

Though  I  should  not  be  disposed  to  put  a  consideration  of  this  kind  in 
competition  with  the  safety  of  the  Union,  yet  I  should  be  extremely  cau- 
tious about  doing  anything  that  might  affect  the  credit  of  our  currency. 
The  legislature  having  thought  an  emission  of  paper  advisable,  I  consider 
it  my  duty  as  a  representative  of  the  people  to  take  care  of  its  credit.  The 
farmers  appeared  willing  to  exchange  their  produce  for  it.  The  merchants 
on  the  other  hand,  had  large  debts  outstanding.  They  supposed  that  giv- 
ing a  free  circulation  to  the  paper  would  enable  their  customers  in  the 
country  to  pay,  and  as  they  perceived  that  they  would  have  it  in  their  power 
to  convert  the  money  into  produce,  they  naturally  resolved  to  give  it  theii 
support. 

These  causes  combined  to  introduce  the  money  into  general  circulfttion, 
and  having  once  obtained  credit,  it  will  now  be  able  to  support  itself. 

The  chief  difficulty  to  have  been  apprehended  in  respect  to  the  paper, 
was  to  overcome  the  diffidence  which  the  still  recent  experience  of  depre- 
ciating paper  had  instilled  into  men's  minds.  This,  it  was  to  have  been 
feared,  would  have  shaken  its  credit  at  its  outset;  and  if  it  had  once  began 
to  sink,  it  would  be  no  easy  matter  to  prevent  its  total  decline. 

The  event  has  however  turned  out  otherwise,  and  the  money  has  been 
fortunate  enough  to  conciliate  the  general  confidence.  This  point  gained, 
there  need  be  no  apprehensions  of  its  future  fate,  unless  the  government 
should  do  something  to  destroy  that  confidence. 

The  causes  that  first  gave  it  credit  still  operate,  and  will  in  all  probability 
continue  so  to  do.  The  demand  for  money  has  not  lessened,  and  the  mer- 
chant has  still  the  same  inducement  to  countenance  the  circulation  of  the 
paper. 

I  shall  not  deny  that  the  outlet  which  the  payment  of  duties  furnished  to 
the  merchant,  was  an  additional  motive  to  the  reception  of  the  paper.  Nor 
is  it  proposed  to  take  away  this  motive.  There  is  now  before  the  house  a 
bill,  one  object  of  which  is,  the  establishment  of  a  state  impost,  on  certain 
enumerated  articles,  in  addition  to  that  to  be  granted  to  the  United  States. 
It  is  computed  on  very  good  grounds  that  the  additional  duties  would 
amount  to  about  £30,000,  and  as  they  would  be  payable  in  paper  cur- 
rency, they  would  create  a  sufficient  demand  upon  the  merchant,  to  leave 
him  in  this  respect,  substantially  the  same  inducement  which  he  had 
before.  Indeed,  independent  of  this,  the  readiness  of  the  trading  people  to 
take  the  money  can  never  be  doubted,  while  it  will  freely  command  the 
commodities  of  the  country ;  for  this  to  them  is  the  most  important  use 
they  can  make  of  it. 

But,  besides  the  State  Imposts,  there  must  be  other  taxes ;  and  these  will 


24  SPEECH    ON    THE   IMPOST    GRANT. 

all  contribute  to  create  a  demand  for  the  money  ;  which  is  all  we  now  mean, 
when  we  talk  of  funds  for  its  support ;  for  there  are  none  appropriated  for 
the  REDEMPTION  of  the  paper. 

Upon  the  whole  the  additional  duties  will  be  a  competent  substitute  for 
those  now  in  existence ;  and  the  general  good  will  of  the  community 
towards  the  paper,  will  be  the  best  security  for  its  credit. 

Having  now  shown,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  there  is  no  constitutional  impedi- 
ment to  the  adoption  of  the  bill ;  that  there  is  no  danger  to  be  apprehended 
to  the  public  liberty  from  giving  the  power  in  question  to  the  United  States  ; 
that  in  the  view  of  revenue  the  measure  under  consideration  is  not  only 
expedient,  but  necessary.  Let  us  turn  our  attention  to  the  other  side  of 
this  important  subject.  Let  us  ask  ourselves  what  will  be  the  consequence 
of  rejecting  the  bill  ?  What  will  be  the  situation  of  our  national  affairs 
if  they  are  left  much  longer  to  float  in  the  chaos  in  which  they  are  now 
involved  ? 

Can  our  National  Character  be  preserved  without  paying  our  debts? 
Can  the  Union  subsist  without  revenue  ?  Have  we  realized  the  consequences 
which  would  attend  its  dissolution  ? 

If  these  States  are  not  united  under  a  Federal  government,  they  will 
infallibly  have  wars  with  each  other  ;  and  their  divisions  will  subject  them 
to  all  the  mischiefs  of  foreign  influence  and  intrigue.  The  human  passions 
will  never  want  objects  of  hostility.  The  Western  territory  is  an  obvious 
and  fruitful  source  of  contest.  Let  us  also  cast  our  eye  upon  the  map  of 
this  State,  intersected  from  one  extremity  to  the  other  by  a  large  navigable 
river.  In  the  event  of  a  rupture  with  them,  what  is  to  hinder  our  Metrop- 
olis from  becoming  a  prey  to  our  neighbors?  Is  it  even  supposable 
that  they  would  suffer  it  to  remain  the  nursery  of  wealth  to  a-  distinct 
community  ? 

These  subjects  are  delicate,  but  it  is  necessary  to  contemplate  them,  to 
teach  us  to  form  a  true  estimate  of  our  situation. 

Wars  with  each  other  would  beget  standing  armies — a  source  of  more 
real  danger  to  our  liberties  than  all  the  powers  that  could  be  conferred 
upon  the  representatives  of  the  Union.  And  wars  with  each  other  would 
lead  to  opposite  alliances  with  foreign  powers,  and  plunge  us  into  all  the 
labyrinths  of  European  politics. 

The  Romans  in  their  progress  to  universal  dominion  when  they  conceived 
the  project  of  subduing  the  refractory  spirit  of  the  Grecian  Repuljlics, 
which  composed  the  famous  Achaean  league,  began  by  sowing  dissensions 
among  them,  and  instilling  jealousies  of  each  other,  and  of  the  common 
head,  and  finished  by  making  them  a  province  of  the  Roman  Empire. 

The  application  is  easy  ;  if  there  are  any  foreign  enemies,  if  there  are 
any  domestic  foes  to  this  country,  all  their  arts  and  artifices  will  be  em- 
ployed to  effect  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  This  cannot  be  better  done 
than  by  sowing  jealousies  of  the  Federal  head  and  cultivating  in  each 
state  an  undue  attachment  to  its  own  power. 


RESOLUTIONS    CALLING   A   CONVENTION.  25 


RESOLUTION  FOR  AN  ACT  BY  CONGRESS  RECOMMENDING  THE 
HOLDING  A  CONVENTION. 

February  17,  1787. 
Resolved,  If  the  Honorable  the  Senate  concur,  That  the  Delegates  of  this 
State  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  in  America  be,  and  they  are 
hereby  instructed  to  move  in  Congress  for  an  Act  recommending  to  the 
States  composing  the  Union,  that  a  Convention  of  Representatives  from  the 
said  States  respectively,  be  held  and  meet  at  a  time  and  place  to  be  men- 
tioned in  said  recommendation,  for  the  purpose  of  revising  the  Articles  of 
Confederation  and  Perpetual  Union  between  the  United  States  of  America, 
by  such  alterations  and  amendments  as  a  majority  of  the  Representatives 
in  suoh  Convention  shall  judge  proper  and  necessary  to  render  them  ade- 
quate to  the  preservation  and  support  of  the  Union. 


RESOLUTION    FOR    THE    APPOINTMENT    BY    NEW    YORK    OF 
DELEGATES  TO  THE  GENERAL  CONVENTION. 

February  26,  1787. 
Resolved,  (if  the  Honorable  the  Senate  concur  herein,)  That  five  Dele- 
gates be  appointed  on  the  part  of  this  State  to  meet  such  Delegates  as  may 
be  appointed  on  the  part  of  the  other  States  respectively,  on  the  Second 
Monday  of  May  next,  at  Philadelphia,  for  the  sole  and  express  purpose  of 
revising  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  reporting  to  Congress  and  to  the 
several  Legislatures  such  alterations  and  provisions  therein,  as  shall,  when 
agreed  to  in  Congress  and  confirmed  by  the  several  States,  render  the  Fed- 
eral Constitution  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  Government  and  the  pre- 
servation of  the  Union  ;  and  that,  in  case  of  such  concurrence,  the  two 
Houses  of  the  Legislature  will  meet  on  Thursday  next,  at  such  place  as 
the  Honorable  the  Senate  shall  think  proper,  for  the  purpose  of  electing 
the  said  delegates  by  joint  ballot. 


26  ARTICLES    OF   CONFEDERATIOW. 


ARTICLES  OF  CONFEDERATION. 


Articles  of  Confederation  and  perpetual  Union  between  the  States  of 
New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts  Bay,  Rhode  Island  and  Providence  Planta- 
tions, Connecticut,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  Mary- 
land, Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia. 

Article  I.  The  style  of  this  Confederacy  shall  be  "  The  United  States  of  America." 

Art.  II.  Each  State  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom,  and  independence,  and  every 
power,  jurisdiction,  and  right,  which  is  not  by  this  Confederation  expressly  delegated 
to  the  United  States,  in  Congress  assembled. 

Art.  III.  The  said  States  hereby  severally  enter  into  a  firm  league  of  friendship 
with  each  other,  for  their  common  defence,  the  security  of  their  liberties,  and  their 
mutual  and  general  welfare,  binding  themselves  to  assist  each  other,  against  all  force 
offered  to,  or  attacks  made  upon  them,  or  any  of  them,  on  account  of  religion,  sov- 
ereignty, trade,  or  any  other  pretence  whatever. 

Art.  IV.  The  better  to  secure  and  perpetuate  mutual  friendship  and  intercourse 
among  the  people  of  the  different  States  in  this  Union,  the  free  inhabitants  of  each 
of  these  States,  paupers,  vagabonds,  and  fugitives  from  justice  excepted,  shall  be 
entitled  to  all  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  free  citizens  in  the  several  States,  and 
the  people  of  each  State  shall  have  free  ingress  and  regiasi  to  and  from  any  other 
State,  and  shall  enjoy  therein  all  the  privileges  of  trade  and  commence,  subject  to  the 
same  duties,  impositions,  and  restrictions  as  the  inhabitants  thereof  respectively,  pro- 
vided that  such  restrictions  shall  not  extend  so  far  as  to  prevent  the  removal  of  prop- 
erty imported  into  any  State,  to  any  other  State  of  which  the  owner  is  an  inhabitant ; 
provided  also,  that  no  imposition,  duties  or  restriction  shall  be  laid  by  any  State,  on 
the  property  of  the  United  States,  or  either  of  them. 

If  any  person  guilty  of  or  charged  with  trettson,  felony,  or  other  high  misdemeanor 
in  any  State,  shall  flee  from  justice,  and  be  found  in  any  of  the  United  States,  he 
shall  upon  demand  of  the  governor  or  executive  power  of  the  State  from  which 
he  fled,  be  delivered  up  and  removed  to  the  State  having  jurisdiction  of  his  ofi"ence. 

Full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in  each  of  these  States  to  the  records,  acts,  and 
judicial  proceedings  of  the  Courts  and  magistrates  of  every  other  State. 

Art.  V.  For  the  more  convenient  management  of  the  general  interests  of  the  United 
States,  delegates  shall  be  annually  appointed  in  such  manner  as  the  legislature  of 
each  State  shall  direct,  to  meet  in  Congress  on  the  first  Monday  in  November,  in  every 
year,  with  a  power  reserved  to  each  State,  to  recall  its  delegates,  or  any  of  them,  at 
any  time  within  the  year,  and  to  send  others  in  their  stead,  for  the  remainder  of  the 
year. 

No  State  shall  be  represented  in  Congress  by  less  than  two,  nor  by  more  than  seven 
members ;  and  no  person  shall  be  capable  of  being  a  delegate  for  more  than  three 
years  in  any  term  of  six  years,  nor  shall  any  person,  being  a  delegate,  be  capable  of 
holding  any  oflSce  under  the  United  States,  for  which  he  or  another  for  his  benefit 
receives  any  salary,  fees,  or  emolument  of  any  kind. 

Each  State  shall  maintain  its  own  delegates  in  a  meeting  of  the  States,  and  while  . 
they  act  as  members  of  the  committee  of  the  States. 

In  determining  questions  in  the  United  States,  in  Congress  assembled,  each  State 
8hall  have  one  vote. 


ARTICLES    OF    CONFEDERATION.  27 

Freedom  of  speech  and  debate  in  Congress  shall  not  be  impeached  or  questioned  in 
any  Court  or  place  out  of  Congress,  and  the  members  of  Congress  shall  be  protected 
in  their  persons  from  arrests  and  imprisonments,  during  the  time  of  their  going  to 
and  from,  and  attendance  on  Congress,  except  for  treason,  felony,  or  breach  of  thn 
peace. 

Art.  VI.  No  State,  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States  in  Congress  assem- 
bled, shall  send  any  embassy  to,  or  receive  any  embassy  from,  or  enter  into  any  con- 
ference, agreement,  alliance,  or  treaty  with  any  king,  prince,  or  State ;  nor  shall  any 
person  holding  any  office  of  profit  or  trust  under  the  United  States,  or  any  of  them, 
accept  of  any  present,  emolument,  office,  or  title  of  anj-  kind  whatever  from  any  king, 
nrince,  or  foreign  State ;  nor  shall  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  or  any 
of  them,  grant  any  title  of  nobility. 

No  two  or  more  States  shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  confederation,  or  alliance  what- 
ever between  them,  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled, 
specifying  accurately  the  purposes  for  which  the  same  is  to  be  entered  into,  and  how 
long  it  shall  continue. 

No  State  shall  lay  any  imposts  or  duties,  which  may  interfere  with  any  stipulations 
in  treaties  entered  into  by  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  with  any  king, 
prince,  or  State,  in  pursuance  of  any  treaties  already  proposed  by  Congress,  to  the 
Courts  of  France  and  Spain. 

No  vessels  of  war  shall  be  kept  up  in  time  of  peace  by  any  State,  except  such  num- 
ber only  as  shall  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  United  States,  in  Congress  assembled, 
for  the  defence  of  such  State  or  its  trade ;  nor  shall  any  body  of  forces  be  kept  up  by 
any  State,  in  time  of  peace,  except  such  number  only  as  in  the  judgment  of  the  United 
States,  in  Congress  assembled,  shall  be  deemed  requisite  to  garrison  the  forts  neces- 
sary for  the  defence  of  such  State ;  but  every  State  shall  always  keep  up  a  well  regu- 
lated and  disciplined  militia,  sufficiently  armed  and  accoutred,  and  shall  provide  and 
constantly  have  ready  for  use,  in  public  stores,  a  due  number  of  field  pieces  and  tents, 
and  a  proper  quantity  of  arms,  ammunition,  and  camp  equipage. 

No  State  shall  engage  in  any  war  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States  in  Con- 
gress assembled,  unless  such  State  be  actually  invaded  by  enemies,  or  shall  have 
received  certain  advice  of  a  resolution  being  formed  by  some  nation  of  Indians  to 
invade  such  State,  and  the  danger  is  so  imminent  as  not  to  admit  of  a  delay  till  the 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled  can  be  consulted ;  nor  shall  any  State  grant 
commissions  to  any  ships  or  vessels  of  war,  nor  letters  of  marque  or  reprisal,  except 
it  be  after  a  declaration  of  war  by  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  and  then 
only  against  the  kingdom  or  State,  and  the  subjects  thereof,  against  which  war  has 
been  so  declared,  and  under  such  regulations  as  shall  be  established  by  the  United 
States  in  Congress  assembled,  unless  such  State  be  infested  by  pirates,  in  which  case 
vessels  of  war  may  be  fitted  out  for  that  occasion,  and  kept  so  long  as  the  danger 
shall  continue,  or  until  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled  shall  determine 
)therwise. 

Art.  VII.  When  land  forces  are  raided  by  any  State  for  the  common  defence,  all 
officers  of  or  under  the  rank  of  Colonel  shall  be  appointed  by  the  legislature  of  each 
State  respectively,  by  whom  such  forces  shall  be  raised,  or  in  such  manner  as  such 
State  shall  direct ;  and  all  vacancies  shall  be  filled  up  by  the  State  which  first  made 
the  appointment. 

Art.  VIII.  All  charges  of  war  and  all  other  expenses  that  shall  be  incurred  for  the 
common  defence  or  general  welfare,  and  allowed  by  the  United  States  in  Congress 
assembled,  shall  be  defrayed  out  of  a  common  treasury,  which  shall  be  supplied  by 
the  several  States,  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  all  land  within  each  State,  granted  to 
)r  surveyed  for  any  person,  buC  «uoh  land  and  the  bnildings  and  improvements  thereon 

13 


28  ARTICLES    OF    CONFEDEP  ATION. 

ehall  be  estimated  according  to  such  mode  as  the  United  States  in  Congress  assen.  led 
shall  from  time  to  time  direct  and  appoint. 

The  taxes  for  paying  that  proportion  shall  be  laid  and  levied  by  the  authorit.'  and 
direction  of  the  legislatures  of  the  several  States  within  the  time  agreed  upon  t  /  the 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled. 

Art.  IX.  The  United  States  in  Congress  assembled  shall  have  the  sole  and  jxclu- 
sive  right  and  power  of  determining  on  peace  and  war,  except  in  the  cases  mentioned  in 
the  sixth  article — of  sending  and  receiving  ambassadors — entering  into  treaties  and 
alliances,  provided  that  no  treaty  of  commerce  shall  be  made  whereby  the  legislative 
power  of  the  respective  States  shall  be  restrained  from  imposing  such  imposts  and  duties 
on  foreigners  as  their  own  people  are  subjected  to,  or  from  prohibiting  the  exportation  or 
importation  of  any  species  of  goods  or  commodities  whatsoever — of  establishing  rules 
for  deciding,  in  all  cases,  what  captures  on  land  or  water  shall  be  legal,  and  in  what 
manner  prizes  takeo  by  land  or  naval  forces  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  shall 
be  divided  or  appropriated — of  granting  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  in  times  of 
peace — appointing  Courts  for  the  trial  of  piracies  and  felonies  committed  on  the  high 
seas,  and  establishing  courts  for  receiving  and  determining  finally  appeals  in  all  cases 
of  captures,  provided  that  no  member  of  Congress  shall  be  appointed  a  judge  of  any 
of  the  said  Courts. 

The  United  States  in  Congress  assembled  shall  also  be  the  last  resort  on  appeal  in 
all  disputes  and  diflferences  now  subsisting  or  that  hereafter  may  arise  between  twc  or 
more  States  concerning  boundary,  jurisdiction,  or  any  other  cause  whatever ;  which 
authority  shall  always  be  exercised  in  the  manner  following : — Whenever  the  legisla- 
tive or  executive  authority  or  lawful  agent  of  any  State  in  controversy  with  another 
shall  present  a  petition  to  Congress  stating  the  matter  in  question  and  praying  for  a 
hearing,  notice  thereof  shall  be  given  by  order  of  Congress  to  the  legislative  or  execu- 
tive authority  of  the  other  State  in  controversy,  and  a  day  assigned  for  the  appear- 
ance of  the  parties  by  their  lawful  agents,  who  shall  then  be  directed  to  appoint,  by 
joint  consent,  commissioners  or  judges  to  constitute  a  court  for  hearing  and  determin- 
ing the  matter  in  question ;  but  if  they  cannot  agree.  Congress  shall  name  three  per- 
sons out  of  each  of  the  United  States,  and  from  the  list  of  such  persons  each  party 
shall  alternately  strike  out  one,  the  petitioners  beginning,  until  the  number  shall  be 
reduced  to  thirteen ;  and  from  that  number  not  less  than  seven  nor  more  than  nine 
names,  as  Congress  shall  direct,  shall,  in  the  presence  of  Congress  be  drawn  out  by 
lot,  and  the  persons  whose  names  shall  be  so  drawn,  or  any  five  of  them,  shall  be  cor 
missioners  or  judges,  to  hear  and  finally  determine  the  controversy,  so  always  8 
major  part  of  the  Judges  who  shall  hear  the  cause  shall  agree  in  the  determination  ; 
and  if  either  party  shall  neglect  to  attend  at  the  day  appointed,  without  showing  rea- 
sons, which  Congress  shall  judge  suflBcient,  or,  being  present,  shall  refuse  to  strike,  the 
Congress  shall  proceed  to  nominate  three  persons  out  of  each  State,  and  the  secretary 
of  Congress  shall  strike  in  behalf  of  such  party  absent  or  refusing ;  and  the  judg- 
ment and  sentence  of  the  Court  to  be  appointed,  in  the  manner  before  prescribed,  shall 
be  final  and  conclusive ;  and  if  any  of  the  parties  shall  refuse  to  submit  to  the  autho- 
rity of  such  court,  or  to  appear  or  defend  their  claim  or  cause,  the  Court  shall  never- 
theless proceed  to  pronounce  sentence  or  judgment,  which  shall  in  like  manner  be  final 
and  decisive,  the  judgment  or  sentence  and  other  proceedings  being  in  either  case 
transmitted  to  Congress,  and  lodged  among  the  acts  of  Congress  for  the  security  of 
the  parties  concerned  :  provided  that  every  commissioner,  before  he  sits  in  judgment, 
shall  take  an  oath,  to  be  administered  by  one  of  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  or  Supe- 
rior Court  of  the  State  where  the  cause  shall  be  tried,  "well  and  truly  to  hear  and 

ietermine  the  matter  in  question  according  to  the  best  of  his  judgment,  without  favour, 
affection,  or  hope  of  retoard :"  provided  also  that  no  State  sl^all  be  deprived  of  terri- 
tory for  the  benefit  of  the  United  States. 


ARTICLES    OF   CONFEDERATION.  29 

All  controversies  concerning  the  private  right  of  soil,  claimed  under  dififerent  granU 
of  two  or  more  States,  whose  jurisdictions  as  they  may  respect  such  lands  and  the 
States  which  passed  such  grants  are  adjusted,  the  said  grants  or  either  of  them  being 
at  the  same  time  claimed  to  h<ave  originated  antecedent  to  such  settlement  of  jurisdic- 
tion, shall,  on  the  petition  of  either  party  to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  be 
finally  determined  as  near  as  may  be  in  the  same  manner  as  is  before  prescribed  for 
deciding  disputes  respecting  territorial  jurisdiction  between  diflFerent  States. 

The  United  States  in  Congress  assembled  shall  also  have  the  sole  and  exclusive  right 
and  power  of  regulating  the  alloy  and  value  of  coin  struck  by  their  own  authority,  or 
by  that  of  the  respective  States — fixing  the  standard  of  weights  and  measures  through- 
out the  United  States — regulating  the  trade  and  managing  all  affairs  with  the  Indians, 
not  members  of  any  of  the  States,  provided  that  the  legislative  right  of  any  State 
within  its  own  limits  be  not  infringed  or  violated — establishing  and  regulating  post- 
offices  from  one  State  to  another,  throughout  all  the  United  States,  and  exacting  such 
postage  on  the  papers  passing  through  the  same  as  may  be  requisite  to  defray  the 
expenses  of  the  said  office — appointing  all  officers  of  the  land  forces  in  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  excepting  regimental  officers — appointing  all  the  officers  of  the 
naval  forces,  and  commissioning  all  officers  whatever  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States  —  making  rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  said  land  and  naval 
forces,  and  directing  their  operations. 

The  United  States  in  Congress  assembled  shall  have  authority  to  appoint  a  commit- 
tee, to  sit  in  the  recess  of  Congress,  to  be  denominated  "A  Committee  of  the  States," 
and  to  consist  of  one  delegiite  from  each  State ;  and  to  appoint  such  other  committees 
and  civil  officers  as  may  be  necessary  for  managing  the  general  affairs  of  the  United 
States  under  their  direction — to  appoint  one  of  their  number  to  preside,  provided  that 
no  person  be  allowed  to  serve  in  the  office  of  president  more  than  one  year  in  any 
term  of  three  years ;  to  ascertain  the  necessary  sums  of  money  to  be  raised  for  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  and  to  appropriate  and  apply  the  same  for  defraying  the 
public  expenses — to  borrow  money,  or  emit  bills  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States, 
transmitting  every  half-year  to  the  respective  States  an  account  of  the  snms  of  money 
so  borrowed  or  emitted — to  build  and  equip  a  navy — to  agree  upon  the  number  of  land 
forces,  and  to  make  requisitions  from  each  State  for  its  quota,  in  proportion  to  the 
number  of  white  inhabitants  in  such  State ;  which  requisition  shall  be  binding,  and 
thereupon  the  legislature  of  each  State  shall  appoint  the  regimental  officers,  rajse  the 
men,  and  clothe,  arm,  and  equip  them  in  a  soldier-like  manner,  at  the  expense  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  officers  and  men  so  clothed,  armed,  and  equipped  shall  march 
to  the  place  appointed,  and  within  the  time  agreed  on  by  the  United  States  in  Con 
gress  assembled ;  but  if  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled  shall,  on  considera 
tion  of  circumstances,  judge  proper  that  any  State  should  not  raise  men,  or  should 
raise  a  smaller  number  than  its  quota,  and  that  any  other  State  should  raise  a  greater 
number  of  men  than  the  quota  thereof,  such  extra  number  shall  be  raised,  officered, 
clothed,  armed,  and  equipped  in  the  same  manner  as  the  quota  of  such  State,  unless 
the  legislature  of  such  State  shall  judge  that  such  extra  number  cannot  be  safely 
spared  out  of  the  same,  in  which  case  they  shall  raise,  officer,  clothe,  arm,  and  equip 
as  many  of  such  extra  number  as  they  judge  can  be  safely  spared.  And  the  officers 
and  men  so  clothed,  armed,  and  equipped  shall  march  to  the  place  appointed,  and 
within  the  time  agreed  on  by  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled. 

The  United  States  in  Congress  assembled  shall  never  engage  in  a  war,  nor  grant 
letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  in  time  of  peace,  nor  enter  into  any  treaties  or  alliances, 
nor  coin  money,  nor  regulate  the  value  thereof,  nor  ascertain  the  sums  and  expenses 
necessary  for  the  defence  and  welfare  of  the  United  States,  or  any  of  them,  nor  emit 
bills,  nor  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States,  nor  appropriate  money, 
nor  agree  upop  ine  number  of  vessels  of  war  to  be  built  or  purchased,  or  the  auiab«r 


30  ARTICLES    OF    CONFEDERATION. 

*f  land  or  sea  forces  to  be  raised,  nor  appoint  a  commander  in  chief  of  the  army  or 
navy,  unless  nine  States  assent  to  the  same ;  nor  shall  a  question  on  any  other  point, 
except  for  adjourning  from  day  to  day,  be  deteririued,  unless  by  the  votes  of  a  majority 
of  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled. 

The  Congress  of  the  United  States  shall  have  power  to  adjourn  to  any  time  within 
the  year,  and  to  any  place  within  the  United  States,  so  that  no  period  of  adjournment 
be  for  a  longer  duration  than  the  space  of  six  months,  and  shall  publish  the  journal 
of  their  proceedings  monthly,  except  such  parts  thereof  relating  to  treaties,  alliances, 
or  military  operations,  as  in  their  judgment  require  secresy,  and  the  yeas  and  nays  of 
the  delegates  of  each  State  on  any  question  shall  be  entered  on  the  journal,  when  it 
is  desired  by  any  delegate ;  and  the  delegates  of  a  State,  or  any  of  them,  at  his  or 
their  request,  shall  be  furnished  with  a  transcript  of  the  said  journal,  except  such 
parts  as  are  above  excepted,  to  lay  before  the  legislatures  of  the  several  States. 

Art.  X.  The  Committee  of  the  States,  or  any  niae  of  them,  shall  be  authorized  to 
execute,  in  the  recess  of  Congress,  such  of  the  powers  of  Congress  as  the  United 
States  in  Congress  assembled,  by  the  consent  of  nine  States,  shall  from  time  to  time 
think  expedient  to  vest  them  with :  provided  that  no  power  be  delegated  to  the  said 
Committee,  for  the  exercise  of  which,  by  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  the  voice  of 
nine  States  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  assembled  is  requisite. 

Art.  XL  Canada,  acceding  to  this  Confederation,  and  joining  in  the  measures  ol 
the  United  States,  shall  be  admitted  into  and  entitled  to  all  the  advantages  of  this 
Union  ,■  but  no  other  colony  shall  be  admitted  into  the  same,  unless  such  admission  be 
agreed  to  by  nine  States. 

Art.  XII.  All  bills  of  credit  emitted,  moneys  borrowed,  and  debts  contracted  by  or 
under  the  authority  of  Congress,  before  the  assembling  of  the  United  States  in  pursu- 
ance of  the  present  Confederation,  shall  be  deemed  and  considered  as  a  charge  against 
the  United  States,  for  payment  and  satisfaction  whereof  the  said  United  States  and 
the  public  faith  are  hereby  solemnly  pledgftd. 

Art.  XIII.  Every  State  shall  abide  by  the  determinations  of  the  United  States  in 
Congress  assembled,  on  all  questions  which  by  this  Confederation  are  submitted  to 
them.  And  the  Articles  of  this  Confederation  shall  be  inviolably  observed  by  every 
State,  and  the  Union  shall  be  perpetual ;  nor  shall  any  alteration  at  any  time  here- 
after be  made  in  any  of  them;  unless  such  alteration  be  agreed  to  in  a  Congress  of 
the  United  States,  and  be  afterwards  confirmed  by  the  legislatures  of  every  State. 

And  whereas  it  hath  pleased  the  Great  Governor  of  the  world  to  incline  the  hearts 
of  the  legislatures  we  respectively  represent  in  Congress  to  approve  of  and  to  author- 
ize us  to  ratify  the  said  articles  of  Confederation  and  perpetual  Union,  Know  ye, 
That  we  the  undersigned  delegates,  by  virtue  of  the  power  and  authority  to  us  given 
for  that  purpose,  do  by  these  presents,  in  the  name  and  in  behalf  of  our  respectivo 
constituents,  fully  and  entirely  ratify  and  confirm  each  and  every  of  the  said  Articles 
of  Confederation  and  perpetual  Union,  and  all  and  singular  the  matters  and  things 
therein  contained :  and  we  do  further  solemnly  plight  and  engage  the  faith  of  our 
respective  constituents  that  they  shall  abide  by  the  determinations  of  the  United 
States  in  Congress  assembled,  on  all  questions  which  by  the  said  Confederation  are 
submitted  to  them.  And  that  the  Articles  thereof  shall  be  inviolably  observed  by  tha 
States  we  respeotively  represent,  and  that  the  Union  shall  be  perpetual. 


Hamilton's  first  plan  of  government.  iil 


HAMILTON'S  FIRST  PLAN  OF  GOVERNMENT. 


The  People  of  the  United  States  of  America  do  ordain  and  estor 
blish  this  Constitution  for  the  Government  of  themselves  and 
their  Posterity. 

ARTICLE    I. 

Section  1.  The  Legislative  power  shall  be  vested  in  two  distinct  bodies  of  men, 
one  to  be  called  the  Assembly,  the  other  the  Senate,  subject  to  the  negative  herein- 
after mentioned. 

Sec.  2.  The  Executive  power,  with  the  qualifications  hereinafter  specified,  shall  be 
vested  in  a  President  of  the  United  States. 

Sec.  3.  The  supreme  Judicial  authority,  except  in  the  cases  otherwise  provided  for 
in  this  Constitution,  shall  be  vested  in  a  court  to  be  called  the  Supreme  Court,  to 
consist  of  not  less  than  six,  nor  more  than  twelve  judges. 

ARTICLE    II. 

Sec.  1.  The  Assembly  shall  consist  of  persona  to  be  called  Representatives,  who 
shall  be  chosen,  except  in  the  first  instance,  by  the  free  male  citizens  and  inhabitants 
of  the  several  States  comprehended  in  the  Union,  all  of  whom  of  the  age  of  twenty- 
one  years  and  upwards  shall  be  entitled  to  an  equal  vote. 

Sec.  2.  But  the  first  Assembly  shall  be  chosen  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  the  last 
Article,  and  shall  consist  of  one  hundred  members,  of  whom  New  Hampshire  shall 
have  five,  Massachusetts  thirteen,  Rhode  Island  two,  Connecticut  seven.  New  York 
nine,  New  Jersey  six,  Pennsylvania  twelve,  Delaware  two,  Maryland  eight,  Virginia 
sixteen,  North  Carolina  eight,  South  Carolina  eight,  Georgia  four. 

Sec.  3.  The  Legislature  shall  provide  for  the  future  elections  of  Representatives, 
apportioning  them  in  each  State,  from  time  to  time,  as  nearly  as  may  be  to  the 
number  of  persons  described  in  the  4th  Section  of  the  Vllth  Article,  so  as  that  the 
whole  number  of  Representatives  shall  never  be  less  than  one  hundred,  nor  more 
than  hundred.     There  shall  be  a  census   taken  for  this  purpose  within  three 

years,  after  the  first  meeting  of  the  Legislature,  and  within  every  successive  period 
of  ten  years.  The  term  for  which  Representatives  shall  be  elected  shall  be  determined 
by  the  Legislature ;  but  shall  not  exceed  three  years.  There  shall  be  a  general 
election  at  least  once  in  three  years ;  and  the  time  of  service  of  all  the  members  in 
each  Assembly  shall  begin  (except  in  filling  vacancies)  on  the  same  day,  and  shall 
always  end  on  the  same  day. 

Sec.  4.  Forty  members  shall  make  a  bouse  sufQcient  to  proceed  to  business.  But 
this  number  may  be  increased  by  the  Legislature,  yet  so  as  never  to  exceed  a  majority 
of  ',ho  whole  number  of  Representatives. 

Sec.  5.  The  Assembly  shall  choose  its  President  and  other  officers :  shall  judge  of 
the  qualifications  and  elections  of  its  own  members ;  punish  them  for  improper  con- 
duct in  their  capacity  of  Representatives  not  extending  to  life  or  limb,  and  shall 
exclusively  possess  the  power  of  impeachment,  except  in  the  case  of  the  President  of 


32  Hamilton's  first  plan  of  government. 

the  United  States ;  but  no  impeachment  of  a  member  of  the  Senate  shall  be  by  less 
than  two-thirds  of  the  Representatives  present. 

Sec.  6.  Representatives  may  vote  by  proxy,  but  no  Representative  present  shall  be 
proxy  for  more  than  one  who  is  absent. 

Sec.  7.  Bills  for  raising  revenue  and  bills  for  appropriating  monies  for  the  support 
of  fleets  and  armies  and  for  paying  the  salaries  of  the  oflScers  of  government  shall 
originate  in  the  Assembly,  but  may  be  altered  and  amended  by  the  Senate. 

Sec.  8.  The  acceptance  of  an  office  under  the  United  States  by  a  Representative 
■hall  vacate  his  seat  in  the  Assembly. 

ARTICLE    II L 

Sec.  1.  The  Senate  shall  consist  of  persons  to  be  chosen,  except  in  the  first  instance, 
by  Electors  elected  for  that  purpose  by  the  citizens  and  inhabitants  of  the  several 
States,  comprehended  in  the  Union,  who  shall  have  in  their  own  right,  or  in  the  right 
of  their  wives,  an  estate  in  land  for  not  less  than  life,  or  a  term  of  years,  whereof,  at 
the  time  of  giving  their  votes,  there  shall  be  at  least  fourteen  years  unexpired. 

Sec.  2.  But  the  first  Senate  shall  be  chosen  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  the  last 
Article,  and  shall  consist  of  forty  members  to  be  called  Senators,  of  whom  New  Hamp- 
shire shall  have  ;  Massachusetts  ;  Rhode  Island  ;  Connecticut 
;  New  York  ;  New  Jersey  ;  Pennsylvania  ;  Delaware  ; 
Maryland  ;  Virginia  ;  North  Carolina  ;  South  Carolina  ; 
Georgia 

Sec.  .3.  The  Legislature  shall  provide  for  the  future  elections  of  Senators  ;  for  which 
purpose  the  States  respectively,  which  have  more  than  one  Senator,  shall  be  divided 
into  convenient  districts  to  which  the  Senators  shall  be  apportioned :  a  State  having 
but  one  Senator  shall  be  itself  a  district.  On  the  death,  resignation,  or  removal  from 
office  of  a  Senator,  his  place  shall  be  supplied  by  a  new  election  in  the  District  from 
which  he  came.  Upon  each  election  there  shall  be  not  less  than  six,  nor  more  than 
twelve  electors  chosen  in  a  District. 

Sec.  4.  The  number  of  Senators  shall  never  be  less  than  forty,  nor  shall  any  State, 
if  the  same  shall  not  hereafter  be  divided,  ever  have  less  than  the  number  allotted  to 
it  in  the  second  Section  of  this  Article.  But  the  Legislature  may  increase  the  whole 
number  of  Senators,  in  the  same  proportion  to  the  whole  number  of  Representatives, 
as  forty  is  to  one  hundred,  and  such  increase  beyond  the  present  number  shall  be 
apportioned  to  the  respective  States,  in  a  ratio  to  the  respective  numbers  of  their 
Representatives. 

Sec.  5.  If  States  shall  be  divided,  or  if  a  new  arrangement  of  the  boundaries  of 
two  or  more  States  shall  take  place,  the  Legislature  shall  apportion  the  number  of 
Senators  (in  elections  succeeding  such  division  or  arrangement)  to  which  the  con- 
stituent parts  were  entitled,  according  to  the  change  of  situation,  having  regard  to 
the  number  of  persons  described  in  the  4th  Section  of  the  Vllth  Article. 

Sec.  6.  The  Senators  shall  hold  their  places  during  good  behaviour,  removeable 
only  by  conviction  on  impeachment  for  some  crime  or  misdemeanour.  They  shall 
continue  to  exercise  their  offices,  when  impeached,  until  a  conviction  shall  take  place. 
Sixteen  Senators  attending  in  person  shall  be  sufficient  to  make  a  house  to  transact 
business.  But  the  Legislature  may  increase  this  number,  yet  so  as  never  to  exceed  a 
majority  of  the  whole  number  of  Senators.  The  Senators  may  vote  by  proxy,  but  nt 
Senator  who  is  present  shall  be  proxy  for  more  than  two  who  are  absent. 

Sec.  7.  The  Senate  shall  choose  its  President  and  other  officers,  shall  ji'dge  of  ti« 
qualifications  and  elections  of  its  members,  and  shall  punish  them  for  improper  con- 
duct in  their  capacity  of  Senators;  but  such  punishment  shall  not  extend  to  lile  or 
limb,  nor  to  expulsion.     In  the  absence  of  their  President,  they  may  jhoose  a  tempo- 


Hamilton's  first  plan  of  government.  88 

rary  President.     The  President  shall  only  have  a  casting  vote  wnen  the  House  u 
equally  divided. 

Sec.  8.  The  Senate  shall  exclusively  possess  the  power  of  declaring  war.  No  treaty 
shall  be  made  without  their  advice  and  consent,  which  shall  also  be  necessary  to  the 
appointment  of  all  officers,  except  such  for  which  a  different  provision  is  made  in  this 
Constitution. 

ARTICLE    IV. 

Sec.  1.  The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  (except  in  the  first  instance) 
shall  be  elected  in  the  manner  following. 

The  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  shall,  within  sixty  days  after  a  vacancy  shall 
happen,  cause  public  notice  to  be  given  in  each  State  of  such  vacancy,  appointing 
therein  three  several  days  for  the  several  purposes  following,  to  wit  — 

A  day  for  commencing  the  election  of  Electors  for  the  purposes  hereinafter  specified 
— to  be  called  the  first  Electors,  which  day  shall  not  be  less  than  forty,  nor  more  than 
sixty  days  after  the  day  of  the  publication  of  the  notice  in  each  State ;  another  day 
for  the  meeting  of  the  Electors  not  less  than  forty,  nor  more  than  ninety  days,  from 
the  day  for  commencing  their  election ;  another  day  for  the  meeting  of  Electors,  to  be 
chosen  by  the  first  Electors,  for  the  purpose  hereinafter  specified,  and  to  be  called  the 
second  Electors,  which  day  shall  not  be  less  than  forty,  nor  more  than  sixty  days, 
after  the  day  for  the  meeting  of  the  first  Electors. 

Sec.  2.  After  notice  of  a  vacancy  shall  have  been  given,  there  shall  be  chosen  in 
each  State  a  number  of  persons,  as  the  first  Electors  in  the  preceding  Section  men- 
tioned, equal  to  the  whole  number  of  the  Repres^ntativep  and  Senators  of  such  State 
in  the  Legislature  of  the  United  States ;  which  Electors  shall  be  chosen  by  the  citizens 
of  such  State,  having  an  estate  of  inheritance,  or  for  three  lives  in  land,  or  a  clear 
personal  estate  of  the  value  of  one  thousand  Spanish  milled  dollars  of  the  present 
standard. 

Sec.  3.  These  first  Electors  shall  meet  in  their  respective  States  at  the  time 
appointed,  at  one  place,  and  shall  proceed  to  vote  by  ballot  for  a  President,  who  shall 
not  be  one  of  their  own  number,  unless  the  Legislature  upon  experiment  should  here- 
after direct  otherwise. 

They  shall  cause  two  lists  to  be  made  of  the  name  or  names  of  the  person  or  persons 
voted  for,  which  they  or  the  major  part  of  them  shall  sign  and  certify.  They  shall 
then  proceed  each  to  nominate  openly  in  the  presence  of  the  others  two  persons  as  for 
second  Electors,  and  out  of  the  persons  who  shall  have  the  four  highest  numbers  of 
nominations ;  they  shall  afterwards  by  ballot  by  plurality  of  votes  choose  two,  who 
shall  be  the  second  Electors,  to  each  of  whom  shall  be  delivered  one  of  the  lists  before 
mentioned.  These  second  Electors  shall  not  be  any  of  the  persons  voted  for  as 
President. 

A  copy  of  the  same  list,  signed  and  certified  in  like  manner,  shall  be  transmitted 
by  the  first  Electors  to  the  seat  of  the  government  of  the  United  States,  under  a 
sealed  cover  directed  to  the  President  of  the  Assembly,  which,  after  the  meeting  of 
the  second  Electors,  shall  be  opened  for  the  inspection  of  the  two  houses  of  the  Legis- 
lature. 

Sec.  4.  These  second  Electors  shall  meet  precisely  on  the  day  appointed  (and  not 
on  another  day)  at  one  place.  The  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  or  if  there 
be  no  Chief  Justice,  the  Judge  Senior  in  office  in  such  court,  or  if  there  be  no  one 
Judge  Senior  in  office,  some  other  Judge  of  that  court,  by  the  choice  of  the  rest  of  the 
Judges,  or  of  a  majority  of  them,  shall  attend  at  the  same  place,  and  shall  preside  at 
the  meeting,  but  shall  have  no  vote.  Two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  of  the  Electors 
shall  constitute  a  sufficient  meeting  for  the  execution  of  their  trust.  At  this  meeting 
the  lists  delivered  to  the  respective  Electors  shall  be  produced  and  inspected,  and  if 


34  HAMILTON'S    FIRST    PLAN    OF    GOVERNMENT. 

there  be  any  person  who  has  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  the  votes  given  by 
the  first  Electors,  he  shall  be  the  President  of  the  United  States.  But  if  there  be  no 
Buoh  person,  the  second  Electors  so  met  shall  proceed  to  vote  by  ballot  for  one  of  the 
persons  named  in  the  lists,  who  shall  have  the  three  highest  numbers  of  the  votes  of 
the  first  Electors,  and  if  upon  the  first  or  any  succeeding  ballot,  on  the  day  of  the 
meeting,  either  of  those  persons  shall  have  a  number  of  votes  equal  to  a  majority  of 
the  whole  number  of  second  Electors  chosen,  he  shall  be  the  President.  But  if  no 
Buch  choice  be  made  on  the  day  appointed  for  the  meeting,  either  by  reason  of  the 
non-attendance  of  the  second  Electors,  or  their  not  agreeing  or  any  other  matter, 
the  person  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  of  the  first  Electors  shall  be  the 
President. 

Sec.  5.  If  it  should  happen  that  the  Chief  Justice  or  some  other  Judge  of  the 
Supreme  Court  should  not  attend  in  due  time,  the  second  Electors  shall  proceed  to  the 
execution  of  their  trust  without  him. 

Sec.  6.  If  the  Judges  should  neglect  to  cause  the  notice  required  by  the  first 
Section  of  this  Article  to  be  given  within  the  time  therein  limited,  they  may  never- 
theless cause  it  to  be  afterwards  given ;  but  their  neglect,  if  wilful,  is  hereby  declared 
to  be  an  offence  for  which  they  may  be  impeached,  and  if  convicted,  they  shall  be 
punished  as  in  other  cases  of  conviction  on  impeachment. 

Sec.  7.  The  Legislature  shall  by  permanent  laws  provide  such  further  regulations 
as  may  be  necessary  for  the  more  orderly  election  of  the  President,  not  contravening 
the  provisions  herein  contained. 

Sec.  8.  The  President,  before  he  shall  enter  upon  the  execution  of  his  oflBce,  shall 
take  an  oath  or  affirmation  faithfully  to  execute  the  same,  and  to  the  utmost  of  his 
judgment  and  power  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  people,  and  preserve  the  Constitution 
inviolate.  This  oath  or  affirmation  shall  be  administered  by  the  President  of  the 
Senate  for  the  time  'being,  in  the  presence  of  both  houses  of  the  Legislature. 

Sec.  9.  The  Senate  and  the  Assembly  shall  always  convene  in  session  on  the  day 
appointed  for  the  meeting  of  the  second  Electors,  and  shall  continue  sitting  till  the 
President  take  the  oath  or  affirmation  of  office.  He  shall  hold  his  office  during  good 
behaviour,  removeable  only  by  conviction  upon  an  impeachment  for  some  crime  or 
misdemeanour. 

Sec.  10.  The  President  at  the  beginning  of  every  meeting  of  the  Legislature,  as 
Boon  as  they  shall  be  ready  to  proceed  to  business,  shall  convene  them  together  at  the 
place  where  the  Senate  shall  sit,  and  shall  communicate  to  them  all  such  matters  as 
may  be  necessary  for  their  information,  or  as  may  require  their  consideration.  He 
may  by  message  during  the  session  communicate  all  other  matters  which  may  appear 
to  him  proper.  He  may,  whenever  in  his  opinion  the  public  business  shall  require  it, 
convene  the  Senate  and  Assembly,  or  either  of  them,  and  may  prorogue  them  for  a 
time  not  exceeding  forty  days  at  one  prorogation,  and  if  they  should  disagree  about 
their  adjournment,  he  may  adjourn  them  to  such  time  as  he  shall  think  proper.  He 
shall  have  a  right  to  negative  all  bills,  resolutions  or  acts  of  the  two  houses  of  the 
Legislature  about  to  be  passed  into  laws.  He  shall  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faith- 
fully executed.  He  shall  be  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the 
United  States,  and  of  the  militia  within  the  several  States,  and  shall  have  the 
direction  of  war  when  commenced ;  but  he  shall  not  take  the  actual  command  in  the 
field  of  an  army,  without  the  consent  of  the  Senate  and  Assembly. 

All  treaties,  conventions,  and  agreements  with  foreign  nations  shall  be  made  by 
him,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  He  shall  have  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  principal  or  chief  officer  of  each  of  the  departments  of  war,  naval  affairs, 
finance  and  foreign  affairs,  and  shall  have  the  nomination,  and  by  and  with  the  con- 
Bent  of  the  Senate  the  appointment  of  all  other  officers  to  be  appointed  under  the 
authority  of  the  United  States,  except  such  for  whom  different  provision  is  maae  oy 


HAMILTON'S    FIRST    PLAN   OF   GOVERNMENT.  35 

this  Constitution,  and  provided  that  this  shall  not  be  construed  to  prevent  the  Legis- 
lature from  appointing  by  name  in  their  laws  persons  to  special  and  particular  trusts 
created  in  such  laws,  nor  shall  be  construed  to  prevent  principals  in  oflBees  merely 
ministerial  from  constituting  deputies.  In  the  recess  of  the  Senate  he  may  fill 
vacancies  in  offices  by  appointments,  to  continue  in  force  until  the  end  of  the  nest 
iiession  of  the  Senate,  and  he  shall  commission  all  officers.  He  shall  have  power  to 
pardon  all  offenct  s ,  except  treason,  for  which  he  may  grant  reprieves  until  the  opinion 
of  the  Senate  an  1  Assembly  can  be  had,  and  with  their  concurrpnce  may  pardon  the 
same. 

Sec.  11.  He  stall  receive  a  fixed  compensation  for  his  services,  to  be  paid  to  him 
at  stated  times,  ind  not  to  be  increased  nor  diminished  during  his  continuance  in 
office. 

Sec.  12.  If  he  depart  out  of  the  United  States  without  the  consent  of  the  Senate 
and  Assembly,  h*  shall  thereby  abdicate  his  office. 

Sec.  13.  He  m  ir  be  impeached  for  any  crime  or  misdemeanour  by  the  two  houses 
of  the  Legislatui  ,  two-thirds  of  each  house  concurring,  and  if  convicted  shall  be 
removed  from  of5  ?.  He  may  be  afterwards  tried  and  punished  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  law.  His  imj  ichment  shall  operate  as  a  suspension  from  office  until  the  deter- 
mination thereof. 

Sec.  14.  The  Pi  jsident  of  the  Senate  shall  be  Vice  President  of  the  United  States. 
On  the  death,  resignation,  impeachment,  removal  from  office,  or  absence  from  the 
United  States  of  the  President  thereof,  the  Vice  President  shall  exercise  all  the 
powers  by  this  Constitution  vested  in  the  President  until  another  shall  be  appointed, 
or  until  he  shall  return  within  the  United  States,  if  his  absence  was  with  the  consent 
of  the  Senate  and  Assembly. 

ARTICLE    V. 

Sec.  1.  There  si  all  be  a  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  who,  together  with 
the  other  Judges  tl  ?reof,  shall  hold  their  offices  during  good  behaviour,  removeable 
only  by  conviction  an  impeachment  for  some  crime  or  misdemeanour.  Each  Judge 
shall  have  a  com  etent  salary,  to  be  paid  to  him  at  stated  times,  and  not  to  be 
diminished  during  ais  continuance  in  office. 

The  Supreme  Court  shall  have  original  jurisdiction  in  all  causes  in  which  the 
United  States  shall  be  a  party ;  in  all  controversies  between  the  United  States  and  a 
particular  State,  or  between  two  or  more  States,  except  such  as  relate  to  a  claim  of 
territory,  between  the  United  States  and  one  or  more  States,  which  shall  be  determined 
in  the  mode  prescribed  in  the  VI.  Article ;  in  all  cases  affecting  foreign  ministers, 
consuls,  and  agents,  and  an  appellate  jurisdiction  both  as  to  law  and  fact,  in  all  cases 
which  shall  concern  the  citizens  of  foreign  nations,  in  all  questions  between  the 
citizens  of  different  States,  and  in  all  others  in  which  the  fundamental  rights  of  this 
Constitution  are  involved,  subject  to  such  exceptions  as  are  herein  contained,  and  to 
snch  regulations  as  the  Legislature  shall  provide. 

The  Judges  of  all  courts  which  may  be  constituted  by  the  Legislature  shall  also 
hold  their  places  during  good  behaviour,  removeable  only  by  conviction  on  impeach- 
ment for  some  crime  or  misdemeanour;  and  shall  have  competent  salaries,  to  be  paid 
at  stated  times,  and  not  to  be  diminished  during  their  continuance  in  office.  But 
nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  construed  to  prevent  the  Legislature  from  abolish- 
ing such  courts  themselves. 

All  crimes,  except  upon  impeachment,  shall  be  tried  by  a  jury  of  twelve  men.  and 
ii  they  shall  have  been  committed  within  any  State  shall  be  tried  within  such  State, 
and  all  civil  causes  arising  under  this  Constitution  of  the  like  kind  with  those  which 
have  beo?  heretofore  triable  by;nry  in  the  respective  States,  shall  in  like  manner  be 
tried  hy  jury,  unless  in  spe  'M  cases   the   Legislature   shall  think  proper  to  mabfr 


36  Hamilton's  first  plan  of  government. 

diflferent  provision,  to  which  provision  the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  of  both  houses 
shall  be  necessary. 

Sec.  2.  Impeachments  of  the  President  and  Vice  President  of  the  United  States, 
members  of  the  Senate,  the  Governors  and  Presidents  of  the  several  States,  the 
principal  or  chief  officers  of  the  departments  enumerated  in  the  tenth  Section  of  the 
fourth  Article,  ambassadors  and  other  like  public  ministers,  the  Judges  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  generals,  and  admirals  of  the  navy,  shall  be  tried  by  a  court  to  consist  of  the 
Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  Chief  Justice  or  first  or  senior  Judge  of  the 
Superior  Court  of  law  in  each  State,  of  whom  twelve  shall  constitute  a  court.  A 
majority  of  the  Judges  present  may  convict.  All  other  persons  shall  be  tried  on 
impeachment  by  a  court  to  consist  of  the  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  six 
Senators  drawn  by  lot;  a  majority  of  whom  may  convict. 

Impeachments  shall  clearly  specify  the  particular  ofience  for  which  the  party  accused 
is  to  be  tried,  and  judgment  on  conviction  upon  the  trial  thereof  shall  be  either  of 
removal  from  office  singly,  or  removal  from  office  and  disqualification  for  holding  any 
future  office  or  place  of  trust ;  but  no  judgment  on  impeachment  shall  prevent  prose- 
cution and  punishment  in  the  ordinary  course  of  law,  provided  that  no  Judge  con- 
cerned in  such  conviction  shall  sit  as  Judge  on  the  second  trial.  The  Legislature 
mav  remove  the  disabilities  incurred  by  conviction  on  impeachment. 

ARTICLE    VI. 

Contro'^ersies  about  the  right  of  territory  between  the  United  States  and  particular 
States  shall  be  determined  by  a  court  to  be  constituted  in  manner  following. 

The  State  or  States  claiming  in  opposition  to  the  United  States  as  parties  shall 
nominate  a  number  of  persons  equal  to  double  the  number  of  the  Judges  of  the 
Supreme  Court  for  the  time  being,  of  whom  none  shall  be  citizens  by  birth  of  the 
States  which  are  parties,  nor  inhabitants  thereof  when  nominated,  and  of  whom  not 
more  than  two  shall  have  their  actual  residence  in  one  State.  Out  of  the  persons  so 
nominated  the  Senate  shall  elect  one-half,  who,  together  with  the  Judges  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  shall  form  the  court. 

Two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  may  hear  and  determine  the  controversy  by 
plurality  of  voices.  The  States  concerned  may  at  their  option  claim  a  decision  by 
the  Supreme  Court  only.  All  the  members  of  the  court  hereby  instituted  shall,  prioi 
to  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  take  an  oath  impartiallj',  and  according  to  the  best  of 
their  judgments  and  consciences,  to  hear  and  determine  the  controversy. 

ARTICLE    VII. 

Sec.  1.  The  Legislature  of  the  United  States  shall  have  power  to  pass  all  laws 
which  they  shall  judge  necessary  to  the  common  defence  and  safety,  and  to  the 
general  welfare  of  the  Union.  But  no  bill,  resolution,  or  act  of  the  Senate  and 
Assembly  shall  have  the  force  of  a  law  until  it  shall  have  received  the  assent  of  the 
President,  or  of  the  Vice  President  when  exercising  the  powers  of  the  President,  anr. 
if  such  assent  shall  not  have  been  given  within  ten  days  after  such  bill,  resolution,  or 
other  act  shall  have  been  presented  for  that  purpose,  the  same  shall  not  be  a  law.  No 
bill,  resolution,  or  other  act  not  assented  to  shall  be  revived  in-  the  same  session  of 
the  Legislature.  The  mode  of  signifying  such  assent  shall  bo  by  signing  the  bill,  act, 
or  resolution,  and  returning  it  so  signed  to  either  house  of  the  Legislature. 

Sec.  2.  The  enacting  style  of  all  laws  shall  be:  "Be  it  enacted  by  the  people  of 
the  United  States  of  America." 

Sec.  3.  No  bill  of  attainder  shall  be  passed,  nor  any  ex  post  facto  law;  nor  shall 
any  title  of  nobility  be  granted  by  the  United  States  or  by  either  of  them  ;  no-  shall 
any  person  holding  an  office  or  place  of  trust  under  the  United  States,  without  the 


Hamilton's  first  plan  of  uovernment.  37 

permission  of  the  Legislature  accept  any  present,  emolument,  office,  or  title  froui  a 
foreign  prince  or  state ;  nor  shall  any  religious  sect  or  denomination,  or  religious  test 
for  any  office  or  place  be  ever  established  by  law. 

Sec.  4.  Taxes  on  lands,  houses,  and  other  real  estate,  and  capitation  taxes,  shall 
be  proportioned  in  each  State  by  the  whole  number  of  free  persons,  except  Indiana 
not  taxed  and  by  three-fifths  of  all  other  persons. 

Sec.  5.  The  two  houses  of  the  Legislature  may  by  joint  ballot  appoint  a  Treasurer 
of  the  United  States.  Neither  house  (in  the  session  of  both  houses)  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  other  shall  adjourn  for  more  than  three  days  at  a  time.  The  Senators  and 
Representatives  in  attending,  going  to  and  coming  from  the  session  of  their  respective 
houses  shaH'be  privileged  from  arrests,  except  for  crimes  and  breaches  of  the  peace. 
The  place  of  meeting  shall  always  be  at  the  seat  of  Government,  which  shall  be  fixed 
by  law. 

Sec.  6.  The  laws  of  the  United  States  and  the  treaties  which  have  been  made  under 
the  Articles  of  the  Confederation,  and  which  shall  be  made  under  this  Constitution, 
«hall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  shall  be  so  construed  by  the  courts  of  the 
several  States. 

Sec.  7.  The  Legislature  shall  convene  at  least  once  in  each  year,  which,  unless 
•otherwise  provided  for  by  law,  shall  be  the  first  Monday  in  December. 

Sec.  8.  The  members  of  the  two  houses  of  the  Legislature  shall  receive  a  reasonable 
compensation  for  their  services,  to  be  paid  out  of  the  treasury  of  the  United  States 
and  ascertained  by  law.  The  law  for  making  sach  provision  shall  be  passed  with  the 
concurrence  of  the  first  Assembly,  and  Ehall  extend  to  succeeding  Assemblies,  and  no 
succeeding  Assembly  shall  concur  in  an  alteration  of  such  provision,  so  as  to  increase 
its  own  compensation  j  but  there  shall  be  always  a  law  in  existence  for  making  such 
provision. 

ARTICLE    VIII. 

Sec.  1.  The  Governor  or  President  of  eaoh  St&te  shall  be  appointed  under  the 
authority  of  the  United  States,  and  shall  have  a  right  to  negative  all  laws  about  to  be 
passed  in  the  State  of  which  he  shall  be  Governor  or  President,  subject  to  such  quali- 
fications and  regulations  as  the  Legislature  of  the  United  States  shall  prescribe.  He 
shall  in  other  respects  have  the  same  powers  only  which  the  Constitution  of  the  State 
does  or  shall  allow  to  its  Governor  or  President,  except  as  to  the  appointment  of 
officers  of  the  militia. 

Sec.  2.  Each  Governor  or  President  of  a  State  shall  hold  his  office  until  a  successor 
be  actually  appointed,  unless  he  die  or  resign,  or  be  removed  from  office  by  conviction 
on  impeachment.  There  shall  be  no  appointment  of  such  Governor  or  President  in 
the  recess  of  the  Senate. 

The  Governors  and  Presidents  of  the  several  States,  at  the  time  of  the  ratification 
of  this  Constitution,  shall  continue  in  office  in  the  same  manner  and  with  the  same 
powers  as  if  they  had  been  appointed  pursuant  to  the  first  Section  of  this  Article. 

The  officers  of  militia  in  the  several  States  may  be  appointed  under  the  authority 
of  the  United  States ;  the  Legislature  whereof  may  authorize  the  Governors  or 
Presidents  of  States  to  make  such  appointments,  with  such  restrictions  as  they  shall 
think  proper. 

ARTICLE    IX. 

Sec.  1.  No  person  shall  be  eligible  to  the  office  of  President  of  the  United  States 
unless  he  be  now  a  citizen  of  one  of  the  States,  or  hereafter  be  born  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States. 

Sec.  2.  No  person  shall  be  eligible  as  a  Senator  or  Representative  unless  at  the 
time  of  his  election  he  be  a  citizen  and  inhabitant  of  the  State  in  which  he  is  chosen. 


Ii8  HAMILTON'S   FIRST    PLAN    OF    GOVERNMENT. 

proj'ided  that  he  shall  not  be  deemed  to  be  disqualified  by  a  temporary  absence  from 
the  State. 

Sec.  3.  No  person  entitled  by  this  Constitution  to  elect  or  be  elected  President  of 
the  United  States,  or  a  Senator  or  Representative  in  the  Legislature  thereof,  shall  be 
disqualified  but  by  the  conviction  of  some  ofience  for  which  the  law  shall  have  pre- 
viously ordained  the  punishment  of  disqualification.  But  the  Legislature  may  by  law 
provide  that  persons  holding  ofiices  under  the  United  States  or  either  of  them  shall 
not  be  eligible  to  a  place  in  the  Assembly  or  Senate,  and  shall  be  during  their  con- 
tinuance in  ofiice  suspended  from  sitting  in  the  Senate. 

Sec.  4.  No  person  having  an  oflBce  or  place  of  trust  under  the  United  States  shall 
without  permission  of  the  Legislature  accept  any  present,  emolument,  (JflRce,  or  title 
from  any  foreign  prince  or  state. 

Sec.  5.  The  citizens  of  each  State  shall  be  entitled  to  the  rights,  privileges,  and 
immunities  of  citizens  in  every  other  State,  and  full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in 
each  State  to  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of  another. 

Sec.  6.  Fugitives  from  justice  from  one  State  who  shall  be  found  in  another  shall 
be  delivered  up  on  the  application  of  the  State  from  which  they  fled. 

Sec.  7.  No  new  State  shall  be  erected  within  the  limits  of  another,  or  by  the 
junction  of  two  or  more  States,  without  the  concurrent  consent  of  the  Legislature  of 
the  United  States  and  of  the  States  concerned.  The  Legislature  of  the  United  States 
may  admit  new  States  into  the  Union. 

Sec.  8.  The  United  States  are  hereby  declared  to  be  bound  to  guarantee  to  each 
State  a  republican  form  of  Government,  and  to  protect  each  State  as  well  against 
domestic  violence  as  foreign  invasion. 

Sec.  9.  All  treaties,  contracts,  and  engagements  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
under  the  Articles  of  Confederation  and  perpetual  Union,  shall  have  equal  validity 
under  this  Constitution. 

Sec.  10.  No  State  shall  enter  into  a  treaty,  alliance,  or  contract  with  another  or 
with  a  foreign  power  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States. 

Sec.  11.  The  members  of  the  Legislature  of  the  United  States  and  of  each  State. 
and  all  officers  executive  and  judicial  of  the  one  and  of  the  other,  shall  take  an  oath 
or  affirmation  to  support  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

Sec.  12.  This  Constitution  may  receive  such  alteration  and  amendments  as  may  be 
proposed  by  the  Legislature  of  the  United  States,  with  the  concurrence  of  two-third» 
of  the  members  of  both  houses,  and  ratified  by  the  Legislatures  of  or  by  conventions- 
of  deputies  chosen  by  the  people  in  two-thirds  of  the  States  composing  the  Union. 

ARTICLE    X. 

This  Constitution  shall  be  submitted  to  the  consideration  of  conventions  in  ttie- 
several  States,  the  members  whereof  shall  be  chosen  by  the  people  of  such  States 
respectively  under  the  direction  of  their  respective  Legislatures.  Each  convention 
which  shall  ratify  the  same  shall  appoint  the  first  Representatives  and  Senators  froiiy 
such  State,  acording  to  the  rule  prescribed  in  the  Section  of  the  Article. 

The  Representatives  so  appointed  shall  continue  in  office  for  one  year  only.  Each 
convention  so  ratifying  shall  give  notice  thereof  to  the  Congress- of  the  United  States, 
transmitting  at  the  same  time  a  list  of  the  Representatives  and  Senators  chosen. 
When  the  Constitution  shall  have  been  duly  ratified.  Congress  shall  give  notice  of  a 
day  and  place  for  the  meeting  of  the  Senators  and  Representatives  from  the  several 
States,  and  when  these  or  a  majority  of  them  shall  have  assembled  according  to  such 
notice,  they  shall  by  joint  ballot  by  plurality  of  votes  elect  a  President  of  the  Unitfid 
States,  and  the  Constitntion,  thus  organized,  shall  be  carried  into  effect. 


THE    FEDERAL    CONSTITUTION.  '6\* 


THE   FEDERAL   CONSTITUTION, 

AS    AGREED    UPON 

BY  THE  CONVENTION, 

SEPTEMBER   17,  1787. 


?t2^*^  the  ^COpU  of  the  United  States,  in  order  to  form  a  mort, 
perfect  Union,  establiah  Justice,  insure  domestic  Tranquillity,  pro- 
vide for  the  common  Defence,  promote  the  general  Welfare,  and 
secure  the  Blessings  of  Liberty  to  ourselves  and  our  posterity,  do 
ordain  and  establish  this  CONSTITUTION  for  the  United 
States  of  America. 

ARTICLE    L 

Section  1.  All  legislative  powers  herein  granted  shall  be  vested  in  a  congress  oi 
the  United  States,  which  shall  consist  of  a  senate  and  house  of  representatives. 

Sect.  2.  The  house  of  representatives  shall  be  composed  of  members  chosen  every 
second  year  by  the  people  of  the  several  states,  and  the  electors  in  each  state  shall 
have  the  qualifications  requisite  for  electors  of  the  most  numerous  branch  of  the 
state  legislature. 

No  person  shall  be  a  representative  who  shall  not  have  attained  to  the  age  of  twenty- 
five  years,  and  been  seven  years  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  who  shall  not, 
when  elected,  be  an  inhabitant  of  that  state  in  which  he  shall  be  chosen. 

Representatives  and  direct  taxes  shall  be  apportioned  among  the  several  states 
which  may  be  included  within  this  union,  according  to  their  respective  numbers,  which 
shall  be  determined  by  adding  to  the  whole  number  of  free  persons,  including  those 
bound  to  service  for  a  term  of  years,  and  excluding  Indians  not  taxed,  three-fifths  of 
all  other  persons.  The  actual  enumeration  shall  be  made  within  three  years  after  the 
first  meeting  of  the  congress  of  the  United  States,  and  within  every  subsequent  term 
of  ten  years,  in  such  manner  as  they  shall  by  law  direct.  The  number  of  represen- 
tatives shall  not  exceed  one  for  every  thirty  thousand,  but  each  state  shall  have  at 
least  one  representative ;  and  until  such  enumeration  shall  be  made,  the  state  of  New- 
Hampshire  shall  be  entitled  to  choose  three,  Massachusetts  eight,  Rhode-Island  and 
Providence  Plantations  one,  Connecticut  five,  New-York  six,  New-Jersey  four,  Penn- 
sylvania eight,  Delaware  one,  Maryland  six,  Virginia  ten,  North-Carolina  five,  South- 
Carolina  five,  and  Georgia  three. 

When  vacancies  happen  in  the  representation  from  any  state,  the  exeoative  autho- 
rity thereof  shall  issue  writs  of  election  to  fill  such  vacancies. 

The  house  of  representatives  shall  choose  their  speaker  and  other  oflSoers ;  and  shall 
bave  the  sole  power  of  impeachment. 

Sect.  3.  The  senate  of  the  United  States  shall  be  composed  of  two  senators  from 
each  state,  chosen  by  the  legislature  thereof,  for  six  years ;  and  each  senator  shall 
\iave  one  vote. 


10  THE    FEDERAL    CONSTITUTION. 

Immediately  after  they  shall  be  assembled  in  consequence  of  the  first  election,  they 
ehall  be  divided  as  equally  as  may  be  into  three  classes.  The  seats  of  the  senators  of 
the  first  class  shall  be  vacated  at  the  expiration  of  the  second  year,  the  second  class  at 
the  expiration  of  the  fourth  year,  and  the  third  class  at  the  expiration  of  the  sixth 
year,  so  that  one  third  maj'  be  chosen  every  second  year:  and  if  vacancies  happen  by 
resignation  or  otherwise,  during  the  recess  of  the  legislature  of  any  state,  the  execu- 
tive thereof  may  make  temporary  appointments  until  the  next  meeting  of  the  legisla- 
ture, which  shall  then  fill  such  vacancies. 

No  person  shall  be  a  Senator  who  shall  not  have  attained  to  the  age  of  thirty  years, 
and  been  nine  years  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  who  shall  not,  when  elected, 
be  an  inhabitant  of  that  state  for  which  he  shall  be  chosen. 

The  vice-president  of  the  United  States  shall  be  president  of  the  senate,  but  shall 
have  no  vote,  unless  they  be  equally  divided. 

The  senate  shall  choose  their  other  officers,  and  also  a  president  pro  tempore,  in  the 
absence  of  the  vice-president,  or  when  he  shall  exercise  the  office  of  president  of  the 
United  States. 

The  senate  shall  have  the  sole  power  to  try  all  impeachments.  When  sitting  for 
that  purpose  they  shall  be  on  oath  or  affirmation.  When  the  president  of  the  United 
States  is  tried,  the  chief  justice  shall  preside.  And  no  person  shall  be  convicted  with- 
out the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  present. 

Judgment  in  cases  of  impeachment  shall  not  extend  further  than  to  removal  from 
office,  and  disqualification  to  hold  and  enjoy  any  office  of  honour,  trust,  or  profit, 
under  the  United  States ;  but  the  party  convicted  shall,  nevertheless,  be  liable  and 
subject  to  indictment,  trial,  judgment,  and  punishment,  according  to  law. 

Sect.  4.  The  times,  places,  and  manner  of  holding  elections  for  senators  and  repre- 
sentatives, shall  be  prescribed  in  each  state  by  the  legislature  thereof:  but  the  con- 
gress may  at  any  time  by  law  make  or  alter  such  regulations,  except  as  to  the  places 
of  choosing  senators. 

The  congress  shall  assemble  at  least  once  in  every  year,  and  such  meeting  shall  be 
on  the  first  Monday  in  December,  unless  they  shall  by  law  appoint  a  different  day. 

Sect.  5.  Each  house  shall  be  the  judge  of  the  elections,  returns,  and  qualifications 
of  its  own  members;  and  a  majority  of  each  shall  constitute  a  quorum  to  do  business: 
but  a  smaller  number  may  adjourn  from  day  to  day,  and  may  be  authorized  to  compel 
the  attendance  of  absent  members,  in  such  manner,  and  under  such  penalties,  as  each 
house  may  provide. 

Each  house  may  determine  the  rules  of  its  proceedings,  punish  its  members  for  dis- 
orderly behaviour,  and,  with  the  concurrence  of  two-thirds,  expel  a  member. 

Each  house  shall  keep  a  journal  of  its  proceedings,  and  from  time  to  time  publish 
the  same,  excepting  such  parts  as  may  in  their  judgment  require  secresy;  and  tho 
yeas  and  nays  of  the  members  of  either  house  on  any  question  shall,  at  the  desire  of 
one-fifth  of  those  present,  be  entered  on  the  journal. 

Neither  house,  during  the  session  of  congress,  shall,  without  the  consent  of  the 
other,  adjourn  for  more  than  three  days,  nor  to  any  other  place  than  that  in  which  the 
two  houses  shall  be  sitting. 

Sect.  6.  The  senators  and  representatives  shall  receive  a  compensation  for  their 
services,  to  be  ascertained  by  law,  and  paid  out  of  the  treasury  of  the  United  States. 
They  shall  in  all  cases,  except  treason,  felony,  and  breach  of  the  peace,  be  privileged 
from  arrest  during  their  attendance  at  the  session  of  their  respective  houses,  and  in 
going  to  and  returning  from  the  same,  and  for  any  speech  or  debate  in  either  house, 
they  shall  not  be  questioned  in  any  other  place. 

No  senator  or  representative  shall,  during  the  time  for  which  he  was  elected,  be 
appointed  to  any  civU  office  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  which  shall 
have  been  created,  or  the  emoluments  whereof  shall  have  been  increased  during  such 


THE    FEDERAL    CONSTITUTION.  41 

time ;  and  no  person,  holding  any  office  under  the  United  States,  shall  be  a  member 
of  either  house  during  his  continuance  in  office. 

Sect.  7.  All  bills  for  raising  revenue  shall  originate  in  the  house  of  representatives ; 
but  the  senate  may  propose  or  concur  with  amendments  as  on  other  bills. 

Every  bill  which  shall  have  passed  the  house  of  representatives  and  the  senate  shall, 
before  it  become  a  law,  be  presented  to  the  president  of  the  United  States;  if  ho 
approve,  he  shall  sign  it;  but  if  not,  he  shall  return  it,  with  his  objections,  to  thai 
house  in  which  it  shall  have  originated,  who  shall  enter  the  objections  at  large  on 
their  journal,  and  proceed  to  reconsider  it.  If  after  such  reconsideration  two-thirds  of 
that  house  shall  agree  to  pass  the  bill,  it  shall  be  sent,  together  with  the  objections,  to  the 
other  house,  by  which  it  shall  likewise  be  reconsidered,  and  if  approved  by  two-thirds 
of  that  house,  it  shall  become  a  law.  But  in  all  such  cases  the  votes  of  both  houses 
shall  be  determined  by  yeas  and  nays,  and  the  names  of  the  persons  voting  for  and 
against  the  bill  shall  be  entered  on  the  journal  of  each  house  respectively.  If  any  bill 
shall  not  be  returned  by  the  president  within  ten  days  (Sundays  excepted)  after  it 
shall  have  been  presented  to  him,  the  same  shall  be  a  law,  in  like  manner  as  if  he  had 
signed  it,  unless  the  congress  by  their  adjournment  prevent  its  return,  in  which  case 
it  shall  not  be  a  law. 

Every  order,  resolution,  or  vote,  to  which  the  concurrence  of  the  senate  and  house 
of  representatives  may  be  necessary  (except  on  a  question  of  adjournment)  shall  be 
presented  to  the  president  of  the  United  States ;  and  before  the  same  shall  take  efiect, 
shall  be  approved  by  him,  or,  being  disapproved  by  him,  shall  be  repassed  by  two- 
thirds  of  the  senate  and  house  of  representatives,  according  to  the  rules  and  limita.- 
tions  prescribed  in  the  case  of  a  bill. 

Sect.  8.  The  congress  shall  have  power, 

To  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises,  to  pay  the  debts  and  provide 
for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  of  the  United  States ;  but  a.11  rti^tj««,  yn-  .•         C 

posts,,  and  excises,  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States:   7^"-^^^  ''^'^'l  iT\/^  1-aA^a<JLJ  .r 

To  borrowmoney  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States  :        cj^"^**^      "    nr.^MtA'*^  *f^*^^^'*-^^''*^ 

To  regulate  commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and  among  the  several  states,  and  with 
thelndian  tribes  :         <y^^^  ;v.*A»^W.  v^A^  c.m/^  .  «-:<iyi3£i 

To  establish  an  uniform  rule  of  naturalization,  and  uniform  laws  on  the  subjects  of 
bankruptcies  throughout  the  United  States : 

To  coin  money,  regulate  the  value  thereof,  and  of  foreign  coin,  and  fix  the  standard 
of  weights  and  measures  : 

To  provide  for  the  punishment  of  counterfeiting  the  securities  and  current  coin  of 
the  United  States : 

To  establish  post-offices  and  post-roads : 

To  promote  the  progress  of  science  and  useful  arts,  by  securing  for  limited  times  to 
authors  and  inventors  the  exclusive  right  to  their  respective  writings  and  discoveries ; 

To  constitute  tribunals  inferior  to  the  supreme  court : 

To  define  and  punish  piracies  and  felonies  committed  on  the  high  seas,  and  ofiences 
against  the  law  of  nations : 

To  declare  war,  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  and  make  rules  concerning 
captures  on  land  and  water  : 

To  raise  and  support  armies,  but  no  appropriation  of  money  to  that  use  shall  be  for 
a  longer  term  than  two  years : 

To  provide  and  maintain  a  navy  : 

To  make  rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval  forces : 

To  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  union,  suppress 
insurrections,  and  repel  invasions : 

To  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  militia,  and  for  governing 
?uch  parts  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  reserving 


ef 


42  THE    FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 

to  tb<>  slates  respectively,  the  appointment  of  the  oflBcers,  and  the  in-hority  of  train- 
ing tbe  militia  according  to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  congress : 

To  exercise  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever,  eve  aoh  district  (not 
exceeding  ten  miles  square)  as  may,  by  cession  of  particular  states,  ad  the  acceptance 
of  congress,  become  the  seat  of  the  government  of  the  United  Stf.  ?,  and  to  exercise 
like  authority  over  all  places  purchased  by  the  consent  of  the  lej;  a  ature  of  the  state 
in  which  tbe  same  shall  be,  for  the  erection  of  forts,  magazines,  xrienals,  dockyards, 
and  other  needful  buildings :     And, 

To  make  all  laws  which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for  cf  rryiag  into  execution 
the  foregoing  powers,  and  all  other  powers  vested  by  this  constitutii.>n  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  department  or  oflBcer  thereof. 

Sect.  9.  The  migration  or  importation  of  such  persons  as  any  sf  the  states  now 
»'xisting  shall  think  proper  to  admit,  shall  not  be  prohibited  by  th«  congress  prior  to 
the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eight,  but  a  tax  or  duty  e  ay  be  imposed  on 
such  importation,  not  exceeding  ten  dollars  for  each  person. 

The  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  sus^jendjd,  unless  when  in 
oases  of  rebellion  or  invasion  the  public  safety  may  require  it. 
No  bill  of  attainder  or  ex  post  facto  law  shall  be  passed. 

^jf  pnpifftfinnj  nr  othvr  ^irpnt.  tax  ghall  be  laid,  unless  in  p  oportion  to  the  egn^  nr 

enumeration  herein  before  directed  to  be  taken. 

.  L^^litt.  No  tax  or  duty  shall  be  laid  on  articles  exported  from  iny  state.     No  preference 

'^^  I        shall  be  given  by  any  regulation  of  commerce  or  revenue  to  the  ports  of  one  state  over 

those  of  another ;  nor  shall  vessels  bound  to,  or  from,  on    state,  be  obliged  to  enter, 

clear,  or  pay  duties  in  another. 

No  money  shall  be  drawn  from  the  treasury,  but  in  coi. sequence  of  appropriations 
made  by  law ;  and  a  regular  statement  and  account  of  the  receipts  and  expenditures 
of  all  public  money  shall  be  published  from  time  to  time. 

No  title  of  nobility  shall  be  granted  by  the  United  States :  And  no  person  holding  any 
oflSce  of  profit  or  trust  under  them,  shall,  without  the  consent  of  the  congress,  accept  of 
any  present,  emolument,  office,  or  title,  of  any  kind  whatever,  from  any  king,  prince^ 
or  foreign  state. 

Sect.  10.  No  state  shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance,  or  confederation ;  grant  let- 
ters of  marque  and  reprisal ;  coin  money ;  emit  bills  of  credit ;  make  any  thing  but 
gold  and  silver  coin  a  tender  in  payment  of  debts ;  pass  any  bill  of  attainder,  ex  post 
facto  law,  or  law  inipairing  the  obligjation  of  contracts  :  or  grant  any  title  of  nobility. 
No  state  shall,  without  the  consent  of  the  congress,  lay  any  imposts  or  duties  on 
iBi}Ui£tfl_cr  exports,  except  what  may  be  absolutely  necessary  for  executing  its  inspec- 
tion laws ;  and  the  net  proceeds  of  all  duties  and  imposts,  laid  by  any  state  on  imports 
or  exports,  shall  be  for  the  use  of  the  treasury  of  the  United  States ;  and  all  such  laws 
shall  be  subject  to  the  revision  and  control  of  the  congress.  No  state  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  congress,  lay  any  duties  of  tonnage,  keep  troops,  or  ships  of  war,  in 
time  of  peace,  enter  into  any  agreement  or  compact  with  another  state,  or  with  a  for- 
eign power,  or  engage  in  war,  unless  actually  invaded,  or  in  such  imminen,  danger  aa 
will  not  admit  of  delay. 

ARTICLE    IL 

Sect.  1.  The  executive  power  shall  be  vested  in  a  president  of  the  United  States  of 
America.  He  shall  hold  his  office  during  the  term  of  four  years,  and  together  with  the 
vice-president,  chosen  for  the  same  term,  be  elected  as  follows : 

Each  state  shall  appoint,  in  such  manner  as  tho  legislature  thereof  may  direct,  a  num- 
ber of  electors,  equal  to  the  whole  number  of  senators  and  representatives  to  which  the 
utate  may  be  entitled  in  the  congress  :  but  no  senator  or  representative,  or  person  hold- 
u-.g  an  office  of  trust  or  profit  under  the  United  States,  shall  be  appointed  an  elector. 


THE    FEDERAL    CONSTITUTION.  ,  43 

The  electors  shall  meet  in  their  respective  states,  and  vote  by  ballot  for  two  perions, 
of  whom  one  at  least  shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the  same  state  with  themselves. 
And  they  shall  make  a  list  of  all  the  persons  voted  for,  and  of  the  number  of  votes  for 
each ;  which  list  the}'  shall  sign  and  certify,  and  transmit  sealed  to  the  seat  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  directed  to  the  president  of  the  senate.  The  presi- 
dent of  the  senate  shall,  in  the  presence  of  the  senate  and  house  of  representatives, 
open  all  the  certificates,  and  the  votes  shall  then  be  counted.  The  person  having  the 
greatest  number  of  votes  shall  be  the  president,  if  such  number  be  a  majority  of  the 
whole  number  of  electors  appointed ;  and  if  there  be  more  than  one  who  have  such 
majority,  and  have  an  equal  number  of  votes,  then  the  house  of  representatives  shall 
immediately  choose  by  ballot  one  of  them  for  president ;  and  if  no  person  have  a  ma- 
jority, then  from  the  five  highest  on  the  list  the  said  house  shall  in  like  manner  choose 
the  president.  But  in  choosing  the  president,  the  votes  shall  be  taken  by  states,  the 
representation  from  each  state  having  one  vote;  a  quorum  for  this  purpose  shall  con- 
sist of  a  member  or  members  from  two-thirds  of  the  states,  and  a  majority  of  all  the 
states  shall  be  necessary  to  a  choice.  In  every  case,  after  the  choice  of  the  president, 
the  person  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  of  the  electors  shall  be  the  vice-presi- 
dent. But  if  there  should  remain  two  or  more  who  have  equal  votes,  the  senate  shall 
choose  from  them  by  ballot  the  vice-president. 

The  congress  may  determine  the  time  of  choosing  the  electors,  and  the  day  on 
which  they  shall  give  their  votes;  which  day  shall  be  the  same  throughout  the  Uniteil 
States. 

No  person  except  a  natural  born  citizen,  or  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  at  the 
time  of  the  adoption  of  this  constitution,  shall  be  eligible  to  the  ofl5ce  of  president;  nei. 
ther  shall  any  person  be  eligible  to  that  ofiice  who  shall  not  have  attained  to  the  age 
of  thirty-five  years,  and  been  fourteen  years  a  resident  within  the  United  States. 

In  case  of  removal  of  the  president  from  oflSce,  or  of  his  death,  resignation,  or  ina- 
bility to  discharge  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  said  office,  the  same  shall  devolve  on 
the  vice-president,  and  the  congress  may  by  law  provide  for  the  case  of  removal,  death, 
resignation,  or  inability,  both  of  the  president  and  vice-president,  declaring  what  officei 
shall  then  act  as  president,  and  such  officer  shall  act  accordingly,  until  the  disability 
\»e  removed,  or  a  president  shall  be  elected. 

The  president  shall,  at  stated  times,  receive  for  his  services  a  compensation,  which 
shall  neither  be  increased  or  diminished  during  the  period  for  which  he  shall  have  been 
elected,  and  he  shall  not  receive  within  that  period  any  other  emolument  from  the 
United  States,  or  any  of  them. 

Before  he  enter  into  the  execution  of  his  office,  he  shall  take  the  following  oath  or 
affirmation  : 

"  I  do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm)  that  I  will  faithfully  execute  the  office  of  president 
of  the  United  States,  and  will  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  preserve,  protect,  and  defend 
the  constitution  of  the  United  States." 

Sect.  2.  The  president  shall  be  commander  in  chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the 
United  States ;  and  of  the  militia  of  the  several  states,  when  called  into  the  actual 
service  of  the  United  States ;  he  may  require  the  opinion,  in  writing,  of  the  principal 
officer  in  each  of  the  executive  departments,  upon  any  subject  relating  to  the  duties 
of  their  respective  offices,  and  he  shall  have  power  to  grant  reprieves  and  pardons  for 
offnnces  against  the  United  States,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment. 

He  shall  have  power,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  senate,  to  make 
treaties,  provided  two-thirds  of  the  senators  present  concur;  and  he  shall  nominate,  and 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  senate,  shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other  public 
ministers  and  consuls,  judges  of  the  supreme  court,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  United 
States,  whose  appointments  are  not  herein  otherwise  provided  for,  and  which  shall  be 
established  by  law.  But  the  congress  may  by  law  vest  the  appointment  of  such  infe- 
U 


44  THE    FEDERAL   CONSTITUTION. 

rior  officers,  as  they  think  proper,  in  the  president  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law,  or  in 
the  heads  of  departments. 

The  president  shall  have  power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies  that  may  happen  during  the 
recess  of  the  senate,  by  granting  commissions  which  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  their 
next  session. 

Sect.  3.  He  shall  from  time  to  time  give  to  the  congress  information  of  the  state  of 
the  union,  and  recommend  to  their  consideration  such  measures  as  he  shall  judge 
necessary  and  expedient;  he  may,  on  extraordinary  occasions,  convene  both  houses, 
or  either  of  them,  and  in  case  of  disagreement  between  them,  with  respect  to  the  time 
of  adjournment,  he  may  adjourn  them  to  such  time  as  he  shall  think  proper;  he  shall 
receive  ambassadors  and  other  public  ministers ;  he  shall  take  care  that  the  laws  be 
faithfully  executed,  and  shall  commission  all  the  officers  of  the  United  States. 

Sect.  4.  The  president,  vice-president,  and  all  civil  officers  of  the  United  States 
shall  be  removed  from  office  on  impeachment  for,  and  conviction  of,  treason,  bribery, 
or  other  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors. 

ARTICLE    III. 

Sect.  1.  The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall  be  vested  in  one  supreme 
court,  and  in  such  inferior  courts  as  the  congress  may  from  time  to  time  ordain  and 
establish.  The  judges,  both  of  the  supreme  and  inferior  courts,  shall  hold  their  offices 
during  good  behaviour,  and  shall  at  stated  times,  receive  for  their  services  a  compen- 
sation, which  shall  not  be  diminished  during  their  continuance  in  office. 

Sect.  2.  The  judicial  power  shall  extend  to  all  cases  in  law  and  equity,  arising 
under  this  constitution,  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  treaties  made,  or  which 
shall  be  made,  under  their  authority ;  to  all  cases  aflfecting  ambassadors,  other  public 
ministers  and  consuls ;  to  all  cases  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdiction ;  to  contro- 
versies to  which  the  United  States  shall  be  a  party ;  to  controversies  between  two  or 
more  states ;  between  a  state  and  citizens  of  another  state ;  between  citizens  of  differ- 
ent states;  between  citizens  of  the  same  state  claiming  lands  under  grants  of  different 
states;  and  between  a  state,  or  the  citizens  thereof,  and  foreign  states,  citizens  or 
subjects. 

In  all  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and  consuls,  and  those  in 
which  a  state  shall  be  party,  the  supreme  court  shall  have  original  jurisdiction.  In 
all  the  other  cases  before  mentioned,  the  supreme  court  shall  have  appellate  jurisdic- 
tion, both  as  to  law  and  fact,  with  such  exceptions,  and  under  such  regulations,  as  the 
congress  shall  make. 

The  trial  of  all  crimes,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment,  shall  be  by  jury ;  and  such 
trial  shall  be  held  in  the  state  where  the  said  crimes  shall  have  been  committed ;  but 
when  not  committed  within  any  state,  the  trial  shall  be  at  such  place  or  places  as  the 
congress  may  by  law  have  directed. 

Sect.  3.  Treason  against  the  United  States,  shall  consist  onlj^  in  levying  war  against 
them,  or  in  adhering  to  their  enemies,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort.  No  person  shall 
be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt 
act,  or  on  confession  in  open  court. 

The  Congress  shall  have  power  to  declare  the  punishment  of  treason,  bat  no  attain- 
der of  treason  shall  work  corruption  of  blood,  or  forfeiture,  except  during  the  life  of 
the  person  attainted.  * 

ARTICLE    IV. 

Sect.  1.  Full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in  each  state  to  the  public  acts,  records, 
and  judicial  proceedings  of  every  other  state.  And  the  congress  may  by  general  laws 
prescribe  the  manner  in  which  such  acts,  records,  and  proceedings  shall  be  proved,  and 
the  effect  thereof. 


THE    FEDERAL    COXSTITUTION.  4/) 

Sect.  2.  The  citizens  of  each  state  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and  immunitie*  / / 
of  citizens  in  the  several  states.     Xr>*^  ^-o*  ^\^c£^<**^  c,o-r^. 

A  person  charged  in  any  state  with  treason,  felony,  or  other  crime,  who  shall  flee 
from  justice,  and  be  found  in  another  state,  shall,  on  demand  of  the  executive  authority 
of  the  state  from  which  he  fled,  be  delivered  up,  to  be  removed  to  the  state  having 
jurisdiction  of  the  crime. 

No  person  held  to  service  or  labour  in  one  state,  under  the  laws  thereof,  escaping 
into  another,  shall,  in  consequence  of  any  law  or  regulation  therein,  be  discharged 
from  such  service  or  labour,  but  shall  be  delivered  up  on  claim  of  the  party  to  whom 
such  service  or  labour  may  be  due. 

Sect.  3.  New  states  may  be  admitted  by  the  congress  into  this  union;  but  no  new 
state  shall  be  formed  or  erected  within  the  jurisdiction  of  any  other  state,  nor  any 
state  be  formed  by  the  junction  of  two  or  more  states,  or  parts  of  states,  without  the 
consent  of  the  legislatures  of  the  states  concerned,  as  well  as  of  the  congress. 

The  congress  shall  have  power  to  dispose  of  and  make  all  needful  rules  and  regula- 
tions respecting  the  territory  or  other  property  belonging  to  the  United  States ;  and 
nothing  in  this  constitution  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  prejudice  any  claims  of  the 
United  States,  or  of  any  particular  state. 

Skct.  4.  The  United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every  state  in  this  Union,  a  republi- 
can form  of  government,  and  shall  protect  each  of  them  against  invasion;  and  on 
application  of  the  legislature,  or  of  the  executive  (when  the  legislature  cannot  be  con- 
vened) against  domestic  violence. 

ARTICLE    V. 

The  congress,  whenever  two-thirds  of  both  houses  shall  deem  it  necessary,  shall 
propose  amendments  to  this  constitution,  or,  on  the  application  of  the  legislatures  of 
two-thirds  of  the  several  states,  shall  call  a  convention  for  proposing  amendments, 
which,  in  either  case,  shall  be  valid  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  as  part  of  this  consti- 
tution, when  ratified  by  the  legislatures  of  three-fourths  of  the  several  states,  or  by 
conventions  in  three-fourths  thereof,  as  the  one  or  the  other  mode  of  ratification  may 
be  proposed  by  the  congress  :  Provided,  that  no  amendment  which  may  be  made  prior 
to  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eight,  shall  in  any  manner  afi'ect  the  first 
and  fourth  clauses  in  the  ninth  section  of  the  first  article ;  and  that  no  state,  without 
its  consent,  shall  be  deprived  of  its  equal  sufi°rage  in  the  senate. 

ARTICLE    VI. 

All  debts  contracted  and  engagements  entered  into,  before  the  adoption  of  this  con- 
stitution, shall  be  as  valid  against  the  United  States  under  this  constitution,  as  under 
the  confederation. 

This  constitution,  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States  which  shall  be  made  in  pursu- 
ance thereof;  and  all  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  under  the  authority  of 
ihe  United  States,  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land;  and  the  judges  in  every  stat« 
shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  thing  in  the  constitution  or  laws  of  any  state  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding. 

The  senators  and  representatives  before  mentioned,  and  the  members  of  the  several 
state  legislatures,  and  all  executive  and  judicial  oflBcers,  both  of  the  United  States  and 
of  the  several  states,  shall  be  bound  by  oath  or  aflSrmation  to  support  this  constitu- 
tion :  but  no  religious  test  shall  ever  be  required  as  a  qualification  to  any  ofiBce  or 
public  trust  under  the  United  States. 

ARTICLE   VI  L 

The  ratification  of  the  convention  of  nine  states,  shall  be  sufficient  for  the  establish. 
Dicnt  of  this  constitution  between  the  8tJi*<»3  so  ratifying  the  same. 


46 


THE    FEDERAL    CONSTITUTION. 


DONE  in  convention,  by  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  states  present,  the  seventeenth 
day  of  September,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty- 
seven,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  of  America  the  twelfth.  In 
witness  whereof,  we  have  hereunto  subscribed  our  names. 

«EORGE  WASHINGTON,  Vrrsidf.ht,  and  Deputy  from  Virginia. 


NEW-HAMPSHIRE. 


j  John  Langdon, 

■■  I  NiCHC 


lOLAS    GiLMAN. 


MASSACHUSETTS {  R^JusSg^*'''''''"' 

CONNECTICUT  I  ^^i^^'^"  Samuel  Johnson, 

(  Roger  Sherman. 

NEW-YORK -{  Alexander  Hamilton. 

William  Livingston, 


NEW-JERSEY. 


PENNSYLVANIA 


Uavid  Brearly, 
William  Paterson, 
Jonathan  Dayton. 
Benjamin  Franklin, 
Thomas  Mifflin, 
Robert  Morris, 
George  Clymer, 
Thomas  Fitzsimons, 
Jared  Ingersoll, 
James  Wilson, 

GOUVERNEUR  MoRRIS. 

'  George  Read, 
Gunning  Bedford,  junior, 

DELAWARE i  John  Dickinson, 

Richard  Bassett, 
(^  Jacob  Broom. 
(  James  M'Henry, 

MARYLAND -J  Daniel  of  St.  Thomas  Jenifer, 

(  Daniel  Carrol. 

VIRGINIA j  John  Blair, 

[  Jamks  Madison,  junior. 

r  William  Blount, 
NORTH-CAROLINA...  i  Richard  Dobbs  Spaight, 

(Hiigh  Williamson. 

f  John  Rutledge, 
Chs.  Cotesworth  Pinckney, 
Charles  Pinckney, 

[PiERCK  Butler. 
OT70POTA  (William  Few, 

GEORGIA 1  Abraham  Baldwin. 

Attest.  WILLIAM  JACKSON,  Stcretarv. 


SOUTH-CAROLINA , 


IN  CONVENTION. 

Monday,  September  17.  17S7. 
Presbnt,  The  States  of  New-Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  Mr.  Hamilton  from 

New-  York,  Neio-Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware, Mary  land,  Virginia,  North-  Carolina, 

South- Carolina  and  Georgia. 

Resolved,  That  the  preceding  constitution  be  laid  before  the  United  States  in  con- 
gress assembled,  and  that  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  convention,  that  it  should  after- 
wards be  submitted  to  a  convention  of  delegates,  chosen  in  each  state  by  the  people 
thereof,  under  the  recommendation  of  its  legislature,  for  their  assent  and  ratification  ; 
and  that  each  convention  assenting  to,  and  ratifying  the  same,  sliould  give  notice 
thereof  to  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled. 

Resolved,  That  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  convention,  that  as  soon  as  the  convention? 
of  nine  states  shall  have  ratified  this  constitution,  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled 
should  fix  a  day  on  which  electors  should  be  appointed  by  the  states  which  shall  have 
ratified  the  same,  and  a  day  on  which  the  electors  should  assemble  to  vote  for  the 
president,  and  the  time  and  place  for  commencing  proceedings  under  this  constitution. 
That  after  such  publication  the  electors  should  be  appointed,  and  the  senators  and 
representatives  elected  :  That  the  electors  should  meet  on  the  day  fixed  for  the  election 
of  the  president,  and  should  transmit  their  votes  certified,  signed,  sealed,  and  directed, 
as  the  constitution  requires,  to  the  secretary  of  the  United  States  in  congress  asseiu 
bled  ]  that  the  senators  and  representatives   should   convene  at  the  time  and  phuc 


THE    FEDERAL   CONSTITUTION.  47 

ussi^nej ;  that  the  senators  should  appoint  a  president  of  the  senate,  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  receiving,  opening,  and  counting  the  votes  for  president;  and  that  after  h» 
shall  be  chosen,  the  congress,  together  with  the  president,  should  without  delay  pro- 
ceed to  execute  this  constitution. 

By  the  unanimous  order  of  the  Convention. 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON,  President. 

William  Jackson,  Secretary. 

AMENDMENTS  TO  THE  CONSTITUTION.  J, 

The  first  ten  amendments  were  proposed  in  Congress  during  its  Jirst  session,  and  on 
the  loth  of  December,  1791,  were  ratified.     The  eleventh  amendment  was  proposed   ^, 
during  the  Jirst  session  of  the  third  congress,  and  was  announced  by  the  President  of   ^j(x»       jL^ 
the  United  States  in  a  message  to  it,  of  date  January  8th,  1798,  as  having  been  rati-  9      •  /wk*^ 
fied.     The  twelfth  amendment  originated  with  Hamilton,*  and  was  proposed  during  ..^j/Ju 
the  first  session  of  the  eighth  Congress,  and  was  adopted  in  1804.  v^^^ 

ARTICLE  THE  FIRST. 
Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  the  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting 
the  free  exercise  thereof;  or  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  of  the  press;  or  the 
right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assemble,  and  to  petition  the  government  for  a  redress 
of  grievances. 

ARTICLE  THE  SECOND. 
A  well  regulated  militia  being  necessary  to  the  security  of  a  free  state,  the  right 
of  the  people  to  keep  and  bear  arms  shall  not  be  infringed. 
ARTICLE  THE  THIRD. 
No  soldier  shall,  in  time  of  peace,  be  quartered  in  any  house  without  the  consent 
of  the  owner ;  nor  in  time  of  war,  but  in  a  manner  to  be  prescribed  by  law. 
ARTICLE  THE  FOURTH. 
The  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses,  papers,  and  effects, 
against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures,  shall  not  be  violated,  and  no  warrants 
shall  issue,  but  upon  probable  cause,  supported  by  oath  or  afiirmation,  and  particu- 
larly describing  the  place  to  be  searched,  and  the  persons  or  things  to  be  seized. 
ARTICLE  THE  FIFTH. 
No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital  or  otherwise  infamous  crime,  unless 
on  a  presentment  or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  except  in  cases  arising  in  the  land  or 
naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia  when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or  public  danger; 
nor  shall  any  person  be  subject  for  the  same  offence  to  be  twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  life 
or  limb;  nor  shall  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  witness  against  himself ; 
nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law ;  nor  shall  pri- 
vate property  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation. 
ARTICLE  THE  SIXTH. 
In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a  speedy  and  public 
trial,  by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  state  and  district  wherein  the  crime  shall  have  been 
••-ommitted,  which  district  shall  have  been  previously  ascertained  by  law,  and  to  be 
informed  of  the  nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation ;  to  be  confronted  with  the  wit- 
nesses against  him :  to  have  compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his  favour, 
und  to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  defence. 

ARTICLE  THE  SEVENTH. 
In  suits  at  common  law,  where  the  value  in  controversy  shall  exceed  twenty  dollars, 
ihe  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  preserved ;  and  no  fact  tried  by  a  jury,  shall  be 
otherwise  re-examined  in  any  court  of  the  United  States  than  according  to  the  rules 
of  the  common  law. 

ARTICLE  THK  EIGHTH. 
Excessive  bail  shall  not  be  required,  nor  excessive  fines  imposed,  nor  cruel  and  unu- 
sual punishments  inflicted.  * 
ARTICLE  THE  NINTH. 
The  enumeration  in  the  constitution  of  certain  rights,  shall  not  be  construed  to  den^ 
or  disparage  others  retained  by  the  people. 

ARTICLE  THE  TENTH. 
The  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the  constitution,  nor  prohibited 
*>y  it  to  the  states,  are  reserved  to  the  states  respectively,  or  to  the  people. 
ARTICLE  THE  ELEVENTH. 
The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall  not  be  construed  to  extend  to  any  suit 
fti  law  or  equity,  commenced  or  prosecuted  against  one  of  the  United  States  by  oiti- 
zfus  of  another  state,  or  by  citizens  or  subjects  of  any  foreign  state. 

*  Hist.  Rep.  TIL.  Sfifi. 


48  THE   FEDERAL    CONSTITUTION 

ARTICLE  XIL 

The  electors  shall  meet  in  their  respective  states,  and  vote  by  ballot  for  president  and 
vice-president,  one  of  whom,  at  least,  shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the  same  state  with 
themselves  j  they  shall  name  in  their  ballots  the  person  voted  for  as  president,  and  in 
distinct  ballots  the  person  voted  for  as  vice-president ;  and  they  shall  make  distinct  lists 
</f  all  persons  voted  for  as  president,  and  of  all  persons  voted  for  as  vice-president,  and 
of  the  number  of  votes  for  each,  which  lists  they  shall  sign  and  certify,  and  transmit 
sealed  to  the  seat  of  the  government  of  the  United  States,  directed  to  the  president  of  the 
senate;  the  president  of  the  senate  shall,  in  the  presence  of  the  senate  and  house  of  rep- 
resentatives, open  all  the  certificates,  and  the  votes  shall  then  be  counted :  the  person 
having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  for  president,  shall  be  the  president,  if  such  number 
be  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  electors  appointed;  and  if  no  person  have  such 
majority,  then  from  the  persons  having  the  highest  numbers,  not  exceeding  three,  on  the 
list  of  those  voted  for  as  president,  the  house  of  representatives  shall  choose  immedi- 
ately, by  ballot,  the  president.  But  in  choosing  the  president,  the  votes  shall  be  taken 
by  states,  the  representation  from  each  state  having  one  vote;  a  quorum  for  this  pur- 
pose shall  consist  of  a  member  or  members  from  two  thirds  of  the  states,  and  a  majority 
of  all  the  states  shall  be  necessary  to  a  choice.  And  if  the  house  of  representatives 
shall  not  choose  a  president  whenever  the  right  of  choice  shall  devolve  upon  them, 
before  the  fourth  day  of  March  next  following,  then  the  vice-president  shall  act  as 
president  as  in  the  case  of  the  death  or  other  constitutional  disability  of  the  president. 

The  person  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  as  vice-president,  shall  be  the  vice- 
president,  if  such  number  be  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  electors  appointed  :  and 
if  no  person  have  a  majority,  then  from  the  two  highest  numbers  on  the  list,  the  senate 
shall  choose  the  vice-president :  a  quorum  for  the  purpose  shall  consist  of  two  thirds 
of  the  whole  number  of  senators,  and  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  shall  be  neces- 
sary to  a  choice. 

But  no  person  constitutionally  ineligible  to  the  office  of  president,  shall  be  eligible 
to  that  of  vice-president  of  the  United  States. 


IN    CONVENTION. 

September  17th,  1787. 

Sir  :  We  have  now  the  honor  to  submit  to  the  consideration  of  the  United  States  in 
Congress  assembled,  that  Constitution  which  has  appeared  to  us  the  most  advisable. 
The  friends  of  our  country  have  long  seen  and  desired,  that  the  power  of  making  war, 
peace,  and  treaties ;  that  of  levying  money  and  regulating  commerce,  and  the  corre- 
spondent executive  and  judicial  authorities  should  be  fully  and  efifectually  vested  in 
the  general  government  of  the  Union ;  but  the  impropriety  of  delegating  such  extensive 
trusts  to  one  body  of  men  is  evident.  Hence  results  the  necessity  of  a  different 
organization.  It  is  obviously  impracticable,  in  the  federal  government  of  these  States, 
to  secure  all  rights  of  independent  sovereignty  to  each,  and  yet  provide  for  the  interest 
and  safety  of  all.  Individuals  entering  into  society  must  give  up  a  share  of  liberty  to 
preserve  the  rest.  The  magnitude  of  the  sacrifice  must  depend  as  well  on  situation 
and  circumstance  as  on  the  object  to  be  obtained.  It  is  at  all  times  difficult  to  draw 
with  precision  the  line  between  those  rights  which  must  be  surrendered,  and  those 
which  may  be  reserved ;  and  on  the  present  occasion  this  difficulty  was  increased  by  a 
difference  among  the  several  states  as  to  their  situation,  extent,  habits,  and  particular 
interests. 

In  all  our  deliberations  on  this  subject  we  kept  steadily  in  our  view,  that  which 
appears  to  us  the  greatest  interest  of  every  true  American,  the  consolidation  of  our 
union,  in  which  is  involved  our  prosperity,  felicity,  safety,  perhaps  our  national  exist- 
ence. This  important  consideration,  seriously  and  deeply  impressed  on  our  minds, 
led  each  ptate  in  the  convention  to  be  less  rigid  on  points  of  inferior  magnitude  than 
might  have  been  otherwise  expected;  and  thus  the  Constitution,  which  we  now  present, 
is  the  result  of  a  spirit  of  amity,  and  of  that  mutual  deference  and  concession  which 
the  peculiarity  of  our  political  situation  rendered  indispensable. 

That  it  will  meet  the  full  and  entire  approbation  of  every  state  is  not  perhaps  to  be 
expected  :  but  each  will  doubtless  consider,  that  had  her  interests  alone  been  consulted, 
the  consequences  might  have  been  particularly  disagreeable  or  injurious  to  others ; 
that  it  is  liable  to  as  few  exceptions  as  could  reasonably  have  been  expected,  we  hope 
and  believe ;  that  it  may  promote  the  lasting  welfare  of  that  country  so  dear  to  us  all, 
and  secure  her  freedom  and  happiness,  is  our  most  ardent  wish.  With  great  respect, 
we  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your  excellency's  most  obedient  and  humble  servants. 
By  unanimous  order  of  the  convention.  Go  :  Washinoton,  I'resident 

His  excellency  the  President  of  Congress. 


THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION.  48a 

The  following  amendment  was  ratified  by  Alabama,  December 
2d,  1865,  which  filled  the  requisite  complement  of  ratifying 
states,  and  was  certified  by  the  secretary  of  state  to  have  be- 
come valid  as  a  part  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  Stetes, 
December  18th,  1865. 

ARTICLE    XIIL 

Sect.  1.  Neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude,  except  as  a  punishment  for 
crime,  whereof  the  party  shail  have  been  duly  convicted,  shall  exist  within  the  United 
States,  or  any  place  subject  to  their  jurisdiction. 

Skct.  2.  Congress  shall  have  power  to  enforce  this  article  by  appropriate  legislation. 

The  following  amendment  was  certified  by  the  secretary  of 
state  to  have  become  valid  as  a  part  of  the  Constitution  of  thej 
United  States,  July  28th,  1868. 

ARTICLE    XIV. 

Sect.  1.  All  persons  bom  or  naturalized  in  the  United  States,  and  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  states  wherein  they 
reside.  No  state  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall  abridge  the  privileges  oi 
immuTlities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States ;  nor  shaji  any  stat«  deprive  anyjierson^^ 
of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  procpss -iif  law;  nor  deny  to  anyjersoii 
^•Within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  thp  law.gi.       ">t^^  C.«'^-/»«  /  <*22iy  •^  VJ_ 

Sect.  2.  Representatives  shall  be  apportioned  among  the  several  states  according 
to  their  respective  numbers,  counting  the  whole  number  of  persons  in  each  State, 
excluding  Indians  not  tase4.  But  when  the  right  to  vote  at  any  election  for  the 
choice  of  electors  for  president  and  vice  president  of  the  United  States,  representa- 
tives in  congress,  the  executive  and  judicial  officers  of  a  state,  or  the  members  of  the 
legislature  thereof,  is  denied  to  any  of  the  male  inhabitants  of  such  state,  being 
twenty-one  years  of  age,  and  citizens  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  way  abridged, 
except  fi>r  participation  in  rebellion  or  other  crime,  the  basis  of  representation 
•  herein  shall  i.e  reduced  in  the  proportion  which  the  number  of  such  male  citizens 
shall  bear  to  the  whole  number  of  male  citizens  of  twenty-one  years  of  age  in  such 
state. 

Sect.  .3.  No  person  shall  be  a  senator  or  representative  in  congress,  or  elector  of 
president  and  vice  president,  or  hold  any  office,  civil  or  military,  under  the  United 
States,  or  under  any  state,  who,  having  previously  taken  an  oath  as  a  member  of 
congress,  or  as  an  officer  of  the  United  States,  or  as  a  member  of  any  state  legisla- 
ture, or  as  an  executive  or  judicial  officer  of  any  state,  to  support  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  Siates,  shall  have  engaged  in  insurrection  or  rebellion  against  the  same 
or  given  aid  or  comfort  to  the  enemies  thereof.  But  congress  may,  by  a  vote  of  two- 
thirds  of  each  house,  remove  such  disability. 

Sect.  4.  The  validity  of  the  public  debt  of  the  United  States,  authorized  by  law, 
including  debts  incurred  for  payment  of  pensions  and  bounties  for  services  in  sup- 
pressing insurrection  or  rebellion,  shall  not  be  questioned.  But  neither  the  United 
States  nor  any  state  shall  assume  or  pay  any  debt  or  obligation  incurred  in  aid  of 
insurrection  or  rebellion  against  the  United  States,  or  any  claim  for  the  loss  or  eman- 
cipation of  any  slave ;  but  all  such  debts,  obligations,  and  claims  shall  be  held  illegal 
and  void. 

Sect.  5.  The  congress  shall  have  power  to  enforce,  by  appropriate  legislation,  tht 
orovisions  of  this  article. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBEK  I. 


NEW    YORK,   OCTOBER  27,   1787. 


HAMILTON. 


INTRODUCTION. 

After  full  experience  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  existing 
Federal  Government,  you  are  invited  to  deliberate  upon  a  new 
Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America. 

The  subject  speaks  its  own  importance ;  comprehending  in  its 
consequences,  nothing  less  than  the  existence  of  the  UNION — 
the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  parts  of  which  it  is  composed — 
the  fate  of  an  empire,  in  many  respects,  the  most  interesting  in 
the  world.  It  has  been  frequently  remarked,  that,  it  seems  to 
have  been  reserved  to  the  people  of  this  country,  to  decide  by 
their  conduct  and  example,  the  important  question,  whether 
societies  of  men  are  really  capable  or  not,  of  establishing  good 
government  from  reflection  and  choice,  or  whether  they  are  for 
ever  destined  to  depend,  for  their  political  constitutions,  on  acci- 
dent and  force.  If  there  be  any  truth  in  the  remark,  the  crisis, 
at  which  we  are  arrived,  may  with  propriety  be  regarded  as  the 
period  when  that  decision  is  to  be  made;  and  a  wrong  election 
of  the  part  we  shall  act,  may,  in  this  view,  deserve  to  be  con- 
sidered as  the  general  misfortune  of  mankind. 

This  idea,  by  adding  the  inducements  of  philanthropy  to  those 
of  patriotism,  will  heighten  the  solicitude,  which  all  considerate 
and  good  men  must  feel  for  the  event.      Happy  will  it  be  if  our 

49 


50  THE   FEDERALIST. 

choieti  should  be  directed  by  a  judicious  estimate  of  our  true 
interests,  uninfluenced  by  considerations  foreign  to  the  public 
good.  But  this  is  more  ardently  to  be  wished  for,  than  seriously 
to  be  expected.  The  plan  offered  to  our  deliberations,  affects  too 
many  particular  interests,  innovates  upon  too  many  local  institu- 
tions, not  to  involve  in  its  discussion  a  variety  of  objects  ex- 
traneous to  its  merits;  and  of  views,  passions,  and  prejudices^ 
little  favourable  to  the  discovery  of  truth. 

Among  the  most  formidable  of  the  obstacles,  which  the  new 
constitution  will  have  to  encounter,  may  readily  be  distinguished 
the  obvious  interest  of  a  certain  class  of  men  in  every  state,  to 
resist  all  changes  which  may  hazard  a  diminution  of  the  power, 
emolument,  and  consequence,  of  the  offices  they  hold  under  the 
state  establishments :  and  the  perverted  ambition  of  another  class 
of  men,  who  will  either  hope  to  aggrandize  themselves  by  the 
confusions  of  their  country,  or  will  flatter  themselves  with  fairer 
prospects  of  elevation  from  the  subdivision  of  the  empire  into 
several  partial  confederacies,  than  from  its  union  under  one 
government. 

It  is  not,  however,  my  design  to  dwell  upon  observations  of 
this  nature.  I  am  aware  that  it  would  be  disingenuous  to 
resolve  indiscriminately  the  opposition  of  any  set  of  men  into 
interested  or  ambitious  views,  merely  because  their  situations 
might  subject  them  to  suspicion.  Candour  will  oblige  us  to 
admit,  that  even  such  men  may  be  actuated  by  upright  inten- 
tions; and  it  cannot  be  doubted,  that  much  of  the  opposition 
which  has  already  shown  itself,  or  that  may  hereafter  make  its 
appearance,  will  spring  from  sources,  blameless  at  least,  if  not 
respectable — the  honest  errors  of  minds  led  astray  by  pre- 
conceived jealousies  and  fears.  So  numerous  indeed,  and  so 
powerful  are  the  causes,  which  serve  to  give  a  false  bias  to  the 
judgment,  that  we,  upon  many  occasions,  see  wise  and  good  men 
on  the  wrong  as  well  as  on  the  right  side  of  questions,  of  the 
first  magnitude  to  society.  This  circumstance,  if  duly  attended 
to,  would  always  furnish  a  lesson  of  moderation  to  those  who  are 
engaged  in  any  controversy,  however  well  persuaded  of  being 


THE   FEDERALIST.  51 

m  the  right.  And  a  further  reason  for  caution,  in  this  respect, 
might  be  drawn  from  the  reflection,  that  we  are  not  always 
sure,  that  those  who  advocate  the  truth  are  actuated  by  purer 
principles  than  their  antagonists.  Ambition,  avarice,  personal 
animosity,  party  opposition,  and  many  other  motives,  not  more 
laudable  than  these,  are  apt  to  operate  as  well  upon  those  who 
support,  as  upon  those  who  oppose,  the  right  side  of  a  question 
Were  there  not  even  these  inducements  to  moderation,  nothing 
could  be  more  illjudged  than  that  intolerant  spirit,  which  has, 
at  all  times,  characterized  political  parties.  For,  in  politics  as 
in  religion,  it  is  equally  absurd  to  aim  at  making  proselytes  by 
fire  and  sword.  Heresies  in  either  can  rarely  be  cured  by 
persecution. 

And  yet,  just  as  these  sentiments  must  appear  to  candid  men, 
we  have  already  sufficient  indications,  that  it  will  happen  in  this, 
as  in  all  former  cases  of  great  national  discussion.  A  torrent  of 
angry  and  malignant  passions  will  be  let  loose.  To  judge  from 
the  conduct  of  the  opposite  parties,  we  shall  be  led  to  conclude, 
that  they  will  mutually  hope  to  evince  the  justness  of  their 
opinions,  and  to  increase  the  number  of  their  converts,  by  the 
loudness  of  their  declamations,  and  by  the  bitterness  of  their 
invectives.  An  enlightened  zeal  for  the  energy  and  efficiency 
of  government,  will  be  stigmatized  as  the  offspring  -of  a 
temper  fond  of  power,  and  hostile  to  the  principles  of  liberty 
An  overscrupulous  jealousy  of  danger  to  the  rights  of  the  people, 
which  is  more  commonly  the  fault  of  the  head  than  of  the  heart, 
will  be  represented  as  mere  pretence  and  artifice;  the  stale  bait 
for  popularity  at  the  expense  of  public  good.  It  will  be  for- 
gotten, on  the  one  hand,  that  jealousy  is  the  usual  concomitant 
of  violent  love,  and  that  the  noble  enthusiasm  of  liberty  is  too 
apt  to  be  infected  with  a  spirit  of  narrow  and  illiberal  distrust. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  will  be  equally  forgotten,  that  the  vigour 
of  government  is  essential  to  the  security  of  liberty ;  that,  in 
the  contemplation  of  a  sound  and  well  informed  judgment,  their 
interests  can  never  be  separated;  and  that  a  dangerous  ambi- 
tion more  often  lurks  behind  the  specious  mask  of  zeal  for  the 


52  THE    FEDERALIST. 

rights  of  the  people,  ihan  under  the  forbidding  appearances  of 
zeal  for  the  firmness  and  efficiency  of  government.  History  will 
teach  us,  that  the  former  has  been  found  a  much  more  certain 
road  to  the  introduction  of  despotism  than  the  latter;  and  that 
of  those  men  who  have  overturned  the  liberties  of  republics, 
the  greatest  number  have  begun  their  career,  by  paying  an 
obsequious  court  to  the  people,  commencing  demagogues  and 
ending  tyrants. 

In  the  course  of  the  preceding  observations  it  has  been  my 
aim,  fellow  citizens,  to  put  you  upon  your  guard  against  all 
attempts,  from  whatever  quarter,  to  influence  your  decision  in  a 
matter  of  the  utmost  moment  to  your  welfare,  by  any  impres- 
sions other  than  those  which  may  result  from  the  evidence  of 
truth.  You  will,  no  doubt,  at  the  same  time,  have  collected 
from  the  general  scope  of  them,  that  they  proceed  from  a  source 
not  unfriendly  to  the  new  constitution.  Yes,  my  countrymen, 
I  own  to  you,  that,  after  having  given  it  an  attentive  con- 
sideration, I  am  clearly  of  opinion,  it  is  your  interest  to  adopt 
it.  I  am  convinced,  that  this  is  the  safest  course  for  your 
liberty,  your  dignity,  and  your  happiness.  I  affect  not  reserves, 
which  I  do  not  feel.  I  will  not  amuse  you  with  an  appearance 
of  deliberation,  when  I  have  decided.  I  frankly  acknowledge 
to  you  my  convictions,  and  I  will  freely  lay  before  you  the 
reasons  on  which  they  are  founded.  The  consciousness  of  good 
intentions  disdains  ambiguity.  I  shall  not,  however,  multiply 
professions  on  this  head.  My  motives  must  remain  in  the  depo- 
sitory of  my  own  breast :  my  arguments  will  be  open  to  all,  and 
may  be  judged  of  by  all.  They  shall  at  least  be  offered  in  a 
spirit,  which  will  not  disgrace  the  cause  of  truth. 

I  propose,  in  a  series  of  papers,  to  discuss  the  following  inte- 
resting particulars...  2%e  utility  of  the  UNION  to  your  political 
prosperity...  The  insufficienq/  of  the  present  confederation  to  preserve 
that  Union...  The  necessity  of  a  government,  at  least  equally  energetic 
with  the  one  proposed,  to  the  attainment  of  this  object...  The  conformity 
of  the  proposed  constitution  to  the  true  principles  of  republican  govern- 
ment...Its  analogy  to  your  own  state  constitution.. .&nd  lastly,  2%e 


THE    FEDERALIST.  53 

additional  security,  which  its  adoption  will  afford  to  the  preservation 
of  that  species  of  government,  to  liberty,  and  to  property. 

In  the  progress  of  this  discussion,  I  shall  endeavour  to  give 
a  satisfactory  answer  to  all  the  objections  which  shall  have 
made  their  appearance,  that  may  seem  to  have  any  claim  to 
attention. 

It  may  perhaps  be  thought  superfluous  to  offer  arguments  to 
prove  the  utility  of  the  UNION;  a  point,  no  doubt,  deeply 
engraved  on  the  hearts  of  the  great  body  of  the  people  in  every 
state,  and  one  which,  it  may  be  imagined,  has  no  adversaries. 
But  the  fact  is,  that  we  already  hear  it  whispered  in  the  private 
circles  of  those  who  oppose  the  new  constitution,  that  the  Thir- 
teen States  are  of  too  great  extent  for  any  general  system,  and 
that  we  must  of  necessity  resort  to  separate  confederacies  of 
distinct  portions  of  the  whole.*  This  doctrine  will,  in  all  pro 
bability,  be  gradually  propagated,  till  it  has  votaries  enough  to 
countenance  its  open  avowal.  For  nothing  can  be  more  evident, 
to  those  who  are  able  to  take  an  enlarged  view  of  the  subject, 
than  the  alternative  of  an  adoption  of  the  constitution,  or  a 
dismemberment  of  the  Union.  It  may  therefore  be  essential  to 
examine  particularly  the  advantages  of  that  Union,  the  certain 
evils,  and  the  probable  dangers,  to  which  every  state  will  be 
exposed  from  its  dissolution.     This  shall  accordingly  be  done. 

PUBLIUS 

*  The  same  idea,  tracing  the  arguments  to  their  consequences,  is  held  out  in 
seyeral  of  the  late  publications  against  tne  new  constitution. 


64  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  II. 


NEW    YORK.    OOTOBER   51,   J787. 


JAY. 


CONCERNING  DANGERS  FROM  FOREIGN  FORCE  AND  INFLUENCE. 

When  the  people  of  America  reflect,  that  the  question  now 
submitted  to  their  determination,  is  one  of  the  most  important 
that  has  engaged,  or  can  well  engage,  their  attention,  the  pro- 
priety of  their  taking  a  very  comprehensive,  as  well  as  a  very 
serious,  view  of  it,  must  be  evident. 

Nothing  is  more  certain  than  the  indispensable  necessity 
of  government;  and  it  is  equally  undeniable,  that  whenever 
and  however  it  is  instituted,  the  people  must  cede  to  it  some  of 
their  natural  rights,  in  order  to  vest  it  with  requisite  powers. 
It  is  well  worthy  of  consideration  therefore,  whether  it  would 
conduce  more  to  the  interest  of  the  people  of  America,  that  they 
should,  to  all  general  purposes,  be  one  nation,  under  one  federal 
government,  than  that  they  should  divide  themselves  into  sepa- 
rate confederacies,  and  give  to  the  head  of  each,  the  same  kind 
of  powers  which  they  are  advised  to  place  in  one  national 
government. 

It  has  until  lately  been  a  received  and  uncontradicted  opi- 
nion, that  the  prosperity  of  the  people  of  America  depended 
on  their  continuing  firmly  united ;  and  the  wishes,  prayers,  and 
efforts,  of  our  best  and  wisest  citizens,  have  been  constantly 
directed  to  that  object.     But  politicians  now  appear,  who  insist 


THE    FEDERALIST.  55 

that  this  opinion  is  erroneous,  and  that  instead  of  looking  for 
safety  and  happiness  in  union,  we  ought  to  seek  it  in  a  division 
of  the  states  into  distinct  confederacies  or  sovereignties.  How- 
ever extraordinary  this  new  doctrine  may  appear,  it  neverthe 
less  has  its  advocates ;  and  certain  characters  who  were  formerly 
much  opposed  to  it,  are  at  present  of  the  number.  Whatever 
may  be  the  arguments  or  inducements,  which  have  wrought 
this  change  in  the  sentiments  and  declarations  of  these  gentle- 
men, it  certainly  would  not  be  wise  in  the  people  at  large  to 
tidopt  these  new  political  tenets,  without  being  fully  convinced 
that  they  are  founded  in  truth  and  sound  policy. 

It  has  often  given  me  pleasure  to  observe,  that  independent 
America  was  not  composed  of  detached  and  distant  territories, 
but  that  one  connected,  fertile,  wide-spreading  country,  was  the 
portion  of  our  western  sons  of  liberty.  Providence  has  in  a 
particular  manner  blessed  it  with  a  variety  of  soils  and  produc- 
tions, and  watered  it  with  innumerable  streams,  for  the  delight 
and  accommodation  of  its  inhabitants.  A  succession  of  navi- 
gable waters  forms  a  kind  of  chain  round  its  borders,  as  if  to 
bind  it  together;  while  the  most  noble  rivers  in  the  world,  run- 
ning at  convenient  distances,  present  them  with  highways  for 
the  easy  communication  of  friendly  aids,  and  the  mutual  trans- 
portation and  exchange  of  their  various  commodities. 

With  equal  pleasure  I  have  as  often  taken  notice,  that 
Providence  has  been  pleased  to  give  this  one  connected  coun- 
try to  one  united  people;  a  people  descended  from  the  same 
ancestors,  speaking  the  same  language,  professing  the  same 
religion,  attached  to  the  same  principles  of  government,  very 
similar  m  their  manners  and  customs,  and  who,  by  their  joint 
counsels,  arms  and  efforts,  fighting  side  by  side  throughout  a 
long  and  bloody  war,  have  nobly  established  their  general 
liberty  and  independence. 

Tliis  country  and  this  people  seem  to  have  been  made  for 
each  other;  and  it  appears  as  if  it  was  the  design  of  Provi- 
dence, that  an  inheritance  so  proper  and  convenient  for  a  band 
of  brethren,  united  to  each  other  by  the  strongest  ties,  should 


5t»  THE    FEDERALIST. 

never  be  split  into  a  number  of  unsocial,  jealous,  and  alien 
sovereignties. 

Similar  sentiments  have  hitherto  prevailed  among  all  orders 
and  denominations  of  men  among  us.  To  all  general  purposes, 
we  have  uniformly  been  one  people.  Each  individual  citizen 
every  where  enjoying  the  same  national  rights,  privileges,  and 
protection.  As  a  nation,  we  have  made  peace  and  war:  as  a 
nation,  we  have  vanquished  our  common  enemies  :  as  a  nation, 
we  have  formed  alliances,  and  made  treaties,  and  entered  into 
various  compacts  and  conventions  with  foreign  states. 

A  strong  sense  of  the  value  and  blessings  of  Union  induced 
the  people,  at  a  very  early  period,  to  institute  a  federal  gov- 
ernment to  preserve  and  perpetuate  it.  They  formed  it 
almost  as  soon  as  they  had  a  political  existence ;  nay,  at  a 
time,  when  their  habitations  were  in  flames,  when  many  of 
them  were  bleeding  in  the  field ;  and  when  the  progress  of 
hostility  and  desolation  left  little  room  for  those  calm  and 
mature  inquiries  and  reflections,  which  must  ever  precede  the 
formation  of  a  wise  and  well  balanced  government  for  a  free 
people.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  a  government  insti- 
tuted in  times  so  inauspicious,  should  on  experiment  be  found 
greatly  deficient,  and  inadequate  to  the  purpose  it  was  intended 
to  answer. 

This  intelligent  people  perceived  and  regretted  these  defects. 
Still  continuing  no  less  attached  to  union,  than  enamoured  of 
liberty,  they  observed  the  danger,  which  immediately  threatened 
the  former  and  more  remotely  the  latter;  and  being  persuaded 
that  ample  security  for  both,  could  only  be  found  in  a  national 
government  more  wisely  framed,  they,  as  with  one  voice,  con- 
vened the  late  Convention  at  Philadelphia,  to  take  that  import- 
ant subject  under  consideration. 

This  Convention,  composed  of  men  who  possessed  the  con- 
fidence of  the  people,  and  many  of  whom  had  become  highly 
distinguished  by  their  patriotism,  virtue,  and  wisdom,  in  times 
(vhich  tried  the  souls  of  men,  undertook  the  arduous  task.  In  the 
mild  season  of  peace,  with  minds  unoccupied  by  other  subjects, 


THE    FEDERALIST.  57 

they  passed  many  months  in  cool  uninterrupted  and  daily  con- 
sultations :  And  finally,  without  having  been  awed  by  power, 
or  influenced  by  any  passion,  except  love  for  their  country,  they 
presented  and  recommended  to  the  people  the  plan  produced 
by  their  joint  and  very  unanimous  counsels. 

Admit,  for  so  is  the  fact,  that  this  plan  is  only  recommended, 
not  imposed,  yet,  let  it  be  remembered,  that  it  is  neither 
recommended  to  blind  approbation,  nor  to  blind  reprobation ;  but 
to  that  sedate  and  candid  consideration,  which  the  magnitude 
and  importance  of  the  subject  demand,  and  which  it  certainly 
ought  to  receive.  But,  as  has  been  already  remarked,  it  is 
more  to  be  wished  than  expected  that  it  may  be  so  con- 
sidered and  examined.  Experience  on  a  former  occasion 
teaches  us  not  to  be  too  sanguine  in  such  hopes.  It  is  not 
yet  forgotten,  that  well  grounded  apprehensions  of  imminent 
danger  induced  the  people  of  America  to  form  the  memorable 
Congress  of  1774.  That  body  recommended  certain  measures 
to  their  constituents,  and  the  event  proved  their  wisdom;  yet 
it  is  fresh  in  our  memories  how  soon  the  press  began  to 
teem  with  pamphlets  and  weekly  papers  against  those  very 
measures.  Not  only  many  of  the  officers  of  government  who 
obeyed  the  dictates  of  personal  interest,  but  others  from  a 
mistaken  estimate  of  consequences,  from  the  undue  influenco 
of  ancient  attachments,  or  whose  ambition  aimed  at  objectts 
which  did  not  correspond  with  the  public  good,  were  inde- 
fatigable in  their  endeavours  to  persuade  the  people  to  reject 
the  advice  of  that  patriotic  Congress.  Many  indeed  were 
deceived  and  deluded,  but  the  great  majority  reasoned  and 
decided  judiciously;  and  happy  they  are  in  reflecting  that 
they  did  so. 

They  considered  that  the  Congress  was  composed  of  many 
wise  and  experienced  men.  That  being  convened  from  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  country,  they  brought  with  them  and  com- 
municated to  each  other  a  variety  of  useful  information. 
That  in  the  course  of  the  time  they  passed  together  in  in- 
quiring into  and  discussing  the  true  interests  of  their  country, 


5b  THE    FEDERALIST. 

tney  must  have  acquired  very  accurate  knowledge  on  that 
head.  That  they  were  individually  interested  in  the  public 
liberty  and  prosperity,  and  therefore  that  it  was  not  less  their 
inclination  than  their  duty,  to  recommend  such  measures  only, 
as  after  the  most  mature  deliberation  they  really  thought  pru- 
dent and  advisable. 

These  and  similar  considerations  then  induced  the  people  to 
rely  greatly  on  the  judgment  and  integrity  of  the  Congress; 
and  they  took  their  advice,  notwithstanding  the  various  arts 
and  endeavours  used  to  deter  and  dissuade  them  from  it.  But 
if  the  people  at  large  had  reason  to  confide  in  the  men  of 
that  Congress,  few  of  whom  had  then  been  fully  tried  or  gene- 
rally known,  still  greater  reason  have  they  now  to  respect  the 
judgment  and  advice  of  the  Convention ;  for  it  is  well  known, 
that  some  of  the  most  distinguished  members  of  that  Con 
gress,  who  have  been  since  tried  and  justly  approved  foi 
patriotism  and  abilities,  and  who  have  grown  old  in  acquiring 
political  information,  were  also  members  of  this  Conven- 
tion, and  carried  into  it  their  accumulated  knowledge  and  ex- 
perience. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  not  only  the  first,  but  every 
succeeding  Congress,  as  well  as  the  late  Convention,  have  in- 
variably joined  with  the  people  in  thinking  that  the  prosperity 
of  America  depended  on  its  Union.  To  preserve  and  perpetuate 
it,  was  the  great  object  of  the  people  in  forming  that  Conven- 
tion; and  it  is  also  the  great  object  of  the  plan  which  the  Con- 
vention has  advised  them  to  adopt.  With  what  propriety  there- 
fore, or  for  what  good  purposes,  are  attempts  at  this  particular 
period  made,  by  some  men,  to  depreciate  the  importance  of  the 
Union  ?  or  why  is  it  suggested  that  three  or  four  confederacies 
would  be  better  than  one  ?  I  am  persuaded  in  my  own  mind, 
that  the  people  have  always  thought  right  on  this  subject,  and 
that  their  universal  and  uniform  attachment  to  the  cause  of  the 
Union,  rests  on  great  and  weighty  reasons. 

They  who  promote  the  idea  of  substituting  a  number  of  dis- 
tinct confederacies  in  the  room  of  the  plan  of  the  Convention, 


THE    FEDERALIST.  5» 

aeem  clearly  to  foresee  that  the  rejection  of  it  would  put  tbc 
continuance  of  the  Union  in  the  utmost  jeopardy :  that  certainly 
would  be  the  case ;  and  I  sincerely  wish  that  it  may  bfi  as  clearly 
foreseen  by  every  good  citizen,  that  whenever  the  dissolution 
of  the  Union  arrives,  America  will  have  reason  to  exclaim  in 
the  words  of  the  Poet,  "  Farewell  I  a  long  farewell,  to  all 
my  greatness  i" 

Publius. 


15 


60  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  III. 


NEW   YORK,   NOVEMBER   3,  1787. 


JAY. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 

It  is  not  a  new  observation  that  the  people  of  any  country 
(if  like  the  Americans,  intelligent  and  well  informed)  seldom 
adopt,  and  steadily  persevere  for  many  years,  in  any  erroneous 
opinion  respecting  their  interests.  That  consideration  naturally 
tends  to  create  great  respect  for  the  high  opinion  which  the 
people  of  America  have  so  long  and  uniformly  entertained  of  the 
importance  of  their  continuing  firmly  united  under  one  federal 
government,  vested  with  sufficient  powers  for  all  general  and 
national  purposes. 

The  more  attentively  I  consider  and  investigate  the  reasons 
which  appear  to  have  given  birth  to  this  opinion,  the  more  I 
become  convinced  that  they  are  cogent  and  conclusive. 

Among  the  many  objects  to  which  a  wise  and  free  people  find 
it  necessary  to  direct  their  attention,  that  of  providing  for  theii 
safety  seems  to  be  the  first.  The  safety  of  the  people  doubtless 
has  relation  to  a  great  variety  of  circumstances  iand  considera- 
tions, and  consequently  affords  great  latitude' to  those  who  wish 
to  define  it  precisely  and  comprehensively. 

At  present  I  mean  only  to  consider  it  as  it  respects  security 
for  the  preservation  of  peace  and  tranquillity,  as  well  against 
dangers   from  foreign   arms   and   influence,  as   against   dangers 


THE    FEDERALIST.  tJi 

arising  from  domestic  causes.  As  the  former  of  these  comes 
fii'St  in  order,  it  is  proper  it  should  be  the  first  discussed.  Let 
us  therefore  proceed  to  examine  whether  the  people  are  not 
right  in  their  opinion,  that  a  cordial  Union  under  an  efficient 
national  Government,  affords  them  the  best  security  that  can  be 
devised  against  hostilities  from  abroad. 

The  number  of  wars  which  have  happened,  or  may  happen  in 
the  world,  will  always  be  found  to  be  in  proportion  to  th« 
number  and  weight  of  the  causes,  whether  real  or  pretended, 
which  provoke  or  invite  them.  If  this  remark  be  just,  it  be- 
comes useful  to  inquire,  whether  so  Tn&nyjust  causes  of  war  are 
likely  to  be  given  by  united  America,  as  by  disunited  America ; 
for  if  it  should  turn  out  that  united  America  will  probably  give 
the  fewest,  then  it  will  follow  that,  in  this  respect,  the  Union 
tends  most  to  preserve  the  people  in  a  state  of  peace  with  other 
nations. 

The  just  causes  of  war  for  the  most  part  arise  either  from 
violations  of  treaties,  or  from  direct  violence.  America  has 
already  formed  treaties  with  no  less  than  six  foreign  nations, 
and  all  of  them,  except  Prussia,  are  maritime,  and  therefore 
able  to  annoy  and  injure  us :  She  has  also  extensive  commerce 
with  Portugal,  Spain,  and  Britain;  and  with  respect  to  the  two 
latter,  has  the  additional  circumstance  of  neighbourhood  to 
attend  to. 

It  is  of  high  importance  to  the  peace  of  America,  that  she 
observe  the  law  of  nations  towards  all  these  powers;  and  to  me  it 
appears  evident,  that  this  will  be  more  perfectly  and  punctually 
done  by  one  national  government,  than  it  could  be  either  by 
thirteen  separate  states,  or  by  three  or  four  distinct  confedera- 
cies.    For  this  opinion  various  reasons  may  be  assigned. 

When  once  an  efficient  national  government  is  established, 
the  best  men  in  the  country  will  not  only  consent  to  serve,  but 
will  also  generally  be  appointed  to  manage  it;  for  although 
town,  or  county,  or  other  contracted  influence,  may  place  men 
in  state  assemblies,  or  senates,  or  courts  of  justice,  or  executive 
departments;   yet  more  general  and  extensive  reputation  for 


62  THE    FEDERALIST. 

talents  ana  other  qualifications,  will  be  necessary  to  recommend 
men  to  ofiiees  under  the  national  government,  especially  as  it 
will  have  the  widest  field  for  choice,  and  never  experience  that 
want  of  proper  persons,  which  is  not  uncommon  in  some  of  the 
states.  Hence  it  will  result,  that  the  administration,  the  politi- 
cal councils,  and  the  judicial  decisions,  of  the  national  govern- 
ment, will  be  more  wise,  systematical  and  judicious,  than  those 
of  individual  states,  and  consequently  more  satisfactory  with 
respect  to  the  other  nations,  as  well  as  more  safe  with  respect 
to  ourselves. 

Under  the  national  government,  treaties  and  articles  of 
treaties,  as  well  as '  the  laws  of  nations,  will  always  be  ex- 
pounded in  one  sense,  and  executed  in  the  same  manner; 
whereas  adjudications  on  the  same  points  and  questions,  in 
thirteen  states,  or  in  three  or  four  confederacies,  will  not  always 
accord  or  be  consistent ;  and  that  as  well  from  the  variety  ol 
independent  courts  and  judges,  appointed  by  different  and  inde- 
pendent governments,  as  from  the  different  local  laws  and  inte- 
rests which  may  affect  and  influence  them.  The  wisdom  of  the 
Convention  in  committing  such  questions  to  the  jurisdiction  and 
judgment  of  courts  appointed  by,  and  responsible  only  to  one 
national  government,  cannot  be  too  much  commended. 

The  prospect  of  present  loss  or  advantage,  may  often  tempt 
the  governing  party  in  one  or  two  states  to  swerve  from  good 
faith  and  justice;  but  those  temptations  not  reaching  the  other 
states,  and  consequently  having  little  or  no  influence  on  the 
national  government,  the  temptations  will  be  fruitless,  and  good 
faith  and  justice  be  preserved.  The  case  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
with  Britain,  adds  great  weight  to  this  reasoning. 

If  even  the  governing  party  in  a  state  should  be  disposed  to 
resist  such  temptations,  yet  as  such  temptations  inay,  and  com- 
monly do,  result  from  circumstances  peculiar  to  the  state,  and 
may  affect  a  great  number  of  the  inhabitants,  the  governing 
party  may  not  always  be  able,  if  willing,  to  prevent  the  injustice 
meditated,  or  to  punish  the  aggressors.  But  the  national  gov 
ernment,  not  being  affected  by  those  local  circumstances,  will 


THE    FEDERALIST.  63 

neither  be  induced  to  commit  the  wrong  themselves,  nor  want 
power  or  inclination  to  prevent,  or  punish  its  commission  by 
others. 

So  far  therefore  as  either  designed  or  accidental  violations  of 
treaties  and  of  the  laws  of  nations  afford  just  causes  of  war,  they 
are  less  to  be  apprehended  under  one  general  government,  than 
under  several  lesser  ones;  and  in  that  respect,  the  former  most 
favours  the  safety  of  the  people. 

As  to  those  just  causes  of  war  which  proceed  from  direct  and 
unlawful  violence,  it  appears  equally  clear  to  me,  that  one  good 
national  government  affords  vastly  more  security  against  dangers 
of  that  sort,  than  can  be  derived  from  any  other  quarter. 

Such  violences  are  more  frequently  occasioned  by  the  passions 
and  interests  of  a  part  than  of  the  whole,  of  one  or  two  states 
than  of  the  union.  Not  a  single  Indian  war  has  yet  been  produced 
by  aggressions  of  the  present  federal  government,  feeble  as  it  is; 
but  there  are  several  instances  of  Indian  hostilities  having  been 
provoked  by  the  improper  conduct  of  individual  states,  who 
either  unable  or  unwilling  to  restrain  or  punish  offences,  hare 
given  occasion  to  the  slaughter  of  many  innocent  inhabitants. 

The  neighbourhood  of  Spanish  and  British  territories,  border- 
ing on  some  states,  and  not  on  others,  naturally  confines  tho 
causes  of  quarrel  more  immediately  to  the  borderers.  The  bor- 
dering states,  if  any,  will  be  those  who,  under  the  impulse  of 
sudden  irritations,  and  a  quick  sense  of  apparent  interest  or 
injury,  will  be  most  likely  by  direct  violence,  to  excite  war  with 
those  nations;  and  nothing  can  so  effectually  obviate  that  danger, 
as  a  national  government,  whose  wisdom  and  prudence  will  not 
be  diminished  by  the  passions  which  actuate  the  parties  imme- 
diately interested. 

But  not  only  fewer  just  causes  of  war  will  be  given  by  the 
national  government,  but  it  will  also  be  more  in  their  power  to 
accommodate  and  settle  them  amicably.  They  will  be  more 
temperate  and  cool,  and  in  that  respect,  as  well  as  in  others, 
will  be  more  in  a  capacity  to  act  with  circumspection  than  the 
offending    state      The    pride   of   states,   as   well    as  of   men. 


64  THE    FEDERALIST. 

naturally  disposes  them  to  justify  all  their  actions,  and  opposes 
their  acknowledging,  correcting,  or  repairing  their  errors  and 
offences.  The  national  government  in  such  cases  will  not  be 
affected  by  this  pride ;  but  will  proceed  with  moderation  and 
candour  to  consider  and  decide  on  the  means  most  proper  to 
extricate  them  from  the  difficulties  which  threaten  them. 

Besides,  it  is  well  known  that  acknowledgments,  explanations, 
and  compensations,  are  often  accepted  as  satisfactory  from  a 
strong  united  nation,  which  would  be  rejected  as  unsatisfactory 
if  offered  by  a  state  or  confederacy  of  little  consideration  or 
power. 

In  the  year  1685,  the  state  of  Genoa  having  offended  Louis 
XlVth,  endeavoured  to  appease  him.  He  demanded  that  they 
should  send  their  Doge  or  chief  magistrate,  accompanied  by  four 
of  their  Senators,  to  France,  to  ask  his  pardon  and  receive  his 
terms.  They  were  obliged  to  submit  to  it  for  the  sake  of  peace. 
Would  he  on  any  occasion  either  have  demanded  or  have  re- 
ceived the  like  humiliation  from  Spain,  or  Britain,  or  any  other 
powerfol  nation  ? 

PUBLIUK. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  %6 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  IV. 


NEW    YORK,    NOVEMBER   7,    1787. 


JAY. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 

My  last  paper  assigned  several  reasons  why  the  safety  of  the 
people  would  be  best  secured  by  Union  against  the  danger  it 
may  be  exposed  to  hy  just  causes  of  war  given  to  other  nations; 
and  those  reasons  show  that  such  causes  would  nqt  only  be  more 
rarely  given,  but  would  also  be  more  easily  accommodated  by  a 
national  government,  than  either  by  the  state  governments,  or 
the  proposed  confederacies. 

But  the  safety  of  the  people  of  America  against  dangers  from 
foreign  force,  depends  not  only  on  their  forbearing  to  give  just 
causes  of  war  to  other  nations,  but  also  on  their  placing  and  con- 
tinuing themselves  in  such  a  situation  as  not  to  invite  hostility 
or  insult  j  for  it  need  not  be  observed,  that  there  are  pretended 
as  well  as  just  causes  of  war. 

It  is  too  true,  however  disgraceful  it  may  be  to  human  na- 
ture, that  nations  in  general  will  make  war  whenever  they  have 
a  prospect  of  getting  any  thing  by  itj  nay,  that  absolute 
monarchs  will  often  make  war  when  their  nations  are  to  get 
nothing  by  it,  but  for  purposes  and  objects  merely  personal,  such 
as,  a  thirst  for  military  glory,  revenge  for  personal  affronts,  ambi- 
tion, or  private  compacts  to  aggrandize  or  support  their  par- 
ticular families,  or  partizans.     These,  and  a  variety  of  motives, 


66  THE   FEDERALIST. 

wnicb  affect  only  the  mind  of  the  sovereign,  often  lead  him  to 
engage  in  wars  not  sanctioned  by  justice,  or  the  voice  and  inte- 
rests of  his  people.  But  independent  of  these  inducements  to 
war,  which  are  most  prevalent  in  absolute  monarchies,  but 
which  well  deserve  our  attention,  there  are  others  which  affect 
nations  as  often  as  kings ;  and  some  of  them  will,  on  examina- 
tion, be  found  to  grow  out  of  our  relative  situation  and  circum- 
stances. 

With  France  and  with  Britain  we  are  rivals  in  the  fisheries, 
and  can  supply  their  markets  cheaper  than  they  can  themselves, 
notwithstanding  any  efforts  to  prevent  it  by  bounties  on  their 
own,  or  duties  on  foreign  fish. 

With  them,  and  with  most  other  European  nations,  we  are 
rivals  in  navigation,  and  the  carrying  trade ;  and  we  shall  deceive 
ourselves  if  we  suppose  that  any  of  them  will  rejoice  to  see 
these  flourish  in  our  hands :  for  as  our  carrying  trade  cannot 
increase,  without  in  some  degree  diminishing  their's,  it  is  more 
their  interest  and  will  be  more  their  policy,  to  restrain  than  to 
promote  it. 

In  the  trade  to  China  and  India,  we  interfere  with  more  than 
one  nation,  inasmuch  as  it  enables  us  to  partake  in  advantages 
which  they  had  in  a  manner  monopolized,  and  as  we  thereby 
supply  ourselves  with  commodities  which  we  used  to  purchase 
from  them. 

The  extension  of  our  own  commerce  in  our  own  vessels, 
uannot  give  pleasure  to  any  nations  who  possess  territories  on 
or  near  this  continent,  because  the  cheapness  and  excellence  of 
our  productions,  added  to  the  circumstance  of  vicinity,  and  the 
enterprise  and  address  of  our  merchants  and  navigators,  will 
give  us  a  greater  share  in  the  advantages  which  those  territories 
afford,  than  consists  with  the  wishes  or  policy  of  their  respec- 
tive sovereigns. 

Spain  thinks  it  convenient  to  shut  the  Mississippi  against  us 
on  the  one  side,  and  Britain  excludes  us  from  the  St.  Lawrence 
on  the  other;  nor  will  either  of  them  permit  the  other  waters. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  0  4 

which  are  between  them  and  us,  to  become  the  means  of  mutual 
intercourse  and  traflSc. 

From  these,  and  like  considerations,  which  might,  if  consistent 
with  prudence,  be  more  amplified  and  detailed,  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  jealousies  and  uneasinesses  may  gradually  slide  into  the 
minds  and  cabinets  of  other  nations;  and  that  we  are  not  to 
expect  they  should  regard  our  advancement  in  union,  in  power 
and  consequence  by  land  and  by  sea,  with  an  eye  of  indifference 
and  composure. 

The  people  of  America  are  aware  that  inducements  to  war 
may  arise  out  of  these  circumstances,  as  well  as  from  others  not 
BO  obvious  at  present;  and  that  whenever  such  inducements 
may  find  fit  time  and  opportunity  for  operation,  pretences  to 
colour  and  justify  them  will  not  be  wanting.  Wisely  therefore, 
do  they  consider  union  and  a  good  national  government,  as  neces- 
sary to  put  and  keep  them  in  such  a  situation,  as,  instead  of 
inviting  war,  will  tend  to  repress  and  discourage  it.  That  situa- 
tion consists  in  the  best  possible  state  of  defence,  and  necessarily 
depends  on  the  government,  the  arms,  and  the  resources  of  the 
country. 

As  the  safety  of  the  whole  is  the  interest  of  the  whole,  and 
cannot  be  provided  for  without  government,  either  one  or  more, 
or  many,  let  us  inquire  whether  one  good  government  is  not, 
relative  to  the  object  in  question,  more  competent  than  any 
other  given  number  whatever. 

One  government  can  collect  and  avail  itself  of  the  talents  and 
experience  of  the  ablest  men,  in  whatever  part  of  the  Union 
they  may  be  found.  It  can  move  on  uniform  principles  of  policy. 
It  can  harmonize,  assimilate,  and  protect  the  several  parts  and 
members,  and  extend  the  benefit  of  its  foresight  and  pre- 
cautions to  each.  In  the  formation  of  treaties'  it  will  regard 
tne  interest  of  the  whole,  and  the  particular  interests  of  the 
parts  as  connected  with  that  of  the  whole.  It  can  apply  the 
resources  and  power  of  the  whole  to  the  defence  of  any  par- 
ticular part,  and  that  more  easily  and  expeditiously  than  state 
governments,  or   separate   confederacies,  can   possibly  do,  f<* 


68  THE   FEDERALIST. 

want  of  concert  and  unity  of  system.  It  can  place  the  militia 
under  one  plan  of  discipline,  and  by  putting  their  officers  in  a 
proper  line  of  subordination  to  the  chief  magistrate,  will  in  a 
manner  consolidate  them  into  one  corps,  and  thereby  render 
them  more  efficient  than  if  divided  into  thirteen,  or  into  three 
or  four  distinct  independent  bodies. 

What  would  the  militia  of  Britain  be,  if  the  English  militia 
obeyed  the  government  of  England,  if  the  Scotch  militia 
obeyed  the  government  of  Scotland,  and  if  the  Welch  militia 
obeyed  the  government  of  Wales  ?  Suppose  an  invasion : 
would  those  three  governments  (if  they  agreed  at  all)  be  able 
with  all  their  respective  forces,  to  operate  against  the  enemy 
80  effectually  as  the  single  government  of  Great  Britain 
would? 

We  have  heard  much  of  the  fleets  of  Britain ;  and  if  we 
are  wise,  the  time  may  come,  when  the  fleets  of  America  may 
engage  attention.  But  if  one  national  government  had  not 
so  regulated  the  navigation  of  Britain  as  to  make  it  a  nursery 
for  seamen — if  one  national  government  had  not  called  forth 
all  the  national  means  and  materials  for  forming  fleets,  their 
prowess  and  their  thunder  would  never  have  been  cele- 
brated. Let  England  have  its  navigation  and  fleet ;  let  Scot- 
land have  its  navigation  and  fleet ;  let  Wales  have  its  naviga- 
tion and  fleet;  let  Ireland  have  its  navigation  and  fleet;  let 
those  four  of  the  constituent  parts  of  the  British  empire 
be  under  four  independent  governments,  and  it  is  easy  to  per- 
ceive how  soon  they  would  each  dwindle  into  comparative  insig- 
nificance. 

Apply  these  facts  to  our  own  case.  Leave  America  divided 
into  thirteen,  or,  if  you  please,  into  three  or  four  independ- 
ent governments,  what  armies  could  they  raise  and  pay, 
what  fleets  could  they  ever  hope  to  have  ?  If  one  was 
attacked,  would  the  others  fly  to  its  succour,  and  spend  their 
blood  and  money  in  its  defence?  Would  there  be  no  danger 
of  their  being  flattered  into  neutrality  by  specious  promises, 
or   seduced  by  a  too  great  fondness  for  peace  to  decline  haz- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  69 

aiding  their  tranquillity  and  present  safety  for  the  sake  of 
neighbours,  of  whom  perhaps  they  have  been  jealous,  and 
whose  importance  they  are  content  to  see  diminished?  Al- 
though such  conduct  would  not  be  wise,  it  would  nevertheless 
be  natural.  The  history  of  the  states  of  Greece,  and  of  other 
countries,  abound  with  such  instances ;  and  it  is  not  improbable 
that  what  has  so  often  happened,  would,  under  similar  circum- 
stances,  happen  again. 

But  admit  that  they  might  be  willing  to  help  the  invaded 
state  or  confederacy.  How,  and  when,  and  in  what  propor- 
tion, shall  aids  of  men  and  money  be  afforded?  Who  shall 
command  the  allied  armies,  and  from  which  of  the  associates 
shall  he  receive  his  orders?  Who  shall  settle  the  terms  of 
peace  ?  and  in  case  of  disputes,  what  umpire  shall  decide  be- 
tween them,  and  compel  acquiescence?  Various  difficulties 
and  inconveniences  would  be  inseparable  from  such  a  situa- 
tion; whereas  one  government,  watching  over  the  general 
and  common  interests,  combining  and  directing  the  powers 
and  resources  of  the  whole,  would  be  free  from  all  these 
embarrassments,  and  conduce  far  more  to  the  safety  of  the 
•  people. 

But  whatever  may  be  our  situation,  whether  firmly  united 
under  one  national  government,  or  split  into  a  number  of 
confederacies,  certain  it  is,  that  foreign  nations  will  know  and 
view  it  exactly  as  it  ib ;  and  they  will  act  towards  us  accord- 
ingly. If  they  see  that  our  national  government  is  efficient 
and  well  administered — our  trade  prudently  regulated — our 
militia  properly  organized  and  disciplined — our  resources  and 
finances  discreetly  managed — our  credit  re-established — our 
people  free,  contented,  and  united;  they  will  be  much  more 
disposed  to  cultivate  our  friendship,  than  to  provoke  our  re- 
sentment. If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  find  us  either  destitute 
of  an  effectual  government,  (each  state  doing  right  or  wrong, 
as  to  its  rulers  may  seem  convenient)  or  split  into  three  or 
four  independent,  and  probably  discordant,  republics  or  con- 
federacies, one  inclining  to  Britain,  another  to  France,  and  a 


70,  THE    FEDERALIST. 

third  to  Spain,  and  perhaps  played  off  against  each  other  by 
the  three,  what  a  poor  pitiful  figure  will  America  make  in 
their  eyes !  How  liable  would  she  become,  not  only  to  their 
contempt,  but  to  their  outrage;  and  how  soon  would  dear 
bought  experience  proclaim,  that  when  a  people  or  family  so 
divide,  it  never  fail  3  to  be  against  themselves. 

PUBLTUS. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  71 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  V. 


NEW    YORK,   NOVEMBER    10,  1787. 


JAY. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 

Queen  Ann,  in  her  letter  of  the  Ist  July,  1706,  to  the  Scotch 
Parliament,  makes  some  observations  on  the  importance  of  the 
Union  then  forming  between  England  and  Scotland,  which  merit 
our  attention. 

I  shall  present  the  public  with  one  or  two  extracts  from  it 
"An  entire  and  perfect  union  will  be  the  solid  foundation  of 
lasting  peace :  It  will  secure  your  religion,  liberty,  and  property; 
remove  the  animosities  amongst  yourselves,  and  the  jealousies 
and  differences  betwixt  our  two  kingdoms.  It  must  increase 
your  strength,  riches,  and  trade;  and  by  this  union  the  whole 
island,  being  joined  in  affection  and  free  from  all  apprehensions 
of  different  interests,  will  be  enabled  to  resist  all  its  enemies." 
"  We  most  earnestly  recommend  to  you  calmness  and  unanimity 
in  this  great  and  weighty  affair,  that  the  union  may  be  brought 
to  a  happy  conclusion,  being  the  only  effectual  way  to  secure 
our  present  and  future  nappiness;  and  disappoint  the  designs 
of  our  and  your  enemies,  who  will  doubtless,  on  this  occasion, 
use  their  utmost  endeavours  to  prevent  or  delay  this  union." 

It  was  remarked  in  the  preceding  paper,  that  weakness  and 
divisions  at  home,  would  invite  dangers  from  abroad ;  and  that 
nothing  would  tend  more  to  secure  us  from  them  than  union, 


72  THE   FEDERALIST. 

strength,  and  good  government  within  ourselves.     This  subject 
is  copious,  and  cannot  easily  be  exhausted. 

The  history  of  Great-Britain  is  the  one  with  which  we  are  in 
general  the  best  acquainted,  and  it  gives  us  many  useful  lessons 
We  may  profit  by  their  experience,  without  paying  the  price 
which  it  cost  them.  Although  it  seems  obvious  to  common 
sense,  that  the  people  of  such  an  island  should  be  but  one  nation, 
yet  we  find  that  they  were  for  ages  divided  into  three,  and  that 
those  three  were  almost  constantly  embroiled  in  quarrels  and 
wars  with  one  another.  Notwithstanding  their  true  interest, 
with  respect  to  the  continental  nations,  was  really  the  same,  yet 
by  the  arts  and  policy,  and  practices  of  those  nations,  their 
mutual  jealousies  were  perpetually  kept  enflamed,  and  for  a  long 
series  of  years  they  were  far  more  inconvenient  and  troublesome, 
than  they  were  useful  and  assisting  to  each  other. 

Should  the  people  of  America  divide  themselves  into  three  or 
four  nations,  would  not  the  same  thing  happen  ?  Would  not 
similar  jealousies  arise,  and  be  in  like  manner  cherished  ?  Instead 
of  their  being  "joined  in  affection,  and  free  from  all  apprehension 
of  different  interests,"  envy  and  jealousy  would  soon  extinguish 
confidence  and  affection,  and  the  partial  interests  of  each  con- 
federacy, instead  of  the  general  interests  of  all  America,  would 
be  the  only  objects  of  their  policy  and  pursuits.  Hence,  like  most 
other  bordering  nations,  they  would  always  be  either  involved  in 
disputes  and  war,  or  live  in  the  constant  apprehension  of  them. 

The  most  sanguine  advocates  for  three  or  four  confederacies, 
cannot  reasonably  suppose  that  they  would  long  remain  exactly 
on  an  equal  footing  in  point  of  strength,  even  if  it  was  possible 
to  form  them  so  at  first :  but  admitting  that  to  be  practicable, 
yet  what  human  contrivance  can  secure  the  continuance  of  such 
equality  ?  Independent  of  those  local  circumstances,  which  tenu 
to  beget  and  increase  power  in  one  part,  and  to  impede  its  pro- 
gress in  another,  we  must  advert  to  the  effects  of  that  superior 
policy  and  good  management  which  would  probably  distinguish 
the  government  of  one  above  the  rest,  and  by  which  their  reJa^- 
tive  equality  in  strength  and  consideration  would  be  destroyed 


THE    FEDERALIST.  78 

For  it  cannot  be  presumed,  that  the  same  degree  of  sound  pohcy, 
prudence,  and  foresight,  would  uniformly  be  observed  by  each 
of  these  confederacies,  for  a  long  succession  of  years. 

Whenever,  and  from  whatever  causes  it  might  happen,  and 
happen  it  would,  that  any  one  of  these  nations  or  confederacies 
should  rise  on  the  scale  of  political  importance  much  above  the 
degree  of  her  neighbours,  that  moment  would  those  neighbours 
behold  her  with  envy  and  with  fear.  Both  those  passions  would 
lead  them  to  countenance,  if  not  to  promote,  whatever  might 
promise  to  diminish  her  importance;  and  would  also  restrain 
them  from  measures  calculated  to  advance,  or  even  to  secure  her 
prosperity. — Much  time  would  not  be  necessary  to  enable  her  to 
discern  these  unfriendly  dispositions.  She  would  soon  begin,  not 
only  to  lose  confidence  in  her  neighbours,  but  also  to  feel  a  dis- 
position equally  unfavourable  to  them.  Distrust  naturally  creates 
distrust;  and  by  nothing  is  good  will  and  kind  conduct  more 
speedily  changed,  than  by  invidious  jealousies  and  uncandid 
imputations,  whether  expressed  or  implied. 

The  North  is  generally  the  region  of  strength,  and  many  local 
circumstances  render  it  probable,  that  the  most  northern  of  the 
proposed  confederacies  would,  at  a  period  not  very  far  distant, 
be  unquestionably  more  formidable  than  any  of  the  others.  No 
sooner  would  this  become  evident,  than  the  Northern  Hive  would 
excite  the  same  ideas  and  sensations  in  the  more  Southern  parts 
of  America,  which  it  formerly  did  in  the  Southern  parts  of  Eu- 
rope :  Nor  does  it  appear  to  be  a  rash  conjecture,  that  its  young 
swarms  might  often  be  tempted  to  gather  honey  in  the  more 
blooming  fields  and  milder  air  of  their  luxurious  and  more 
delicate  neighbours. 

They  who  well  consider  the  history  of  similar  divisions  and 
confederacies,  will  find  abundant  reasons  to  apprehend,  that  those 
in  contemplation  would  in  no  other  sense  be  neighbours,  than  as 
they  would  be  borderers;  that  they  would  neither  love  nor  trust 
one  another,  but  on  the  contrary,  would  be  a  prey  to  discord, 
Jealousy,  and  mutual  injuries;  in  short,  that  they  would  place 
us  exactly  in  tho  situation   in  which   some  nations  doubtless 


74  THE    FEDERALIST. 

wish  to  see  us — in  which  we  should  be  formidable  only  to  each, 
other. 

From  these  considerations,  it  appears  that  those  persons  are 
greatly  mistaken,  who  suppose  that  alliances  oflfensive  and  defen 
sive  might  be  formed  between  these  confederacies,  which  would 
produce  that  combination  and  union  of  wills,  of  arms,  and  of 
resources,  which  would  be  necessary  to  put  and  keep  them  in  a 
formidable  state  of  defence  against  foreign  enemies. 

When  did  the  independent  states  into  which  Britain  and  Spain 
were  formerly  divided,  combine  in  such  alliances,  or  unite  their 
forces  against  a  foreign  enemy?  The  proposed  confederacies 
will  be  distinct  nations.  Each  of  them  would  have  to  regulate 
its  commerce  with  foreigners  by  distinct  treaties;  and  as  their 
productions  and  commodities  are  different,  and  proper  for  differ 
ent  markets,  so  would  those  treaties  be  essentially  different 
Different  commercial  concerns  must  create  different  interests, 
and  of  course  different  degrees  of  political  attachment  to,  and 
connection  with,  different  foreign  nations.  Hence  it  might  and 
probably  would  happen,  that  the  foreign  nation  with  whom 
the  Southern  confederacy  might  be  at  war,  would  be  the  one, 
with  whom  the  Northern  confederacy  would  be  the  most  desirous 
of  preserving  peace  and  friendship.  An  alliance  so  contrary  to 
their  immediate  interest  would  not  therefore  be  easy  to  form, 
nor  if  formed,  would  it  be  observed  and  fulfilled  with  perfect 
good  faith. 

Nay,  it  is  far  more  probable  that  in  America,  as  in  Europe, 
neighbouring  nations,  acting  under  the  impulse  of  opposite  inte- 
rests, and  unfriendly  passions,  would  frequently  be  found  taking 
different  sides.  Considering  our  distance  from  Europe,  it  would 
be  more  natural  for  these  confederacies  to  apprehend  danger 
from  one  another,  than  from  distant  nations,  and  therefore  that 
each  of  them  should  be  more  desirous  to  guard  against  the  others, 
by  the  aid  of  foreign  alliances,  than  to  guard  against  foreign 
dangers  by  alliances  between  themselves.  And  here  let  us  not 
forget  how  much  more  easy  it  is  to  receive  foreign  fleets  into  our 
ports,  and  foreign  armies  into  our  countrv.  than  it  is  to  persuade* 


THE    FEDERALIST.  71 

or  compel  them  to  depart.  How  many  conquests  did  the  Eoman? 
and  others  make  in  the  character  of  allies,  and  what  innovation? 
did  they  under  the  same  character  introduce  into  the  govern- 
ments of  those  whom  they  pretended  to  protect? 

Let  candid  men  judge  then  whether  the  division  of  America 
into  any  given  number  of  independent  sovereignties,  would  tend 
to  secure  us  against  the  hostilities  and  improper  interference  of 
foreign  nations. 

PUBLIUS 


1« 


76  THE   FEDERADIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    VI. 


NEW    YORK,    NOVEMBER   14,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


CONCERNING  DANGERS  FROM  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  STATES. 

The  three  last  numbers  of  this  work  have  been  dedicated  to 
an  enumeration  of  the  dangers  to  which  we  should  be  exposed, 
in  a  state  of  disunion,  from  the  arms  and  arts  of  foreign  nations. 
I  shall  now  proceed  to  delineate  dangers  of  a  different,  and, 
perhaps,  still  more  alarming  kind,  those  which  will  in  all  proba- 
bility flow  from  dissentions  between  the  states  themselves,  and 
from  domestic  factions  and  convulsions.  These  have  been  already 
in  some  instances  slightly  anticipated;  but  they  deserve  a  more 
particular  and  more  full  investigation. 

If  these  states  should  either  be  wholly  disunited,  or  only  united 
m  partial  confederacies,  a  man  must  be  far  gone  in  Utopian  spe- 
culations, who  can  seriously  doubt  that  the  subdivisions  into 
which  they  might  be  thrown,  would  have  frequent  and  violent 
contests  with  each  other.  To  presume  a  want  of  motives  for 
such  contests,  as  an  argument  against  their  existence,  would  be 
to  forget  that  men  are  ambitious,  vindictive,  and  rapacious.  To 
look  for  a  continuation  of  harmony  between,  a  number  of  inde- 
pendent unconnected  sovereignties,  situated  in  the  same  neigh- 
bourhood, would  be  to  disregard  the  uniform  course  of  human 
events,  and  to  set  at  defiance  the  accumulated  experience  of  ages. 

The  causes  of  hostility  among  nations  are  innumerable.    There 


THE    FEDERALIST.  77 

are  some  which  have  a  general  and  almost  constant  operatiop 
upon  the  collective  bodies  of  society.  Of  this  description  are 
the  love  of  power,  or  the  desire  of  preeminence  and  dominion- 
the  jealousy  of  power,  or  the  desire  of  equality  and  safety.  There 
are  others  which  have  a  more  circumscribed,  though  an  equally 
operative  influence,  within  their  spheres:  such  are  therivalships 
and  competitions  of  commerce  between  commercial  nations. 
And  there  are  others,  not  less  numerous  than  either  of  the  former, 
which  take  their  origin  entirely  in  private  passions;  in  the 
attachments,  enmities,  interests,  hopes,  and  fears,  of  leading  indi- 
viduals in  the  communities  of  which  they  are  members.  Men  of 
this  class,  whether  the  favourites  of  a  king  or  of  a  people,  have 
in  too  many  instances  abused  the  confidence  they  possessed;  and 
assuming  the  pretext  of  some  public  motive,  have  not  scrupled 
to  sacrifice  the  national  tranquillity  to  personal  advantage,  or 
personal  gratification. 

The  celebrated  Pericles,  in  compliance  with  the  resentments 
of  a  prostitute,*  at  the  expense  of  much  of  the  blood  and  trea- 
sure of  his  countrymen,  attacked,  vanquished,  and  destroyed  the 
city  of  the  Samnians.  The  same  man,  stimulated  by  private 
pique  against  the  Magarensians,  another  nation  of  Greece,  or  to 
avoid  a  prosecution  with  which  he  was  threatened  as  an  accom- 
plice in  a  supposed  theft  of  the  statuary  Phidias,  or  to  get  rid 
of  the  accusations  prepared  to  be  brought  against  him  for  dissi- 
pating the  funds  of  the  state  in  the  purchase  of  popularity,  or 
from  a  combination  of  all  these  causes,  was  the  primitive  author 
of  that  famous  and  fatal  war,  distinguished  in  the  Grecian  annals 
by  the  name  of  the  Peloponnesian  war;  which,  after  various  vicis- 
situdes, intermissions,  and  renewals,  terminated  in  the  ruin  of 
the  Athenian  commonwealth. 

The  ambitious  cardinal,  who  was  prime  minister  to  Henry 
Vlllth,  permitting  his  vanity  to  aspire  to  the  triple-crown, 
entertained  hopes  of  succeeding  in  the  acquisition  of  that  splendid 
prizn  by  the  influence  of  the  emperor  Charles  Vth.     To  secure 

*  AsPASiA,  vide  Pltttabch's  life  of  Pericles. 


78  THE   FEDERALIST. 

the  favour  dnd  interest  of  this  enterprising  and  powerful  monaren, 
he  precipitated  England  into  a  war  with  France,  contrary  to  the 
plainest  dictates  of  policy,  and  at  the  hazard  of  the  safety  and 
independence,  as  well  of  the  kingdom  over  which  he  presided  by 
his  counsels,  as  of  Europe  in  general.  For  if  there  ever  was  a 
sovereign  who  bid  fair  to  realize  the  project  of  universal  mon- 
archy, it  was  the  emperor  Charles  Vth,  of  whose  intrigues  Wolsey 
was  at  once  the  instrument  and  the  dupe. 

The  influence  which  the  bigotry  of  one  female,*  the  petulances 
of  another,f  and  the  cabals  of  a  third,|  had  in  the  cotemporary 
policy,  ferments,  and  pacifications,  of  a  considerable  part  of 
Europe,  are  topics  that  have  been  too  often  descanted  upon  not 
to  be  generally  known. 

To  multiply  examples  of  the  agency  of  personal  considerations 
in  the  production  of  great  national  events,  either  foreign  or 
domestic,  according  to  their  direction,  would  be  an  unnecessary 
waste  of  time.  Those  who  have  but  a  superficial  acquaintance 
with  the  sources  from  which  they  are  to  be  drawn,  will  them- 
selves recollect  a  variety  of  instances;  and  those  who  have  a 
tolerable  knowledge  of  human  nature,  will  not  stand  in  need  of 
such  lights,  to  form  their  opinion  either  of  the  reality  or  extent 
of  that  agency.  Perhaps,  however,  a  reference,  tending  to  illus- 
trate the  general  principle,  may  with  propriety  be  made  to  a 
case  which  has  lately  happened  among  ourselves.  If  Shays  had 
had  not  been  a  desperate  debtor,  it  is  much  to  be  doubted  whether 
Massachusetts  would  have  been  plunged  into  a  civil  war. 

But  notwithstanding  the  concurring  testimony  of  experience, 
in  this  particular,  there  are  still  to  be  found  visionary,  or  design- 
ing men,  who  stand  ready  to  advocate  the  paradox  of  perpetual 
peace  between  the  states,  though  dismembered  and  alienated 
from  each  other.  The  genius  of  republics,  say  they,  is  pacific; 
the  spirit  of  commerce  has  a  tendency  to  soften  the  manners  of 
men,  and  to  extinguish  those  inflammable  humours  which  have 
80  often  kindled  into  wars.    Commercial  republics,  like  ours,  will 

*  Madame  de  Maintenon.  f  Duchess  of  Marlborough. 

X  Madame  de  Pompadour. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  79 

never  be  disposed  to  waste  themselves  in  ruinous  contentions 
with  each  other.  They  will  be  governed  by  mutual  interest,  and 
will  cultivate  a  spirit  of  mutual  amity  and  concord. 

We  may  ask  these  projectors  in  politics,  whether  it  is  not  the 
true  interest  of  all  nations  to  cultivate  the  same  benevolent  and. 
philosophic  spirit  ?  If  this  be  their  true  interest,  have  they  in 
fact  pursued  it?  Has  it  not,  on  the  contrary,  invariably  been 
found,  that  momentary  passions,  and  immediate  interests,  have  a 
more  active  and  imperious  control  over  human  conduct,  than 
general  or  remote  considerations  of  policy,  utility,  or  justice? 
Have  republics  in  practice  been  less  addicted  to  war  than  mon- 
archies ?  Are  not  the  former  administei  od  by  men  as  well  as 
the  latter?  Are  there  not  aversions,  predilections,  rivalships, 
and  desires  of  unjust  acquisition,  that  affect  nations,  as  well  as 
kings?  Are  not  popular  assemblies  frequently  subject  to  the 
impulses  of  rage,  resentment,  jealousy,  avarice,  and.  of  other, 
irregular  and  violent  propensities  ?  Is  it  not  well  known,  that 
their  determinations  are  often  governed  by  a  few  individuals  in 
whom  they  place  confidence,  and  that  they  are  of  course  liable 
to  be  tinctured  by  the  passions  and  views  of  those  individuals  ? 
Has  commerce  hitherto  done  any  thing  more  than  change  the 
objects  of  war?  Is  not  the  love  of  wealth  as  domineering  and 
enterprising  a  passion  as  that  of  power  or  glory?  Have  there 
not  been  as  many  wars  founded  upon  commercial  motives,  since 
that  has  become  the  prevailing  system  of  nations,  as  were  before 
occasioned  by  the  cupidity  of  territory  or  dominion  ?  Has  not 
the  spirit  of  commerce,  in  many  instances,  administered  new 
incentives  to  the  appetite  both  for  the  one  and  for  the  other? — 
Let  experience,  the  least  fallible  guide  of  human  opinions,  be 
appealed  to  for  an  answer  to  these  inquiries. 

Sparta,  Athens,  Eome,  and  Carthage,  were  all  republics;  two 
of  them,  Athens  and  Carthage,  of  the  commercial  kind.  Yet 
were  they  as  often  engaged  in  wars,  offensive  and  defensive,  as 
the  neighbouring  monarchies  of  the  same  times.  Sparta  was 
little  better  than  a  well  regulate!  camp;  and  Eome  was  never 
sated  of  carnage  and  conquest. 


80  THE    FEDERALIST. 

Cai  tltage,  though  a  commercial  republiis,  was  the  aggressor  in 
the  very  war  that  ended  in  her  destruction.  Hannibal  had 
carried  her  arms  into  the  heart  of  Italy,  and  even  to  the  gates 
of  Eome,  before  Scipio,  in  turn,  gave  him  an  overthrow  in  the 
territories  of  Carthage,  and  made  a  conquest  of  the  common- 
wealth. 

Venice,  in  latter  times,  figured  more  than  once  in  wars  of 
ambition;  till  becoming  an  object  of  terror  to  the  other  Italian 
states.  Pope  Julius  the  Second  found  means  to  accomplish  that 
formidable  league,*  which  gave  a  deadly  blow  to  the  power  and 
pride  of  that  haughty  republic. 

The  provinces  of  Holland,  till  they  were  overwhelmed  in 
debts  and  taxes,  took  a  leading  and  conspicuous  part  in  the 
wars  of  Europe.  They  had  furious  contests  with  England  for 
the  dominion  of  the  sea ;  and  were  among  the  most  persevering 
and  most  implacable  of  the  opponents  of  Lewis  XIV. 

In  the  government  of  Britain  the  representatives  of  the  people 
compose  one  branch  of  the  national  legislature.  Commerce  has 
been  for  ages  the  predominant  pursuit  of  that  country.  Yet  few 
nations  have  been  more  frequently  engaged  in  war;  and  the 
wars,  in  which  that  kingdom  has  been  engaged,  have  in  nume- 
rous instances  proceeded  from  the  people.  There  have  been,  if  I 
may  so  express  it,  almost  as  many  popular  as  royal  wars.  The 
cries  of  the  nation  and  the  importunities  of  their  representa- 
tives have,  upon  various  occasions,  dragged  their  monarchs  into 
war,  or  continued  them  in  it,  contrary  to  their  inclinations,  and 
sometimes  contrary  to  the  real  interests  of  the  state  In  that 
memorable  struggle  for  superiority,  between  the  rival  houses  of 
Austria  and  Bourbon,  which  so  long  kept  Europe  in  a  flame,  it  is 
well  known  that  the  antipathies  of  the  English  against  the 
French,  seconding  the  ambition,  or  rather  the  avarice,  of  a 
favourite  leader ,f  protracted  the  war  beyond  the  limits  marked 

*  Thk  LKAamc  or  Cahbbat,  comprehending  the  Emperor,  the  King  of  France 
the  King  of  Aragon,  and  most  of  the  Italian  Princes  and  States, 
f  The  Duke  of  Marlborough. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  81 

out  by  sound  policy,  and  for  a  considerable  time  in  opposition  to 
the  views  of  the  court. 

The  wars  of  these  two  last  mentioned  nations  have  in  a  great 
measure  grown  out  of  commercial  considerations  ; — the  desire 
of  supplanting,  and  the  fear  of  being  supplanted  either  in  par- 
ticular  branches  of  traffic,  or  in  the  general  advantages  of  trade 
and  navigation;  and  sometimes  even  the  more  culpable  desire 
of  sharing  in  the  commerce  of  other  nations,  without  their 
consent. 

The  last  war  but  two  between  Britain  and  Spain,  sprang  from 
the  attempts  of  the  English  merchants,  to  prosecute  an  illicit 
trade  with  the  Spanish  main.  These  unjustifiable  practices  on 
their  part,  produced  severities  on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards, 
towards  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain,  which  were  not  mort> 
justifiable ;  because  they  exceeded  the  bounds  of  a  just  retalia- 
tion, and  were  chargeable  with  inhumanity  and  cruelty.  Many 
of  the  English  who  were  taken  on  the  Spanish  coasts,  were  sent 
to  dig  in  the  mines  of  Potosi  j  and  by  the  usual  progress  of  a 
spirit  of  resentment,  the  innocent  were  after  a  while  confounded 
with  the  guilty  in  indiscriminate  punishment.  The  complaints 
of  the  merchants  kindled  a  violent  flame  throughout  the  nation, 
which  soon  after  broke  out  in  the  house  of  commons,  and  was 
communicated  from  that  body  to  the  ministry.  Letters  of 
reprisal  were  granted,  and  a  war  ensued;  which,  in  its  con- 
sequences, overthrew  all  the  alliances  that  but  twenty  years 
before  had  been  formed,  with  sanguine  expectations  of  the  most 
beneficial  fruits. 

From  this  summary  of  what  has  taken  place  in  other  coun- 
tries, whose  situations  have  borne  the  nearest  resemblance  to  our 
own,  what  reason  can  we  have  to  confide  in  those  reveries,  which 
would  seduce  us  into  the  expectation  of  peace  and  cordiality 
between  the  members  of  the  present  confederacy,  in  a  state  of 
separation  ?  Have  we  not  already  seen  enough  of  the  fallacy  and 
extravagance  of  those  idle  theories  which  have  amused  us  with 
promises  of  an  exemption  from  the  imperfections,  the  weak- 
nesses, and  the  evils  incident  to  society  in  every  shape?     Is  it 


82  THE   FEDERALIST 

not  time  to  awake  from  the  deceitful  dream  of  a  golden  age, 
and  to  adopt  as  a  practical  maxim  for  the  direction  of  our 
political  conduct,  that  we,  as  well  as  the  other  inhabitants  of  the 
globe,  are  yet  remote  from  the  happy  empire  of  perfect  wisdom 
and  perfect  virtue  ? 

Let  the  point  of  extreme  depression  to  which  our  national 
dignity  and  credit  have  sunk;  let  the  inconveniences  felt  every 
where  from  a  lax  and  ill  administration  of  government;  let  the 
revolt  of  a  part  of  the  state  of  North  Carolina;  the  late  men- 
acing disturbances  in  Pennsylvania,  and  the  actual  insurrec- 
tions and  rebellions  in  Massachusetts,  declare ! 

So  far  is  the  general  sense  of  mankind  from  corresponding 
with  the  tenets  of  those,  who  endeavour  to  lull  asleep  our  appre- 
hensions of  discord  and  hostility  between  the  states,  in  the  event 
of  disunion,  that  it  has  from  long  observation  of  the  progress  of 
society  become  a  sort  of  axiom  in  politics,  that  vicinity,  or  near- 
ness of  situation,  constitutes  nations  natural  enemies.  An  intel- 
ligent writer  expresses  himself  on  this  subject  to  this  effect: 
"  Neighbouring  nations  (says  he)  are  naturally  enemies  of 
each  other,  unless  their  common  weakness  forces  them  to  league 
in  a  CONFEDERATE  REPUBLIC,  and  their  constitution  prevents  the 
differences  that  neighbourhood  occasions,  extinguishing  that 
secret  jealousy,  which  disposes  all  states  to  aggrandize  them- 
selves at  the  expense  of  their  neighbours."*  This  passage,  at 
the  same  time,  points  out  the  evil  and  suggests  the  remedy. 

PUBLIUS. 
*  Vide,  Prinoipea  des  Negotiations  par  I'Abb^  de  Mably. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  .  83 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  VII. 


NEW   YORK,   NOVEMBER  17,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 

THE  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  AND  PARTICULAR  CAUSES  ENUMERATED. 

It  is  sometimes  asked,  with  an  air  of  seeming  triumph,  what 
inducements  the  states  could  have,  if  disunited,  to  make  war 
upon  each  other?  It  would  be  a  full  answer  to  this  question 
to  say, — precisely  the  same  inducements  which  have,  at  dif- 
ferent times,  deluged  in  blood  all  the  nations  in  the  world. 
But  unfortunately  for  us,  the  question  admits  of  a  more  par- 
ticular answer.  There  are  causes  of  difference  within  our  im- 
mediate contemplation,  of  the  tendency  of  which,  even  under 
the  restraints  of  a  federal  constitution,  we  have  had  sufficient 
experience  to  enable  us  to  form  a  judgment  of  what  might  be 
expected,  if  those  restraints  were  removed. 

Territorial  disputes  have  at  all  times  been  found  one  of  the 
aiost  fertile  sources  of  hostility  among  nations.  Perhaps  the 
greatest  proportion  of  the  wars  that  have  desolated  the  earth 
have  sprung  from  this  origin.  This  cause  would  exist,  among 
us,  in  full  force.  We  have  a  vast  tract  of  unsettled  territory 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States.  There  still  are 
discordant  and  undecided  claims  between  several  of  them ;  and 
the  dissolution  of  the  union  would  lay  a  foundation  for  similar 
claims  between  them  all.  It  is  well  known,  that  they  have 
heretofore  had  serious  and  animated  discussions  concerning  the 


«4  THE   FEDERALIST. 

right  to  the  lands  which  were  ungranted  at  ihu  timi>  of  the 
revolution,  and  which  usually  went  under  the  name  of  crown- 
lands.  The  states  within  the  limits  of  whose  colonial  govern- 
ments they  were  comprised,  have  claimed  them  as  their  pro- 
perty; the  others  have  contended  that  the  rights  of  the  crown 
in  this  article  devolved  upon  the  union;  especially  as  to  all  that 
part  of  the  Western  territory  which,  either  by  actual  pos- 
session, or  through  the  submission  of  the  Indian  pi'oprietors, 
was  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  King  of  Great-Britain, 
till  it  was  relinquished  by  the  treaty  of  peace.  This,  it  has 
been  said,  was  at  all  events  an  acquisition  to  the  confederacy 
by  compact  with  a  foreign  power.  It  has  been  the  prudent 
policy  of  Congress  to  appease  this  controversy,  by  prevail- 
ing upon  the  states  to  make  cessions  to  the  United  States 
for  the  benefit  of  the  whole.  This  has  been  so  far  accom- 
plished, as  under  a  continuation  of  the  union,  to  afford  a 
decided  prospect  of  an  amicable  termination  of  the  dispute. 
A  dismemberment  of  the  confederacy  however  would  revive 
this  dispute,  and  would  create  others  on  the  same  subject 
At  present,  a  large  part  of  the  vacant  "Western  territory  ig 
by  cession  at  least,  if  not  by  any  anterior  right,  the  common 
property  of  the  union.  If  that  were  at  an  end,  the  states 
which  have  made  cessions,  on  a  principle  of  federal  com- 
promise, would  be  apt,  when  the  motive  of  the  grant  had 
ceased,  to  reclaim  the  lands  as  a  reversion.  The  other  states 
would  no  doubt  insist  on  a  proportion,  by  right  of  represen- 
tation. Their  argument  would  be,  that  a  grant  once  made, 
could  not  be  revoked;  and  that  the  justice  of  their  partici- 
pating in  territory  acquired  or  secured,  by  the  joint  efforts 
of  the  confederacy,  remained  undiminished.  If,  contrary  to 
probability,  it  should  be  admitted  by  all  the  states,  that  each 
had  a  right  to  a  share  of  this  common  stock,  there  would 
still  be  a  difficulty  to  be  surmounted,  as  to  a  proper  rule  of 
apportionment.  Different  principles  would  be  set  up  by  dif- 
ferent states  for  this  purpose;   and  as  they  would  affect  the 


THE    FEDERALIST.  flS 

opposite  interests  of  the  parties,  they  miglit  not  easny  be  sus- 
ceptible of  a  pacific  adjustment. 

In  the  wide  field  of  Western  territory,  therefore,  we  per- 
ceive an  ample  theatre  for  hostile  pretensions,  without  any 
umpire  or  common  judge  to  interpose  between  the  contend- 
ing parties.  To  reason  from  the  past  to  the  future,  we  shall 
have  good  ground  to  apprehend,  that  the  sword  would  some- 
times be  appealed  to  as  the  arbiter  of  their  differences.  The 
circumstances  of  the  dispute  between  Connecticut  and  Penn- 
sylvania, respecting  the  lands  at  "Wyoming,  admonish  us  not 
to  be  sanguine  in  expecting  an  easy  accommodation  of  such 
differences,.  The  articles  of  confederation  obliged  the  parties 
to  submit  the  matter  to  the  decision  of  a  federal  court.  The 
submission  was  made,  and  the  court  decided  in  favour  of 
Pennsylvania.  But  Connecticut  gave  strong  indications  of  dis- 
satisfaction with  that  determination;  nor  did  she  appear  to  be 
entirely  resigned  to  it,  till  by  negotiation  and  management  some- 
thing like  an  equivalent  was  found  for  the  loss  she  supposed 
herself  to  have  sustained.  Nothing  here  said,  is  intended  to 
convey  the  slightest  censure  on  the  conduct  of  that  State.  She 
no  doubt  sincerely  believed  herself  to  have  been  injured  by 
the  decision;  and  states,  like  individuals,  acquiesce  with  great 
reluctance  in  determinations  to  their  disadvantage. 

Those  who  had  an  opportunity  of  seeing  the  inside  of  the 
transactions,  which  attended  the  progress  of  the  controversy 
between  this  state  and  the  district  of  Vermont,  can  vouch  the 
opposition  we  experienced,  as  well  from  states  not  interested, 
as  from  those  which  were  interested  in  the  claim ; '  and  can 
attest  the  danger  to  which  the  peace  of  the  confederacy  might 
have  been  exposed,  had  this  state  attempted  to  assert  its  rights 
by  force.  Two  motives  preponderated  in  that  opposition ;  one, 
a  jealousy  entertained  of  our  future  power;  another,  the  inte- 
rest of  certain  individuals  of  influence  in  the  neighbouring  states, 
who  had  obtained  grants  of  lands  under  the  actual  government 
of  that  district.  Even  the  states  which  brought  forward  claims, 
;n  contradiction  to  ours,  seemed  more  solicitous  to  dismember 


86  THE    FEDERALIST. 

this  Stale,  than  to  establish  their  own  pretensions.  These  were 
New-Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  and  Connecticut.  New-Jersey 
and  Rhode-Island,  upon  all  occasions,  discovered  a  warm  zeal  for 
the  independence  of  Vermont;  and  Maryland,  until  alarmed  by 
the  appearance  of  a  connection  between  Canada  and  that 
place,  entered  deeply  into  the  same  views.  These  being  small 
states,  saw  with  an  unfriendly  eye  the  perspective  of  our  grow- 
ing greatness.  In  a  review  of  these  transactions,  we  may  trace 
some  of  the  causes  which  would  be  likely  to  embroil  the  states 
with  each  other,  if  it  should  be  their  unpropitious  destiny  to 
become  disunited. 

The  competitions  of  commerce  would  be  another  fruitful 
source  of  contention.  The  states  less  favourably  circumstanced, 
would  be  desirous  of  escaping  from  the  disadvantages  of 
local  situation,  and  of  sharing  in  the  advantages  of  their  more 
fortunate  neighbours.  Each  state,  or  separate  confederacy, 
would  pursue  a  system  of  commercial  polity  peculiar  to  itself. 
This  would  occasion  distinctions,  preferences,  and  exclusions, 
which  would  beget  discontent.  The  habits  of  intercourse,  on 
the  basis  of  equal  privileges,  to  which  we  have  been  accustomed 
from  the  earliest  settlement  of  the  country,  would  give  a  keener 
edge  to  those  causes  of  discontent,  than  they  would  naturally 
have,  independent  of  this  circumstance.  We  should  be  ready  to 
denominate  injuries,  those  things  which  were  in  reality  the  justifiable 
acts  of  independent  sovereignties  consulting  a  distinct  interest.  The 
spirit  of  enterprise,  which  characterizes  the  commercial  part  of 
America,  has  left  no  occasion  of  displaying  itself  unimproved. 
It  is  not  at  all  probable,  that  this  unbridled  spirit  would  pay 
much  respect  to  those  regulations  of  trade,  by  which  particular 
states  might  endeavour  to  secure  exclusive  benefits  to  their 
own  citizens.  The  infractions  of  these  regulations  on  one  Side, 
the  efforts  to  prevent  and  repel  them  on  the  other,  would  natu 
rally  lead  to  outrages,  and  these  to  reprisals  and  wars. 

The  opportunities,  which  some  states  would  have  of  rendering 
others  tributary  to  them,  by  commercial  regulations,  would  be 
impatiently  submitted  to  by  the  tributary  states     The  relative 


THE    FEDERALIST.  87 

situation  of  New-York,  Connecticut,  and  New-Jersey,  would 
afford  an  example  of  this  kind.  New- York,  from  the  necessities 
of  revenue,  must  lay  duties  on  her  importations.  A  great  pan 
of  these  duties  must  be  paid  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  other 
states,  in  the  capacity  of  consumers  of  what  we  import.  New- 
York  would  neither  be  willing,  nor  able  to  forego  this  advantage. 
Her  citizens  would  not  consent  that  a  duty  paid  by  them  should 
be  remitted  in  favour  of  the  citizens  of  her  neighbours;  nor 
would  it  be  practicable,  if  there  were  not  this  impediment  in  the 
way,  to  distinguish  the  customers  in  our  own  markets. 

Would  Connecticut  and  New-Jersey  long  submit  to  be  taxed 
by  New- York  for  her  exclusive  benefit?  Should  we  be  long 
permitted  to  remain  in  the  quiet  and  undisturbed  enjoyment  of 
a  metropolis,  from  the  possession  of  which  we  derived  an  ad- 
vantage so  odious  to  our  neighbours,  and,  in  their  opinion,  so 
oppressive  ?  Should  we  be  able  to  preserve  it  against  the  incum- 
bent weight  of  Connecticut  on  the  one  side,  and  the  co-operating 
pressure  of  New-Jersey  on  the  other  ?  These  are  questions  that 
temerity  alone  will  answer  in  the  aflSrmative. 

The  public  debt  of  the  Union  would  be  a  further  cause  of 
collision  between  the  separate  states  or  confederacies.  The 
apportionment,  in  the  first  instance,  and  the  progressive  extin- 
guishment, afterwards,  would  be  alike  productive  of  ill  humour 
and  animosity.  How  would  it  be  possible  to  agree  upon  a  rule 
of  apportionment,  satisfactory  to  all  ?  There  is  scarcely  any, 
that  can  be  proposed,  which  is  entirely  free  from  real  objections 
These,  as  usual,  would  be  exaggerated  by  the  adverse  interest 
of  the  parties.  There  are  even  dissimilar  views  among  the 
states,  as  to  tne  general  principle  of  discharging  the  public 
debt.  Some  of  them,  either  less  impressed  with  the  importance 
of  national  credit,  or  because  their  citizens  have  little,  if  any, 
immediate  interest  in  the  question,  feel  an  indifference,  if  not  a 
repugnance,  to  the  payment  of  the  domestic  debt,  at  any  rate. 
These  would  be  inclined  to  magnify  the  difficulties  of  a  distribu- 
tion. Others  of  them,  a  numerous  body  of  whose  citizens  are 
creditors  of   the    public,  beyond  the    proportion    of  the    state 


38  THE   FEDERALIST. 

in  the  total  amount  of  the  national  debt,  would  be  strenuous 
for  some  equitable  and  effectual  provision.  The  procrastina- 
tions of  the  former,  would  excite  the  resentments  of  the  latter. 
The  settlement  of  a  rule,  would  in  the  mean  time  be  postponed, 
by  real  differences  of  opinion,  and  affected  delays.  The  citizens 
of  the  states  interested,  would  clamour ;  foreign  powers  would 
urge,  for  the  satisfaction  of  their  just  demands;  and  the  peace 
of  the  states  would  be  exposed  to  the  double  contingency  of 
external  invasion,  and  internal  contention. 

But  suppose  the  difficulties  of  agreeing  upon  a  rule  sur- 
mounted, and  the  apportionment  made.  Still  there  is  great 
room  to  suppose,  that  the  rule  agreed  upon  would,  in  the  ex- 
periment, be  found  to  bear  harder  upon  some  states  than  upon 
otLers.  Those  which  were  sufferers  by  it,  would  naturally  seek 
for  a  mitigation  of  the  burthen.  The  others  would  as  naturally 
De  disinclined  to  a  revision,  which  was  likely  to  end  in  an 
increase  of  their  own  incumbrances.  Their  refusal  would 
afford  to  the  complaining  states  a  pretext  for  withholding  theii 
contributions,  too  plausible  not  to  be  embraced  with  avidity; 
and  the  non-compliance  of  these  states  with  their  engagements, 
would  be  a  ground  of  bitter  dissention  and  altercation.  If  even 
the  rule  adopted  should  in  practice  justify  the  equality  of  its 
principle,  still  delinquencies  in  payment,  on  the  part  of  some  of 
the  states,  would  result  from  a  diversity  of  other  causes — the 
real  deficiency  of  resources;  the  mismanagement  of  their 
finances;  accidental  disorders  in  the  administration  of  the  gov- 
ernment; and  in  addition  to  the  rest,  the  reluctance  with  which 
men  commonly  part  with  money  for  purposes,  that  have  out- 
lived the  exigencies  which  produced  them,  and  interfere  with 
the  supply  of  immediate  wants.  Delinquencies  from  whatever 
causes  would  be  productive  of  complaints,  recriminations,  and 
quarrels.  There  is,  perhaps,  nothing  more  likely  to  disturb  the 
tranquillity  of  nations,  than  their  being  bound  to  mutual  contri- 
butions for  any  common  object,  which  does  not  yield  an  equal 
and  coincident  benefit.     For  it  is  an   observation   as  true,  as 


THE    FEDERALIST.  fc9 

It  is  trite,  that  there  is  nothing  men  differ  so  readily  about,  as 
tlie  payment  of  money. 

Laws  in  violation  of  private  contracts,  as  they  amount  to 
aggressions  on  the  rights  of  those  states,  whose  citizens  are 
injured  by  them,  may  be  considered  as  another  probable  source  of 
hostility.  We  are  not  authorized  to  expect,  that  a  more  liberal, 
or  more  equitable  spirit  would  preside  over  the  legislations  of 
the  individual  states  hereafter,  if  unrestrained  by  any  additional 
checks,  than  we  have  heretofore  seen,  in  too  many  instances, 
disgracing  their  several  codes.  We  have  observed  the  disposi- 
tion to  retaliation  excited  in  Connecticut,  in  consequence  of  the 
enormities  perpetrated  by  the  legislature  of  Rhode-Island;  and 
we  may  reasonably  infer,  that  in  similar  cases,  under  other  cir- 
cumstances, a  war,  not  of  parchment,  but  of  the  sword,  would 
chastise  such  atrocious  breaches  of  moral  obligation  and  social 
justice. 

The  probability  of  incompatible  alliances  between  the  dif- 
ferent states  or  confederacies,  and  different  foreign  nations,  and 
the  effects  of  this  situation  upon  the  peace  of  the  whole,  have 
been  sufficiently  unfolded  in  some  preceding  papers.  From  the 
view  they  have  exhibited  of  this  part  of  the  subject,  this  con- 
clusion is  to  be  drawn,  that  America,  if  not  connected  at  all,  or 
only  by  the  feeble  tie  of  a  simple  league  offensive  and  defensive, 
would,  by  the  operation  of  such  opposite  and  jarring  alliances, 
be  gradually  entangled  in  all  the  pernicious  labyrinths  of  Euro- 
pean politics  and  wars;  and  by  the  destructive  contentions  of 
the  parts  into  which  she  was  divided,  would  be  likely  to  become 
a  prey  to  the  artifices  and  machinations  of  powers  equally  the 
enemies  of  them  all.  Divide  et  impera  must  be  the  motto  of 
every  nat;'  n  ♦iat  either  hates  or  fears  ub. 

JfUisLiUb. 


90  THE   FBDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    VIII. 


NEW    YORK,    NOVEMBER  21,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  EFFECTS    OF  INTERNAL  WAR  IN   PRODUCING  STANDING 

ARMJES,   AND   OTHER  INSTITUTIONS   UNFRIENDLY 

TO   LIBERTY. 

.  Assuming  it  therefore  as  an  established  truth,  that,  in  case  of 
disunion,  the  several  states,  or  such  combinations  of  them  as 
might  happen  to  be  formed  out  of  the  wreck  of  the  general  con- 
federacy, would  be  subject  to  those  vicissitudes  of  peace  and 
war,  of  friendship  and  enmity  with  each  other,  which  have 
fallen  to  the  lot  of  all  neighbouring  nations  not  united  under 
one  government,  let  us  enter  into  a  concise  detail  of  some  of 
the  consequences  that  would  attend  such  a  situation. 

War  between  the  states,  in  the  first  periods  of  their  separate 
existence,  would  be  accompanied  with  much  greater  distresses 
than  it  commonly  is  in  those  countries,  where  regular  military 
establishments  have  long  obtained.  The  disciplined  armies 
always  kept  on  foot  on  the  continent  of  Europe,  though  they 
bear  a  malignant  aspect  to  liberty  and  economy,  have,  notwith- 
standing, been  productive  of  the  signal  advantage  of  rendering 
sudden  conquests  impracticable,  and  of  preventing  that  rapid 
desolation,  which  used  to  mark  the  progress  of  war,  prior  to 
their  introduction.  The  art  of  fortification  has  contributed  to 
the  same  ends.     The  nations  of  Europe  are  encircled  with  chains 


THE    FEDERALIST.  91 

of  fortified  places,  which  mutually  obstruct  invasion.  Cam- 
paigns are  wasted  in  reducing  two  or  three  frontier  garrisons, 
to  gain  admittance  into  an  enemy's  country.  Similar  impedi- 
ments occur  at  every  step,  to  exhaust  the  strength,  and  delay 
the  progress  of  an  invader.  Formerly,  an  invading  army  would 
penetrate  into  the  heart  of  a  neighbouring  country,  almost  as 
soon  as  intelligence  of  its  approach  could  be  received ;  but  now, 
a  comparatively  small  force  of  disciplined  troops,  acting  on  the 
defensive,  with  the  aid  of  posts,  is  able  to  impede,  and  finally  to 
frustrate,  the  enterprises  of  one  much  more  considerable.  The 
history  of  war,  in  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  is  no  longer  a  his- 
tory of  nations  subdued,  and  empires  overturned;  but  of  towns 
taken  and  retaken,  of  battles  that  decide  nothing,  of  retreats 
more  beneficial  than  victories,  of  much  effort  and  little  acquj- 
sition. 

In  this  country,  the  scene  would  be  altogether  reversed.  The 
jealousy  of  military  establishments,  would  postpone  them  as 
long  as  possible.  The  want  of  fortifications,  leaving  the  fron- 
tiers of  one  state  open  to  another,  would  facilitate  inroads.  The 
populous  states  would,  with  little  difficulty,  over-run  their  less 
populous  neighbours.  Conquests  would  be  as  easy  to  be  made, 
as  difficult  to  be  retained.  War,  therefore,  would  be  desultory 
and  predatory.  Plunder  and  devastation  ever  march  in  the 
train  of  irregulars.  The  calamities  of  individuals  would  make 
the  principal  figure  in  the  events,  which  would  characterize  our 
military  exploits. 

This  picture  is  not  too  highly  wrought;  though,  1  confess,  it 

would  not  long  remain  a  just  one.     Safety  from  external  danger, 

is  the  most  powerful   director  of  national  conduct.     Even  the 

ardent  love  of  liberty  will,  after  a  time,  give  way  to  its  dictates. 

The  violent  destruction  of  life  and  property  incident  to  war;  the 

continual  effort  and  alarm  attendant   on  a  state  of  continual 

danger,  will  compel  nations  the  most  attached  to  liberty,  to  resort 

for  repose  and  security  to  institutions  which  have  a  tendency  to 

destroy  their  civil  and  political  rights.     To  be  more  safe,  they, 

Ht  length,  become  willing  to  run  the  risk  of  being  less  free. 

17 


92  THE   FEDERALIST. 

The  institutions  chiefly  alluded  to,  are  standing  armies,  and 
the  correspondent  appendages  of  military  establishment.  Stand- 
ing armies,  it  is  said,  are  not  provided  against  in  the  new  consti- 
tution; and  it  is  thence  inferred  that  they  would  exist  under  it.* 
This  inference,  from  the  very  form  of  the  proposition,  is,  at  best, 
problematical  and  uncertain.  But  standing  armies,  it  may  be 
■"eplied,  must  inevitably  result  from  a  dissolution  of  the  con- 
federacy. Frequent  war,  and  constant  apprehension,  which 
require  a  state  of  as  constant  preparation,  will  infallibly  produce 
them.  The  weaker  states,  or  confederacies,  would  first  have 
recourse  to  them,  to  put  themselves  upon  an  equality  with  their 
more  potent  neighbours.  They  would  endeavour  to  supply  the 
inferiority  of  population  and  resources,  by  a  more  regular  and 
effective  system  of  defence,  by  disciplined  troops,  and  by  forti- 
fications. They  would,  at  the  same  time,  be  obliged  to  strengthen 
the  executive  arm  of  government ;  in  doing  which,  their  consti- 
tutions would  acquire  a  progressive  direction  towards  monarchy. 
It  is  of  the  nature  of  war  to  increase  the  executive,  at  the 
expense  of  the  legislative  authority. 

The  expedients  which  have  been  mentioned  would  soon  give 
the  states,  or  confederacies,  that  made  use  of  them,  a  superiority 
over  their  neighbours.  Small  states,  or  states  of  less  natural 
strength,  under  vigorous  governments,  and  with  the  assistance 
of  disciplined  armies,  have  often  triumphed  over  large  states,  or 
states  of  greater  natural  strength,  which  have  been  destitute  of 
these  advantages.  Neither  the  pride,  nor  the  safety,  of  the 
more  important  states,  or  confederacies,  would  permit  them  long 
to  submit  to  this  mortifying  and  adventitious  superiority.  They 
would  quickly  resort  to  means  similar  to  those  by  which  it  had 
been  effected,  to  reinstate  themselves  in  their  lost  pre-eminence. 
Thus  we  should  in  a  little  time  see  established  in  every  part  of 
this  country,  the  same  engines  of  despotism  which  have  been 

*  This  objection  will  be  fully  examined  in  its  proper  place;  and  it  will  be 
shown,  that  the  only  rational  precaution  which  could  have  been  taken  on  this 
Bubjeot,  has  been  taken;  and  a  much  better  one  than  is  to  be  found  in  any 
constitution  that  has  been  heretofore  framed  in  America,  most  of  which  contain 
no  guard  at  all  on  this  subject. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  98 

the  scourge  of  the  old  world.  This,  at  least,  would  be  the 
natural  course  of  things;  and  our  reasonings  will  be  likeiy  lo 
be  just,  in  proportion  as  they  are  accommodated  to  this  stan- 
dard. 

These  are  not  vague  inierences  deduced  from  speculative 
defects  in  a  constitution,  the  whole  power  of  which  is  lodged  in 
the  hands  of  the  people,  or  their  representatives  and  delegates  j 
they  are  solid  conclusions,  drawn  from  the  natural  and  necessary 
progress  of  human  affairs. 

It  may  perhaps  be  asked,  by  way  of  objection,  why  did  not 
standing  armies  spring  up  out  of  the  contentions  which  so  often 
distracted  the  ancient  republics  of  Greece  ?  Different  answers 
equally  satisfactory,  may  be  given  to  this  question.  The  indua 
trious  habits  of  the  people  of  the  present  day,  absorbed  in  tha 
pursuits  of  gain,  and  devoted  to  the  improvements  of  agriculture 
and  commerce,  are  incompatible  with  the  condition  of  a  nation, 
of  soldiers,  which  was  the  true  condition  of  the  people  of  those 
republics.  The  means  of  revenue,  which  have  been  so  greatly 
multiplied  by  the  increase  of  gold  and  silver,  and  of  the  arts 
of  industry,  and  the  science  of  finance,  which  is  the  offspring  of 
modern  times,  concurring  with  the  habits  of  nations,  have  pro- 
duced an  entire  revolution  in  the  system  of  war,  and  have 
rendered  disciplined  armies,  distinct  from  the  body  of  the  citi- 
zens, the  inseparable  companion  of  frequent  hostility. 

There  is  a  wide  difference  also,  between  military  establish- 
ments in  a  country  which,  by  its  situation,  is  seldom  exposed  to 
invasions,  and  in  one  which  is  often  subject  to  them,  and  always 
apprehensive  of  them.  The  rulers  of  the  former  can  have  no 
good  pretext,  if  they  are  even  so  inclined,  to  keep  on  foot  armies' 
so  numerous  as  must  of  necessity  be  maintained  in  the  latten 
These  armies  being,  in  the  first  case,  rarely,  if  at  all,  called  into 
activity  for  interior  defence,  the  people  are  in  no  danger  of  being 
broken  to  military  subordination.  The  laws  are  not  accustomed 
to  relaxations,  in  favour  of  military  exigencies ;  the  civil  state 
remains  in  full  vigour,  neither  corrupted  nor  confounded  with 
ihe  principles  or  propensities  of  the  other  state.     The  smallneea 


94  .  THE   FEDERALIST. 

of  ihe  army  forbids  competition  with  the  natural  strength  of 
the  community,  and  the  citizens,  not  habituated  to  look  up  to 
the  military  power  for  protection,  or  to  submit  to  its  oppressions, 
neither  love  nor  fear  the  soldiery:  They  view  them  with  a  spirit 
of  jealous  acquiescence  in  a  necessary  evil,  and  stand  ready  to 
resist  a  power  which  they  suppose  may  be  exerted  to  the  preju- 
dice of  their  rights. 

The  army  under  such  circumstances,  though  it  may  usefully 
did  the  magistrate  to  suppress  a  small  faction,  or  an  occasional 
mob,  or  insurrection,  will  be  utterly  incompetent  to  the  purpose 
of  enforcing  encroachments  against  the  united  efforts  of  the 
great  body  of  the  people. 

But  in  a  country,  where  the  perpetual  menacings  of  danger 
oblige  the  government  to  be  always  prepared  to  repel  it,  her 
armies  must  be  numerous  enough  for  instant  defence.  The 
continual  necessity  for  his  services  enhances  the  importance  of 
the  soldier,  and  proportionably  degrades  the  condition  of  the 
citizen.  The  military  state  becomes  elevated  above  the  civil. 
The  inhabitants  of  territories  often  the  theatre  of  war,  are 
unavoidably  subjected  to  frequent  infringements  on  their  rights, 
which  serve  to  weaken  their  sense  of  those  rights;  and  by 
degrees,  the  people  are  brought  to  consider  the  soldiery  not 
only  as  their  protectors,  but  as  their  superiors.  The  transition 
from  this  disposition  to  that  of  considering  them  as  masters,  is 
neither  remote  nor  difficult :  But  it  is  very  difficult  to  prevail 
upon  a  people  under  such  impressions,  to  make  a  bold,  or  effectual 
resistance,  to  usurpations,  supported  by  the  military  power. 

The  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  falls  within  the  first  descrip- 
tion. An  insular  situation,  and  a  powerful  marine,  guarding  it 
in  a  great  measure  against  the  possibility  of  foreign  invasion, 
supersede  the  necessity  of  a  numerous  army  within  the  kingdom. 
A  sufficient  force  to  make  head  against  a  sudden  descent  till  the 
militia  could  have  time  to  rally  and  embody,  is  all  that  has  been 
deemed  requisite.  No  motive  of  national  policy  has  demanded, 
nor  would  public  opinion  have  tolerated  a  larger  number  of 
♦joops  upon  its  domestic  establishment.     This  peculiar  felicitv 


THE    FEDERALIST.  •  95 

of  situation*  has,  in  a  great  degree,  contributed  to  preserve  the 
liberty,  which  that  country  to  this  day  enjoys,  in  spite  of  the 
prevalent  venalit}'  and  corruption.  If  Britain  had  been  situated 
on  the  continent,  and  had  been  compelled,  as  she  would  have 
been,  by  that  situation,  to  make  her  military  establishments  ai 
home  co-extensive  with  those  of  the  other  great  powers  of 
Europe,  she,  like  them,  would  in  all  probability,  at  this  day  be 
a  victim  to  the  absolute  power  of  a  single  man.  It  is  possible, 
though  not  easy,  for  the  people  of  that  island  to  be  enslaved 
from  other  causes;  but  it  cannot  be  by  the  prowess  of  an  army 
so  inconsiderable  as  that  which  has  been  usually  kept  up  within 
the  kingdom. 

If  we  are  wise  enough  to  preserve  the  union,  we  may  for  ages 
enjoy  an  advantage  similar  to  that  of  an  insulated  situation. 
Europe  is  at  a  great  distance  from  us.  Her  colonies  in  our 
vicinity,  will  be  likely  to  continue  too  much  disproportioned  in 
strength,  to  be  able  to  give  us  any  dangerous  annoyance.  Ex- 
tensive military  establishments  cannot,  in  this  position,  be  neces- 
sary to  our  security.  But  if  we  should  be  disunited,  and  the 
integral  parts  should  either  remain  separated,  or  which  is  most 
probable,  should  be  thrown  together  into  two  or  three  confede- 
racies, we  should  be  in  a  short  course  of  time,  in  the  predica- 
ment of  the  continental  powers  of  Europe.  Our  liberties  would 
be  a  prey  to  the  means  of  defending  ourselves  against  the 
ambition  and  jealousy  of  each  other. 

This  is  an  idea  not  superficial  nor  futile,  but  solid  and  weighty. 
It  deserves  the  most  serious  and  mature  consideration  of  every 
prudent  and  honest  man,  of  whatever  party:  If  such  men  wil\ 
make  a  firm  and  solemn  pause,  and  meditate  dispassionately  on 
its  vast  importance;  if  they  will  contemplate  it  in  all  its  atti- 
tudes, and  trace  it  to  all  its  consequences,  they  will  not  hesitate 
to  part  with  trivial  objections  to  a  constitution,  the  rejection  of 

*  The  recent  prodigious  aggrandizement  of  France  has,  probably,  altered  tht 
Bituation  of  Great-Britain  in  this  respect:  it  will  be  happy  if  the  alteration 
has  no  tendency  inanspicious  to  British  liberty. 


fiQ  •  THE   FEDEBALIST. 

which  would  in  all  probability  put  a  final  period  to  the  Union. 
The  airy  phantoms  that  now  flit  before  the  distempered  imagi- 
nations of  some  of  its  adversaries,  would  then  quickly  give  place 
to  the  more  substantial  prospects  of  dangers,  real,  certain,  and 
extremely  formidable. 

PUBLIUS 


THE    FEDERALIST.  97 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  IX. 


NEW  YORK,  NOVEMBER  21,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THF  UTILITY  OF  THE  UNION  AS  A  SAFEGUARD  AGAINST  DOMESTIC 
FACTION  AND  INSURRECTION. 

A  FIRM  union  will  be  of  the  utmost  moment  to  the  peace 
and  liberty  of  the  states,  as  a  barrier  against  domestic  faction 
and  insurrection. 

It  is  impossible  to  read  the  history  of  the  petty  republics  of 
Greece  and  Italy,  without  feeling  sensations  of  horror  and 
disgust  at  the  distractions  with  which  they  were  continually 
agitated,  and  at  the  rapid  succession  of  revolutions,  by  which 
they  were  kept  perpetually  vibrating  between  the  extremes  of 
tyranny  and  anarchy.  If  they  exhibit  occasional  calms,  these 
only  serve  as  shortlived  contrasts  to  the  furious  storms  that 
arc  to  succeed.  If  now  and  then  intervals  of  felicity  open 
themselves  to  view,  we  behold  them  with  a  mixture  of  regret 
urising  from  the  reflection,  that  the  pleasing  scenes  before  us 
are  soon  to  be  overwhelmed  by  the  tempestuous  waves  of 
sedition  and  party  rage.  If  momentary  rays  of  glory  break 
forth  from  the  gloom,  while  they  dazzle  us  with  a  transient 
and  fleeting  brilliancy,  they  at  the  same  time  admonish  us  to 
lament,  that  the  vices  of  government  should  pervert  the  direc- 
tion, and  tarnish  the  lustre,  of  those  bright  talents  and  exalted 
endowments,  for  which  the  favoured  soils  that  produced  them 
hav*»  been  so  justly  celebrated. 


98  THE    FEDERALIST. 

From  the  disorders  that  disfigure  the  annals  of  those  re- 
publics, the  advocates  of  despotism  have  drawn  arguments,  not 
only  against  the  forms  of  republican  government,  but  against 
the  very  principles  of  civil  liberty.  They  have  decried  all  free 
government,  as  inconsistent  with  the  order  of  society,  and  have 
indulged  themselves  in  malicious  exultation  over  its  friends  and 
partizans.  Happily  for  mankind,  stupendous  fabrics  reared 
On  the  basis  of  liberty,  which  have  flourished  for  ages,  have 
in  a  few  glorious  instances  refuted  their  gloomy  sophisms. 
And,  I  trust,  America  will  be  the  broad  and  solid  foundation 
of  other  edifices  not  less  magnificent,  which  will  be  equally 
permanent  monuments  of  their  error. 

But  it  is  not  to  be  denied,  that  the  portraits  they  have 
sketched  of  republican  government,  were  too  just  copies  of 
the  originals  from  which  they  were  taken.  If  it  had  been 
found  impracticable,  to  have  devised  models  of  a  more  perfect 
structure,  the  enlightened  friends  of  liberty  would  have  been 
obliged  to  abandon  the  cause  of  that  species  of  government 
as  indefensible..  The  science  of  politics,  however,  like  most 
other  sciences,  has  received  great  improvement.  The  efficacy 
of  various  principles  is  now  well  understood,  which  were  either 
not  known  at  all,  or  imperfectly  known  to  the  ancients.  The 
regular  distribution  of  power  into  distinct  departments;  the 
introduction  of  legislative  balances  and  checks;  the  institution 
of  courts  composed  of  judges,  holding  their  offices  during  good 
behaviour;  the  representation  of  the  people  in  the  legislature, 
by  deputies  of  their  own  election;  these  are  either  wholly  new 
discoveries,  or  have  made  their  principal  progress  towards 
perfection  in  modern  times.  They  are  means,  and  powerful 
means,  by  which  the  excellencies  of  republican  government 
may  be  ratained,  and  its  imperfections  lessened  ct  avoided. 
To  this  catalogue  of  circumstances,  that  tend  to  the  ameliora- 
tion of  popular  systems  of  civil  government,  I  shall  venture, 
however  novel  it  may  appear  to  some,  to  add  one  more,  on  a 
principle,  which  has  been  made  the  foundation  of  an  objection 
to  the  new  constitution;  I  mean  the  enlargement  of  the  orbit 


THE    FEDERALIST.  99 

within  which  such  systems  are  to  revolve,  either  in  respect 
to  the  dimensions  of  a  single  state,  or  to  the  consolidation  of 
several  smaller  states  into  one  great  confederacy.  The  latter 
is  that  which  immediately  concerns  the  object  under  consider 
ation.  It  will,  however,  be  of  use  to  examine  the  principle  in 
its  application  to  a  single  state,  which  shall  be  attended  to  in 
another  place. 

The  utility  of  a  confederacy,  as  well  to  suppress  faction,  and 
to  guard  the  internal  tranquillity  of  states,  as  to  increase  their 
external  force  and  security,  is  in  reality  not  a  new  idea.  It  has 
been  practised  upon  in  different  countries  and  ages,  and  has 
received  the  sanction  of  the  most  approved  writers  on  the 
subjects  of  politics.  The  opponents  of  the  plan  proposed  have 
with  great  assiduity  cited  and  circulated  the  observations  of 
Montesquieu  on  the  necessity  of  a  contracted  territory  for  a 
republican  government.  But  they  seem  not  to  have  been 
apprised  of  the  sentiments  of  that  great  man  expressed  in 
another  part  of  his  work,  nor  to  have  adverted  to  the  conse- 
quences of  the  principle  to  which  they  subscribe  with  such 
ready  acquiescence. 

"When  Montesquieu  recommends  a  small  extent  for  republics, 
the  standards  he  had  in  view  were  of  dimensions,  far  short  of 
the  limits  of  almost  every  one  of  these  states.  Neither  Vir- 
ginia, Massachusetts,  Pennsylvania,  New- York,  North-Carolina, 
nor  Georgia,  can  by  any  means  be  compared  with  the  models 
from  which  he  reasoned,  and  to  which  the  terms  of  his  de- 
scription apply.  If  we  therefore  receive  his  ideas  on  this  point, 
as  the  criterion  of  truth,  we  shall  be  driven  to  the  alternative, 
either  of  taking  refuge  at  once  in  the  arms  of  monarchy,  or 
of  splitting  ourselves  into  an  infinity  of  little,  jealous,  clash- 
ing, tumultuous  commonwealths,  the  wretched  nurseries  of  un- 
ceasing discord,  and  the  miserable  objects  of  universal  pity  or 
contempt.  Some  of  the  writersi,  who  have  come  forward  on 
the  other  side  of  the  question,  seem  to  have  been  aware  of 
the  dilemma;  and  have  even  been  bold  enough  to  hint  at  the 
division  of  the  larger  states,   as  a  desirable   thing.     Such   an 


100  THE    FEDEKALIST. 

infatuated  policy,  such  a  desperate  expedient,  might,  by  the 
multiplication  of  petty  offices,  answer  the  views  of  men,  who 
possess  not  qualifications  to  extend  their  influence  beyond  the 
narrow  circles  of  personal  intrigue;  but  it  could  never  promote 
the  greatness  or  happiness  of  the  people  of  America. 

Referring  the  examination  of  the  principle  itself  to  another 
place,  as  has  been  already  mentioned,  it  will  be  sufficient  to 
remark  here,  that  in  the  sense  of  the  author  who  has  been  most 
emphatically  quoted  upon  the  occasion,  it  would  only  dictate 
a  reduction  of  the  size  of  the  more  considerable  members 
of  the  union;  but  would  not  militate  against  their  being  all 
comprehended  in  one  confederate  government.  And  this  is 
the  true  question,  in  the  discussion  of  which  we  are  at  present 
interested. 

So  far  are  the  suggestions  of  Montesquieu  from  standing  in 
opposition  to  a  general  union  of  the  states,  that  he  explicitly 
treats  of  a  confederate  republic  as  the  expedient  for  extend- 
ing the  sphere  of  popular  government,  and  reconciling  the  advan- 
tages of  monarchy  with  those  of  republicanism. 

"It  is  very  probable,"  says  he,*  "that  mankind  would  have 
been  obliged,  at  length,  to  live  constantly  under  the  govern- 
ment of  a  SINGLE  person,  had  they  not  contrived  a  kind  of 
constitution,  that  has  all  the  internal  advantages  of  a  repub- 
lican, together  with  the  external  force  of  a  monarchical  govern- 
ment.    I  mean  a  confederate  republic. 

"  This  form  of  government  is  a  convention,  by  which  several 
smaller  states  agree  to  become  members  of  a  larger  one,  which 
they  intend  to  form.  It  is  a  kind  of  assemblage  of  societies, 
that  constitute  a  new  one,  capable  of  increasing  by  means 
of  new  associations,  till  they  arrive  to  such  a  degree  of  power 
as  to  be  able  to  provide  for  the  security  of  the  united  body. 

"  A  republic  of  this  kind,  able  to  withstand  an  external  force, 
may  support  itself  without  any  internal  corruption.  The  form 
of  this  society  prevents  all  manner  of  inconveniences. 

*  Spirit  of  Laws,  Vol.  I.   Book  IX.  Chap.  I. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  101 

"If  a  single  memler  should  attempt  to  usurp  the  supreme 
authority,  he  could  net  be  supposed  to  have  an  equal  authority 
and  credit  in  all  the  confederate  states.  Were  he  to  have 
too  great  influence  over  one,  this  would  alarm  the  rest.  Were 
he  to  subdue  a  part,  that  which  would  still  remain  free  might 
oppose  him  with  forces,  independent  of  those  which  he  had 
usurped,  and  overpower  him  before  he  could  be  settled  in  his 
usurpation. 

"Should  a  popular  insurrection  happen  in  one  of  the  con- 
federate states,  the  others  are  able  to  quell  it.  Should  abuses 
creep  into  one  part,  they  are  reformed  by  those  that  remain 
sound.  The  state  may  be  destroyed  on  one  side,  and  not  on 
the  other;  the  confederacy  may  be  dissolved,  and  the  confede- 
rates preserve  their  sovereignty. 

"As  this  government  is  composed  of  small  republics,  it  enjoys 
the  internal  happiness  of  each,  and  with  respect  to  its  external 
situation,  it  is  possessed,  by  means  of  the  association,  of  all  the 
advantages  of  large  monarchies." 

I  have  thought  it  proper  to  quote  at  length  these  interesting 
passages,  because  they  contain  a  luminous  abridgment  of  the 
principal  arguments  in  favour  of  the  union,  and  must  efifectu- 
ally  remove  the  false  impressions,  which  a  misapplication  of  the 
other  parts  of  the  work  was  calculated  to  produce.  They  have, 
at  the  same  time,  an  intimate  connection  with  the  more  im- 
mediate design  of  this  paper;  which  is  to  illustrate  the  tend- 
ency of  the  union  to  repress  domestic  faction  and  insurrection. 

A  distinction,  more  subtle  than  accurate,  has  been  raised 
between  a  confederacy  and  a  consolidation  of  the  states.  The 
essential  characteristic  of  the  first,  is  said  to  be  the  restriction 
of  its  authority  to  the  members  in  their  collective  capacities, 
without  reaching  to  the  individuals  of  whom  they  are  com- 
posed. It  is  contended  that  the  national  council  ought  to 
have  no  concern  with  any  object  of  internal  administration. 
An  exact  equality  of  sufirage  between  the  members,  has  also 
been  insisted  upon  as  a  leading  feature  of  a  confederate  govern- 
ment.    These  posit'oixs  are.  in  the  main,  arbitrary;   they  are 


102  THE    FEDERALIST. 

supported  neither  by  principle  nor  precedent.  It  has  indeed 
aappened,  that  governments  of  this  kind  have  generally  ope- 
rated in  the  manner  which  the  distinction  taken  notice  of  sup- 
poses to  be  inherent  in  their  nature;  but  there  have  been  in 
most  of  them  extensive  exceptions  to  the  practice,  which  serve 
to  prove,  as  far  as  example  will  go,  that  there  is  no  absolute 
rule  on  the  subject.  And  it  will  be  clearly  shown,  in  the  course 
of  this  investigation,  that,  as  far  as  the  principle  contended  for 
has  prevailed,  it  has  been  the  cause  of  incurable  disorder  and 
imbecility  in  the  government. 

The  definition  of  a  confederate  republic  seems  simply  to  be, 
*'  an  assemblage  of  societies,"  or  an  association  of  two  or  mere 
states  into  one  state.  The  extent,  modifications,  and  objects,  of 
the  federal  authority,  are  mere  matters  of  discretion.  So  long 
as  the  separate  organization  of  the  members  be  not  abolished, 
so  long  as  it  exists  by  a  constitutional  necessity  for  local  pur- 
poses, though  it  should  be  in  perfect  subordination  to  the  gene- 
ral authority  of  the  union,  it  would  still  be,  in  fact  and  in 
theory,  an  association  of  states,  or  a  confederacy.  The  pro- 
posed constitution,  so  far  from  implying  an  abolition  of  the 
state  governments,  makes  them  constituent  parts  of  the  national 
sovereignty,  by  allowing  them  a  direct  representation  in  the 
senate,  and  leaves  in  their  possession  certain  exclusive,  and 
very  important,  portions  of  the  sovereign  power.  This  fully 
corresponds,  in  every  rational  import  of  the  terms,  with  the 
idea  of  a  federal  government. 

In  the  Lycian  confederacy,  which  consisted  of  twenty-three 
CITIES,  or  republics,  the  largest  were  entitled  to  three  votes 
in  the  common  council,  those  of  the  middle  class  to  two,  and 
the  smallest  to  one.  The  common  council  had  the  appoint- 
ment of  all  the  judges  and  magistrates  of  the  respective  cities. 
This  was  certainly  the  most  delicate  specie's  of  interference 
in  their  internal  administration;  for  if  there  be  any  thing 
that  seems  exclusively  appropriated  to  the  local  jurisdictions, 
It  is  the  appointment  of  their  own  officers.     Yet  Montesquieu, 


THE    FEDERALIST.  103 

speaking  of  this  association,  says,  "  Were  I  to  give  a  model  of 
an  excellent  confederate  republic,  it  would  be  that  of  Lycia." 
Thus  we  perceive,  that  the  distinctions  insisted  upon,  were  not 
within  the  contemplation  of  this  enlightened  writer;  and  we 
shall  be  led  to  conclude,  that  they  are  the  novel  refinements  of 
an  eironeous  theory. 

PUBLIUS. 


104  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    X. 


NEW    YORK,    NOVEMBER  24,  1787. 


MADISON. 


THE  SAME   SUBJECT   CONTINUED. 

Amonq  the  numerous  advantages  promised  by  a  well  cod 
structed  union,  none  deserves  to  be  more  accurately  developed 
than  its  tendency  to  break  and  control  the  violence  of  faction 
The  friend  of  popular  governments,  never  finds  himself  so  much 
alarmed  for  their  character  and  fate,  as  when  he  contemplates 
their  propensity  to  this  dangerous  vice.  He  will  not  fail,  there- 
fore, to  set  a  due  value  on  any  plan  which,  without  violating  the 
principles  to  which  he  is  attached,  provides  a  proper  cure  for  it 
The  instability,  injustice,  and  confusion,  introduced  into  the 
public  councils,  have,  in  truth,  been  the  mortal  diseases  under 
which  popular  governments  have  everywhere  perished;  as  they 
continue  to  be  the  favourite  and  friiitlul  topics  from  which  the 
adversaries  to  liberty  derive  their  most  specious  declamations. 
The  valuable  improvements  made  by  the  American  constitu- 
tions on  the  popular  models,  both  ancient  and  modern,  cannot 
certainly  be  too  much  admired ;  but  it  would  be  an  unwarrant- 
able partiality,  to  contend  that  they  have  as  effectually  obviated 
the  danger  on  this  side,  as  was  wished  and  expected.  Com- 
plaints are  every  where  heard  from  our  most  considerate  and 
virtuous  citizens,  equally  the  friends,  of  public  and  private  faith, 
and  of  public  and  personal  liberty,  that  our  governments  are 


THE    FEDERALIST.  105 

tjo  unstable;  that  the  public  good  is  disregarded  in  the  con- 
flicts of  rival  parties;  and  that  measures  are  too  often  de- 
cided, not  according  to  the  rules  of  justice,  and  the  rights  of 
the  minor  party,  but  by  the  superiour  force  of  an  interested 
and  overbearing  majority.  However  anxiously  we  may  wish 
that  these  complaints  had  no  foundation,  the  evidence  of  known 
facts  will  not  permit  us  to  deny  that  they  are  in  some  degree 
true.  It  will  be  found,  indeed,  on  a  candid  review  of  our  situ- 
ation, that  some  of  the  distresses  under  which  we  labour,  have 
been  erroneously  charged  on  the  operation  of  our  governments; 
but  it  will  be  found,  at  the  same  time,  that  other  causes  will  not 
alone  account  for  many  of  our  heaviest  misfortunes;  and,  par- 
ticularly, for  that  prevailing  and  increasing  distrust  of  public 
engagements,  and  alarm  for  private  rights,  which  are  echoed 
from  one  end  of  the  continent  to  the  other.  These  must  bo 
chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  effects  of  the  unsteadiness  and  injustice, 
with  which  a  factious  spirit  has  tainted  our  public  admin 
istrations. 

By  a  faction,  I  understand  a  number  of  citizens,  whethei 
amounting  to  a  majority  or  minority  of  the  whole,  who  are  united 
and  actuated  by  some  common  impulse  of  passion,  or  of  interest, 
adverse  to  the  rights  of  other  citizens,  or  to  the  permanent  and 
aggregate  interests  of  the  community. 

There  are  two  methods  of  curing  the  mischiefs  of  factiou. 
The  one,  by  removing  its  causes ;  the  other,  by  controlling  ite 
effects. 

There  are  again  two  methods  of  removing  the  causes  of  fac- 
tion :  The  one,  by  destroying  the  liberty  which  is  essential  to  its 
existence ;  the  other,  by  giving  to  every  citizen  the  same  opi- 
nions, the  same  passions,  and  the  same  interests. 

It  could  never  be  more  truly  said,  than  of  the  first  remedy, 
that  it  was  worse  than  the  disease.  Liberty  is  to  faction  what 
air  is  to  fire,  an  aliment,  without  which  it  instantly  expires. 
But  it  could  not  be  a  less  folly  to  abolish  liberty,  which  is  essen- 
tial to  political  life  because  it  nourishes  faction,  than  it  would 


106 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


be  to  wish  the  annihilation  of  air,  which  is  essential  to  animal 
life,  because  it  imparts  to  fire  its  destructive  agency. 

The  second  expedient  is  as  impracticable,  as  the  first  would 
be  unwise.  As  long  as  the  reason  of  man  continues  fallible,  and 
he  is  at  liberty  to  exercise  it,  different  opinions  will  be  formed. 
As  long  as  the  connection  subsists  between  his  reason  and  his 
self-love,  his  opinions  and  his  passions  will  have  a  reciprocal  in- 
fluence on  each  other ;  and  the  former  will  be  objects  to  which 
the  latter  will  attach  themselves.  The  diversity  in  the  faculties 
of  men,  from  which  the  rights  of  property  originate,  is  not  less 
an  insuperable  obstacle  to  an  uniformity  of  interests.  The  pro- 
tection of  these  faculties  is  the  first  object  of  government. 
From  the  protection  of  different  and  unequal  faculties  of  ac- 
quiring property,  the  possession  of  different  degrees  and  kinds 
of  property  immediately  results;  and  from  the  influence  of 
these  on  the  sentiments  and  views  of  the  respective  proprie- 
tors, ensues  a  division  of  the  society  into  different  interests  and 
parties. 

The  latent  causes  of  faction  are  thus  sown  in  the  nature  of 
man;  and  we  see  them  every  where  brought  into  different  de- 
grees of  activity,  according  to  the  different  circumstances  of 
civil  society.  A  zeal  for  different  opinions  concerning  religion, 
concerning  government,  and  many  other  points,  as  well  of 
speculation  as  of  practice ;  an  attachment  to  different  leaders, 
ambitiously  contending  for  pre-eminence  and  power ;  or  to  per- 
sons of  other  descriptions,  whose  fortunes  have  been  interesting 
to  the  human  passions,  have,  in  turn,  divided  mankind  into 
parties,  inflamed  them  with  mutual  animosity,  and  rendered 
them  much  more  disposed  to  vex  and  oppress  each  other,  than 
to  co-operate  for  their  common  good.  So  strong  is  this  propen- 
sity of  mankind,  to  fall  into  mutual  animosities,  that  where  no 
substantial  occasion  presents  itself,  the  most  frivolous  and  fan- 
ciful distinctions  have  been  sufficient  to  kindle  their  unfriendly 
passions,  and  excite  their  most  violent  conflicts.  But  the  most 
common  and  durable  source  of  factions,  has  been  the  various 
and  unequal  distribution  of  property.     Those   who  hold,  and 


THE    FEDERALIST, 


101 


Ao 


^vcrur-: 


those  who  are  Avithout  property,  have  ever  formed  distinct  in- 
terests in  society.  Those  who  are  creditors,  and  those  who  are 
debtors,  fall  under  a  like  discrimination.  A  landed  interest,  a 
manufacturing  interest,  a  mercantile  interest,  a  moneyed  in- 
terest, with  many  lesser  interests,  grow  up  of  necessity  in  civil- 
ized nations,  and  divide  them  into  different  classes,  actuated  by 
diflferent  sentiments  and  views.  The  regulation  of  these  various  V  %,^J,^  /y^'-O'^^ 
and  interfering  interests  forms  the  principal  task  of  modern 
legislation,  and  involves  the  spirit  of  party  and  faction  in  the 
necessary  and  ordinary  operations  of  government. 

No  man  is  allowed  to  be  a  judge  in  his  own  cause ;  because 
his  interest  will  certainly  bias  his  judgment,  and,  not  impro- 
bably, corrupt  his  integrity.  With  equal,  nay,  with  greater 
reason,  a  body  of  men  are  unfit  to  be  both  judges  and  parties 
at  the  same  time;  yet  what  are  many  of  the  most  important 
acts  of  legislation,  but  so  many  Judicial  determinations,  not 
indeed  coucernmg  the  rights  of  single  persons,  but  concernmg 
the  rights  of  large  bodies  of  citizens?  and  what  are  the  difier- 
ent  classes  of  legislators,  but  advocates  and  parties  to  the 
causes  which  they  determine?  Is  a  law  proposed  concerning 
private  debts?  It  is  a  question  to  which  the  creditors  are 
parties  on  one  side,  and  the  debtors  on  the  other.  Justice  ought 
to  hold  the  balance  between  them.  Yet  the  parties  are,  and 
must  be,  themselves  the  judges :  and  the  most  numerous  party, 
or,  in  other  words,  the  most  powerful  faction,  must  be  expected 
to  prevail.  Shall  domestic  manufactures  be  encouraged,  and  in' 
what  degree,  by  restrictions  on  foreign  manufactures?  are  ques- 
tions which  would  be  differently  decided  by  the  landed  and  the 
majuifacturing  classes ;  and  probably  by  neither  with  a  sole 
regard  to  justice  and  the  public  good.  The  apportionment  of 
taxes,  on  the  various  descriptions  of  property,  is  an  act  which 
seems  to  require  the  most  exact  impartiality;  yet  there  is,  per- 
haps, no  legislative  act,  in  which  greater  opportunity  and  tempt- 
ation are  given  to  a  predominant  party,  to  trample  on  the  rules 
of  justice.  Every  shilling,  with  which  they  overburden  the) 
inferiour  number,  is  a  shilling  saved  to  their  own  pockets. 

18 


108  THE   FEDERALIST. 

It  ia  iu  vain  to  say,  that  enlightened  statesmen  will  be  able  to 
adjust  these  clashing  interests,  and  render  them  all  subservient 
to  the  public  good.  Enlightened  statesmen  will  not  always  be 
at  the  helm :  nor,  in  many  cases,  can  such  an  adjustment  be  made 
at  all,  without  taking  into  view  indirect  and  remote  considerations, 
which  will  rarely  prevail  over  the  immediate  interest  which  one 
party  may  find  in  disregarding  the  rights  of  another,  or  the  good 
of  the  whole. 

The  inference  to  which  we  are  brought  is,  that  the  causes  of 
faction  cannot  be  removed ;  and  that  relief  is  only  to  be  sought 
in  the  means  of  controlling  its  effects. 

If  a  faction  consists  of  less  than  a  majority,  relief  is  supplied 
by  the  republican  principle,  which  enables  the  majority  to  defeat 
its  sinister  views,  by  regular  vote.  It  may  clog  the  administra- 
tion, it  may  convulse  the  society;  but  it  will  be  unable  to  exe- 
cute and  mask  its  violence  under  the  forms  of  the  constitution. 
When  a  majority  is  included  in  a  faction,  the  form  of  jpopular 
government,  on  the  other  hand,  enables  it  to  sacrifice  to  its 
ruling  passion  or  interest,  both  the  public  good  and  the  rights 
of  other  citizens.  To  secure  the  public  good,  and  private  rights, 
against  the  danger  of  such  a  faction,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
preserve  the  spirit  and  the  form  of  popular  government,  is  then 
the  great  object  to  which  our  inquiries  are  directed.  Let  me 
add,  that  it  is  the  great  desideratum,  by  which  alone  this  form 
of  government  can  be  rescued  from  the  opprobrium  under  which 
it  has  so  long  laboured,  and  be  recommended  to  the  esteem  and 
adoption  of  mankind. 

By  what  means  is  this  object  attainable  ?  Evidently  by  one 
of  two  only.  Either  the  existence  of  the  same  passion  or  in- 
terest in  a  majority,  at  the  same  time  must  be  prevented;  or  the 
majority,  having  such  coexistent  passion  or  interest,  must  be 
rendered,  by  their  number  and  local  situation,  unable  to  concert 
jind  carry  into  effect  schemes  of  oppression.  If  the  impulse  and 
the  opportunity  be  suffered  to  coincide,  we  well  know,  that 
neither  moral  nor  religious  motives  can  be  relied  on  as  an 
adequate  control.     They  are  not  found  to  be  «uch  on  the  in- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  109 

J  astice  and  violence  of  individuals,  and  lose  their  eflScacy  in 
proportion  to  the  number  combined  together;  that  is,  in  pro- 
portion as  their  efficacy  becomes  needful. 

From  this  view  of  the  subject,  it  may  be  concluded,  that  a 
pure  democracy,  by  which  I  mean  a  society  consisting  of  a 
small  number  of  citizens,  who  assemble  and  administer  the 
government  in  person,  can  admit  of  no  cure  from  the  mischiefs 
of  faction.  A  common  passion  or  interest  will,  in  almost  every 
case,  be  felt  by  a  majority  of  the  whole;  a  communication  and 
concert,  results  from  the  form  of  government  itself;  and  there 
is  nothing  to  check  the  inducements  to  sacrifice  the  weaker 
party,  or  an  obnoxious  individual.  Hence  it  is,  that  such  de^ 
mocracies  have  ever  been  spectacles  of  turbulence  and  con-' 
tention ;  have  ever  been  found  incompatible  with  personal' 
security,  or  the  rights  of  property;  and  have,  in  general,  been; 
as  short  in  their  lives,  as  they  have  been  violent  in  their  deathsj 
Theoretic  politiciajis,  who  have  patronized  this  species  of  gov-  nn''rT' 
emment,  have  erroneously  supposed,  that  by  reducing  mankind 
to  a  perfect  equality  in  their  political  rights,  they  would,  at  the 
same  time,  be  perfectly  equalized  and  assimilated  in  their  pos- 
sessions, their  opinions,  and  their  passions. 

^^  A  republic,  by  which  I  mean  a  government  in  which  the 
sdieme  of  representation  takes  place,  opens  a  different  prospect, 
and  promises  the  cure  for  which  we  are  seeking.  Let  us  examine 
the  points  in  which  it  varies  from  pure  democracy,  and  we  shall 
comprehend  both  the  nature  of  the  cure  and  the  efficacy  which 
it  must  derive  from  the  union. 

The  two  great  points  of  difference,  between  a  democracy  and 
a  republic,  are,  first,  the  delegation  of  the  government,  in  the 
latter,  to  a  small  number  of  citizens  elected  by  the  restj 
secondly,  the  greater  number  of  citizens,  and  greater  sphere  of 
country,  over  which  the  latter  may  be  extended.  Vv^?    1Vi^«./M.....--^U.*'Vi^^ 

The  effect  of  the  first  difference  is,  on  the  one  hand,  to  refipQ 
and  enlarge  the  public  views,  by  passing  them  through  the 
medium  of  a  chosen  body  of  citizens,  whose  wisdom  may  best 
disrerr  tne  true  irlerest  of  their  country,  and  whose  patriotism 


no 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


^' 


and  lov«?  of  justice,  will  be  least  likely  to  sacrifice  it  to  tem- 
porary or  partial  considerations.  Under  such  a  regulation,  it 
may  well  happen,  that  the  public  voice,  pronounced  by  the  re- 
presentatives of  the  people,  will  be  more  consonant  to  the  public 
good,  than  if  pronounced  by  the  people  themselves,  convened 
for  the  purpose.  On  the  other  hand,  the  effect  may  be  inverted. 
Men  of  factious  tempers,  of  local  prejudices,  or  of  sinister 
designs,  may  by  intrigue,  by  corruption,  or  by  other  means, 
first  obtain  the  suffrages,  and  then  betray  the  interests  of  the 
people.  The  question  resulting  is,  whether  small  or  extensiyfi 
republics  are  most  favourable  to  the  election  of  proper  guar- 
dians of  the  public  weal ;  and  it  is  clearly  decided  in  favour  of 
the  latter  by  two  obvious  considerations. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  remarked,  that  however  small  the 
republic  may  be,  the  representatives  must  be  raised  to  a  certain 
number,  in  order  to  guard  against  the  cabals  of  a  few ;  and  that 
however  large  it  may  be,  they  must  be  limited  to  a  certain 
number,  in  order  to  guard  against  the  confusion  of  a  multitude. 
Hence,  the  number  of  representatives  in  the  two  cases  not  being 
in  proportion  to  that  of  the  constituents,  and  being  proportion- 
ally greatest  in  the  small  republic,  it  follows,  that  if  the  propor- 
tion of  fit  chara-cters  be  not  less  in  the  large  than  in  the  small 
republic,  the  former  will  present  a  greater  option,  and  conse- 
quently a  greater  probability  of  a  fit  choice. 

In  the  next  place,  as  each  representative  will  be  chosen  by  a 
■y^ ,  greater  number  of  citizens  in  the  large  than  in  the  small  repub- 
'^  lie,  it  will  be  more  difficult  for  unworthj'  candidates  to  practice 
with  success  the  vicious  arts,  by  which  elections  are  too  often 
carried ;  and  the  suffrages  of  the  people  being  more  free,  will  be 
more  likely  to  centre  in  men  who  possess  the  most  attractive 
merit,  and  the  most  diffusive  and  established  characters. 

It  must  be  confessed,  that  in  this,  as  in  most  .other  cases,  there 
is  a  mean,  on  both  sides  of  which  inconveniences  will  be  found 
to  lie.  By  enlarging  too  much  the  number  of  electors,  you 
render  the  representative  too  little  acquainted  with  all  their 
'ocal  circumstances  and  lesser  interests ;  as  by  reducing  it  too 


THE    FEDERALIST.  IH 

much,  you  render  him  unduly  attached  to  these,  and  too  littlt^ 
fit  to  comprehend  and  pursue  great  and  national  objects.  The 
federal  constitution  forms  a  happy  combination  in  this  respect; 
the  great  and  aggregate  interests  being  referred  to  the  national, 
the  local  and  particular  to  the  state  legislatures. 

The  other  point  of  difference  is,  the  greater  number  of  citi-  z'^*'  .  *^ 
zens,  and  extent  of  territory,  which  may  be  brought  within  the  ^S-  ,^^^f^^^ 
compass  of  republican,  than  of  democratic  govei*nment ;  and  it 
is  this  circumstance  principally  which  renders  factious  combina- 
tions less  to  be  dreaded  in  the  former,  than  in  the  latter.  The 
smaller  the  society,  the  fewer  probably  will  be  the  distinct 
parties  and  interests  composing  it ;  the  fewer  the  distinct 
parties  and  interests,  the  more  frequently  will  a  majority  be 
found  of  the  same  party ;  and  the  smaller  the  number  of  indi- 
viduals composing  a  majority,  and  the  smaller  the  compass 
within  which  they  are  placed,  the  more  easily  will  they  concert 
and  execute  their  plans  of  oppression.  Extend  the  sphere,  and 
you  take  in  a  greater  variety  of  parties  and  interests;  you 
make  it  less  probable  that  a  majority  of  the  whole  will  have  a 
common  motive  to  invade  the  rights  of  other  citizens ;  or  if  such 
a  common  motive  exists,  it  will  be  more  difficult  for  all  who  feel 
it  to  discover  their  own  strength,  and  to  act  in  unison  with  each 
other.  Besides  other  impediments,  it  may  be  remarked,  that 
where  there  is  a  consciousness  of  unjust  or  dishonourable  pur- 
poses, communication  is  always  checked  by  distrust,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  number  whose  concurrence  is  necessary. 

Hence,  it  clearly  appears,  that  the  same  advantage,  which  a 
republic  has  over  a  democracy,  in  controlling  the  effects  of  fac- 
tion, is  enjoyed  by  a  large  over  a  small  republic — is  enjoyed  by 
the  union  over  the  states  composing  it.  Does  this  advantage 
consist  in  the  substitution  of  representatives,  whose  enlightened 
views  and  virtuous  sentiments  render  them  superiour  to  local 
])rejudices,  and  to  schemes  of  injustice  ?  It  will  not  be  denied, 
that  the  representation  of  the  union  will  be  most  likely  to  pos- 
sess these  requisite  endowments.  Does  it  consist  in  the  greater 
security  afforded  by  a  greater  variety  of- parties,  against  the 


112  THE    FEDERALIST. 

event  of  uny  one  party  being  able  to  outnumber  and  oppress  the 
rest?  In  an  equal  degree  does  the  increased  variety  of  parties, 
comprised  within  the  union,  increase  this  security.  Does  it,  in 
fine,  consist  in  the  greater  obstacles  opposed  to  the  concert  and 
accomplishment  of  the  secret  wishes  of  an  unjust  and  interested 
majority  ?  Here,  again,  the  extent  of  the  union  gives  it  the 
most  palpable  advantage. 

Ihe  influence  of  factious  leaders  may  kindle  a  flame  within 
their  particular  states,  but  will  be  unable  to  spread  a  general 
conflagration  through  the  other  states ;  a  religious  sect  may  de- 
generate into  a  political  faction  in  a  part  of  the  confederacy; 
but  the  variety  of  sects  dispersed  over  the  entire  face  of  it, 
must  secure  the  national  councils  against  any  danger  from  that 
source  :  a  rage  for  paper  money,  for  an  abolition  of  debts,  for  an 
equal  division  of  property,  or  for  any  other  improper  or  wicked 
project,  will  be  less  apt  to  pervade  the  whole  body  of  the  union, 
than  a  particular  member  of  it ;  in  the  same  proportion  as  such 
a  malady  is  more  likely  to  taint  a  particular  county  or  district, 
than  an  entire  state. 

In  the  extent  and  proper  structure  of  the  union,  therefore,  we 
Oehold  a  republican  remedy  for  the  diseases  most  incident  to  re- 
publican government.  And  according  to  the  degree  of  pleasure 
and  pride  ws  feel  in  being  ropublicans,  ought  to  be  our  zeal  in 
cherishing  the  spirit,  and  supporting  the  character  of  federalists, 

PUBUUS. 

'^•'**7  JUa-c^Z*^   #U.<,Ct   eUtl^  t-v-^-UX  Uul.   dSrvt.,.*i*«rw  f'-^'-^f^t.^  r^ 


■^^Hf- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  118 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XI. 


NEW    YORK,    NOVEMBER   24,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 

THE  UTILITY  OF  THE  UNION  IN  RESPECT  TO  COMMERCE  AND 

A  NAVY. 

The  importance  of  the  union,  in  a  commercial  light,  is  one  of 
those  points,  about  which  there  is  least  room  to  entertain  a  dif- 
ference of  opinion,  and  which  has  in  fact  commanded  the  most 
general  assent  of  men,  who  have  any  acquaintance  with  the  sub- 
ject. This  applies  as  well  to  our  intercourse  with  foreign  coun- 
tries, as  with  each  other. 

There  are  appearances  to  authorize  a  supposition,  that  the 
adventurous  spirit,  which  distinguishes  the  commercial  character 
of  America,  has  already  excited  uneasy  sensations  in  several  of 
the  maritime  powers  of  Europe.  They  seem  to  be  apprehen- 
sive of  our  too  great  interference  in  that  carrying  trade,  which 
is  the  support  of  their  navigation,  and  the  foundation  of  their 
naval  strength.  Those  of  them,  which  have  colonies  in  America, 
look  forward,  with  painful  solicitude,  to  what  this  country  is 
capable  of  becoming.  They  foresee  the  dangers,  that  may 
threaten  their  American  dominions  from  the  neighbourhood  of 
states,  which  have  all  the  dispositions,  and  would  possess  all  the 
means,  requisite  to  the  creation  of  a  powerful  marine.  Impres- 
sions of  this  kind  will  naturally  indicate  the  policy  of  fostering 
divisions  among  us,  and  of  depriving  us,  as  far  as  possible,  of  an 


Hi  THE   FEDERALIST. 

ACTIVE  COMMERCE  in  our  own  bottoms.  This  would  answei  then 
the  threefold  purpose  of  preventing  our  interference  in  their 
navigation,  of  monopolizing  the  j)rofit8  of  our  trade,  and  of 
clipping  the  wings,  on  which  we  might  soar  to  a  dangerous 
greatness.  Did  not  prudence  forbid  the  detail,  it  would  not  be 
difficult  to  trace,  by  facts,  the  workings  of  this  policy  to  the 
cabinets  of  ministers.  If  we  continue  united,  we  may,  in  a 
variety  of  ways,  counteract  a  policy  so  unfriendly  to  our  pros- 
perity. By  prohibitory  regulations,  extending  at  the  same  time 
throughout  the  states,  we  may  oblige  foreign  countries  to  bid 
against  each  other,  for  the  privileges  of  our  markets.  This 
assertion  will  not  appear  chimerical  to  those  who  are  able  to 
appreciate  the  importance,  to  any  manufacturing  nation,  of  the 
markets  of  three  millions  of  people — increasing  in  rapid  progres- 
sion; for  the  most  part,  exclusively  addicted  to  agriculture, 
and  likely  from  local  circumstances  to  remain  in  this  disposi- 
tion ;  and  the  immense  difference  there  would  be  to  the  trade  and 
navigation  of  such  a  nation,  between  a  direct  communication  in 
its  own  ships,  and  an  indirect  conveyance  of  its  products  and 
returns,  to  and  from  America,  in  the  ships  of  another  country. 
Suppose,  for  instance,  we  had  a  government  in  America,  capable 
of  excluding  Great  Britain  (with  whom  we  have  at  present  no 
treaty  of  commerce)  from  all  our  ports ;  what  would  be  the  pro- 
bable operation  of  this  step  upon  her  politics?  Would  it  not 
onable  us  to  negociate,  with  the  fairest  prospect  of  success,  for 
commercial  privileges  of  the  most  valuable  and  extensive  kind, 
in  the  dominions  of  that  kingdom  ?  When  these  questions 
have  been  asked,  upon  other  occasions,  they  have  received  a 
plausible,  but  not  a  solid  or  satisfactory  answer.  It  has  been 
said,  that  prohibitions  on  our  part  would  produce  nc  change  in 
the  system  of  Britain ;  because  she  could  prosecute  her  trade 
with  us,  through  the  medium  of  the  Dutch,  who  would  be  her 
immediate  customers  and  pay-masters  for  those  articles  which 
were  wanted  for  the  supply  of  our  markets.  But  would  not  her 
navigation  be  materially  injured,  by  the  loss  of  the  important 
advantage  of  being  her  own  carrier  in  that  trade  ?    Would  not 


THE   FEDERALIST.  115 

the  principal  fart  of  its  profits  be  intercepted  by  the  Dutch, 
as  a  compensation  for  their  agency  and  risk?  Would  not  the 
mere  cii'cumst  ince  of  freight  occasion  a  considerable  deduction  ? 
Would  not  sc  circuitous  an  intercourse  facilitate  the  competi- 
tions of  othei  nations,  by  enhancing  the  price  of  British  com- 
modities in  01  r  markets,  and  by  transferring  to  other  hands  the 
management  Df  this  interesting  branch  of  the  British  commerce '( 

A  mature  consideration  of  the  objects,  suggested  by  these 
questions,  will  justify  a  belief,  that  the  real  disadvantages  to 
Great  Britain,  from  such  a  state  of  things,  conspiring  with  the 
prepossessions  of  a  great  part  of  the  nation  in  favour  of  the 
American  trace,  and  with  the  importunities  of  the  West-India 
islands,  would  produce  a  relaxation  in  her  present  system,  and 
would  let  us  into  the  enjoyment  of  privileges  in  the  mai'kets 
of  those  islanis  and  elsewhere,  from  which  our  trade  would 
derive  the  most  substantial  benefits.  Such  a  point  gained  from 
the  British  government,  and  which  could  not  be  expected  without 
an  equivalent  in  exemptions  and  immunities  in  our  markets, 
would  be  likely  to  have  a  correspondent  effect  on  the  conduct 
of  other  nations,  who  would  not  be  inclined  to  see  themselves 
altogether  supplanted  in  our  trade. 

A  further  resource  for  influencing  the  conduct  of  European 
nations  towards  us,  in  this  respect,  would  arise  from  the  esta- 
blishment of  a  federal  navy.  There  can  be  no  doubt,  that  the 
continuance  of  the  union,  under  an  efficient  government,  would 
put  it  in  our  power,  at  a  period  not  very  distant,  to  create  a 
navy,  which,  if  it  could  not  vie  with  those  of  the  great  maritime 
powers,  would  at  least  be  of  respectable  weight,  if  thrown  into 
the  scale  of  either  of  two  contending  parties.  This  would  bo 
more  particularly  the  case,  in  relation  to  operations  in  the  West- 
Indies.  A  few  ships  of  the  line,  sent  opportunely  to  the  reinforce- 
ment of  either  side,  would  often  be  sufficient  to  decide  the  fate 
of  a  campaign,  on  the  event  of  which,  interests  of  the  greatest 
magnitude  were  suspended.  Onr  position  is,  in  this  respect,  a 
very  commanding  one.  And  ii  to  this  consideration  we  add 
that  of  the  usefulness  of  supplies  ft  ^ti  this    ^nntry,  in  the  prose- 


116 


THE   FEDEKALIST. 


<XI^ 


eution  of  military  operations  in  the  West-Indies,  it  will  readily 
be  perceived,  that  a  situation  so  favourable,  would  enable  us  to 
bargain  with  great  advantage  for  commercial  privileges.  A 
price  would  be  set  not  only  upon  our  friendship,  but  upon  our 
neutrality.  By  a  steady  adherence  to  the  union,  we  may  hope, 
ere  long,  to  become  the  arbiter  of  Europe  in  America;  and  to  be 
able  to  incline  the  balance  of  European  competitions  in  this  part 
of  the  world,  as  our  interest  may  dictate. 

But  in  the  reverse  of  this  eligible  situation,  we  shall  discover, 
that  the  rivalships  of  the  parts  would  make  them  checks  upon 
each  other,  and  would  frustrate  all  the  tempting  advantages, 
which  nature  has  kindly  placed  within  our  reach.  In  a  state  so 
insignificant,  our  commerce  would  be  a  prey  to  the  wanton  inter- 
meddlings  of  all  nations  at  war  with  each  other;  who,  having 
nothing  to  fear  from  us,  would,  with  little  scruple  or  remorse, 
supply  their  wants  by  depredations  on  our  property,  as  often 
as  it  fell  in  their  way.  The  rights  of  neutrality  will  only  be 
respected,  when  they  are  defended  by  an  adequate  power.  A 
nation,  despicable  by  its  weakness,  forfeits  even  the  privilege  of 
being  neutral. 

Under  a  vigorous  national  government,  the  natural  strength 
and  resources  of  the  country,  directed  to  a  common  interest, 
would  baffle  all  the  combinations  of  European  jealousy  to  restrain 
our  growth.  This  situation  would  even  take  away  the  motive 
to  such  combinations,  by  inducing  an  impracticability  of  success. 
jLn  active  commerce,  an  extensive  navigation,  a  flourishing 
marine,  would  then  be  the  inevitable  offspring  of  moral  and 
physical  necessity.  We  might  defy  the  little  arts  of  little  poli- 
ticians to  control,  or  vary,  the  irresistible  and  unchangeable 
course  of  nature. 

But  in  a  state  of  disunion,  these  combinations  might  exist, 
and  might  operate  with  success.  It  would  be  in  the  power  of 
the  maritime  nations,  availing  themselves  of  our  universal  im- 
potence, to  prescribe  the  conditions  of  our  political  existence; 
and  as  they  have  a  common  interest  in  being  our  carriers,  and 
still  more  in  preventing  us  from  becoming  theirs,  tLey  would,  in 


THE    FEDERALIST.  117 

nil  probability,  combine  to  embarrass  our  navigation  in  such  » 
manner,  as  would  in  effect  destroy  it,  and  confine  us  to  a  PA&diVE 
COMMERCE.  We  should  thus  be  compelled  to  content  oui'selves 
with  the  first  price  of  our  commodities,  and  to  see  the  profits  of 
our  trade  snatched  from  us,  to  enrich  our  enemies  and  perse- 
cutors. That  unequalled  spirit  of  enterprise,  which  signalizes 
the  genius  of  the  American  merchants  and  navigators,  and  which 
is  in  itself  an  inexhaustible  mine  of  national  wealth,  would  bo 
stifled  and  lost;  and  poverty  and  disgrace  would  overspread  a 
country,  which,  with  wisdom,  might  make  herself  the  admira- 
tion and  envy  of  the  world. 

There  are  rights  of  great  moment  to  the  trade  of  America, 
which  are  rights  of  the  union :  I  allude  to  the  fisheries,  to  the 
navigation  of  the  Lakes,  ajid_to  that  of  the  Mississippi.  The 
dissolution  of  the  confederacy  would  give  room  for  delicate  ques- 
tions, concerning  the  future  existence  of  these  rights;  which  the 
interest  of  more  powerful  partners  would  hardly  fail  to  solve  to 
our  disadvantage.  The  disjjosition  of  Spain,  with  regard  to  thelj 
Mississippi,  needs  no  comment.  France  and  Britain  are  con- 
cerned with  us  in  the  fisheries;  and  view  them  as  of  the  utmost 
moment  to  their  navigation.  They,  of  course,  would  hardly 
remain  long  indifferent  to  that  decided  mastery,  of  which 
experience  has  shown  us  to  be  possessed,  in  this  valuable  branch 
of  traflSc;  and  by  which  we  are  able  to  undersell  those  nations 
in  their  own  markets.  What  more  natural,  than  that  they  shouldf  | 
be  disposed  to  exclude  from  the  lists  such  dangerous  compe  1 1 
titers  ? 

This  branch  of  trade  ought  not  to  be  considered  as  a  partial 
l)enefit.  All  the  navigating  states  may  in  different  degrees 
advantageously  participate  in  it;  and  under  circumstances  of  a 
greater  extension  of  mercantile  capacity,  would  not  be  unlikely 
to  do  it.  As  a  nursery  of  seamen,  it  now  is,  or  when  time  shall 
have  more  nearly  assimilated  the  principles  of  navigation  in  the 
several  states,  will  become  an  universal  resource.  To  the  esta- 
oliflhment  of  a  navy,  it  must  be  indispensable. 

To  this  great  national  object,  a  navy,  union  will  contribute  io 


118  THE    FEDERALIST. 

various  ways.  Every  institution  will  grow  and  flourish  in  pro- 
portion to  the  quantity  and  extent  of  the  means  concentered 
towards  its  formation  and  support.  A  navy  of  the  United  States, 
as  it  would  embrace  the  resources  of  all,  is  an  object  far  less 
remote  than  a  navy  of  any  single  state,  or  partial  confederacy, 
which  would  only  embrace  the  resources  of  a  part.  It  happens, 
indeed,  that  different  portions  of  confederated  America,  possess 
each  some  peculiar  advantage  for  this  essential  establishment. 
The  more  southern  states  furnish  in  greater  abundance  certain 
kinds  of  naval  stores — tar,  pitch,  and  turpentine.  Their  wood, 
for  the  construction  of  ships,  is  also  of  a  more  solid  and  lasting 
texture.  The  difference  in  the  duration  of  the  ships  of  which 
the  navy  might  be  composed,  if  chiefly  constructed  of  southern 
wood,  would  be  of  signal  importance,  either  in  the  view  of  naval 
strength,  or  of  national  economy.  Some  of  the  southern  and  of 
the  middle  states,  yield  a  greater  plenty  of  iron  and  of  better 
quality.  Seamen  must  chiefly  be  drawn  from  the  northern  hive. 
The  necessity  of  naval  protection  to  external  ©r  maritime  com- 
merce, and  the  conduciveness  of  that  species  of  commerce,  to 
the  prosperity  of  a  navy,  are  points  too  manifest  to  require  a 
particular  elucidation.  They,  by  a  kind  of  reaction,  mutually 
beneficial,  promote  each  other. 

An  unrestrained  intercourse  between  the  states  themselves, 
will  advance  the  trade  of  each,  by  an  interchange  of  their  re- 
spective productions,  not  only  for  the  supply  of  reciprocal  wants, 
but  for  exportation  to  foreign  markets.  The  veins  of  commerce 
in  every  part  will  be  replenished,  and  will  acquire  additional 
motion  and  vigour  from  a  free  circulation  of  the  commodities  of 
every  part.  Commercial  enterprise  will  have  much  greater 
scope,  from  the  diversity  in  the  productions  of  different  states 
When  the  staple  of  one  fails,  from  a  bad  harvest  or  unproductive 
crop,  it  can  call  to  its  aid  the  staple  of  another.  The  variety, 
not  less  than  the  value,  of  products  for  exportation,  contributes 
to  the  activity  of  foreign  commerce.  It  can  be  conducted  upon 
much  better  terms,  with  a  large  number  of  materials  of  a 
given  value,  than  with  a  small  number  of  materials  of  the  sam" 


'kio-^^xt^^  *&^ 


THE    .  EDERALIST.  IJ^ 

value;  arising  from  the  competitions  of  traoe,  and  from  the  flue 
tuations  of  markets.  Particular  articles  may  be  in  great  de- 
mand at  certain  periods,  and  unsaleable  at  others ;  but  if  there  be 
a  variety  of  articles,  it  can  scarcely  happen  that  they  should  all  be 
at  one  time  in  the  latter  predicament;  and  on  this  account,  the 
operations  of  the  merchant  would  be  less  liable  to  any  consider- 
able obstruction  or  stagnation.  The  speculative  trader  will  at 
once  perceive  the  force  of  these  observations ;  and  will  acknow- 
ledge, that  the  aggregate  balance  of  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States,  would  bid  fair  to  be  much  more  favourable  than  that  of 
the  Thirteen  States,  without  union,  or  with  partial  unions. 

It  may  perhaps  be  replied  to  this,  that  whether  the  states  are 
united,  or  disunited,  there  would  still  be  an  intimate  intercourse 
between  them,  which  would  answer  the  same  ends :  But  this 
intercourse  would  be  fettered,  interrupted,  and  narrowed,  by  a 
multiplicity  of  causes;  which  in  the  course  of  these  papers  have 
been  amply  detailed.  An  unity  of  commercial,  as  well  as  politi- 
cal interests,  can  only  result  from  an  unity  of  government. 

There  are  other  points  of  view,  in  which  this  subject  might 
be  placed,  of  a  striking  and  animating  kind.  But  they  would 
lead  us  too  far  into  the  regions  of  futurity,  and  would  involve 
topics  not  proper  for  newspaper  discussion.  I  shall  briefly  ob- 
serve, that  our  situation  invites,  and  our  interests  prompt  us,  to 
aim  at  an  ascendant  in  the  system  of  American  afiairs.  The 
world  may  politically,  as  well  as  geographically,  be  divided  into 
four  parts,  each  having  a  distinct  set  of  interests.  Unhappily 
for  the  other  three,  Europe,  by  her  arms  and  by  her  negocia- 
tions;  by  force  and  by  fraud,  has,  in  different  degrees,  extended  5L 

her  dominion  over  them  all.     Africa,  Asia,  and  America,  have  "^ 

successively  felt  her  domination.  The  superiority  she  has  long 
maintained,  has  tempted  her  to  plume  herself  as  the  mistress  of 
the  world,  and  to  consider  the  rest  of  mankind  as  created  for 
her  benefit.  Men,  admired  as  profound  philosophers,  have,  in 
direct  terms,  attributed  to  her  inhabitants  a  physical  supe- 
riority; and  have  gravely  asserted  that  all  animals,  and  with  ^  _ 
them  the  human  species,  degenerate  in  America — that  even  dogs  '    "S 


iJ 


^ 


120  THE    FEDERALIST. 

cease  to  bark,  after  having  breathed  a  while  in  our  atmosphere.* 
Facts  have  too  long  supported  these  arrogant  pretensions  of  the 
European :  It  belongs  to  us  to  vindicate  the  honour  of  the 
human  race,  and  to  teach  that  assuming  brother  moderation. 
Union  will  enable  us  to  do  it.  Disunion  will  add  another  victim 
to  his  triumphs.  Let  Americans  disdain  to  be  the  instruments 
of  European  greatness !  Let  the  Thirteen  States,  bound  together 
in  a  strict  and  indissoluble  union,  concur  in  erecting  one  great 
American  system,  superior  to  the  control  of  all  transatlantic 
force  or  influence,  and  able  to  dictate  the  terms  of  the  connec- 
tion between  the  old  and  the  new  world ! 

PUBLIUS. 
*  Uecherches  philosophiques  sar  les  Am^ricains 


THE    FEDERALIST.  121 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XII. 


NEW    YORK,  NOVEMBER   28,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  UTILITY  OF  THE  UNION  IN  RESPECT  TO  REVENUE. 

The  effects  of  union,  upon  the  commercial  prosperity  of  the 
states,  have  been  sufficiently  delineated.  Its  tendency  to  pro- 
mote the  interests  of  revenue,  will  be  the  subject  of  our  present 
inquiry. 

A  prosperous  commerce  is  now  perceived  and  acknowledged, 
by  all  enlightened  statesmen,  to  be  the  most  useful,  as  well  as 
the  most  productive,  source  of  national  wealth ;  and  has  accord- 
ingly become  a  primary  object  of  their  political  cares.  By  mul- 
tiplying the  means  of  gratification,  by  promoting  the  introduc- 
tion and  circulation  of  the  precious  metals,  those  darling  objects 
of  human  avarice  and  enterprise,  it  serves  to  vivify  and  invigor- 
ate all  the  channels  of  industry,  and  to  make  them  flow  with 
greater  activity  and  copiousness.  The  assiduous  merchant,  the 
laborious  husbandman,  the  active  mechanic,  and  the  industrious 
manufacturer — all  orders  of  men,  look  forward  with  eager  ex- 
pectation, and  growing  alacrity,  to  this  pleasing  reward  of  their 
toils.  The  often-agitated  question  between  agriculture  and  com- 
merce, has,  from  indubitable  experience,  received  a  decision, 
which  has  silenced  the  rivalships  that  once  subsisted  between 
them,  and  has  proved,  to  the  entire  satisfaction  of  their  friends, 
that  their  irterests  are  intimately  blended  and  interwoven.     It 


122  THE    FEDERALIST. 

has  been  found,  in  various  countries,  that  in  proportion  as  com- 
merce has  flourished,  laud  has  risen  in  value.  And  how  could  it 
liavo  happened  otherwise?  Could  that  which  proc ures  a  freer 
vent  for  the  products  of  the  earth ;  which  furnisliee  new  incite- 
ments to  the  cultivators  of  land ;  which  is  the  m-  st  powerful 
instrument  in  increasing  the  quantity  of  mon  )y  in  a  state — 
could  that,  in  fine,  which  is  the  faithful  handma  d  of  labour  and 
industry,  in  every  shape,  fail  to  augment  the  value  of  that 
article,  which  is  the  prolific  parent  of  far  the  greatest  part  of 
the  objects,  upon  which  they  are  exerted  ?  It  is  astonishing, 
that  so  simple  a  truth  should  ever  have  had  an  adversary; 
and  it  is  one,  among  a  multitude  of  proofs,  how  apt  a  spirit 
of  ill  informed  jealousy,  or  of  too  great  abstraction  and  refine- 
ment, is  to  lead  men  astray  from  the  plainest  paths  of  reason 
and  conviction. 

The  ability  of  a  country  to  pay  taxes,  must  always  be  pro 
portioned,  in  a  great  degree,  to  the  quantity  of  money  in  circu 
lation,  and  to  the  celerity  with  which  it  circulates.  Commerce, 
contributing  to  both  these  objects,  must  of  necessity  render  the 
payment  of  taxes  easier,  and  facilitate  the  requisite  supplies  to 
the  treasury.  The  hereditary  dominions  of  the  emperor  of  Ger- 
many, contain  a  great  extent  of  fertile,  cultivated,  and  populous 
territory,  a  large  proportion  of  which  is  situated  in  jnild  and 
luxuriant  climates.  In  some  parts  of  this  territory  are  to  be 
found,  the  best  gold  and  silver  mines  in  Europe.  And  yet,  from 
the  want  of  the  fostering  influence  of  commerce,  that  monarch 
can  boast  but  slender  revenues.  He  has  several  times  been 
compelled  to  owe  obligations  to  the  pecuniary  succours  of  other 
nations,  for  the  preservation  of  his  essential  interests;  and  is 
unable,  upon  the  strength  of  his  own  resources,  to  sustain  a  long 
or  continued  war. 

But  it  is  not  in  this  aspect  of  the  subject  alone,  that  union 
will  be  seen  to  conduce  to  the  purposes  of  revenue.  There  are 
other  points  of  view,  in  which  its  influence  will  appear  more 
immediate  and  decisive.  It  is  evident  from  the  state  ot  the 
country,  from  the  habits  of  the  people,  from  the  experience  we 


THE    FEDERALIST.  123 

have  had  on  the  point  itself,  that  it  is  impracticable  to  raise 
any  very  considerable  sums  by  direct  taxation.  Tax  laws  have 
in  vain  been  multiplied;  new  methods  to  enforce  the  collection 
have  in  vain  been  tried;  the  public  expectation  has  been  uni- 
formly disappointed,  and  the  treasuries  of  the  states  have  re- 
mained empty.  The  popular  system  of  administration,  inherent 
in  the  nature  of  popular  government,  coinciding  with  the  real 
scarcity  of  money,  incident  to  a  languid  and  mutilated  state  of 
trade,  has  hitherto  defeated  every  experiment  for  extensive 
collections,  and  has  at  length  taught  the  diflferent  legislatures 
the  folly  of  attempting  them. 

No  person,  acquainted  with  what  happens  in  other  countries, 
will  be  surprised  at  this  circumstance.  In  so  opulent  a  nation 
as  that  of  Britain,  where  direct  taxes,  from  superior  wealth, 
must  be  much  more  tolerable,  and,  from  the  vigour  of  the 
government,  much  more  practicable,  than  in  America,  far  the 
greatest  part  of  the  national  revenue  is  derived  from  taxes  of - 
the  indirect  kind;  from  imposts,  and  from  excises.  Duties  on] 
imported  articles,  form  a  large  branch  of  this  latter  description^ 

In  America,  it  is  evident,  that  we  must  a  long  time  depend  for 
the  means  of  revenue,  chiefly  on  such  duties.  In  most  parts 
of  it,  excises  must  be  confined  within 'a  narrow  compass.  The 
genius  of  the  people  will  illy  brook  the  inquisitive  and  peremp- 
tory spirit  of  excise  laws.  The  pockets  of  the  farmers,  on  the 
other  hand,  will  reluctantly  yield  but  scanty  supplies,  in  the 
unwelcome  shape  of  impositions  on  their  houses  and  lands ;  and 
personal  property  is  too  precarious  and  invisible  a  fund  to  be 
laid  hold  of  in  any  other  way,  than  by  the  imperceptible  agency 
of  taxes  on  consumption. 

If  these  remarks  have  any  foundation,  that  state  of  things  j 

which  will  best  enable  us  to  improve  and  extend  so  valuable  a 
resource,  must  be  the  best  adapted  to  our  political  welfare.  And 
it  cannot  admit  of  a  serious  doubt,  that  this  state  of  things  must 
rest  on  the  basis  of  a  general  union.  As  far  as  this  would  be 
conducive  to  the  interests  of  commerce,  so  far  it  must  tend  to 
the  extension  of  the  revenue  to  be  drawn  from  that  source.     As 

19 


124  THE    FEDERALIST. 

far  at>  it  would  contribute  to  render  regulations  for  the  collection 
of  the  duties  more  simple  and  efficacious,  so  far  it  must  serve  to 
answer  the  purposes  of  making  the  same  rate  of  duties  more 
productive,  and  of  putting  it  into  the  power  of  the  government 
to  increase  the  rate,  without  prejudice  to  trade. 

The  relative  situation  of  these  states;  the  number  of  rivers 
with  which  they  are  intersected,  and  of  bays  that  wash  their 
shores;  the  facility  of  communication  in  every  direction;  the 
affinity  of  language  and  manners ;  the  familiar  habits  of  inter- 
course; all  these  are  circumstances  that  would  conspire  to 
render  an  illicit  trade  between  them  a  matter  of  little  difficulty; 
and  would  ensure  frequent  evasions  of  the  commercial  regula- 
tions of  each  other.  The  separate  states,  or  confederacies, 
would  be  driven  by  mutual  jealousy  to  avoid  the  temptations 
to  that  kind  of  trade,  by  the  lowness  of  their  duties.  The 
temper  of  our  governments,  for  a  long  time  to  come,  would  not 
permit  those  rigorous  precautions,  by  which  the  European  na- 
tions guard  the  avenues  into  their  respective  countries,  as  well 
by  land  as  by  water,  and  which,  even  there,  are  found  insufficient 
obstacles  to  the  adventurous  stratagems  of  avarice. 

In  France,  there  is  an  army  of  patrols  (as  they  are  called) 
constantly  employed  to  secure  her  fiscal  regulations  against  the 
inroads  of  the  dealers  in  contraband.  Mr.  Neckar  computes  the 
number  of  these  patrols  at  upwards  of  twenty  thousand.  This 
proves  the  immense  difficulty  in  preventing  that  species  of 
traffic,  where  there  is  an  inland  communication,  and  shows,  in 
a  strong  light,  the  disadvantages,  with  which  the  collection  of 
duties  in  this  country  would  be  incumbered,  if  by  disunion  the 
states  should  be  placed  in  a  situation  with  respect  to  each  other, 
resembling  that  of  France  with  respect  to  her  neighbours.  The 
arbitrary  and  vexatious  powers  with  which  the  patrols  are 
necessarily  armed,  would  be  intolerable  in  a  free  country. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  there  be  but  one  government,  pervading 
all  the  states,  there  will  be,  as  to  the  principal  part  of  our  com- 
merce, but  ONE  SIDE  to  guard,  the  Atlantic  coast.  Vessels 
arriving' directly  from  foreign  countries,  laden  with  valuable  car- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  125 

goes  would  rarely  choose  to  expose  themselves  to  the  complicated 
and  critical  perils,  which  would  attend  attempts  to  unlade  prior 
to  their  coming  into  port.  They  would  have  to  dread  both  the 
dangers  of  the  coast,  and  of  detection,  as  well  after,  as  before 
their  arrival  at  the  places  of  their  final  destination.  An  ordinary 
degree  of  vigilance,  would  be  competent  to  the  prevention  of 
any  material  infractions  upon  the  rights  of  the  revenue.  A  few 
armed  vessels,  judiciously  stationed  and  employed,  might  at 
small  expense  be  made  useful  sentinels  of  the  laws.  And  the 
government,  having  the  same  interest  to  provide  against  viola- 
tions everywhere,  the  co-operation  of  its  measures  in  each  state, 
would  have  a  powerful  tendency  to  render  them  effectual. 
Here  also  we  should  preserve,  by  union,  an  advantage  which 
nature  holds  out  to  us,  and  which  would  be  relinquished  by 
separation.  The  United  States  lie  at  a  great  distance  from 
Europe,  and  at  a  considerable  distance  from  all  other  places, 
with  which  they  would  have  extensive  connections  of  foreign 
trade.  The  passage  from  them  to  us  in  a  few  hours,  or  in  a 
single  night,  as  between  the  coasts  of  France  and  Britain,  and 
of  other  neighbouring  nations,  would  be  impracticable.  This  is 
a  prodigious  security  against  a  direct  contraband  with  foreign 
countries;  but  a  circuitous  contraband  to  one  state,  through  the 
medium  of  another,  would  be  both  easy  and  safe.  The  differ- 
ence between  a  direct  importation  fi-om  abroad,  and  an  indirect 
importation,  through  the  channel  of  an  adjoining  state,  in  small 
parcels,  according  to  time  and  opportunity,  jvith  the  additional 
facilities  of  inland  communication,  must  be  palpable  to  every 
man  of  discernment. 

It  is,  therefore,  evident,  that  one  national  government  would 
be  able,  at  much  less  expense,  to  extend  the  duties  on  imports, 
beyond  comparison,  further,  than  would  be  practicable  to  the 
states  separately,  or  to  any  partial  confederacies:  Hitherto  I 
believe  it  may  safely  be  asserted,  that  these  duties  have  not 
tipon  an  average  exceeded  in  any  state  three  per  cent.  In 
France  they  are  estimated  at  about  fifteen  pej  cent,  and  in 
Britain    the   proportion   is   still   greater      There   seems   t-o    be 


/ 


126  THE    FEDERALIST. 

notniug  to  hinder  their  being  increased  in  this  country,  to  at 
least  treble  their  present  amount.  The  single  article  of  ardent 
spirits,  under  federal  regulation,  might  be  made  to  furnish  a 
considerable  revenue.  According  to  the  ratio  of  importation 
into  this  state,  the  whole  quantity  imported  into  the  United 
States  may,  at  a  low  computation,  be  estimated  at  four  millions 
of  gallons;  which  at  a  shilling  per  gallon,  would  produce  two 
/^'  hundred  thousand  pounds.     That  article  would  well  bear  this 

rate  of  duty ;  and  if  it  should  tend  to  diminish  the  consumption 
of  it,  such  an  effect  would  be  equally  favourable  to  the  agricul- 
ture, to  the  economy,  to  the  morals,  and  to  the  health  of  society. 
There  is,  perhaps,  nothing  so  much  a  subject  of  national  extra- 
vagance, as  this  very  article. 

What  will  be  the  consequence,  if  we  are  not  able  to  avail  our 
selves  of  the  resource  in  question  in  its  full  extent  ?  A  nation 
cannot  long  exist  without  revenue.  Destitute  of  this  essential 
support,  it  must  resign  its  independence,  and  sink  into  the  de 
graded  condition  of  a  province.  This  is  an  extremity  to  which 
no  government  will  of  choice  accede.  Revenue  therefore  must 
be  had  at  all  events  In  this  country,  if  the  principal  part  be 
not  drawn  from  comi^erce,  it  must  fall  with  oppressive  weight 
upon  land.  It  has  been  already  intimated  that  excises,  in  their 
true  signification,  are  too  little  in  unison  with  the  feelings  of  the 
people,  to  admit  of  great  use  being  made  of  that  mode  of  taxa- 
tion :  nor  indeed,  in  the  states  where  almost  the  sole  employ- 
ment is  agriculture^  are  the  objects  proper  for  excise  sufficiently 
numerous,  to  permit  very  ample  collections  in  that  way.  Per- 
sonal estate,  as  before  remarked,  from  the  difficulty  of  tracing 
it,  cannot  be  subjected  to  large  contributions,  by  any  other 
means  than  by  taxes  on  consumption.  In  populous  cities,  it 
may  be  enough  the  subject  of  conjecture,  to  occasion  the  oppres- 
sion of  individuals,  without  much  aggregate  benefit  to  the  state ; 
but  beyond  these  circles,  it  must,  in  a  great  measure,  escape  the 
eye  and  the  hand  of  the  tax  gatherer.  As  the  necessities  of  the 
state,  nevertheless,  must  be  satisfied  in  some  mode,  the  defect  oi" 
other  resource?  must  throw  the  principal  weight  of  the  p«blic 


THE    FEDERALIST  127 

burthens  on  the  possessors  of  land.  And,  as  on  the  other  hand, 
the  wants  of  the  government  can  never  obtain  an  adequate 
supply,  unless  all  the  sources  of  revenue  are  open  to  its  de- 
mands, the  finances  of  the  community,  under  such  embarrass- 
ments, cannot  be  put  into  a  situation  consistent  with  its  respect- 
ability or  its  security.  Thus  we  shall  not  even  have  the  con- 
solations of  a  full  treasury,  to  atone  for  the  oppression  of  that 
valuable  class  of  citizens,  who  are  employed  in  the  cultivation 
of  the  soil.  But  public  and  private  distress  will  keep  pace  with 
each  other  in  gloomy  concert ;  and  unite  in  deploring  the  infatu- 
ation of  those  counsels  which  led  to  disunion. 

PUBLIUS. 


123  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XIII. 


NEW    YORK,    NOVEMBER   28,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME    SUBJECT   CONTINUED,  WITH   A   VIEW    TO   ECON(JMY. 

As  connected  with  the  subject  of  revenue,  we  may  with  pro- 
priety consider  that  of  economy.  The  money  saved  from  one 
object,  may  be  usefully  applied  to  another;  and  there  will  be  so 
much  the  less  to  be  drawn  from  the  pockets  of  the  people.  If 
the  states  be  united  under  one  government,  there  will  be  but 
one  national  civil  list  to  support ;  if  they  are  divided  into  several 
confederacies,  there  will  be  as  many  different  national  civil  lists 
to  be  provided  for ;  and  each  of  them,  as  to  the  principal  de- 
partments, co-extensive  with  that  which  would  be  neoessary  for 
a  government  of  the  whole.  The  entire  separation  of  the  states 
into  thirteen  unconnected  sovereignties,  is  a  project  too  extrava- 
gant, and  too  replete  with  danger,  to  have  many  advocates. 
The  ideas  of  men  who  speculate  upon  the  dismemberment  of 
the  empire,  seem  generally  turned  towards  three  confederacies; 
one  consisting  of  the  four  northern,  another  of  the  four  middle, 
and  a  third  of  the  five  southern  states.  There  is  little  proba- 
bility that  there  would  be  a  greater  number.  According  to  this 
distribution,  each  confederacy  would  comprise  an  extent  of  terri- 
tory larger  than  that  of  the  kingdom  of  Great  Britain.  No 
well  informed  man  will  suppose  that  the  affairs  of  such  a  con- 
federacy can  be  properly  regulated  by  a  government,  lens  com 


THE    FEDERALIST.  129 

preLensive  in  its  organs  or  institutions,  than  that  which  has 
been  proposed  by  the  convention.  When  the  dimensions  of  a 
state  attain  to  a  certain  magnitude,  it  requires  the  same  energy 
of  government,  and  the  same  forms  of  administration,  which  are 
requisite  in  one  of  much  greater  extent.  This  idea  admits  not 
of  precise  demonstration,  because  there  is  no  rule  by  which  we 
can  measure  the  momentum  of  civil  power,  necessary  to  the 
government  of  any  given  number  of  individuals;  but  when  we 
consider  that  the  Island  of  Britain,  nearly  commensurate  with 
each  of  the  supposed  confederacies,  contains  about  eight  millions 
of  people,  and  when  we  reflect  upon  the  degree  of  authority 
required  to  direct  the  passions  of  so  large  a  society  to  the  public 
good,  we  shall  see  no  reason  to  doubt,  that  the  like  portion  of 
power  would  be  sufficient  to  perform  the  same  task  in  a  society 
far  more  numerous.  Civil  power,  properly  organized  and 
exerted,  is  capable  of  diffusing  its  force  to  a  very  great  extent : 
and  can,  in  a  manner,  reproduce  itself  in  every  part  of  a  great 
empire,  by  a  judicious  arrangement  of  subordinate  institutions.  | 
The  supposition,  that  each  confederacy  into  which  the  states] 
would  be  likely  to  be  divided,  would  require  a  government  not 
less  comprehensive  than  the  one  proposed,  will  be  strengthened 
by  another  conjecture,  more  probable  than  that  which  presents 
us  with  three  confederacies,  as  the  alternative  to  a  general  union. 
If  we  attend  carefully  to  geographical  and  commercial  con- 
siderations, in  conjunction  with  the  habits  and  prejudices  of  the 
different  states,  we  shall  be  led  to  conclude,  that,  in  case  of  dis- 
union, they  will  most  naturally  league  themselves  under  two 
governments.  The  four  eastern  states,  from  all  the  causes  that 
form  the  links  of  national  sympathy  and  connection,  may  with 
certainty  be  expected  to  unite.  New-York,  situated  as  she  is, 
would  never  be  unwise  enough  to  oppose  a  feeble  and  unsup- 
ported flank  to  the  weight  of  that  confederacy.  There  are 
obvious  reasons,  that  would  facilitate  her  accession  to  it.  New- 
Jersey  is  too  small  a  state  to  think  of  being  a  frontier,  in  oppo- 
sition to  this  still  more  powerful  combination;  nor  do  there 
ai)pear  to  be  any  obstacles  to  her  admission  into  it.    Even  Penn- 


130  THE   FEDERALIST. 

Bylvania  would  iiave  strong  inducements  to  join  the  northern 
league.  An  active  foreign  commerce,  on  the  basis  of  her  own 
navigation,  is  her  true  policy,  and  coincides  with  the  opinions 
and  dispositions  of  her  citizens.  The  more  southern  states,  from 
various  circumstances,  may  not  think  themselves  much  in- 
terested in  the  encouragement  of  navigation.  They  may  prefer 
a  system,  which  would  give  unlimited  scope  to  all  nations,  to  be 
the  carriers,  as  well  as  the  purchasers,  of  their  commodities. 
Pennsylvania  may  not  choose  to  confound  her  interests  in  a  con- 
nection so  adverse  to  her  policy.  As  she  must,  at  all  events,  be 
a  frontier,  she  may  deem  it  most  consistent  with  her  safety,  to 
have  her  exposed  side  turned  towards  the  weaker  power  of  the 
southern,  rather  than  towards  the  stronger  power  of  the  northern 
confederacy.  This  would  give  her  the  fairest  chance  to  avoid 
being  the  Flanders  of  America.  "Whatever  may  be  the  deter- 
mination of  Pennsylvania,  if  the  northern  confederacy  includes 
New-Jersey,  there  is  no  likelihood  of  more  than  one  confederacy 
to  the  south  of  that  state. 

Nothing  can  be  more  evident  than  that  the  Thirteen  States 
will  be  able  to  support  a  national  government,  better  than  one 
half,  or  one  third,  or  any  number  less  than  the  whole.  This  re- 
flection must  have  great  weight  in  obviating  that  objection  to 
the  proposed  plan,  which  is  founded  on  the  principle  of  expense  • 
an  objection  however,  which,  when  we  come  to  take  a  nearer  view 
o^  it,  will  appear  in  every  light  to  stand  on  mistaken  ground. 

If,  in  addition  to  the  consideration  of  a  plurality  of  civil  lists, 
we  take  into  view  the  number  of  persons  who  must  necessarily 
be  employed  to  guard  the  inland  communication,  between  the 
different  confederacies,  against  illicit  trade,  and  who  in  time  will 
infallibly  spring  up  out  of  the  necessities  of  revenue;  and  if  we 
also  take  into  view  the  military  establishments,  which  it  has 
been  shown  would  unavoidably  result  from  the  jealousies  and 
conflicts  of  the  several  nations,  into  which  the  states  would  be 
divided,  we  shall  clearly  discover  that  a  separation  would  be  not 
less  injurious  to  the  economy,  than  to  the  tranquillity,  commerce, 
revenue,  and  liberty,  of  every  part.  Publius 


THE   FEDERALIST.  131 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XIV. 


NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER    1,    1777, 


MADISON. 


AN  OBJECTION  DRAWN  FROM  THE  EXTENT  OF  COUNTRY 
ANSWERED. 

We  have  seen  the  necessity  of  the  union,  as  our  bulwark 
against  foreign  danger;  as  the  conservator  of  peace  among  our- 
selves; as  the  guardian  of  our  commerce,  and  other  common  inte- 
rests ;  as  the  only  substitute  for  those  military  establishments 
which  have  subverted  the  liberties  of  the  old  world;  and  as  the 
proper  antidote  for  the  diseases  of  faction,  which  have  proved 
fatal  to  other  popular  governments,  and  of  which  alarming 
symptoms  have  been  betrayed  by  our  own.  All  that  remains, 
within  this  branch  of  our  inquiries,  is  to  take  notice  of  an  ob- 
jection, that  may  be  drawn  from  the  great  extent  of  country 
which  the  union  embraces.  A  few  observations,  on  this  subject, 
will  be  the  more  proper,  as  it  is  perceived,  that  the  adversaries 
of  the  new  constitution  are  availing  themselves  of  a  prevailing 
prejudice,  with  regard  to  the  practicable  sphere  of  republican 
administration,  in  order  to  supply,  by  imaginary  diflSculties,  the 
want  of  those  solid  objections,  which  they  endeavour  in  vain  to 
find. 

The  errour  which  limits  republican  government  to  a  narrow 
district,  has  been  unfolded  and  refuted  in  preceding  papers.  I 
remark  here  only,  that  it  seems  to  owe  its  rise  and  prevalence 


132  THE   FEDERALIST. 

chiefly  to  the  confounding  of  a  republic  with  a  democracy;  and 
applying  to  the  former,  reasonings  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the 
latter.  The  true  distinction  between  these  forms,  was  also  ad- 
verted to  on  a  former  occasion.  It  is,  that  in  a  democracy,  the 
people  meet  and  exercise  the  government  in  person :  in  a  repub- 
lic, they  assemble  and  administer  it  by  their  representatives  and 
agents.  A  democracy,  consequently,  must  be  confined  to  a 
small  spot.     A  republic  may  be  extended  over  a  large  region. 

To  this  accidental  source  of  the  errour,  may  be  added  the 
artifice  of  some  celebrated  authors,  whose  writings  have  had  a 
great  share  in  forming  the  modern  standard  of  political  opinions. 
Being  subjects,  either  of  an  absolute,  or  limited  monarchy,  they 
have  endeavoured  to  heighten  the  advantages,  or  palliate  the 
ev'.ls,  of  those  forms,  by  placing  in  comparison  with  them  the 
vices  and  defects  of  the  republican,  and  by  citing,  as  specimens 
of  the  latter,  the  turbulent  democracies  of  ancient  Greece,  and 
modern  Italy.  Under  the  confusion  of  names,  it  has  been  an 
easy  task  to  transfer  to  a  republic  observations  applicable  to  a 
democracy  only;  and,  among  others,  the  observation,  that  it 
can  never  be  established  but  among  a  small  number  of  people, 
living  within  a  small  compass  of  territory. 

Such  a  fallacy  may  have  been  the  less  perceived,  as  most  of 
the  popular  governments  of  antiquity  were  of  the  democratic 
species ;  and  even  in  modern  Europe,  to  which  we  owe  the  great 
principle  of  representation,  no  example  is  seen  of  a  government 
wholly  popular,  and  founded,  at  the  same  time,  wholly  on  that 
principle.  If  Europe  has  the  merit  of  discovering  this  great 
mechanical  power  in  government,  by  the  simple  agency  of 
which,  the  will  of  the  largest  political  body  may  be  concentered, 
and  its  force  directed  to  any  object,  which  the  public  good 
requires;  America  can  claim  the  merit  of  making  the  discovery 
the  basis  of  unmixed  and  extensive  republics.  It  is  only  to  be 
lamented,  that  any  of  her  citizens  should  wish  to  deprive  her  of 
the  additional  merit  of  displaying  its  full  efiicacy  in  the  esta- 
blishment of  the  comprehensive  system  now  under  her  conpider 
ation 


THE   FEDERALIST.  133 

As  the  natural  limit  of  a  democracy  is  that  distance  from  the 
central  point,  which  will  just  permit  the  most  remote  citizens  to 
assemble  as  often  as  their  public  functions  demand,  ana  will 
include  no  greater  number  than  can  join  in  those  functions:  so 
the  natural  limit  of  a  republic,  is  that  distance  from  the  centre, 
which  will  barely  allow  the  representatives  of  the  people  to  meet 
as  often  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  administration  of  public 
affairs.  Can  it  be  said,  that  the  limits  of  the  United  States  ex- 
ceed this  distance  ?  It  will  not  be  said  by  those  who  recollect, 
that  the  Atlantic  coast  is  the  longest  side  of  the  union ;  that 
during  the  term  of  thirteen  years,  the  representatives  of  the 
ntates  have  been  almost  continually  assembled;  and  that  the 
members,  from  the  most  distant  states,  are  not  chargeable  with 
greater  intermissions  of  attendance,  than  those  from  the  states 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Congress. 

That  we  may  form  a  juster  estimate  with  regard  to  this  inte- 
resting subject,  let  us  resort  to  the  actual  dimensions  of  the 
union.  The  limits,  as  fixed  by  the  treaty  of  peace,  are,  on  the 
east  the  Atlantic,  on  the  south  the  latitude  of  thirty-one  degrees, 
on  the  west  the  Mississippi,  and  on  the  north  an  irregular  line 
running  in  some  instances  beyond  the  forty-fifth  degree,  in 
others  falling  as  low  as  the  forty-second.  The  southern  shore 
of  lake  Erie  lies  below  that  latitude.  Computing  the  distance 
between  the  thirty-first  and  forty-fifth  degrees,  it  amounts  to 
nine  hundred  and  seventy  three  common  miles;  computing  it 
from  thirty-one  to  forty-two  degrees,  to  seven  hundred  sixty- 
four  miles  and  a  half.  Takiiig  the  mean  for  the  distance,  the 
amount  will  be  eight  hundred  sixty-eight  miles  and  three  fourths. 
The  mean  distance  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Mississippi,  does  not 
probably  exceed  seven  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  On  a  com- 
parison of  this  extent,  with  that  of  several  countries  in  Europe, 
the  practicability  of  rendering  our  system  commensurate  to  it, 
appears  to  be  demonstrable.  It  is  not  a  great  deal  larger  than 
Germany,  where  a  diet,  representing  the  whole  empire,  is  con- 
tinually assembled ;  or  than  Poland  before  the  late  dismember- 
ment, where  another  national  diet  was  the  depository  of  the 


134  THE    FEDERALIST. 

supreme  power.  Passing  by  France  and  Spain,  we  find  that  id 
(ireat  Britain,  inferiour  as  it  may  be  in  size,  the  representatives 
of  the  northern  extremity  of  the  island,  have  as  far  to  travel  tc 
the  national  council,  as  will  be  required  of  those  of  the  most 
remote  parts  of  the  union. 

Favourable  as  this  view  of  the  subject  may  be,  some  observa- 
tions remain,  which  will  place  it  in  a  light  still  more  satis- 
factory. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  the  general  gov- 
ernment is  not  to  be  charged  with  the  whole  power  of  making 
and  administering  laws;  its  jurisdiction  is  limited  to  certain 
enumerated  objects,  which  concern  all  the  members  of  the  re- 
public, but  which  are  not  to  be  attained  by  the  separate  pro- 
visions of  any.  The  subordinate  governments,  which  can  extend 
their  care  to  all  those  other  objects,  which  can  be  separately  pro- 
vided for,  will  retain  their  due  authority  and  activity.  Were  it  pro- 
posed by  the  plan  of  the  convention,  to  abolish  the  governments 
of  the  particular  states,  its  adversaries  would  have  some  ground 
for  their  objection  j  though  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  show, 
that  if  they  were  abolished,  the  general  government  would  be 
compelled,  by  the  principle  of  self-preservation,  to  reinstate 
them  in  their  proper  jurisdiction, 

A  second  observation  to  be  made  is,  that  the  immediate  object 
of  the  federal  constitution,  is  to  secure  the  union  of  the  thirteen 
primitive  states,  which  we  know  to  be  practicable;  and  to  add 
to  them  such  other  states,  as  may  arise  in  their  own  bosoms,  or 
in  their  neighbourhoods,  which  we  cannot  doubt  to  be  equally 
practicable.  The  arrangements  that  may  be  necessary  for  those 
angles  and  fractions  of  our  territory,  which  lie  on  our  north 
western  frontier,  must  be  left  to  those  whom  further  discoveries 
and  experience  will  render  more  equal  to  the  task. 

Let  it  be  remarked,  in  the  third  place,  that  the  intercourse 
throughout  the  union  will  be  daily  facilitated  by  new  improve- 
ments. Eoads  will  every  where  be  shortened,  and  kept  in  better 
order ;  accommodations  for  travellers  will  be  multiplied  and  me- 
liorated; an  interiour  navigation  on  our  eastern  side,  will   be 


TIIE    FEDERALIST.  186 

opened  throughout,  or  Dearly  throughout,  the  whole  extent  of  the 
Thirteen  States.  The  communication  between  the  western  and 
Atlantic  districts,  and  between  different  parts  of  each,  will  be 
rendered  more  and  more  easy,  by  those  numerous  canals,  with 
which  the  beneficence  of  nature  has  intersected  our  country, 
and  which  art  finds  it  so  little  difficult  to  connect  and  complete. 

A  fourth,  and  still  more  important  consideration,  is,  that  as 
almost   every  state  will,  on  one  side  or  other,  be  a   frontier, 
and  will  thus  find,  in  a  regard  to  its  safety,  an  inducement  to 
make  some  sacrifices  for  the  sake  of  the  general  protection :  so 
the  states  which  lie  at  the  greatest  distance  from  the  heart  of 
the  union,  and  which  of  course  may  partake  least  of  the  ordinary 
circulation  of  its  benefits,  will  be  at  the  same  time  immediately 
contiguous  to  foreign  nations,  and  will  consequently  stand,  on 
particular   occasions,  in  greatest  need  of  its  strength  and  re- 
sources.    It   may  be   inconvenient   for   Georgia,  or  the  states^ 
forming  our  western  or  north  eastern  borders,  to   send   their  / 
representatives  to  the  seat  of  government;  but  they  would  find  / 
it  more  so  to  struggle  alone  against  an  invading  enemy,  or  even  | 
to  support  alone  the  whole  expense  of  those  precautions,  which  j 
may  be  dictated  by  the  neighbourhood  of  continual  danger.     If] 
they  should  derive  less  benefit  therefore  from  the  union  in  some 
respects,  than  the  less  distant  states,  they  will  derive  greater 
benefit  from  it  in  other  respects,  and  thus  the  proper  equilibrium 
will  be  maintained  throughout. 

I  submit  to  you,  my  fellow-citizens,  these  considerations,  in  full 
confidence  that  the  good  sense  which  has  so  often  marked  your 
decisions,  will  allow  them  their  due  weight  and  effect;  and  that 
you  will  never  suffer  difficulties,  however  formidable  in  appear- 
ance, or  however  fashionable  the  errour  on  which  they  may  be 
founded,  to  drive  you  into  the  gloomy  and  perilous  scenes  into 
which  the  advocates  for  disunion  would  conduct  you.  Hearken 
not  to  the  unnatural  voice,  which  tells  you  that  the  people  of 
America,  knit  together  as  they  are  by  so  many  chords  of  affec- 
tioii,  can  no  longer  live  together  as  members  of  the  same  family: 
can  no  longer  continue  the  mutual  guardians  of  their  mutual 


136  THE    FEDERALIST. 

happiness;  can  no  longer  be  fellow-citizens  of  one  ^rf^at,  re- 
spectable, and  flourishing  empire.  Hearken  not  to  the  voice, 
which  petulantly  tells  you,  that  the  form  of  government  recom- 
mended for  your  adoption,  is  a  novelty  in  the  political  world; 
that  it  has  never  yet  had  a  place  in  the  theories  of  the  wildest 
projectors;  that  it  rashly  attempts  what  it  is  impossible  to 
accomplish.  No,  my  countrymen,  shut  your  ears  against  this 
unhallowed  language.  Shut  your  hearts  against  the  poison 
which  it  conveys.  The  kindred  blood  which  flows  in  the  veins 
of  American  citizens,  the  mingled  blood  which  they  have  shed 
in  defence  of  their  sacred  rights,  consecrate  their  union,  and 
excite  horrour  at  the  idea  of  their  becoming  aliens,  rivals,  ene- 
mies. And  if  novelties  are  to  be  shunned,  believe  me,  the  most 
alarming  of  all  novelties,  the  most  wild  of  all  projects,  the  most 
rash  of  all  attempts,  is  that  of  rending  us  in  pieces,  in  order  to 
preserve  our  liberties,  and  promote  our  happiness.  But  why  is 
the  experiment  of  an  extended  republic  to  be  rejected,  merely 
because  it  may  comprise  what  is  new  ?  Is  it  not  the  glory  of 
the  people  of  America,  that  whilst  they  have  paid  a  decent  re- 
gard to  the  opinions  of  former  times  and  other  nations,  they 
have  not  suffered  a  blind  veneration  for  antiquity,  for  custom, 
or  for  names,  to  overrule  the  suggestions  of  their  own  good 
sense,  the  knowledge  of  their  own  situation,  and  the  lessons  of 
their  own  experience  ?  To  this  manly  spirit,  posterity  will  be 
indebted  for  the  possession,  and  the  world  for  the  example,  of 
the  numerous  innovations  displayed  on  the  American  theatre, 
in  favour  of  private  rights  and  public  happiness.  Had  no  im- 
portant step  been  taken  by  the  leaders  of  the  revolution,  for 
which  a  precedent  could  not  be  discovered;  no  government 
established  of  which  an  exact  model  did  not  present  itself,  the 
people  of  the  United  States  might,  at  this  moment,  have  been 
numbered  among  the  melancholy  victims  of  misguided  councils; 
must  at  best  have  been  labouring  under  the  weight  of  some  of 
those  forms  which  have  crushed  the  liberties  of  the  rest  of  man- 
kind. Happily  for  America,  happily,  we  trust,  for  the  whole 
human  race,  they  pursued  a  new  and  more  noble  course.     They 


THE    FEDERALIST.  137 

accomplished  a  revolution  which  has  no  parallel  in  the  annals 
of  human  society.  They  reared  the  fabrics  of  governments 
which  have  no  model  on  the  face  of  the  globe.  They  formed  the 
design  of  a  great  confederacy,  which  it  is  incumbent  on  their  suc- 
cessors to  improve  and  perpetuate.  If  their  works  betray  im- 
perfections, we  wonder  at  the  fewness  of  them.  If  they  erred 
most  in  the  structure  of  the  union,  this  was  the  work  most  diflS- 
cult  to  be  executed;  this  is  the  work  which  has  been  new 
modelled  by  the  act  of  your  convention,  and  it  is  that  act  on 
which  you  are  now  to  deliberate  and  to  decide. 

PUBLIUS. 


138  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XV. 


NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER   1,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


CONCERNING    THE   DEFECTS   OF   THE    PRESENT    CONFEDERATION 

IN   RELATION   TO   THE   PRINCIPLE   OF   LEGISLATION   FOR 

THE   STATES   IN   THEIR   COLLECTIVE    CAPACITIES. 

In  the  course  of  the  preceding  papers,  I  have  endeavoured, 
my  fellow  citizens,  to  place  before  you,  in  a  clear  and  convincing 
light,  the  importance  of  union  to  your  political  safety  and  hap- 
piness. I  have  unfolded  to  you  a  complication  of  dangers  to 
which  you  would  be  exposed,  should  you  permit  that  sacred 
knot,  which  binds  the  people  of  America  together,  to  be  severed 
or  dissolved  by  ambition  or  by  avarice,  by  jealousy  or  by  misre- 
presentation. In  the  sequel  of  the  inquiry,  through  which  I 
propose  to  accompany  you,  the  truths  intended  to  be  inculcated 
will  receive  farther  confirmation  from  facts  and  arguments 
hitherto  unnoticed.  If  the  road,  over  which  you  will  still  have 
to  pass,  should  in  some  places  appear  to  you  tedious  or  irk- 
some, you  will  recollect,  that  you  are  in  quest  of  information  on 
a  subject  the  most  momentous,  which  can  engage  the  attention 
of  a  free  people ;  that  the  field  through  which  you  have  to  travel 
is  in  itself  spacious,  and  that  the  difficulties  of  the  journey  have 
been  uuLecessarily  increased  by  the  mazes  with  which  sophistry 
has  beset  the  way.     It  will  be  my  aim  to  remove  the  obstacles 


THE   FEDEKALIST.  139 

to  your  progress,  in  as  compendious  a  manner  as  it  can  be  done 
without  sacrificing  utility  to  dispatch. 

In  pursuance  of  the  plan,  which  I  have  laid  down  for  the 
discussion  of  the  subject,  the  point  next  in  order  to  be  examined, 
is  the  "  insuflSciency  of  the  present  confederation  to  the  preser 
vation  of  the  union." 

It  may  perhaps  be  asked,  what  need  there  is  of  reasoning  or 
proof  to  illustrate  a  position,  which  is  neither  controverted  nor 
doubted ;  to  which  the  understandings  and  feelings  of  all  classes 
of  men  assent ;  and  which  in  substance  is  admitted  by  the  oppo- 
nents as  well  as  by  the  friends  of  the  new  constitution?  It 
must  in  truth  be  acknowledged,  that  however  these  may  difier 
in  other  respects,  they  in  general  appear  to  harmonize  in  the 
opinion  that  there  are  material  imperfections  in  our  national 
system,  and  that  something  is  necessary  to  be  done  to  rescue  us 
from  impending  anarchy.  The  facts  that  support  this  opinion, 
are  no  longer  objects  of  speculation.  They  have  forced  them- 
selves upon  the  sensibility  of  the  people  at  large,  and  have  at 
length  extorted  from  those,  whose  mistaken  policy  has  had  the 
principal  share  in  precipitating  the  extremity  at  which  we  are 
arrived,  a  reluctant  confession  of  the  reality  of  many  of  those 
defects  in  the  scheme  of  our  federal  government,  which  have 
been  long  pointed  out  and  regretted  by  the  intelligent  friends  of 
the  union. 

"We  may  indeed,  with  propriety,  be  said  to  have  reached 
almost  the  last  stage  of  national  humiliation.  There  is  scarcely 
any  thing  that  can  wound  the  pride,  or  degrade  the  character, 
of  an  independent  people,  which  we  do  not  experience.  Are 
there  engagements,  to  the  performance  of  which  we  are  held  by 
every  tie  respectable  among  men?  These  are  the  subjects  of 
constant  and  unblushing  violation.  Do  we  owe  debts  to  foreign- 
ers, and  to  our  own  citizens,  contracted  in  a  time  of  imminent 
peril,  for  the  preservation  of  our  political  existence?  These 
remain  without  any  proper  or  satisfactory  provision  for  their 
discharge.     Have  we  valuable  territories  and  important  posts 

in  the  possession  of  a  foreign  power,  which,  by  express  stipula- 

20 


140        -  THE    FEDERALIST. 

tions.  ought  l(tog  since  to  have  been  surrendered  ?  These  are 
still  retained,  to  the  prejudice  of  our  interest  not  less  than  of 
our  rights.  Are  we  in  a  condition  to  resent,  or  to  repel  tho 
aggression?  We  have  neither  troops,  nor  treasury,  nor  govern- 
ment.* Are  we  even  in  a  condition  to  remonstrate  with  dignity  "^ 
The  just  imputations  on  our  own  faith,  in  respect  to  the  saF 
treaty,  ought  first  to  be  removed.  Are  we  entitled,  by  nature  f  .id 
compact,  to  a  free  participation  in  the  navigation  of  the  Ilrlissis- 
sippi  ?  Spain  excludes  us  from  it.  Is  public  credit  an  indispensable 
resource  in  time  of  public  danger?  We  seem  to  have  abandonee 
its  cause  as  desperate  and  irretrievable.  Is  commerce  of  import 
ance  to  national  wealth  ?  Ours  is  at  the  lowest  point  of  declen- 
Bion.  Is  respectability  in  the  eyes  of  foreign  powers,  a  safe- 
guard against  foreign  encroachments?  The  imbecility  of  our 
government  even  forbids  them  to  treat  with  us :  Our  ambassa- 
dors abroad  are  the  mere  pageants  of  mimic  sovereignty.  Is  • 
violent  and  unnatural  decrease  in  the  value  of  land,  a  sympto-oi 
of  national  distress  ?  The  price  of  improved  land,  in  most  piirts 
of  the  country,  is  much  lower  than  can  be  accounted  for  by  thf 
quantity  of  waste  land  at  market,  and  can  only  be  fully  explaine* 
by  that  want  of  private  and  public  confidence,  which  are  kj 
alarmingly  prevalent  among  all  ranks,  and  which  have  a  direct 
tendency  to  depreciate  property  of  every  kind.  Is  private 
credit  the  friend  and  patron  of  industry?  That  most  useful 
kind  which  relates  to  borrowing  and  lending,  is  reduced  within 
the  narrowest  limits,  and  this  still  more  from  an  opinion  of  inse- 
curity than  from  a  scarcity  of  money.  To  shorten  an  enumera- 
tion of  particulars  which  can  aflfbrd  neither  pleasure  nor  instruc- 
tion, it  may  in  general  be  demanded,  what  indication  is  tK^re 
of  national  disorder,  poverty,  and  insignificance,  that  could  befal 
a  community  so  peculiarly  blessed  with  natural  advantages  as 
we  are,  which  does  not  form  a  part  of  the  dark  catalogue  of  our 
public  misfortunes  ? 

This  18  the   melancholy   situation   to  which  we   have   been 

*  I  mean  for  the  union. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  141 

brought  by  those  very  maxims  and  counsels,  which  would  now 
deter  us  from  adopting  the  proposed  constitution;  and  which, 
not  content  with  having  conducted  us  to  the  brink  of  a  precipice 
seem  resolved  to  plunge  us  into  the  abyss  that  awaits  us  below. 
Here,  my  countrymen,  impelled  by  every  motive  that  ought  to 
influence  an  enlightened  people,  let  us  make  a  firm  stand  for 
our  safety,  our  tranquillity,  our  dignity,  our  reputation.  Let 
us  at  last  break  the  fatal  charm  which  has  too  long  seduced  us 
from  the  paths  of  felicity  and  prosperity. 

It  is  true,  as  has  been  before  observed,  that  facts  too  stubborn 
to  be  resisted,  have  produced  a  species  of  general  assent  to  the 
abstract  proposition,  that  there  exist  material  defects  in  our 
national  system;  but  the  usefulness  of  the  concession,  on  the 
part  of  the  old  adversaries  of  federal  measures,  is  destroyed  by 
a  strenuous  opposition  to  a  remedy,  upon  the  only  principles  that 
can  give  it  a  chance  of  success.  While  they  admit  that  the 
government  of  the  United  States  is  destitute  of  energy,  they 
contend  against  conferring  upon  it  those  powers  which  are 
requisite  to  supply  that'  energy.  They  seem  still  to  aim  at 
things  repugnant  and  irreconcilable;  at  an  augmentation  of 
federal  authority,  without  a  diminution  of  state  authority;  at 
sovereignty  in  the  union,  and  complete  independence  in  the 
members.  They  still,  in  fine,  seem  to  cherish  with  blind  devo- 
tion the  political  monster  of  an  imperium  in  imperio.  This 
renders  a  full  display  of  the  principal  defects  of  the  confedera- 
tion necessary,  in  order  to  show,  that  the  evils  we  experience 
do  not  proceed  from  minute  or  partial  imperfections,  but  from 
fundamental  errors  in  the  structure  of  the  building,  which  can- 
not be  amended,  otherwise  than  by  an  alteration  in  the  very 
elements  ajid  main  pillars  of  the  fabric. 

The  great,  and  radical  vice,  in  the  construction  of  the  existing 
confederation,  is  in  the  principle  of  legislation  for  states  or 
GOVERNMENTS,  in  their  corporate  or  collective  capacities, 
and  as  contradistinguished  from  the  individuals  of  whom  they 
cjonsist.  Though  this  principle  does  not  run  through  all  the 
powers  delegated  to  the  union ;  yet  it  pervades  and  governs  those 


H2  THE    FEDERALIST. 

on  wMch  the  efficacy  of  the  rest  depends:  Excv.;t,  as  to  the  rule 
of  apportionment,  the  United  States  have  an  indefaiiite  discretion 
to  make  requisitions  for  men  and  money;  but  they  have  no 
authority  to  raise  either,  by  regulations  extending  to  the  indivi- 
dual citizens  of  America.  The  consequence  of  this  is,  that, 
though J^njheory,  their  resolutions  concerning  those  objects,  are 
laws,  constitutionally  binding  on  the  members  of  the  union,  yet, 
in  practice,  they  are  mere  recommendations,  which  the  states 
observe  or  disregard  at  their  option. 

It  is  a  singular  instance  of  the  capriciousness  of  the  human 
mind,  that,  after  all  the  admonitions  we  have  had  from  expe- 
rience on  this  head,  there  should  still  be  found  men,  who  object 
to  the  new  constitution,  for  deviating  from  a  principle  which  has 
been  found  the  bane  of  the  old ;  and  which  is,  in  itself,  evidently 
incompatible  with  the  idea  of  a  government  ;  a  principle,  in  short, 
which,  if  it  is  to  be  executed  at  all,  must  substitute  the  violent 
and  sanguinary  agency  of  the  sword,  to  the  mild  influence  of  the 
magistracy. 

There  is  nothing-  absurd  or  impracticable,  in  the  idea  of  a 
league  or  alliance  between  independent  nations,  for  certain  de- 
fined purposes  precisely  stated  in  a  treaty ;  regulating  all  the 
details  of  time,  place,  circumstance,  and  quantity;  leaving 
nothing  to  future  discretion  ;  and  depending  for  its  execution  on 
the  good  faith  of  the  parties.  Compacts  of  this  kind,  exist 
among  all  civilized  nations,  subject  to  the  usual  vicissitudes  of 
peace  and  war;  of  observance  and  non-observance,  as  the  in- 
terests or  passions  of  the  contracting  powers  dictate.  In  the 
early  part  of  the  present  century,  there  was  an  epidemical  rage 
in  Europe  for  this  species  of  compacts;  from  which  the  poli- 
ticians of  the  times  fondly  hoped  for  benefits  which  were  never 
realized.  "With  a  view  to  establishing  the  equilibrium  of  power, 
and  the  peace  of  that  part  of  the  world,  all  the  resources  of  ne- 
gociation  were  exhausted,  and  triple  and  quadruple  alliance^ 
were  formed ;  but  they  were  scarcely  formed  before  they  were 
broken,  giving  an  instructive,  but  afflicting,  lesson  to  mankind, 
now  little  dependence  is  to  be  placed  on  treaties  which  have  no 


THE    FEDERALIST.  14S 

other  sanction  than  the  obligations  of  good  faith;  and  which 
oppose  general  considerations  of  peace  and  justice,  to  the  impulse 
of  any  immediate  interest  or  passion. 

If  the  particular  states  in  this  country  are  disposed  to  stand 
in  a  similar  relation  to  each  other,  and  to  drop  the  project  of  a 
general  discretionary  superintendence,  the  scheme  would  in- 
deed be  pernicious,  and  would  entail  upon  us  all  the  mischiefs 
which  have  been  enumerated  under  the  first  head ;  but  it  would 
have  the  merit  of  being,  at  least,  consistent  and  practicable. 
Abandoning  all  views  towards  a  confederate  government,  this 
would  bring  us  to  a  simple  alliance,  offensive  and  defensive ; 
and  would  place  us  in  a  situation  to  be  alternately  friends  and 
enemies  of  each  other,  as  our  mutual  jealousies  and  rivalships, 
nourished  by  the  intrigues  of  foreign  nations,  should  prescribe 
to  us. 

But  if  we  are  unwilling  to  be  placed  in  this  perilous  situation ; 
if  we  still  adhere  to  the  design  of  a  national  government,  or, 
wliich  is  the  same  thing,  of  a  superintending  power,  under  the 
direction  of  a  common  council,  we  must  resolve  to  incorporate 
into  our  plan  those  ingredients,  which  may  be  considered  as 
forming  the  characteristic  difference  between  a  league  and  a 
government ;  we  must  extend  the  authority  of  the  union  to  thtf 
persons  of  the  c'tizens — ^the  only  proper  objects  of  government. 

Government  implies  the  power  of  making  laws.  It  is  essen 
tial  to  the  idea  of  a  law,  that  it  be  attended  with  a  sanction  ;  or 
in  other  words,  a  penalty  or  punishment  for  disobedience.  If 
there  be  no  penalty  annexed  to  disobedience,  the  resolutions  or 
commands  which  pretend  to  be  laws,  will  in  fact  amount  to 
nothing  more  than  advice  or  recommendation.  This  penalty, 
whatever  it  may  be,  can  only  be  inflicted  in  two  ways ;  by  the 
agency  of  the  courts  and  ministers  of  justice,  or  by  military 
force ;  by  the  coercion  of  the  magistracy,  or  by  the  coercion 
of  arms.  The  first  kind  can  evidently  apply  only  to  men  ;  the 
last  kind  must  of  necessity  be  employed  against  bodies  politic, 
or  communities  or  states.  It  is  evident,  that  there  is  no  process 
of  a  court  by  which  their  observance  of  the  laws  can,  in  the  last 


144  THE    FEDERALIST. 

nssort,  be  enforced.  Sentences  may  be  denounced  against  them 
for  violations  of  their  duty ;  but  these  sentences  can  only  be 
carried  into  execution  by  the  sword.  In  an  association,  where 
the  general  authority  is  confined  to  the  collective  bodies  of  the 
communities  that  compose  it,  every  breach  of  the  laws  must 
involve  a  state  of  war,  and  military  execution  must  become  the 
only  instrument  of  civil  obedience.  Such  a  state  of  things  can 
certainly  not  deserve  the  name  of  government,  nor  would  any 
prudent  man  choose  to  commit  his  happiness  to  it. 

There  was  a  time  when  we  were  told  that  breaches,  by  the 
states,  of  the  regulations  of  the  federal  authority  were  not  to  be 
expected ;  that  a  sense  of  common  interest  would  preside  over 
the  conduct  of  the  respective  members,  and  would  beget  a  full 
compliance  with  all  the  constitutional  requisitions  of  the  union. 
This  language,  at  the  present  day,  would  appear  as  wild  us  a 
great  part  of  what  we  now  hear  from  the  same  quarter  will  be 
thought,  when  we  shall  have  received  further  lessons  from  that 
best  oracle  of  wisdom,  experience.  It  at  all  times  betrayed  an 
ignorance  of  the  true  springs  by  which  human  conduct  is  ac- 
tuated, and  belied  the  original  inducements  to  the  establishment 
of  civil  power.  Why  has  government  been  instituted  at  all  ? 
Because  the  passions  of  men  will  not  conform  to  the  dictates  of 
reason  and  justice,  without  constraint.  Has  it  been  found  that 
bodies  of  men  act  with  more  rectitude  or  greater  disinterested- 
ness than  individuals  ?  The  contrary  of  this  has  been  inferred 
by  all  accurate  observers  of  the  conduct  of  mankind ;  and  the 
jinference  is  founded  upon  obvious  reasons.  Eegard  to  reputa- 
ntion,  has  a  less  active  influence,  when  the  infamy  of  a  bad  action 
is  to  be  divided  among  a  number,  than  when  it  is  to  fall  singly 
upon  one.  A  spirit  of  faction,  which  is  apt  to  mingle  its  poison 
in  the  deliberations  of  all  bodies  of  men,  will  often  hurry  the 
persons,  of  whom  they  are  composed,  into  improprieties  and 
excesses,  for  which  they  would  blush  in  a  private  capacity. 

In  addition  to  all  this,  there  is,  in  the  nature  of  sovereign 
power,  an  impatience  of  control,  which  disposes  those  who 
are  invested  with  the  exercise  of  it,  to  look  with  an  evil  eye 


THE    FEDERALIST.  145 

upon  all  external  attempts  to  restrain  or  direct  its  operations 
From  this  spirit  it  happens,  that  in  every  political  association 
which  is  formed  upon  the  principle  of  uniting  in  a  common  inte- 
rest a  number  of  lesser  sovereignties,  there  will  be  found  a  kind 
of  eccentric  tendency  in  the  subordinate  or  inferior  orbs,  by  the 
operation  of  which,  there  will  be  a  perpetual  effort  in  each  to  fly 
off  from  the  common  centre.  This  tendency  is  not  difficult  to 
be  accounted  for.  It  has  its  origin  in  the  love  of  power.  Power 
controlled  or  abridged  is  almost  always  the  rival  and  enemy  of 
that  power  by  which  it  is  controlled  or  abridged.  This  simple 
proposition  will  teach  us  how  little  reason  there  is  to  expect 
that  the  persons  entrusted  with  the  administration  of  the  affairs 
of  the  particular  members  of  a  confederacy,  will  at  all  times  be 
ready,  with  perfect  good  humour,  and  an  unbiassed  regard  to 
the  public  weal,  to  execute  the  resolutions  or  decrees  of  the 
general  authority.  The  reverse  of  this  results  from  the  con- 
stitution of  man. 

If  therefore  the  measures  of  the  confederacy  cannot  be  exe- 
cuted, without  the  intervention  of  the  particular  administra- 
tions, there  will  be  little  prospect  of  their  being  executed  at  all. 
The  rulers  of  the  respective  members,  whether  they  have  a  con- 
stitutional right  to  do  it  or  not,  will  undertake  to  judge  of  the 
propriety  of  the  measures  themselves.  They  will  consider  the 
conformity  of  the  thing  proposed  or  required  to  their  immediate 
interests  or  aims ;  the  momentary  conveniences  or  inconve- 
niences that  would  attend  its  adoption.  All  this  will  be  done  ; 
and  in  a  spirit  of  interested  and  suspicious  scrutiny,  without 
that  knowledge  of  national  circumstances  and  reasons  of  state, 
which  is  essential  to  a  right  judgment,  and  with  that  strong  pre- 
dilection in  favour  of  local  objects,  which  can  hardly  fail  to  mis- 
lead the  decision.  The  same  process  must  be  repeated  in  every 
member  of  which  the  body  is  constituted;  and  the  execution  of 
the  plans,  framed  by  the  councils  of  the  whole,  will  always  fluc- 
tuate on  the  discretion  of  the  ill-informed  and  prejudiced  opinion 
of  every  part.  Those  who  have  been  conversant  in  the  proceed- 
ings of  popular  assemblies  ;  who  have  seen  how  difficult  it  often 


146  THE    FEDERALIST. 

is,  when  there  is  no  exterior  pressure  of  circumstances,  to  bring 
them  to  harmonious  resolutions  on  important  points,  will  readily 
conceive  how  impossible  it  must  be  to  induce  a  number  of  such 
assemblies,  deliberating  at  a  distance  from  each  other,  at  differ- 
ent times,  and  under  different  impressions,  long  to  co-operate  in 
the  same  views  and  pursuits. 

In  our  case,  the  concurrence  of  thirteen  distinct  sovereign 
wills  is  requisite  under  the  confederation,  to  the  complete  exe- 
cution of  every  important  measure,  that  proceeds  from  the 
union.  It  has  happened,  as  was  to  have  been  foreseen.  The 
measures  of  the  union  have  not  been  executed  ;  the  delinquences 
of  the  states  have,  step  by  step,  matured  themselves  to  an 
extreme,  which  has  at  length  arrested  all  the  wheels  of  the 
national  government,  and  brought  them  to  an  awful  stand. 
Congress  at  this  time  scarcely  possess  the  means  of  keeping  up 
the  forms  of  administration,  till  the  states  can  have  time  to 
agree  upon  a  more  substantial  substitute  for  the  present  shadow 
of  a  federal  government.  Things  did  not  come  to  this  desperate 
extremity  at  once.  The  causes  which  have  been  specified,  pro- 
duced at  first  only  unequal  and  disproportionate  degrees  of  com- 
pliance with  the  requisitions  of  the  union.  The  greater  de- 
ficiencies of  some  states  furnished  the  pretext  of  example,  and 
the  temptation  of  interest  to  the  complying,  or  at  least  delin- 
quent states.  "Why  should  we  do  more  in  proportion  than  those 
who  are  embarked  with  us  in  the  same  political  voyage  ?  Why 
should  we  consent  to  bear  more  than  our  proper  share  of  the 
common  burthen  ?  These  were  suggestions  which  human 
selfishness  could  not  withstand,  and  which  even  speculative 
a>en,  who  looked  forward  to  remote  consequences,  could  not 
without  hesitation  combat.  Each  state,  yielding  to  the  per- 
suasive voice  of  immediate  interest  or  convenience,  has  succes- 
sively withdrawn  its  support,  till  the  frail  and  tottering  edifice 
seems  ready  to  fall  upon  our  heads  and  to  crush  us  beneath  its 
ruins. 

PUBLIUS. 


TH  ?   FEDERALIST.  *4' 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XVI. 


NEW    YORIC,    DECEMBER   5,1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME   SUBJ];CT   CONTINUED,  IN   RELATION  TO   THE   SAME 
PRINCIPLES. 

The  tendency  of  the  principle  of  legislation  for  states  or 
communities  in  their  political  capacities,  as  it  has  been  exempli- 
fied by  the  expeiim ^nt  we  have  made  of  it,  is  equally  attested 
by  the  events  wh.  ch  have  befallen  all  other  governments  of  the 
confederate  kind,  of  which  we  have  any  account,  in  exact  pro- 
portion to  its  prevalence  in  those  systems.  The  confirmations 
of  this  fact  will  be  worthy  of  a  distinct  and  particular  examina- 
tion. I  shall  content  myself  with  barely  observing  here,  that 
of  all  the  confederacies  of  antiquity  w'lich  history  has  handed 
down  to  us,  tl  e  Lycian  and  Achaean  leagues,  as  far  as  there 
remain  vestiges  of  them,  appear  to  have  been  most  free  from  the 
fetters  of  that  mistaken  principle,  and  were  accordingly  those 
which  have  best  deserved,  and  have  most  liberally  received,  the 
applauding  suffrages  of  political  writers. 

This  exceptionable  principle  may,  as  truly  as  emphaticallj- , 
be  styled  the  parent  of  anarchy:  It  has  been  seen  that  delin- 
quencies in  the  members  of  the  union  are  its  natural  and  neces- 
sary offspring;  and  that  whentver  they  lappen,  the  only  con- 
Btitutional  remedy  is  force,  and  ^h  •  immed  «.te  effect  of  the  uso 
of  it,  civil  war.  , 


348  THE   FEDERALIST. 

ft  remains  to  inquire  how  far  so  odious  an  engine  of  govern- 
ment, in  its  application  to  us,  would  even  be  capable  of  answer- 
ing its  end.  If  there  should  not  be  a  large  army,  constantly  at 
the  disposal  of  the  national  government,  it  would  either  not  be 
able  to  employ  force  at  all,  or  when  this  could  be  done,  it  would 
amount  to  a  war  between  different  parts  of  the  confederacy, 
concerning  the  infractions  of  a  league;  in  which  the  strongest 
combination  would  be  most  likely  to  prevail,  whether  it  con- 
sisted of  those  who  supported,  or  of  those  who  resisted,  the 
general  authority.  It  would  rarely  happen  that  the  delinquency 
to  be  redressed  would  be  confined  to  a  single  member,  and  if 
there  were  more  than  one,  who  had  neglected  their  duty,  simi- 
larity of  situation  would  induce  them  to  unite  for  common 
defence.  Independent  of  this  motive  of  sympathy,  if  a  large 
and  influential  state  should  happen  to  be  the  aggressing  member, 
it  would  commonly  have  weight  enough  with  its  neighbours,  to 
win  over  some  of  them  as  associates  to  its  cause.  Specious 
arguments  of  danger  to  the  general  liberty  could  easily  be  con- 
trived; plausible  excuses  for  the  deficiencies  of  the  party,  could, 
without  diflSculty,  be  invented,  to  alarm  the  apprehensions, 
inflame  the  passions,  and  conciliate  the  good  will  even  of  those 
states  which  were  not  chargeable  with  any  violation,  or  omission 
of  duty.  This  would  be  the  more  likely  to  take  j^lace,  as  the 
delinquencies  of  the  larger  members  might  be  expected  some- 
times to  proceed  from  an  ambitious  premeditation  in  their  rulers, 
with  a  view  to  getting  rid  of  all  external  control  upon  their 
designs  of  personal  aggrandizement;  the  better  to  efi'ect  which, 
it  is  presumable  they  would  tamper  beforehand  with  leading  indi- 
viduals in  the  adjacent  states.  If  associates  could  not  be  found  at 
home,  recourse  would  be  had  to  the  aid  of  foreign  powers,  who 
would  seldom  be  disinclined  to  encouraging  the  dissensions  of  a 
3onfederacy,  from  the  firm  union  of  which  th6y  had  so  much  to 
fear.  When  the  sword  is  once  drawn,  the  passions  of  men 
observe  no  bounds  of  moderation.  The  suggestions  of  wounded 
pride,  the  instigations  of  irritated  resentment,  would  be  apt  to 
carry  the   states,  against  which   the   arms  of  the  union  were 


THE    FEDERALIST.  149 

r^ei'ted,  to  any  extremes  necessary  to  avenge  the  affront,  or  to 
avoid  the  disgrace  of  submission.  The  first  war  of  this  Kina 
would  probably  terminate  in  a  dissolution  of  the  union. 

This  may  be  considered  as  the  violent  death  of  the  confede- 
racy. Its  more  natural  death  is  what  we  now  seem  to  be  on 
the  point  of  experiencing,  if  the  federal  system  be  not  speedily 
renovated  in  a  more  substantial  form.  It  is  not  probable,  con- 
sidering the  genius  of  this  country,  that  the  complying  states 
would  often  be  inclined  to  support  the  authority  of  the  union, 
by  engaging  in  a  war  against  the  non-complying  states.  They 
would  always  be  more  ready  to  pursue  the  milder  course  of 
putting  themselves  upon  an  equal  footing  with  the  delinquent 
members,  by  an  imitation  of  their  example.  And  the  guilt  of  all 
would  thus  become  the  security  of  all.  Our  past  experience 
has  exhibited  the  operation  of  this  spirit  in  its  full  light.  There 
would  in  fact  be  an  insuperable  difficulty  in  ascertaining  when 
force  could  with  propriety  be  employed.  In  the  article  of  pecu- 
niary contribution,  which  would  be  the  most  usual  source  of 
delinquency,  it  would  often  be  impossible  to  decide  whether  it 
had  proceeded  from  disinclination,  or  inability.  The  pretence 
of  the  latter  would  always  be  at  hand.  And  the  case  must  be 
very  flagrant  in  which  its  fallacy  could  be  detected  with  sufficient 
certainty  to  justify  the  harsh  expedient  of  compulsion.  It  is 
easy  to  see  that  this  problem  alone,  as  often  as  it  should  occur, 
would  open  a  wide  field  to  the  majority  that  happened  to  prevail 
in  the  national  council,  for  the  exercise  of  factious  views,  of 
partiality,  and  of  oppression. 

It  seems  to  require  no  pains  to  prove  that  the  states  ought 
not  to  prefer  a  national  constitution,  which  could  only  be  kept 
in  motion  by  the  instrumentality  of  a  large  army,  continually 
on  foot  to  execute  the  ordinary  requisitions  or  decrees  of  the  gov- 
ernment. And  yet  this  is  the  plain  alternative  involved  by  those 
who  wish  to  deny  it  the  power  of  extending  its  operations  to 
rndividuals.  Such  a  scheme,  if  practicable  at  all,  would  instantly 
degenerate  into  a  military  despotism;  but  it  will  be  found  in 
every  light  impracticable.     The  resources  of  the  union  would 


150  THE   FEDERALIST. 

not  be  equal  to  the  maintenance  of  an  army  considerable  enough 
to  confine  the  larger  states  within  the  limits  of  their  duty;  nor 
would  the  means  ever  be  furnished  of  forming  such  an  army  in 
the  first  instance.  Whoever  considers  the  populousness  and 
strength  of  several  of  these  states  singly  at  the  present  juncture^ 
and  looks  forward  to  what  they  will  become,  even  at  the  distance 
of  half  a  century,  will  at  once  dismiss  as  idle  and  visionary  any 
Bcheme,  which  aims  at  regulating  their  movements  by  laws,  to 
operate  upon  them  in  their  collective  capacities,  and  to  be  exe- 
cuted by  a  coercion  applicable  to  them  in  the  same  capacities. 
A  project  of  this  kind  is  little  less  romantic  than  the  monster- 
taming  spirit,  attributed  to  the  fabulous  heroes  and  demi-gods 
of  antiquity. 

Even  in  those  confederacies,  which  have  been  composed  of 
members  smaller  than  many  of  our  counties,  the  principle  of 
legislation  for  sovereign  states,  supported  by  military  coercion, 
has  never  been  found  effectual.  It  has  rarely  been  attempted 
to  be  employed,  but  against  the  weaker  members;  and  in  most 
instances  attempts  to  coerce  the  refractory  and  disobedient, 
have  been  the  signals  of  bloody  wars;  in  which  one  half  of  the 
confederacy  has  displayed  its  banners  against  the  other. 

The  result  of  these  observations  to  an  intelligent  mind  must 
be  clearly  this,  that  if  it  be  possible  at  any  rate  to  construct  a 
federal  government  capable  of  regulatiqg  the  common  concerns, 
and  preserving  the  general  tranquillity,  it  must  be  founded,  as 
to  the  objects  committed  to  its  care,  upon  the  reverse  of  the 
principle  contended  for  by  the  opponents  of  the  proposed  consti- 
1  I  tution.  rXt  must  carry  its  agency  to  the  persons  of  the  citizensTl 
It  must^tand  in  need  of  no  intermediate  legislations;  but  must 
itself  be  empowered  to  employ  the  arm  of  the  ordinary  magis- 
trate to  execute  its  own  resolutions.  The  majesty  of  the  national 
authority  must  be  manifested  through  the  medium  of  the  courts 
of  justice.  The  government  of  the  union,  like  that  of  each  state, 
must  be  able  to  address  itself  immediately  to  the  hopes  and  fears 
of  individuals;  and  to  attract  to  its  support,  those  passions,  which 
have  the  strongest  influence  upon  the  human  heart.     It  must,  in 


THE   FEDERALIST.  151 

s^iort,  possess  all  tho  means,  and  have  a  rrght  to  resort  to  all 
tJie  methods,  of  executing  the  powers  with  which  it  is  entrusted, 
ihat  are  possessed  and  exercised  by  the  governments  of  the 
particular  states. 

To  this  reasoning  it  may  perhaps  be  objected,  that  if  any 
state  should  be  disaffected  to  the  authority  of  the  union,  it  could 
at  any  time  obstruct  the  execution  of  its  laws,  and  bring  the 
matter  to  the  same  issue  of  force,  with  the  necessity  of  which 
the  opposite  scheme  is  reproached. 

The  plausibility  of  this  objection  will  vanish  the  moment  we 
advert  to  the  essential  difference  between  a  mere  non-com- 
pliance and  a  direct  and  active  resistance.  If  the  interpo- 
sition of  the  state  legislatures  be  necessary  to  give  effect  to  a 
measure  of  the  union,  they  have  only  not  to  act,  or  to  act 


1 


EVASIVELY,  and  the  measure  is  defeated.  This  neglect  of  duty 
may  be  disguised  under  affected  but  unsubstantial  provisions  so 
AS  not  to  appear,  and  of  course  not  to  excite  any  alarm  in  the 
people  for  the  safety  of  the  constitution.  The  state  leaders  may 
even  make  a  merit  of  their  surreptitious  invasions  of  it,  on  the 
ground  of  some  temporary  convenience,  exemption,  or  advan- / 
tage. 

But  if  the  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  national  government 
should  not  require  the  intervention  of  the  state  legislatures;  if 
they  were  to  pass  into  immediate  operation  upon  the  citizens 
themselves,  the  particular  governments  could  not  interrupt  their 
progress  without  an  open  and  violent  exertion  of  an  unconstitu- 
tional power.  No  omission,  nor  evasions,  would  answer  the 
■end.  They  would  be  obliged  to  act,  and  in  such  a  manner,  as 
would  leave  no  doubt  that  they  had  encroached  on  the  national 
rights.  An  experiment  of  this  nature  would  always  be  hazard- 
ous in  the  face  of  a  constitution  in  any  degree  competent  to  its 
own  defence,  and  of  a  people  enlightened  enough  to  distinguish 
between  a  legal  exercise  and  an  illegal  usurpation  of  authority. 
The  success  of  it  would  require  not  merely  a  factious  majority 
in  the  legislature,  but  the  concurrence  of  the  courts  of  justice, 
and  of  the  body  of  the  people.     If  the  judges  were  not  em- 


A 


152  THE    FEDERALIST. 

barked  in  a  conspiracy  with  the  legislature,  they  would  pro- 
nounce the  resolutions  of  such  a  majority  to  be  contrary  to  the 
supreme  law  of  the  land,  unconstitutional  and  void.  If  the 
people  were  not  tainted  with  the  spirit  of  their  state  represent- 
atives, they,  as  the  natural  guardians  of  the  constitution,  would 
throw  their  weight  into  the  national  scale,  and  give  it  a  decided 
preponderancy  in  the  contest.  Attempts  of  this  kind  would 
not  often  be  made  with  levity  or  rashness;  because  they  could 
seldom  be  made  without  danger  to  the  authors;  unless  in  cases 
of  a  tyrannical  exercise  of  the  federal  authority. 

If  opposition  to  the  national  government  should  arise  from 
the  disorderly  conduct  of  refractory,  or  seditious  individuals,  it 
could  be  overcome  by  the  same  means  which  are  daily  em- 
ployed against  the  same  evil,  under  the  state  governments. 
The  magistracy,  being  equally  the  ministers  of  the  law  of  the 
land,  from  whatever  source  it  might  emanate,  would,  doubtless, 
be  as  ready  to  guard  the  national  as  the  local  regulations,  from 
the  inroads  of  private  licentiousness.  As  to  those  partial  com- 
motions and  insurrections,  which  sometimes  disquiet  society, 
from  the  intrigues  of  an  inconsiderable  faction,  or  from  sudden 
or  occasional  ill  humours,  that  do  not  infect  the  great  body  of 
the  community,  the  general  government  could  command  more 
extensive  resources,  for  the  suppression  of  disturbances  of  that 
kind,  than  would  be  in  the  power  of  any  single  member.  And 
as  to  those  mortal  feuds,  which,  in  certain  conjunctures,  spread 
a  conflagration  through  a  whole  nation,  or  through  a  very  large 
proportion  of  it,  proceeding  either  from  weighty  causes  of  dis- 
content, given  by  the  governmentj.^or  from  the  contagion  of 
some  violent  popular  paroxism,  they  do  not  fall  within  any 
ordinary  rules  of  calculation.  When  they  happen,  they  com- 
monly amount  to  revolutions,  and  dismemberments  of  empire. 
No  form  of  government  can  always  either  avoid  or  control 
them.  It  is  in  vain  to  hope  to  guard  against  events  too  mighty 
for  human  foresight  or  precaution;  and  it  would  be  idle  to  object 
to  a  government,  because  it  could  not  perform  impossibilities. 

PifBLirs. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  153 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XVII. 


NEW    YORK,   DECEMBER   5,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  AND  ILLUSTRATED  BY  EXAMPLES,  TO 
SHOW  THE  TENDENCY  OF  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENTS,  RATHER 
TO  ANARCHY  AMONG  THE  MEMBERS,  THAN  TYRANNY  IN  THE 
HEAD. 

An  objection,  of  a  nature  different  from  that  which  has  been 
Btated  and  answered  in  my  last  address,  may,  perhaps,  be  urged 
against  the  principle  of  legislation  for  the  individual  citizens  of 
America.  It  may  be  said,  that  it  would  tend  to  render  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  union  too  powerful,  and  to  enable  it  to  absorb 
those  residuary  authorities,  which  it  might  be  judged  proper  to 
leave  with  the  states  for  local  purposes.  Allowing  the  utmost 
latitude  to  the  love  of  power,  which  any  reasonable  man  can 
require,  I  confess  I  am  at  a  loss  to  discover  what  temptation  the 
persons  entrusted  with  the  administration  of  the  general  gov- 
ernment, could  ever  feel  to  divest  the  states  of  the  authorities 
of  that  description.  The  regulation  of  the  mere  domestic  police 
of  a  state,  appears  to  me  to  hold  out  slender  allurements  to  am- 
bition. Commerce,  finance,  negociation,  and  war,  seem  to  com- 
prehend all  the  objects  which  have  charms  for  minds  governed 
by  that  passion;  and  all  the  powers  necessary  to  those  objects, 
ought,  in  the  first  instance,  to  be  lodged  in  the  national  deposi- 
tory The  administration  of  private  justice  between  the  citi- 
zens of  the  same  state :  the  supervision  of  agriculture,  and  of 


154  THE    FEDERALIST 

Other  concerns  of  a  similar  nature;  all  those  things,  in  short, 
which  are  proper  to  be  provided  for  by  local  legislation,  can 
never  be  desirable  cares  of  a  general  jurisd  ctioD.  It  is  therefore 
improbable,  that  there  should  exist  a  disposition  in  the  federal 
councils,  to  usurp  the  powers  with  which  they  are  connected; 
because  the  attempt  to  exercise  them,  would  b  3  as  troublesome 
as  it  would  be  nugatory ;  and  the  possession  of  them,  for  that 
reason,  would  contribute  nothing  to  the  digni  y,  to  the  import- 
ance, or  to  the  splendour,  of  the  national  govtrn  nent. 

But  let  it  be  admitted,  for  argument  salr  i,  that  mere  wanton- 
ness, and  lust  of  domination,  would  be  st  Mcient  to  beget  that 
disposition ;  still  it  may  be  safely  affirmed,  th  it  the  sense  of  the 
constituent  body  of  the  national  represents.tives,  or,  in  other 
words,  of  the  people  of  the  several  states,  wc»uld  control  the 
indulgence  of  so  extravagant  an  appetite.  It  will  always  be  far 
more  easy  for  the  state  governments  to  encroach  upon  the 
national  authorities,  than  for  the  national  government  to  en- 
croach upon  the  state  authorities.  The  proof  of  this  proposi- 
tion turns  upon  the  greater  degree  of  influence  which  the  state 
governments,  if  they  administer  their  affairs  with  uprightness 
and  prudence,  will  generally  possess  over  the  people ;  a  circum- 
stance which  at  the  same  time  teaches  us,  that  there  is  an  inhe- 
rent and  intrinsic  weakness  in  all  federal  constitutions ;  and  that 
too  much  pains  cannot  be  taken  in  their  organization,  to  give  them 
all  the  force  which  is  compatible  with  the  principles  of  liberty 

The  superiority  of  influence  in  favor  of  the  particular  govern- 
ments, would  result  partly  from  the  diffusive  construction  of  the 
national  government;  but  chiefly  from  the  nature  of  the  objects 
to  which  the  attention  of  the  state  administrations  would  be 
directed. 

It  is  a  Known  fact  in  human  nature,  that  its  affections  are 
commonly  weak  in  proportion  to  the  distance  or  diffusiveness 
of  the  object.  Upon  the  same  principle  that  a  man  is  more 
attached  to  his  family  than  to  his  neighbourhood,  to  his 
neighbourhood  than  to  the  community  at  large,  the  people 
of  each   state  would  be   apt  to  feel  a  stronger   bias  towards 


THE    FEDERALIST.  lo5 

their  local  governments,  than  towards  the  government  of  the 
union,  unless  the  force  of  that  principle  should  be  destroyed  by 
a  much  better  administration  of  the  latter. 

This  strong  propensity  of  the  human  heart,  would  find  power- 
ful auxiliaries  in  the  objects  of  state  regulation. 

The  variety  of  more  minute  interests,  which  will  necessarily 
fall  under  the  superintendence  of  the  local  administrations,  and 
which  will  form  so  many  rivulets  of  influence,  running  through 
every  part  of  the  society,  cannot  be  particularized,  without 
involving  a  detail  too  tedious  and  uninteresting,  to  compensate 
for  the  instruction  it  might  afford. 

There  is  one  transcendent  advantage  belonging  to  the  pro- 
vince of  the  state  governments,  which  alone  suffices  to  place  the 
matter  in  a  clear  and  satisfactory  light — I  mean  the  ordinary 
administration  of  criminal  and  civil  justice.  This,  of  all  others, 
is  the  most  powerful,  most  universal,  and  most  attractive  source 
of  popular  obedience  and  attachment.  It  is  this,  which,  being 
the  immediate  and  visible  guardian  of  life  and  property ;  having 
its  benefits  and  its  terrors  in  constant  activity  before  the  public 
eye;  regulating  all  those  personal  interests,  and  familiar  con- 
cerns, to  which  the  sensibility  of  individuals  is  more  immediately 
awake ;  contributes,  more  than  any  other  circumstance,  to  im  • 
press  upon  the  minds  of  the  people  affection,  esteem,  and  reve- 
rence towards  the  government.  This  great  cement  of  society, 
which  will  diffuse  itself  almost  wholly  through  the  channels  of 
the  particular  governments,  independent  of  all  other  causes  of 
influence,  would  insure  them  so  decided  an  empire  over  their 
respective  citizens,  as  to  render  them  at  all  times  a  complete 
counterpoise,  and  not  unfrequently  dangerous  rivals  to  the  power 
of  the  union. 

The  operations  of  the  national  government,  on  the  othei 
hand,  falling  less  immediately  under  the  observation  of  the  mass 
of  the  citizens,  the  benefits  derived  from  it  will  chiefly  be  per- 
ceived, and  attended  to  by  speculative  men.  Eelating  to  more 
general  interests,  they  will  be  less  apt  to  come  home  to  the 
feelings  of  the  people;  and,  in  proportion,  less  likely  to  inspire, 

21 


15t)  THE    FEDERALIST. 

a  habitual    sense  of  obligation,  and   an   active   sentiment  of 
attachment. 

The  reasoning  on  this  head  has  been  abundantly  exemplified 
by  the  experience  of  all  federal  constitutions,  with  which  we  are 
acquainted,  and  of  all  others,  which  have  borne  the  least  analogy 
to  them. 

Though  the  ancient  feudal  systems  were  not,  strictly  speaJj- 
ing,  confederacies,  yet  they  partook  of  the  nature  of  that  species 
of  association.  There  was  a  common  head,  chieftain,  or  sove- 
roi^,  whose  authority  extended  over  the  whole  nation ;  and  a 
'  jmber  of  subordinate  vassals,  or  feudatories,  who  had  large 
'  ortions  of  land  allotted  to  them,  and  numerous  trains  of  inferior 
/assals  or  retainers,  who  occupied  and  cultivated  that  land  upon 
the  tenure  of  fealty,  or  obedience  to  the  persons  of  whom  they 
held  it.  Each  principal  vassal  was  a  kind  of  sovereign  within 
his  particular  demesnes.  The  consequences  of  this  situation 
were  a  continual  opposition  to  the  authority  of  the  sovereign, 
and  frequent  wars  between  the  great  barons,  or  chief  feudatories 
themselves.  The  power  of  the  head  of  the  nation  was  com- 
monly too  weak  either  to  preserve  the  public  peace,  or  to  pro- 
tect the  people  against  the  oppressions  of  their  immediate  lords. 
This  period  of  European  affairs  is  emphatically  styled  by  his- 
torians, the  times  of  feudal  anarchy. 

When  the  sovereign  happened  to  be  a  man  of  vigorous  and 
warlike  temper  and  of  superior  abilities,  he  would  acquire  a  per- 
sonal weight  and  influence,  which  answered  for  the  time  the 
purposes  of  a  more  regular  authority.  But  in  general,  the  power 
of  the  barons  triumphed  over  that  of  the  prince ;  and  in  many 
instance  J  his  dominion  was  entirely  thrown  off,  and  the  great 
iefs  V  ^re  erected  into  independent  principalities  or  states.  In 
tho8«  instances  in  which  the  monarch  finally  prevailed  over  his 
vasBdls,  his  success  was  chiefly  owing  to  the  tyranny  of  those 
vai'Sals  over  their  dependants.  The  barons,  or  nobles,  equally 
the  enemies  of  the  sovereign  and  the  oppressors  of  the  common 
',eople,  were  dreaded  and  detested  by  both;  till  mutual  danger 
*nd  mutual  interest  effected  an  union  between  them  fatal  to  the 


THE    FEDERALIST.  157 

power  ol  tne  aristocracy.  L.^d  the  nobles,  b^  ^  conduct  of 
clemency  and  justice,  preserved  tL^  fidelity  and  devotion  of 
their  retainers  and  followers,  the  contests  between  them  and 
the  prince  must  almost  always  have  ended  in  their  favour,  and 
in  the  abridgement  or  subversion  of  the  royal  authority. 

This  is  not  an  assertion  founded  merely  in  speculation  or  con- 
jecture. Among  other  illustrations  of  its  truth  which  might  be 
cited,  Scotland  will  furnish  a  cogent  example.  The  spirit  of 
•olanship  which  was  at  an  early  day  introduced  into  that  king- 
dom, uniting  the  nobles  and  their  dependants  by  ties  equivalent 
to  those  of  kindred,  rendered  the  aristocracy  a  constant  over- 
match for  the  power  of  the  monarch,  till  the  incorporation  with 
England  subdued  its  fierce  and  ungovernable  spirit,  and  reduced 
it  within  those  rules  of  subordination,  which  a  more  rational 
and  a  more  energetic  system  of  civil  polity  had  previously 
established  in  the  latter  kingdom. 

The  separate  governments  in  a  confederacy  may  aptly  be  com- 
pared with  the  feudal  baronies ;  with  this  advantage  in  their 
favour,  that  from  the  reasons  already  explained,  they  will  gene- 
rally possess  the  confidence  and  good  will  of  the  people;  and 
with  so  important  a  support,  will  be  able  effectually  to  oppose 
all  encroachments  of  the  national  government.  It  will  be  well 
if  they  are  not  able  to  counteract  its  legitimate  and  necessary 
authority.  The  points  of  similitude  consist  in  the  rivalship  of 
power,  applicable  to  both,  and  in  the  concentration  of  large 
portions  of  the  strength  of  the  community  into  particular  de- 
positories, in  one  case  at  the  disposal  of  individuals,  in  the 
other  case,  at  the  disposal  of  political  bodies. 

A  concise  review  of  the  events  that  have  attended  confederate 
governmer  ts,  will  further  illustrate  this  important  doctrine ;  an 
inattention  to  which  has  been  the  great  source  of  onr  political 
mistakes,  and  has  given  our  jealousy  a  direction  to  the  wrong 
side.    This  review  shall  form  the  subject  of  some  ensuing  papers 

PUBLIUS 


1«'>8  THE   FEDERALIST. 


0' 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XVIII. 


NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER   8,  1787. 


HAMILTON  AND  MADISON. 


THE    SUBJECT   CONTINUED,   WITH    FARTHER   EXAMPLES. 

Among  the  confederacies  of  antiquity,  the  most  considerable 
was  that  of  the  Grecian  republics,  associated  under  the  Ampbyc- 
tionic  council.  From  the  best  transmitted  accounts  of  this  cele- 
brated institution,  it  bore  a  very  instructive  analogy  to  the  pre- 
sent confederation  of  the  American  states. 
\]/  The   members  retained    the   character   of   independent   and 

Q  ^  sovereign  states,  and   had  equal  votes  in  the   federal  council, 

'-^  ^i^>  This  council  had  a  general  authority  to    propose  and  resolve 

whatever  it  judged  necessary  for  the  common  welfare  of  Greece ; 
to  declare  and  carry  on  war ;  to  decide,  in  the  last  resort,  all 
controversies  between  the  members;  to  fine  the  aggressing 
party;  to  employ  the  whole  force  of  the  confederacy  against 
the  disobedient;  to  admit  new  members.  The  Amphyctions 
were  the  guardians  of  religion,  and  of  the  immense  riches  be- 
longing to  the  temple  of  Delphqs,  where  they  had  the  right  of 
jurisdiction  in  controversies  between  the  inhabitants  and  those 
who  came  to  consult  the  oracle.  As  a  further  provision  for  the 
eflScacy  of  the  federal  powers,  they  took  an  oath  mutually  to 
defend  and  protect  the  united  cities,  to  punish  the  violators  of 
this  oath,  and  to  inflict  vengeance  on  sacrilegious  despoilers  of 
the  temple. 


'  THE    FEDERALIST.  159 

In  theoij,  and  upon  paper,  this  apparatus  of  powers,  seems 
t  -nply  sufficient  for  all  general  purposes.  In  several  material 
instances,  they  exceed  the  powers  enumerated  in  the  articles  of 
confederation.  The  Amphyctions  had  in  their  hands  the  super- 
stition of  the  times,  one  of  the  principal  engines  by  which  gov- 
ernment was  then  maintained;  they  had  a  declared  authority 
to  use  coercion  against  refractory  cities,  and  were  bound  by 
oath  to  exert  this  authority  on  the  necessary  occasions. 

Very  different,  nevertheless,  was  the  experiment  from  the 
theory.  The  powers,  like  those  of  the  present  congress,  were 
administered  by  deputies  appointed  wholly  by  the  cities  in  their 
political  capacities;  and  exercised  over  them  in  the  same  capa- 
cities. Hence  the  weakness,  the  disorders,  and  finally  the  de- 
struction of  the  confederacy.  The  more  powerful  members,  in- 
stead of  being  kept  in  awe  and  subordination,  tyrannized  suc- 
cessively over  all  the  rest.  Athens,  as  we  learn  from  Demos- 
thenes, was  the  arbiter  of  Greece  seventy-three  years.  The 
Lacedemonians  next  governed  it  twenty-nine  years ;  at  a  subse- 
quent period,  aft^r  the  battle  of  Leuctra,  the  Thebans  had  their 
turn  of  domination. 

It  happened  but  too  often,  according  to  Plutarch,  that  the 
deputies  of  the  strongest  cities,  awed  and  corrupted  those  of  the 
weakest,  and  that  judgment  went  in  favour  of  the  most  power- 
ful party. 

Even  in  the  midst  of  defensive  and  dangerous  wars  with 
Persia  and  Macedon,  the  members  never  acted  in  concert,  and 
were  more  or  fewer  of  them,  eternally  the  dupes,  or  the  hire- 
lings, of  the  common  enemy.  The  intervals  of  foreign' war, 
were  filled  up  by  domestic  vicissitudes,  convulsions,  and  carnage. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  war  with  Xerxes,  it  appears  that 
the  Lacedemonians  required  that  a  number  of  the  cities  should 
be  turned  out  of  the  confederacy  for  the  unfaithful  part  they 
had  acted.  The  Athenians,  finding  that  the  Lacedemonians 
would  lose  fewer  partizans  by  such  a  measure  than  themselves, 
and  would  become  masters  of  the  public  deliberations,  vigor- 
.^u^ly  opposed  and  defeated  the  attempt.     This  piece  of  history 


'160  THE   FEDERALIST.  * 

proveu  at  on'je  the  inefficiency  of  the  union;  the  ambition  and 
jealousy  of  its  most  powerful  members,  and  the  dependent  and 
degraded  condition  of  the  rest.  The  smaller  members,  though 
entitled  by  the  theory  of  their  system,  to  revolve  in  equal  pride 
and  majesty  around  the  common  centre,  had  in  fact  become 
satellites  of  the  orbs  of  primary  magnitude. 

Had  the  Greeks,  says  the  abbe  Milot,  been  as  wise  as  they 
were  courageous,  they  would  have  been  admonished  by  expe- 
rience of  the  necessity  of  a  closer  union,  and  would  have  availed 
themselves  of  the  peace  which  followed  their  success  against 
the  Persian  arms,  to  establish  such  a  reformation.  Instead  of 
this  obvious  policy,  Athens  and  Sparta,  inflated  with  the  vic- 
tories and  the  glory  they  had  acquired,  became  first  rivals,  and 
then  enemies;  and  did  each  other  infinitely  more  mischief  than 
they  had  suffered  from  Xerxes.  Their  mutual  jealousies,  fears, 
hatreds,  and  injuries,  ended  in  the  celebrated  Peloponnesian 
war ;  which  itself  ended  in  the  ruin  and  slavery  of  the  Athe- 
nians, who  had  begun  it. 

As  a  weak  government,  when  not  at  war,  is  ever  agitated  by 
internal  dissentions ;  so  these  never  fail  to  bring  on  fresh  calami- 
ties from  abroad.  The  Phocians  having  ploughed  up  some  con- 
secrated ground  belonging  to  the  temple  of  Apollo,  the  Amphyc- 
tionic  council,  according  to  the  superstition  of  the  age,  imposed 
a  fine  on  the  sacrilegious  offenders.  The  Phocians,  being 
abetted  by  Athens  and  Sparta,  refused  to  submit  to  the  decree. 
The  Thebans,  with  others  of  the  cities,  undertook  to  maintain 
the  authority  of  the  Amphyctions,  and  to  avenge  the  violated 
god.  The  latter  being  the  weaker  party,  invited  the  assistance 
of  Philip  of  Macedon,  who  secretly  fostered  the  contest.  Philip 
gladly  seized  the  opportunity  of  executing  the  designs  he  had 
long  planned  against  the  liberties  of  Greece.  By  his  intrigues 
and  bribes,  he  won  over  to  his  interests  the  popular  leaders  of 
several  cities;  by  their  influence  and  votes,  gained  admission 
into  the  Amphyctionic  council;  and  by  his  arts  and  his  arms, 
made  himself  master  of  the  confederacy. 

Sneh  were  the  consequences  of  the  fallacious  principle,  on 


THE    FEDERALIST.  161 

which  this  interesting  establishment  was  founded.  Had  Greece, 
says  a  judicious  observer  on  her  fate,  been  united  by  a  stricter 
confederation,  and  persevered  in  her  union,  she  would  never 
have  worn  the  chains  of  Macedon;  and  might  have  proved  a 
barrier  to  the  vast  projects  of  Eome. 

The  Achaean  league,  as  it  is  called,  was  another  society  of 
Grecian  republics,  which  supplies  us  with  valuable  instruction. 

The  union  here  was  far  more  intimate,  and  its  organization 
much  wiser,  than  in  the  preceding  instance.  It  will  accordingly 
appear,  that  though  not  exempt  from  a  similar  catastrophe,  it 
by  no  means  equally  deserved  it. 

The  cities  composing  this  league,  retained  their  municipal 
jurisdiction,  appointed  their  own  officers,  and  enjoyed  a  perfect 
equality.  The  senate  in  which  they  were  represented,  had  the 
sole  and  exclusive  right  of  peace  and  war ;  of  sending  and  re- 
ceiving ambassadors ;  of  entering  into  treaties  and  alliances ;  of 
appointing  a  chief  magistrate  or  pretor,  as  he  w^as  called, — who 
commanded  their  armies;  and  who,  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  ten  of  the  senators,  not  only  administered  the  government 
in  the  recess  of  the  senate,  but  had  a  great  share  in  its  delibe- 
rations, ^vhen  assembled.  According  to  the  primitive  constitu- 
tion, there  were  two  pretors  associated  in  the  administration, 
but  on  trial,  a  single  one  was  preferred. 

It  appears  that  the  cities  had  all  the  same  laws  and  customs, 
the  same  weights  and  measures,  and  the  same  money.  But  how 
far  this  effect  proceeded  from  the  authority  of  the  federal  coun- 
cil, is  left  in  uncertainty.  It  is  said  only,  that  the  cities  were 
tn  a  manner  compelled  to  receive  the  same  laws  and  usages. 
"When  Lacedemon  was  brought  into  the  league,  by  Philopcemen, 
it  was  attended  with  an  abolition  of  the  institutions  and  laws 
of  Lycurgus,  and  an  adoption  of  those  of  the  Achseans.  The 
Amphyctionic  confederacy,  of  which  she  had  been  a  member, 
left  her  in  the  full  exercise  of  her  government  and  her  legisla- 
tion. This  circumstance  alone  proves  a  very  material  differ- 
ence in  the  genius  of  the  two  systems. 

It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  monuments  which  remain 


132  THE    FEDERALIST. 

of  this  curious  political  fabric  are  so  imperfect.  Could  its  inte- 
rior structure  and  regular  operation  be  ascertained,  it  is  pro- 
bable that  more  light  would  be  thrown  by  it  on  the  science  of 
federal  government,  than  by  any  of  the  like  experiments  with 
which  we  are  acquainted. 

One  important  fact  seems  to  be  witnessed  by  all  the  historians 
who.  take  notice  of  Achsean  affairs.  It  is,  that  as  well  after  the 
renovation  of  the  league  by  Aratus,  as  before  its  dissolution  by 
the  arts  of  Maeedon,  there  was  infinitely  more  of  moderation 
and  justice  in  the  administration  of  its  government,  and  less  of 
violence  and  sedition  in  the  people,  than  were  to  be  found  in  any 
of  the  cities  exercising  singly  all  the  prerogatives  of  sovereignty. 
The  abbe  Mably  in  his  observations  on  Greece,  says  that  the 
popular  government,  which  was  so  tempestuous  elsewhere, 
caused  no  disorders  in  the  members  of  the  Achaean  republic, 
because  it  was  there  *em,pered  by  the  general  authority  and  laws  of 
the  confeaerac-q. 

We  are  not  to  conclude  too  hastily,  however,  that  tiaction  did 
not  in  a  certain  degree  agitate  the  particular  cities;  much  less, 
that  a  due  subordination  and  harmony  reigned  in  the  general 
system.  The  contrary  is  sufficiently  displayed  in  the  vicissitudes 
and  fate  of  the  republic. 

Whilst  the  Amphyctionic  confederacy  remained,  that  of  the 
Achseans,  which  comprehended  the  less  important  cities  only, 
made  little  figure  on  the  theatre  of  Greece.  When  the  former 
became  a  victim  to  Maeedon,  the  latter  was  spared  by  the  policy 
of  Philip  and  Alexander.  Under  the  successors  of  these  princes, 
however,  a  different  policy  prevailed.  The  arts  of  division  wer^ 
practised  among  the  Achseans;  each  city  was  seduced  into  a 
separate  interest;  the  union  was  dissolved.  Some  of  the  cities 
fell  under  the  tyranny  of  Macedonian  garrisons :  others  und^r 
that  of  usurpers  springing  out  of  their  own  confusions.  Shame 
and  oppression  ere  long  awakened  their  love  of  liberty.  A  few 
cities  re-united.  Their  example  was  followed  by  others,  as 
opportunities  were  found  of  cutting  off  their  tyrants.  The 
league  soon  embraced  almost  the  whole  Peloponnesus.    Maeedon 


THE    FEDERALIST.  163 

Baw  its  progress;  but  "vv.  s  hindeiad  by  internal  dissentions  from 
stopping  it.  All  Greece  caught  the  enthusiasm,  and  seemed 
ready  to  unite  in  one  confoderaey,  when  the  jealousy  and  envy 
in  Sparta  and  Athens,  of  the  rising  glory  of  the  Achjeans,  threw 
a  fatal  damp  on  the  enterprise.  The  dread  of  the  Macedonian 
power  induced  the  league  to  court  the  alliance  )f  the  kings  of 
Egypt  and  Syria;  who,  as  successors  of  Alex;  ne'er,  were  rivals 
of  the  king  of  Macedon.  This  policy  was  defeated  by  Cleomenes. 
king  of  Sparta,  who  was  led  by  his  ambition  to  make  an  unpro- 
voked attack  on  his  neighbours  the  Achaeans;  and  who,  as  an 
enemy  to  Macedon,  had  interest  enough  with  th(!  Egyptian  and 
Syrian  princes,  to  effect  a  breach  of  their  engage  nents  with  the 
league.  The  Achaeans  were  now  reduced  to  thf  dilemma  of  suo- 
mitting  to  Cleomenes,  or  of  suppUcating  the  aid  of  Macedon, 
its  former  oppressor.  The  latter  expedient  wis  adopted.  The 
contest  of  the  Greeks  always  afforded  a  pleasiag  opportunity  to 
that  powerful  neighbour,  of  intermeddling  in  their  affairs.  A 
Macedonian  army  quickly  appeared :  Cleoin  mt  s  was  vanquished. 
The  Achaeans  soon  experienced,  as  often  happens,  that  a  victo- 
rious and  powerful  ally,  is  but  another  nume  for  a  master.  All 
that  their  most  abject  compliances  could  obtain  from  him,  was  a 
toleration  of  the  exercise  of  their  lawa.  Philip,  who  was  now 
on  the  throne  of  Macedon,  soon  provoked,  by  his  tyrannies,  fresh 
combinations  among  the  Greeks.  The  Ach;ef.ns,  though  weak- 
ened by  internal  dissentions,  and  by  the  re^  olt  of  Messene,  one 
of  its  members,  being  joined  by  the  Etolians  and  Athenians, 
erected  the  standard  of  opposition.  Findin  ;  themselves,  though 
thus  supported,  unequal  to  the  undertaking  they  once  more  had 
recourse  to  the  dangerous  expedient  of  inti educing  the  succour 
of  foreign  arms.  The  Eomans,  to  whoia  the  invitation  was 
made,  eagerly  embraced  it.  Philip  ^v&s  fonqiered:  Macedon 
subdued.  A  new  crisis  ensued  to  the  leagao.  L'ssentions  broke 
out  among  its  members.  These  the  Roraans  fostered.  Calli- 
crates,  and  other  popular  leaders,  became  mercenary  instruments 
for  inveigling  their  countrymen.  The  more  effectually  to 
nourish  discord  and  disorder,  the  Romans  nad,  to  the  astonish- 


164  THE    FEDERALIST. 

ment  of  those  who  confided  in  their  sincerity,  already  proclaimed 
universal  liberty*  throughout  Greece.  "With  the  same  insidious 
views,  they  now  seduced  the  members  from  the  league,  by 
representing  to  their  pride,  the  violation  it  committed  on  tlieir 
sovereignty.  By  these  arts,  this  union,  the  last  hope  of  Greece, 
the  last  hope  of  ancient  liberty,  was  torn  into  pieces;  and  such 
imbecility  and  distraction  introduced,  that  the  arms  of  Rome 
found  little  difficulty  in  completing  the  ruin  which  their  arts 
had  commenced.  The  Achteans  were  cut  to  pieces;  and  Achaia 
loaded  with  chains,  under  which  it  is  groaning  at  this  hour. 

1  have  thought  it  not  superfluous  to  give  the  outlines  of  this 
important  portion  of  history;  both  because  it  teaches  more  than 
one  lesson;  and  because,  as  a  supplement  to  the  outlines  of  the 
Achaean  constitution,  it  emphatically  illustrates  the  tendency  of 
federal  bodies,  rather  to  anarchy  among  the  members,  than  to 
tyraunv  in  the  head. 

PUBLIUS. 

*  This  vas  but  another  name  more  specious,  for  the  independence  of  th« 
members  on  the  federal  head 


THE   FEDERALIST.  165 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XIX. 


NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER   8,  1787. 


HAMILTON  AND  MADISON. 


THE   SUBJECT   CONTINUED,   WITH   FURTHER  EXAMPLES. 

The  examples  of  ancient  confederacies,  cited  in  my  last  paper 
have  not  exhausted  the  source  of  experimental  instruction  on 
this  subject.  There  are  existing  institutions,  founded  on  a 
similar  principle,  which  merit  particular  consideration.  The 
first  which  presents  itself  is  the  Germanic  body. 

In  the  early  ages  of  Christianity,  Germany  was  occupied  by 
seven  distinct  nations,  who  had  no  common  chief  The  Franks 
one  of  the  number,  having  conquered  the  Gauls,  established  the 
kingdom  which  has  taken  its  name  from  them.  In  the  ninth 
century,  Charlemagne,  its  warlike  monarch,  carried  his  victorious 
arms  in  every  direction ;  and  Germany  became  a  part  of  his  vast 
dominion*  On  the  dismemberment,  which  took  place  under 
his  sons,  this  part  was  erected  into  a  separate  and  independent 
empire.  Charlemagne  and  his  immediate  descendants  possessed 
the  reality,  as  well  as  the  ensigns  and  dignity  of  imperial 
power.  But  the  principal  vassals,  whose  fiefs  had  become 
hereditary,  and  who  composed  the  national  diets,  which  Charle 
magne  had  not  abolished,  gradually  threw  off  the  yoke,  and 
advanced  to  sovereign  jurisdiction  and  independence.  The  force 
of  imperial  sovereignty  was  insuflScient  to  restrain  sr  ch  power- 
ful dependants;  or  to  preserve  the  unity  and  tranquillity  of  the 


166  THE    FEDERALIST. 

empire.  The  most  furious  private  wars,  accompanied  with  every 
species  of  calamity,  were  carried  on  between  the  different  princes 
and  states.  The  imperial  authority,  unable  to  maintain  the 
public  order,  declined  by  degrees,  till  it  was  almost  extinct  in 
the  anarchy,  which  agitated  the  long  interval  between  the  death 
of  the  last  emperor  of  the  Suabian,  and  the  accession  of  the  first 
emperor  of  the  Austrian  lines.  In  the  eleventh  century,  the 
emperors  enjoyed  full  sovereignty:  In  the  fifteenth,  they  had 
little  more  than  the  symbols  and  decorations  of  power. 

Out  of  this  feudal  system,  which  has  itself  many  of  the  import- 
ant features  of  a  confederacy,  has  grown  the  federal  system, 
which  constitutes  the  Germanic  empire.  Its  powers  are  vested 
in  a  diet  representing  the  component  members  of  the  confede- 
racy; in  the  emperor  who  is  the  executive  magistrate,  with  a 
negative  on  the  decrees  of  the  diet;  and  in  the  imperial  cham- 
ber and  aulic  council,  two  judiciary  tribunals  having  supreme 
jurisdiction  in  controversies  which  concern  the  empire,  or  which 
happen  among  its  members. 

The  diet  possesses  the  general  power  of  legislating  for  the 
empire;  of  making  war  and  peace;  contracting  alliances;  assess- 
ing quotas  of  troops  and  money;  constructing  fortresses;  regu- 
lating coin;  admitting  new  members;  and  subjecting  disobedient 
\aembers  to  the  ban  of  the  empire,  by  which  the  party  is  degraded 
j[ix)m  his  sovereign  rights,  and  his  possessions  forfeited.  The 
members  of  the  confederacy  are  expressly  restricted  from  enter- 
ing into  compacts,  prejudicial  to  the  empire,  from  imposing  tolls 
and  duties  on  their  mutual  intercourse,  without  the  consent  of 
the  emperor  and  diet;  from  altering  the  value  of  money;  from 
doing  injustice  to  one  another;  or  from  affording  assistance  or 
retreat  to  disturbers  of  the  public  peace.  And  the  ban  is  de- 
nounced against  such  as  shall  violate  any  of  these  restrictions. 
The  members  of  the  diet,  as  such,  are  subject  in  all  cases  to  be 
judged  by  the  emperor  and  diet,  and  in  their  private  capacities, 
by  the  aulic  council  and  imperial  chamber. 

The  prerogatives  of  the  emperor  are  numerous  The  most 
.mportant  of  them  are,  his  exclusive  right  to  make  propositions 


THE    FEDERALIST.  167 

to  the  diet 3  to  negative  its  resolutions;  to  name  ambassadors; 
to  confer  dignities  and  titles;  to  fill  vacant  electorates;  to  found 
universities;  to  grant  privileges  not  injurious  to  the  states  of  the 
empire;  to  receive  and  apply  the  public  revenues;  and  generally 
to  watch  over  the  public  safety.  In  certain  cases,  the  electors 
form  a  council  to  him.  In  quality  of  emperor,  he  possesses  no 
territory  within  the  empire;  nor  receives  any  revenue  for  his 
support.  But  his  revenues  and  dominions,  in  other  qualities, 
constitute  him  one  of  the  most  powerful  princes  in  Europe. 

From  such  a  parade  of  constitutional  powers,  in  the  represen- 
tatives and  head  of  this  confederacy,  the  natural  supposition 
would  be,  that  it  must  form  an  exception  to  the  general  charac- 
ter which  belongs  to  its  kindred  systems. — Nothing  would  be 
farther  from  the  reality.  The  fundamental  principle,  on  which 
it  rests,  that  the  empire  is  a  community  of  sovereigns;  that  the 
diet  is  a  representation  of  sovereigns;  and  that  the  laws  are 
addressed  to  sovereigns;  renders  the  empire  a  nerveless  body; 
incapable  of  regulating  its  own  members;  insecure  against  ex- 
ternal dangers;  and  agitated  with  unceasing  fermentations  in 
its  own  bowels. 

The  history  of  Germany,  is  a  history  of  wars  between  the  em- 
peror and  the  princes  and  states;  of  wars  among  the  princes 
and  states  themselves;  of  the  licentiousness  of  the  strong,  and 
the  oppression  of  the  weak;  of  foreign  intrusions,  and  foreign 
intrigues;  of  requisitions  of  men  and  money  disregarded,  or 
partially  complied  with;  of  attempts"  to  enforce  them,  altogether 
abortive,  or  attended  with  slaughter  and  desolation,  involving 
the  innocent  with  the  guilty;  of  general  imbecility,  confusion, 
and  misery. 

In  the  sixteenth  century,  the  emperor,  witn  one  part  of  the 
empire  on  his  side,  was  seen  engaged  against  the  other  princes 
and  states.  In  one  of  the  conflicts,  the  emperor  himself  was  put 
tj  flight,  and  very  near  being  made  prisoner  by  the  elector  of 
Saxony.  The  late  king  of  Prussia  was  more  than  once  pitted 
again pt  his  imperial  sovereign;  and  commonly  proved  an  over- 
match for  him.     Controversies  and  wars  among  the  members 


168  THE   FEDERALIST. 

themselves,  have  been  so  common,  that  the  German  annals  are 
crowded  with  the  bloody  pages  which  describe  them.  Previous 
to  the  peace  of  Westphalia,  Germany  was  desolated  by  a  war 
of  thirty  years,  in  which  the  emperor,  with  one  half  of  the 
empire,  was  on  one  side;  and  Sweden,  with  the  other  half,  on 
the  opposite  side.  Peace  was  at  length  negociated,  and  dictated 
by  foreign  powers;  and  the  articles  of  it,  to  which  foreign 
powers  are  parties,  made  a  fundamental  part  of  the  Germanic 
constitution. 

If  the  nation  happens,  on  any  emergency,  to  be  more  united 
by  the  necessity  of  self-defence,  its  situation  is  still  deplorable. 
Military  preparations  must  be  preceded  by  so  many  tedious  dis- 
cussions, arising  from  the  jealousies,  pride,  separate  views,  and 
clashing  pretensions,  of  sovereign  bodies,  that  before  the  diet 
can  settle  the  arrangements,  the  enemy  are  in  the  field;  and 
before  the  federal  troops  are  ready  to  take  it,  are  retiring  into 
winter  quarters. 

The  small  body  of  national  troops,  which  has  been  judged 
necessary  in  time  of  peace,  is  defectively  kept  up,  badly  paid, 
infected  with  local  prejudices,,  and  supported  by  irregular  and 
disproportionate  contributions  to  the  treasury. 

The  impossibility  of  maintaining  order,  and  dispensing  justice 
among  these  sovereign  subjects,  produced  the  experiment  of 
dividing  the  empire  Into  nine  or  ton  circles  or  districts;  of 
giving  them  an  interior  organization;  and  of  charging  them 
with  the  military  execution* of  the  laws  against  delinquent  and 
contumacious  members.  This  experiment  has  only  served  to 
demonstrate  more  fully,  the  radical  vice  of  the  constitution. 
Each  circle  is  the  miniature  picture  of  the  deformities  of  this 
political  monster.  They  either  fail  to  execute  their  commis- 
sions, or  they  do  it  with  all  the  devastation  and  carnage  of  civil 
war.  Sometimes  whole  circles  are  defaulters;  and  then  they 
increase  the  mischief  which  they  were  instituted  tx)  remedy. 

We  may  form  some  judgment  of  this  scheme  of  military  coer- 
cion, from  a  sample  given  by  Thuanus.  in  Donawerth,  a  free 
and  imperial  city,  of  the  circle  -^f  Suabia,  the  abbe  de  St.  Croix 


THE    FEDERALIST.       '  169 

enjoyed  certain  immunities  which  had  been  reserved  to  him.  In 
the  exercise  of  these,  on  some  public  occasion,  outrages  were 
committed  on  him,  by  the  people  of  the  city.  The  consequence 
was,  that  the  city  was  put  under  the  ban  of  the  empire;  and  the 
duke  of  Bavaria,  though  director  of  another  circle,  obtained  an 
appointment  to  enforce  it.  He  soon  appeared  before  the  city, 
with  a  corps  of  ten  thousand  troops;  and  finding  it  a  fit  occa- 
sion, as  he  had  secretly  intended  from  the  beginning,  to  revive 
an  antiquated  claim,  on  the  pretext  that  his  ance?tors  had  suf- 
fered the  place  to  be  dismembered  from  his  territory;*  he  took 
possession  of  it  in  his  own  name;  disarmed  anci  punished  the 
inhabitants,  and  re-annexed  the  city  to  his  domains. 

It  may  be  asked,  perhaps,  what  has  so  lon^  kept  this  dis- 
jointed machine  from  falling  entirelj-  to  pieces?  The  answer 
is  obvious.  The  weakness  of  most  of  the  merabers,  who  are  un- 
willing to  expose  themselves  to  the  mercy  of  foreign  powers; 
the  weakness  of  most  of  the  principal  members,  compared  with 
the  formidable  powers  all  around  them;  the  vast  weight  and 
influence  which  the  emperor  derives  from  his  separate  and 
hereditary  dominions;  and  the  interest  he  feels  in  preserving  a 
system  with  which  his  family  pride  is  connected,  and  which 
constitutes  him  the  first  prince  in  Europe;  these  causes  support 
a  feeble  and  precarious  union ;  whilst  the  repellent  quality,  in- 
cident to  the  nature  of  sovereignty,  and  which  time  continually 
strengthens,  prevents  any  reform  whatever,  founded  on  a  pro- 
per consolidation.  Nor  is  it  to  be  imagined,  if  this  obstacle 
could  be  surmounted,  that  the  neighbouring  powers  would  sufi'er 
a  revolution  to  take  place,  which  would  give  to  the  empire  the 
force  and  pre-eminence  to  which  it  is  entitled.  Foreign  nations 
have  long  considered  themselves  as  interested  in  the  changes 
made  by  events  in  this  constitution;  and  have,  on  various  occa- 
sions, betrayed  their  policy  ot  perpetuating  its  anarchy  and 
weakness 

if  more  direct  examples  were  wanting,  Poland,  as  a  govern 

*  PfeflFel,  Nouvel  abreg.  chronol.  de  I'hist.  &c.  d'Allemagne,  says  the  pre- 
text vas  to  indemnify  himself  for  the  expense  of  the  expedition. 


170  •       THE    FEDERALIST. 

ment  over  local  sovereigns,  might  not  improperly  be  taken 
notice  of.  Nor  could  any  proof,  more  striking,  be  given  of  the 
calamities  flowing  from  such  institutions.— Equally  unfit  for  self- 
government,  and  self-defence,  it  has  long  been  at  the  mercy  of 
its  powerful  neighbours;  who  have  lately  had  the  mercy  to  dis- 
burden it  of  one  third  of  its  people  and  territories. 

The  connection  among  the  Swiss  cantons,  scarcely  amounts  to 
a  confederacy;  though  it  is  sometimes  cited  as  an  instance  of 
the  stability  of  such  institutions. 

They  have  no  common  treasury;  no  common  troops  even  in 
war;  no  common  coin;  no  common  judicatory,  nor  any  other 
common  mark  of  sovereignty. 

They  are  kept  together  by  the  peculiarity  of  their  topograph- 
ical position;  by  their  individual  weakness  and  insignificancy; 
by  the  fear  of  powerful  neighbours,  to  one  of  which  they  were 
formerly  subject;  by  the  few  sources  of  contention  among  a 
people  of  such  simple  and  homogeneous  manners;  by  their  joint 
interest  in  their  dependent  possessions;  by  the  mutual  aid  they 
stand  in  need  of,  for  suppressing  insurrections  and  rebellions; 
an  aid  expressly  stipulated,  aud  often  required  and  afforded; 
and  by  the  necessity  of  some  regular  aud  permanent  provision 
for  accommodating  disputes  among  the  cantons.  The  provision 
is,  that  the  parties  at  variance  shall  each  choose  four  judges  out 
of  the  neutral  cantons,  who,  in  case  of  disagreement,  choose  au 
umpire.  This  tribunal,  under  an  oath  of  impartiality,  pro- 
nounces definitive  sentence,  which  all  the  cantons  are  bound  to 
enforce.  The  competency  of  this  regulation  may  be  estimated 
by  a  clause  in  their  treaty  of  1683,  with  Victor  Amadeus  of 
Savoy ;  in  which  he  obliges  himself  to  interpose  as  mediator  in 
disputes  between  the  cantons;  and  to  employ  force,  if  necessary, 
against  the  contumacious  party 

So  far  as  the  peculiarity  of  their  case  will  admit  of  comparison 
with  that  of  the  United  States,  it  serves  to  confirm  the  principle 
intended  to  be  established.  Whatever  efficacy  the  union  may 
have  had  in  ordinary  cases,  it  appears  that  the  moment  a  cause 
of  difference  sprang  up,   capable  of  trying  its   strength,  it   failed. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  171 

The  controversies  on  the  subject  of  religion,  which  in  three 
instances  have  kindled  violent  and  bloody  contests,  may  be  said 
in  fact  to  have  severed  the  league.  The  Protestant  and  Catho- 
lic cantons,  have  since  had  their  separate  diets;  where  all  the 
most  important  concerns  are  adjusted,  and  which  have  left  tho 
general  diet  little  other  business  than  to  take  care  of  the  common 
bailages. 

That  separation  had  another  consequence,  which  merits  atten- 
tion.    It  produced  opposite  alliances  with  foreign  powers;  of 
3ern,  as  the  head  of  the  Protestant  association,  with  the  United 
'rovinces ;  and  of  Luzerne,  as  the  head  of  the  Catholic  associa. 
cion,  with  France 

PUBLIUS. 

12 


172  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XX. 


NEW    YORK,   DECEMBER    12,   1787. 


HAMILTON  AND  MADISON. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  WITH  FURTHER  EXAMPLES. 

The  United  Netherlands  are  a  confederacy  of  republics,  or 
rather  of  aristocracies,  of  a  very  remarkable  texture;  yet  con- 
firming all  the  lessons  derived  from  those  which  we  have  already 
reviewed. 

The  union  is  composed  of  seven  co-equal  and  sovereign  states,  and 
each  state  or  province  is  a  composition  of  equal  and  independent 
cities.  In  all  important  cases,  not  only  the  provinces,  but  the  cities, 
must  be  unanimous. 

The  sovereignty  of  the  union  is  represented  by  the  states 
general,  consisting  usually  of  about  fifty  deputies  appointed  by 
the  provinces.  They  hold  their  seats,  some  for  life,  some  for 
six,  three,  and  one  years  From  two  provinces  they  continue  in 
appointment  during  pleasure. 

The  states  general  have  authority  to  enter  into  treaties  and 
alliances;  to  make  war  and  peace;  to  raise  armies  and  equip 
fleets;  to  ascertain  quotas  and  demand  contributions.  In  all 
these  cases,  however,  unanimity  and  the  sanction  of  their  con- 
stituents are  requisite.  They  have  authority  to  appoint  and 
receive  ambassadors;  to  execute  treaties  and  alliances  already 
formed;  to  provide  for  the  collection  of  duties  on  imports  and 
exports;  to  regulate  the  mint,  with  a  saving  to  the  provincial 


THE    FEDERALIST.  173 

rights;  to  govern  as  sovereigns  the  dependent  territories.  The 
provinces  are  restrained,  unless  with  the  general  consent,  from 
entering  into  foreign  treaties; -from  establishing  imposts  inju- 
rious to  others,  or  charging  their  neighbours  with  higher  duties 
than  their  own  subjects.  A  council  of  state,  a  chamber  of 
accounts,  with  five  colleges  of  admiralty,  aid  and  fortify  the 
federal  administration. 

The  executive  magistrate  of  the  union  is  the  stadtholder,  who 
is  now  an  hereditary  prince.  His  principal  weight  and  influence 
in  the  republic  are  derived  from  his  independent  title;  from  his 
great  patrimonial  estates ;  from  his  family  connections  with 
some  of  the  chief  potentates  of  Europe;  and  more  than  all, 
perhaps,  from  his  being  stadtholder  in  the  several  provinces,  as 
well  as  for  the  union,  in  which  provincial  quality,  he  has  the 
appointment  of  town  magistrates  under  certain  regulations, 
executes  provincial  decrees,  presides  when  he  pleases  in  the 
provincial  tribunals;  and  has  throughout  the  power  of  pardon. 

As  stadtholder  of  the  union,  he  has,  however,  considerable 
prerogatives. 

In  his  political  capacity,  he  has  authority  to  settle  disputes 
between  the  provinces,  when  other  methods  fail;  to  assist  at 
the  deliberations  of  the  states  general,  and  at  their  particular 
conferences;  to  give  audience  to  foreign  ambassadors,  and  to 
keep  agents  for  his  particular  affairs  at  foreign  courts. 

In  his  military  capacity-,  he  commands  the  federal  troops; 
provides  for  garrisons,  and  in  general  regulates  military  affairs; 
•lisposes  of  all  appointments  from  colonels  to  ensigns,  and  of  the 
governments  and  posts  of  fortified  towns. 

In  his  marine  capacity,  he  is  admiral  general,  and  superintends 
and  directs  every  thing  relative  to  naval  forces,  and  other  naval 
affairs;  presides  in  the  admiralties  in  person  or  by  proxy;  ap- 
points lieutenant  admirals  and  other  officers;  and  establishes 
councils  of  war,  whose  sentences  are  not  executed  till  he  ap- 
proves them. 

His   revenue,  exclusive  of   his  private   income,  amounts   to 


174  THE    FEDERALIST. 

300,000  florins.  The  standing  army  which  he  commands  con- 
sists of  about  40,000  men. 

Such  is  the  nature  of  the  celebrated  Belgic  confederacy,  as 
delineated  on  parchment.  What  are  the  characters  which  prac- 
tice has  stampt  upon  it  ?  Imbecility  in  the  government ;  dis- 
cord among  the  provinces;  foreign  influence  and  indignities; 
a  precarious  existence  in  peace,  and  peculiar  calamities  from 
war. 

It  was  long  ago  remarked  by  Grotius,  that  nothing  but  the 
hatred  of  his  countrymen  to  the  house  of  Austria,  kept  them 
from  being  ruined  by  the  vices  of  their  constitution. 

The  union  of  Utrecht,  says  another  respectable  writer,  reposes 
an  authority  in  the  states  general,  seemingly  sufiicient  to  secure 
harmony,  but  the  jealousy  in  each  province  renders  the  practice 
very  different  from  the  theory. 

The  same  instrument,  says  another,  obliges  each  province  to 
levy  certain  contributions;  but  this  article  never  could,  and 
probably  never  will,  be  executed;  because  the  inland  provinces, 
who  have  little  commerce,  cannot  pay  an  equal  quota. 

In  matters  of  contribution,  it  is  the  practice  to  wave  the 
articles  of  the  constitution.  The  danger  of  delay  obliges  the 
consenting  provinces  to  furnish  their  quotas,  withot  ^  waiting 
for  the  others;  and  then  to  obtain  reimbursement  l.^om  the 
others,  by  deputations,  which  are  frequent,  or  otherwise,  as  they 
can.  The  great  wealth  and  influence  of  the  province  of  Holland, 
enable  her  to  effect  both  these  purposes. 

It  has  more  than  once  happened  that  the  deficiencies  have 
been  ultimately  to  be  collected  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet ;  a 
thing  practicable,  though  dreadful,  in  a  confederacy,  where  one 
of  the  members  exceeds  in  force  all  the  rest;  and  where  several 
of  them  are  too  small  to  meditate  resistance :  But  utterly  im- 
practicable in  one  composed  of  members,  several  of  which  are 
equal  to  each  other  in  strength  and  resources,  and  equal  singly 
to  a  vigorous  and  persevering  defence. 

Foreign  ministers,  says  Sir  William  Temple,  who  was  himself 


THE    FEDERALIST.  175 

a  foreign  minister,  elude  matters  taken  ad  referendum,  by  tarn 
pering  with  the  provinces  and  cities.  In  1726,  the  treaty  of 
Hanover  was  delayed  by  these  means  a  whole  year.  InstarceR 
of  a  like  nature  are  numerous  and  notorious. 

In  critical  emergencies,  the  states  general  are  often  compelled 
to  overleap  their  constitutional  bounds.  In  1688,  they  concluded 
a  treaty  of  themselves,  at  the  risk  of  their  heads.  The  treaty  of 
Westphalia  in  1648,  by  which  their  independence  was  formally 
and  finally  recognized,  was  concluded  without  the  consent  of 
Zealand.  Even  as  recently  as  the  last  treaty  of  peace  with  Great 
Britain,  the  constitutional  principle  of  unanimity  was  departed 
from.  A  weak  constitution  must  necessarily  terminate  in  disso- 
lution, for  want  of  proper  powers,  or  from  the  usurpation  of 
powers  requisite  for  the  public  safety.  "Whether  the  usurpation, 
when  once  begun,  will  stop  at  the  salutary  point,  or  go  forward 
to  the  dangerous  extreme,  must  depend  on  the  contingencies  of 
the  moment.  Tyranny  has  perhaps  oftener  grown  out  of  the 
assumptions  of  power,  called  for,  on  pressing  exigencies,  by  a 
defective  constitution,  than  out  of  the  full  exercise  of  the  largest 
constitutional  authorities. 

Notwithstanding  the  calamities  produced  by  the  stadtholder- 
ship,  it  has  been  supposed,  that  without  his  influence  in  the 
individual  provinces,  the  causes  of  anarchy  manifest  in  the  con- 
federacy, would  long  ago  have  dissolved  it.  "  Under  such  a 
government,  says  the  abbe  Mably,  the  union  could  never  have 
subsisted,  if  the  provinces  had  not  a  spring  within  themselves, 
capable  of  quickening  their  tardiness,  and  compelling  them  to 
the  same  way  of  thinking.  This  spring  is  the  stadtholder." 
ft  is  remarked  by  Sir  William  Temple,  "  that  in  the  intermis. 
sions  of  the  stadtholdership,  Holland,  by  her  riches  and  her 
authority,  which  drew  the  others  into  a  sort  of  dependence,  sup- 
plied the  place." 

These  are  not  the  only  circumstances  which  have  controlled 
the  tendency  to  anarchy  and  dissolution.  The  surrounding 
powers  impose  an  absolute  necessity  of  union  to  a  certain  d©^ 


176  THE    FEDERALIST. 

gree,  at  the  same  time  that  thej'^  nourish,  bj  their  intrigues,  the 
constitutional  vices,  which  keep  the  republic  in  some  measure 
always  at  their  mercy. 

The  true  patriots  have  long  bewailed  the  fatal  operation  of 
these  vices,  and  have  made  no  less  than  four  regular  experi- 
ments by  extraordinary  assemblies,  convened  for  the  special  pur- 
pose, to  apply  a  remedy.  As  many  times,  has  their  laudable 
zeal  found  it  impossible  to  unite  the  public  councils  in  reforming 
the  known,  the  acknowledged,  the  fatal  evils  of  the  existing 
constitution.  Let  us  pause,  my  fellow-citizens,  for  one  moment, 
over  this  melancholy  and  monitory  lesson  of  history;  and  with 
the  tear  that  drops  for  the  calamities  brought  on  mankind  by 
their  adverse  opinions  and  selfish  passions,  let  our  gratitude 
mingle  an  ejaculation  to  Heaven,  for  the  propitious  concord 
which  has  distinguished  the  consultations  for  our  political 
happiness. 

A  design  was  also  conceived,  of  establishing  a  general  tax  to 
be  administered  by  the  federal  authority.  This  also  had  its 
adversaries  and  failed. 

This  unhappy  people  seem  to  be  now  suflfering,  from  popular 
convulsions,  from  dissentions  among  the  states,  and  from  the 
actual  invasion  of  foreign  arms,  the  crisis  of  their  destiny.  All 
nations  have  their  eyes  fixed  on  the  awful  spectacle.  The  first 
wish  prompted  by  humanity  is,  that  this  severe  trial  may  issue 
in  such  a  revolution  of  their  government,  as  will  establish  their 
union,  and  render  it  the  parent  of  tranquillity,  freedom,  and 
happiness :  The  next,  that  the  asylum  under  which,  we  trust, 
the  enjoyment  of  these  blessings  will  speedily  be  secured  in  this 
country,  may  receive  and  console  them  for  the  catastrophe  of 
their  own. 

I  make  no  apology  for  having  dwelt  so  long  on  the  contem- 
plation of  these  federal  precedents.  Experience  is  the  oracle 
of  truth ;  and  where  its  responses  are  unequivocal,  they  ought 
to  be  conclusive  and  sacred.  The  important  truth,  which  it  un- 
equivocally pronounces  in  the  present  case,  is,  that  a  sovereignty 


THE    FEDERALIST.  177 

over  sovereigns,  a  government  over  governments,  a  legislation 
for  communities,  as  contradistinguished  from  individuals ;  as  it 
is  a  solecism  in  theory,  so  in  practice,  it  is  subversive  of  the 
order  and  ends  of  civil  polity,  by  substituting  violence  in  the 
place  of  law,  or  the  destructive  coercion  of  the  sword,  in  the  place 
of  the  mild  and  salutary  coercion  of  the  magistracy. 

PUBLIUS. 


178  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXI. 


NEW  YORK,  DECEMBER  12,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


FURTHER   DEFECTS   OF  THE   PRESENT  CONSTITUTION. 

Having  in  the  three  last  numbers  taken  a  summary  review 
of  the  principal  circumstances  and  events,  which  depict  the 
genius  and  fate  of  other  confederate  governments ;  I  shall  now 
proceed  in  the  enumeration  of  the  most  important  of  those  de- 
fects, which  have  hitherto  disappointed  our  hopes  from  the 
system  established  among  ourselves.  To  form  a  safe  and  satis- 
factory judgment  of  the  proper  remedy,  it  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary that  we  should  be  well  acquainted  with  the  extent  and 
malignity  of  the  disease. 

The  next  most  palpable  defect  of  the  existing  confederation, 
is  the  total  want  of  a  sanction  to  its  laws.  The  United  States, 
as  now  composed,  have  no  power  to  exact  obedience,  or  punish 
diaobedience  to  their  resolutions,  either  by  pecuniary  mulcts,  by 
a  suspension  or  divestiture  of  privileges,  or  by  any  other  con- 
stitutional means.  There  is  no  express  delegation  of  authority 
to  them  to  use  force  against  delinquent  members ,;  and  if  such  a 
right  should  be  ascribed  to  the  federal  head,  as  resulting  from 
-.he  nature  of  the  social  compact  between  the  states,  it  must  be 
tv  inference  and  construction,  in  the  face  of  that  part  of  the 
Bt  c  end  article,  by  which  it  is  declared,  "  that  each  state  shall 
rrUin  every  power,  jurisdiction,  and  right,  not  expressly  dele- 


THE   FEDERALIST.  17^ 

gated  to  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled."  The  warn 
of  such  a  right  involves,  no  doubt,  a  striking  absurdity ;  but  we 
are  reduced  to  the  dilemma,  either  of  supposing  that  deficiency, 
preposterous  as  it  may  seem,  or  of  contravening  or  explaining 
away  a  provision,  which  has  been  of  late  a  repeated  theme  of 
the  euloi^ies  of  those  who  oppose  the  new  constitution ;  and  the 
omission  of  which,  in  that  plan,  has  been  the  subject  of  much 
plausible  animadversion,  and  severe  criticism.  If  we  are  un- 
willing to  impair  the  force  of  this  applauded  provision,  we  shall 
be  obliged  to  conclude,  that  the  United  States  afford  the  extra- 
ordinary spectacle  of  a  government,  destitute  even  of  the  shadow 
of  constitutional  power,  to  enforce  the  execution  of  its  own  laAvs. 
It  will  appear,  from  the  specimens  which  have  been  cited,  that 
the  American  confederacy,  in  this  particular,  stands  discrimi- 
nated from  every  other  institution  of  a  similar  kind,  and  exhibits 
a  new  and  unexampled  phenomenon  in  the  political  world. 

The  want  of  £  mutual  guarantee  of  the  state  governments,  is 
another  capital  imperfection  in  the  federal  plan.  There  is 
nothing  of  this  kind  declared  in  the  articles  that  compose  it : 
and  to  imply  a  tacit  guarantee  from  considerations  of  utility 
would  be  a  still  more  flagrant  departure  from  the  clause  which 
has  been  mentioned,  than  to  imply  a  tacit  power  of  coercion, 
from  the  like  considerations.  The  want  of  a  guarantee,  though 
it  might  in  its  consequences  endanger  the  union,  does  not  so  im- 
mediately attack  its  existence,  as  the  want  of  a  constitutional 
sanction  to  its  laws. 

Without  a  guarantee,  the  assistance  to  be  derived  from  the 
union,  in  repelling  those  domestic  dangers,  which  eg  ay  some- 
times threaten  the  existence  of  the  state  constitutions,  must  be 
renounced.  Usurpation  may  rear  its  crest  in  each  state,  and 
trample  upon  the  liberties  of  the  people;  while  the  national 
government  could  legally  do  nothing  more  than  behold  its  en- 
croachments with  indignation  and  regret.  A  successful  faction 
may  erect  a  tyranny  on  the  ruins  of  order  sxnd  law,  while  no 
succour  could  constitutionally  be  aflfbrded  by  the  union  to  the 
friends  and  supporters  of  the  government,     '.^he  tempestuous 


180  THE    FEDERALIST. 

Bitualion,  from  -which  Massachusetts  has  scarcely  emerged, 
evinces,  that  dangers  of  this  kind  are  not  merely  speculative. 
Who  can  determine  wha'.  might  have  been  the  issue  of  her  late 
convulsions,  if  the  mal-contents  had  been  headed  by  a  Ccesar  or 
by  a  Cromwell  ?  "Who  can  predict  what  effect  a  despotism, 
established  in  Massachusetts,  would  have  upon  the  liberties  of 
New-Hampshire  or  Ehode-Island ;  of  Connecticut  or  New- York  ? 

The  inordinate  pride  of  state  importance,  has  suggested  to 
some  minds  an  objection  to  the  principle  of  a  guarantee  in  the 
federal  government;  as  involving  an  oflScious  interference  in 
the  domestic  concerns  of  the  members.  A  scruple  of  this  kind 
would  deprive  us  of  one  of  the  principal  advantages  to  be  ex- 
pected from  union  j  and  can  only  flow  from  a  misapprehension 
of  the  nature  of  the  provision  itself.  It  could  be  no  impedi- 
ment to  reforms  of  the  state  constitutions  by  a  majority  of  the 
people  in  a  legal  and  peaceable  mode.  This  right  would  remain 
undiminished.  The  guarantee  could  only  operate  against 
changes  to  be  effected  by  violence.  Towards  the  prevention 
of  calamities  of  this  kind,  too  many  checks  cannot  be  provided. 
The  peace  of  society,  and  the  stability  of  government,  depend 
absolutely  on  the  efficacy  of  the  precautions  adopted  on  this 
head.  Where  the  whole  power  of  the  government  is  in  the 
hands  of  the  people,  there  is  the  loss  pretence  for  the  use  of 
violent  remedies,  in  partial  or  occasional  distempers  of  the 
state.  The  natural  cure  for  an  ill  administration,  in  a  popular 
or  representative  constitution,  is,  a  change  of  men.  A  guaran- 
tee by  the  national  authority,  would  be  as  much  directed  against 
the  usurpations  of  rulers,  as  against  the  ferments  and  outrages 
of  faction  and  sedition  in  the  community. 

The  principle  of  regulating  the  contributions  of  the  states  to 
the  common  treasury  by  quotas,  is  another  fundamental  error 
in  the  confederation.  Its  repugnancy  to  an  adequate  supply  of 
the  national  exigencies,  has  been  already  pointed  out,  and  has 
sufficiently  appeared  from  the  trial  which  has  been  made  of  it. 
I  speak  of  it  now  solely,  with  a  view  to  equality  among  the 
states.     Those  who  have  been  accustomed  to  contemplate  the 


THE    FEDEHALIST.  181 

Circumstances,  which  produce  and  constitute  national  wealth, 
must  be  satisfied  that  there  is  no  common  standara,  or  barome- 
ter, by  which  the  degrees  of  it  can  be  ascertained.  Neither  the 
value  of  lands,  nor  the  numbers  of  the  people,  which  have  been 
successively  proposed  as  the  rule  of  state  contributions,  has  any 
pretension  to  being  a  just  representative.  If  we  compare  the 
wealth  of  the  United  Netherlands  with  that  of  Russia  or  Ger- 
many, or  even  of  France;  and  if  we  at  the  same  time  compare 
the  total  value  of  the  lands,  and  the  aggregate  population  of 
the  contracted  territory  of  that  republic,  with  the  total  value  of 
the  lands,  and  the  aggregate  population  of  the  immense  regions 
of  either  of  those  kingdoms,  we  shall  at  once  discover,  that  there 
is  no  comparison  between  the  proportion  of  either  of  these  two 
objects,  and  that  of  the  relative  wealth  of  those  nations.  If  the 
like  parallel  were  to  be  run  between  several  of  the  American 
states,  it  would  furnish  a  like  result.  Let  Virginia  be  contrasted 
with  North-Carolina,  Pennsylvania  with  Connecticut,  or  Mary- 
land with  New-Jersey,  and  we  shall  be  convinced  that  the  re- 
spective abilities  of  those  states,  in  relation  to  revenue,  bear 
little  or  no  analogy  to  their  comparative  stock  in  lands,  or  to 
their  comparative  population.  The  position  may  be  equally 
illustrated,  by  a  similar  process  between  the  counties  of  the 
same  state.  No  man  acquainted  with  the  state  of  New- York 
will  doubt,  that  the  active  wealth  of  King's  county  bears  a 
much  greater  proportion  to  that  of  Montgomery,  than  it  would 
appear  to  do,  if  we  should  take  either  the  total  value  of  the 
lands,  or  the  total  numbers  of  the  people  as  a  criterion. 

The  wealth  of  nations  depends  upon  an  infinite  variety  of 
causes.  Situation,  soil,  climate,  the  nature  of  the  productions, 
the  nature  of  the  government,  the  genius  of  the  citizens ;  the 
degree  of  information  they  possess ;  the  state  of  commerce,  of 
arts,  of  industry  ;  these  circumstances,  and  many  more  too  com- 
plex, minute,  or  adventitious,  to  admit  of  a  particular  specifica- 
tion, occasion  differences  hardly  conceivable  in  the  relative  opu- 
lence and  riches  of  diflferent  countries.  The  consequence  clearly 
>8,  tnal  mere  can  bo  no  common  measure  of  national  wealth  ; 


182  THE    FEDERALIST. 

and  of  course,  no  general  or  stationary  rule,  by  which  the 
ability  of  a  state  to  pay  taxes  can  be  determined.  The  attempt, 
therefore,  to  regulate  the  contributions  of  the  members  of  a 
confederacy,  by  any  such  rule,  cannot  fail  to  be  productive  of 
glaring  inequality,  and  extreme  oppression. 

This  inequality  would  of  itself  be  sufficient  in  America  to 
work  the  eventual  destruction  of  the  union,  if  any  mode  of 
enforcing  a  compliance  with  its  requisitions  could  be  devised. 
The  suflfering  states  would  not  long  consent  to  remain  associated 
upon  a  principle  which  distributed  the  public  burthens  with  so 
unequal  a  hand;  and  which  was  calculated  to  impoverish  and 
oppress  the  citizens  of  some  states,  while  those  of  others  would 
scarcely  be  conscious  of  the  small  proportion  of  the  weight  they 
were  required  to  sustain.  This,  however,  is  an  evil  inseparable 
from  the  principle  of  quotas  and  requisitions. 

There  is  no  method  of  steering  clear  of  this  inconvenience, 
but  by  authorizing  the  national  government  to  raise  its  own 
revenues  in  its  own  way.  Imposts,  excises,  and  in  general  all 
duties  upon  articles  of  consumption,  may  be  compared  to  a  fluid, 
which  will  in  time  find  its  level  with  the  means  of  paying  them. 
The  amount  to  be  contributed  by  each  citizen  will  in  a  degree 
be  at  his  own  option,  and  can  be  regulated  by  an  attention  to 
his  resources.  The  rich  may  be  extravagant,  the  poor  can  be 
frugal.  And  private  oppression  may  always  be  avoided,  by  a 
judicious  selection  of  objects  proper  for  such  impositions.  If 
inequalities  should  arise  in  some  states  from  duties  on  particular 
objects,  these  will,  in  all  probability,  be  counterbalanced  by 
proportional  inequalities  in  other  states,  from  the  duties  on 
other  objects.  In  the  course  of  time  and  things,  an  equilibrium, 
as  far  as  it  is  attainable,  in  so  complicated  a  subject,  will  be 
established  every  where.  Or  if  inequalities  should  still  exist, 
they  would  neither  be  so  great  in  their  degree,  so  uniform  in 
their  operation,  nor  so  odious  in  their  appearance,  as  those  which 
would  necessarily  spring  from  quotas,  upon  any  scale  that  can 
possibly  be  devised. 

It  is  a  signal  advantage  of  taxes  on  articles  of  consumption, 


THE    FEDERALIST.  183 

tbat  they  contain  in  their  own  nature  a  security  against  excess 
They  prescribe  their  own  limit;  which  cannot  he  exceeded  with- 
out defeating  the  end  proposed — that  is,  an  extension  of  the 
revenue.  When  applied  to  this  object,  the  saying  is  as  just  as 
it  is  witty,  that  "in  political  arithmetic,  two  and  two  do  not 
always  make  four."  If  duties  are  too  high,  they  lessen  the 
consumption — the  collection  is  eluded;  and  the  product  to  the 
treasury  is  not  so  great  as  when  they  are  confined  within  proper 
and  moderate  bounds. 

This  forms  a  complete  barrier  against  any  material  oppression 
of  the  citizens,  by  taxes  of  this  class,  and  is  itself  a  natural 
limitation  of  the  power  of  imposing  them. 

Impositions  of  this  kind  usually  fall  under  the  denomination 
of  indirect  taxes,  and  must  for  a  long  time  constitute  the  chief 
part  of  the  revenue  raised  in  this  country.  Those  of  the  direct 
kind,  which  principally  relate  to  lands  and  buildings,  may 
admit  of  a  rule  of  apportionment.  Either  the  value  of  land, 
or  the  number  of  the  people  may  serve  as  a  standard.  The 
state  of  agriculture,  and  the  populousness  of  a  country,  are 
considered  as  having  a  near  relation  to  each  other.  And  as  a 
rule  for  the  purpose  intended,  numbers  in  the  view  of  simplicity 
and  certainty,  are  entitled  to  a  preference.  In  every  country  it 
is  an  Herculean  task  to  obtain  a  valuation  of  the  land;  in  a 
country  imperfectly  settled  and  progressive  in  improvement, 
the  difficulties  are  increased  almost  to  impracticability.  The 
expense  of  an  accurate  valuation,  is  in  all  situations  a  formidable 
objection.  In  a  branch  of  taxation  where  no  limits  to  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  government  are  to  be  found  in  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  the  establishment  of  a  fixed  rule,  not  incompatible  with 
the  end,  may  be  attended  with  fewer  inconveniences  than  to 
leave  that  discretion  altogether  at  large. 

PUBLIUS 


lai 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XXII. 


NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER  15,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME  SUBJECT   CONTINUED,   AND  CONCLUDED. 

In  addition  to  the  defects  of  the  existing  federal  system, 
enumerated  in  the  last  number,  there  are  others  of  not  less 
mportance,  which  concur  in  rendering  that  system  altogether 
unfit  for  the  administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  union. 

The  want  of  a  power  to  regulate  commerce,  is  by  all  parties 
allowed  to  be  of  the  number.  The  utility  of  such  a  power  has 
been  anticipated  under  the  first  head  of  our  inquiries ;  and  for 
this  reason,  as  well  as  from  the  universal  conviction  entertained 
upon  the  subject,  little  need  be  added  in  this  place.  It  is  indeed 
evident,  on  the  most  superficial  view,  that  there  is  no  object, 
either  as  it  respects  the  interests  of  trade  or  finance,  that  more 
strongly  demands  a  federal  superintendance.  The  want  of  it 
has  already  operated  as  a  bar  to  the  formation  of  beneficial 
treaties  with  foreign  powers;  and  has  given  occasions  of  dissatis- 
faction between  the  states.  No  nation  acquainted  with  tho 
nature  of  our  political  association  would  be  unwise  enough  to 
enter  into  stipulations  with  the  United  States,  conceding  on 
their  part  privileges  of  importance,  while  they  were  apprised 
that  the  engagements  on  the  part  of  the  union,  might  at  any 
moment  be  violated  by  its  members;  and  while  they  found,  from 
experience,  that  they  might  enjoy  every  advantage  they  desired 


THE    FEDERALIST.  186 

in  our  markets,  without  granting  us  any  return,  but  such  as 
their  momentary  convenience  might  suggest.  It  is  not  there- 
fore to  be  wondered  at,  that  Mr.  Jenkinson,  in  ushering  into  the 
house  of  commons  a  bill  for  regulating  the  temporary  inter- 
course between  the  two  countries,  should  preface  its  introduction 
by  a  declaration,  that  similar  provisions  in  former  bills  had  been 
found  to  answer  every  purpose  to  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain, 
and  that  it  would  be  prudent  to  persist  in  the  plan  until  it  should 
appear  whether  the  American  government  was  likely  or  not  to 
acquire  greater  consistency.* 

Several  states  have  endeavoured,  by  separate  prohibitions, 
restrictions,  and  exclusions,  to  influence  the  conduct  of  that 
kingdom  in  this  particular;  but  the  want  of  concert,  arising 
from  the  want  of  a  general  authority,  and  from  clashing  and  dis- 
similar views  in  the  states,  has  hitherto  frustrated  every  experi- 
ment of  the  kind;  and  will  continue  to  do  so,  as  long  as  the  same 
obstacles  to  an  uniformity  of  measures  continue  to  exist. 

The  interfering  and  unneighbourly  regulations  of  some  states, 
contrary  to  the  true  spirit  of  the  union,  have,  in  different 
instances,  given  just  cause  of  umbrage  and  complaint  to  others; 
and  it  is  to  be  feared  that  examples  of  this  nature,  if  not  re- 
strained by  a  national  control,  would  be  multiplied  and  extended 
till  they  became  not  less  serious  sources  of  animosity  and  discord, 
than  injurious  impediments  to  the  intercourse  between  the  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  confederacy.  "  The  commerce  of  the  German 
empire,!  is  in  continual  trammels,  from  the  multiplicity  of  the 
duties  which  the  several  princes  and  states  exact  upon  the  mer- 
chandizes passing  through  their  territories ;  by  means  of  which 
the  fine  streams  and  navigable  rivers  with  which  Germany  is  so 
happily  watered,  are  rendered  almost  useless."  Though  the 
genius  of  the  people  of  this  country  might  never  permit  this 
description  to  be  strictly  applicable  to  us,  yet  we  may  reason- 
ably expect,  from  the  gradual  conflicts  of  state  regulations,  that 

*  This,  as  nearly  as  I  can  recollect,  wan  the  sense  of  this  speech  on  intro> 
ducing  the  laat  bill. 

+  Encyclopedia,  article  Empire. 


186  THE   FEDERALIST. 

the  citizens  of  each,  would  at  lengjth  come  to  be  considered  and 
treated  by  the  others  in  no  better  light  than  that  of  foreigners 
and  aliens. 

The  power  of  raising  armies,  by  the  most  ob^*  ois  construc- 
tion of  the  articles  of  the  confederation,  is  mer  ly  a  power  of 
making  requisitions  upon  the  states  for  quotas  of  men.  This 
practice,  in  the  course  of  the  late  war,  was  fouj  d  replete  with 
obstructions  to  a  vigorous,  and  to  an  economics  I  system  of  de- 
fence. It  gave  birth  to  a  competition  between  the  states,  which 
created  a  kind  of  auction  for  men.  In  order  to  furnish  the 
quotas  required  of  them,  they  outbid  each  other,  till  bounties 
grew  to  an  enormous  and  insupportable  size.  The  hope  of  a 
still  further  increase,  afforded  an  inducement  to  those  who  were 
disposed  to  serve,  to  procrastinate  their  enlistment;  and  dis- 
inclined them  from  engaging  for  any  considerable  periods. 
Hence  slow  and  scanty  levies  of  men,  in  the  most  critical 
emergencies  of  our  affairs — short  enlistments  at  an  unparalleled 
expense — continual  fluctuations  in  the  troops,  ruinous  to  their 
discipline,  and  subjecting  the  public  safety  frequently  to  the 
perilous  crisis  of  a  disbanded  army.  Hence  also,  those  oppress- 
ive expedients  for  raising  men,  which  were  upon  several  occa- 
sions practised,  and  which  nothing  but  the  enthusiasm  of  liberty, 
would  have  induced  the  people  to  endure. 

This  method  of  raising  troops,  is  not  more  unfriendly  to 
economy  and  vigour,  than  it  is  to  an  equal  distribution  of  the 
burthen.  The  states  near  the  seat  of  war,  influenced  by  motives 
of  self-preservation,  made  efforts  to  furnish  their  quotas,  which 
even  exceeded  their  abilities,  while  those  at  a  distance  from 
danger  were,  for  the  most  part,  as  remiss  as  the  others  were 
diligent,  in  their  exertions.  The  immediate  pressure  of  this 
inequality,  was  not,  in  this  case,  as  in  that  of  the  contributions 
of  money,  alleviated  by  the  hope  of  a  final  liquidation.  The 
states  which  did  not  pay  their  proportions  of  money,  might 
at  least  be  charged  with  their  deficiencies;  but  no  account  could 
be  formed  of  the  deficiencies  in  the  supplies  of  men.  We  shall 
not,  however,  see  much  reason  to  regret  the  want  of  this  hope, 


THE    FEDERALIST.  i87 

when  we  consider  how  little  prospect  ther'^  Is,  that  the  most 
delinquent  states  ever  will  be  able  to  make  compensation  for 
their  pecuniary  failures.  The  system  of  quotas  and  requisitions, 
whether  it  be  applied  to  men  or  money,  is,  in  every  view,  a 
system  of  imbecility  in  the  union,  and  of  inequality  and  injustice 
a'nong  the  members. 

The  right  of  equal  suffrage  among  the  states,  is  another  ex- 
ceptionable part  of  the  confederation.  Every  idea  of  propor- 
tion, and  every  rule  of  fair  representation,  conspire  to  condemn 
a  principle,  which  gives  to  Ehode-Island  an  equal  weight  in  the 
pale  of  power  with  Massachusetts,  or  Connecticut,  or  New- 
/ork ;  and  to  Delaware,  an  equal  voice  in  the  national  delibera- 
tions with  Pennsylvania,  or  Virginia,  or  North-Carolina.  Its 
ojioration  contradicts  that  fundamental  maxim  of  republican 
government,  which  requires  that  the  sense  of  the  majority 
should  prevail.  Sophistry  may  reply,  that  sovereigns  are  equal, 
and  that  a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the  states,  will  be  a  majority 
of  confederated  America.  But  this  kind  of  logical  legerdemain, 
will  never  counteract  the  plain  suggestions  of  justice  and 
common  sense.  It  may  happen,  that  this  majority  of  states  is  a 
small  minority  of  the  people  of  America  ;*  and  two  thirds  of  the 
people  of  America,  could  not  long  be  persuaded,  upon  the  credit 
of  artificial  distinctions  and  syllogistic  subtleties,  to  submit 
their  interests  to  the  management  and  disposal  of  one  third. 
The  larger  states  would,  after  a  while,  revolt  from  the  idea  of 
receiving  the  law  from  the  smaller.  To  acquiesce  in  such  a 
privation  of  their  due  importance  in  the  political  scale,  would 
be,  not  merely  to  be  insensible  to  the  love  of  power,  but  even 
to  sacrifice  the  desire  of  equality.  It  is  neither  rational  to 
expect  the  first,  nor  just  to  require  the  last :  Considering  how 
peculiarly  the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  smaller  states  depend 
on  union,  they  ought  readily  to  renounce  a  pretension,  which, 
if  not  relinquished,  would  prove  fatal  to  its  duration. 

*  New-Hampshire,  Rhode-Island,  New-Jersey,  Delaware,  Georgia,  South- 
Carolina,  and  Maryland,  are  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  the  States,  but 
\hey  do  not  contain  one  third  of  the  people. 

23 


188  THE   FEDERALIST. 

It  may  be  objected  to  this,  that  not  seven,  but  nine  states,  or 
two  thirds  of  the  whole  number,  must  consent  to  the  most 
important  resolutions ;  and  it  may  be  thence  inferred,  that  nine 
states  would  always  comprehend  a  majority  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  union.  But  this  does  not  obviate  the  impropriety  of  an 
equal  vote,  between  states  of  the  most  unequal  dimensions  and 
populousness;  nor  is  the  inference  accurate  in  point  of  fact;  for 
we  can  enumerate  nine  states,  which  contain  less  than  a  ma- 
jority of  the  people;*  and  it  is  constitutionally  possible,  that 
these  nine  may  give  the  vote.  Besides,  there  are  matters  of 
considerable  moment  determinable  by  a  bare  majority;  and 
there  are  others,  concerning  which  doubts  have  been  entertained, 
which,  if  interpreted  in  favour  of  the  sufficiency  of  a  vote  of 
seven  states,  would  extend  its  operation  to  interests  of  the  first 
magnitude.  In  addition  to  this,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  there 
is  a  probability  of  an  increase  in  the  number  of  states,  and  no 
provision  for  a  proportional  augmentation  of  the  ratio  of  votes. 

But  this  is  not  all;  what  at  first  sight,  may  seem  a  remedy, 
is,  in  reality,  a  poison.  To  give  a  minority  a  negative  upon 
the  majority,  which  is  always  the  case,  where  more  than  a  ma- 
jority is  requisite  to  a  decision,  is,  in  its  tendency,  to  subject  the 
sense  of  the  greater  number  to  that  of  the  lesser.  Congress,  from 
the  non-attendance  of  a  few  states,  have  been  frequently  in  the 
situation  of  a  Polish  diet,  where  a  single  veto  has  been  suffi- 
cient to  put  a  stop  to  all  their  movements.  A  sixtieth  part  of 
the  union,  which  is  about  the  proportion  of  Delaware  and  Rhode- 
Island,  has  several  times  been  able  to  oppose  an  entire  bar  to  ita 
operations.  This  is  one  of  those  refinements,  which,  in  practice, 
has  an  effect  the  reverse  of  what  is  expected  from  it  in  theory. 
The  necessity  of  unanimity  in  public  bodies,  or  of  something 
approaching  towards  it,  has  been  founded  upon  a  supposition 
that  it  would  contribute  to  security.  But  its  real  operation  is, 
to  embarrass  the  administration,  to  destroy  the  energy  of  gov- 
ernment, and  to  substitute  the  pleasure,  caprice,  or  artifices  of  an 

*  Add  New-York  and  Connecticut  to  the  foregoing  seven,  And  they  will  still 
be  less  than  a  majority. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  189 

insignificant,  turbulent,  or  corrupt  junto,  to  the  re^^utar  de- 
liberations and  decisions  of  a  respectable  majority.  In  those 
emergencies  of  a  nation,  in  which  the  goodness  or  badness,  the 
weakness  or  strength  of  its  government,  is  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance, there  is  commonly  a  necessity  for  action.  The  public 
business  must,  in  some  way  or  other,  go  forward.  If  a  perti- 
nacious minority  can  control  the  opinion  of  a  majority,  respect- 
ing the  best  mode  of  conducting  it,  the  majority,  in  order  that 
something  may  be  done,  must  conform  to  the  views  of  the  mi- 
nority; and  thus  the  sense  of  the  smaller  number,  will  over-rule 
that  of  the  greater,  and  give  a  tone  to  the  national  proceedings. 
Hence  tedious  delays;  continual  negociation  and  intrigue;  con- 
temptible compromises  of  the  public  good.  And  yet,  in  such  a 
system,  it  is  even  fortunate  when  such  compromises  can  take 
place  :  For,  upon  some  occasions,  things  will  not  admit  of  ac- 
commodation; and  then  the  measures  of  government  must  be 
injuriously  suspended,  or  fatally  defeated.  It  is  often,  by  the 
impracticability  of  obtaining  the  concurrence  of  the  necessary 
number  of  votes,  kept  in  a  state  of  inaction.  Its  situation 
must  always  savour  of  weakness;  sometimes  border  upon 
anarchy. 

It  is  not  difiBcult  to  discover,  that  a  principle  of  this  kind 
gives  greater  scope  to  foreign  corruption,  as  well  as  to  domestic 
faction,  than  that  which  permits  the  sense  of  the  majority  to 
decide ;  though  the  contrary  of  this  has  been  presumed.  The 
mistake  has  proceeded  from  not  attending  with  due  care  to  the 
mischiefs  that  may  be  occasioned,  by  obstructing  the  progress 
of  government  at  certain  critical  seasons.  When  the  concur- 
rence of  a  large  number  is  required  by  the  constitution  to  the 
doing  of  any  national  act,  we  are  apt  to  rest  satisfied  that  all  is 
safe,  because  nothing  improper  will  be  likely  to  be  done  ;  but  we 
forget  how  much  good  may  be  prevented,  and  how  much  ill  may 
be  produced,  by  the  power  of  hindering  that  which  it  is  neces- 
sary to  do,  and  of  keeping  afi'airs  in  the  same  unfavourable 
posture  in  which  they  ma^  happen  to  stand  at  particular 
periods. 


tyO  THE    FEDERALIST. 

SuppuSb,  for  instant,  we  were  engaged  in  a  war,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  one  foreign  nation,  against  another.  Suppose  the 
necessity  of  our  situation  demanded  peace,  and  that  the  interest 
or  ambition  of  our  ally  led  him  to  seek  the  prosecution  of  the 
war,  with  views  that  might  justify  us  in  making  separate  terms. 
In  such  a  state  of  things,  this  ally  of  ours  would  evidently  find 
it  much  easier  by  his  bribes  and  his  intrigues,  to  tie  up  the 
hands  of  government  from  making  peace,  where  two  thirds  of 
all  the  votes  were  requisite  to  that  object,  than  where  a  simple 
majority  would  suffice.  In  the  first  case,  he  would  have  to 
'torrupt  a  smaller,  in  the  last  a  greater  number.  Upon  the 
same  principle,  it  would  be  much  easier  for  a  foreign  power 
with  which  we  were  at  war,  to  perplex  our  councils  and  embar- 
rass our  exertions.  And  in  a  commercial  view,  we  may  be 
subjected  to  similar  inconveniences.  A  nation  with  which  we 
might  have  a  treaty  of  commerce,  could  with  much  greater 
facility  prevent  our  forming  a  connection  with  her  competitor 
in  trade;  though  such  a  connection  should  be  ever  so  beneficial 
to  ourselves. 

Evils  of  this  description  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  imagi- 
nary. One  of  the  weak  sides  of  republics,  among  their  nume- 
rous advantages,  is,  that  they  aff'ord  too  easy  an  inlet  to  foreign 
corruption.  An  hereditary  monarch,  though  often  disposed  to 
sacrifice  his  subjects  to  his  ambition,  has  so  great  a  personal 
interest  in  the  government,  and  in  the  external  glory  of  the 
nation,  that  it  is  not  easy  for  a  foreign  power  to  give  him  an 
equivalent,  for  what  he  would  sacrifice  by  trea(.hery  to  the 
state.  The  world  has  accordingly  been  witness  to  lew  examples 
of  this  species  of  royal  prostitution,  though  there  have  been 
abundant  specimens  of  every  other  kind. 

In  republics,  persons  elevated  from  the  mass  Of  the  com- 
munity, by  the  suffrages  of  their  fellow-citizens,  to  stations  of 
great  pre-eminence  and  power,  may  find  compensations  for 
betraying  their  trust,  which  to  any  but  minds  actuated  by 
superior  virtue,  may  appear  to  exceed  the  proportion  of  interest 
they  have  in  the  common  stock,  and  to  over-balance  the  obliga- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  191 

tions  of  duty.  Hence  it  is,  that  history  furnishes  us  with  sc 
many  mortifying  examples  of  the  prevalency  of  foreign  corrup- 
tion in  republican  governments.  How  much  this  contributed 
to  the  ruin  of  the  ancient  commonwealths,  has  been  already 
disclosed.  It  is  well  known  that  the  deputies  of  the  United 
Provinces  have,  in  various  instances,  been  purchased  by  the 
emissaries  of  the  neighbouring  kingdoms.  The  earl  of  Chester- 
field, if  my  memory  serves  me  right,  in  a  letter  to  his  court, 
intimates  that  his  success  in  an  important  negociation,  must 
depend  on  his  obtaining  a  major's  commission  for  one  of  those 
deputies.  And  in  Sweden,  the  rival  parties  were  alternately 
bought  by  France  and  England,  in  so  barefaced  and  notorious  a 
manner,  that  it  excited  universal  disgust  in  the  nation,  and  was 
a  principal  cause  that  the  most  limited  monarch  in  Europe,  in 
a  single  day,  without  tumult,  violence,  or  opposition,  became 
one  of  the  most  absolute  and  uncontroled. 

A  circumstance,  which  crowns  the  defects  of  th?  confedera- 
tion, remains  yet  to  be  mentioned — the  want  of  a  judiciary 
power.  Laws  are  a  dead  letter,  without  courts  to  e::pound  and 
define  their  true  meaning  and  operation.  The  treaties  of  the 
United  States,  to  have  any  force  at  all,  must  be  considered  as 
part  of  the  law  of  the  land.  Their  true  import,  as  far  as 
respects  individuals,  must,  like  all  other  laws,  be  ascertained  by 
judicial  determinations.  To  produce  uniformity  in  these  deter- 
minations, they  ought  to  be  submitted  in  the  last  resort,  to  one 
SUPREME  TRIBUNAL.  And  this  tribunal  ought  to  be  instituted 
under  the  same  authority  which  forms  the  treaties  themselves. 
These  ingredients  are  both  indispensable.  If  there  is  in  each 
state  a  court  of  final  jurisdiction,  there  maybe  as  many  different 
final  determiirations  on  the  same  point,  as  there  are  courts. 
There  are  endless  diversities  in  the  opinions  of  men.  We  often 
Bee  not  only  different  courts,  but  the  judges  of  the  same  court, 
differing  from  each  other.  To  avoid  the  confusion  which  would 
unavoidably  result  from  the  contradictory  decisions  of  a  number 
of  independent  judicatories,  all  nations  have  found  it  necessary 
to  establish  one  tribunal    paramount  to  the  rest,   possessing  a 


192  THE   FEDERALIST. 

general  superintendance,  and  authorized  to  settle  and  declare  in 
the  last  resort  an  uniform  rule  of  civil  justice. 

This  is  the  more  necessary  where  the  frame  of  the  government 
IS  so  compounded,  that  the  laws  of  the  whole  are  in  danger  of 
being  contravened  by  the  laws  of  the  parts.  In  this  case,  if  the 
particular  tribunals  are  invested  with  a  right  of  ultimate  deci- 
sion, besides  the  contradictions  to  be  expected  from  difference 
of  opinion,  there  will  be  much  to  fear  from  the  bias  of  local 
views  and  prejudices,  and  from  the  interference  of  local  regula- 
tions. As  often  as  such  an  interference  should  happen,  there 
would  be  reason  to  apprehend,  that  the  provisions  of  the  par- 
ticular laws  might  be  preferred  to  those  of  the  general  laws, 
from  the  deference  with  which  men  in  office  naturally  look  up 
to  that  authority  to  which  they  owe  their  official  existence. 
The  treaties  of  the  United  States,  under  the  present  constitu- 
tion, are  liable  to  the  infractions  of  thirteen  different  legislatures, 
and  as  many  different  courts  of  final  jurisdiction,  acting  under 
the  authority  of  those  legislatures.  The  faith,  the  reputation, 
the  peace  of  the  whole  union,  are  thus  continually  at  the  mercy 
of  the  prejudices,  the  passions,  and  the  interests  of  eveiy  member 
of  which  these  are  composed.  Is  it  possible  that  foreign 
nations  can  either  respect  or  confide  in  such  a  government? 
Is  it  possible  that  the  people  of  America  will  longer  consent  to 
trust  their  honour,  their  happiness,  their  safety,  on  so  precarious 
a  foundation  ? 

In  this  review  of  the  confederation,  I  have  confined  myself  to 
the  exhibition  of  its  most  material  defects;  passing  over  those 
imperfections  in  its  details,  by  which  even  a  considerable  part 
of  the  power  intended  to  be  conferred  upon  it,  has  been  in  a 
great  measure  rendered  abortive.  It  must  be  by  this  time  evi- 
dent to  all  men  of  reflection,  who  are  either  free  from  erroneous 
prepossessions,  or  can  divest  themselves  of  them,  that  it  is  a 
system  so  radically  vicious  and  unsound,  as  to  admit  not  of 
amendment,  but  by  an  entire  change  in  its  leading  features  and 
characters. 

The  organization  of  congress,  is  itself  utterly  imj  ropor  for 


THE   FEDERALIST.  193 

the  exercise  of  those  powers,  which  are  necessary  to  be  deposited 
in  the  union.  A  single  assembly  may  be  a  proper  receptacle 
of  those  slender,  or  rather  fettered  authorities,  which  have  been 
heretofore  delegated  to  the  federal  head ;  but  it  would  be  incon- 
sistent with  all  the  principles  of  good  government,  to  intrust  it 
with  those  additional  powers  which  even  the  moderate  and 
more  rational  adversaries  of  the  proposed  constitution  admit, 
ought  to  reside  in  the  United  States.  If  that  plan  should  not 
be  adopted;  and  if  the  necessity  of  union  should  be  able  to 
withstand  the  ambitious  aims  of  those  men,  who  may  indulge 
magnificent  schemes  of  personal  aggrandizement  from  its  disso- 
lution ;  the  probability  would  be,  that  we  should  run  into  the 
project  of  conferring  supplementary  powers  upon  congress,  as 
they  are  now  constituted.  And  either  the  machine,  from  the 
intrinsic  feebleness  of  its  structure,  will  moulder  into  pieces 
in  spite  of  our  ill-judged  efforts  to  prop  it;  or  by  successive 
augmentations  of  its  force  and  energy,  as  necessity  might 
prompt,  we  shall  finally  accumulate  in  a  single  body,  all  the 
most  important  prerogatives  of  sovereignty;  and  thus  entail 
upon  our  posterity,  one  of  the  most  execrable  forms  of  govern- 
ment that  human  infatuation  ever  contrived.  Thus  we  should 
create  in  reality  that  very  tyranny,  which  the  adversaries  of 
the  new  constitution  either  are,  or  affect  to  be,  solicitous  to 
avert. 

It  has  not  a  little  contributed  to  the  infirmities  of  the  exist- 
ing federal  system,  that  it  never  had  a  ratification  by  the 
PEOPLE.  Resting  on  no  better  foundation  than  the  consent 
of  the  several  legislatures,  it  has  been  exposed  to  frequent  and 
intricate  questions  concerning  the  validity  of  its  powers;  and 
has,  in  some  instances,  given  birth  to  the  enormous  doctrine 
of  a  right  of  legislative  repeal.  Owing  its  ratification  to  the 
law  of  a  state,  it  has  been  contended,  that  the  same  authority 
might  repeal  the  law  by  which  it  was  ratified.  However  gross 
a  heresy  it  may  be,  to  maintain  that  a  party  to  a  compact  has  a 
right  to  revoke  that  compact,  the  doctrine  itself  has  had  respect- 
able advocates.     The  possibility  of  a  question  of  this  nature. 


W4  THE    FEDERALIST. 

proves  the  neciissity  of  laying  the  foundations  of  our  national 
government  deeper,  than  in  the  mere  sanction  of  delegated 
authority.  Th  i  fabric  of  American  empire  ought  to  rest  on  the 
solid  basis  of  the  consent  op  the  people.  The  streams  of 
national  power  ought  to  flow  immediately  from  that  pure 
original  fountain  c    all  legitimate  authority. 

Pdblius. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  liU> 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXIII. 


N    :W    YORK,    DECEMBER    19,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   NECESSITY   OF   A   GOVERNMENT,  AT  LEAST   EQUALLY  ENER- 
GETIC  WITH   THE  ONE   PROPOSED. 

The  necessity  of  a  constitution,  at  least  equally  energetic  with 
the  one  proposed,  to  the  preservation  of  the  union,  is  the  point, 
at  the  examination  of  which  we  are  now  arrived. 

This  inquiry  will  naturally  divide  itself  into  three  branches. 
The  objects  to  be  provided  for  by  a  federal  government.  The 
quantity  of  power  necessary  to  the  accomplishment  of  those 
objects.  The  persons  upon  whom  that  power  ought  to  operate. 
Its  distribution  and  organization,  will  more  properly  claim  our 
attention  under  the  succeeding  head. 

The  principal  purposes  to  be  answered  by  union,  are  these : 
The  common  defence  of  the  members;  the  preservation  of  th9 
public  peace,  as  well  against  internal  convulsions  as  externa. 
attacks;  the  regulation  of  commerce  with  other  nations,  and 
between  the  states;  the  superintendance  of  our  intercourse, 
political  and  commercial,  with  foreign  countries. 

The  authorities  essential  to  the  care  of  the  common  defence 
are  these  :  To  raise  armies ;  to  build  and  equip  fleets ;  to  pre- 
scribe rules  for  the  government  of  both ;  to  direct  their  opera- 
tions ;  to  provide  for  their  supp  trt.  These  powers  ought  to 
exist  without  limitation ;  because  it  is  impossible  to  foresee  or 


196  THE   FEDERALIST. 

to  define  the  extent  and  variety  of  national  exigencies,  and  the 
correspondent  extent  and  variety  of  the  means  which  may  be 
necessary  to  satisfy  them.  The  circumstances  that  endanger 
the  safety  of  nations  are  infinite;  and  for  this  reason,  no  con- 
stitutional shackles  can  wisely  be  imposed  on  the  power  to  which 
the  care  of  it  is  committed.  This  power  ought  to  be  co-exten- 
sive with  all  the  possible  combinations  of  such  circumstances ; 
and  ought  to  be  under  the  direction  of  the  same  councils,  which 
are  appointed  to  preside  over  the  common  defence. 

This  is  one  of  those  truths,  which,  to  a  correct  and  unpre- 
judiced mind,  carries  its  own  evidence  along  with  it ;  and  may 
be  obscured,  but  cannot  be  made  plainer  by  argument  or  reason- 
ing. It  rests  upon  axioms,  as  simple  as  they  are  universal — the 
means  ought  to  be  proportioned  to  the  end;  the  persons  from 
whose  agency  the  attainment  of  any  end  is  expected,  ought  to 
possess  the  means  by  which  it  is  to  be  attained. 

Whether  there  ought  to  be  a  federal  government  intrusted 
with  the  care  of  the  common  defence,  is  a  question,  in  the  first 
Instance,  open  to  discussion  ;  but  the  moment  it  is  decided  in  the 
affirmative,  it  will  follow,  that,  that  government  ought  to  be 
cloathed  with  all  the  powers  requisite  to  the  complete  execution 
of  its  trust.  And  unless  it  can  be  shown,  that  the  circumstances 
which  may  affect  the  public  safety,  are  reducible  within  certain 
determinate  limits ;  unless  the  contrary  of  this  position  can  be 
fairly  and  rationally  disputed,  it  must  be  admitted  as  a  necessary 
consequence,  that  there  can  be  no  limitation  of  that  authority, 
which  is  to  provide  for  the  defence  and  protection  of  the  com- 
munity, in  any  matter  essential  to  its  efficacy ;  that  is,  in  any 
matter  essential  to  the  formation,  direction,  or  support  of  the  na- 
tional FOlCtS. 

Defective  as  the  present  confederation  has  been  proved  to  be, 
this  principle  appears  to  have  been  fully  recognized  by  the  framers 
of  it ;  though  they  have  not  made  jjroper  or  adequate  provision 
for  its  exercise.  Congress  have  an  unlimited  discretion  to  make 
requisitions  of  men  and  money;  to  govern  the  army  and  nt»vy; 
to  direct  their  operations.    As  their  requisitions  are  made  eon. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  197 

Btitutionally  binding  upon  the  states,  who  are  in  fact  under  Wxq 
most  solemn  obligations  to  furnish  the  supplies  required  of  them 
the  intention  evidently  was,  that  the  United  States  should  com 
mand  whatever  resources  were  by  them  judged  requisite  to  the 
"  common  defence  and  general  welfare."  It  was  presumed,  that 
a  sense  of  their  true  interests,  and  a  regard  to  the  dictates  of 
good  faith,  would  be  found  sufficient  pledges  for  the  punctual 
performance  of  the  duty  of  the  members  to  the  federal  head. 

The  experiment  has  however  demonstrated,  that  this  expecta- 
tion was  ill  founded  and  illusory;  and  the  observations  made 
under  the  last  head  will,  I  imagine,  have  sufficed  to  convince  the 
impartial  and  discerning,  that  there  is  an  absolute  necessity  for 
an  entire  change  in  the  first  principles  of  the  system.  That  if 
we  are  in  earnest  about  giving  the  union  energy  and  duration, 
we  must  abandon  the  vain  project  of  legislating  upon  the  states 
in  their  collective  capacities ;  we  must  extend  the  laws  of  the 
federal  government  to  the  individual  citizens  of  America;  we 
must  discard  the  fallacious  scheme  of  quotas  and  requisitions, 
as  equally  impracticable  and  unjust.  The  result  from  all  this 
is,  that  the  union  ought  to  be  invested  with  full  power  to  levy 
troops;  to  build  and  equip  fleets;  and  to  raise  the  revenues 
which  will  be  required  for  the  formation  and  support  of  an  army 
and  navy,  in  the  customary  and  ordinary  modes  practised  in 
other  governments. 

If  the  circumstances  of  our  country  are  such,  as  to  demand  a 
compound,  instead  of  a  simple ;  a  confederate,  instead  of  a  sole 
government,  the  essential  point  which  will  remain  to  be  adjusted, 
will  be  to  discriminate  the  objects,  as  far  as  it  can  be  done, 
which  shall  appertain  to  the  different  provinces  or  departments 
of  power :  allowing  to  each,  the  most  ample  authority  for  fulfill- 
ing THOSE  which  may  be  committed  to  its  charge.  Shall  the 
union  be  constituted  the  guardian  of  the  common  safety  ?  Are 
fleets,  and  armies,  and  revenues,  necessary  to  this  purpose  ? 
The  government  of  the  union  must  be  empowered  to  pass  all 
laws,  and  to  make  all  regulations  which  have  relation  to  them 
Tlie  same  must  be  the  case  in  respect  to  commerce,  and  to  every 


798  THE    FEDERALIST. 

othei  matter  to  whi.n  its  jurisdiction  is  permitted  to  extend. 
18  the  administration  of  justice,  between  the  citizens  of  the  same 
state,  the  proper  department  of  the  local  governments  ?  These 
must  possess  all  the  authorities  which  are  connected  with  this 
object,  and  with  every  other  that  may  be  allotted  to  thteir  par- 
ticular cognizance  and  direction.  Isot  to  confer  in  each  case  a 
degree  of  power,  commensurate  to  the  end,  would  be  to  violate 
the  most  obvious  rules  of  prudence  and  propriety,  and  improvi- 
dently  to  trust  the  great  interests  of  the  nation  to  hands  which 
are  disabled  from  managing  them  with  vigour  and  success. 

Who  so  likely  to  make  suitable  provisions  for  the  public  de- 
fence, as  that  body  to  which  the  guardianship  of  the  public 
safety  is  confided  ?  Which,  as  the  centre  of  information,  will 
best  understand  the  extent  and  urgency  of  the  dangers  that 
threaten;  as  the  representative  of  the  whole,  will  feel  itself 
most  deeply  interested  in  the  preservation  of  every  part ;  which, 
from  the  responsibility  implied  in  the  duty  assigned  to  it,  will 
be  most  sensibly  impressed  with  the  necessity  of  proper  exer- 
tions ;  and  which,  by  the  extension  of  its  authority  throughout 
the  states,  can  alone  establish  uniformity  and  concert  in  the 
plans  and  measures,  by  which  the  common  safety  is  to  be  se- 
cured ?  Is  there  not  a  manifest  inconsistency  in  devolving  upon 
the  federal  government  the  care  of  the  general  defence,  and 
leaving  in  the  state  governments  the  effective  powers,  by  which 
it  is  to  be  provided  for?  Is  not  a  want  of  co-operation  the  in- 
fallible consequence  of  such  a  system  ?  And  will  not  weakness, 
disorder,  an  undue  distribution  of  the  burthens  and  calamities  of 
war,  an  unnecessary  and  intolerable  increase  of  expense,  be  it» 
natural  and  inevitable  concomitants  ?  Have  we  not  had  un- 
equivocal experience  of  its  effects  in  the  course  of  the  revolu- 
tion, which  we  have  just  achieved  ? 

Every  view  we  may  take  of  the  subject  as  candid  inquirers 
after  truth,  will  serve  to  convince  us,  that  it  is  both  unwise  and 
dangerous  to  deny  the  federal  government  an  unconfined  author- 
ity, in  respect  to  all  those  objects  which  are  intrusted  to  its  man- 
agement     It  will  indeed  deserve  the  most  vigilant  and  careful 


THE    FEDERALIST.  199 

attention  of  the  people,  to  see  that  it  be  modelled  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  admit  of  its  being  safely  vested  with  the  requisite 
powers.  If  any  plan,  which  has  been,  or  may  be,  offered  to  our 
consideration,  should  not,  upon  a  dispassionate  inspeetion.  be 
found  to  answer  this  description,  it  ought  to  be  rejected.  A 
government,  the  constitution  of  which  renders  it  unfit  to  be  in- 
trusted with  all  the  powers  which  a  free  people  ought  to  delegate 
to  any  government,  would  be  an  unsafe  and  improper  depository 
of  tlie  NATIONAL  INTERESTS.  Wherever  these  can  with  pro- 
priety  be  confided,  the  coincident  powers  may  safely  accompany 
them.  This  is  the  true  result  of  all  just  reasoning  upon  the  sub- 
ject. And  the  adversaries  of  the  plan,  promulgated  by  the  con- 
vention, would  have  given  a  better  impression  of  their  candour, 
if  they  had  confined  themselves  to  showing,  that  the  internal 
structure  of  the  proposed  government,  was  such  as  to  render  it 
unworthy  of  the  confidence  of  the  people.  They  ought  not  to 
have  wandered  into  inflammatory  declamations  and  unmeaning 
cavils,  about  the  extent  of  the  powers.  The  powers  are  not  too 
extensive  for  the  objects  of  federal  administration,  or,  in  other 
words,  for  the  management  of  our  national  interests;  nor 
can  any  satisfactory  argument  be  framed,  to  show  that  they  are 
chargeable  with  such  an  excess.  If  it  be  true,  as  has  been  in- 
sinuated by  some  of  the  writers  on  the  other  side,  that  the  diflS- 
culty  arises  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  and  that  the  extent  of 
the  country  will  not  permit  us  to  form  a  government,  in  which 
such  ample  powers  can  safely  be  reposed,  it  would  prove  that  we 
ought  to  contract  our  views,  and  resort  to  the  expedient  of  sepa- 
rata confederacies,  which  will  move  within  more  practicable 
spheres.  For  the  absurdity  must  continually  stare  us  in  the 
face,  of  confiding  to  a  government  the  direction  of  the  most 
essential  national  concerns,  without  daring  to  trust  it  with  the 
authorities  which  are  indispensable  to  their  proper  and  efficient 
management.  Let  us  not  attempt  to  reconcile  contradictions, 
but  firmly  embrace  a  rational  alternative. 

I   trust,   however,  that   the   impracticability  of  one  general 
system  cannot  be  shown.     1  am  greatly  mistaken,  if  any  thing 


200  THE    FEDERALIST. 

of  weight  has  yet  been  advanced  of  this  tendency;  and  I  flatter 
myself,  that  the  observations,  which  have  been  made  in  the 
course  of  these  papers,  have  served  to  place  the  reverse  of  that 
position  in  as  clear  a  light  as  any  matter,  still  in  the  womb  of 
time  and  experience,  is  susceptible  of.  This,  at  all  events,  must 
be  evident,  that  the  very  difficulty  itself,  drawn  from  the  extent 
of  the  country,  is  the  strongest  argument  in  favour  of  an  ener- 
getic government ;  for  any  other  can  certainly  never  preserve 
the  union  of  so  large  an  empire.  If  we  embrace,  as  the  standard 
of  our  political  creed,  the  tenets  of  those,  who  oppose  the  adop- 
tion of  the  proposed  constitution,  we  cannot  fail  to  verify  the 
gloomy  doctrines,  which  predict  the  impracticability  of  a  na- 
tional system  pervading  the  entire  limits  of  the  present  con- 
federacy 

PUBLIUS. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  201 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXIV. 


NEW  YORK,  DECEMBER  19,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  WITH   AN   ANSWER  TO  AN  OBJ»:CTION 
CONCERNING  STANDING  ARMIES. 

To  the  powers  proposed  to  be  conferred  upon  the  foderal  gov- 
ernment, in  respect  to  the  creation  and  direction  of  the  national 
forces,  I  have  met  with  but  one  specific  objection;  which  is,  that 
proper  provision  has  not  been  made  against  the  existence  of 
standing  armies  in  time  of  peace :  An  object'on  which  1  shall 
now  endeavour  to  show,  rests  on  weak  and  ur  iubstantial  founda- 
tions. 

It  has  indeed  been  brought  forward  ii.  the  most  vague  and 
general  form,  supported  only  by  bold  assertions,  without  the 
appearance  of  argument;  without  ev.n  the  sanction  of  theo- 
retical opinions,  in  contradiction  to  the  practice  of  other  free 
nations,  and  to  the  general  sense  of  America,  as  expressed  in  most 
of  the  existing  constitutions.  The  propriety  of  this  remark  will 
appear,  the  moment  it  is  recollected  that  the  objection  under 
consideration  turns  upon  a  supposed  necessity  of  restraining  the 
LEGISLATIVE  authority  of  the  nation,  in  the  article  of  military 
establishments;  a  principle  unheard  of,  except  in  one  or  two  of 
our  state  constitutions,  and  rejected  in  all  the  rest. 

A  stranger  to  our  politics,  who  was  to  read  our  newspapers  at 
the  present  juncture,  without  having  previously  inspected  the 


202  THE   FEDERALIST. 

plan  reported  by  the  convention,  would  be  naturally  led  to  one 
of  two  conclusions:  either  that  it  contained  a  positive  injunction, 
that  standing  armies  should  be  kept  up  in  time  of  peace;  or,  that 
it  vested  in  the  executive  the  whole  power  of  levying  troops. 
without  subjecting  his  discretion  in  any  shape  to  the  control  of 
the  legislature 

If  he  came  afterwards  to  peruse  the  plan  itself,  he  would  be 
surprised  to  discover,  that  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  was  the 
case ;  that  the  whole  power  of  raising  armies  was  lodged  in  the 
legislature,  not  in  the  executive;  that  this  legislature  was  to  be 
a  popular  body,  consisting  of  the  representatives  of  the  people 
periodically  elected;  and  that  instead  of  the  provision  he  had 
supposed  in  favour  of  standing  armies,  there  was  to  be  found 
in  respect  to  this  object,  an  important  qualification  even  of  the 
legislative  discretion,  in  that  clause  which  forbids  the  appropria- 
tion of  money  for  the  support  of  an  army  for  any  longer  period 
than  two  years:  A  precaution  which,  upon  a  nearer  view  of  it, 
will  appear  to  be  a  great  and  real  security  against  military 
establishments  without  evident  necessity. 

Disappointed  in  his  first  surmise,  the  person  1  have  supposed 
would  be  apt  to  pursue  bis  conjectures  a  little  further  Ho 
would  naturally  say  to  himself,  it  is  impossible  that  all  this 
vehement  and  pathetic  declamation  can  be  without  some  colour- 
able pretext.  It  must  needs  be  that  this  people,  so  jealous  of 
their  liberties,  have,  in  all  the  preceding  models  of  the  con- 
stitutions which  they  have  established,  inserted  the  most  precise 
and  rigid  precautions  on  this  point,  the  omission  of  which  in  the 
new  plan,  has  given  birth  to  all  this  apprehension  and  clamour. 

If,  under  this  impression,  he  proceeded  to  pass  in  review  the 
several  st,!  te  constitutions,  how  great  would  be  his  disappoint- 
ment to  find  that  two  only  of  them*  contained  an  interdiction 

*  This  statement  of  the  matter  is  taken  from  the  printed  collections  of  state 
constitutions.  Pennsylvania  and  North-Carolina,  are  the  two  which  contain 
the  interdiction  in  these  words:  "As  standing  armies  in  time  of  peace  are 
dangerous  to  liberty,  thet  ought  not  to  be  kept  up."  This  is,  in  truth,  rather 
a  CAUTION  than  a  pkohibition.     New-Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Delawar»». 


THE    FEDERALIST.  203 

of  standing  armies  in  time  of  peace ;  that  the  other  eleven  had 
either  observed  a  profound  silence  on  the  subject,  or  had  in  ex- 
press terms  admitted  the  right  of  the  legislature  to  authorize 
their  existence. 

Still,  however,  he  would  be  persuaded  that  there  must  be  sot^^o 
plausible  foundation,  for  the  cry  raised  on  this  head.  He  would 
never  be  able  to  imagine,  while  any  source  of  information  re- 
mained unexplored,  that  it  was  nothing  more  than  an  experi- 
ment upon  the  public  credulity,  dictated  either  by  a  deliberate 
intention  to  deceive,  or  by  the  overflowings  of  a  zeal  too  intem- 
perate to  be  ingenuous.  It  would  probably  occur  to  him,  that  he 
would  be  likely  to  find  the  precautions  he  was  in  search  of,  in 
the  primitive  compact  between  the  states.  Here,  at  length,  he 
vould  expect  to  meet  with  a  solution  of  the  enigma.  No  doubt, 
he  would  observe  to  himself,  the  existing  confederation  must 
contain  the  most  explicit  provisions  against  military  establish- 
ments in  time  of  peace;  and  a  departure  from  this  model  in 
a  favourite  point,  has  occasioned  the  discontent,  which  appears 
to  influence  these  political  champions. 

If  he  should  now  apply  himself  .to  a  careful  and  critical  survey 
of  the  articles  of  confederation,  his  astonishment  would  not 
only  be  increased,  but  would  acquire  a  mixture  of  indignation, 
at  the  unexpected  discovery,  that  these  articles,  instead  of  con- 
taining the  prohibition  he  looked  for,  and  though  they  had, 
with  jealous  circumspection,  restricted  the  authority  of  the 
state  legislatures  in  this  particular,  had  not  imposed  a  single 
restraint  on  that  of  the  United  States.  If  he  happened  to 
be  a  man  of  quick  sensibility,  or  ardent  temper,  he  could  now 
no  longer  refrain  from  pronouncing  these  clamours  to  be,  the 

and  Maryland,  have  in  each  of  their  bills  of  rights  a  clause  to  this  eflFect  : 
"Standing  armies  are  dangerous  to  liberty,  and  ought  not  to  be  raised  or  kept 
up  WITHOUT  THK  CONSENT  OF  THE  LEGISLATURE;"  which  is  a  formal  admis- 
sion of  the  authority  of  the  legislature.  New- York  has  no  bill  of  rights,  and 
her  constitution  says  not  a  word  about  the  matter.  No  bills  of  rights  appear 
annexed  to  the  constitutions  of  the  other  states,  and  their  constitutions  are 
equally  silent.  I  am  told,  however,  that  one  or  two  states  have  bills  of  rights, 
which  do  not  appear  in  this  collection;  but  that  those  also  recognize  the  right 
of  the  legislative  authority  in  this  respect. 

24 


204  THE    FEDERALIST. 

dishonest  artifices  of  a  sinister  and  unprincipled  opposition  to  a 
plan  which  ought  at  least  to  receive  a  fair  and  candid  examina- 
tion from  all  sincere  lovers  of  their  country!  How  else,  he 
would  say,  could  the  authors  of  them  have  been  tempted  to 
vent  such  loud  censures  upon  that  plan,  about  a  point  in  which 
it  seems  to  have  conformed  itself  to  the  general  sense  of 
America  as  declared  in  its  different  forms  of  government,  and 
in  which  it  has  even  superadded  a  new  and  powerful  guard 
unknown  to  any  of  them  ?  If,  on  the  contrary,  he  happened 
to  be  a  man  of  calm  and  dispassionate  feelings,  he  would  indulge 
a  sigh  for  the  frailty  of  human  nature,  and  would  lament,  that 
in  a  matter  so  interesting  to  the  happiness  of  millions,  the  true 
merits  of  the  question  should  be  perplexed,  and  obscured  by  ex- 
pedients so  unfriendly  to  an  impartial  and  right  determination. 
Even  such  a  man  could  hardly  forbear  remarking,  that  a  con- 
duct of  this  kind,  has  too  much  the  appearance,  of  an  intention 
to  mislead  the  people  by  alarming  their  passions,  rather  than  to 
convince  them  by  arguments  addressed  to  their  understandings. 

But  however  little  this  objection  may  be  countenanced,  even 
by  precedents  among  ourselves,  it  may  be  satisfactory  to  take  a 
nearer  view  of  its  intrinsic  merits.  From  a  close  examination. 
it  will  appear,  that  restraints  upon  the  discretion  of  the  legis- 
lature, in  respect  to  military  establishments,  would  be  improper 
to  be  imposed;  and  if  imposed,  from  the  necessities  of  society, 
would  be  unlikely  to  be  observed. 

Though  a  wide  ocean  separates  the  United  States  from  Europe, 
yet  there  are  various  considerations  that  warn  us  against  an 
excess  of  confidence  or  security.  On  one  side  of  us,  stretching 
far  into  our  rear,  are  growing  settlements  subject  to  the  domi 
nion  of  Britain.  On  the  other  side,  and  extending  to  meet  tL'} 
British  settlements,  are  colonies  and  establishments  subject  tc 
the  dominion  of  Spain.  This  situation,  and  the  vicinity  of  tue 
West-India  islands,  belonging  to  these  two  powers,  create  be- 
tween them,  in  respect  to  their  American  possessions,  and  in 
relation  to  ns,  a  common  interest.  The  savage  tribes  on  our 
western  frontier,  ought  to  be  regarded  as  our  natural  enemies; 


THE    FEDERALIST  205 

their  natural  allies:  because  they  hav€  most  to  fear  irom  us, 
and  most  to  hope  from  them.  The  improvements  in  the  art 
of  navigation,  have,  as  to  the  facility  of  communication,  ren- 
dered distant  nations,  in  a  gi*eat  measure,  neighbours.  Britain 
and  Spain,  are  among  the  principal  maritime  powers  of  Europe. 
A  future  concert  of  views  between  these  nations,  ought  not  to 
be  regarded  as  improbable.  The  increasing  remoteness  of  con- 
sanguinity, is  every  day  diminishing  the  force  of  the  family 
compact  between  France  and  Spain.  And  politicians  have 
ever,  with  great  reason,  considered  the  ties  of  blood,  as  feeble 
and  precarious  links  of  political  connection.  These  circum- 
stances, combined,  admonish  us  not  to  be  too  sanguine  in  con- 
sidering ourselves  as  entirely  out  of  the  reach  of  danger. 

Previous  to  the  revolution,  and  ever  since  the  peace,  there 
has  been  a  constant  necessity  for  keeping  small  garrisons  on 
our  western  frontier.  No  person  can  doubt,  that  these  will 
continue  to  be  indispensable,  if  it  should  only  be  to  guard 
against  the  ravages  and  depredations  of  the  Indians.  These 
garrisons  must  either  be  furnished  by  occasional  detachments 
from  the  militia,  or  by  permanent  corps  in  the  pay  of  the 
government.  The  first  is  impracticable;  and  if  practicable, 
would  be  pernicious.  The  militia,  in  times  of  profound  peace, 
would  not  long,  if  at  all,  submit  to  be  dragged  from  their  occu- 
pations and  families,  to  perform  that  most  disagreeable  duty. 
And  if  they  could  be  prevailed  upon,  or  compelled  to  do  it, 
the  increased  expense  of  a  frequent  rotation  of  service,  and 
the  loss  of  labour,  and  disconcertion  of  the  industrious  pursuits 
of  individuals,  would  form  conclusive  objections  to  the  scheme. 
It  would  be  as  burthensome  and  injurious  to  the  public,  as  ruin- 
ous to  private  citizens.  The  latter  resource  of  permanent  corps 
in  the  pay  of  government,  amounts  to  a  standing  army  in  time  of 
peace ;  a  small  one,  indeed,  but  not  the  less  real  for  being  small. 

Here  is  a  simple  view  of  the  subject,  that  shows  us  at  once 
the  impropriety  of  a  constitutional  interdiction  of  such  esta- 
blishments, and  the  necessity  of  leaving  the  matter  to  the  dis- 
crex'on  and  prudence  of  the  legislature. 


'ZOQ  THE    FEDERALIST. 

In  proportion  to  our  increase  in  strength,  it  is  probable,  nay, 
it  may  be  said  certain,  that  Britain  and  Spain  would  augment 
their  mihtary  establishments  in  our  neighbourhood.  If  we 
should  not  be  willing  wO  be  exposed,  in  a  naked  and  defenceless 
condition,  to  their  insults  or  encroachments,  we  should  find  it 
expedient  to  increase  our  frontier  garrisons,  in  some  ratio  to 
the  force  by  which  our  western  settlements  might  be  annoyed. 
There  are,  and  will  be,  particular  posts,  the  possession  of  which 
will  include  the  command  of  large  districts  of  territory,  and 
facilitate  future  invasions  of  the  remainder.  It  may  be  added, 
that  some  of  those  posts  will  be  keys  to  the  trade  with  the 
Indian  nations.  Can  any  man  think  it  would  be  wise,  to  leave 
such  posts  in  a  situation  to  be  at  any  instant  seized  by  one  or 
the  other  of  two  neighbouring  and  formidable  powers  ?  To  act 
this  part,  would  be  to  desert  all  the  usual  maxims  of  prudence 
and  policy. 

If  we  mean  to  be  a  commercial  people,  or  even  to  be  secure 
on  our  Atlantic  side,  we  must  endeavour,  as  soon  as  possible,  to 
have  a  navy.  To  this  purpose,  there  must  be  dock-yards  and 
arsenals;  and,  for  the  defence  of  these,  fortifications,  and  pro- 
bably garrisons.  When  a  nation  has  become  so  powerful  by  sea, 
that  it  can  protect  its  dock-yards  by  its  fleets,  this  supersedes 
the  necessity  of  garrisons  for  that  purpose;  but  where  naval 
establishments  are  in  their  infancy,  moderate  garrisons  will, 
in  all  likelihood,  be  found  an  indispensable  security  against 
descents  for  the  destruction  of  the  arsenals  and  dock-yards, 
and  sometimes  of  the  fleet  itself. 

Pdblius. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  207 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXV. 


NEW   "!  ORK,  DECEMBER   22,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SUBJECT  CO>'TINUED,  WITH  THE  SAME  VIEW. 

It  may  perhaps  be  urged,  that  the  objects  enumerated  in  the 
preceding  number  ought  to  be  provided  by  the  state  govern 
ments,  under  the  direction  of  the  union.  But  this  would  be  an 
inversion  of  the  primary  principle  of  our  political  association ; 
as  it  would  in  practice  transfer  the  care  of  the  common  defence 
from  the  federal  head  to  the  individual  members:  A  project 
oppressive  to  some  states,  dangerous  to  all,  and  baneful  to  the 
confederacy. 

The  territories  of  Britain,  Spain,  and  of  the  Indian  nations 
in  our  neighbourhood,  do  not  border  on  particular  states;  but 
encircle  the  union  from  Maine  to  Georgia.  The  danger,  though 
in  different  degrees,  is  therefore  common.  And  the  means  of 
guarding  against  it,  ought,  in  like  manner,  to  be  the  objects  of 
common  councils,  and  of  a  common  treasury.  It  happens  that 
some  states,  from  local  situation,  are  more  directly  exposed. 
New- York  is  of  this  class.  Upon  the  plan  of  separate  pro- 
visions, Kew-York  would  have  to  sustain  the  whole  weight  of 
the  establishments  requisite  to  her  immediate  safety,  and  to  the 
mediate,  or  ultimate  protection  of  her  neighbours.  This  would 
neither  be  equitable  as  it  respected  New- York,  nor  safe  as  it 
respected  the  other  states.   Yarious  inconveniences  would  attend 


208  THE    FEDERALIST. 

such  a  system.  The  states,  to  whose  lot  it  might  fall  to  support 
the  necessary  establishments,  would  be  as  little  able  as  willing, 
for  a  considerable  time  to  come,  to  bear  the  burthen  of  com- 
petent provisions.  The  security  of  all,  would  thus  be  subjected 
to  the  parsimony,  improvidence,  or  inability  of  a  part.  If  from 
the  resources  of  such  part  becoming  more  abundant,  its  pro- 
visions should  be  proportionably  enlarged,  the  other  states  would 
quickly  take  the  alarm  at  seeing  the  whole  military  force  of  the 
union  in  the  hands  of  two  or  three  of  its  members;  and  those 
probably  amongst  the  most  powerful.  They  would  each  choose 
to  have  some  counterpoise :  and  pretences  could  easily  be  con- 
trived. In  this  situation,  military  establishments,  nourished 
by  mutual  jealousy,  would  be  apt  to  swell  beyond  their  natural 
or  proper  size ;  and  being  at  the  separate  disposal  of  the  mem- 
bers, they  would  be  engines  for  the  abridgment,  or  demolition, 
of  the  national  authority. 

Eeasons  have  been  already  given  to  induce  a  supposition,  that 
the  state  governments  will  too  naturally  be  prone  to  a  rivalship 
with  that  of  the  union,  the  foundation  of  which  will  be  the  love 
of  power;  and  that  in  any  contest  between  the  federal  head  and 
one  of  its  members,  the  people  will  be  most  apt  to  unite  with 
their  local  government :  If  in  addition  to  this  immense  advantage, 
the  ambition  of  the  members  should  be  stimulated  by  the  sepa- 
rate and  independent  possession  of  military  forces,  it  would  aflford 
too  strong  a  temptation,  and  too  great  facility  to  them  to  make 
enterprises  upon,  and  finally  to  subvert,  the  constitutional 
authority  of  the  u  lion.  On  the  other  hand,  the  liberty  of  the 
people  would  be  less  safe  in  this  state  of  things,  than  in  that 
which  left  the  national  forces  in  the  hands  of  the  national  gov- 
ernment. As  far  as  an  army  may  be  considered  as  a  dangerous 
weapon  of  power,  it  had  better  be  in  those  hands,  of  which  the 
people  are  most  likely  to  be  jealous,  than  in  those  of  which  they 
are  least  likely  to  be  so.  For  it  is  a  truth  which  the  experience 
of  all  ages  has  attested,  that  the  people  are  commonly  most  in 
danger,  when  the  means  of  injuring  their  rights  are  in  tho  po«- 
eession  of  those  of  whom  they  entertain  the  least  suspicion 


THE    FEDERALIliT.  209 

The  framers  of  the  existing  confederation,  fully  aware  of  the 
danger  to  the  union  from  the  separate  possession  of  military 
forces  by  the  states,  have  in  express  terms,  prohibited  them  from 
having  either  ships  or  troops,  unless  with  the  consent  of  congress. 
The  truth  is,  that  the  existence  of  a  federal  government  and 
military  establishments,  under  state  authority,  are  not  less  at 
variance  with  each  other,  than  a  due  supply  of  the  federal 
treasury,  and  the  system  of  quotas  and  requisitions. 

There  are  other  views  besides  those  already  presented,  in 
which  the  impropriety  of  restraints  on  the  discretion  of  the 
national  legislature  will  be  equally  manifest.  The  design  of  the 
objection,  which  has  been  mentioned,  is  to  preclude  standing 
armies  in  time  of  peace;  though  we  have  never  been  informed 
how  far  it  is  desired  the  prohibition  should  extend  ;  whether  to 
raising  armies,  as  well  as  to  keeping  them  up,  in  a  season  of 
tranquillity,  or  not.  If  it  be  confined  to  the  latter,  it  will  have 
no  precise  signification,  and  it  will  be  ineffectual  for  the  purpose 
intended.  When  armies  are  once  raised,  what  shall  be  denomi- 
nated "  keeping  them  up,"  contrary  to  the  sense  of  the  consti- 
tution? What  time  shall  be  requisite  to  ascertain  the  viola- 
tion ?  Shall  it  be  a  week,  a  month,  a  year  ?  Or  shall  we  say, 
they  may  be  continued  as  long  as  the  danger  which  occasioned 
their  being  raised  continues  ?  This  would  be  to  admit  that  they 
might  be  kept  up  in  time  of  peace,  against  threatening  or  impend- 
ing danger;  which  would  be  at  once  to  deviate  from  the  literal 
meaning  of  the  prohibition,  and  to  introduce  an  extensive  lati- 
tude of  construction.  Who  shall  judge  of  the  continuance  of 
the  danger?  This  must  undoubtedly  be  submitted  to  the  na- 
tional government,  and  the  matter  would  then  be  brought  to 
this  issue,  that  the  national  government,  to  provide  against  ap- 
prehended danger,  might,  in  the  first  instance,  raise  troops,  and 
might  afterwards  keep  them  on  foot,  as  long  as  they  supposed  the 
peace  or  safety  of  the  community  was  in  any  degree  of  jeopardy. 
It  is  easy  to  perceive,  that  a  discretion  so  latitudinary  as  this, 
would  afford  ample  room  for  eluding  the  force  of  the  provision. 
The  utility  of  a  provision  of  this  kind,  can  only  be  vindicated 


21C  THE    FEDERALIST. 

on  the  hypothesis  of  a  probability,  at  least  possibility,  of  eom- 
oination  between  the  executive  and  legislature,  in  some  scheme 
of  usurpation.  Should  this  at  any  time  happen,  how  easy  would 
it  be  to  fabricate  pretences  of  approaching  danger  ?  Indian  hos- 
tilities instigated  by  Spain  or  Britain,  would  always  be  at  hand. 
Provocations  to  produce  the  desired  appearances,  might  even 
be  given  to  some  foreign  power,  and  appeased  again  by  timely 
concessions.  If  we  can  re'»sonably  presume  such  a  combination 
to  have  been  formed,  and  ..hat  the  enterprize  is  warranted  by  a 
sufficient  prospect  of  suc(  ess :  the  army  when  once  raised,  from 
whatever  cause,  or  on  whatever  pretext,  may  be  applied  to  the 
execution  of  the  project. 

If  to  obviate  this  consequence,  it  should  be  resolved  to  extend 
the  prohibition  to  the  raising  of  armies  in  time  of  peace,  the 
United  States  would  then  exhibit  the  most  extraordinary  spec- 
tacle, which  the  world  has  yet  seen — that  of  a  nation  incapa- 
citated by  its  constitution  to  prepare  for  defence,  before  it  was 
actuall}/-  invaded.  As  the  ceremony  of  a  formal  denunciation  of 
war  has  of  late  fallen  into  disuse,  the  presence  of  an  enemy 
within  our  territories  must  be  waited  for,  as  the  legal  warrant 
to  the  government  to  begin  its  levies  of  men  for  the  protection 
of  the  (Btate.  We  must  receive  the  blow,  before  we  could  even 
prepare  to  return  it.  All  that  kind  of  policy  by  which  nations 
anticipate  distant  danger,  and  meet  the  gathering  storm,  must 
be  abstained  from,  as  contrary  to  the  genuine  maxims  of  a 
free  government.  "We  must  expose  our  property  and  liberty  to 
the  mercy  of  foreign  invaders,  and  invite  them  by  our  weakness, 
to  seize  the  naked  and  defenceless  prey,  because  we  are  afraid 
that  rulers,  created  by  our  choice,  dependent  on  our  will,  might 
endanger  that  liberty,  by  an  abuse  of  the  means  necessary  to  its 
preservation. 

Here  I  expect  we  shall  be  told,  that  the  militia  of  the  country 
is  its  natural  bulwark,  and  would  at  all  times  be  equal  to  the 
national  defence.  This  doctrine,  in  substance,  had  like  to  have 
lost  us  our  independence.  It  cost  millions  to  the  United  States, 
that  might  have  been  saved.     The  facts,  which  from  our  own 


THE    FEDERALIST.  21} 

experience  forbid  a  reliance  of  this  kind,  are  too  recent  to  permit 
us  to  be  the  dupes  of  such  a  suggestion.  The  steady  operations 
of  war  against  a  regalar  and  disciplined  army,  can  only  be  suc- 
cessfully conducted  by  a  force  of  the  same  kind.  Consider- 
ations of  economy,  lot  lesj.  than  of  stability  and  vigour,  con 
firm  this  position.  The  Ajnerican  militia,  in  the  course  of  the 
late  war,  have,  by  their  vg,lour  on  numerous  occasions,  erected 
eternal  monumeoti  to  their  fame;  but  the  bravest  of  them  feel 
and  know,  that  the  liberty  of  their  country  could  not  have  been 
established  by  their  efforts  alone,  however  great  and  valuable 
they  we] e.  Wir,  Ike  most  other  things,  is  a  science  to  be 
acquired  and  perfeited  oy  diligence,  by  perseverance,  by  time, 
and  by  ]»ractice. 

All  violent  policy,  as  it  is  contrary  to  the  natural  and  expe- 
rienced course  cf  human  affairs,  defeats  itself.  Pennsylvania  at 
this  instant  afforc.s  an  example  of  the  truth  of  this  remark. 
The  bill  of  rig'its  of  that  state  declares,  that  standing  armies 
are  dangtrous  to  liberty,  and  ought  not  to  be  kept  up  in  time  of 
peace.  1  ennsylvania  nevertheless,  in  a  time  of  profound  peace^ 
from  the  existence  of  partial  disorders  in  one  or  two  of  her 
counties,  has  r3Solved  to  raise  a  body  of  troops;  and  in  all  pro- 
bability, will  keep  them  up  as  long  as  there  is  any  appearance 
of  danger  to  the  public  peace.  The  conduct  of  Massachusetts 
affords  a  lessor  on  the  same  subject,  though  on  different  ground. 
That  state  (w  thout  waiting  for  the  sanction  of  congress,  as  the 
articles  of  the  confederation  require)  was  compelled  to  raise 
troops  to  quell  a  domestic  insurrection,  and  still  keeps  a  corps 
in  pay  to  prevent  a  revival  of  the  spirit  of  revolt.  The  par- 
ticular constitution  of  Massachusetts  opposed  no  obstacle  to  the 
measure ;  but  the  instance  is  still  of  use  to  instruct  us,  that  cases 
are  likely  to  occur  under  our  governments,  as  well  as  under 
those  ol  other  nations,  which  will  sometimes  render  a  military 
force  in  time  of  peace,  essential  to  the  security  of  the  society, 
and  that  it  is  therefore  improper,  in  this  respect,  to  control  the 
legislative  discretion.  It  also  teaches  us,  in  its  application  to 
the  United  States,  how  little  the  rights  ')f  a  feeble  government 


212  THE    FEDERALIST. 

are  likely  to  be  respected,  even  by  its  own  constituents.  And 
it  teaches  us,  in  addition  to  the  rest,  how  unequal  are  parch- 
ment provisions,  to  a  struggle  with  public  necessity. 

It  was  a  fundamental  maxim  with  the  Lacedemonian  com- 
monwealth, that  the  post  of  admiral  should  not  be  conferred 
twice  on  the  same  person.  The  Peloponnesian  confederates, 
having  suffered  a  severe  defeat  at  sea  from  the  Athenians,  de- 
manded Lysander,  who  had  before  served  with  success  in  that 
capacity,  to  command  the  combined  fleets.  The  Lacedemo- 
nians, to  gratify  their  allies,  and  yet  preserve  the  semblance 
of  an  adherence  to  their  ancient  institutions,  had  recourse  to  the 
flimsy  subterfuge  of  investing  Lysander  with  the  real  power  of 
admiral,  under  the  nominal  title  of  vice-admiral.  This  instance 
is  selected  from  among  a  multitude  that  might  be  cited,  to  con- 
firm the  truth  already  advanced  and  illustrated  by  domestic 
examples;  which  is,  that  nations  pay  little  regard  to  rules  and 
maxims,  calculated  in  their  very  nature  to  run  counter  to  the  ne- 
cessities of  society.  Wise  politicians  will  be  cautious  about  fetter- 
ing the  government  with  restrictions,  that  cannot  be  observed; 
because  they  know,  that  every  breach  of  the  fundamental  laws, 
though  dictated  by  necessity,  impairs  that  sacred  reverence, 
which  ought  to  be  maintained  in  the  breast  of  rulers  towards 
the  constitution  of  a  country,  and  forms  a  precedent  for  other 
breaches,  where  the  same  plea  of  necessity  does  not  exist  at  all, 
or  is  less  urgent  and  palpable. 

PUBLIUB 


THE    FEDERALIST.  213 


fl^ 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXVI. 


NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER    22,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  WITH  THE  SAME  VIEW. 

It  was  a  thing  hardly  to  have  been  expected,  that  in  a  popular 
revolution,  the  minds  of  men  should  stop,  at  that  happy  mean, 
which  marks  the  salutary  boundary  between  power  and  privi- 
lege, and  combines  the  energy  of  government  with  the  security 
of  private  rights.  A  failure  in  this  delicate  and  important 
point,  is  the  great  source  of  the  inconveniences  we  experience ; 
and  if  we  are  not  cautious  to  avoid  a  repetition  of  the  error,  in 
our  future  attempts  to  rectify  and  ameliorate  our  system,  we 
may  travel  from  one  chimerical  project  to  another  j  we  may  try 
change  after  change ;  but  we  shall  never  be  likely  to  make  any 
material  change  for  the  better. 

The  idea  of  restraining  the  legislative  authority,  in  the  means 
of  providing  for  the  national  defence,  is  one  of  those  refinements, 
which  owe  their  origin  to  a  zeal  for  liberty  more  ardent  than  en- 
lightened. We  have  seen,  however,  that  it  has  not  had  thus  far  an 
extensive  prevalency  ;  that  even  in  this  country,  where  it  made 
its  first  appearance,  Pennsylvania  and  North-Carolina,  are  the 
onlv  two  states  by  which  it  has  been  in  any  degree  patronized ; 
and  that  all  the  others  have  refused  to  give  it  the  least  counte- 
nance. They  wisely  judged  that  confidence  must  be  placed 
somewhere  •  that  the  necessity  of  doing  it,  is  implied  in  the  very 


214  THE   FEDERALIST. 

act  of  delegating  power :  and  that  it  is  better  to  hazard  the 
abuse  of  that  confidence,  than  to  embarraos  the  government  and 
endanger  the  public  safety,  by  impolitic  restrictions  on  the  legis- 
lative authority.  The  opponents  of  the  proposed  constitution, 
combat  in  this  respect  the  general  decision  of  America;  and 
instead  of  being  taught  by  experience,  the  propriety  of  correct- 
ing any  extremes,  into  which  we  may  have  heretofore  run ;  they 
appear  disposed  to  conduct  us  into  others  still  more  dangerous, 
and  more  extravagant.  As  if  the  tone  of  government  had  been 
found  too  high,  or  too  rigid,  the  doctrines  they  teach  are  calcu- 
lated to  induce  us  to  depress,  or  to  relax  it,  by  expedients  which 
upon  other  occasions,  have  been  condemned  or  forborne.  It  may 
be  affirmed  without  the  imputation  of  invective,  that  if  the 
principles  they  inculcate  on  various  points,  could  so  far  obtain 
as  to  become  the  popular  creed,  they  would  utterly  unfit  the 
people  of  this  country  for  any  species  of  government  whatever. 
But  a  danger  of  this  kind  is  not  to  be  apprehended.  The  citi- 
zens of  America  have  too  much  discernment  to  be  argued  into 
anarchy.  And  I  am  much  mistaken,  if  experience  has  not 
wrought  a  deep  and  solemn  conviction  in  the  public  mind,  that 
greater  energy  of  government  is  essential  to  the  welfare  and 
prosperity  of  the  community. 

It  may  not  be  amiss  in  this  place,  concisely  to  remark  the 
origin  and  progress  of  the  idea,  which  aims  at  the  exclusion  of 
military  establishments  in  time  of  peace.  Though  in  specula- 
tive minds,  it  may  arise  from  a  contemplation  of  the  nature  and 
tendency  of  such  institutions,  fortified  by  the  events  that  have 
happened  in  other  ages  and  countries ;  yet,  as  a  national  senti- 
ment, it  must  bo  traced  to  those  habits  of  thinking  which  we 
derive  from  the  nation,  from  which  the  inhabitants  of  these 
states  have  in  general  sprung. 

In  England,  for  a  long  time  after  the  Norman  conquest,  the 
authority  of  the  monarch  »vas  almost  unlimited.  Inroads  were 
gradually  made  upon  the  prerogative,  in  favour  of  liberty,  first 
by  the  barons,  and  afterwards  by  the  people,  till  the  greatest 
part  of  its  most  formidable  pretensions  became  extinct.     But  't 


THE    FEDERALIST.  216 

wafr  noi  till  the  revolution  in  1688,  which  elevated  the  pnnce  of 
Orange  to  the  throne  of  Great  Britain,  that  English  liberty  was 
completely  triumphant.  As  incident  to  the  undefined  power  of 
making  war,  an  acknowledged  prerogative  of  the  crown,  Charles 
II.  had,  by  his  own  authority,  kept  on  foot  in  time  of  peace  a 
JOody  of  5,000  regular  troojDS.  And  this  number  James  II,  in- 
'ireased  to  30,000 ;  who  were  paid  out  of  his  civil  list  At  the 
revolution,  to  abolish  the  exercise  of  so  dangerous  an  authority, 
it  became  an  article  of  the  bill  of  rights  then  framed,  that "  raising 
or  keeping  a  standing  army  within  the  kingdom  in  time  of  peace, 
unless  with  the  consent  of  parliament,  was  against  law." 

In  that  kingdom,  when  the  pulse  of  liberty  was  at  its  highest 
pitch,  no  security  against  the  danger  of  standing  armies  was 
thought  requisite,  beyond  a  prohibition  of  their  being  raised  or 
kept  up  by  the  mere  authority  of  the  executive  magistrate. 
The  patriots,  who  effected  that  memorable  revolution,  were  too 
temperate,  and  too  well  informed,  to  think  of  any  restraint  on 
the  legislative  discretion.  They  were  aware,  that  a  certain 
number  of  troops  for  guards  and  garrisons,  were  indispen- 
sable; that  no  precise  bounds  could  be  set  to  the  national 
exigencies ;  that  a  power  equal  to  every  possible  contingency 
must  exist  somewhere  in  the  government ;  and  that  when  they 
referred  the  exercise  of  that  power  to  the  judgment  of  the  legis- 
lature, they  had  arrived  at  the  ultimate  point  of  precaution, 
which  was  reconcileable  with  the  safety  of  the  community. 

From  the  same  source,  the  people  of  America  may  be  said  to 
have  derived  an  hereditary  impression  of  danger  to  liberty,  from 
standing  armies  in  time  of  peace.  The  circumstances  of  a  revo- 
lution, quickened  the  public  sensibility  on  every  point  connected 
with  the  security  of  popular  rights;  and  in  some  instances 
raised  the  warmth  of  our  zeal  beyond  the  degree,  which  con- 
sisted with  the  due  temperature  of  the  body  politic.  The  at- 
tempts of  two  of  the  states,  to  restrict  the  authority  of  the  legis- 
lature in  the  article  of  military  establishments,  are  of  the  num- 
ber of  these  instances.  The  principles,  which  had  taught  us  to 
be  jealous  of  the  power  of  an  hereditary  monarch,  were,  by  an 


216  THE    FEDERALIST. 

injudicious  excess,  extended  to  the  repre8entative8  of  the  people 
in  their  popular  assemblies.  Even  in  some  of  the  states,  where 
this  error  was  not  adopted,  we  find  unnecessary  declarations, 
that  standing  armies  ought  not  to  be  kept  up,  in  time  of  peace, 
without  the  consent  of  the  legislature ;  I  call  them  unnecessary, 
because  the  reason,  which  had  introduced  a  similar  provision 
into  the  English  bill  of  rights,  is  not  applicable  to  any  of  the 
state  constitutions.  The  power  of  raising  armies  at  all,  under 
those  constitutions,  can  by  no  construction  be  deemed  to  reside 
any  where  else,  than  in  the  legislatures  themselves ;  and  it  was 
superfluous,  if  not  absurd,  to  declare,  that  a  matter  should  not 
be  done  without  the  consent  of  a  body,  which  alone  had  the 
power  of  doing  it.  Accordingly,  in  some  of  those  constitutions, 
and  among  others,  in  that  of  the  state  of  New- York,  which  has 
been  justly  celebrated,  both  in  Europe  and  America,  as  one  of 
the  best  of  the  forms  of  government  established  in  this  country, 
there  is  a  total  silence  upon  the  subject. 

It  is  remarkable,  that  even  in  the  two  states,  which  seem  to 
have  meditated  an  interdiction  of  military  establishments  in 
time  of  peace,  the  mode  of  expression  made  use  of  is  rather 
monitory,  than  prohibitory.  It  is  not  said,  that  standing  armies 
shall  not  he  kept  up,  but  that  they  ought  not  to  be  kept  up  in  time 
of  peace.  This  ambiguity  of  terms  appears  to  have  been  the 
result  of  a  conflict  between  jealousy  and  conviction,  between 
the  desire  of  excluding  such  establishments  at  all  events,  and 
the  persuasion  that  an  absolute  exclusion  would  be  unwise  and 
unsafe. 

Can  it  be  doubted  that  such  a  provision,  wheneyer  the  situa- 
tion of  public  affairs  was  understood  to  require  a  departure 
from  it,  would  be  interpreted  by  the  legislature  into  a  mero 
admonition,  and  would  be  made  to  yield  to  the  actual  or  sup 
posed  necessities  of  the  state  ?  Let  the  fact  already  mentioned 
with  respect  to  Pennsylvania,  decide.  "What  then,  it  may  be 
asked,  is  the  use  of  such  a  provision,  if  it  cease  to  operate,  the 
moment  there  is  an  inclination  to  disregard  it  ? 

Let  us  examine  whether  the^e  be  any  comparison,  in  point  of 


THE    FEDERALIST.  21T 

efficacy,  between  the  provision  alluded  to,  and  tLat  which  la 
contained  in  the  new  constitution,  for  restraining  the  appropri- 
ations of  money  for  military  purposes,  to  the  period  of  two 
years.  The  former,  by  aiming  at  too  much,  is  calculated  to 
effect  nothing ;  the  latter,  by  steering  clear  of  an  imprudent 
extreme,  and  by  being  perfectly  compatible  with  a  proper  pro- 
vision for  the  exigencies  of  the  nation,  will  have  a  salutary  and 
powerful  operation. 

The  legislature  of  the  United  States  will  be  obliged,  by  this 
provision,  once  at  least  in  every  two  years,  to  deliberate  upon 
the  propriety  of  keeping  a  military  force  on  foot ;  to  come  to  a 
new  resolution  on  the  point ;  and  to  declare  their  sense  of  the 
matter,  by  a  formal  vote  in  the  face  of  their  constituents.  They 
are  not  at  liberty  to  vest  in  the  executive  department,  permanent 
funds  for  the  support  of  an  army  ;  if  they  were  even  incautious 
enough  to  be  willing  to  repose  in  it  so  improper  a  confidence. 
As  the  spirit  of  party,  in  different  degrees,  must  be  expected  to 
infect  all  political  bodies,  there  will  be,  no  doubt,  persons  in  the 
national  legislature  willing  enough  to  arraign  the  measures,  and 
criminate  the  views  of  the  majority.  The  provision  for  the 
support  of  a  military  force,  will  always  be  a  favourable  topic  for 
declamation.  As  often  as  the  question  comes  forward,  the  public 
attention  will  be  roused  and  attracted  to  the  subject,  by  the 
party  in  opposition :  And  if  the  majority  should  be  really  dis- 
posed to  exceed  the  proper  limits,  the  community  will  be  warned 
of  the  danger,  and  will  have  an  opportunity  of  taking  measures 
to  guard  against  it.  Independent  of  parties  in  the  national 
legislature  itself,  as  often  as  the  period  of  discussion  arrived,  the 
state  legislatures,  who  will  always  be  not  only  vigilant,  but  sus- 
picious and  jealous  guardians  of  the  rights  of  the  citizens,  against 
encroachments  from  the  federal  government,  will  constantly 
have  their  attention  awake  to  the  conduct  of  the  national  rulers, 
and  will  be  ready  enough,  if  any  thing  improper  appears,  to 
sound  the  alarm  to  the  people,  and  not  only  to  be  the  voice,  but 
if  necessary,  the  arm  of  their  discontent. 

Schemes  to  subvert  the  liberties  of  a  great  community,  require 


218  THE    FEDERALIST. 

time  tc  mature  them  for  executior..  Ar  army,  so  large  as  se- 
riously to  menace  those  liberties,  could  »nly  Ov  formed  by  pro- 
gressive augmentations;  which  wouh  suppos  ,  not  merely  a 
temporary  combination  between  the  '(gisla^-ure  an-l  executive, 
but  a  continued  conspiracy  for  a  seri^h  of  time.  If  t  probable 
that  such  a  combination  would  exist  ac  all?  Is  it  jn  jbable  that 
it  would  be  persevered  in,  and  transmitted  through  all  the  suc- 
cessive variations  in  the  representative  body,  wh  ch  biennial 
elections  would  naturally  produce  in  both  houe  .s  Is  it  pre- 
sumable, that  every  man,  the  instant  he  t'>ok  lifj  seat  in  the 
national  senate,  or  house  of  representatives  would  commence  a 
traitor  to  his  constituents,  and  to  his  count.'y  ?  Can  it  be  sup- 
posed, that  there  would  not  be  found  one  man,  discerning  enough 
to  detact  so  atrocious  a  conspiracy,  or  bold  or  honest  enough  to 
apprise  his  constituents  of  their  danger.?  If  su«jh  presumptions 
can  fairly  be  made,  there  ought  at  once  to  be  an  end  of  all  dele- 
gated authority.  The  people  should  resolve  to  recal  all  the 
powers  they  have  heretofore  parted  with ;  and  to  divide  them- 
selves into  as  many  states  as  there  are  counties,  in  order  that 
they  may  be  able  to  manage  their  own  concerns  in  person. 

If  such  suppositions  could  even  be  reasonably  made,  still  the 
concealment  of  the  design,  for  any  duration,  would  be  imprac- 
ticable. It  would  be  announced,  by  the  very  circumstance  of 
augmenting  the  army  to  so  great  an  extent,  in  time  of  profound 
peace.  "What  colourable  reason  could  be  assigned,  in  a  country 
so  situated,  for  such  vast  augmentations  of  the  military  force  ? 
It  is  impossible  that  the  people  could  be  long  deceived ;  and  the 
destruction  of  the  project,  and  of  the  projectors,  would  quickly 
follow  the  discovery 

It  has  been  said,  that  the  provision,  which  limits  the  appro- 
priation of  money  for  the  support  of  an  army  to  the  period  of 
two  years,  would  be  unavailing;  because  the  executive,  when 
once  possessed  of  a  force  large  enough  to  awe  the  people  into 
submission,  would  find  resources  in  that  very  force,  sufficient  to 
enable  him  to  dispense  with  supplies  from  the  votes  of  the  legis- 
lature.    But  the  question  again  recurs:    Upon  what  pretence 


THE    FEDERALIST.  219 

could  he  be  put  in  possession  of  a  force  of  that  magnitude,  in 
time  of  peace  ?  If  we  suppose  it  to  have  been  created  in  con- 
sequence of  some  domestic  insurrection  or  foreign  war,  then  it 
becomes  a  case  not  within  the  principle  of  the  objection ;  for 
this  is  levelled  against  the  power  of  keeping  up  troops  in  time 
of  peace.  Few  persons  will  be  so  visionary,  as  seriously  to  con- 
tend that  military  forces  ought  not  to  be  raised  to  quell  a 
rebellion,  or  resist  an  invasion ;  and  if  the  defence  of  the  com- 
munity, under  such  circumstances,  should  make  it  necessary  to 
have  an  army,  so  numerous  as  to  hazard  its  liberty,  this  is  one 
of  those  calamities  for  which  there  is  neither  preventative  nor 
cure.  It  cannot  be  provided  against,  by  any  possible  form  of 
government :  It  might  even  result  from  a  simple  league  offensive 
and  defensive ;  if  it  should  ever  be  necessary  for  the  confederates 
or  allies,  to  form  an  army  for  common  defence. 

But  it  is  an  evil  infinitely  less  likely  to  attend  us  in  an 
united,  than  in  a  disunited  state;  nay,  it  may  be  safely  a.sserted, 
that  it  is  an  evil  altogether  unlikely  to  attend  us  in  the  latter 
situation.  It  is  not  easy  to  conceive  a  possibility,  that  dangers 
so  formidable  can  assail  the  whole  union,  as  to  demand  a  force 
considerable  enough  to  place  our  liberties  in  the  least  jeopardy, 
especially  if  we  take  into  view  the  aid  to  be  derived  from  the 
militia,  which  ought  always  to  be  counted  upon,  as  a  valuable 
and  powerful  auxiliary.  But  in  a  state  of  disunion,  as  has  been 
fully  shown  in  another  place,  the  contrary  of  this  supposition  would 
become  not  only  probable,  but  almost  unavoidable. 

PUBLIUS 


220  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   XXVII. 


NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER  26,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SUBJECT   CONTINUED,  WITH   THE  SAME    VIEW. 

It  has  been  urged,  in  different  shapes,  that  a  constitution  of 
the  kind  proposed  by  the  convention,  cannot  operate,  without 
the  aid  of  a  military  force  to  execute  its  laws.  This,  however, 
like  most  other  things  that  have  been  alleged  on  that  side,  rests 
on  mere  general  assertion,  unsupported  by  any  precise  or  intel- 
ligible designation  of  the  reasons  upon  which  it  is  founded.  As 
far  as  I  have  been  able  to  divine  the  latent  meaning  of  the 
objectors,  it  seems  to  originate  in  a  pre-supposition,  that  the 
people  will  be  disinclined  to  the  exercise  of  federal  authority, 
in  any  matter  of  an  internal  nature.  Waving  any  exception 
that  might  be  taken  to  the  inaccuracy,  or  inexplicitness,  of  the 
distinction  between  internal  and  external,  let  us  inquire  what 
ground  there  is  to  pre-suppose  that  disinclination  in  the  people. 
Unless  we  presume,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  powers  of  the 
general  government  will  be  worse  administered  than  those  of 
the  state  governments,  there  seems  to  be  no  room  for  the  pre- 
sumption of  ill  will,  disaffection,  or  opposition  in  the  people. 
I  believe  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  rule,  that  their  confi- 
dence in,  and  their  obedience  to,  a  government,  will  commonly 
be  proportioned  to  the  goodness  or  badness  of  its  administration 
It  must  b    admitted,  that  there  are  exceptions  to  this  rule  ;  but 


THE   FEDERALIST.  221 

these  exceptions  depend  so  entirely  on  accidental  causes,  that 
they  cannot  be  considered  as  having  any  relation  to  the  intrinsic 
merits  or  demerits  of  a  constitution.  These  can  only  be  judged 
of  by  general  principles  and  maxims. 

Various  reasons  have  been  suggested,  in  the  course  of  tliese 
papers,  to  induce  a  probability,  that  the  general  government 
will  be  better  administered,  than  the  particular  governments; 
the  principal  of  which  are,  that  the  extension  of  the  spheres  of 
election  will  present  a^reater  option,  or  latitude  of  choice,  to  the 
people;  that,  through  the  medium  of  the  state  legislatures,  who 
are  select  bodies  of  men,  and  who  are  to  appoint  the  members 
of  the  national  senate,  there  is  reason  to  expect,  that  this  branch 
will  generally  be  composed  with  peculiar  care  and  judgment; 
that  these  circumstances  promise  greater  knowledge,  and  more 
comprehensive  information,  in  the  national  councils;  and  that, 
on  account  of  the  extent  of  the  country  from  which  will  be 
drawn  those  to  whose  direction  they  will  be  committed,  they 
will  be  less  apt  to  be  tainted  by  the  spirit  of  faction,  and  more 
out  of  the  reach  of  those  occasional  ill  humours,  or  temporary 
prejudices  and  propensities,  which,  in  smaller  societies,  frequently 
contaminate  the  public  deliberations,  beget  injustice  and  oppres- 
sion towards  a  part  of  the  community,  and  engender  schemes, 
which,  though  they  gratify  a  momentary  inclination  or  desire, 
terminate  in  general  distress,  dissatisfaction,  and  disgust.  Seve- 
ral additional  reasons  of  considerable  force,  will  occur,  to  fortify 
that  probability,  when  we  come  to  survey,  with  a  more  critical 
eye,  the  interior  structure  of  the  edifice  which  we  are  invited  to 
erect.  It  will  be  suflScient  here  to  remark,  that,  until  satisfac- 
tory reasons  can  be  assigned  to  justify  an  opinion,  that  the 
federal  government  is  likely  to  be  administered  in  such  a  manner, 
as  to  render  it  odious  or  contemptible  to  the  people,  there  can 
be  no  reasonable  foundation  for  the  supposition,  that  the  laws  of 
the  union  will  meet  with  any  greater  obstruction  from  them,  or 
will  stand  in  need  of  any  other  methods  to  enforce  their  execu- 
tion, than  the  laws  of  the  particular  members. 

The  hope  of  impunity,  is  a  strong  incitement  to  sedition ;  tb« 


1522  THE    FEDEll  VLIST. 

dread  of  punishment,  a  projiortionably  strong  discouragement 
10  it.  W  ill  not  the  government  of  the  union,  which,  if  possessed 
of  a  due  degree  of  power,  2an  call  to  its  aid  the  collective 
resources  of  the  whole  confederacy,  be  more  likely  to  repress 
the  former  sentiment,  and  to  inspire  the  latter,  than  that  of  a 
single  state,  which  can  only  command  the  resources  within 
itself?  A  turbulent  faction  in  a  state,  may  easily  suppose  itself 
able  to  contend  with  the  friends  to  the  government  in  that  state; 
but  it  can  hardly  be  so  infatuated,  as  to  ipiagine  itself  equal  to 
the  combined  efforts  of  the  union.  If  this  reflection  be  just, 
there  is  less  danger  of  resistance  from  irregular  combinations 
of  individuals,  to  the  authority  of  the  confederacy,  than  to  that 
of  a  single  member. 

I  will,  in  the  first  place,  hazard  an  observation,  which  will  not 
be  the  less  just,  because  to  some  it  may  appear  new;  which  is, 
that  the  more  the  operations  of  the  national  authority  are  inter- 
mingled in  the  ordinary  exercise  of  government,  the  more  the 
citizens  are  accustomed  to  meet  with  it  in  the  common  occur- 
rences of  their  poliiical  life;  the  more  it  is  familiarized  to  their 
sight,  and  to  their  feelings;  the  further  it  enters  into  those 
objects,  which  touch  the  most  sensible  cords,  and  put  in  motion 
the  most  active  springs  of  the  human  heart;  the  greater  will 
be  the  probability,  that  it  will  conciliate  the  respect  and  attach- 
ment of  the  community.  Man  is  very  much  a  creature  of  habit. 
A  thing  that  rarely  strikes  his  senses,  will  have  but  a  transient 
influence  upon  his  mind.  A.  government  continually  at  a  dis- 
tance and  out  of  sight,  can  hardly  be  expected  to  interest  the 
sensations  of  the  people.  The  inference  is,  that  the  authority 
of  the  union,  and  the  affections  of  the  citizens  towards  it,  will 
be  strengthened,  rather  than  weakened,  by  its  extension  to  what 
are  called  matters  of  internal  concern;  and  thait  it  will  have  less 
occasion  to  recur  to  force,  in  proportion  to  the  familiarity  and 
comprehensiveness  of  its  agency.  The  more  it  circulates  through 
those  channels  and  currents,  in  which  the  passions  of  mankind  natu- 
rally flow,  the  less  will  it  require  the  aid  of  the  violent  and  perilous 
expedients  of  compulsion. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  223 

Une  thing,  at  all  events,  must  be  evident,  that  a  government 
like  the  one  proposed,  would  bid  much  fairer  to  avoid  the  neces- 
Bity  of  using  ."'^rce,  than  the  species  of  league  contended  for  by 
most  of  its  opponents;  the  authority  of  which  should  only  ope- 
rate upon  the  states  in  their  political  or  collective  capacities.  It 
has  been  shown,  that  in  such  a  confederacy,  there  can  be  no 
sanction  for  the  laws  but  force;  that  frequent  delinquencies  in 
the  members,  are  the  natural  offspring  of  the  very  frame  of  the 
government;  and  that  as  often  as  these  happen,  they  can  only 
be  redressed,  if  at  all,  by  war  auc'  violence. 

The  plan  reported  by  the  couvention,  by  extending  the 
authority  of  the  federal  head  to  the  individual  citizens  of  the 
several  states,  will  enable  the  government  to  employ  the  ordi- 
nary magistracy  of  each,  in  the  execution  of  its  laws.  It  is 
easy  to  perceive,  that  this  will  tend  to  destroy,  in  the  common 
apprehension,  all  distinction  between  the  sources  from  which 
they  might  proceed;  and  will  give  the  federal  government  the 
same  advantage  for  securing  a  due  obedience  to  its  authority, 
which  is  enjoyed  by  the  government  of  each  state;  in  addition 
to  the  influence  on  public  opinion,  which  will  result  from  the 
important  consideration,  of  its  having  power  to  call  to  its  assist- 
ance and  support  the  resources  of  the  whole  union.  It  merits 
particular  attention  in  this  place,  that  the  laws  of  the  con- 
federacy, as  to  the  enumerated  and  legitimate  objects  of  its  juris- 
diction, will  become  the  supreme  law  of  the  land;  to  the  ob- 
servance of  which,  all  officers,  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial, 
in  each  state,  will  be  bound  by  the  sanctity  of  an  oath.  Thus 
the  legislatures,  courts,  and  magistrates,  of  the  respective  mem- 
bers, will  be  incorporated  into  the  operations  of  the  national 
government,  as  far  as  its  just  and  constitutional  authority  extends  ; 
and  will  be  rendered  auxiliary  to  the  enforcement  of  its  laws.* 
Any  man,  who  will  pursue,  by  his  own  reflections,  the  conse- 
quences of  this  situation,  will  perceive,  that  if  its  powers  are 
administered  with  a  common  share  of  prudence,  there  is  good 

*  The  sophistry  which  has  been  employed,  to  show  tlmt  this  will  tend  to  the 
destruction  of  the  state  governments  will,  in  its  proper  place,  be  fully  detected. 


224  THE   FEDERALIST. 

ground  to  calculate  upon  a  regular  and  peaceable  execution  of 
the  laws  of  the  union.  If  we  will  arbitrarily  suppose  the  con- 
trary, we  may  deduce  any  inferences  we  please  from  the  suppo- 
sition; for  it  is  certainly  possible,  by  an  injudicious  exercise  of 
the  authorities  of  the  best  government  that  ever  was,  or  ever 
can  be  instituted,  to  provoke  and  precipitate  the  people  into  the 
wildest  excesses.  But  though  the  adversaries  of  the  proposed 
constitution  should  presume,  that  the  national  rulers  would  be 
insensible  to  the  motives  of  public  good,  or  to  the  obligations  of 
duty;  I  would  still  ask  them,  how  the  irterests  of  ambition,  or 
the  views  of  encroachment,  can  be  promo  ^d  by  such  a  conduct  ? 

PUBLIUS. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  225 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XXVIII. 


NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER   26,  1787. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME   SUBJECT   CONTINUED. 

That  there  may  happen  eases,  in  which  the  national  govern- 
ment may  be  under  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  force,  cannot 
be  denied.  Our  own  experience  has  corroborated  the  lessons 
taught  by  the  examples  of  other  nations;  that  emergencies  of 
this  sort  will  sometimes  exist  in  all  societies,  however  con- 
stituted ;  that  seditions  and  insurrections  are,  unhappily,  mala- 
dies as  inseparable  from  the  body  politic,  as  tumours  and  erup- 
tions from  the  natural  body ;  that  the  idea  of  governing  at  all 
times  by  the  simple  force  of  law,  (which  we  have  been  told  is  the 
only  admissible  principle  of  republican  government)  has  no  place 
but  in  the  reveries  of  those  political  doctors,  whose  sagacity  disdains 
the  admonitions  of  experimental  instruction. 

Should  such  emergencies  at  any  time  happen  under  the 
national  government,  there  could  be  no  remedy  but  force.  The 
means  to  be  employed,  must  be  proportioned  to  the  extent  of 
the  mischief.  If  it  should  be  a  slight  commotion  in  a  small  part 
of  a  state,  the  militia  of  the  residue  would  be  adequate  to  its 
suppression :  and  the  natural  presumption  is,  that  they  would 
be  ready  to  do  their  duty.  An  insurrection,  whatever  may  be 
its  immediate  cause,  eventually  endangers  all  government:  Re- 
gard to  the  public  peace,  if  not  to  the  rights  of  the  union,  would 


226  THE    FEDERALIST. 

engage  the  ci  izens,  to  whom  the  contagion  had  not  ^l"ommuni- 
cated  itself,  to  oppose  the  insurgents :  And  if  the  general  gov- 
ernment should  be  found  in  practice  conducive  to  the  prosperity 
and  felicity  of  the  people,  it  were  irrational  to  believe  that  they 
would  be  disinclined  to  its  support. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  insurrection  should  pervade  a  whole 
state,  or  a  principal  part  of  it,  the  employment  of  a  different 
kind  of  force  might  become  unavoidable.  It  appears  that  Mas- 
sachusetts found  it  necessary  to  raise  troops  for  suppressing  the 
disorders  within  that  state;  that  Pennsylvania,  from  the  mere 
apprehension  of  commotions  among  a  part  of  her  citizens,  has 
thought  proper  to  have  recourse  to  the  same  measure.  Suppose 
the  state  of  New- York  had  been  inclined  to  re-establish  her  lost 
jurisdiction  over  the  inhabitants  of  Vermont;  could  she  have 
hoped  for  success  in  such  an  enterprise,  from  the  efforts  of  the 
militia  alone  ?  Would  she  not  have  been  compelled  to  raise,  and 
to  maintain,  a  more  regular  force  for  the  execution  of  her  de- 
sign ?  If  it  must  then  be  admitted,  that  the  necessity  of  recur- 
ring to  a  force  different  from  the  militia,  in  cases  of  this  extra- 
ordinary nature,  is  applicable  to  the  state  governments  them- 
selves, why  should  the  possibility,  that  the  national  government 
might  be  under  a  like  necessity  in  similar  extremities,  be  made 
an  objection  to  its  existence?  Is  it  not  surprising  that  men, 
who  declare  an  attachment  to  the  union  in  the  abstract,  should 
urge,  as  an  objection  to  the  proposed  constitution,  what  applies 
with  ten-fold  weight  to  the  plan  for  which  they  contend;  and 
what,  as  far  as  it  has  any  foundation  in  truth,  is  an  inevitable 
consequence  of  civil  society  upon  an  enlarged  scale  ?  who  would 
not  prefer  that  possibility,  to  the  unceasing  agitations,  and  fre- 
quent revolutions,  which  are  the  continual  scourges  of  petty 
republics  ? 

Let  us  pursue  this  examination  m  another  light.  Suppose,  in 
lieu  of  one  general  system,  two  cr  three,  or  even  four  confede- 
racies were  to  be  formed,  would  not  the  same  diflSculty  oppose 
itself  to  the  operations  of  either  of  these  confederacies?  Would 
not  each  of  them  be  exposed  to  the  same  casualties;  and,  when 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


'ITi 


these  happened,  be  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  the  same  expe- 
dients for  upholding  its  authority,  which  are  objected  to  a  govern- 
ment for  all  the  states?  Would  the  militia,  in  this  supposition,  be 
more  ready  or  more  able  to  support  the  federal  authority,  than  in 
the  case  of  a  general  union?  All  candid  and  intelligent  men 
must,  upon  due  consideration,  acknowledge  that  the  principle  of 
the  objection  is  equally  applicable  to  either  of  the  two  cases;  and 
that  whether  we  have  one  government  for  all  the  states,  or 
different  governments  for  different  parcels  of  them,  or  as  man}- 
unconnected  governments  as  there  are  stat^,  there  might  some- 
times be  a  necessity,  to  make  use  of  a  force  constituted  differ- 
ently from  the  militia,  to  preserve  the  peace  of  the  community, 
and  to  maintain  the  just  authority  of  the  laws  against  those 
violent  invasions  of  them,  which  amount  to  insurrections  and 
rebellions. 

Independent  of  all  other  reasonings  upon  the  subject,  it  is  a 
full  answer  to  those  who  require  a  more  peremptory  provision 
against  military  establishments  in  time  of  peace,  to  say,  that 
the  whole  power  of  the  proposed  government  is  to  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  representatives  of  the  people.  This  is  the  essential, 
and,  after  all,  the  only  eflScacious  security  for  the  rights  and  privi- 
leges of  the  people,  which  is  attainable  in  civil  society.* 

If  the  representatives  of  the  people  betray  their  constituents, 
there  is  then  no  resource  left  but  in  the  exertion  of  that  original 
right  of  self-defence,  which  is  paramount  to  all  positive  forms  of 
government;  and  which,  against  the  usurpation  of  the  national 
rulers,  may  be  exerted  with  an  infinitely  better  prospect  of 
success,  than  against  those  of  the  rulers  of  an  individual  state. 
In  a  single  state,  if  the  persons  intrusted  with  supreme  power 
become  usurpers,  the  different  parcels,  subdivisions,  or  districts, 
of  which  it  consists,  having  no  distinct  government  in  each,  can 
take  no  regular  measures  for  defence.  The  citizens  must  rush 
tumultuously  to  arms,  without  concert,  without  system,  without 
resource;    except    in    their    courage    and    despair.      The   usurpers 

*  Its  full  efficacy  will  be  rxamined  hereafter. 


22>5  THE    FEDERALIST. 

cloathed  with  the  forms  of  legal  authority,  can  too  often  crush 
the  opposition  in  embryo.  The  smaller  the  extent  of  territory 
the  more  difficult  will  it  be  for  the  people  to  form  a  regular,  or 
syistematic  plan  of  opposition ;  and  the  more  easy  will  it  be  to 
defeat  their  early  efforts.  Intelligence  can  be  more  speedily 
obtained  of  their  preparations  and  movements ;  and  the  military 
force  in  the  possession  of  the  usurpers,  can  be  more  rapidly 
directed  against  the  part  where  the  opposition  has  begun.  In 
this  situation,  there  must  be  a  peculiar  coincidence  of  circum- 
stances, to  ensure  subcess  to  the  popular  resistance. 

The  obstacles  to  usurpation,  and  the  facilities  of  resistance, 
increase  with  the  increased  extent  of  the  state;  provided  the 
citizens  understand  their  rights,  and  are  disposed  to  defend 
them.  The  natural  strength  of  the  people  in  a  large  commu- 
nity, in  proportion  to  the  artificial  strength  of  the  government, 
is  greater  than  in  a  small ;  and  of  course  more  competent  to  a 
struggle  with  the  attempts  of  the  government  to  establish  a 
tyranny.  But  in  a  confederacy,  the  people,  without  exaggera- 
tion, may  be  said  to  be  entirely  the  masters  of  their  own  fate. 
Power  being  almost  always  the  rival  of  power;  the  general 
government  will,  at  all  times,  stand  ready  to  check  the  usurpa- 
tions of  the  state  governments ;  and  these  will  have  the  same 
disposition  towards  the  general  government.  The  people,  by 
throwing  themselves  into  either  scale,  will  infallibly  make  it 
preponderate.  If  their  rights  are  invaded  by  either,  they  can 
make  use  of  the  other,  as  the  instrument  of  redress.  How  wise 
will  it  be  in  them,  by  cherishing  the  union,  to  preserve  to  them- 
selves an  advantage  which  can  never  be  too  highly  prized  ! 

It  may  safely  be  received  as  an  axiom  in  our  political  system, 
that  the  state  governments  will,  in  all  possible  contingencies, 
afford  complete  security  against  invasions  of  the  public  liberty 
by  the  national  authority.  Projects  of  usurpation,  cannot  be 
masked  under  pretences,  so  likely  to  escape  the  penetration  of 
select  bodies  of  men,  as  of  the  people  at  large.  The  legislatures 
will  have  better  means  of  information,  they  can  discover  the 
danger  at  a  distance;   and   possessing  all  the  organ?  of  civil 


THE   FEDERALIST.  229 

[lower,  and  the  confidence  of  the  people,  they  can  at  onco  adopt 
a  regular  plan  of  opposition,  in  which  they  can  combine  all  the 
resources  of  the  community.  They  can  readily  communicate 
Hith  each  other  in  the  different  states;  and  unite  their  common 
.  forces,  for  the  protection  of  their  common  liberty. 

The  great  extent  of  the  country,  is  a  further  security.  "We 
have  already  experienced  its  utility,  against  the  attacks  of  a 
foreign  enemy.  And  it  would  have  precisely  the  same  effect 
against  the  enterprises  of  ambitious  rulers  in  the  national 
councils.  If  the  federal  army  should  be  able  to  quell  the  re- 
sistance of  one  state,  the  distant  states  would  have  it  in  their 
power  to  make  head  with  fresh  forces.  The  advantages  ob- 
tained in  one  place  must  be  abandoned,  to  subdue  the  opposition 
in  others  ;  and  the  moment  the  part  which  had  been  reduced  to 
submission  was  left  to  itself,  its  efforts  would  be  renewed,  and 
its  resistance  revive. 

We  should  recollect,  that  the  extent  of  the  military  force, 
must,  at  all  events,  be  regulated  by  the  resources  of  the  country. 
For  a  long  time  to  come,  it  will  not  be  possible  to  maintain  a 
large  army ;  and  as  the  means  of  doing  this,  increase,  the  popu- 
lation, and  the  natural  strength  of  the  community  will  propor- 
tionably  increase.  When  will  the  time  arrive,  that  the  federal 
government  can  raise  and  maintain  an  army  capable  of  erecting 
a  despotism  over  the  great  body  of  the  people  of  an  immense 
empire;  who  are  in  a  situation,  through  the  medium  of  their 
state  governments,  to  take  measures  for  their  own  defence  with 
all  the  celerity,  regularity,  and  system,  of  independent  nations  ? 
The  apprehension  may  be  considered  as  a  disease,  for  which 
there  can  be  found  lo  cure  in  the  resr/urces  of  argument  and 
reasoning 

PUBLIUS 


280  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXIX. 


NEW  YORK,    JANUARY  11,  1788. 


HAMILTON. 


CONCERNING    THE    MILITIA. 

The  power  of  regulating  the  militia,  and  of  commanding  itf» 
nervices  in  times  of  insurrection  and  invasion,  are  natural  inci- 
dents to  the  duties  of  superintending  the  common  defence,  and 
of  watching  over  the  internal  peace  of  the  confederacy. 

It  requires  no  skill  in  the  science  of  war  to  discern,  that  uni- 
formity in  the  organization  and  discipline  of  the  militia,  would 
be  attended  with  the  most  beneficial  effects,  whenever  they 
were  called  into  service  for  the  public  defence.  It  would  enable 
them  to  discharge  the  duties  of  the  camp,  and  of  the  field,  with 
mutual  intelligence  and  concert;  an  advantage  of  peculiar 
moment  in  the  operations  of  an  army ;  And  it  would  fit  them 
much  sooner  to  acquire  the  degree  of  proficiency  in  military 
functions,  which  would  be  essential  to  their  usefulness.  This 
desirable  uniformity  can  only  be  accomplished,  by  confiding  the 
regulation  of  the  militia,  to  the  direction  of  the  national  author- 
ity. It  is  therefore  with  the  most  evident  propriety,  that  the 
plan  of  the  convention  proposes  to  empower  the  union  "  to  pro- 
vide for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  militia,  and  for 
governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  reserving  to  the  states  respectively  the  appoint 


THE    FEDERALIST.  231 

nerd  of  the  officers,  and  the  authority  of  training  the  militia  accord- 
ing to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress." 

Of  the  different  grounds,  which  have  been  taken  in  oppopition 
to  this  plan,  there  is  Hone  that  was  so  little  to  have  been  ex- 
pected, or  is  so  untenable  in  itself,  as  the  one  from  which  this 
particular  provision  has  been  attacked.  If  a  well  regulated 
militia  be  the  most  natural  defence  of  a  free  country,  it  ought 
certainly  to  be  under  the  regulation,  and  at  the  disposal  of  that 
body,  which  is  constituted  the  guardian  of  the  national  security. 
If  standing  armies  are  dangerous  to  liberty,  an  efficacious  power 
over  the  militia,  in  the  same  body,  ought,  as  far  as  possible,  to 
take  away  the  inducement  and  the  pretext,  to  such  unfriendly 
institutions.  If  the  federal  government  can  command  the  aid 
of  the  militia  in  those  emergencies,  which  call  for  the  military 
arm  in  support  of  the  civil  magistrate,  it  can  the  better  dispense 
with  the  employment  of  a  different  kind  of  force.  If  it  cannot 
avail  itself  of  the  former,  it  will  be  obliged  to  recur  to  the  latter. 
To  render  an  army  unnecessary,  will  be  a  more  certain  method 
of  preventing  its  existence,  than  a  thousand  prohibitions  upon 
paper. 

In  order  to  cast  an  odium  upon  the  power  of  calling  forth  the 
militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  union,  it  has  been  remarked, 
that  there  is  no  where  any  provision  in  the  proposed  constitu- 
tion for  requiring  the  aid  of  the  posse  comitatus,  to  assist  the 
magistrate  in  the  execution  of  his  duty;  whence  it  has  been 
inferred,  that  military  force  was  intended  to  be  his  only  auxi- 
liarJ^  There  is  a  striking  incoherence  in  the  objections  which 
have  appeared,  and  sometimes  even  from  the  same  quarter,  not 
much  calculated  to  inspire  a  very  favourable  opinion  of  the 
sincerity  or  fair  dealing  of  their  authors.  The  same  persons 
who  tell  us  in  one  breath,  that  the  powers  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment will  be  despotic  and  unlimited,  inform  us  in  the  next, 
that  it  has  not  authority  sufficient  even  to  call  out  the  posse 
COMITATUS.  The  latter,  fortunately,  is  as  much  short  of  the 
truth,  as  the  former  exceeds  it.  It  would  be  as  absurd  to  doubt, 
*hat  a  right  to  pass  all  laws  necessary  and  proper  to  execute  its 


232  THE   FEDERALIST. 

declared  powers,  would  include  that  of  requiring  the  assistance 
of  the  citizens  to  the  oflficers  who  may  be  intrusted  with  the 
execution  of  those  laws ;  as  it  would  be  to  believe,  that  a  right 
to  enact  laws  necessary  and  proper  for  the  imposition  and  col- 
lection of  taxes,  would  involve  that  of  varying  the  rules  of 
descent,  and  of  the  alienation  of  landed  property,  or  of  abolish- 
ing the  trial  by  jury  in  cases  relating  to  it.  It  being  therefore 
evident,  that  the  supposition  of  a  want  of  power  to  require  the 
aid  of  the  posse  comitatus  is  entirely  destitute  of  colour,  it  will 
follow,  that  the  conclusion  which  has  been  drawn  from  it,  in  its 
application  to  the  authority  of  the  federal  government  over  the 
militia,  is  as  uncandid,  as  it  is  illogical.  Wha-t  reason  could 
there  be  to  infer,  that  force  was  intended  to  be  the  sole  instru- 
ment of  authority,  merely  because  there  is  a  power  to  make  use 
of  it  when  necessary  ?  What  shall  we  think  of  the  motives 
which  could  induce  men  of  sense  to  reason  in  this  extraordinar}' 
manner  ?  How  shall  we  prevent  a  conflict  between  charity  and 
conviction  ? 

By  a  curious  refinement  upon  the  spirit  of  republican  jealousy, 
we  are  even  taught  to  apprehend  danger  from  the  militia  itself, 
in  the  hands  of  the  federal  government.  It  is  observed,  that 
select  corps  may  be  formed,  composed  of  the  young  and  the 
ardent,  who  may  be  rendered  subservient  to  the  views  of  arbi- 
trary power.  "What  plan  for  the  regulation  of  the  militia,  may 
be  pursued  by  the  national  government,  is  impossible  to  be  fore- 
seen. But  so  far  from  viewing  the  matter  in  the  same  light 
with  those  who  object  to  select  corps  as  dangerous,  were  the 
constitution  ratified,  and  were  I  to  deliver  my  sentiments  to  a 
member  of  the  federal  legislature  on  the  subject  of  a  militia 
establishment,  I  should  hold  to  him  in  substance  the  following 
discourse: 

"  The  project  of  disciplining  all  the  militia  of  the  United 
States,  is  as  futile  as  it  would  be  injurious,  if  it  were  capable  of 
being  carried  into  execution.  A  tolerable  expertness  in  military 
movements,  is  a  business  that  requires  time  and  practice.  It  is 
not  a  day,  nor  a  week,  nor  even  a  month  that  will  suffice  foi  <Jie 


THE   FEDERALIST.  233 

attainment  of  it.  To  oblige  the  great  body  of  the  yeomanry, 
and  of  the  other  classes  of  the  citizens,  to  be  under  arms  for  the 
purpose  of  going  through  m'litary  exercises  and  evolutions,  as 
often  as  might  be  necessary,  to  acquire  the  degree  of  perfection 
which  would  entitle  them  ',o  the  character  of  a  well  regulated 
militia,  would  be  a  real  grievance  to  the  people,  and  a  serious 
public  inconvenience  and  loss.  It  would  form  an  annual  deduc- 
tion from  the  productive  labour  of  the  country,  to  an  amount, 
which,  calculating  upon  the  present  numbers  of  the  people,  would 
not  fall  far  short  of  a  million  of  pounds.  To  attempt  a  thing 
which  would  abridge  the  mass  of  labour  and  industry  to  so  con- 
siderable an  extent,  would  be  unwise ;  and  the  experiment,  if 
made,  could  not  succeed,  because  it  would  not  long  be  endured. 
Little  more  can  reasonably  be  aimed  at,  with  respect  to  the 
people  at  large,  than  to  have  them  properly  armed  and 
equipped ;  and  in  order  to  see  that  this  be  not  neglected,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  assemble  them  once  or  twice  in  the  course 
of  a  year. 

"  But,  though  the  scheme  of  disciplining  the  whole  nation  must 
be  abandoned  as  mischievous  or  impracticable;  yet  it  is  a  matter 
of  the  utmost  importance,  that  a  well  digested  plan  should,  as 
soon  as  possible,  be  adopted  for  the  proper  establishment  of  the 
militia.  The  attention  of  the  government  ought  particularly 
to  be  directed  to  the  formation  of  a  select  corps  of  moderate 
size,  upon  such  principles  as  will  really  fit  it  for  service  in  case 
of  need.  By  thus  circumscribing  the  plan,  it  will  be  possible  to 
have  an  excellent  body  of  well  trained  militia,  ready  to  take  the 
field  whenever  the  defence  of  the  state  shall  require  it.  This 
will  not  only  lessen  the  call  for  military  establishments;  but  if 
circumstances  should  at  any  time  oblige  the  government  to  form 
an  army  of  any  magnitude,  that  army  can  never  be  formidable 
to  the  liberties  of  the  people,  while  there  is  a  large  body  of 
citizens,  little,  if  at  all,  inferior  to  them  in  discipline  and  the  use 
of  arms,  who  stand  ready  to  defend  their  own  rights,  and  those 
of  their  fellow  citizens.     This  appears  to  me  the  only  substitute 


284  THE    FEDERALIST. 

that  can  be  devised  for  a  standing  army ;  and  the  best  possible 
security  against  it,  if  it  should  exist." 

Thus  differently  from  the  adversaries  of  the  proposed  constitu- 
tion should  I  reason  on  the  same  subject ;  deducing  arguments 
of  safety,  from  the  very  sources  which  they  represent  as  fraught 
with  danger  and  perdition.  But  how  the  national  legislature 
may  reason  on  the  point,  is  a  thing  which  neither  they  nor  I  can 
foresee. 

There  is  something  so  far  fetched,  and  so  extravagant,  in  the 
idea  of  danger  to  liberty  from  the  militia,  that  one  is  at  a  loss 
whether  to  treat  it  with  gravity  or  with  raillery ;  whether  to 
consider  it  as  a  mere  trial  of  skill,  like  the  paradoxes  of  rheto- 
ricians; as  a  disingenuous  artifice,  to  instil  prejudices  at  any 
price ;  or  as  the  serious  offspring  of  political  fanaticism.  Where, 
in  the  name  of  common  sense,  are  our  fears  to  end,  if  we  may 
not  trust  our  sons,  our  brothers,  our  neighbours,  our  fellow 
citizens  ?  What  shadow  of  danger  can  there  be  from  men,  who 
are  daily  mingling  with  the  rest  of  their  countrymen;  and  who 
participate  with  them  in  the  same  feelings,  sentiments,  habits 
and  interests?  What  reasonable  cause  of  apprehension  can  be 
inferred  from  a  power  in  the  union  to  prescribe  regulations  for 
the  militia,  and  to  command  its  services  when  necessary;  while 
the  particular  states  are  to  have  the  sole  and  exclusive  appointment 
of  the  officers  f  If  it  were  possible  seriously  to  indulge  a  jealousy 
of  the  militia,  upon  any  conceivable  establishment  under  the 
federal  government,  the  circumstance  of  the  officers  being  in  the 
appointment  of  the  states,  ought  at  once  to  extinguish  it.  There 
can  be  no  doubt,  that  this  circumstance  will  always  secure  to 
them  a  preponderating  influence  over  the  militia. 

In  reading  many  of  the  publications  against  the  constitution, 
a  man  is  apt  to  imagine  that  he  is  perusing  some  ill  written  tale 
or  romance;  which,  instead  of  natural  and  agreeable  images, 
exhibits  to  the  mind  nothing  but  frightful  and  distorted  shapes — 

"Gorgona,  Hydras,  and  Chimeras  dire;" 

discolouring  and  disfiguring  whatever  it  represents,  and  trans- 
forming every  thing  it  touches  into  a  monster. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  235 

A  sample  of  this  is  to  be  observed  in  the  exaggerated  and 
improbable  suggestions,  which  have  taken  place  respecting  the 
power  of  calling  for  the  services  of  the  militia.  That  of  New- 
Hampshire  is  to  be  marched  to  Georgia,  of  Georgia  to  New- 
Ilampshire,  of  New-York  to  Kentucky,  and  of  Kentucky  to  Lake 
Chamijlain.  •Nay,  the  debts  due  to  the  French  and  Dutch,  are 
to  be  paid  in  militia-men,  instead  of  Louis  d'ors  and  ducats.  At 
one  moment,  there  is  to  be  a  large  army  to  lay  prostrate  the 
liberties  of  the  people;  at  another  moment,  the  militia  of  Vir- 
ginia are  to  be  dragged  from  their  homes,  five  or  six  hundred 
miles,  to  tame  the  republican  contumacy  of  Massachusetts ;  and 
that  of  Massachusetts  is  to  be  transported  an  equal  distance,  to 
subdue  the  refractory  haughtiness  of  the  aristocratic  Virginians. 
Do  the  persons,  who  rave  at  this  rate,  imagine,  that  their  art  or 
their  eloquence  can  impose  any  conceits  or  absurdities  upon  the 
people  of  America  for  infallible  truths  ? 

If  there  should  be  an  army  to  be  made  use  of  as  the  engine 
of  despotism,  what  need  of  the  militia?  If  there  should  be  no 
army,  whither  would  the  militia,  irritated  at  being  required  to 
undertake  a  distant  and  distressing  expedition,  for  the  purpose 
of  rivetting  the  chains  of  slavery  upon  a  part  of  their  country- 
men, direct  their  course,  but  to  the  seat  of  the  tyrants,  who  had 
meditated  so  foolish,  as  well  as  so  wicked  a  project;  to  crush 
them  in  their  imagined  entrenchments  of  power,  and  make 
them  an  example  of  the  just  vengeance  of  an  abused  and 
incensed  people  ?  Is  this  the  way  in  which  usurpers  stride  to 
dominion  over  a  numerous  and  enlightened  nation  ?  Do  they 
begin  by  exciting  the  detestation  of  the  very  instruments  of 
their  intended  usurpations  ?  Do  they  usually  commence  their 
career  by  wanton  and  disgustful  acts  of  power,  calculated  to 
answer  no  end,  but  to  draw  upon  themselves  universal  hatred 
and  execration  ?  Are  suppositions  of  this  sort,  the  sober  admo- 
nitions of  discerning  patriots  to  a  discerning  people  ?  Or  are 
they  the  inflammatory  ravings  of  chagrined  incendiaries,  or  dis- 
tempered enthusiasts  ?  If  we  were  even  to  suppose  the  national 
rulers  actuated  by  the  most  ungovernable  ambition,  it  is  impos- 

26 


236  THE    FEDERALIST. 

siblc  to  believe  that  they  would  employ  such  preposterous  means 
to  accomplish  their  designs. 

In  times  of  insurrection,  or  invasion,  it  would  be  natural  and 
proper,  that  the  militia  of  a  neighbouring  state  should  be 
marched  into  another,  to  resist  a  common  enemy,  or  to  guard 
the  republic  against  the  violences  of  faction  or  sedition.  This 
was  frequently  the  case,  in  respect  to  the  first  object,  in  the 
course  of  the  late  war;  and  this  mutual  succour  is,  indeed,  a 
principal  end  of  our  political  association.  If  the  power  of  afi'ord- 
ing  it  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  union,  there  will  be 
no  danger  of  a  supine  and  listless  inattention  to  the  dangers 
of  a  neighbour,  till  its  near  approach  had  superadded  the  incite- 
ments of  self-preservation,  to  the  too  feeble  impulses  of  duty 
and  sympathy. 

PUBLILS 


THE    FEDERALIST.  237 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XXX. 


NEW    YORK,    DECEMBER  29,  1787, 


HAMILTON. 


CONCERNING   TAXATION. 

It  has  been  already  observed,  that  the  federal  governmeut 
ought  to  possess  the  power  of  providing  for  the  support  of  the 
national  forces;  in  which  proposition  was  intended  to  be  includea 
the  expense  of  raising  troops,  of  building  and  equipping  fleets, 
and  all  other  expenses  in  any  wise  connected  with  military 
arrangements  and  operations.  But  these  are  not  the  only  objects 
to  which  the  jurisdiction  of  the  union,  in  respect  to  revenue, 
must  necessarily  be  impowered  to  extend.  It  must  embrace  a 
provision  for  the  support  of  the  national  civil  list ;  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  national  debts  contracted,  or  that  may  be  contracted ; 
and,  in  general,  for  all  those  matters  which  will  call  for  disburse- 
ments out  of  the  national  treasury.  The  conclusion  is,  that 
there  must  be  interwoven  in  the  frame  of  the  government,  a 
general  power  of  taxation  in  one  shape  or  another. 

Money  is  with  propriety  considered  as  the  vital  principle  ot 
the  body  politic;  as  that  which  sustains  its  life  and  motion,  and 
enables  it  to  perform  its  most  essential  functions.  A  complete 
power,  therefore,  to  procure  a  regular  and  adequate  supply  of 
revenue,  as  far  as  the  resources  of  the  community  will  permit 
may  bo  regarded  as  an  indispensable  inscredient  in  every  consti- 
tution.    From  a  deficiency  in  this  particular,  one  of  two  evils 


238  THE    FEDERALIST. 

must  ensue,  either  the  people  must  be  subjected  to  continual 
plunder,  as  a  substitute  for  a  naore  eligible  mode  of  supplying 
the  public  wants,  or  the  government  must  sink  into  a  fatal 
atrophy,  and  in  a  short  course  of  time  perish. 

In  the  Ottoman  or  Turkish  empire,  the  sovereign,  though  in 
other  respects  absolute  master  of  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  his 
subjects,  has  no  right  to  impose  a  new  tax.  The  consequence 
is,  that  he  permits  the  bashaws  or  governors  of  provinces  to 
pillage  the  people  at  discretion ;  and,  in  turn,  squeezes  out  of 
them  the  sums  of  which  he  stands  in  need,  to  satisfy  his  own 
exigencies,  and  those  of  the  state.  In  America,  from  a  like 
cause,  the  government  of  the  union  has  gradually  dwindled  into 
a  state  of  decay,  approaching  nearly  to  annihilation.  Who  can 
doubt,  that  the  happiness  of  the  people  in  both  countries  would 
be  promoted  by  competent  authorities  in  the  proper  hands,  to 
provide  the  revenues  which  the  necessities  of  the  public  might 
require  ? 

The  present  confederation,  feeble  as  it  is,  intended  to  repose 
in  the  United  States,  an  unlimited  power  of  providing  for  the 
pecuniary  wants  of  the  union.  But  proceeding  upon  an  erro- 
neous principle,  it  has  been  done  in  such  a  manner,  as  entirely 
to  have  frustrated  the  intention.  Congress,  by  the  articles 
which  compose  that  compact  (as  has  been  already  stated)  are 
authorized  to  ascertain  and  call  for  any  sums  of  money  neces- 
sary, in  their  judgment,  to  the  service  of  the  United  States;  and 
their  requisitions,  if  conformable  to  the  rule  of  apportionment, 
are,  in  every  constitutional  sense,  obligatory  upon  the  states. 
These  have  no  right  to  question  the  propriety  of  the  demand : 
no  discretion  beyond  that  of  devising  the  ways  and  means  of 
furnishing  the  sums  demanded.  But  though  this  be  strictly  and 
truly  the  case ;  though  the  assumption  of  such  a  right  would  be 
an  infringement  of  the  articles  of  union  :  though  it  may  seldom 
or  never  have  been  avowedly  claimed;  yet  in  practice  it  has 
bcQn  constantly  exercised,  and  would  continue  to  be  so,  as  long 
as  the  revenues  of  the  confederacy  should  remain  dependent  on 
the  intermediate  agency  of  its  members.   What  the  consequences 


THE    FEDERALIST.  239 

of  the  system  have  been,  is  within  the  knowledge  of  every  man, 
the  least  conversant  in  our  public  affairs,  and  has  been  abun 
dantly  unfolded  in  different  parts  of  these  inquiries.  It  is  this 
which  has  chiefly  contributed  to  reduce  us  to  a  situation,  that 
affords  ample  cause  of  mortification  to  ourselves,  and  of  triumph 
to  our  enemies. 

What  remedy  can  there  be  for  this  situation,  but  in  a  change 
of  the  system,  which  has  produced  it  ?  in  a  change  of  the  falla- 
cious and  delusive  system  of  quotas  and  requisitions  ?  What 
substitute  can  there  be  imagined  for  this  ignis  fatuus  in  finance, 
but  that  of  permitting  the  national  government  to  raise  its  own 
revenues  by  the  ordinary  methods  of  taxation,  authorized  in 
every  well  ordered  constitution  of  civil  government?  Ingenious 
men  may  declaim  with  plausibility  on  any  subject;  but  no  human 
ingenuity  can  point  out  any  other  expedient  to  rescue  us  from 
the  inconveniences  and  embarrassments,  naturally  resulting  from 
defective  supplies  of  the  public  treasury. 

The  more  intelligent  adversaries  of  the  new  constitution, 
admit  the  force  of  this  reasoning ;  but  they  qualify  their  admis- 
sion, by  a  distinction  between  what  they  call  internal,  and  ex- 
ternal taxations.  The  former  they  would  reserve  to  the  state 
governments;  the  latter,  which  they  explain  into  commercial 
imposts,  or  rather  duties  on  imported  articles,  they  declare 
themselves  willing  to  concede  to  the  federal  head.  This  dis- 
tinction, however,  would  violate  that  fundamental  maxim  of 
good  sense  and  sound  policy,  which  dictates  that  every  power 
ought  to  be  proportionate  to  its  object  ;  and  would  still  leave 
the  general  government  in  a  kind  of  tutelage  to  the  state  gov 
ernments,  inconsistent  with  every  idea  of  vigour  or  efficiency. 
Who  can  pretend  that  commercial  imposts  are,  or  would  be, 
alone  equal  to  the  present  and  future  exigencies  of  the  union  ? 
Taking  into  the  account  the  existing  debt,  foreign  and  domestic, 
upon  any  plan  of  extinguishment,  which  a  man,  moderately  im- 
pressed with  the  importance  of  pubUc  justice  and  public  credit 
could  approve,  in  addition  to  the  establishments,  which  all 
oarties  will  acknowledge  to  be  necessary,  we  could  not  reasoo'i 


240  THE    FEDERALIST. 

ably  il^iiter  ourselves,  that  this  resource  alone,  upon  the  most 
improved  scale,  would  even  suffice  for  its  present  necessities. 
Its  future  necessities  admit  not  of  calculation  or  limitation;  and 
upon  the  principle  more  than  once  adverted  to,  the  power  of 
making  provision  for  them  as  they  arise,  ought  to  be  equally 
unconjSned.  I  believe  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  position,  war- 
ranted by  the  history  of  mankind,  that  in  the  usual  progress  of 
things,  the  necessities  of  a  nation,  in  every  stage  of  its  eocistence,  will 
be  found  at  least  equal  to  its  resources. 

To  say  that  deficiencies  may  be  provided  for  by  requisitions 
upon  the  states,  is  on  the  one  hand  to  acknowledge  that  this 
system  cannot  be  depended  upon;  and  on  the  other  hand,  to 
depend  upon  it  for  every  thing  beyond  a  certain  limit.  Those 
who  have  carefully  attended  to  its  vices  and  deformities,  as  they 
have  been  exhibited  by  experience,  or  delineated  in  the  course 
ot  these  papers,  must  feel  an  invincible  repugnancy  to  trusting 
the  national  interests,  in  any  degree,  to  its  operation.  When- 
ever it  is  brought  into  activity,  its  inevitable  tendency,  must  be 
to  enfeeble  the  union,  and  sow  the  seeds  of  discord  and  conten- 
tion between  the  federal  head  and  its  members,  and  between  the 
members  themselves.  Can  it  be  expected  that  the  deficiencies 
would  be  better  supplied  in  this  mode,  than  the  total  wants  of 
the  union  have  heretofore  been  supplied,  in  the  same  mode  .'  It 
ought  to  be  recollected,  that  if  less  will  be  required  from  the 
states,  they  will  have  proportionably  less  means  to  answer  the 
demand.  If  the  opinions  of  those  who  contend  for  the  distinc- 
tion which  has  been  mentioned,  were  to  be  received  as  evidence 
of  truth,  one  would  be  led  to  conclude,  that  there  was  some 
known  point  in  the  economy  of  national  affairs,  at  which  it 
would  be  safe  to  stop,  and  to  say:  Thus  far,  the  ends  of  public 
happiness  will  be  promoted  by  supplying  the  wants  of  govern- 
ment, and  all  beyond  this  is  unworthy  of  our  care  or  anxiety 
How  is  it  possible  that  a  government,  half  supplied  and  always 
necessitous,  can  fulfil  the  purposes  of  its  institution ;  can  pro 
vide  for  the  security,  advance  the  prosperity,  or  support  the 
reputation  of  the  commonwealth  ?    How  can   it  ever  possess 


THE    FEDERALIST.  241 

either  energy  or  stability,  dignity  or  credit,  confidence  at  home, 
or  respectability  abroad  ?  How  can  its  administration  be  any 
thing  else  than  a  succession  of  expedients  temporizing,  impotent, 
disgraceful  ?  How  will  it  be  able  to  avoid  a  frequent  sacrifice 
of  its  engagements  to  immediate  necessity  ?  How  can  it  under- 
take or  execute  any  liberal  or  enlarged  plans  of  public  good  ? 

Let  us  attend  to  what  would  be  the  effects  of  this  situation, 
in  the  very  first  war  in  which  we  should  happen  to  be  engaged. 
We  will  presume,  for  argument  sake,  that  the  revenue  arising 
from  the  import  duties  answers  the  purposes  of  a  provision  for 
the  public  debt,  and  of  a  peace  establishment  for  the  union.  Thus 
circumstanced,  a  war  breaks  out.  What  would  be  the  probable 
conduct  of  the  government  in  such  an  emergency  ?  Taught  by 
experience,  that  proper  dependence  could  not  be  placed  on  the 
success  of  requisitions;  unable,  by  its  own  authority,  to  lay  hold 
of  fresh  resources,  and  urged  by  considerations  of  national 
danger,  would  it  not  be  driven  to  the  expedient  of  diverting 
the  funds  already  appropriated,  from  their  proper  objects,  to 
the  defence  of  the  state  ?  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  a  step  of  this 
kind  could  be  avoided;  and  if  it  should  be  taken,  it  is  evident 
that  it  would  prove  the  destruction  of  public  credit  at  the  very 
moment  that  it  was  become  essential  to  the  public  safety.  To 
imagine  that  at  such  a  crisis  credit  might  be  dispensed  with, 
would  be  the  extreme  of  infatuation.  In  the  modern  system  of 
war,  nations  the  most  wealthy,  are  obliged  to  have  recourse  to 
large  loans.  A  country  so  little  opulent  as  ours,  must  feel  this 
necessity  in  a  much  stronger  degree.  But  who  would  lend  to  a 
government,  that  prefaced  its  overtures  for  borrowing,  by  an 
act  which  demonstrated  that  no  reliance  could  be  placed  on 
the  steadiness  of  its  measures  for  paying  ?  The  loans  it  might 
be  able  to  procure,  would  be  as  limited  in  their  extent,  as 
burthensome  in  their  conditions.  They  would  be  made  upon 
the  same  principles  that  usurers  commonly  lend  to  bankrupt 
and  fraudulent  debtors — with  a  sparing  hand,  and  at  enormous 
premiums 

Ii  may  perhaps  be  imagined,  that  from  the  scantiness  ot  the 


242  THE    FEDERALIST, 

resources  of  the  country,  the  necessity  of  diverting  the  esta- 
blished funds  in  the  case  supposed,  would  exist;  though  the 
national  government  should  possess  an  unrestrained  power  of 
taxation.  But  two  considerations  will  serve  to  quiet  all  ap- 
prehensions on  this  head;  one  is,  that  we  are  sure  the  resources 
of  the  community  in  their  full  extent,  will  be  brought  into 
activity  for  the  benefit  of  the  union ;  the  other  is,  that  whatever 
deficiencies  there  may  be,  can  without  difficulty  be  supplied  by 
loans. 

The  power  of  creating  by  its  own  authority,  new  funds  from 
new  objects  of  taxation,  would  enable  the  national  government 
to  borrow,  as  far  as  its  necessities  might  require.  Foreigners, 
as  well  as  the  citizens  of  America,  could  then  reasonably  repose 
confidence  in  its  engagements;  but  to  depend  upon  a  govern- 
ment, that  must  itself  depend  upon  thirteen  other  governments, 
for  the  means  of  fulfilling  its  contracts,  when  once  its  situation 
is  clearly  understood,  would  require  a  degree  of  credulity,  not 
often  to  be  met  with  in  the  pecuniary  transactions  of  mankind, 
and  little  reconcileable  with  the  usual  sharp-sightedness  of 
avarice. 

Eeflections  of  this  kind  may  have  trifling  weight  with  men, 
who  hope  to  see  the  halcyon  scenes  of  the  poetic  or  fabulous  age 
realized  in  America ;  but  to  those  who  believe  we  are  likely  to 
experience  a  common  portion  of  the  vicissitudes  and  calamities, 
which  have  fallen  to  the  lot  of  other  nations,  they  must  appear 
entitled  to  serious  attention.  Such  men  must  behold  the  actual 
situation  of  their  country  with  painful  solicitude,  and  deprecate 
the  evils  which  ambition  or  revenge  might,  with  too  much 
facility,  inflict  upon  it. 

PUBLIUS 


THE   FEDERALIST.  243 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXXI. 


NEW   YORK,   JANUARY  1,  1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 

In  disquisitions  of  every  kind,  there  are  certain  primary 
truths,  or  first  principles,  upon  which  all  subsequent  reasoninge 
must  depend.  These  contain  an  internal  evidence,  which,  ante- 
cedent to  all  reflection  or  combination,  commands  the  assent  of 
the  mind.  Where  it  produces  not  this  effect,  it  must  proceed 
either  from  some  disorder  in  the  organs  of  perception,  or  from 
the  influence  of  some  strong  interest,  or  passion,  or  prejudice. 
Of  this  nature  are  the  maxims  in  geometry,  that  the  whole  is 
greater  than  its  part ;  that  things  equal  to  the  same,  are  equal 
to  one  another;  that  two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose  a  space; 
and  that  all  right  angles  are  equal  to  each  other.  Of  the  same 
nature,  are  these  other  maxims  in  ethics  and  politics,  that  there 
cannot  be  an  effect  without  a  cause;  that  the  means  ought  to 
be  proportioned  to  the  end;  that  every  power  ought  to  be  com- 
mensurate with  its  object;  that  there  ought  to  be  no  limitation 
of  a  power  destined  to  effect  a  purpose,  which  is  itself  incapable 
of  limitation.  And  there  are  other  truths  in  the  two  latter 
sciences,  which,  if  they  cannot  pretend  to  rank  in  the  class  ot 
axioms,  are  such  direct  inferences  from  them,  and  so  obvious  in 
themselves,  and  so  agreeable  to  the  natural  and  unsophisticated 
dictates  of  common  sepse,  that  they  challenge  the  assent  of  a 


244  THE    FEDERALIST. 

Bound  and  unbiassed  mind,  with  a  degree  of  force  and  convic 
tion  almost  equally  irresistible. 

The  objects  of  geometrical  inquiry,  are  so  entirely  abstracted 
from  those  pursuits  which  stir  up  and  put  in  motion  the  unruly 
passions  of  the  human  heart,  that  mankind,  without  difficulty, 
adopt  not  only  the  more  simple  theorems  of  the  science,  but  even 
those  abstruse  paradoxes  which,  however  they  may  appear  sus 
ceptible  of  demonstration,  are  at  variance  with  the  natural  con- 
ceptions which  the  mind,  without  the  aid  of  philosophy,  would 
be  led  to  entertain  upon  the  subject.  The  infinite  divisibility 
of  matter,  or  in  other  words,  the  infinite  divisibility  of  a 
finite  thing,  extending  even  to  the  minutest  atom,  is  a  point 
agreed  among  geometricians ;  though  not  less  incomprehensible 
to  common  sense,  than  any  of  those  mysteries  in  religion, 
against  which  the  batteries  of  infidelity  have  been  so  indus- 
triously levelled. 

But  in  the  sciences  of  morals  and  politics,  men  are  found  far 
less  ti-actable.  To  a  certain  degree,  it  is  right  and  useful  that 
this  should  be  the  case.  Caution  and  investigation  are  a  neces- 
sary armour  against  error  and  imposition.  But  this  untracta- 
bleness  may  be  carried  too  far,  and  may  degenerate  into  ob- 
stinacy, perverseness,  or  disingenuity.  Though  it  cannot  be 
pretended,  that  the  principles  of  moral  and  political  knowledge 
have,  in  general,  the  same  degree  of  certainty  with  those  of  the 
mathematics;  yet  they  have  much  better  claims  in  this  respect, 
than,  to  judge  from  the  conduct  of  men  in  particular  situations, 
we  should  be  disposed  to  allow  them.  The  obscurity  is  much 
oftener  in  the  passions  and  prejudices  of  the  reasoner,  than  in 
the  subject.  Men,  upon  too  many  occasions,  do  not  give  their 
own  understandings  fair  play;  but  yielding  to  some  untoward 
bias,  they  entangle  themselves  in  words,  and  confound  them- 
selves in  subtleties. 

How  else  could  it  happen  (if  we  admit  the  objectors  to  be  sincere 
in  their  opposition)  that  positions  so  clear  as  those  which  mani- 
fest the  necessity  of  a  general  power  of  taxation  in  the  govern- 
mftnt  of  the  union,  should  have  to  encounter  any  adTcraaries 


THE   FEDERALIST.  246 

among  men  of  discernment?  Though  these  positions  nave  been 
elsewhere  fully  stated,  they  will  perhaps  not  be  improperly  re- 
capitulated in  this  place,  as  introductory  to  an  examination  of 
what  may  have  been  offered  by  way  of  objection  to  them.  They 
are  in  substance  as  follow : 

A  government  ought  to  contain  in  itself  every  power  requi- 
site to  the  full  accomplishment  of  the  objects  committed  to  its 
care,  and  to  the  complete  execution  of  the  trusts  for  which  it  is 
-esponsible ;  free  from  every  other  control,  but  a  regard  to  the 
public  good  and  to  the  sense  of  the  people. 

As  the  duties  of  superintending  the  national  defence,  and  of 
securing  the  public  peace  against  foreign  or  domestic  violence, 
involve  a  provision  for  casualties  and  dangers,  to  which  no  pos- 
sible limits  can  be  assigned,  the  power  of  making  that  provision 
ought  to  know  no  dther  bounds  than  the  exigencies  of  the  nation, 
and  the  resources  of  the  community. 

As  revenue  is  the  essential  engine  by  which  the  means  of 
answering  the  national  exigencies  must  be  procured,  the  power 
of  procuring  that  article  in  its  full  extent,  must  necessarily  be 
comprehended  in  that  of  providing  for  those  exigencies. 

As  theory  and  practice  conspire  to  prove,  that  the  power  of 
procuring  revenue  is  unavailing,  when  exercised  over  the  states 
in  their  collective  capacities,  the  federal  government  must  of 
necessity  be  invested  with  an  unqualified  power  of  taxation  in 
the  ordinary  modes. 

Did  not  experience  evince  the  contrary,  it  would  be  natural 
to  conclude,  that  the  propriety  of  a  general  power  of  taxation 
in  the  national  government  might  safely  be  permitted  to  rest  on 
the  evidence  of  these  propositions,  unassisted  by  any  additional 
arguments  or  illustrations.  But  we  find,  in  fact,  that  the  an- 
tagonists of  the  proposed  constitution,  bo  far  from  acquiescing 
in  their  justness  or  truth,  seem  to  make  their  principal  and  most 
Kealous  effort  against  this  part  of  the  plan.  It  may  therefore 
be  satisfactory  to  analize  the  arguments  with  which  they 
combat  it. 

Those  ot  ttiem  which  have  been  most  laboured  with  that  view, 


246  THE    FEDERALIST. 

seem  in  substance  to  amount  to  this :  "  It  is  not  true,  because 
die  exigencies  of  the  union  may  not  be  susceptible  of  limitation, 
that  its  power  of  laying  taxes  ought  to  be  unconfined.  Eevenue 
is  as  requisite  to  the  purposes  of  the  local  administrations,  as  to 
those  of  the  union ;  and  the  former  are  at  least  of  equal  import- 
ance with  the  latter,  to  the  happiness  of  the  people.  It  is  there- 
fore as  necessary,  that  the  state  governments  should  be  able  to 
command  the  meansof  supplying  their  wants,  as,  that  the  national 
government  should  possess  the  like  faculty,  in  respect  to  the 
wants  of  the  union.  But  an  indefinite  power  of  taxation  in  the 
latter  might,  and  probably  would,  in  time,  deprive  the  former  of 
the  means  of  providing  for  their  own  necessities ;  and  would 
subject  them  entirely  to  the  mercy  of  the  national  legislature. 
As  the  laws  of  the  union  are  to  become  the  supreme  law  of  the 
land ;  as  it  is  to  have  power  to  pass  all  laws  that  may  be  neces- 
sary for  carrying  into  execution,  the  authorities  with  which  it 
is  proposed  to  vest  it;  the  national  government  might  at  any 
time  abolish  the  taxes  imposed  for  state  objects,  upon  the  pre- 
tence of  an  interference  with  its  own.  It  might  allege  a  neces- 
sity of  doing  this,  in  order  to  give  efficacy  to  the  national  reve- 
nues :  And  thus  all  the  resources  of  taxation  might,  by  degrees, 
become  the  subjects  of  federal  monopoly,  to  the  entire  exclusion 
and  destruction  of  the  state  governments." 

This  mode  of  reasoning,  appears  sometimes  to  turn  upon  the 
supposition  of  usurpation  in  the  national  government ;  at  other 
times,  it  seems  to  be  designed  only  as  a  deduction  from  the  con- 
stitutional operation  of  its  intended  powers.  It  is  only  in  the 
latter  light,  that  it  can  be  admitted  to  have  any  pretensions 
to  fairness.  The  moment  we  launch  into  conjectures,  about  the 
usurpations  of  the  federal  government,  we  get  into  an  unfathom- 
able abyss,  and  fairly  put  ourselves  out  of  the  reach  of  all  rea- 
soning. Imagination  may  range  at  pleasure,  till  it  gets  bewil- 
dered amidst  the  labyrinths  of  an  enchanted  castle,  and  knows 
not  on  which  side  to  turn  to  escape  from  the  apparitions  which , 
itself  has  raised.  Whatever  may  be  the  limits,  or  modifications, 
of  the  powers  of  the  union,  it  is  easy  to  imagine  at   endless 


THE    FEDERALIST.  247 

train  of  possible  dangers  j  and  by  indulging  an  excess  of  jealousy 
and  timidity,  we  may  bring  ourselves  to  a  state  of  absolute 
scepticism  and  irresolution.  I  repeat  here  what  I  have  observed 
in  substance  in  another  place,  that  all  observations,  founded 
upon  the  danger  of  usurpation,  ought  to  be  referred  to  the  com- 
position and  structure  of  the  government,  not  to  the  nature  and 
extent  of  its  powers.  The  state  governments,  by  their  original 
constitutions,  are  invested  with  complete  sovereignty.  In  what 
does  our  security  consist  against  usurpations  from  that  quarter? 
Doubtless  in  the  manner  of  their  formation,  and  in  a  due  de- 
pendence of  those  who  are  to  administer  them  upon  the  people. 
If  the  proposed  construction  of  the  federal  government  be  found, 
upon  an  impartial  examination  of  it,  to  be  such  as  to  afford,  to 
fa,  proper  extent,  the  same  species  of  securit}',  all  apprehensions 
on  the  score  of  usurpation  ought  to  be  discarded. 

It  should  not  be  forgotten,  that  a  disposition  in  the  state  gov- 
ernments, to  encroach  upon  the  rights  of  the  union,  is  quite  as 
probable  as  a  disposition  in  the  union  to  encroach  upon  the 
rights  of  the  state  governments.  What  side  would  be  likely 
to  prevail  in  such  a  conflict,  must  depend  on  the  means  which 
the  contending  parties  could  employ,  towards  insuring  success 
As  in  republics,  strength  is  always  on  the  side  of  the  people ; 
and  as  there  are  weighty  reasons  to  induce  a  belief,  that  the 
state  governments  will  commonly  possess  most  influence  over 
them,  the  natural  conclusion  is,  that  such  contests  will  be  most 
apt  to  end  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  union  j  and  that  there  is 
greater  probability  of  encroachments  by  the  members  upon  the 
federal  head,  than  by  the  federal  head  upon  the  members.  But 
it  is  evident,  that  all  conjectures  of  this  kind,  must  be  ex- 
tremely vague  and  fallible;  and  that  it  is  by  far  the  safest 
course  to  lay  them  altogether  aside ;  and  to  confine  our  atten- 
tion wholly  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  powers,  as  they  are 
delineated  in  the  constitution.  Every  thing  beyond  this,  must 
be  left  to  the  prudence  and  firmness  of  the  people;  who,  as 
they  will  hold  the  scales  in  their  own  hands,  it  is  to  be  hoped, 


248  THE    FEDERALIST. 

will  alwaj'i  take  care  to  preserve  the  constitutional  equilibrium 
between  the  general  and  the  state  governments.  Upon  thia 
ground,  which  is  evidently  the  true  one,  it  will  not  be  difficult 
to  obviate  the  objections,  which  have  been  made  to  an  indefinite 
Dower  of  taxation  in  the  United  States. 

PUBLIDB. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  249 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXXII. 


NEW    YORK,    JANUARY    4,  1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 

Although  1  am  of  opinion  that  there  would  be  no  real 
danger  of  the  consequences  to  the  state  governments,  which 
seem  to  be  apprehended  from  a  power  in  the  union  to  control 
them  in  the  levies  of  money  j  because  I  am  persuaded  that  the 
sense  of  the  people,  the  extreme  hazard  of  provoking  the  re- 
sentments of  the  state  governments,  and  a  conviction  of  the 
utility  and  necessity  of  local  administrations,  for  local  purposes, 
would  be  a  complete  barrier  against  the  oppressive  use  of  such 
a  power :  Yet  I  am  willing  here  to  allow,  in  its  full  extent,  the 
justness  of  the  reasoning,  which  requires,  that  the  individual 
states  should  possess  an  independent  and  uncontrolable  author- 
ity to  raise  their  own  revenues  for  the  supply  of  their  own 
wants.  And  making  this  concession,  I  affirm  that  (with  the  sole 
exception  of  duties  on  imports  and  exports)  they  would,  under 
the  plan  of  the  convention,  retain  that  authority  in  the  most 
absolute  and  unqualified  sense ;  and  that  an  attempt  on  the  part 
of  the  national  government  to  abridge  them  in  the  exercise  of 
it,  would  be  a  violent  assumption  of  power,  unwarranted  by  any 
article  or  clause  of  its  constitution. 

An  entire  consolidation  of  the  states  mto  one  complete  na 
tional  sovereignty,  would  imply  an  entire  subordination  of  the 


250  THE    FEDERALIST. 

parts;  and  whatever  powers  might  remain  in  them,  would  be 
altogether  dependent  on  the  general  wUl.      But  as  the  plan  of 
the  convention  aims  only  at  a  partial  union  or  consolidation,  the 
state  governments  would  clearly  retain  all  the  rights  of  sove- 
reignty which  they  before  had,  and  which  were  not,  by  that  act, 
exclusively  delegated  to  the  United  States.     This  exclusive  dele- 
gation, or  rather  this  alienation  of  state  sovereignty,  would  only 
exist  in  three  cases ;  where   the  constitution  in  express  terms 
granted  an  exclusive  authority  to  the  union ;  where  it  granted, 
in  one  instance,  an  authority  to  the  union;  and  in  another,  pro- 
hibited the  states  from  exercising  the  like  authority ;  and  where 
it  granted  an  authority  to  the  union,  to  which  a  similar  authority 
in  the  states  would  be  absolutely  and  totally  contradictory  and 
repugnant.    I  use  these  terms  to  distinguish  this  last  case  from 
another  which  might  appear  to  resemble  it ;  but  which  would, 
in  fact,  be  essentially  different :  I  mean  where  the  exercise  of  a 
concurrent  jurisdiction,  might  be  productive  of  occasional  in- 
terferences in  the  policy  of  any  branch  of  administration,  but 
would  not  imply  any  direct  contradiction  or  repugnancy  in  point 
of  constitutional  authority.    These  three  cases  of  exclusive  juris- 
diction in  the  federal  government,  may  be  exemplified  by  the 
following  instances  :  The  last  clause  but  one  in  the  eighth  sec- 
tion of  the  first  article,  provides  expressly,  that  congress  shall 
exercise   "  exclusive  legislation"  over  the  district  to  be   appro- 
priated as  the  seat  of  government.     This  answers  to  the  first 
case.     The  first  clause  of  the  same  section  impowers  congress 
"<o  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises;"  and  the 
second  clause  of  the  tenth  section  of  the  same  article  declares, 
that  "  no  state  shall,  without  the  consent  of  congress,  lay  any 
imposts  or  duties  on  imports  or  exports,  except  for  the  purpose  of 
executing  its  inspection  laws.''    Hence  would  result  an  exclusive 
power  in  the  union  to  lay  duties  on  imports  and  exportb  with 
the  particular  exception  mentioned  ;  but  this  power  is  abridged 
by  another  clause,  which  declares,  that  no  tax  or  duty  shall  be 
laid  on  articles  exported   from  any  state ;  in  consequence  of 
which  qualification,  it  now  only  extends  to  the  duties  on  imports 


THE    FEDERALIST.  2^x 

This  answers  to  the  second  case.  The  third  will  be  found  in 
that  clause  which  declares,  that  congress  shall  have  power  "  to 
establish  an  uniform  rule  of  naturalization  throughout  the 
United  States."  This  must  necessarily  be  exclusive ;  because 
if  each  state  had  power  to  prescribe  a  distinct  rule,  there 
could  be  no  uniform  rule. 

A  case  which  may  perhaps  be  thought  to  resemble  the  latter, 
but  which  is  in  fact  widely  different,  affects  the  question  imme- 
diately under  consideration.  I  mean  the  power  of  imposing 
taxes  on  all  articles  other  than  exports  and  imports.  This,  I 
contend,  is  manifestly  a  concurrent  and  coequal  authority  in  the 
United  States  and  in  the  individual  states.  There  is  plainly  no 
expression  in  the  granting  clause,  which  makes  that  power 
exclusive  in  the  union.  There  is  no  independent  clause  or  sen- 
tence which  prohibits  the  states  from  exercising  it.  So  far  is 
this  from  being  the  case,  that  a  plain  and  conclusive  argument 
to  the  contrary  is  deducible,  from  the  restraint  laid  upon  the 
states  in  relation  to  duties  on  imports  and  exports.  This  restric- 
tion implies  an  admission,  that  if  it  were  not  inserted,  the  states 
would  possess  the  power  it  excludes,  and  it  implies  a  further 
admission,  that  as  to  all  other  taxes,  the  authority  of  the  states 
remains  undiminished.  In  any  other  view  it  would  be  both 
unnecessary  and  dangerous;  it  would  be  unnecessary,  because 
if  the  grant  to  the  union  of  the  power  of  laying  such  duties, 
implied  the  exclusion  of  the  states,  or  even  their  subordination 
in  this  particular,  there  could  be  no  need  of  such  a  restriction ; 
it  would  be  dangerous,  because  the  introduction  of  it  leads 
directly  to  the  conclusion  which  has  been  mentioned,  and  which, 
if  the  reasoning  of  the  objectors  be  just,  could  not  have  been 
intended;  I  mean  that  the  states,  in  all  cases  to  which  the 
restriction  did  not  apply,  would  have  a  concurrent  power  of 
taxation  with  the  union.  The  restriction  in  question  amounts 
to  what  lawyers  call  a  negative  pregnant  ;  that  is,  a  negation 
of  one  thing,  and  an  affirmance  of  another;  a  negation  of  the 
authority  of  the  states  to  impose  taxes  on  imports  and  exports, 
and  an  affirmance  of  their  authority  to  impose  them  on  all  other 

27 


252  THE   FEDERALIST. 

articles.  It  would  be  mere  sophistry  to  argue  that  it  was  meant 
to  exclude  them  absolutely  from  the  imposition  of  taxes  of  the 
former  kind,  and  to  leave  them  at  liberty  to  lay  others  subject  to 
the  control  of  the  national  legislature.  The  restraining  or  prohi- 
bitory clause  only  says,  that  they  shall  not,  without  the  consent  of 
congress,  lay  such  duties ;  and  if  we  are  to  understand  this  in  the 
sense  last  mentioned,  the  constitution  would  then  be  made  to 
introduce  a  formal  provision,  for  the  sake  of  a  very  absurd  con- 
clusion J  which  is,  that  the  states,  with  the  consent  of  the  national 
legislature,  might  tax  imports  and  exports;  and  that  they  might 
tax  every  other  article,  unless  controled  by  the  same  body.  If 
this  was  the  intention,  why  was  it  not  left,  in  the  first  instance, 
to  what  is  alleged  to  be  the  natural  operation  of  the  original 
clause,  conferring  a  general  power  of  taxation  upon  the  union  ? 
It  is  evident  that  this  could  not  have  been  the  intention,  and  that 
it  will  not  bear  a  construction  of  the  kind. 

As  to  a  supposition  of  repugnancy  between  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion in  the  states  and  in  the  union,  it  cannot  be  supported  in  that 
sense  which  would  be  requisite  to  work  an  exclusion  of  the  states. 
It  is  indeed  possible,  that  a  tax  might  be  laid  on  a  particular 
article  by  a  state,  which  might  render  it  inexpedient  that  a  further 
tax  should  be  laid  on  the  same  article  by  the  union;  but  it 
would  not  imply  a  constitutional  inability  to  impose  a  further 
tax.  The  quantity  of  the  imposition,  the  expediency  or  inexpe- 
diency of  an  increase  on  either  side,  would  be  mutually  questions 
of  prudence ;  but  there  would  be  involved  no  direct  jjontradiction 
of  power.  The  particular  policy  of  the  national  and  of  the  state 
system  of  finance,  might  now  and  then  not  exactly  coincide, 
and  might  require  reciprocal  forbearances.  It  is  not  however  a 
mere  possibility  of  inconvenience  in  the  exercise  of  powers,  but 
an  immediate  constitutional  repugnancy,  that  can  by  implication 
alienate  and  extinguish  a  pre-existing  right  of  sovereignty. 

The  necessity  of  a  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  certain  cases, 
results  from  the  division  of  the  sovereign  power;  and  the  rule 
that  all  authorities,  of  which  the  states  are  not  explicitly  divested 
in  favour  of  the  union,  remain  with  them  in  full  vigour,  is  not 


THE    FEDERALIST.  253 

only  a  theoretical  consequence  of  that  division  but  is  clearly 
admitted  by  the  whole  tenor  of  the  instrument  which  contains 
the  articles  of  the  proposed  constitution.  We  there  find,  that 
notwithstanding  the  affirmative  grants  of  general  authorities, 
there  has  been  the  most  pointed  care  in  those  cases  where  it  was 
deemed  improper  that  the  like  authorities  should  reside  in  the 
states,  to  insert  negative  clauses  prohibiting  the  exercise  of 
them  by  the  states.  The  tenth  section  of  the  first  article  consists 
altogether  of  such  provisions.  This  circumstance  is  a  cleai 
indication  of  the  sense  of  the  convention,  and  furnishes  a  rule 
of  interpretation  out  of  the  body  of  the  act,  which  justifies  the 
position  I  have  advanced,  and  refutes  every  hypothesis  to  the 
contrary. 

PUBLIUB 


254  THE     FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XXXIII. 


NEW    YORK,    JANUARY   4,  1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME   SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 

The  residue  of  the  argument  against  the  provisions  of  the 
constitution,  in  respect  to  taxation,  is  ingrafted  upon  the  follow- 
ing clauses :  The  last  clause  of  the  eighth  section  of  the  first 
article,  authorizes  the  national  legislature  "  to  make  all  laws 
which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper^  for  carrying  into  execution 
the  powers  by  that  constitution  vested  in  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  or  in  any  department  or  oflScer  thereof;  "  and  the 
second  clause  of  the  sixth  article  declares,  that  "  the  constitution 
and  the  laws  of  the  United  States  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  and 
the  treaties  made  by  their  authority,  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of 
the  land ;  any  thing  in  the  constitution  or  laws  of  any  state  to 
the  contrary  notwithstanding." 

These  two  clauses  have  been  the  sources  of  much  virulent 
invective,  and  petulant  declamation,  against  the  proposed  consti- 
tution ;  they  have  been  held  up  to  the  people  in  all  the  exagge- 
rated colours  of  misrepresentation,  as  the  pernicious  engines  by 
which  their  local  governments  were  to  be  destroyed,  and  their 
liberties  exterminated — as  the  hideous  monster  whose  devouring 
jaws  would  spare  neither  sex  nor  age,  nor  high  nor  low,  nor 
sacred  nor  profane;  and  yet,  strange  as  it  may  appear,  after  all 
this  clamour,  to  those  who  may  not  have  happened  to  contem- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  255 

plate  them  in  the  same  light,  it  may  be  affirmed  with  perfect 
confidence,  that  the  constitutional  operation  of  the  intended 
government  would  be  precisely  the  same,  if  these  clauses  were 
entirely  obliterated,  as  if  they  were  repeated  in  every  article. 
They  are  only  declaratory  of  a  truth,  which  would  have  resultea 
by  necessary  and  unavoidable  implication  from  the  very  act  of 
constituting  a  federal  government,  and  vesting  it  with  certain 
specified  powers.  This  is  so  clear  a  proposition,  that  moderation 
itself  can  scarcely  listen  to  the  railings  which  have  been  so 
copiously  vented  against  this  part  of  the  plan,  without  emotions 
that  disturb  its  equanimity. 

What  is  a  power,  but  the  ability  or  faculty  of  doing  a  thing? 
What  is  the  ability  to  do  a  thing,  but  the  power  of  employing 
the  means  necessary  to  its  execution  ?  What  is  a  legislative 
power,  but  a  power  of  making  laws  ?  What  are  the  means  to 
execute  a  legislative  power,  but  laws?  What  is  the  power 
>f  laying  and  collecting  taxes,  but  a  legislative  power,  or  a  power 
of  making  laws,  to  lay  and  collect  taxes  ?  What  are  the  proper 
means  of  executing  such  a  power,  but  necessary  and  proper 
laws? 

This  simple  train  of  inquiry  furnishes  us  at  once  with  a  tost 
of  the  true  nature  of  the  clause  complained  of.  It  conducts  us 
to  this  palpable  truth,  that  a  power  to  lay  and  collect  taxes, 
must  be  a  power  to  pass  all  laws  necessary  Siud  proper  for  the  execu- 
tion of  that  power:  and  what  docs  the  unfortunate  and  calum- 
niated provision  in  question  do,  more  than  declare  the  same 
truth;  to  wit,  that  the  national  legislature  to  whom  the  power 
of  laying  and  collecting  taxes  had  been  previously  given,  might, 
in  the  execution  of  that  pdwer,  pass  all  laws  necessary  and  proper 
to  carry  it  into  eff'ect?  I  have  applied  these  observations  thus 
particularly  to  the  power  of  taxation,  because  it  is  the  immediate 
subject  under  consideration,  and  because  it  is  the  most  important 
of  the  authorities  proposed  to  be  conferred  upon  the  union.  But 
the  same  process  will  lead  to  the  same  result,  in  relation  to  all 
other  powers  declared  in  the  constitution.  And  it  is  expressly 
to  execute  these  powers,  that  the  sweeping  clause,  as  it  has  been 


256  THE    FEDERALIST. 

affected.}  nailed,  authorizes  the  national  legislature  to  pass  all 
necessary  and  proper  laws.  If  there  be  any  thing  exceptionable, 
it  must  be  sought  for  in  the  specific  powers,  upon  which  this 
general  declaration  is  predicated.  The  declaration  itself,  though 
it  may  be  chargeable  with  tautology  or  redundancy,  is  at  least 
perfectly  harmless. 

But  SUSPICION  may  ask,  why  then  was  it  introduced?  The 
answer  is,  that  it  could  only  have  been  done  for  greater  caution, 
and  to  guard  against  all  cavilling  refinements  in  those  who  might 
hereafter  feel  a  disposition  to  curtail  and  evade  the  legitimate 
authorities  of  the  union.  The  convention  probably  foresaw, 
what  it  has  been  a  principal  aim  of  these  papers  to  inculcate, 
that  the  danger  which  most  threatens  our  political  welfare,  is, 
that  the  state  governments  will  finally  sap  the  foundations  of 
the  union ;  and  might  therefore  think  it  necessary,  in  so  cardinal 
a  point,  to  leave  nothing  to  construction.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  inducement  to  it,  the  wisdom  of  the  precaution  is 
evident  from  the  cry  which  has  been  raised  against  it;  as  thai 
very  cry  betrays  a  disposition  to  question  the  great  and  essen 
tial  truth  which  it  is  manifestly  the  object  of  that  provision 
to  declare. 

But  it  may  be  again  asked,  who  is  to  judge  of  the  necessity 
and  propriety  of  the  laws  to  be  passed  for  executing  the  powerb 
of  the  union  ?  I  answer,  first,  that  this  question  arises  as  well 
and  as  fully  upon  the  simple  grant  of  those  powers,  as  ujjon  the 
declaratory  clause :  and  I  answer,  in  the  second  place,  that  the 
national  government,  like  every  other,  must  judge,  in  the  first 
instance,  of  the  proper  exercise  of  its  powers;  and  its  constitu- 
ents in  the  last.  If  the  federal  government  should  overpass  the 
just  bounds  of  its  authority,  and  make  a  tyrannical  use  of  its 
powers;  the  people,  whose  creature  it  is,  must  appeal  to  the 
standard  they  have  formed,  and  take  such  measures  to  redress 
the  injury  done  to  the  constitution,  as  the  exigency  may  suggest 
and  prudence  justify.  The  propriety  of  a  law,  in  a  constitutional 
light,  must  always  be  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  powers 
upon  which  it  is  founded.     Suppose,  by  some  forced  construction 


THE    FEDERALIST.  257 

of  its  authority  (which  indeed  cannot  easily  be  imagined)  the 
federal  legislature  should  attempt  to  vsiry  the  law  of  descent  in 
any  state ;  would  it  not  be  evident,  that  in  making  such  an 
attempt,  it  had  exceeded  its  jurisdiction,  and  infringed  upon  that 
of  the  state  ?  Suppose,  again, that  upon  the  pretence  of  an  inter- 
ference with  its  I'evenues,  it  should  undertake  to  abrogate  a  land 
tax,  imposed  by  the  authority  of  a  state;  would  it  not  be 
equally  evident,  that  this  was  an  invasion  of  that  concurrent 
jurisdiction  in  respect  to  this  species  of  tax,  which  the  constitu- 
tion plainly  supposes  to  exist  in  the  state  governments?  If 
there  ever  should  be  a  doubt  on  this  head,  the  credit  of  it  will 
be  entirely  due  to  those  reasoners,  who,  in  the  imprudent  zeal 
of  their  animosity  to  the  plan  of  the  convention,  have  laboured 
to  envelope  it  in  a  cloud,  calculated  to  obscure  the  plainest  and 
simplest  truths. 

But  it  is  said,  that  the  laws  of  the  union  are  to  be  the  supreme 
law  of  the  land.  What  inference  can  be  drawn  from  this,  or 
what  would  they  amount  to,  if  they  were  not  to  be  supreme  ? 
It  is  evident  they  would  amount  to  nothing.  A  law,  by  the 
very  meaning  of  the  term,  includes  supremacy.  It  is  a  rule, 
which  those  to  whom  it  is  prescribed  are  bound  to  observe. 
This  results  from  every  political  association.  If  individuals 
enter  into  a  state  of  society,  the  laws  of  that  society  must  be 
the  supreme  regulator  of  their  conduct.  If  a  number  of  politi- 
cal soci-eties  enter  into  a  larger  political  society,  the  laws  which 
the  latter  may  enact,  pursuant  to  the  powers  intrusted  to  it  by 
its  constitution,  mus*  necessarily  Le  supreme  over  those  societies, 
and  the  individuals  of  whom  they  are  composed.  It  would  other- 
wise be  a  mere  treaty,  dependent  on  the  good  faith  of  the 
parties,  and  not  a  government ;  which  is  only  another  word  for 
POLITICAL  POWER  AND  SUPREMACY.  But  it  will  not  follow  from 
this  doctrine,  that  acts  of  the  larger  society  which  are  not  pur- 
suant to  its  constitutional  powers,  but  which  are  invasions  of  the 
rfi.siauary  authorities  of  the  smaller  societies,  will  become  the 
supreme  law  of  the  land.  These  will  be  merely  acts  of  usurpa- 
tion, and  will  deserve  to  be  treated  as  such.    Hence  we  perceive, 


258  THE   FEDERALIST. 

that  tue  clause  which  declares  the  supremacy  of  the  laws  of  the 
uniou,  like  the  one  we  have  just  before  considered,  only  declares 
a  truth,  which  flows  immediately  and  necessarily  from  the  insti- 
tution of  a  federal  government.  It  will  not,  I  presume,  have 
escaped  observation,  that  it  expressly  confines  this  supremacy  to 
laws  made  pursuant  to  the  constitution ;  which  I  mention  merely 
as  an  instance  of  caution  in  the  convention ;  since  that  limita- 
tion would  have  been  to  be  understood,  though  it  had  not  been 
expressed. 

Though  a  law,  therefore,  laying  a  tax  for  the  use  of  the 
United  States  would  be  supreme  in  its  nature,  and  could  not 
legally  be  opposed  or  controled;  yet,  a  law  abrogating  or  pre- 
venting the  collection  of  a  tax  laid  by  the  authority  of  a  state, 
(unless  upon  imports  and  exports)  would  not  be  the  supreme 
law  of  the  land,  but  an  usurpation  of  a  power,  not  granted  by  the 
constitution.  As  far  as  an  improper  accumulation  of  taxes,  on 
the  same  object,  might  tend  to  render  the  collection  difficult  or 
precarious,  this  would  be  a  mutual  inconvenience,  not  arising 
from  a  superiority  or  defect  of  power  on  either  side,  but  from 
an  injudicious  exercise  of  power  by  one  or  the  other,  in  a 
manner  equally  disadvantageous  to  both.  It  is  to  be  hoped  and 
presumed,  however,  that  mutual  interests  would  dictate  a  con 
cert  in  this  respect,  which  would  avoid  any  material  incon- 
venience. The  inference  from  the  whole  is — that  the  individual 
states  would,  under  the  proposed  constitution,  retain  an  inde- 
pendent and  uncontrolable  authority  to  raise  revenue  to  any 
extent  of  which  they  may  stand  in  need,  by  every  kind  of  tax- 
ation, except  duties  on  imports  and  exports.  It  will  be  shown 
in  the  next  paper,  that  this  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  the  article 
of  taxation,  was  the  only  admissible  substitute  for  an  entire  sub- 
ordination, in  respect  to  this  branch  of  pcwer,  of  state  authority 
to  that  of  the  union. 

PUBLIUS 


THE   FEDERALIST.  2/>9 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXXIV. 


,      NEW  YORK.  JANUARY  4,  17f 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 

1  FLATTER  myself  it  has  been  clearly  shown  in  my  last  num- 
ber, that  the  particular  states,  under  the  proposed  constitution, 
would  have  co-equal  authority  with  the  union  in  the  article 
of  revenue,  except  as  to  duties  on  imports.  As  this  leaves  open 
to  the  states  far  the  greatest  part  of  the  resources  of  the  com- 
munity, there  can  be  no  colour  for  the  assertion,  that  they 
would  not  possess  means  as  abundant  as  could  be  desired,  for 
the  supply  of  their  own  wants,  independent  of  all  external 
control.  That  the  field  is  sufficiently  wide,  will  more  fully 
appear,  when  we  come  to  develope  the  inconsiderable  share 
of  the  public  expenses,  for  which  it  will  fall  to  the  lot  of  the 
state  governments  to  provide. 

To  argue  upon  abstract  principles,  that  this  co-ordinate  au- 
thority cannot  exist,  would  be  to  set  up  theory  and  supposi- 
tion against  fact  and  reality.  However  proper  such  reasonings 
might  be,  to  show  that  a  thing  ought  not  to  exist,  they  are  wholly 
to  be  rejected,  when  they  are  made  use  of  to  prove  that  it  does 
not  exist,  contrary  to  the  evidence  of  the  fact  itself.  It  is  well 
known,  that  in  the  Roman  republic,  the  legislative  authority  in 
the  last  resort,  resided  for  ages  in  two  different  political  bodies; 
not  as  branches  of  the  same  legislature,  but  as  distinct  and  inde- 


260  THE    FEDERALIST. 

penaeut  legislntures ;  in  each  of  which  an  opposite  interest  pr©« 
vailed;  in  one,  the  Patrician j  in  the  other,  the  Plebeian.  Many 
arguments  might  have  been  adduced,  to  prove  the  unfitness  of 
two  such  seemingly  contradictory  authorities,  each  having  power 
to  annul  or  repeal  the  acts  of  the  other.  But  a  man  would 
have  been  regarded  as  frantic,  who  should  have  attempted  at 
Eome  to  disprove  their  existence.  It  will  readily  be  understood, 
that  I  allude  to  the  comitia  centuriata  and  the  comitia  tri- 
BUTIA.  The  former,  in  which  the  people  voted  by  centuries,  was 
80  arranged  as  to  give  a  superiority  to  the  Patrician  interest: 
In  the  latter,  in  which  numbers  prevailed,  the  Plebeian  interests 
had  an  entire  predominancy.  And  yet  these  two  legislatures 
co-existed  for  ages,  and  the  Eoman  republic  attained  to  the 
pinnacle  of  human  greatness. 

In  the  case  particularly  under  consideration,  there  is  no  such 
tontradiction  as  appears  in  the  example  cited ;  there  is  no  power 
:>n  either  side  to  annul  the  acts  of  the  other.  And  in  practice, 
there  is  little  reason  to  apprehend  any  inconvenience;  because, 
In  a  short  course  of  time,  the  wants  of  the  states  will  naturally 
reduce  themselves  within  a  very  narrow  compass;  and  in  the 
interim,  the  United  States  will,  in  all  probability,  find  it  conve- 
nient to  abstain  wholly  from  those  objects  to  which  the  particular 
states  would  be  inclined  to  resort. 

To  form  a  more  precise  judgment  of  the  true  merits  of  this 
question,  it  will  be  well  to  advert  to  the  proportion  between 
the  objects  that  will  require  a  federal  provision  in  respect  to 
revenue,  and  those  which  will  require  a  state  provision.  We 
shall  discover  that  the  former  are  altogether  unlimited;  and 
that  the  latter  are  circumscribed  within  very  moderate  bounds. 
In  pursuirg  this  inquiry,  we  must  bear  in  mind,  that  we  are  not 
to  confine  our  view  to  the  present  period,  but  to  look  forward  to 
remote  futurity.  Constitutions  of  civil  government,  are  not.  to 
be  framed  upon  a  calculation  of  existing  exigencies;  but  upon 
a  combination  of  these,  with  the  probable  exigencies  of  ages, 
according  to  the  natural  and  tried  course  of  human  affair?. 
Nothing,  therefore,  can  be  more  fallacious,  than  to  infer  Wi 


THE    FEDERALIST.  261 

extent  of  any  p<  wer  proper  to  be  lodged  in  the  national  govern- 
ment, from  an  estimate  of  its  immediate  necessities.  There 
ought  to  be  a  capacity  to  provide  for  future  contingencies,  as 
they  may  happen;  and  as  these  are  illimitable  in  their  nature, 
so  it  is  impossible  safely  to  limit  that  capacity.  It  is  true,  per 
haps,  that  a  computation  might  be  made,  with  sufficient  accuracy 
to  answer  the  purpose,  of  the  quantity  of  revenue  requisite  to 
discharge  the  subsisting  engagements  of  the  union,  and  to 
maintain  those  establishments,  which,  for  some  time  to  come, 
would  suffice  in  time  of  peace.  But  would  it  be  wise,  or  would 
it  not  rather  be  the  extreme  of  folly,  to  stop  at  this  point,  and 
to  leave  the  government  intrusted  with  the  care  of  the  national 
defence,  in  a  state  of  absolute  incapacity  to  provide  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  community,  against  future  invasions  of  the  publi* 
peace,  by  foreign  war  or  domestic  convulsions  ?  If  we  must  bc 
obliged  tc  exceed  this  point,  where  can  we  stop  short  of  an  in- 
definite power  of  providing  for  emergencies  as  they  may  arise  ? 
Though  it  be  easy  to  assert,  in  general  terms,  the  possibility  of 
forming  a  rational  judgment  of  a  due  provision  against  probable 
dangers;  yet  we  may  safely  challenge  those  who  make  the 
assertion,  to  bring  forward  their  data,  and  may  affirm,  that  they 
would  be  found  as  vague  and  uncertain  as  any  that  could  be 
produced  to  establish  the  probable  duration  of  the  world.  Ob- 
servations, confined  to  the  mere  prospects  of  internal  attacks, 
can  deserve  no  weight;  though  even  these  will  admit  of  no 
satisfactory  calculations:  But  if  we  mean  to  be  a  commercial 
people,  it  must  form  a  part  of  our  policy  to  be  able  one  day 
*x)  defend  that  commerce.  The  support  of  a  navy,  and  of  naval 
wars,  would  involve  contingencies  that  must  baffle  all  the  efforts 
of  political  arithmetic. 

Admitting  that  we  ought  to  try  the  novel  and  absurd  ex- 
periment in  politics,  of  tying  up  the  hands  of  government 
from  offensive  war,  founded  upon  reasons  of  state:  Yet,  cer- 
tainly, we  ought  not  to  disable  it  from  guarding  ihe  com- 
munity against  the  ambition  or  enmity  of  other  nations.  A 
3loud   has    been   for   some   time    hanging   over   the   European 


2t)i:  THE    FEDERALIST. 

world.  If  it  should  break  forth  into  a  storm,  who  can  ins  ire 
us,  that  in  its  progress,  a  part  of  its  fury  would  not  be  spent 
apon  us  ?  No  reasonable  man  would  hastily  pronounce  that  we 
are  entirely  out  of  its  reach.  Or  if  the  combustible  materials 
tnat  now  seem  to  be  collecting,  should  be  dissipated  without 
coming  to  maturity;  or  if  a  flame  should  be  kindled  without 
extending  to  us;  what  security  can  we  have  that  our  tran- 
quillity will  long  remain  undisturbed  from  some  other  cause, 
or  from  some  other  quarter?  Let  us  recollect,  that  peace  or 
war  will  not  always  be  left  to  our  option;  that  however  mode- 
rate or  unambitious  we  may  be,  we  cannot  count  ipon  the  mode- 
ration, or  hope  to  extinguish  the  ambition,  of  others.  Who 
could  have  imagined,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  last  war,  that 
France  and  Britain,  wearied  and  exhausted  as  they  both  were, 
would  already  have  looked  with  so  hostile  an  aspect  upon  each 
other?  To  judge  from  the  history  of  mankind,  we  shall  be 
compelled  to  conclude,  that  the  fiery  and  destructive  passions 
of  war,  reign  in  the  human  breast  with  much  more  powerfu. 
sway,  than  the  mild  and  beneficent  sentiments  of  peace;  and 
that  to  model  our  political  systems  upon  speculations  of  lasting 
tranquillity,  would  be  to  calculate  on  the  weaker  springs  of  the 
human  character. 

What  are  the  chief  sources  of  expense  in  every  government  ? 
What  has  occasioned  that  enormous  accumulation  of  debts  with 
which  several  of  the  European  nations  are  oppressed?  The 
answer  plainly  is,  wars  and  rebellions;  the  support  of  those 
institutions  which  are  necessary  to  guard  the  body  politic 
against  these  two  most  mortal  diseases  of  society.  The  ex- 
penses arising  from  those  institutions  which  relate  to  the  mere 
domestic  police  of  a  state,  to  the  support  of  its  legislative,  ex- 
ecutive, and  judiciary  departments,  with  their  different  append- 
ages, and  to  the  encouragement  of  agriculture  and  manufactures, 
(which  will  comprehend  almost  all  the  objects  of  state  expend- 
iture) are  insignificant  in  comparison  with  those  which  relate  to 
the  national  defence. 

In  the  kingdom  of  Great  Britain,  where  all  the  ostentalioua 


THE    FEDERALIST.  263 

apparatus  of  mouarchy  is  to  be  provided  for,  not  above  a  fif- 
teenth part  of  the  annual  income  of  the  nation  is  appropriated 
to  the  class  of  expenses  last  mentioned;  the  other  fourteen  fif 
teenths  are  absorbed  in  the  payment  of  the  interest  of  debts, 
contracted  for  carrying  on  the  wars  in  which  that  country  has 
been  engaged,  and  in  the  maintenance  of  fleets  and  armies.  If, 
on  the  one  hand,  it  should  be  observed,  that  the  expenses 
incurred  in  the  prosecution  of  the  ambitious  enterprises  and 
vain-glorious  pursuits  of  a  monarchy,  are  not  a  proper  stand- 
ard by  which  to  judge  of  those  which  might  be  necessary  in  a 
republic;  it  ought,  on  the  other  hand,  to  be  remarked,  that 
there  should  be  as  great  a  disproportion,  between  the  profusion 
and  extravagance  of  a  wealthy  kingdom  in  its  domestic  ad- 
ministration, and  the  frugality  and  economy,  which,  in  that  par- 
ticular, become  the  modest  simplicity  of  republican  government. 
If  we  balance  a  proper  deduction  from  one  side,  against  that 
which  it  is  supposed  ought  to  be  made  from  the  other,  the  pro- 
portion may  still  be  considered  as  holding  good. 

But  let  us  take  a  view  of  the  large  debt  which  we  have  our- 
selves contracted  in  a  single  war,  and  let  us  only  calculate  on  a 
common  share  of  the  events  which  disturb  the  peace  of  nations, 
and  we  shall  instantly  perceive,  without  the  aid  of  any  elaborate 
illustration,  that  there  must  always  be  an  immense  dispropor- 
tion between  the  objects  of  federal  and  state  expenditure.  It  is 
true,  that  several  of  the  states,  separately,  are  incumbered  with 
considerable  debts,  which  are  an  excrescence  of  the  late  war. 
But  this  cannot  happen  again,  if  the  proposed  system  be 
adopted;  and  when  these  debts  are  discharged,  the  only  call  for 
revenue  of  any  consequence,  which  the  state  governments  will 
continue  to  experience,  will  be  for  the  mere  support  of  their 
respective  civil  lists ;  to  which,  if  we  add  all  contingencies,  the 
total  amount  in  every  state,  ought  to  fall  considerably  short  of 
a  million  of  dollars. 

If  it  cannot  be  denied  to  be  a  just  principle,  that  in  framing  a 
constitution  of  government  for  a  nation,  we  ought,  in  those  pro- 
visions which  are  designed  to  be  permanent,  to  calculate,  not  on 


2(54  THE    FEDERALIST. 

tempojary,  but  on  permanent  causes  of  expense;  our  attent.ou 
would  be  directed  to  a  provision  in  favoiir  of  the  state  govern- 
ments, for  an  annual  sum  of  about  1,000,000  of  dollars;  while 
the  exigencies  of  the  union  could  be  susceptible  of  no  limits, 
even  in  imagination.  In  this  view  of  the  subject,  by  what  logic 
''•an  it  be  maintained,  that  the  local  governments  ought  to  com- 
mand, in  perpetuity,  an  exclusive  source  of  revenue  for  any  sum 
beyond  that  which  has  been  stated?  To  extend  its  power 
further,  in  exclusion  of  the  authority  of  the  union,  would  be  to 
take  the  resources  of  the  community  out  of  those  hands  which 
stood  in  need  of  them  for  the  public  welfare,  in  order  to  put 
them  into  other  hands,  which  could  have  no  just  or  proper  occa- 
sion for  them. 

Suppose,  then,  the  convention  had  been  inclined  to  proceed 
upon  the  principle  of  a  repartition  of  the  objects  of  revenue,  be- 
tween the  union  and  its  members,  in  proportion  to  their  compara- 
tive necessities;  what  particular  fund  could  have  been  selected 
for  the  use  of  the  states,  that  would  not  either  have  been  too 
much  or  too  little;  too  little  for  their  present,  too  much  for  their 
future  wants  ?  As  to  the  line  of  separation  between  external 
and  internal  taxes,  this  would  leave  to  the  states,  at  a  rough 
computation,  the  command  of  two  thirds  of  the  resources  of  the 
community,  to  defray  from  a  tenth  to  a  twentieth  of  its  ex- 
penses ;  and  to  the  union,  one  third  of  the  resources  of  the  com- 
inunity,  to  defray  from  nine  tenths  to  nineteen  twentieths  of  its 
expenses.  If  we  desert  this  boundary,  and  content  ourselves 
with  leaving  to  the  states  an  exclusive  power  of  taxing  houses 
and  lands,  there  would  still  be  a  great  disproportion  between 
the  means  and  the  end;  the  possession  of  one  third  of  the  re- 
sources of  the  community,  to  supply,  at  most,  one  tenth  of  its 
wants.  If  any  fund  could  have  been  selected,  and  appropriated, 
equal  to,  and  not  greater  than,  the  object,  it  would  have  been 
inadequate  to  the  discharge  of  the  existing  debts  of  the  parti- 
cular states,  and  would  have  left  them  dependent  on  the  union 
for  a  provision  for  this  purpose. 

The  preceding  train  of  observations,  will  justify  the  positit.n 


THE    FEDERALIST.  265 

^hich  has  been  elsewhere  laid  down,  that  "  a  concurrent  juris- 
diction in  the  article  of  taxation,  was  the  only  admissible  sub- 
stitute for  an  entire  subordination,  in  respect  to  this  branch  of 
power,  of  state  authority  to  that  of  the  union."  Any  separa- 
tion of  the  objects  of  revenue  that  could  have  been  fallen  upon, 
would  have  amounted  to  a  sacrifice  of  the  great  interests  of  the 
union,  to  the  power  of  the  individual  states.  The  convention 
thought  the  concurrent  jurisdiction  preferable  to  that  subordina- 
tion ;  and  it  is  evident,  that  it  has  at  least  the  merit  of  recon- 
ciling an  indefinite  constitutional  power  of  taxation  in  the 
federal  government,  with  an  adequate  and  independent  power 
m  the  states,  to  provide  for  their  own  necessities.  There  re- 
main a  few  other  lights,  in  which  this  important  subject  of  tax. 
ation  will  claim  a  further  consideration. 

PUBLIUS 


266  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XXXV. 


SKW    YORK,    JANUARY    8,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME   SUBJECT   CONTINUED. 

Before  we  proceed  to  examine  any  other  objections  to  an 
indefinite  power  of  taxation  in  the  union,  I  shall  make  one 
general  remark;  which  is,  that  if  the  jurisdiction  of  the  national 
government,  in  the  article  of  revenue,  should  be  restricted  to 
particular  objects,  it  would  naturally  occasion  an  undue  propor- 
tion of  the  public  burthens  to  fall  upon  those  objects.  Two  evils 
would  spring  from  this  source — the  oppression  of  particular 
branches  of  industry,  and  an  unequal  distribution  of  the  taxes, 
as  well  among  the  several  states,  as  among  the  citizens  of  the 
same  state. 

Suppose,  as  has  been  contended  for,  the  federal  power  of  tax- 
ation were  to  be  confined  to  duties  on  imports;  it  is  evident 
that  the  government,  for  want  of  being  able  to  command  other 
resources,  would  frequently  be  tempted  to  extend  these  duties 
to  an  injurious  excess.  There  are  persons  who  imagine  that 
this  can  never  be  the  case ;  since  the  higher  they  are,  the  more 
H  is  alleged  they  will  tend  to  discourage  an  extravagant  con- 
sumption, to  produce  a  favourable  balance  of  trade,  and  to  pro- 
mote domestic  manufactures.  But  all  extremes  are  pernicious 
in  various  ways.  Exorbitant  duties  on  imported  articles,  serve 
to  beget  a  general  spirit  of  smuggling;  which  is  always  pre- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  267 

judicial  to  the  fair  trader,  and  eventually  to  the  revenue  ftself : 
They  tend  to  render  other  classes  of  the  community  tributary, 
[n  an  improper  degree,  to  the  manufacturing  classes,  to  whom 
they  give  a  premature  monopoly  of  the  markets  :  They  sometimes 
force  industry  out  of  its  most  natural  channels  into  others,  in 
which  it  flows  with  less  advantage.  And  in  the  last  place,  they 
oppress  the  merchant,  who  is  often  obliged  to  paj^  them  himself, 
without  any  retribution  from  the  consumer.  When  the  demand 
is  equal  to  the  quantity  of  goods  at  market,  the  consumer  gene- 
rally pays  the  duty;  but  when  the  markets  happen  to  be  over- 
stocked, a  great  proportion  falls  upon  the  merchant,  and  some- 
times not  only  exhausts  his  profits,  but  breaks  in  upon  his 
capital.  I  am  apt  to  think,  that  a  division  of  the  duty,  between 
the  seller  and  the  buyer,  more  often  happens  than  is  commonly 
imagined.  It  is  not  always  possible  to  raise  the  price  of  a  com- 
modity, in  exact  proportion  to  every  additional  imposition  laid 
upon  it.  The  merchant,  especially  in  a  country  of  small  com- 
mercial  capital,  is  often  under  a  necessity  of  keeping  prices 
down,  in  order  to  a  more  expeditious  sale. 

The  maxim,  that  the  consumer  is  the  payer,  is  so  much  oftener 
true  than  the  reverse  of  the  proposition,  that  it  is  far  more 
equitable  that  the  duties  on  imports  should  go  into  a  common 
stock,  than  that  they  should  redound  to  the  exclusive  benefit  of 
the  importing  states.  But  it  is  not  so  generally  true,  as  to 
render  it  equitable,  that  those  duties  should  form  the  only  na- 
tional fund.  When  they  are  paid  by  the  merchant,  they  operate 
as  an  additional  tax  upon  the  importing  state;  whose  citizens 
pay  their  proportion  of  them  in  the  character  of  consumers.  In 
this  view,  they  are  productive  of  inequality  among  the  states ; 
which  inequality  would  be  increased  with  the  increased  extent 
of  the  duties.  The  confinement  of  the  national  revenues  to  this 
species  of  imposts,  would  be  attended  with  inequality,  from  a 
different  cause,  between  the  manufacturing  and  the  non-manu- 
facturing states.  The  states  which  can  go  furthest  towards  the 
supply  of  their  own  wants,  by  their  own  manufactures,  will  not 
according  to  their  numbers  or  wealth,  consume  so  great  a  pro 

28 


'iB8  THE    FEDERALIST. 

porticjp  of  imported  articles,  as  those  states  which  are  not  in 
the  same  favourable  situation ;  they  would  not,  therefore,  in  this 
mode  alone,  contribute  to  the  public  treasury  in  a  ratio  to  their 
abilities.  To  make  them  do  this,  it  is  necessary  that  recourse 
be  had  to  excises ;  the  proper  objects  of  which  are  particular 
kinds  of  manufactures.  New-York  is  more  deeply  interested  in 
these  considerations,  than  such  of  her  citizens,  as  contend  for 
limiting  the  power  of  the  union  to  external  taxation,  may  be 
aware  of.  New-York  is  an  importing  state,  and  from  a  greater 
disproportion  between  her  population  and  territory,  is  less 
likely,  than  some  other  states,  speedily  to  become  in  any  con- 
siderable degree  a  manufacturing  state.  She  would  of  course 
suffer,  in  a  double  light,  from  restraining  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
union  to  commercial  imposts. 

So  far  as  these  observations  tend  to  inculcate  a  danger  of  the 
import  duties  being  extended  to  an  injurious  extreme,  it  may  be 
observed,  conformably  to  a  remark  made  in  another  part  of 
these  papers,  that  the  interest  of  the  revenue  itself  would  be  a 
sufficient  guard  against  such  an  extreme.  I  readily  admit  that 
this  would  be  the  case,  as  long  as  other  resources  were  open ; 
but  if  the  avenues  to  them  were  closed,  hope,  stimulated  by 
necessity,  might  beget  experiments,  fortified  by  rigorous  pre- 
cautions and  additional  penalties ;  which,  for  a  time,  might  have 
the  intended  effect,  till  there  had  been  leisure  to  contrive  expe- 
dients to  elude  these  new  precautions.  The  first  success  would 
be  apt  to  inspire  false  opinions;  which  it  might  require  a  long 
course  of  subsequent  experience  to  correct.  Necessity,  especially 
in  politics,  often  occasions  false  hopes,  false  reasonings,  and  a 
system  of  measures  correspondently  erroneous.  But  even  if 
this  supposed  excess  should  not  be  a  consequence  of  the  limita- 
tion of  the  federal  power  of  taxation,  the  inequalities  spoken  of 
would  still  ensue,  though  not  in  the  same  degree,  from  the  other 
causes  that  have  been  noticed.  Let  us  now  return  to  the  exami- 
nation of  objections. 

One  which,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  frequency  of  its  repe- 
tition, seems  most  to  be  relied  on,  is.  that  the  house  of  ^'epre- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  26i* 

sentatives  is  not  suflSciently  numerous  for  the  reception  of  all 
the  different  classes  of  citizens ;  in  order  to  combine  tde  in- 
terests and  feelings  of  every  part  of  the  community,  and  tc 
produce  a  due  sympathy  between  the  representative  body  and 
its  constituents.  This  argument  presents  itself  under  a  very 
specious  and  seducing  form;  and  is  well  calculated  to  lay  I; old 
of  the  prejudices  of  those  to  whom  it  is  addressed.  But  when 
we  come  to  dissect  it  with  attention,  it  will  appear  to  be  made 
ap  of  nothing  but  fair  sounding  words.  The  object  it  seems  to 
aim  at,  is  in  the  first  place  impracticable,  and  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  is  contended  for,  is  unnecessary.  I  reserve  for  another 
place,  the  discussion  of  the  question  which  relates  to  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  representative  body  in  respect  to  numbers;  and 
shall  content  myself  with  examining  here  the  particular  use 
which  has  been  made  of  a  contrary  supposition,  in  reference  to 
the  immediate  subject  of  our  inquiries. 

The  idea  of  an  actual  representation  of  all  classes  of  the 
people,  by  persons  of  each  class,  is  altogether  visionary.  Unless 
it  were  expressly  provided-  in  the  constitution,  that  each  dif- 
ferent occupation  should  send  one  or  more  members,  the  thing 
would  never  take  place  in  practice.  Mechanics  and  manufac- 
turers will  always  be  inclined,  with  few  exceptions,  to  give  their 
votes  to  merchants,  in  preference  to  persons  of  their  own  pro- 
fessions or  trades.  Those  discerning  citizens  are  well  aware, 
that  the  mechanic  and  manufacturing  arts  furnish  the  materials 
of  mercantile  enterprise  and  industry.  Many  of  them,  indeed, 
are  immediately  connected  with  the  operations  of  commerce. 
They  know  that  the  merchant  is  their  natural  patron  and 
friend ;  and  they  are  aware,  that  however  great  the  confidence 
they  may  justly  feel  in  their  own  good  sense,  their  interests  can 
be  more  effectually  promoted  by  the  merchant  than  by  them- 
selves. They  are  sensible  that  their  habits  of  life  have  not  been 
such  as  to  give  them  those  acquired  endowments,  without  which, 
in  a  deliberative  assembly,  the  greatest  natural  abilities  are  for 
the  most  part  useless ;  and  that  the  influence  and  weight,  and 
superior  acqiiirements  of  the  merchants,  render  them  more  equal 


270  THE    FEDERALIST. 

10  a  cui.tciit  with  any  spirit  which  might  happen  to  infuse  itself 
into  the  public  councils,  unfriendly  to  the  manufacturing  and 
trading  interests.  These  considerations,  and  many  others  that 
might  be  mentioned,  prove,  and  experience  confirms  it,  that 
artizans  and  manufacturers,  will  commonly  be  disposed  to 
bestow  their  votes  upon  merchants  arid  those  whom  they  re- 
commend. We  must  therefore  consider  merchants  as  the  na- 
tural representatives  of  all  these  classes  of  the  community. 

With  regard  to  the  learned  professions,  little  need  he  ob- 
served; they  truly  form  no  distinct  interest  in  society;  and 
according  to  their  situation  and  talents,  will  be  indiscriminately 
the  objects  of  the  confidence  and  choice  of  each  other,  and  of 
other  parts  of  the  community. 

Nothing  remains  but  the  landed  interest;  and  this,  in  a  po 
litical  view,  and  particularly  in  relation  to  taxes,  I  take  to  be 
perfectly  united,  from  the  wealthiest  landlord,  down  to  the 
poorest  tenant.  No  tax  can  be  laid  on  land  which  will  not 
affect  the  proprietor  of  thousands  of  acres,  as  well  as  the  pro- 
prietor of  a  single  acre.  Every  land-holder  will  therefore  have 
a  common  interest  to  keep  the  taxes  on  land  as  low  as  possible ; 
and  common  interest  may  always  be  reckoned  upon  as  the 
surest  bond  of  sympathy.  But  if  we  even  could  suppose  a  dis- 
tirction  of  interests  between  the  opulent  land-holder,  and  the 
middling  farmer,  what  reason  is  there  to  conclude,  that  the 
first  would  stand  a  better  chance  of  being  deputed  to  the  na- 
tional legislature  than  the  last  ?  If  we  take  fact  as  our  guide, 
and  look  into  our  own  senate  and  assembly,  we  shall  find  that 
moderate  proprietors  of  land  prevail  in  both;  nor  is  this  less 
the  case  in  the  senate,  which  consists  of  a  smaller  number  than 
in  the  assembly,  which  is  composed  of  a  greater  number.  Where 
the  qualifications  of  the  electors  are  the  same,  whether  they 
have  to  choose  a  small  or  a  large  number,  their  votes  will  fab 
upon  those  in  whom  they  have  most  confidence;  whether  these 
happen  to  be  men  of  large  fortunes,  or  of  moderate  property,  or 
of  no  property  at  all. 

It  is  said  to  be  necessary  that  all  classes  of  citizens  should 


THE    FEDERALIST.  271 

have  8ome  of  their  own  number  in  the  representative  body,  in 
order  that  their  feelings  and  interests  may  be  the  better  under 
stood  and  attended  to.  But  we  have  seen  that  this  will  never 
happen  under  any  arrangement  that  leaves  the  votes  of  the 
people  free.  Where  this  is  the  case,  the  representative  bodj-, 
with  too  few  exceptions  to  have  any  influence  on  the  spirit  of 
the  government,  will  be  composed  of  land-holders,  merchants, 
and  men  of  the  learned  professions.  But  where  is  the  danger 
that  the  interests  and  feelings  of  the  different  classes  of  citizens 
will  not  be  understood,  or  attended  to  by  these  three  descrip- 
tions of  men?  Will  not  the  land-holder  know  and  feel  whatever 
will  promote  or  injure  the  interests  of  landed  property?  and 
will  he  not,  from  his  own  interest  in  that  species  of  property, 
be  sufficiently  prone  to  resist  every  attempt  to  prejudice  or  en- 
cumber it  ?  Will  not  the  merchant  understand  and  be  disposed 
to  cultivate,  as  far  as  may  be  proper,  the  interests  of  the  me- 
chanic and  manufacturing  arts,  to  which  his  commerce  is  so 
nearly  allied  ?  Will  not  the  man  of  the  learned  profession,  who 
will  feel  a  neutrality  to  the  rivalships  among  the  different 
branches  of  industry,  be  likely  to  prove  an  impartial  arbiter 
between  them,  ready  to  promote  either,  so  far  as  it  shall  appear 
to  him  conducive  to  the  general  interests  of  the  community? 

If  we  take  into  the  account  the  momentary  humours  or  dis- 
positions which  may  happen  to  prevail  in  particular  parts  of  the 
society,  and  to  which  a  wise  administration  will  never  be  in- 
attentive, is  the  man  whose  situation  leads  to  extensive  inquiry 
and  information  less  likely  to  be  a  competent  judge  of  their 
nature,  extent,  and  foundation,  than  one  whose  observation  doe» 
not  travel  beyond  the  circle  of  his  neighbours  and  acquaintances  ? 
Is  it  not  natural  that  a  man  who  is  a  candidate  for  the  favour 
of  the  people,  and  who  is  dependent  on  the  suffrages  of  his 
fellow  citizens  for  the  continuance  of  his  public  honours,  should 
take  care  to  inform  himself  of  their  dispositions  and  inclinations, 
and  should  be  willing  to  allow  them  their  proper  degree  of  in- 
fluence upon  his  conduct  ?  This  dependence,  and  the  necessity 
of  being  bound  himself  and  his  posterity,  by  the  laws  to  which 


'21-2  THE    FEDERALIST. 

I 

he  gives  his  assent,  are  the  true,  and  they  are  the  strong  cords 
of  sympathy  between  the  representative  and  the  constituent. 

There  is  no  part  of  the  administration  of  government  that 
requires  extensive  information,  and  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
the  principles  of  political  economy,  so  much  as  the  business  of 
taxation.  The  man  who  understands  those  principles  best,  will 
be  least  likely  to  resort  to  oppressive  expedients,  or  to  sacrifice 
any  particular  class  of  citizens  to  the  procurement  of  revenue. 
It  might  be  demonstrated  that  the  most  productive  system  of 
finance  will  always  be  the  least  burthensome.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that,  in  order  to  a  judicious  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion, it  is  necessary  that  the  person  in  whose  hands  it  is,  should  be 
acquainted  with  the  general  genius,  habits,  and  modes  of  thinking, 
of  the  people  at  large,  and  with  the  resources  of  the  country. 
And  this  is  all  that  can  be  reasonably  meant  by  a  knowledge 
of  the  interests  and  feelings  of  the  people.  In  any  other  sense, 
the  proposition  has  either  no  meaning,  or  an  absurd  one.  And 
in  that  sense,  let  every  considerate  citizen  judge  for  himself. 
where  the  requisite  qualification  is  most  likely  to  be  found. 

PuBLUJg. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  273 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXXVI. 


NEW   YORK,    JANUARY    8,  1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME   SUBJECT   CONTINUED. 

We  bave  seen  that  the  result  of  the  observations,  to  which 
the  foregoing  number  has  been  principally  devoted,  is,  that  from 
the  natural  operation  of  the  different  interests  and  views  of  the 
various  classes  of  the  community,  whether  the  representation 
of  the  people  be  more  or  less  numerous,  it  will  consist  almost 
entirely  of  proprietors  of  land,  of  merchants,  and  of  members 
of  the  learned  professions,  who  will  truly  represent  all  those 
different  interests  and  views.  If  it  should  be  objected,  that  we 
have  seen  other  descriptions  of  men  in  the  local  legislatures ;  I 
answer,  that  it  is  admitted  there  are  exceptions  to  the  rule,  but 
not  in  sufficient  number  to  influence  the  general  complexion  or 
character  of  the  government.  There  are  strong  minds  in  every 
walk  of  life,  that  will  rise  superior  to  the  disadvantages  of  situa- 
tion, and  will  command  the  tribute  due  to  their  merit,  not  only 
from  the  classes  to  which  they  particularly  belong,  but  from  the 
society  in  general.  The  door  ought  to  be  equally  open  to  all; 
and  I  trust,  for  the  credit  of  human  nature,  that  we  shall  see 
examples  of  such  vigorous  plants  flourishing  in  the  soil  of 
federal,  as  well  as  of  state  legislation ;  but  occasional  instances 
of  this  sort,  will  not  render  the  reasoning,  founded  upon  the 
general  course  of  things,  less  conclusive. 


271  THE    FEDERALIST. 

Tiie  subject  might  be  placed  in  several  other  lights,  that  would 
all  lead  to  the  same  result ;  and  in  particular  it  might  be  asked, 
what  greater  affinity  or  relation  of  interest  can  be  conceived 
between  the  carpenter  and  blacksmith,  and  the  linen  manufac- 
turer or  stocking  weaver,  than  between  the  merchant  and  either 
of  them  ?  It  is  notorious,  that  there  are  often  as  great  rival- 
ships  between  different  branches  of  the  mechanic  or  manufac- 
turing arts,  as  there  are  between  any  of  the  departments  of 
labour  and  industry ;  so  that  unless  the  representative  body 
were  to  be  far  more  numerous,  than  would  be  consistent  with 
any  idea  of  regularity  or  wisdom  in  its  deliberations,  it  is  im- 
possible that  what  seems  to  be  the  spirit  of  the  objection  we 
have  been  considering,  should  ever  be  realized  in  practice.  But 
I  forbear  to  dwell  longer  on  a  matter,  which  has  hitherto  worn 
too  loose  a  garb  to  admit  even  of  an  accurate  inspection  of  its 
real  shape  or  tendency. 

There  is  another  objection  of  a  somewhat  more  precise  nature, 
which  claims  our  attention.  It  has  been  asserted  that  a  power 
of  internal  taxation  in  the  national  legislature,  could  never  be 
exercised  with  advantage,  as  well  from  the  want  of  a  sufficient 
knowledge  of  local  circumstances,  as  from  an  interference  be- 
tween the  revenue  laws  of  the  union,  and  of  the  particular 
states.  The  supposition  of  a  want  of  proper  knowledge,  seems 
to  be  entirely  destitute  of  foundation.  If  any  question  is  de- 
pending in  a  state  legislature,  respecting  one  of  the  counties, 
which  demands  a  knowledge  of  local  details,  how  is  it  acquired  ? 
No  doubt,  from  the  information  of  the  members  of  the  county. 
Cannot  the  like  knowledge  be  obtained  in  the  national  legisla- 
ture, from  the  representatives  of  each  state  ?  And  is  it  not  to 
be  presumed,  that  the  men  who  will  generally  be  sent  there,  will 
be  possessed  of  the  necessary  degree  of  intelligence,  to  be  able 
to  communicate  that  information?  Is  the  knowledge  of  local 
circumstances,  as  applied  to  taxation,  a  minute  topographical 
acquaintance  with  all  the  mountains,  rivers,  streams,  highways, 
and  bye-paths  in  each  state  ?  or  is  it  a  general  acquaintance 
with  its  situation,  and  resources — with  the  state  of  its  agricul- 


THE   FEDERALIST.  275 

ture,  commerce,  manufactures — with  the  nature  of  its  products 
and  consumptions — with  the  different  degrees  and  kinds  of  its 
wealth,  property  and  industry  ? 

Nations  in  general,  even  under  governments  of  the  more 
popular  kind,  usually  commit  the  administration  of  their  finances 
to  single  men,  or  to  boards  composed  of  a  few  individuals,  who 
digest  and  prepare,  in  the  first  instance,  the  plans  of  taxation  • 
which  are  afterwards  passed  into  law  by  the  authority  of  the 
sovereign  or  legislature.  Inquisitive,  and  enlightened  statesmen, 
are  everywhere  deemed  best  qualified,  to  make  a  judicious  selection 
of  the  objects  proper  for  revenue:  which  is  a  clear  indication,  as 
far  as  the  sense  of  mankind  can  have  weight  in  the  question,  of 
the  species  of  knowledge  of  local  circumstances,  requisite  to  the 
purposes  /)f  taxation. 

The  taxes  intended  to  be  comprised  under  the  general  deno- 
mination of  internal  taxes,  may  be  subdivided  into  those  of  the 
direct,  and  those  of  the  indirect  kind.  Though  the  objection  be 
made  to  both,  yet  the  reasoning  upon  it  seems  to  be  confined  to 
the  former  branch.  And  indeed  as  to  the  latter,  by  which  must 
be  understood  duties  and  excises  on  articles  of  consumption, 
one  is  at  a  loss  to  conceive,  what  can  be  the  nature  of  the  diffi- 
culties apprehended.  The  knowledge  relating  to  them,  must 
evidently  be  of  a  kind,  that  will  either  be  suggested  by  the 
nature  of  the  article  itself,  or  can  easily  be  procured  from  any 
'  well  informed  man,  especially  of  the  mercantile  class.  The  cir- 
cumstances that  may  distinguish  its  situation  in  one  state,  from 
its  situation  in  another,  must  be  few,  simple,  and  easy  to  be 
comprehended.  The  principal  thing  to  be  attended  to,  would 
be  to  avoid  those  articles  which  had  been  previously  appro- 
priated to  the  use  of  a  particular  state ;  and  there  could  be  no 
difficulty  in  ascertaining  the  revenue  system  of  each.  This 
could  always  be  known  from  the  respective  codes  of  laws,  as 
well  as  from  the  information  of  the  members  of  the  several 
states. 

The  objection,  when  applied  to  real  property,  or  to  houses  and 
lands,  appears  to  have,  at  first  sight,  more  foundation  ;  but  even 


276  THE    FEDERALIST. 

in  this  view,  it  will  not  bear  a  close  examination.  Land  taxes 
are  commonly  laid  in  one  of  two  modes,  either  by  actual  valua- 
tions, permanent  or  periodical,  or  by  occasional  assessments,  at 
the  discretion,  or  according  to  the  best  judgment  of  certain 
officers,  whose  duty  it  is  to  make  them.  In  either  case,  the 
EXECUTION  of  the  business,  which  alone  requires  the  knowledge 
of  local  details,  must  be  confided  to  discreet  persons  in  the  cha- 
racter of  commissioners  or  assessors,  elected  by  the  people,  or 
appointed  by  the  government  for  the  purpose.  All  that  the  law 
can  do,  must  be  to  name  the  persons,  or  to  prescribe  the  manner 
of  their  election  or  appointment,  to  fix  their  numbei*8  and  quali- 
fications; and  to  draw  the  general  outlines  of  their  powers  and 
duties.  And  what  is  there  in  all  this,  that  cannot  as  well  be 
performed  by  the  national  legislature,  as  by  the  state  legisla- 
ture ?  The  attention  of  either,  can  only  reach  to  general  prin- 
ciples J  local  details,  as  already  observed,  must  be  referred  to 
those  who  are  to  execute  the  plan. 

But  there  is  a  simple  point  of  view,  in  which  this  matter  may 
be  placed,  that  must  be  altogether  satisfactory.  The  national 
legislature  can  make  use  of  the  system  of  each  state  within  that 
state.  The  method  of  laying  and  collecting  this  species  of  taxes 
in  each  state,  can,  in  all  its  parts,  be  adopted  and  employed  by 
the  federal  government. 

Let  it  be  recollected,  that  the  proportion  of  these  taxes  is  not 
to  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  national  legislature :  but  it  is 
to  be  determined  by  the  numbers  of  each  state,  as  described  in 
the  second  section  of  the  first  article.  An  actual  census,  or 
enumeration  of  the  people,  must  furnish  the  rule ;  a  circumstance 
which  effectually  shuts  the  door  to  partiality  or  oppression. 
The  abuse  of  this  power  of  taxation  seems  to  have  been  pro- 
vided against  with  guarded  circumspection.  In  addition  to  the 
precaution  just  mentioned,  there  is  a  provision  that  "  all  duties, 
imposts,  and  excises,  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  United 
States." 

It  has  been  very  properly  observed,  by  different  speakers  and 
writers  on  the  side  of  the  constitution,  that  if  the  exercise  ol 


THE    FEDERALIST.  27? 

the  power  of  internal  taxation  by  the  union,  should  oe  judged 
beforehand  upon  mature  consideration,  or  should  be  discovered 
on  experiment,  to  be  really  inconvenient,  the  federal  govern- 
ment may  forbear  the  use  of  it,  and  have  recourse  to  requisi- 
tions in  its  stead.  By  way  of  answer  to  this,  it  has  been 
triumphantly  asked,  why  not  in  the  first  instance  omit  that 
ambiguous  power,  and  rely  upon  the  latter  resource  ?  Two 
solid  answers  may  be  given ;  the  first  is,  that  the  actual  exercise 
of  the  power,  may  be  found  both  convenient,  and  necessary ;  for  it 
is  impossible  to  prove  in  theory,  or  otherwise  than  by  the  ex- 
periment, that  it  cannot  be  advantageously  exercised.  The 
contrary  indeed,  appears  most  probable.  The  second  answer  is, 
that  the  existence  of  such  a  power  in  the  constitution,  will  have 
a  strong  influence  in  giving  eflficacy  to  requisitions.  When  the 
states  know  that  the  union  can  supply  itself  without  their 
agency,  it  will  be  a  powerful  motive  for  exertion  on  their 
part. 

As  to  the  interference  of  the  revenue  laws  of  the  union,  and 
of  its  members ;  we  have  already  seen  that  there  can  be  no 
clashing  or  repugnancy  of  authority.  The  laws  cannot,  there- 
fore, in  a  legal  sense,  interfere  with  each  other ;  and  it  is  far  from 
impossible  to  avoid  an  interference  even  in  the  policy  of  their 
different  systems.  An  effectual  expedient  for  this  purpose  will 
be,  mutually  to  abstain  from  those  objects,  which  either  side 
may  have  first  had  recourse  to.  As  neither  can  control  the 
other,  each  will  have  an  obvious  and  sensible  interest  in  this 
reciprocal  forbearance.  And  where  there  is  an  immediate  com- 
mon interest,  we  may  safely  count  upon  its  operation.  "When 
the  particular  debts  of  the  states  are  done  away,  and  their  ex- 
penses come  to  be  limited  within  their  natural  compass,  the 
possibility  almost  of  interference  will  vanish.  A  small  land  tax 
will  answer  the  purposes  of  the  states,  and  will  be  their  most 
simple,  and  most  fit  resource. 

Many  spectres  have  been  raised  out  of  this  power  of  internal 
taxation,  to  excite  the  apprehensions  of  the  people-— double  seta 


21t  THE   FEDERALIST. 

of  revenue  officers — a  duplication  of  their  burthens  by  double 
taxations,  and  the  frightful  forms  of  odious  and  oppressive  poll- 
taxes,  have  been  played  off  with  all  the  ingenious  dexterity  of 
political  legerdemain. 

As  to  the  first  point,  there  are  two  cases  in  which  there  can 
be  no  room  for  double  sets  of  officers;  one,  where  the  right  of 
imposing  the  tax  is  exclusively  vested  in  the  union,  which  apjalies 
to  the  duties  on  imports  :  the  other,  where  the  object  has  not 
fallen  under  any  state  regulation  or  provision,  which  maj"  be 
applicable  to  a  variety  of  objects.  In  other  cases,  the  proba- 
bility is,  that  the  United  States  will  either  wholly  abstain  from 
the  objects  pre-occupied  for  local  purposes,  or  will  make  use  of 
the  state  officers,  and  state  regulations,  for  collecting  the  addi- 
tional imposition.  This  will  best  answer  the  views  of  revenue, 
because  it  will  save  expense  in  the  collection,  and  will  best  avoid 
any  occasion  of  disgust  to  the  state  governments  and  to  .the 
people.  At  all  events,  here  is  a  practicable  expedient  for  avoid- 
ing such  an  inconvenience;  and  nothing  more  can  be  required 
than  to  show,  that  evils  predicted  do  not  necessarily  result  from 
the  plan. 

As  to  any  argument  derived  from  a  supposed  system  of  in- 
fluence, it  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  say,  that  it  ought  not  to  be 
presumed ;  but  the  supposition  is  susceptible  of  a  more  precise 
answer.  If  such  a  spirit  should  infest  the  councils  of  the  union, 
the  most  certain  road  to  the  accomplishment  of  its  aim  would 
be,  to  employ  the  state  officers  as  much  as  possible,  and  to 
attach  them  to  the  union  by  an  accumulation  of  their  emolu- 
ments. This  would  serve  to  turn  the  tide  of  state  influence  into 
the  channels  of  the  national  government,  instead  of  making 
federal  influence  flow  in  an  opposite  and  adverse  current.  But 
all  suppositions  of  this  kind  are  invidious,  and  ought  to  be 
banished  from  the  consideration  of  the  great  question  before 
the  people.  They  can  answer  no  other  end  than  to  cast  a  mist 
over  the  truth. 

As  to  the  suggestion  of  double  taxation,  the  answer  is  plain 


THE    FEDERALIST.  279 

The  wants  of  the  union  are  to  be  supplied  in  one  way  or  another 
if  by  the  authority  of  the  federal  government,  then  it  will  not 
remain  to  be  done  by  that  of  the  state  governments.  The 
quantity  of  taxes  to  be  paid  by  the  community,  must  be  the 
same  in  either  ease;  with  this  advantage,  if  the  provision  is  to 
be  made  by  the  union, — that  the  capital  resource  of  commer- 
cial imposts,  which  is  the  most  convenient  branch  of  revenue, 
can  be  prudently  improved  to  a  much  greater  extent  undei 
federal,  than  under  state  regulation,  and  of  course  will  rendei 
it  less  necessary  to  recur  to  more  inconvenient  methods;  and 
with  this  further  advantage,  that  as  far  as  there  may  be  any 
real  difficulty  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  internal  taxation, 
it  will  impose  a  disposition  to  greater  care  in  the  choice  and 
arrangement  of  the  means;  and  must  naturally  tend  to  make 
it  a  fixed  point  of  policy  in  the  national  administration,  to  go 
as  far  as  may  be  practicable  in  making  the  luxury  of  the  rich 
tributary  to  the  public  treasury,  in  order  to  diminish  the  neces- 
sity of  those  impositions,  which  might  create  dissatisfaction  in 
the  poorer  and  most  numerous  classes  of  the  society.  Happy 
it  is  when  the  interest  which  the  government  has  in  the  pre- 
servation of  its  own  power,  coincides  with  a  proper  distribution 
of  the  public  burthens,  and  tends  to  guard  the  least  wealthy  part 
of  the  community  from  oppression ! 

As  to  poll  taxes,  I,  without  scruple,  confess  my  disapproba- 
tion of  them;  and  though  they  have  prevailed  from  an  early 
period  in  those  states,*  which  have  uniformly  been  the  most 
tenacious  of  their  rights,  I  should  lament  to  see  them  intro 
duced  into  practice  under  the  national  government.  But  doeu 
it  follow,  because  there  is  a  power  to  lay  them,  that  they  will 
actually  be  laid?  Every  state  in  the  union  has  power  to  im- 
pose taxes  of  this  kind;  and  yet  in  several  of  them  they  are 
unknown  in  practice.  Are  the  state  governments  to  be  stigma- 
tized as  tyrannies,  because  they  possess  this  power?  If  they 
are  not,  with  what  propriety  can  the  like  power  justify  such 

*  The  New-Eneland  States 


280  THE    FEDERALIST. 

a  cliarge  against  the  national  government,  or  even  be  urged 
as  an  obstacle  to  its  adoption?  As  little  friendly  as  I  am  to 
tLis  species  of  imposition,  I  still  feel  a  thorough  conviction, 
that  the  power  of  having  recourse  to  it,  ought  to  exist  in  the 
federal  government.  There  are  certain  emergencies  of  nations, 
in  which  expedients,  that  in  the  ordinary  state  of  things  ought 
to  be  forborne,  become  essential  to  the  public  weal.  And  the 
government,  from  the  possibility  of  such  emergencies,  ought 
ever  to  have  the  option  of  making  use  of  them.  The  real 
scarcity  of  objects  in  this  country,  which  may  be  considered 
as  productive  sources  of  revenue,  is  a  reason  peculiar  to  itself, 
for  not  abridging  the  discretion  of  the  national  councils  in  this 
respect.  There  may  exist  certain  critical  and  tempestuous  con- 
junctures of  the  state,  in  which  a  poll  tax  maj^  become  an  in- 
estimable resource.  And  as  I  know  nothing  to  exempt  this 
portion  of  the  globe  from  the  common  calamities  that  have 
befallen  other  parts  of  it,  I  acknowledge  my  aversion  to  ever}^ 
project  that  is  calculated  to  disarm  the  government  of  a  single 
weapon,  which  in  any  possible  contingency  might  be  usefully 
employed  for  the  general  defence  and  security. 

1  have  now  gone  through  the  examination  of  those  powers, 
proposed  to  be  conferred  upon  the  federal  government,  which 
relate  more  peculiarly  to  its  energy,  and  to  its  efficiency  for 
answering  the  great  and  primary  objects  of  union.  There  are 
others  which,  though  omitted  here,  will,  in  order  to  render 
the  view  of  the  subject  more  complete,  be  taken  notice  of 
under  the  next  head  of  our  inquiries.  I  flatter  myself  the 
progress  already  made,  will  have  sufficed  to  satisfy  the  candid 
and  judicious  part  of  the  community,  that  some  of  the  objec- 
tions which  have  been  most  strenuously  urged  against  the 
constitution,  and  which  were  most  formidable  in  their  first 
appearance,  are  not  only  destitute  of  substance,  but  if  they 
had  operated  in  the  formation  of  the  plan,  would  have  ren- 
dered it  incompetent  to  the  great  ends  of  public  happiness 
and  national  prosperity.     I  equally  flatter  myself,  that  a  fur- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  2S1 

ther  and  more  critical  investigation  of  the  system,  will  sei-vc 
to  recommend  it  still  more  to  every  sincere  and  disinterested 
advocate  for  good  government;  and  will  leave  no  doubt  with 
men  of  this  character,  of  the  propriety  and  expediency  of  adopt- 
ing it.  Happy  will  it  be  for  ourselves,  and  most  honourable  for 
human  nature,  if  we  have  wisdom  and  virtue  enough,  to  set  so 
glorious  an  example  to  mankind. 

PUBLl  U.S. 


28i{  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XXXVII. 


NEW    YORK,    JANUARY  15,  1788. 


MADISON. 

CONCERNING  THE  DIFFICULTIES    WHICH  THE   CONVENTION  MUST 
HAVE  EXPERIENCED  IN   THE   FORMATION   OF  A  PROPER   PLAN. 

In  reviewing  the  defects  of  the  existing  confederation,  and 
showing  that  they  cannot  be  supplied  by  a  government  of  less 
energy  than  that  before  the  public,  several  of  the  most  important 
principles  of  the  latter  fell  of  course  under  consideration.  But 
as  the  ultimate  object  of  these  papers  is,  to  determine  clearly  and 
fully  the  merits  of  this  constitution,  and  the  expediency  of 
adopting  it,  our  plan  cannot  be  completed  without  taking  a 
more  critical  and  thorough  survey  of  the  work  of  the  conven- 
tion; without  examining  it  on  all  its  sides;  comparing  it  in  all 
its  parts,  and  calculating  its  probable  effects. 

That  this  remaining  task  may  be  executed  under  impressions 
conducive  to  a  just  and  fair  result,  some  reflections  must  in  this 
place  be  indulged,  which  ckndour  previously  suggests. 

It  is  a  misfortune,  inseparable  from  human  affairs,  that  public 
measures  are  rarely  investigated  with  that  spirit  of  moderation, 
which  is  essential  to  a  just  estimate  of  their  real  tendency  to 
advance,  or  obstruct,  the  public  good;  and  that  this  spirit  is 
more  apt  to  be  diminished  than  promoted,  by  those  occasions 
which  require  an  unusual  exercise  of  it.  To  those  who  have 
been  led  by  experience  to  attend  to  this  consideration,  it  could 


THE    FEDERALIST.  283 

not  appear  surprising,  that  the  act  of  the  convention  which 
recommends  so  many  important  changes  and  innovations,  which 
may  be  viewed  in  so  many  lights  and  relations,  and  which  touchee 
the  springs  of  so  many  passions  and  interests,  should  find  or 
excite  dispositions  unfriendly,  both  on  one  side  and  on  the  other, 
to  a  fair  discussion  and  accurate  judgment  of  its  merits.  In 
Bome,  it  has  been  too  evident  from  their  own  publications,  that 
they  have  scanned  the  proposed  constitution,  not  only  with  a 
predisposition  to  censure,  but  with  a  predetermination  to  con- 
demn ;  as  the  language  held  by  others,  betrays  an  opposite  pre- 
determination or  bias,  which  must  render  their  opinions  also  of 
little  moment  in  the  question.  In  placing,  however,  these  differ- 
ent characters  on  a  level,  with  respect  to  the  weight  of  their 
opinions,  I  wish  not  to  insinuate  that  there  may  not  be  a  mate- 
rial  difference  in  the  purity  of  their  intentions.  It  is  but  just 
to  remark  in  favour  of  the  latter  description,  that  as  our  situa- 
tion is  universally  admitted  to  be  peculiarly  critical,  and  to 
require  indispensably,  that  something  should  be  done  for  our 
relief,  the  predetermined  patron  of  what  has  been  actually  done, 
may  have  taken  his  bias  from  the  weight  of  these  considerations, 
as  well  as  from  considerations  of  a  sinister  nature.  The  pre- 
determined adversary,  on  the  other  hand,  can  have  been  governed 
by  no  venial  motive  whatever.  The  intentions  of  the  first  may 
be  upright,  as  they  may  on  the  contrary  be  culpable.  The  views 
of  the  last  cannot  be  upright,  and  must  be  culpable.  But  the 
truth  is,  that  these  papers  are  not  addressed  to  persons  falling 
under  either  of  these  characters.  They  solicit  the  attention  of 
those  only,  who  add  to  a  sincere  zeal  for  the  happiness  of  their 
country,  a  temper  favourable  to  a  just  estimate  of  the  means 
of  promoting  it. 

Persons  of  this  character  will  proceed  to  an  examination  of 
the  plan  submitted  by  the  convention,  not  only  without  a  dispo- 
sition to  find  or  to  magnify  faults;  but  will  see  the  propriety  of 
reflecting,  that  a  faultless  plan  was  not  to  be  expected,  ^or 
will  they  barely  make  allowances  for  the  errours  which  may  be 

chargeable  on  the  fallibility  to  which  the  convention,  as  a  body 

29 


284  THE   FEDERALIST. 

of  men,  were  liable;  but  will  keep  in  mind,  that  they  tnemeeives 
also  are  but  men,  and  ought  not  to  assume  an  infallibility  in 
rejudging  the  fallible  opinions  of  others. 

"With  equal  readiness  will  it  be  perceived,  that  besides  these 
inducements  to  candour,  many  allowances  ought  to  be  made  foi 
the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  the  undertaking 
referred  to  the  convention. 

The  novelty  of  the  undertaking  immediately  strikes  us.  It 
has  been  shown  in  the  course  of  these  papers,  that  the  existing 
confederation  is  founded  on  principles  which  are  fallacious;  that 
we  must  consequently  change  this  foundation,  and  with  it  the 
superstructure  resting  upon  it.  It  has  been  shown,  that  the 
other  confederacies  which  could  be  consulted  as  precedents,  have 
been  vitiated  by  the  same  erroneous  principles,  and  can  there- 
fore furnish  no  other  light  than  that  of  beacons,  which  give 
warning  of  the  course  to  be  shunned,  without  pointing  out  that 
which  ought  to  be  pursued.  The  most  that  the  convention  could 
do  in  such  a  situation,  was  to  avoid  the  errours  suggested  by  the 
past  experience  of  other  countries,  as  well  as  of  our  own ;  and 
to  provide  a  convenient  mode  of  rectifying  their  own  errours  as 
future  experience  may  unfold  them. 

Among  the  difficulties  encountered  by  the  convention,  a  very 
important  one  must  have  lain,  in  combining  the  requisite  sta- 
bility and  energy  in  government,  with  the  inviolable  attention 
due  to  liberty,  and  to  the  republican  form.  Without  substan- 
tially accomplishing  this  part  of  their  undertaking,  they  would 
have  very  imperfectly  fulfilled  the  object  of  their  appointment, 
or  the  expectation  of  the  public :  yet  that  it  could  not  be  easily 
accomplished,  will  be  denied  by  no  one  who  is  unwilling  to 
betray  his  ignorance  of  the  subject.  Energy  in  government  is 
essential  to  that  security  against  external  and  internal  dangers 
and  to  that  prompt  and  salutary  execution  of  the  laws,  which 
enter  into  the  very  definition  of  good  government.  Stability  in 
government  is  essential  to  national  character,  and  to  the  advan- 
tages annexed  to  it,  as  well  as  to  that  repose  and  confidence  in 
the  minds  of  the  people,  which  are  among  the  chief  blessings 


THE    FEDERALIST.  28S 

of  civil  society.  An  irregular  and  mutable  legislation  is  not  more 
an  evil  in  itself,  than  it  is  odious  to  the  people;  and  it  may  be 
pronounced  with  assurance,  that  the  people  of  this  country, 
enlightened  as  they  are,  with  regard  to  the  nature,  and  inte- 
rested, as  the  great  body  of  them  are,  in  the  effects  of  good 
government,  will  never  be  satisfied,  till  some  remedy  be  applied 
to  the  vicissitudes  and  uncertainties,  which  characterize  the 
state  administrations.  On  comparing,  however,  these  valuable 
ingredients  with  the  vital  principles  of  liberty,  we  must  perceive 
at  once  the  difiiculty  of  mingling  them  together  in  their  due 
proportions.  The  genius  of  republican  liberty  seems  to  demand 
on  one  side,  not  only  that  all  power  should  be  derived  from  the 
people;  but  that  those  entrusted  with  it  should  be  kept  in 
dependence  on  the  people,  by  a  short  duration  of  their  appoint- 
ments; and  that  even  during  this  short  period,  the  trust  should 
be  placed  not  in  a  few,  but  in  a  number  of  hands.  Stability,  on 
the  contrary,  requires,  that  the  hands,  in  which  power  is  lodged, 
should  continue  for  a  length  of  time  the  same.  A  frequent 
change  of  men  will  result  from  a  frequent  return  of  elections; 
and  a  frequent  change  of  measures,  from  a  frequent  change  of 
men :  whilst  energy  of  government  requires  not  only  a  certain 
duration  of  power,  but  the  execution  of  it  by  a  single  hand. 

How  far  the  convention  may  have  succeeded  in  this  part  of 
their  work,  will  better  appear  on  a  more  accurate  view  of  it. 
From  the  cursory  view  here  taken,  it  must  clearly  appear  to 
have  been  an  arduous  part. 

Not  less  arduous  must  have  been  the  task  of  marking  the 
proper  line  of  partition,  between  the  authority  of  the  general, 
and  that  of  the  state  governments.  Every  man  will  be  sensible 
of  this  difficulty,  in  proportion  as  he  has  been  accustomed  to 
contemplate  and  discriminate  objects,  extensive  and  complicated 
in  their  nature.  The  faculties  of  the  mind  itself  have  never  yet 
been  distinguished  and  defined,  with  satisfactory  precision,  by 
all  the  efforts  of  the  most  acute  and  metaphysical  philosophers. 
Sense,  perception,  judgment,  desire,  volition,  memory,  imagina- 
tion, are  found  to  be  separated,  by  such  delicate  shades  and 


286  THE    FEDERALIST. 

minute  gradations,  that  their  boundaries  have  eluded  the  most 
subtle  investigations,  and  remain  a  pregnant  source  of  ingenious 
disquisition  and  controversy.  The  boundaries  between  the  great 
kingdoms  of  nature,  and,  still  more,  between  the  various  pro 
vinces,  and  lesser  portions,  into  which  they  are  subdivided,  afford 
another  illustration  of  the  same  important  truth.  The  most 
sagacious  and  laborious  naturalists  have  never  yet  succeeded,  in 
tracing  with  certainty  the  line  which  separates  the  district  oJ 
vegetable  life,  from  the  neighbouring  region  of  unorganized 
matter,  or  which  marks  the  termination  of  the  former,  and  the 
commencement  of  the  animal  empire.  A  still  greater  obscurity 
lies  in  the  distinctive  characters,  by  which  the  objects  in  each 
of  these  great  departments  of  nature  have  been  arranged  and 
assorted. 

When  we  pass  from  the  works  of  nature,  in  which  all  the  de- 
lineations are  perfectly  accurate,  and  appear  to  be  otherwise 
only  from  the  imperfection  of  the  eye  which  surveys  them,  to 
the  institutions  of  man,  in  which  the  obscurity  arises  as  well 
from  the  object  itself,  as  from  the  organ  by  which  it  is  con- 
templated; we  must  perceive  the  necessity  of  moderating  still 
further  our  expectations  and  hopes  from  the  efforts  of  human 
sagacity.  Experience  has  instructed  us,  that  no  skill  in  the 
science  of  government  has  yet  been  able  to  discriminate  and 
define,  with  sufficient  certainty,  its  three  great  provinces,  the 
legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary;  or  even  the  privileges  and 
powers  of  the  different  legislative  branches.  Questions  daily 
occur  in  the  course  of  practice,  which  prove  the  obscurity  which 
reigns  in  these  subjects,  and  which  puzzle  the  greatest  adepts  in 
political  science. 

The  experience  of  ages,  with  the  continued  and  combined 
labours  of  the  most  enlightened  legislators  and  jurists,  have  been 
equally  unsuccessful  in  delineating  the  several  objects  and  limits 
of  different  codes  of  laws,  and  different  tribunals  of  justice.  The 
precise  extent  of  the  common  law,  the  statute  law,  the  maritime 
law,  the  ecclesiastical  law,  the  law  of  corporations,  and  othei 
local  laws  and  customs,  remain  still  to  be  clearly  and  finally 


THE    FEDERALIST.  287 

established  in  Great  Britain,  where  accuracy  in  such  subjects  has 
been  more  industriously  pursued  than  in  any  other  part  of  tho 
world.  The  jurisdiction  of  her  several  courts,  general  and  local 
of  law,  of  equity,  of  admiralty,  &c.,  is  not  less  a  source  of  fre 
quent  and  intricate  discussions,  sufficiently  denoting  the  inde- 
terminate limits  by  which  they  are  respectively  circumscribed 
All  new  laws,  though  penned  with  the  greatest  technical  skill, 
and  passed  on  the  fullest  and  most  mature  deliberation,  are  con- 
sidered as  more  or  less  obscure  and  equivocal,  until  their  mean- 
ing be  liquidated  and  ascertained  by  a  series  of  particular  dis- 
cussions and  adjudications.  Besides  the  obscurity  arising  from 
the  complexity  of  objects,  and  the  imperfection  of  the  human 
faculties,  the  medium  through  which  the  conceptions  of  men  are 
conveyed  to  each  other,  adds  a  fresh  embarrassment.  The  use 
of  words  is  to  express  ideas.  Perspicuity  therefore  requires,  not 
only  that  the  ideas  should  be  distinctly  formed,  but  that  they 
should  be  expressed  by  words  distinctly  and  exclusively  appro- 
priated to  them.  But  no  language  is  so  copious  as  to  supply 
words  and  phrases  for  every  complex  idea,  or  so  correct  as  not 
to  include  many,  equivocally  denoting  different  ideas.  Hence  it 
must  happen,  that  however  accurately  objects  may  be  discrimi- 
nated in  themselves,  and  however  accurately  the  discrimination 
may  be  conceived,  the  definition  of  them  may  be  rendered  inac- 
curate, by  the  inaccuracy  of  the  terms  in  which  it  is  delivered. 
And  this  unavoidable  inaccuracy  must  be  greater  or  less,  accord- 
ing to  the  complexity  and  novelty  of  the  objects  defined.  When 
the  Almighty  himself  condescends  to  address  mankind  in  their 
own  language,  his  meaning,  luminous  as  it  must  be,  is  rendered 
dim  and  doubtful,  by  the  cloudy  medium  through  which  it  is 
Cv)mmunicated. 

Here,  then,  are  three  sources  of  vague  and  incorrect  defini- 
tions; indistinctness  of  the  object,  imperfection  of  the  organ  of 
perception,  inadequateness  of  the  vehicle  of  ideas.  Any  one  of 
chese  must  produce  a  certain  degree  of  obscurity.  The  con- 
vention, in  delineating  the  boundary  between  the  federal  and 


288  THE    FEDERALIST. 

Btato  jurisdictions,  must  have  experienced  the  full  effect  of 
them  nil. 

To  the  difficulties  already  mentioned,  may  be  added  the  inter- 
fering pretensions  of  the  larger  and  smaller  states.  We  cannot 
err,  in  supposing  that  the  former  would  contend  for  a  participa- 
tion in  the  government,  fully  proportioned  to  their  superiour 
wealth  and  importance;  and  that  the  latter  would  not  be  less 
tenacious  of  the  equality  at  present  enjoyed  by  them  We  may 
well  suppose,  that  neither  side  would  entirely  yield  to  the  other, 
and  consequently  that  the  struggle  could  be  terminated  only  by 
compromise.  It  is  extremely  probable  also,  that  after  the  ratio 
of  representation  had  been  adjusted,  this  very  comj)romise  must 
have  produced  a  fresh  struggle  between  the  same  parties,  to  give 
such  a  turn  to  the  organization  of  the  government,  aud  to  the 
distribution  of  its  powers,  as  would  increase  the  importance  of 
the  branches,  in  forming  which  they  had  respectively  obtained 
the  greatest  share  of  influence.  There  are  features  in  the  consti- 
tution which  warrant  each  of  these  suppositions ;  and  as  far  as 
either  of  them  is  well  founded,  it  shows  that  the  convention 
must  have  been  compelled  to  sacrifice  theoretical  propriety,  to 
the  force  of  extraneous  considerations. 

Nor  could  it  have  been  the  large  and  small  states  only,  which 
would  marshal  themselves  in  opposition  to  each  other  on  various 
points.  Other  combinations,  resulting  from  a  difference  of  local 
position  and  policy,  must  have  created  additional  difficulties.  As 
every  state  may  be  divided  into  different  districts,  and  its  citizens 
into  different  classes,  which  give  birth  to  contending  interests 
and  local  jealousies;  so  the  different  parts  of  the  United  States 
are  distinguished  from  each  other,  by  a  variety  of  circumstances, 
which  produce  a  like  effect  on  a  larger  scale.  And  although  this 
variety  of  interests,  for  reasons  sufficiently  explained  in  a  former 
paper,  may  have  a  salutary  influence  on  the  administration  of  the 
government,  when  formed;  yet  every  one  must  be  sensible  ol 
the  contrary  influence,  which  must  have  been  experienced  ir  Ihe 
task  of  forming  it. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  289 

Would  it  be  wonderful,  if  under  the  pressure  of  all  these  diflS- 
culties,  the  convention  should  have  been  forced  into  some  devia- 
tions from  that  artificial  structure  and  regular  symmetry,  which 
an  abstract  view  of  the  subject  might  lead  an  ingenious  theorist 
to  bestow  on  a  constitution  planned  in  his  closet,  or  in  his  imagi- 
nation ?  The  real  wonder  is  that  so  many  diflSculties  should 
have  been  surmounted;  and  surmounted  with  an  unanimity 
almost  as  unprecedented,  as  it  must  have  been  unexpected.  It 
is  impossible  for  any  man  of  candour  to  reflect  on  this  circum- 
stance, without  partaking  of  the  astonishment.  It  is  impossible, 
for  the  man  of  pious  reflection,  not  to  perceive  in  it  a  finger 
of  that  Almighty  Hand,  which  has  been  so  frequently  and  sig- 
nally extended  to  our  relief  in  the  critical  stages  of  the  revo- 
lution. 

We  had  occasion,  in  a  former  paper,  to  take  notice  of  the 
repeated  trials  which  have  been  unsuccessfully  made  in  the 
United  Netherlands,  for  reforming  the  baneful  and  notorious 
vices  of  their  constitution.  The  history  of  almost  all  the  great 
councils  and  consultations,  held  among  mankind  for  reconciling 
their  discordant  opinions,  assuaging  their  mutual  jealousies,  and 
adjusting  their  respective  interests,  is  a  history  of  factions,  con- 
tentions, and  disappointments  J  and  may  be  classed  among  th« 
most  dark  and  degrading  pictures,  which  display  the  infirmities 
and  depravities  of  the  human  character.  If,  in  a  few  scattered 
instances,  a  brighter  aspect  is  presented,  they  serve  only  as 
exceptions  to  admonish  us  of  the  general  truth;  and  by  their 
lustre  to  darken  the  gloom  of  the  adverse  prospect,  to  which 
they  are  contrasted.  In  revolving  the  causes  from  which  these 
exceptions  result,  and  applying  them  to  the  particular  instance 
before  us,  we  are  necessarily  led  to  two  important  conclusions. 
The  first  is,  that  the  convention  must  have  enjoyed,  in  a  very 
smgular  degree,  an  exemption  from  the  pestilential  influence 
of  party  animosities;  the  diseases  most  incident  to  deliberative 
bodies,  and  most  apt  to  contaminate  their  proceedings.  The 
second  conclusion  is,  that  all  the  deputations  composing  the  con- 


290  THE    FEDERALIST. 

vention  were  either  satisfactorily  accommodated  by  the  final 
act ;  '^r  were  induced  to  accede  to  it,  by  a  deep  conviction  of 
tne  necessity  of  sacrificing  private  opinions  and  partial  interests 
to  the  public  good;  and  by  a  despair  of  seeing  this  necessity 
diminished  by  delays,  or  by  n«w  experiments. 

POBLIUfi. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  291 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   XXXVIII. 


NEW    YORK,   JANUARY  15,  1788. 


MADISON. 


THE  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  AND  THE  INCOHERENCE  OF  THE  OBJEC- 
TIONS  TO  THE  PLAN  EXPOSED. 

It  is  not  a  little  remarkable,  that  in  every  case  reported  by 
ancient  history,  in  which  government  has  been  established  with 
deliberation  and  consent,  the  task  of  framing  it  has  not  been 
committed  to  an  assembly  of  men;  but  has  been  performed  by 
some  individual  citizen,  of  preeminent  wisdom  and  approved 
integrity. 

Minos,  we  learn,  was  the  primitive  founder  of  the  government 
of  Crete;  as  Zaleucus  was  of  that  of  the  Locrians.  Theseus 
first,  and  after  him  Draco  and  Solon,  instituted  the  government 
of  Athens.  Lycurgus  was  the  lawgiver  of  Sparta.  The  founda- 
tion of  the  original  government  of  Eome  was  laid  by  Eomulus : 
and  the  work  completed  by  two  of  his  elective  successors,  Numa, 
and  Tullus  Hostilius.  On  the  abolition  of  royalty,  the  consular 
administration  was  substituted  by  Brutus,  who  stepped  forward 
with  a  project  for  such  a  reform,  which,  he  alleged,  had  been  pre- 
pared by  Servius  Tullius,  and  to  which  his  address  obtained  the 
assent  and  ratification  of  the  senate  and  people.  This  remark  is 
applicable  to  confederate  governments  also.  Amphyction,  we  are 
tiold,  was  the  author  of  that  which  bore  his  name.     The  Achaean 


292  THE   FEDERALIST. 

league  received  its  first  birth  from  Achseus,  and  its  second  from 
Aratus. 

What  degree  of  agency  these  reputed  lawgivers  might  have 
in  their  respective  establishments,  or  how  far  they  might  be 
clothed  with  the  legitimate  authority  of  the  people,  cannot,  in 
every  instance,  be  ascertained.  In  some,  however,  the  proceed- 
mg  was  strictly  regular.  Draco  appears  to  have  been  entrusted 
by  the  people  of  Athens,  with  indefinite  powers  to  reform 
its  government  and  laws.  And  Solon,  according  to  Plutarch, 
was  in  a  manner  compelled,  by  the  universal  suffrage  of  his 
fellow-citizens,  to  take  upon  him  the  sole  and  absolute  power  of 
new  modelling  the  constitution.  The  proceedings  under  Ly- 
curgus  were  less  regular;  but  as  far  as  the  advocates  for  a 
regular  reform  could  prevail,  they  all  turned  their  eyes  towards 
the  single  efforts  of  that  celebrated  patriot  and  sage,  instead  of 
seeking  to  bring  about  a  revolution,  by  the  intervention  of  a 
deliberative  body  of  citizens. 

Whence  could  it  have  proceeded,  that  a  people,  jealous  as  the 
Greeks  were  of  their  liberty,  should  so  far  abandon  the  rules  of 
caution,  as  to  place  their  destiny  in  the  hands  of  a  single  citizen  ? 
Whence  could  it  have  proceeded  that  the  Athenians,  a  people  who 
would  not  suffer  an  army  to  be  commanded  by  fewer  than  ten 
generals,  and  who  required  no  other  proof  of  danger  to  their 
liberties  than  the  illustrious  merit  of  a  fellow-citizen,  should  con- 
sider one  illustrious  citizen  as  a  more  eligible  depository  of  the 
fortunes  of  themselves  and  their  posterity,  than  a  select  body  of 
citizens,  from  whose  common  deliberations  more  wisdom,  as  well 
as  more  safety,  might  have  been  expected  ?  These  questions 
cannot  be  fully  answered,  without  supposing  that  the  fears  of 
discord  am'  d'sunion  among  a  number  of  counsellors,  exceeded 
the  apprenension  of  treachery  or  incapacity  in  a  single  indi- 
vidual. History  informs  us  likewise,  of  the  difiiculties  with 
which  these  celebrated  reformers  had  to  contend ;  as  well  as  of 
the  expedients  which  they  were  obliged  to  employ,  in  order  to 
carry  their  reforms  into  effect.  Solon,  who  seems  to  have  in- 
dulged a  more   temporizing  policy,  confessed  that  he  had  not 


TUE   FEDERALIST.  293 

given  to  his  countrymen  the  government  best  suited  to  their 
happiness,  but  most  tolerable  to  their  prejudices.  And  Lycurgus. 
more  true  to  his  object,  was  under  the  necessity  of  mixing  a 
portion  of  violence  with  the  authority  of  superstition ;  and  of 
securing  his  final  success,  by  a  voluntary  renunciation,  first  of 
his  country,  and  then  of  his  life. 

If  these  lessons  teach  us,  on  one  hand,  to  admire  the  improve- 
ment made  by  America  on  the  ancient  mode  of  preparing  and 
establishing  regular  plans  of  government ;  they  serve  not  less  on 
the  other,  to  admonish  us  of  the  hazards  and  difficulties  incident 
to  such  experiments,  and  of  the  great  imprudence  of  unneccR- 
aarily  multiplying  them. 

Is  it  an  unreasonable  conjecture,  that  the  errours  which  may 
be  contained  in  the  plan  of  the  convention,  ai'e  such  as  have 
resulted,  rather  from  the  defect  of  antecedent  experience  on  this 
complicated  and  difficult  subject,  than  from  a  want  of  accuracy 
or  care  in  the  investigation  of  it;  and,  consequently,  such  as  will 
not  be  ascertained  until  an  actual  trial  shall  have  pointed  them 
out  ?  This  conjecture  is  rendered  probable,  not  only  by  many 
considerations  of  a  general  nature,  but  by  the  particular  case  of 
the^articles  of  confederation. 

It  is  observable,  that  among  the  numerous  objections  and 
amendments  suggested  by  the  several  states,  when  these  articles 
were  submitted  for  their  ratification,  not  one  is  found,  which 
alludes  to  the  great  and  radical  errour,  which  on  actual  trial  has 
discovered  itself.  And  if  we  except  the  observations  which  New 
Jersey  was  led  to  make,  rather  by  her  local  situation,  than  by 
her  peculiar  foresight,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  a  single 
suggestion  was  of  sufficient  moment  to  justify  a  revision  of  the 
system.  There  is  abundant  reason  nevertheless  to  suppose,  that 
immaterial  as  these  objections  were,  they  would  have  been  ad- 
hered to  with  a  very  dangerous  inflexibilitj"  in  some  states,  had 
not  a  zeal  for  their  opinions  and  supposed  interests  been  stifled 
by  the  more  powerful  sentiment  of  self-preservation.  One  state, 
we  may  remember,  persisted  for  several  years  in  refusing  her 
concurrence,  although  the  enemy  remained  the  whole  period  at 


2&'l  THE   FEDERALIST. 

our  gates,  oi  rather  in  the  very  bowels  of  our  country.  Nor  was 
her  pliancy  in  the  end  eftected  by  a  less  motive,  than  the  fear  of 
being  chargeable  with  protracting  the  public  calamities,  and 
endangering  the  event  of  the  contest.  Every  candid  reader 
will  make  the  proper  reflections  on  these  important  facts. 

A  patient,  who  finds  his  disorder  daily  growing  worse,  and  that 
an  efficacious  remedy  can  no  longer  be  delayed  without  extreme 
danger;  after  coolly  revolving  his  situation,  and  the  characters 
of  different  physicians,  selects  and  calls  in  such  of  them  as  ho 
judges  most  capable  of  administering  relief,  and  best  entitled 
to  his  confidence.  The  physicians  attend  :  the  case  of  the  patient 
is  carefully  examined — a  consultation  is  held :  they  are  unani- 
mously agreed,  that  the  symptoms  are  critical;  but  that  the 
case,  with  proper  and  timely  relief,  is  so  far  from  being  despe- 
rate, that  it  may  be  made  to  issue  in  an  improvement  of  his 
constitution.  They  are  equally  unanimous  in  prescribing  the 
remedy,  by  which  this  happy  effect  is  to  be  produced.  The  pre- 
scription is  no  sooner  made  known,  however,  than  a  number  of 
persons  interpose,  and,  without  denying  the  reality  or  danger  of 
the  disorder,  assure  the  patient  that  the  prescription  will  be 
poison  to  his  constitution,  and  forbid  him  under  pain  of  certain 
death,  to  make  use  of  it.  Might  not  the  patient  reasonably 
demand,  before  he  ventured  to  follow  this  advice,  that  the 
authors  of  it  should  at  least  agree  among  themselves  on  some 
other  remedy  to  be  substituted  ?  And  if  he  found  them  differing 
as  much  from  one  another,  as  from  his  first  counsellors,  would 
he  not  act  prudently,  in  trying  the  experiment  unanimously 
recommended  by  the  latter,  rather  than  in  hearkening  to  those 
who  could  neither  deny  the  necessity  of  a  speedy  remedy,  nor 
agree  in  proposing  one  ? 

Such  a  patient,  and  in  such  a  situation,  is  America  at  this 
moment.  She  has  been  sensible  of  her  malady.  She  has  ob- 
tained a  regular  and  unanimous  advice  from  men  of  her  own 
deliberate  choice.  And  she  is  warned  by  others  against  fol- 
lowing this  advice,  under  pain  of  the  most  fatal  consequencep 
Do  the   monitors   deny  the   reality  of  her  danger?     No      Df 


THE    FEDERALIST.  295 

the}'  deny  the  necessity  of  some  speedy  and  powerful  remedy  ? 
No.  Are  they  agreed,  are  any  two  of  them  agreed,  in  theii 
objections  to  the  remedy  proposed,  or  in  the  proper  one  to  be 
substituted  ?     Let  them  speak  for  themselves. 

This  one  tells  us,  that  the  proposed  constitution  ought  to  be 
rejected,  because  it  is  not  a  confederation  of  the  states,  but  a 
government  over  individuals.  Another  admits,  that  it  ought  to 
be  a  government  over  individuals,  to  a  certain  extent,  but  by  no 
means  to  the  extent  proposed.  A  third  does  not  object  to  the 
government  over  individuals,  or  to  the  extent  proposed,  but  to 
the  want  of  a  bill  of  rights.  A  fourth  concurs  in  the  absolute 
necessity  of  a  bill  of  rights,  but  contends  that  it  ought  to  be 
declaratory,  not  of  the  personal  rights  of  individuals,  but  of  the 
rights  reserved  to  the  states  in  their  political  capacity.  A  fifth 
is  of  opinion,  that  a  bill  of  rights  of  any  sort  would  be  super- 
fluous and  misplaced,  and  that  the  plan  would  be  unexception- 
able, but  for  the  fatal  power  of  regulating  the  times  and  places 
of  election.  An  objector  in  a  large  state  exclaims  loudly  against 
the  unreasonable  equality  of  representation  in  the  senate.  An 
objector  in  a  small  state  is  equally  loud  against  the  dangerous 
inequality  in  the  house  of  representatives.  From  this  quarter, 
we  are  alarmed  with  the  amazing  expense,  from  the  number  of 
persons  who  are  to  administer  the  new  government.  Frona 
another  quarter,  and  sometimes  from  the  same  quarter,  on 
another  occasion,  the  cry  is,  that  the  congress  will  be  but  a 
Rhadow  of  a  representation,  and  that  the  government  would  be 
far  less  objectionable,  if  the  number  and  the  expense  wert 
doubled.  A  patriot  in  a  state  that  does  not  import  or  export,  dis- 
cerns insuperable  objections  against  the  power  of  direct  taxation 
The  patriotic  adversary  in  a  state  of  great  exports  and  imports, 
is  not  less  dissatisfied  that  the  whole  burthen  of  taxes  may  be 
thrown  on  consumption.  This  politician  discovers  in  the  con- 
Btitction  a  direct  and  irresistible  tendency  to  monarchy  :  that  is 
equuUy  sure,  it  will  end  in  aristocracy.  Another  is  puzzled  to 
say  which  of  these  shapes  it  will  ultimately  assume,  but  sees 
clearly  it  must   be  one  or  other  of  them  :  whilst  a  fourth   is 


296  THE   FEDERALIST. 

QOt  wanting,  who  with  no  less  confidence  affirms,  that  the  con- 
stitution is  so  far  from  having  a  bias  towards  either  of  these 
dangers,  that  the  weight  on  that  side  will  not  be  sufficient  to 
keep  it  upright  and  firm  against  its  opposite  propensities.  With 
another  class  of  adversaries  to  the  constitution,  the  language  is, 
that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary  departments,  are 
intermixed  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  contradict  all  the  ideas  of 
regular  government,  and  all  the  requisite  precautions  in  favour 
of  liberty.  Whilst  this  objection  circulates  in  vague  and  general 
expressions,  there  are  not  a  few  who  lend  their  sanction  to  it. 
Let  each  one  come  forward  with  his  particular  explanation,  and 
scarcely  any  two  are  exactly  agreed  on  the  subject.  In  the 
eyes  of  one,  the  junction  of  the  senate  with  the  president,  in  the 
responsible  function  of  appointing  to  offices,  instead  of  vesting 
this  executive  power  in  the  executive  alone,  is  the  vicious  part 
of  the  organization.  To  another,  the  exclusion  of  the  house  of 
representatives,  whose  numbers  alone  could  be  a  due  security 
against  corruption  and  partiality  in  the  exercise  of  such  a 
power,  is  equally  obnoxious.  With  another,  the  admission  of 
the  president  into  any  share  of  a  power,  which  must  ever  be  a 
dangerous  engine  in  the  hands  of  the  executive  magistrate,  is 
an  unpardonable  violation  of  the  maxims  of  republican  jealousy. 
No  part  of  the  arrangement,  according  to  some,  is  more  inad- 
missible than  the  trial  of  impeachments  by  the  senate,  which  is 
alternately  a  member  both  of  the  legislative  and  executive  de- 
partments, when  this  power  so  evidently  belonged  to  the  judi- 
ciary department.  We  concur  fully,  reply  others,  in  the  objec- 
tion to  this  part  of  the  plan,  but  we  can  never  agree  that  a 
reference  of  impeachments  to  the  judiciary  authority  would  be  an 
amendment  of  the  errour :  our  principal  dislike  to  the  organiza- 
tion, arises  from  the  extensive  powers  already  lodged  in  that  de- 
partment. Even  among  the  zealous  patrons  of  a  council  of  state, 
the  most  irreconcilable  variance  is  discovered,  concerning  the 
mode  in  which  it  ought  to  be  constituted.  The  demand  of  one 
gentleman  is,  that  the  council  should  consist  of  a  small  number, 
to  be  appointed  by  the  most  numerous  branch  of  the  legi/jlature 


THE    FEDERALIST.  297 

Another  would  prefer  a  larger  number,  and  considers  it  as  a  fun- 
damental condition,  that  the  appointment  should  be  made  by  the 
president  himself. 

As  it  can  give  no  umbrage  to  the  writers  against  the  plan  of 
the  federal  constitution,  let  us  suppose,  that  as  thej'  are  the  most 
zealous,  so  they  are  also  the  most  sagacious,  of  those  who  think 
the  late  convention  were  unequal  to  the  task  assigned  them,  and 
that  a  wiser  and  better  plan  might  and  ought  to  be  substituted. 
Let  us  further  suppose,  that  their  country  should  concur,  both 
m  this  favourable  opinion  of  their  merits,  and  in  their  unfavour- 
able opinion  of  the  convention ;  and  should  accordingly  proceed 
to  form  them  into  a  second  convention,  with  full  powers,  and 
for  the  express  purpose  of  revising  and  remoulding  the  work  of 
the  first.  Were  the  experiment  to  be  seriously  made,  though  it 
requires  some  effort  to  view  it  seriously  even  in  fiction,  I  leave  it 
to  be  decided  by  the  sample  of  opinions  just  exhibited,  whether, 
with  all  their  enmity  to  their  predecessors,  they  would,  in  any 
one  point,  depart  so  widely  from  their  example,  as  in  the  discord 
and  ferment  that  would  mark  their  own  deliberations;  and 
whether  the  constitution,  now  before  the  public,  would  not  stand 
as  fair  a  chance  for  immortality,  as  Lycurgus  gave  to  that  of 
Sparta,  by  making  its  change  to  depend  on  his  own  return  from 
exile  and  death,  if  it  were  to  be  immediately  adopted,  and  were 
to  continue  in  force,  not  until  a  better,  but  until  another 
should  be  agreed  upon  by  this  new  assembly  of  lawgivers. 

It  is  a  matter  both  of  wonder  and  regret,  that  those  who  raise 
80  many  objections  against  the  new  constitution,  should  never 
call  to  mind  the  defects  of  that  which  is  to  be  exchanged  for  it. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  the  former  should  be  perfect :  it  19 
suflficient  that  the  latter  is  more  imperfect.  !No  man  would 
refuse  to  give  brass  for  silver  or  gold,  because  the  latter  had 
some  alloy  in  it.  No  man  would  refuse  to  quit  a  shattered  and 
tottering  habitation,  for  a  firm  and  commodious  building,  because 
the  latter  had  not  a  porch  to  it;  or  because  some  of  the  rooms 
tnight  be  a  little  larger  or  smaller,  or  the  ceiling  a  little  higher 
»r  low<;r  than  his  fancy  would  have  planned  them.     But  waving 


•298  THE    FEDERALIST. 

illustrations  'of  this  sort,  is  it  not  manifest,  that  most  of  the 
capital  objections  urged  against  the  new  system,  lie  with  tenfold 
weight  against  the  existing  confederation  ?  Is  an  indefinite 
power  to  raise  money  dangerous  in  the  hands  of  a  federal  govern- 
ment? The  present  congress  can  make  requisitions  to  any 
amount  they  please;  and  tlie  states  are  constitutionally  bound 
to  furnish  them.  They  can  emit  bills  of  credit  as  long  as  they 
will  pay  for  the  paper  j  they  can  borrow  both  abroad  and  at 
home,  as  long  as  a  shilling  will  be  lent.  Is  an  indefinite  power 
to  raise  troops  dangerous  ?  The  confederation  gives  to  congress 
that  power  also:  and  they  have  already  begun  to  make  use  of  it. 
Is  it  improper  and  unsafe  to  intermix  the  different  powers  of 
government  in  the  same  body  of  men  ?  Congress,  a  single  body 
of  men,  are  the  sole  depository  of  all  the  federal  powers.  Is  it 
particularly  dangerous  to  give  the  keys  of  the  treasury,  and  the 
command  of  the  army,  into  the  same  hands  ?  The  confederation 
places  them  both  in  the  hands  of  congress.  Is  a  bill  of  rights 
essential  to  liberty?  The  confederation  has  no  bill  of  rights. 
Is  it  an  objection  against  the  new  constitution,  that  it  empowers 
the  senate,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  executive,  to  make 
treaties  which  are  to  be  the  laws  of  the  land?  The  existing 
congress,  without  any  such  control,  can  make  treaties  which 
they  themselves  have  declared,  and  most  of  the  states  have 
recognized,  to  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land.  Is  the  importa- 
tion of  slaves  permitted  by  the  new  constitution  for  twenty 
years  ?     By  the  old  it  is  permitted  forever. 

I  shall  be  told,  that  however  dangerous  this  mixture  of  powers 
may  be  in  theory,  it  is  rendered  harmless  by  the  dependence  of 
congress  on  the  states  for  the  means  of  carrying  them  into 
practice :  that  however  large  the  mass  of  powers  may  be,  it  is 
in  fact  a  lifeless  mass.  Then,  say  I,  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
confederation  is  chargeable  with  the  still  greater  folly,  of 
declaring  certain  powers  in  the  federal  government  to  be  abso- 
lutely necessary,  and  at  the  same  time  rendering  them  absolutely 
nugatory;  and,  in  the  next  place,  that  if  the  union  is  to  con- 
tinue, and  no  better  government  be  substituted,  effective  powers 


THE    FEDERALIST.  299 

must  either  be  granted  to,  or  assumed  by,  the  existing  congress; 
m  either  of  which  events,  the  contrast  just  stated  will  holu 
good.  But  this  is  not  all.  Out  of  this  lifeless  mass,  has  already- 
grown  an  excrescent  power,  which  tends  to  realize  all  the  dan- 
gers that  can  be  apprehended  from  a  defective  construction  of 
the  supreme  government  of  the  union.  It  is  now  no  longer  a 
point  of  speculation  and  hope,  that  the .  western  territory  is  a 
mine  of  vast  wealth  to  the  United  States:  and  although  it  is 
not  of  such  a  nature  as  to  extricate  them  from  their  present 
distresses,  or  for  some  time  to  come  to  yield  any  regular  sup- 
plies for  the  public  expenses;  yet  must  it  hereafter  be  able, 
under  proper  management,  both  to  effect  a  gradual  dischai'ge  of 
the  domestic  debt,  and  to  furnish,  for  a  certain  period,  liberal 
tributes  to  the  federal  treasury.  A  very  large  proportion  of  this 
fund  has  been  already  surrendered  by  individual  states ;  and  it 
may  with  reason  be  expected,  that  the  remaining  states  will  not 
jjersist  in  withholding  similar  proofs  of  their  equity  ana  genero- 
sity. We  may  calculate,  therefore,  that  a  rich  and  fertile  country, 
of  ^n  area  equal  to  the  inhabited  extent  of  the  United  States, 
will  soon  become  a  national  stock.  Congress  have  assumed 
the  administration  of  this  stock.  They  ha"ve  begun  to  render  it 
productive.  Congress  have  undertaken  to  do  more : — they  have 
proceeded  to  form  new  states;  to  erect  temporary  governments; 
to  appoint  officers  for  them;  and  to  prescribe  the  conditions  on 
which  such  states  shall  be  admitted  into  the  confederacy.  All  this 
has  been  done :  and  done  without  the  least  colour  of  constitu- 
tional authority.  Yet  no  blame  has  been  whispered :  no  alarm 
has  been  sounded.  A  great  and  independent  fund  of  revenue 
is  passing  into  the  hands  of  a  single  body  of  men,  who  can 
EAISE  TROOPS  to  an  INDEFINITE  NUMBER,  and  appropriate  money 
to  their  support  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time.  And  yet 
there  are  men,  who  have  not  only  been  silent  spectators  of  this 
prospect,  but  who  are  advocates  for  the  system  which  exhibits 
t;  and,  at  the  same  time,  urge  against  the  new  system  the 
Dejections  which  we  have  heard.  Would  they  not  act  with  more 
'jonsistency,  in  urging  the  establishment  of  the  latter,  as  no  less 

30 


300  THE    FEDERALIST. 

necessary  to  guard  the  union  against  the  future  powers  and 
resources  of  a  body  constructed  like  the  existing  congress,  than 
to  save  it  from  the  dangers  threatened  by  the  present  impotency 
of  that  assembly? 

I  mean  not,  by  any  thing  here  said,  to  throw  censure  on  the 
measures  which  have  been  pursued  by  congress.  I  am  sensible 
they  could  not  have  done  otherwise.  The  public  interest,  the 
necessity  of  the  case,  imposed  upon  them  the  task  of  overleap- 
ing their  constitutional  limits.  But  is  not  the  fact  an  alarming 
proof  of  the  danger  resulting  from  a  government,  which  does 
not  possess  regular  powers  commensurate  to  its  objects?  A  dis- 
solution, or  usurpation,  is  the  dreadful  dilemma  to  which  it  is 
continually  exj  osed. 

PUBLIUS. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  801 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XXXIX. 


NEW   YORK,   JANUARY   18,   1788. 


MADISON. 


THE  CONFORMITY  OF  THE  PLAN  TO  REPUBLICAN  PRINCIPLES- 
AN  OBJECTION  IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  POWERS  OF  THE  CONVEN- 
TION,  EXAMINED. 

The  last  paper  having  concluded  the  observations,  which  were 
meant  to  introduce  a  candid  survey  of  the  plan  of  government 
reported  by  the  convention,  we  now  proceed  to  the  execution  of 
that  part  of  our  undertaking. 

The  first  question  that  offers  itself  is,  whether  the  general 
form  and  aspect  of  the  government  be  strictly  republican  ?  It 
is  evident  that  no  other  form  would  be  reconcilable  with  the 
genius  of  the  people  of  America;  with  the  fundamental  principles 
of  the  revolution;  or  with  that  honourable  determination  which 
animates  every  votary  of  freedom,  to  rest  all  our  political  expe- 
riments on  the  capacity  of  mankind  for  self-government.  If  the 
plan  of  the  convention,  therefore,  be  found  to  depart  from  the 
republican  character,  its  advocates  must  abandon  it  as  no  longer 
defensible. 

What,  then,  are  the  distinctive  characters  of  the  republican 
form  ?  Were  an  answer  to  this  question  to  be  sought,  not  by 
recurring  to  principles,  but  in  the  application  of  the  term  by 
political  writers,  to  the  constitutions  of  different  states,  no  satis- 
factory one  would  ever  be  found.     Holland,  in  which  no  particle 


302  THE    FEDERALIST. 

of  th.)  supreme  authority  i8  derived  from  tlie  people,  has  passed 
almost  universally  under  the  denomination  of  a  republic.  The 
same  title  has  been  bestowed  on  Venice,  where  absolute  power 
over  the  great  body  of  the  people  is  exercised,  in  the  most  abso- 
lute manner,  by  a  small  body  of  hereditary  nobles.  Poland, 
which  is  a  mixture  of  aristocracy'  and  of  monarchy  in  their 
worst  forms,  has  been  dignified  with  the  same  appellation.  The 
government  of  England,  which  has  one  republican  branch  only, 
combined  with  a  hereditary  aristocracy  and  monarchy,  has,  with 
equal  impropriety,  been  frequently  placed  on  the  list  of  republics. 
These  examples,  which  are  nearly  as  dissimilar  to  each  other  as 
to  a  genuine  republic,  show  the  extreme  inaccuracy  with  which 
the  term  has  been  used  in  political  disquisitions. 

If  we  resort,  for  a  criterion,  to  the  different  principles  on 
which  different  forms  of  government  are  established,  we  may 
define  a  republic  to  be,  or  at  least  may  bestow  that  name  on, 
a  government  which  derives  all  its  powers  directly  or  indirectly 
from  the  great  body  of  the  people,  and  is  administered  by 
persons  holding  their  offices  during  pleasure,  for  a  limited  period, 
or  during  good  behaviour.  It  is  essential  to  such  a  govern- 
ment, that  it  be  derived  from  the  great  body  of  the  society,  not 
from  an  inconsiderable  proportion,  or  a  favoured  class  of  it; 
otherwise  a  handful  of  tyrannical  nobles,  exercising  their  oppres- 
sions by  a  delegation  of  their  powers,  might  aspire  to  the  rank 
of  republicans,  and  claim  for  their  government  the  honourable 
title  of  republic.  It  is  sufficient  for  such  a  government,  that  the 
persons  administering  it  be  appointed,  either  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, by  the  people;  and  that  they  hold  their  appointments  by 
either  of  the  tenures  just  specified;  otherwise  every  government 
in  the  United  States,  as  well  as  every  other  popular  government 
that  has  been  or  can  be  well  organized  or  well  executed,  would  be 
degraded  from  the  republican  character.  According  to  the  con 
stitution  of  every  state  in  the  union,  some  or  other  of  the  officers 
of  government  are  appointed  indirectly  only  by  the  people. 
According  to  most  of  them,  the  chief  magistrate  himself  is  so 
appointed.     And  according  to  one,  this  mode  of  appointment  's 


THE    FEDERALIST.  308 

BXiended  to  one  of  the  coordinate  branches  of  the  legislature. 
According  to  all  the  constitutions  also,  the  tenure  of  the  highesi 
oflSces  is  extended  to  a  definite  period,  and  in  many  instances, 
both  within  the  legislative  and  executive  departments,  to  a 
period  of  years.  According  to  the  provisions  of  most  of  the 
constitutions,  again,  as  well  as  according  to  the  most  respectable 
and  received  opinions  on  the  subject,  the  members  of  the  judi- 
ciary department  are  to  retain  their  offices  by  the  firm  tenure 
of  good  behaviour. 

On  comparing  the  constitution  planned  by  the  convention, 
with  the  standard  here  fixed,  we  perceive  at  once,  that  it  is,  in 
the  most  rigid  sense,  conformable  to  it.  The  house  of  repre- 
sentatives, like  that  of  one  branch  at  least  of  all  the  state  legis- 
latures, is  elected  immediately  by  the  great  body  of  the  people 
The  senate,  like  the  present  congress,  and  the  senate  of  Mary- 
land, derives  its  appointment  indirectly  from  the  people.  The 
president  is  indirectly  derived  from  the  choice  of  the  people, 
according  to  the  example  in  most  of  the  states.  Even  the 
judges,  with  all  other  officers  of  the  union,  will,  as  in  the  several 
states,  be  the  choice,  though  a  remote  choice,  of  the  people  them- 
selves. The  duration  of  the  appointments  is  equally  conform- 
able to  the  republican  standard,  and  to  the  model  of  the  state 
constitutions.  The  house  of  representatives  is  periodically  elect- 
ive, as  in  all  the  states;  and  for  the  period  of  two  years,  as  in  the 
state  of  South  Carolina.  The  senate  is  elective,  for  the  period 
of  six  years ;  which  is  but  one  year  more  than  the  period  of  the 
senate  of  Maryland ;  and  but  two  more  than  that  of  the  senates 
of  New  York  and  Virginia.  The  president  is  to  continue  in  office 
for  the  period  of  four  years ;  as  in  New  York  and  Delaware,  the 
chief  magistrate  is  elected  for  three  years,  and  in  South  Carolina 
for  two  years.  In  the  other  states  the  election  is  annual.  In 
several  of  the  states,  however,  no  explicit  provision  is  made  for 
the  impeachment  of  the  chief  magistrate.  And  in  Delaware  and 
Virginia,  he  is  not  impeachable  till  out  of  office.  The  president 
of  the  United  States  is  impeachable  at  any  time  during  his  con- 
tinuance in  office.     The  tenure  by  which  the  judges  are  to  hold 


304  THE    FEDERALIST. 

their  places,  is,  as  it  unquestionably  ought  to  be,  that  of  good 
behaviour.  The  tenure  of  the  ministerial  offices  generally,  will 
be  a  subject  of  legal  regulation,  conformably  to  the  reason  of 
the  case,  and  the  example  of  the  state  constitutions. 

Could  any  further  proof  be  required  of  the  republican  com- 
plexion of  this  system,  the  most  decisive  one  might  be  found  in 
its  absolute  prohibition  of  titles  of  nobility,  both  under  the 
federal  and  the  state  governments;  and  in  its  express  guarantee 
of  the  republican  form  to  each  of  the  latter. 

But  it  was  not  sufficient,  say  the  adversaries  of  the  proposea 
constitution,  for  the  convention  to  adhere  to  the  republican  form. 
They  ought,  with  equal  care,  to  have  preserved  the  federal  form, 
which  regards  the  union  as  a  confederacy  of  sovereign  states; 
instead  of  which,  they  have  framed  a  national  government,  which 
regards  the  union  as  a  consolidation  of  the  states.  And  it  is 
asked,  by  what  authority  this  bold  and  radical  innovation  was 
undertaken  ?  The  handle  which  has  been  made  of  this  objec- 
tion requires,  that  it  should  be  examined  with  some  precision. 

Without  inquiring  into  the  accuracy  of  the  distinction  on 
which  the  objection  is  founded,  it  will  be  necessary  to  a  just 
estimate  of  its  force,  first,  to  ascertain  the  real  character  of  the 
government  in  question;  secondly,  to  inquire  how  far  the  con- 
vention were  authorized  to  propose  such  a  government;  and 
thirdly,  how  far  the  duty  they  owed  to  their  country,  could 
supply  any  defect  of  regular  authority. 

First.  In  order  to  ascertain  the  real  character  of  the  govern- 
ment, it  may  be  considered  in  relation  to  the  foundation  on 
which  it  is  to  be  established;  to  the  sources  from  which  its 
ordinary  powers  are  to  be  drawn;  to  the  operation  of  those 
powers;  to  the  extent  of  them;  and  to  the  authority  by  which 
future  changes  in  the  government  are  to  be  introduced. 

On  examining  the  first  relation,  it  appears,  on  one  hand,  that 
the  constitution  is  to  be  founded  on  the  assent  and  ratification 
of  the  people  of  America,  given  by  deputies  elected  for  'he  spe- 
cial purpose;  but  on  the  other,  that  this  assent  and  ratifii.avion 
is  to  be  given  by  the  people,  not  as  individuals  composing  on* 


THE    FEDERALIST.  305 

entire  nation,  but  a8  composing  the  distinct  and  independent 
states  to  which  they  respectively  belong.  It  is  to  be  the  assent 
and  ratification  of  the  several  states,  derived  from  the  supreme 
authority  in  each  state — the  authority  of  the  people  themselves. 
The  act,  therefore,  establishing  the  constitution,  will  not  be  a 
national,  but  a  federal  act. 

That  it  will  be  a  federal,  and  not  a  national  act,  as  these  terms 
are  understood  by  the  objectors,  the  act  of  the  people,  as  form- 
ing so  many  independent  states,  not  as  forming  one  aggregate 
nation,  is  obvious  from  this  single  consideration,  that  it  is  to 
result  neither  from  the  decision  of  a  majority  of  the  people  of  the 
union,  nor  from  that  of  a  majority  of  the  states.  It  must  result 
from  the  unanimous  assent  of  the  several  states  that  are  parties  to 
it,  differing  no  otherwise  from  their  ordinary  assent  than  in  its 
being  expressed,  not  by  the  legislative  authority,  but  by  that  of 
the  people  themselves.  Were  the  people  regarded  in  this  trans- 
action as  forming  one  nation,  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the 
whole  people  of  the  United  States  would  bind  the  minority;  in 
the  same  manner  as  the  majority  in  each  state  must  bind  the 
minority;  and  the  will  of  the  majority  must  be  determined  either 
by  a  comparison  of  the  individual  votes,  or  by  considering  the 
will  of  the  majority  of  the  states,  as  evidence  of  the  will  of  a 
majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States.  Neither  of  these 
rules  has  been  adopted.  Each  state,  in  ratifying  the  constitu- 
tion, is  considered  as  a  sovereign  body,  independent  of  all 
others,  and  only  to  be  bound  by  its  own  voluntary  act.  In  this 
relation,  then,  the  new  constitution  will,  if  established,  be  a  fede- 
ral, and  not  a  national  constitution. 

The  next  relation  is,  to  the  sources  from  which  the  ordinary 
powers  of  government  are  to  be  derived.  The  house  of  repre- 
wentatives  will  derive  its  powers  from  the  people  of  America, 
and  the  people  will  be  represented  in  the  same  proportion,  and 
on  the  same  principle,  as  they  are  in  a  legislature  of  a  particular 
state.  So  far  the  government  is  national,  not  federal.  The 
senate,  on  the  other  hand,  will  derive  its  powers  from  the  states, 
as  political  and  coequal  societies ;  and  these  will  be  represented 


806  THE   FEDERALIST. 

on  the  principle  of  equality  in  the  senate,  as  they  now  are  in  the 
existing  congress.  So  far  the  government  is  federal^  not  national. 
The  executive  power  will  be  derived  from  a  very  compound 
source.  The  immediate  election  of  the  president  is  to  be  made 
by  the  states  in  their  political  characters.  The  votes  allotted  to 
them  are  in  a  compound  ratio,  which  considers  them  partly  as 
distinct  and  coequal  societies;  partly  as  unequal  members  of  the 
same  society.  The  eventual  election,  again,  is  to  be  made  by 
that  branch  of  the  legislature  which  consists  of  the  national 
representatives;  but  in  this  particular  act,  they  are  to  be  thrown 
into  the  form  of  individual  delegations,  from  so  many  distinct 
and  coequal  bodies  politic.  Prom  this  aspect  of  the  govern- 
ment, it  appears  to  be  of  a  mixed  character,  presenting  at  least 
as  many  federal  as  national  features. 

The  difference  between  a  federal  and  national  government,  as 
it  relates  to  the  operation  of  the  government,  is,  by  the  adversaries 
of  the  plan  of  the  convention,  supposed  to  consist  in  this,  that  in 
the  former,  the  powers  operate  on  the  political  bodies  composing 
the  confederacy,  in  their  political  capacities;  in  the  latter,  on 
the  individual  citizens  composing  the  nation,  in  their  individual 
capacities.  On  trying  the  constitution  by  this  criterion,  it  falls 
under  the  national^  not  the  federal  character;  though  perhaps 
not  so  completely  as  has  been  understood.  In  several  cases,  and 
particularly  in  the  trial  of  controversies  to  which  states  may  be 
parties,  they  must  be  viewed  and  proceeded  against  in  their  col- 
lective and  political  capacities  only.  But  the  operation  of  the 
government  on  the  people  in  their  individual  capacities,  in  its 
ordinary  and  most  essential  proceedings,  will,  on  the  whole,  in 
the  sense  of  its  opponents,  designate  it,  in  this  relation,  a  national 
government. 

But  if  the  government  be  national,  with  regard  to  tlie  opera- 
tion of  its  powers,  it  changes  its  aspect  again,  when  we  con- 
template it  in  relation  to  the  extent  of  its  powers.  The  idea  of 
a  national  government  involves  in  it,  not  only  an  authority  over 
the  individual  citizens,  but  an  indefinite  supremacy  over  all  per- 
sons and  tb'ngs,  so  far  as  thejare  objects  of  lawful  government. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  307 

Among  a  people  consolidated  into  one  nation,  this  supremacj 
is  completely  vested  in  the  national  legislature.  Among  com- 
munities united  for  particular  purposes,  it  is  vested  partly  in  the 
general,  and  partly  in  the  municipal  legislatures.  In  the  former 
case,  all  local  authorities  are  subordinate  to  the  supreme ;  and 
may  be  controled,  directed,  or  abolished  by  it  at  pleasure.  In 
the  latter,  the  local  or  municipal  authorities  form  distinct  and 
independent  portions  of  the  supremacy,  no  more  subject  within 
their  respective  spheres,  to  the  general  authority,  than  the 
general  authority  is  subject  to  them  within  its  own  sphere.  In 
this  relation,  then,  the  proposed  government  cannot  be  deemed 
a  national  one ;  since  its  jurisdiction  extends  to  certain  enume- 
rated objects  only,  and  leaves  to  the  several  states  a  residuary 
and  inviolable  sovereignty  over  all  other  objects.  It  is  true 
that  in  controversies  relating  to  the  boundary  between  the  two 
jurisdictions,  the  tribunal  which  is  ultimately  to  decide,  is  to  bo 
established  under  the  general  government.  But  this  does  not 
change  the  principle  of  the  case.  The  decision  is  to  be  impar- 
tially made,  according  to  the  rules  of  the  constitution;  and  all 
the  usual  and  most  effectual  precautions  are  taken  to  secure  this 
impartiality.  Some  such  tribunal  is  clearly  essential  to  prevent 
an  appeal  to  the  sword,  and  a  dissolution  of  the  compact;  and 
that  it  ought  to  be  established  under  the  general,  rather  than 
under  the  local  governments ;  or,  to  speak  more  properly,  that 
it  could  be  safely  established  under  the  first  alone,  is  a  position 
not  likel}'  to  be  combated. 

If  we  try  the  constitution  by  its  last  relation,  to  the  authority 
by  which  amendments  are  to  be  made,  we  find  it  neither  wholly 
national,  nor  wholly  federal.  Were  it  wholly  national,  the  su- 
preme an4  ultimate  authority  would  reside  in  the  majority  of  the 
people  of  the  union ;  and  this  authority  would  be  competent  at 
all  times,  like  that  of  a  majority  of  every  national  society,  to 
alter  or  abolish  its  established  government.  "Were  it  wholly 
federal  on  the  other  hand,  the  concurrence  of  each  state  in  the 
union  would  be  essential  to  every  alteration  that  would  be  bind- 
ing on  all.     The  mode  provided  by  the  plan  of  the  convention, 


308  THE    FEDERALIST. 

is  not  founded  on  either  of  these  principles.  In  requiring  more 
than  a  majority,  and  particularly,  in  computing  the  proportion  by 
States,  not  by  citizens,  it  departs  from  the  national,  and  advances 
towards  the  federal  character.  In  rendering  the  concurrence 
of  less  than  the  whole  number  of  states  suflficient,  it  loses  again 
the  federal,  and  partakes  of  the  national  character. 

The  proposed  constitution,  therefore,  even  when  tested  by  the 
rules  laid  down  by  its  antagonists,  is,  in  strictness,  neither  a 
national  nor  a  federal  constitution;  but  a  composition  of  both 
In  its  foundation  it  is  federal,  not  national;  in  the  sources  from 
which  the  ordinary  powers  of  the  government  are  drawn,  it  is 
partly  federal,  and  partly  national :  in  the  operation  of  these 
powers,  it  is  national,  not  federal ;  in  the  extent  of  them  again,  it 
IS  federal,  not  national ;  and  finally  in  the  authoritative  mode  of 
introducing  amendments,  it  is  neither  wholly  federal,  nor  wholly 
national. 

PuBLiua 


THE    FEDERALIST.  -809 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XL. 


NEW    YORK,    JANUARY   18,  1788. 


MADISON. 

THE   SAME   OBJECTION   FURTHER   EXAMINED. 

The  second  point  to  be  examined  is,  whether  the  conventiou 
were  authorized  to  frame,  and  propose  this  mixed  constitution. 

The  powers  of  the  convention  ought,  in  strictness,  to  be  deter- 
mined, by  an  inspection  of  the  commissions  given  to  the  mem- 
bers by  their  respective  constituents.  As  all  of  these,  however, 
had  reference,  either  to  the  recommendation  from  the  meeting 
at  Annapolis,  in  September,  1786,  or  to  that  from  congress,  in 
February,  1787,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  recur  to  these  particular 
acts. 

The  act  from  Annapolis  recommends  the  "  appointment  of 
commissioners  to  take  into  coHsideration  the  situation  of  the 
United  States ;  to  devise  sue  \  further  provisions,  as  shall  appear 
to  them  necessary  to  render  the  constitution  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the  union;  and  to  report 
such  an  act  for  that  purpose,  to  the  United  States  in  congress 
assembled,  as,  when  agreed  to  by  them,  and  afterwards  con- 
Hrmed  by  the  legislature  of  every  state,  will  effectually  provide 
for  the  same." 

The  recommendatory  act  of  congress  is  in  the  words  follow- 
ing :  "  Whereas,  there  is  provision  in  the  articles  of  confedera- 
tion and  perpetual  union,  for  making  alterations  therein,  by  the 


310  THE    FEDERALIST. 

.iHsent  ni'  a  congress  of  United  States,  and  of  the  legislatures 
of  the  several  states;  and  whereas  experience  hath  evinced, 
that  there  are  defects  in  the  present  confederation;  as  a  mean 
to  remedy  which,  several  of  the  states,  and  particularly  the  state 
of  New  York,  by  express  instructions  to  their  delegates  in  con- 
gress, have  suggested  a  convention  for  the  purposes  expressed 
in  the  following  resolution ;  and  such  convention  appearing  to 
be  the  most  probable  mean  of  establishing  in  these  states  a  firm 
national  government :" 

•'  Resolved,  That  in  the  opinion  of  congress,  it  is  expedient,  that 
on  the  2d  Monday  in  May  next,  a  convention  of  delegates,  who 
shall  have  been  appointed  by  the  several  states,  be  held  at  Phila- 
delphia, for  the  sole  and  express  purpose  of  revising  the  articles 
of  confederation,  and  reporting  to  congress  and  the  several  legis- 
latures, such  alterations  and  provisions  therein,  as  shall,  when 
agreed  to  in  congress,  and  confirmed  by  the  states,  render  the 
federal  constitution  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  government,  and 
the  preservation  of  the  union." 

From  these  two  acts,  it  appears,  1st,  that  the  object  of  the 
convention  was  to  establish,  in  these  states,  a  firm  national  govern- 
ment; 2d,  that  this  government  was  to  be  such  as  would  be 
adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  government,  and  the  preservation  of  the 
union;  3d,  that  these  purposes  were  to  be  effected  by  alterations 
and  provisions  in  the  articles  of  confederation,  as  it  is  expressed  in 
the  act  of  congress ;  or  by  such  further  provisions  as  should  appear 
necessary,  as  it  stands  in  the  recommendatory  act  from  Anna- 
polis; 4th,  that  the  alterations  and  provisions  were  to  be  reported 
to  congress,  and  to  the  states,  in  order  to  be  agreed  to  by  the 
former  and  confirmed  by  the  latter. 

From  a  comparison,  and  fair  construction,  of  these  several 
modes  of  expression,  is  to  be  deduced  the  authority  oider  which 
the  convention  acted.  They  were  to  frame  a  national  government, 
adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  government,  and  of  the  union  ;  and  to 
reduce  the  articles  of  confederation  into  such  form,  as  to  accom- 
plish these  purposes. 

There  are  two  rules  of  construction  dictated  by  plain  reason. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  811 

afi  well  as  founded  on  legal  axioms.  The  one  is,  that  every  part 
of  the  expression  ought,  if  possible,  to  be  allowed  some  meaning, 
and  be  made  to  conspire  to  some  common  end.  The  other  is, 
that  where  the  several  parts  cannot  be  made  to  coincide,  the 
less  important  should  give  way  to  the  more  important  part :  the 
means  should  be  sacrificed  to  the  end,  rather  than  the  end  to 
the  means. 

Suppose,  then,  that  the  expressions  defining  the  authority  of 
the  convention,  were  irreconcilably  at  variance  with  each  other; 
that  a  national  and  adequate  government  could  not  possibly,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  convention,  be  effected  by  alterations  and  pro- 
visions in  the  articles  of  confederation ;  which  part  of  the  defini- 
tion ought  to  have  been  embraced,  and  which  rejected  ?  Which 
was  the  more  important ;  which  the  less  important  part  ?  Which 
the  end ;  which  the  means  ?  Let  the  most  scrupulous  expositors 
of  delegated  powers  j  let  the  most  inveterate  objectors  against 
those  exercised  by  the  convention,  answer  these  questions.  Let 
them  declare,  whether  it  was  of  most  importance  to  the  happi- 
ness of  the  people  of  America,  that  the  articles  of  confederation 
should  be  disregarded,  and  an  adequate  government  be  provided, 
and  the  union  preserved ;  or  that  an  adequate  government  should 
be  omitted,  and  the  articles  of  confederation  preserved.  Let 
them  declare,  whether  the  preservation  of  these  articles  was  the 
end,  for  securing  which  a  reform  of  the  government  was  to  be 
introduced  as  the  means ;  or  whether  the  establishment  of  a 
government,  adequate  to  the  national  happiness,  was  the  end  at 
which  these  articles  themselves  originally  aimed,  and  to  which 
they  ought,  as  insufficient  means,  to  have  been  sacrificed. 

But  is  it  necessary  to  suppose,  that  these  expressions  are  abso- 
lutely irreconcilable  to  each  other;  that  no  alterations  or  provi 
sions  in  the  articles  of  the  confederation,  could  possibly  mould  them 
into  a  national  and  adequate  government :  into  such  a  govern- 
ment as  has  been  proposed  by  the  convention  ? 

No  stress,  it  is  presumed,  will,  in  this  case,  be  laid  on  the  title; 
A  change  of  that  could  never  be  deemed  an  exercise  of  ungranted 
oower.     Alterations  in  the  body  of  the  instrument  are  exnressly 


812  THE    FEDERALIST. 

authorized.  New  provisions  therein  are  also  expressly  author- 
ized. Here  then  is  a  power  to  change  the  title;  to  insert  new 
articles;  to  alter  old  ones.  Must  it  of  necessity  be  admitted, 
that  this  power  is  infringed,  so  long  as  a  part  of  the  old  articles 
remain?  Those  who  maintain  the  affirmative,  ought  at  least  to 
mark  the  boundary  between  authorized  and  usurped  innova- 
tions ;  between  that  degree  of  change  which  lies  within  the  com- 
pass of  alterations  and  further  provisions,  and  that  which  amounts 
to  a  transmutation  of  the  government.  Will  it  be  said,  that  the 
alterations  ought  not  to  have  touched  the  substance  of  the  con- 
federation ?  The  states  would  never  have  appointed  a  conven 
tion  with  so  much  solemnity,  nor  described  its  objects  with  so 
much  latitude,  if  some  substantial  reform  had  not  been  in  con- 
templation. Will  it  be  said,  that  th.^  fundamental  principles  ot 
the  confederation  were  not  within  the  purview  of  the  conven- 
tion, and  ought  not  to  have  been  varied  ?  I  ask,  what  are  these 
principles  ?  Do  they  require,  that  in  the  establishment  of  the 
constitution,  the  states  should  be  regarded  as  distinct  and  inde- 
pendent sovereigns  ?  They  are  so  regarded  by  the  constitution 
proposed.  Do  they  require,  that  the  members  of  the  govern- 
ment should  derive  their  appointment  from  the  legislatures,  not 
from  the  people  of  the  states  ?  One  branch  of  the  new  govern- 
ment is  to  be  appointed  by  these  legislatures;  and  under  the 
confederation,  the  delegates  to  congress  may  all  be  appointed 
immediately  by  the  people ;  and  in  two  states*  are  actually  so 
appointed.  Do  they  require,  that  the  powers  of  the  government 
should  act  on  the  states,  and  not  immediately  on  individuals? 
In  some  instances,  as  has  been  shown,  the  powers  of  the  new 
government  will  act  on  the  states  in  their  collective  characters. 
In  some  instances  also,  those  of  the  existing  government  act 
immediately  on  individuals.  In  cases  of  capture ;  of  piracy  ;  of 
the  post-office ;  of  coins,  weights,  and  measures ;  of  trade  with 
the  Indians;  of  claims  under  grants  of  land,  by  different  states; 
and,  above  all,  in  the  case  of  trials  by  courts-martial  in  the  army 

*  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island. 


THE   FEDERALIST  Sl^ 

and  uavy,  by  which  death  may  be  inflicted  witnout  the  luter- 
vention  of  a  jury,  or  even  of  a  civil  magistrate;  in  all  these 
cases,  the  powers  of  the  confederation  operate  immediately  on 
the  persons  and  interests  of  individual  citizens.  Do  these  fun- 
damental principles  require,  particularly,  that  no  tax  should  be 
levied,  without  the  intermediate  agency  of  the  states?  The 
confederation  itself,  authorizes  a  direct  tax,  to  a  certain  extent, 
on  the  post-office.  The  power  of  coinage,  has  been  so  construed 
by  congress,  as  to  levy  a  tribute  immediately  from  that  source 
also.  But  pretermitting  these  instances,  was  it  not  an  acknow- 
ledged object  of  the  convention,  and  the  universal  expectation 
of  the  people,  that  the  regulation  of  trade  should  be  submitted 
to  the  general  government,  in  such  a  form  as  would  render  it  an 
immediate  source  of  general  revenue  ?  Had  not  congress  re- 
peatedly recommended  this  measure,  as  not  inconsistent  with 
the  fundamental  principles  of  the  confederation  ?  Had  not  every 
state,  but  one ;  had  not  New  York  herself,  so  far  complied  with 
the  plan  of  congress,  as  to  recognize  the  principle  of  the  inno- 
vation ?  Do  these  principles,  in  fine,  require  that  the  powers  of 
the  general  government  should  be  limited,  and  that,  beyond  this 
limit,  the  states  should  be  left  in  possession  of  their  sovereignty 
and  independence  ?  We  have  seen,  that  in  the  new  government, 
as  in  the  old,  the  general  powers  are  limited ;  and  that  the  states, 
in  all  unenumerated  cases,  are  left  in  the  enjoyment  of  their 
sovereign  and  independent  jurisdiction. 

Truth  is,  that  the  great  principles  of  the  constitution  proposed 
by  the  convention,  may  be  considered  less,  as  absolutely  new, 
than  as  the  expansion  of  principles  which  are  found  in  the  arti- 
cles of  confederation.  The  misfortune  under  the  latter  sj-stem 
has  been,  that  these  principles  are  so  feeble  and  confined,  as  to 
justify  all  the  charges  of  inefficiency  which  have  been  urged 
against  it;  and  to  require  a  degree  of  enlargement,  which  gives 
to  the  new  system  the  aspect  of  an  entire  transformation  of  the 
old. 

In  one  particular,  it  is  admitted,  that  the  convention  have  de- 
parted from  the  tenor  of  their  commission.     Instead  of  reporting 


314  THE    FEDERALIST. 

a  plan  requiring  the  confirmation  of  all  the  states,  they  have  re- 
ported a  plan,  which  is  to  be  confirmed,  and  may  be  carried  into 
effect,  by  nine  states  only.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  this  objec- 
tion, though  the  most  plausible,  has  been  the  least  urged  in  the 
publications  which  have  swarmed  against  the  convention.  The 
forbearance  can  only  have  proceeded  from  an  ii*resistible  convic- 
tion of  the  absurdity  of  subjecting  the  fate  of  twelve  states  to 
the  perverseness  or  corruption  of  a  thirteenth ;  from  the  example 
of  inflexible  opposition  given  bj'  a  majority  of  one  sixtieth  of  the 
people  of  America,  to  a  measure  approved  and  called  for  by  the 
voice  of  twelve  states,  comprising  fifty-nine  sixtieths  of  the 
people  J  an  example  still  fresh  in  the  memory  and  indignation 
of  every  citizen  who  has  felt  for  the  wounded  honour  and  pros- 
perity of  his  country.  As  this  objection,  therefore,  has  been  in 
a  manner  waved  by  those  who  have  criticised  the  powers  of  the 
convention,  I  dismiss  it  without  further  observation. 

The  third  point  to  be  inquired  into  is,  how  far  considerations 
of  duty  arising  out  of  the  case  itself,  could  have  supplied  any 
defect  of  regular  authority. 

In  the  preceding  inquiries,  the  powers  of  the  convention  have 
been  analyzed  and  ti'ied  with  the  same  rigour,  and  by  the  same 
»*ules,  as  if  they  had  been  real  and  final  powers,  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a  constitution  for  the  United  States.  We  have  seen,  in 
what  manner  they  have  borne  the  trial,  even  on  that  supposition. 
It  is  time  now  to  recollect,  that  the  powers  were  merely  advi- 
sor}- and  recommendatory;  that  they  were  so  meant  by  the 
states,  and  so  understood  by  the  convention  ;  and  that  the  latter 
have  accordingly  planned  and  proposed  a  constitution,  which  is 
to  be  of  no  more  consequence  than'  the  paper  on  which  it  is 
written,  unless  it  be  stamped  with  the  approbation  of  those  to 
whom  it  is  addressed.  This  reflection  places  ]bhe  subject  in  a 
point  of  view  altogether  different,-  and  will  enable  us  to  judgo 
with  propriety  of  the  course  taken  by  the  convention. 

Let  us  view  the  ground  on  which  the  convention  stood.  It 
may  be  collected  from  their  proceedings,  that  they  were  deeply 
and  unanimously  impressed  with  the  crisis,  which  had  led  then 


THE    FEDERALIST.  31 A 

country,  almost  with  one  voice,  to  make  so  singular  and  solemn 
an  experiment,  for  correcting  the  errours  of  a  system,  by  which 
this  crisis  had  been  produced;  that  they  were  no  less  deeply 
and  unanimously  convinced,  that  such  a  reform  as  they  have 
proposed,  was  absolutely  necessary  to  effect  the  purposes  of  theii 
appointment.  It  could  not  be  unknown  to  them,  that  the  hopes 
and  expectations  of  the  great  body  of  citizens,  throughout  this 
gi-eat  empire,  were  turned  with  the  keenest  anxiety,  to  the  event 
of  their  deliberations.  They  had  every  reason  to  believe,  that 
the  contrary  sentiments  agitated  the  minds  and  bosoms  of  every 
external  and  internal  foe  to  the  liberty  and  prosperity  of  the 
United  States.  They  had  seen  in  the  origin  and  progress  of  the 
experiment,  the  alacrity  with  which  the  proposition,  made  by  a 
single  state  (Virginia)  towards  a  partial  amendment  of  the  con- 
federation had  been  attended  to  and  promoted.  They  had  seen 
the  liberty  assumed  by  a  very  few  deputies,  from  a  very  few  states, 
convened  at  Annapolis,  of  recommending  a  great  and  critical 
object,  wholly  foreign  to  their  commission,  not  only  justified  by 
the  public  opinion,  but  actually  carried  into  effect,  by  twelve  out 
of  the  thirteen  states.  They  had  seen,  in  a  variety  of  instances, 
assumptions  by  congress,  not  only  of  recommendatory,  but  of 
operative  powers,  warranted  in  the  public  estimation,  by  occa- 
sions and  objects  infinitely  less  urgent  than  those  by  which  their 
conduct  was  to  be  governed.  They  must  have  reflected,  that  in 
all  great  changes  of  established  governments,  forms  ought  to 
give  way  to  substance;  that  a  rigid  adherence  in  such  cases  to 
the  former,  would  render  nominal  and  nugatory,  the  transcend- 
ant  and  precious  right  of  the  people  to  "  abolish  or  alter  their 
governments  as  to  them  shall  seem  most  likely  to  effect  their 
safety  and  happiness  :"*  since  it  is  impossible  for  the  people 
spontaneously  and  universally,  to  move  in  concert  towards  theix 
object :  and  it  is  therefore  essential,  that  such  changes  be  insti- 
tuted by  some  informul  and  unauthorized  propositions,  made  by 
some  patriotic  and  respectable  citizen,  or  number  of  citizens 

*  Declaration  of  Independence 
31 


316  THE    FEDERALIST 

They  mast  have  recollected,  that  it  was  by  this  irregular  and 
assumed  privilege,  of  proposing  to  the  people  plans  for  their 
safety  and  happiness,  that  the  states  were  first  united  against 
the  danger  with  which  they  were  threatened  by  their  ancient 
government;  that  committees  and  congresses  were  formed  for 
concentrating  their  efforts,  and  defending  their  rights  :  and  that 
conventions  were  elected  in  tfie  several  states,  for  establishing  the 
constitutions  under  which  they  are  now  governed.  Nor  could 
it  have  been  forgotten,  that  no  little  ill-timed  scruples,  no  zeal 
for  adhering  to  ordinary  forms,  were  anywhere  seen,  except  in 
those  who  wished  to  indulge,  under  these  masks,  their  secret 
enmity  to  the  substance  contended  for.  They  must  have  boi*ne 
in  mind,  that  as  the  plan  to  be  framed  and  proposed,  was  to  be 
submitted  to  the  people  themselves,  the  disapprobation  of  this 
supreme  authority  would  destroy  it  for  ever ;  its  approbation 
blot  out  all  antecedent  errours  and  irregularities.  It  might 
even  have  occurred  to  them,  that  where  a  disposition  to  cavil 
prevailed,  their  neglect  to  execute  the  degree  of  power  vested 
in  them,  and  still  more  their  recommendation  of  any  measure 
whatever  not  warranted  by  their  commission,  would  not  less 
excite  animadversion,  than  a  recommendation  at  once  of  a 
measure  fully  commensurate  to  the  national  exigencies. 

Had  the  convention,  under  all  these  impressions,  and  in  the 
midst  of  all  these  considerations,  instead  of  exercising  a  manly 
confidence  in  their  country,  by  whose  confidence  they  had  been 
BO  peculiarly  distinguished,  and  of  pointing  out  a  system  capable,^ 
in  their  judgment,  of  securing  its  happiness,  taken  the  cold  and 
sullen  resolution  of  di8a,ppointing  its  ardent  hopes,  of  sacrificing 
substance  to  forms,  of  committing  the  dearest  interests  of  their 
country  to  the  uncertainties  of  delay,  and  the  hazard  of  events ; 
let  me  ask  he  man,  who  can  raise  his  mind  to  one  elevated  con- 
ception, who  can  awaken  in  his  bosom  one  patriotic  emotion, 
what  judgment  ought  to  have  been  pronounced  by  the  impartial 
world,  by  the  friends  of  mankind,  by  every  virtuous  citizen,  on 
the  conduct  and  character  of  this  assembly  ?  Or  if  there  be  a 
man  whose  propensity  to  condemn  is  susceptible  of  no  control, 


THE    FEDERALIST.  317 

let  me  then  ask,  what  sentence  he  has  in  reserve  for  the  twelve 
states  who  usurped  the  power  of  sending  deputies  to  the  conven- 
tion, a  body  utterly  unknown  to  their  constitutions ;  for  con- 
gress, who  recommended  the  appointment  of  this  body,  equally 
unknown  to  the  confederation  ;  and  for  the  state  of  New  York, 
in  particular,  who  first  urged,  and  then  complied  with  this  un- 
authorized interposition  ? 

But  that  the  objectors  may  be  disarmed  of  every  pretext,  it 
shall  be  granted  for  a  moment,  that  the  convention  were  neither 
authorized  by  their  commission,  nor  justified  by  circumstances, 
in  proposing  a  constitution  for  their  country  :  does  it  follow  that 
the  constitution  ought,  for  that  "eason  alone,  to  be  rejected  ?  If, 
according  to  the  noble  precept,  it  be  lawful  to  accept  good  advice 
even  from  an  enemy,  shall  we  set  the  ignoble  example,  of  re- 
fusing such  advice  even  when  it  is  offered  by  our  friends  ?  The 
prudent  inquiry,  in  all  cases,  ought  surely  to  be  not  so  much /rom 
whom  the  advice  comes,  as  whether  the  advice  be  good. 

The  sum  of  what  has  been  here  advanced  and  proved  is,  that 
the  charge  against  the  convention  of  exceeding  their  powers^ 
except  in  one  instance  little  urged  by  the  objectors,  has  no 
foundation  to  support  it ;  that  if  they  had  exceeded  their  powers, 
they  were  not  only  warranted,  but  required,  as  the  confidential 
servants  of  their  country,  by  the  circumstances  in  which  they 
were  placed,  to  exercise  the  liberty  which  they  assumed ;  and 
that  finally,  if  they  had  violated  both  their  powers  and  theii 
obligations,  in  proposing  a  constitution,  this  ought  nevertheless 
to  be  embraced,  if  it  be  calculated  to  accomplish  the  views  and 
happiness  of  the  people  of  America.  How  far  this  character  is 
due  to  the  constitution,  is  the  subject  under  investigation. 

PUBLIUB. 


818  THE    FEDERALISl. 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XLI. 


NEW    YORK,    JANUARY    22,  1788. 


MADISON. 

liENERAL  VIEW    OF   THE   POWERS   PROPOSED    TO   BE  VESTED    [N 

THE    UNION. 

The  constitution  proposed  by  the  convention,  may  be  con- 
sidered under  two  general  points  of  view.  The  first  relates  to 
the  sum  or  quantity  of  power  which  it  vests  in  the  government, 
including  the  restraints  imposed  on  the  states.  The  second,  to 
the  particular  structure  of  the  government,  and  the  distribution 
of  this  power  among  its  several  branches. 

Under  the  first  view  of  the  subject,  two  important  questions 
arise: — 1.  Whether  any  part  of  the  powers  transferred  to  the 
general  government  be  unnecessary  or  improper? — 2.  Whether 
the  entire  mass  of  them  be  dangerous  to  the  portion  of  jurisdic- 
tion left  in  the  several  states  ? 

Is  the  aggregate  power  of  the  general  government  greater 
than  ought  to  have  been  vested  in  it  ?    This  is  the  first  question 

It  cannot  have  escaped  those,  who  have  attended  with  candour 
to  the  arguments  employed  against  the  extensive  powers  of  the 
government,  that  the  authors  of  them  have  very  little  considered, 
how  far  these  powers  were  necessary  means  of  attaining  a  neces- 
sary end.  They  have  chosen  rather  to  dwell  on  the  inconve- 
niencies  which  must  be  unavoidably  blended  with  all  political 
advantages ;  and  on  the  possible  abuses  which  must  be  incident 


THE    FEDERALIST.  319 

to  every  jjower  or  trust,  of  which  a  beneficial  use  can  be  made 
This  method  of  handling  the  subject,  cannot  impose  on  the  good 
sense  of  the  people  of  America  It  may  display  the  subtlety  ot 
the  writer;  it  may  open  a  boundless  field  of  rhetoric  and  decla- 
mation ;  it  may  inflame  the  passions  of  the  unthinking,  and  may 
confirm  the  prejudices  of  the  misthinking :  but  cool  and  candid 
people  will  at  once  reflect,  that  the  purest  of  human  blessings 
must  have  a  portion  of  alloy  in  them  ;  that  the  choice  must 
always  be  made,  if  not  of  the  lesser  evil,  at  least  of  the  greater, 
not  the  PERFECT  good;  and  that  in  every  political  institution,  a 
power  to  advance  the  public  happiness,  involves  a  discretion 
which  may  be  misapplied  and  abused.  They  will  see,  therefore, 
that  in  all  cases  where  power  is  to  be  conferred,  the  point  first 
to  be  decided  is,  whether  such  a  power  be  necessary  to  the 
public  good ;  as  the  next  will  be,  in  ease  of  an  affirmative  deci- 
sion, to  guard  as  effectually  as  possible  against  a  perversion  of 
the  power  to  the  public  detriment. 

That  we  may  form  a  correct  judgment  on  this  subject,  it  will 
be  proper  to  review  the  several  powers  conferred  on  the  govern- 
ment of  the  union ;  and  that  this  may  be  the  more  conveniently 
done,  they  may  be  reduced  into  different  classes  as  they  relate 
to  the  following  different  objects  :  1.  Security  against  foreign 
danger;  2.  Regulation  of  the  intercourse  with  foreign  nations; 
3.  Maintenance  of  harmony  and  proper  intercourse  among  the 
states;  4.  Certain  miscellaneous  objects  of  general  utility;  5 
Restraint  of  the  states  from  certain  injurious  acts;  6.  Provisions 
for  giving  due  efficacy  to  all  these  powers. 

The  powers  falling  within  the  first  class,  are  those  of  declaring 
war,  and  granting  letters  of  marque;  of  providing  armies  and 
fleets;  of  regulating  and  calling  forth  the  militia;  of  levying 
and  borrowing  money. 

Security  against  foreign  danger,  is  one  of  the  primitive  objects 
of  civil  society.  It  is  an  avowed  and  essential  object  of  the 
American  union.  The  powers  requisite  for  attaining  it,  must 
be  effectually  confided  to  the  federal  councils. 

Is   the  power   of  declaring   war   necessary  ?     No    man   will 


320  THE   FEDERALIST. 

an8"W3r  this  question  in  the  negative.  It  would  be  superfluous, 
therefore,  to  enter  into  a  proof  of  the  affirmative.  The  exist- 
ing confederation  establishes  this  power  in  the  most  ample 
form. 

Is  the  power  of  raising  armies,  and  equipping  fleets  neces- 
sary ?  This  is  involved  in  the  foregoing  power.  It  is  involved 
in  the  power  of  self-defence. 

But  was  it  necessary  to  give  an  indefinite  power  of  raising 
TROOPS,  as  well  as  providing  fleets ;  and  of  maintaining  both  in 
PEACE,  as  well  as  in  war  ? 

The  answer  to  these  questions  has  been  too  far  anticipated  in 
another  place,  to  admit  an  extensive  discussion  of  them  in  this 
place.  The  answer  indeed  seems  to  be  so  obvious  and  conclu- 
sive, as  scarcely  to  justify  such  a  discussion  in  an}'  place.  "With 
what  colour  of  propriety,  could  the  force  necessary  for  defence 
be  limited,  by  those  who  cannot  limit  the  forCe  of  ofi'ence  ?  If 
a  federal  constitution  could  chain  the  ambition,  or  set  bounds 
to  the  exertions  of  all  other  nations,  then  indeed  might  it  pru- 
dently chain  the  discretion  of  its  own  government,  and  set 
bounds  to  the  exertions  for  its  own  safety. 

How  could  a  readiness  for  war  in  time  of  peace  be  safely  pro- 
hibited, unless  we  could  prohibit,  in  like  manner,  the  prepara- 
tions and  establishments  of  every  hostile  nation  ?  The  means 
of  security  can  only  be  regulated  by  the  means  and  danger  of 
attack.  They  will  in  fact  be  ever  determined  by  these  rules, 
and  by  no  others.  It  is  in  vain  to  oppose  constitutional  barriers 
to  the  impulse  of  self-preservation.  It  is  worse  than  in  vain  • 
because  it  plants  in  the  constitution  itself  necessary  usurpations 
of  power,  every  precedent  of  which  is  a  germ  of  unnecessary 
and  multiplied  repetitions.  If  one  nation  maintains"  constantly 
a  disciplined  army,  ready  for  the  service  of  ambition  or  revenge, 
it  obliges  the  most  pacific  nations,  who  may  be  within  the  reach 
of  its  enterprises,  to  take  corresponding  precautions.  The  fif- 
teenth century  was  the  unhappy  epoch  of  military  establish- 
ments in  time  of  peace.  They  were  introduced  by  Charles  VII  of 
France.    All  Europe  has  followed,  or  been  forced  into  the  example 


THE    FEDERALIST  321 

Had  the  example  not  been  followed  by  other  nations,  all  Europe 
must  long  ago  have  worn  the  chains  of  a  universal  monarcn 
Were  every  nation,  except  France,  now  to  disband  its  peac« 
establishment,  the  same  event  might  follow.  The  veteran 
legions  of  Rome  were  an  overmatch  for  the  undisciplined 
valour  of  all  other  nations,  and  rendered  her  mistress  of  the 
world, 

Not  the  less  true  is  it,  that  the  liberties  of  Rome  proved  the 
final  victim  to  her  military  triumphs  j  and  that  the  liberties  of 
Europe,  as  far  as  they  ever  existed,  have,  with  few  exceptions, 
been  the  price  of  her  military  establishments.  A  standing  force, 
therefore,  is  a  dangerous,  at  the  same  time  that  it  may  be  a 
necessary,  provision.  On  the  smaller  scale,  it  has  its  inconve- 
niences. On  an  extensive  scale,  its  consequences  may  be  fatal. 
On  any  scale,  it  is  an  object  of  laudable  circumspection  and 
precaution.  A  wise  nation  will  combine  all  these  considera- 
tions; and  whilst  it  does  not  rashly  preclude  itself  from  any 
resource  which  may  become  essential  to  its  safety,  will  exert 
all  its  prudence  in  diminishing  both  the  necessity  and  the  danger 
of  resorting  to  one  which  may  be  inauspieions  to  its  liberties. 

The  clearest  marks  of  this  prudence  are  stamped  on  the  pro- 
posed constitution.  The  union  itself,  which  it  cements  and  se- 
cures, destroys  every  pretext  for  a  military  establishment  which 
could  be  dangerous.  America  united,  with  a  handful  of  troops, 
or  without  a  single  soldier,  exhibits  a  more  forbidding  posture  to 
foreign  ambition,  than  America  disunited  with  a  hundred  thou- 
sand veterans  ready  for  combat.  It  was  remarked,  on  a  former 
occasion,  that  the  want  of  this  pretext  had  saved  the  liberties 
of  one  nation  in  Europe.  Being  rendered  by  her  insular  situa- 
tion, and  her  maritime  resources,  impregnable  to  the  armies  of 
her  neighbours,  the  rulers  of  Great  Britain  have  never  been  able, 
by  real  or  artificial  dangers,  to  cheat  the  public  into  an  extensive 
peace  establishment.  The  distance  of  the  United  States  from 
the  powerful  nations  of  the  world,  gives  them  the  same  happy 
security.  A  dangerous  establishment  can  never  be  necessary 
or  plausible,  so  long  as  they  continue  a  united  people.    But 


£J22  THE    FEDERALIST. 

let  i*;  never  for  a  moment  be  forgotten,  that  they  are  indebted 
for  this  advantage  to  their  union  alone.  The  moment  of  its  dis- 
solution will  be  the  date  of  a  new  order  of  things.  The  fears 
of  the  weaker,  or  the  ambition  of  the  stronger  states,  or  con- 
federacies, will  set  the  same  example  in  the  new  as  Charles  VII 
did  in  the  old  world.  The  example  will  be  followed  here,  from 
the  same  motives  which  produced  universal  imitation  there 
Instead  of  deriving  from  our  situation  the  precious  advantage 
which  Great  Britain  has  derived  from  hers,  the  face  of  America 
will  be  but  a  copy  of  that  of  the  continent  of  Europe.  It  will 
present  liberty  everywhere  crushed  between  standing  armies, 
and  perpetual  taxes.  The  fortunes  of  disunited  America,  will 
be  even  more  disastrous  than  those  of  Europe.  The  sources  of 
evil  in  the  latter  are  confined  to  her  own  limits.  No  superiour 
powers  of  another  quarter  of  the  globe  intrigue  among  her  rival 
nations,  inflame  their  mutual  animosities,  and  tender  them  the 
instruments  of  foreign  ambition,  jealousy,  and  revenge.  In 
America,  the  miseries  springing  from  her  internal  jealousies, 
contentions,  and  wars,  would  form  a  part  only  of  her  lot.  A 
plentiful  addition  of  evils,  would  have  their  source  in  that 
relation  in  which  Europe  stands  to  this  quarter  of  the  earth, 
and  which  no  other  quarter  of  the  earth  bears  to  Europe. 

This  picture  of  the  consequences  of  disunion  cannot  be  too 
highly  coloured,  or  too  often  exhibited.  Every  man  who  loves 
peace;  every  man  who  loves  his  country;  every  man  who  loves 
liberty,  ought  to  have  it  ever  before  his  eyes,  that  he  may 
cherish  in  his  heart  a  due  attachment  to  the  union  of  America, 
and  be  able  to  set  a  due  value  on  the  means  of  preserving  it. 

Next  to  the  eflPectual  establishment  of  the  union,  the  best 
possible  precaution  against  danger  from  standing  armies,  is  a 
limitation  of  the  term  for  which  revenue  may  be  appropriated 
to  their  support.  This  precaution  the  constitution  has  prudently 
added.  I  -^ill  not  repeat  here  the  observations,  which  I  flatter 
myself  have  placed  this  subject  in  a  just  and  satisfactory  light. 
But  it  may  not  be  improper  to  take  notice  of  an  argument 
against  this  part  of  the   constitution,  which  has  been  drawn 


THE    FEDERALIST.  32b 

from  the  policy  and  practice  of  Great  Britain.  It  is  said,  that 
the  continuance  of  an  army  in  that  kingdom,  requires  an 
annual  vote  of  the  legislature  :  whereas  the  American  constitu- 
tion has  lengthened  this  critical  period  to  two  years.  This  is 
the  form  in  which  the  comparison  is  usually  stated  to  the  public ; 
but  is  it  a  just  form  ?  is  it  a  fair  comparison  ?  Does  the  British 
constitution  restrain  the  parliamentary  discretion  to  one  year? 
Does  the  American  impose  on  the  congress  appropriations  for 
two  years  ?  On  the  contrary,  it  cannot  be  unknown  to  the 
authors  of  the  fallacy  themselves,  that  the  British  constitution 
fixes  no  limit  whatever  to  the  discretion  of  the  legislature,  anii 
that  the  American  ties  down  the  legislature  to  two  years,  as  the 
longest  admissible  term. 

Had  the  argument  from  the  British  example  been  truly  stated, 
it  would  have  stood  thus  :  the  term  for  which  supplies  may  be 
appropriated  to  the  army  establishment,  though  unlimited  by 
the  British  constitution,  has  nevertheless  in  practice  been  limited 
by  parliamentary  discretion  to  a  single  year.  Now,  if  in  Great 
Britain,  where  the  house  of  commons  is  elected  for  seven  years; 
where  so  great  a  proportion  of  the  members  are  elected  by  so 
small  a  proportion  of  the  people ;  where  the  electors  are  so  cor- 
rupted by  the  representatives,  and  the  representatives  so  cor- 
rupted by  the  crown,  the  representative  body  can  possess  a 
power  to  make  appropriations  to  the  army  for  an  indefinite 
term,  without  desiring,  or  without  daring,  to  extend  the  term 
bej-ond  a  single  year;  ought  not  suspicion  herself  to  blush,  in 
pretending  that  the  representatives  of  the  United  States,  elected 
FREELY  by  the  whole  body  of  the  people,  every  second  year, 
cannot  be  safely  entrusted  with  a  discretion  over  such  appro- 
priations, expressly  limited  to  the  short  period  of  two  years  1 

A  bad  cause  seldom  fails  to  betray  itself.  Of  this  truth,  the 
management  of  the  opposition  to  the  federal  government,  is  au 
unvaried  exemplification.  But  among  all  the  blunders  which 
have  been  committed,  none  is  more  striking  than  the  attempt  to 
enlist  on  that  side,  the  prudent  jealousy  entertained  by  the  peo 
pie,  of  standing  armies.     The  attempt  has  awakened  fully  the 


324  THE    FEDERALIST. 

public  attention  to  that  important  subject;  and  has  led  to  inves- 
tigations which  must  terminate  in  a  thorough  and  universal  con- 
viction, not  only  that  the  constitution  has  provided  the  most 
effectual  guards  against  danger  from  that  quarter,  but  that 
nothing  short  of  a  constitution  fully  adequate  to  the  national 
defence,  and  the  preservation  of  the  union,  can  save  America 
from  as  many  standing  armies,  as  it  may  be  split  into  states  or 
confederacies ;  and  from  such  a  progressive  augmentation  of 
these  establishments  in  each,  as  will  render  them  as  burthen- 
some  to  the  properties,  and  ominous  to  the  liberties  of  the  people, 
as  any  establishment  that  can  become  necessary,  under  a  united 
and  efficient  government,  must  be  tolerable  to  the  former  and 
safe  to  the  latter. 

The  palpable  necessity  of  the  power  to  provide  and  maintain 
a  navy,  has  protected  that  part  of  the  constitution  against  a 
spirit  of  censure,  which  has  spared  few  other  parts.  It  must 
indeed  be  numbered  among  the  greatest  blessings  of  America, 
that  as  her  union  will  be  the  only  source  of  her  maritime 
strength,  so  this  will  be  a  principal  source  of  her  security 
against  danger  from  abroad.  In  this  respect,  our  situation  bears 
another  likeness  to  the  insular  advantage  of  Great  Britain. 
The  batteries  most  capable  of  repelling  foreign  enterprises  on 
our  safety,  are  happily  such  as  can  never  be  turned  by  a  per- 
fidious government  against  our  liberties. 

The  inhabitants  of  the  Atlantic  frontier,  are  all  of  them  deeply 
interested  in  this  provision  for  naval  protection.  If  they  have 
hitherto  been  suffered  to  sleep  quietly  in  their  beds;  if  their 
property  has  remained  safe  against  the  predatory  spirit  of  licen- 
tious adventurers ;  if  their  maritime  towns  have  not  yet  been 
compelled  to  ransom  themselves  from  the  terrours  of  a  confla- 
gration, by  yielding  to  the  exactions  of  daring  and  sudden  in- 
vaders, these  instances  of  good  fortune  are  not  to  be  ascribed  to 
the  capacity  of  the  existing  government  for  the  protection  of 
those  from  whom  it  claims  allegiance,  but  to  causes  that  are 
fugit.'ve  and  fallacious.  If  we  except  perhaps  Yirginia  and 
Maryland,  which  are  peculiarly  vulnerable   on   their  eastern 


THE    FEDERALIST.  325 

frontiers,  no  part  of  the  union  ouglit  to  feel  more  anxiety  on 
this  subject  than  New-Yorl£.  Her  sea-coast  is  extensive.  A 
very  important  district  of  the  state,  is  an  island.  The  state 
itself  is  penetrated  by  a  large  navigable  river  for  more  than 
fifty  leagues.  The  great  emporium  of  its  commerce,  the  great 
reservoir  of  its  wealth,  lies  every  moment  at  the  mercy  of 
events,  and  may  be  almost  regarded  as  a  hostage  for  ignomi- 
nious compliances  with  the  dictates  of  a  foreign  enemy ;  or  even 
with  the  rapacious  demands  of  pirates  and  barbarians.  Should 
a  war  be  the  result  of  the  precarious  situation  of  European 
affairs,  and  all  the  unruly  passions  attending  it  be  let  loose  on 
the  ocean,  our  escape  from  insults  and  depredations,  not  only  on 
that  element,  but  every  part  of  the  other  bordering  on  it,  will 
be  truly  miraculous.  In  the  present  condition  of  America,  the 
states  more  immediately  exposed  to  these  calamities  have  nothing 
to  hope  from  the  phantom  of  a  general  government  which  now 
exists;  and  if  their  single  resources  were  equal  to  the  task  of 
fortifying  themselves  against  the  danger,  the  objects  to  be  pro- 
tected would  be  almost  consumed  by  the  means  of  protecting 
them. 

The  power  of  regulating  and  calling  forth  the  militia,  has  been 
already  sufficiently  vindicated  and  explained. 

The  power  of  levying  and  borrowing  money,  being  the  sinew 
of  that  which  is  to  be  exerted  in  the  national  defence,  is  properly 
thrown  into  the  same  class  with  it.  This  power,  also,  has  been 
examined  already  with  much  attention,  and  has,  I  trust,  been 
clearly  shown  to  be  necessary,  both  in  the  extent  and  form  given 
to  it  by  the  constitution.  I  will  address  one  additional  reflection 
only,  to  those  who  contend  that  the  power  ought  to  have  been 
restrained  to  external  taxation — by  which  they  mean,  taxes  on 
articles  imported  from  other  countries.  It  cannot  be  doubted, 
that  this  will  always  be  a  valuable  source  of  revenue ;  that  for  a 
considerable  time,  it  must  be  a  principal  source ;  that  at  this 
moment,  it  is  an  essential  one.  But  we  may  form  very  mistaken 
ideas  on  this  subject,  if  we  do  not  call  to  mind  in  our  calculations, 
that  the  extent  of  revenue  drawn  from  foreign  commerce,  must 


326  THE    FEDERALIST. 

vary  with  the  variations,  both  in  the  extent  and  the  kind  of  im- 
ports; and  that  these  variations  do  not  correspond  with  the 
progress  of  population,  which  must  be  the  «general  measure  of 
the  public  wants.  As  long  as  agriculture  continues  the  sole  field 
of  labour,  the  importation  of  manufactures  must  increase  as  the 
oonsumers  multiply.  As  soon  as  domestic  manufactures  are 
begun  by  the  hands  not  called  for  by  agriculture,  the  imported 
manufactures  will  decrease  as  the  numbers  of  people  increase. 
In  a  more  remote  stage,  the  imports  may  consist  in.  a  consider- 
able part  of  raw  materials,  which  will  be  wrought  into  articles 
for  exportation,  and  will,  therefore,  require  rather  the  encourage- 
ment of  bounties,  than  to  be  loaded  with  discouraging  duties.  A 
system  of  government,  meant  for  duration,  ought  to  contem- 
plate these  revolutions,  and  be  able  to  accommodate  itself  to 
hem. 

Some,  who  have  not  denied  the  necessity  of  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion, have  grounded  a  very  fierce  attack  against  the  constitution, 
on  the  language  in  which  it  is  defined.  It  has  been  urged  and 
echoed,  that  the  power  "  to  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts, 
and  excises,  to  pay  the  debts,  and  provide  for  the  common  de- 
fence and  general  welfare  of  the  United  States,"  amounts  to  an 
unlimited  commission  to  exercise  every  power,  which  may  be 
alleged  to  be  necessary  for  the  common  defence  or  general  wel- 
fare. No  stronger  proof  could  be  giver  of  the  distress  under 
which  these  writers  labour  for  objections,  ban  their  stooping  to 
such  a  misconstruction. 

Had  no  other  enumeration  or  definition  of  the  powers  of  the 
congress  been  found  in  the  constitution,  than  the  general  ex- 
pressions just  cited,  the  authors  of  the  objection  might  have  had 
some  colour  for  it ;  though  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  find  a 
reason  for  so  awkward  a  form  of  describing  an  authority  to  legis- 
late in  all  possible  cases.  A  power  to  destroy  the  freedom  of 
the  press,  the  trial  by  jury,  or  even  to  regulate  the  course  of 
descents,  or  the  forms  of  conveyances,  must  be  very  singularly 
expressed  by  the  terms  "  to  raise  money  for  the  general  welfare  " 

But  what  colour  can  the  objection  have,  when  a  specification 


THE    FEDERALIST.  327 

of  the  objects  alluded  to  by  these  general  terms,  immediately 
follows;  and  is  not  even  separated  by  a  longer  pause  than  a 
semicolon  ?  If  the  different  parts  of  the  same  instrument  ought 
to  be  so  expounded,  as  to  give  meaning  to  every  part  which 
will  bear  it ;  shall  one  part  of  the  same  sentence  be  excluded 
altogether  from  a  share  in  the  meaning;  and  shall  the  mere 
doubtful  and  indefinite  terms  be  retained  in  their  full  extent, 
and  the  clear  and  precise  expressions  be  denied  any  signification 
whatsoever  ?  For  what  purpose  could  the  enumeration  of  par- 
ticular powers  be  inserted,  if  these  and  all  others  were  meant  to 
he  included  in  the  preceding  general  power  ?  Nothing  is  more 
natural  or  common,  than  first  to  use  a  general  phrase,  and  then 
to  explain  and  qualify  it  by  a  recital  of  particulars.  But  the 
idea  of  an  enumeration  of  particulars,  which  neither  explain  nor 
qualify  the  general  meaning,  and  can  have  no  other  effect  than 
to  confound  and  mislead,  is  an  absurdity,  which,  as  we  are  re- 
duced to  the  dilemma  of  charging  either  on  the  authors  of  the 
objection  or  on  the  authors  of  the  constitution,  we  must  take  the 
liberty  of  supposing,  had  not  its  origin  with  the  latter. 

The  objection  here  is  the  more  extraordinary,  as  it  appears, 
that  the  language  used  by  the  convention  is  a  copy  from  the 
articles  of  confederation.  The  objects  of  the  union  among  the 
states,  as  described  in  article  third,  are,  "  their  common  defence, 
security  of  their  liberties,  and  mutual  and  general  welfare." 
The  terms  of  article  eighth  are  still  more  identical :  "  All 
charges  of  war,  and  all  other  expenses,  that  shall  be  incurred 
for  the  common  defence  or  general  welfare,  and  allowed  by  tho 
United  States  in  congress,  shall  be  defrayed  out  of  a  common 
treasury,"  &c.  A  similar  language  again  occurs  in  article  ninth. 
Construe  either  of  these  articles  by  the  rules  which  would 
justify  the  construction  put  on  the  new  constitution,  and  they 
vest  in  the  existing  congress  a  power  to  legislate  in  all  cases 
whatsoever.  But  what  would  have  been  thought  of  that  assem- 
bly, if,  attaching  themselves  to  these  general  expressions,  and 
disregarding  the  specifications  which  ascertain  and  limit  their 
import,  they  had  exercised  an  unlimited  power  of  providing  foi 


328  THE    FEDERALIST. 

the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  ?  I  appeal  to  the  ob« 
jectors  themselves,  whether  they  would  in  that  case  have  em- 
ployed the  same  reasoning  in  justification  of  congress,  as  they 
now  make  use  of  against  the  convention.  How  difficult  it  is 
for  errour  to  escape  its  own  condemnation  I 

PUBLI'JS. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  329 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XLII. 


NEW   YORK,    JANUARY  22,   1788. 


MADISON. 

THE   SAME   VIEW   CONTINUED. 

The  second  class  of  powers,  lodged  in  the  general  government, 
consists  of  those  which  regulate  the  intercourse  with  foreign 
nations,  to  wit:  to  make  treaties;  to  send  and  receive  ambassa- 
dors, other  public  ministers  and  consuls ;  to  define  and  punish 
piracies  and  felonies  committed  on  the  high  seas,  and  oflfences 
against  the  law  of  nations ;  to  regulate  foreign  commerce,  in- 
cluding a  power  to  prohibit,  after  the  year  1808,  the  importa- 
tion of  slaves,  and  to  lay  an  intermediate  duty  of  ten  dollars 
per  head,  as  a  discouragement  to  such  importations. 

This  class  of  powers  forms  an  obvious  and  essential  branch  of 
the  federal  administration.  If  we  are  to  be  one  nation  in  any 
respect,  it  clearly  ought  to  be  in  respect  to  other  nations. 

The  powers  to  make  treaties,  and  to  send  and  receive  ambas- 
sadors, speak  their  own  propriety.  Both  of  them  are  comprised 
in  the  articles  of  confederation ;  with  this  difference  only,  that 
the  former  is  disembarrassed  by  the  plan  of  the  convention  of 
an  exception,  under  which  treaties  might  be  substantially  frus- 
trated by  regulations  of  the  states;  and  that  a  power  of  appoint- 
ing and  receiving  "  other  public  ministers  and  consuls,"  is  ex- 
pressly and  very  properly  added  to  the  former  provision  con- 
cerning ambassadors.     The  term  ambassador,  if  taken  strictly. 


'6S0  THE   FEDERALIST. 

as  seems  to  be  required  by  the  second  of  the  articles  of  confede- 
ration, comprehends  the  highest  grade  only  of  public  ministers; 
and  excludes  the  grades  which  the  United  States  will  be  most 
likely  to  prefer,  where  foreign  embassies  may  be  necessary. 
And  under  no  latitude  of  construction  will  the  term  comprehend 
consuls.  Yet  it  has  been  found  expedient,  and  has  been  the 
practice  of  congress,  to  employ  the  inferiour  grades  of  public 
ministers  j  and  to  send  and  receive  consuls. 

It  is  true,  that  where  treaties  of  commerce  stipulate  for  the 
mutual  appointment  of  consuls,  whose  functions  are  connected 
with  commerce,  the  admission  of  foreign  consuls  may  fall  within 
the  power  of  making  commercial  treaties ;  and  that  where  no 
such  treaties  exist,  the  mission  of  American  consuls  into  foreign 
countries  may  perhaps  be  covered  under  the  authority,  given  by 
the  ninth  article  of  the  confederation,  to  appoint  all  such  civil 
oflScers  as  may  be  necessary  for  managing  the  general  affairs  of 
the  United  States.  But  the  admission  of  consuls  into  the  United 
States,  where  no  previous  treaty  has  stipulated  it,  seems  to  have 
been  nowhere  provided  for.  A  supply  of  the  omission  is  one  of 
the  lesser  instances,  in  which  the  convention  have  improved  on 
the  model  before  them.  But  the  most  minute  provisions  become 
important,  when  they  tend  to  obviate  the  necessity  or  the  pre- 
text for  gradual  and  unobserved  usurpations  of  power.  A  list 
of  the  cases,  in  which  congress  have  been  betrayed,  or  forced, 
by  the  defects  of  the  confederation,  into  violations  of  their  char- 
tered authorities,  would  not  a  little  surprise  those  who  have 
paid  no  attention  to  the  subject;  and  would  be  no  inconsider- 
able argument  in  favour  of  the  new  constitution,  which  seems 
to  have  provided  no  less  studiously  for  the  lesser,  than  the  more 
/bvious  and  striking  defects  of  the  old. 

The  power  to  define  and  punish  piracies  and  felonies  com- 
mitted on  the  high  seas,  and  offences  against  the  law  of  nations, 
belongs  with  equal  propriety  to  the  general  government ;  and  is 
a  still  greater  improvement  on  the  articles  of  confederation. 

These  articles  contain  no  provision  for  the  case  of  offences 
against  the  law  of  nations :  and  consequently  leave  it  in  the 


THE    FEDERALIST.  831 

power  of  any  indiscreet  member  to  embroil  the  confedei'ucj  with 
foreign  nations. 

The  provision  of  the  federal  articles  on  the  subject  of  piracies 
and  felonies,  extends  no  farther  than  to  the  establishment  of 
courts  for  the  trial  of  these  offences.  The  definition  of  piracies 
might,  perhaps,  without  inconveniency,  be  left  to  the  law  of 
nations ;  though  a  legislative  definition  of  them  is  found  in  most 
municipal  codes.  A  definition  of  felonies  on  the  high  seas,  is 
evidently  requisite.  Felony  is  a  term  of  loose  signification,  even 
in  the  common  law  of  England ;  and  of  various  import  in  the 
statute  law  of  that  kingdom.  But  neither  the  common,  nor  the 
statute  law  of  that,  or  of  any  other  nation,  ought  to  be  a  standard 
for  the  proceedings  of  this,  unless  previously  made  its  own  by 
legislative  adoption.  The  meaning  of  the  term,  as  defined  in 
the  codes  of  the  several  states,  would  be  as  impracticable,  as 
the  former  would  be  a  dishonourable  and  illegitimate  guide.  It 
is  not  precisely  the  same  in  any  two  of  the  states;  and  varies  in 
each  with  every  revision  of  its  criminal  laws.  For  the  sake  of 
certainty  and  uniformity,  therefore,  the  power  of  defining  felon- 
ies in  this  case,  was  in  every  respect  necessary  and  proper. 

The  regulation  of  foreign  commerce,  having  fallen  within 
several  views  which  have  been  taken  of  this  subject,  has  been 
too  fully  discussed  to  need  additional  proofs  here  of  its  being 
properly  submitted  to  the  federal  administration. 

It  were  doubtless  to  be  wished,  that  the  power  of  prohibiting 
the  importation  of  slaves,  had  not  been  postponed  until  the  year 
1808,  or  rather,  that  it  had  been  sufiered  to  have  immediate 
operation.  But  it  is  not  diflficult  to  account,  either  for  this  re- 
striction on  the  general  government,  or  for  the  manner  in  which 
the  whole  clause  is  expressed.  It  ought  to  be  considered  as  a 
great  point  gained  in  favour  of  humanity,  that  a  period  of 
twenty  years  may  terminate  for  ever  within  these  states,  a 
traffic  which  has  so  long  and  so  loudly  upbraided  the  barbarism 
of  modern  policy ;  that  within  that  period,  it  will  receive  a  con- 
siderable discouragement  from  the  federal  government,  and  may 

be  totally  abolished,  by  a  concurrence  of  the  few  states  which 

32 


dS2  THE   FEDERALIST. 

continue  the  unnatural  traffic,  in  the  prohibitory  example  which 
has  been  given  by  so  great  a  majority  of  the  union.  Happy 
would  it  be  for  the  unfortunate  Africans,  if  an  equal  prospect 
lay  before  them,  of  being  redeemed  from  the  oppressions  of  theii 
European  brethren ! 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  pervert  this  clause  into  an  objec- 
tion against  the  constitution,  by  representing  it  on  one  side,  as  a 
criminal  toleration  of  an  illicit  practice  :  and  on  another,  as  cal- 
culated to  prevent  voluntary  and  beneficial  emigrations  from 
Europe  to  America.  I  mention  these  misconstructions,  not  with 
a  view  to  give  them  an  answer,  for  they  deserve  none ;  but  as 
specimens  of  the  manner  and  spirit,  in  which  some  have  thought 
fit  to  conduct  their  opposition  to  the  proposed  government. 

The  powers  included  in  the  third  class,  are  those  which  pro- 
vide for  the  harmony  and  proper  intercourse  among  the  states. 

Under  this  head,  might  be  included  the  particular  restraints 
imposed  on  the  authority  of  the  states,  and  certain  powers  of 
the  judicial  department;  but  the  former  are  reserved  for  a  dis- 
tinct class,  and  the  latter  will  be  particularly  examined,  when 
we  arrive  at  the  structure  and  organization  of  the  government. 
I  shall  confine  myself  to  a  cursory  review  of  the  remaining 
powers  comprehended  under  this  third  description,  to  wit:  to 
regulate  commerce  among  the  several  states  and  the  Indian 
tribes;  to  coin  money,  regulatp  the  value  thereof,  and  of  foreign 
coin;  to  provide  for  the  punishment  of  counterfeiting  the  current 
coin  and  securities  of  the  United  States;  to  fix  the  standard 
of  weights  and  measures ;  to  establish  an  uniform  rule  of  natu- 
ralization, and  uniform  laws  of  bankruptcy;  to  prescribe  the 
manner  in  which  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceed- 
ings of  each  state  shall  be  proved,  and  the  effect  they  shall  have 
in  other  states;  and  to  establish  post-offices  and  post-roads. 

The  defect  of  power  in  the  existing  confederacy,  to  regulate 
the  commerce  between  its  several  members,  is  in  the  number  of 
those  which  have  been  clearly  pointed  out  by  experience.  To 
the  proofs  and  remarks  which  former  papers  have  brought  into 
view  on  this  subject,  it  may  be  added,  that  without  this  supple- 


THE    FEDERALIST. 

mental  provision,  the  great  and  essential  power  of  regulating 
foreign  commerce,  would  have  been  incomplete  and  ineffectual. 
A  very  material  object  of  this  power  was  the  relief  of  the  states 
which  import  and  export  through  other  states,  from  the  im- 
proper contributions  levied  on  them  by  the  latter.  Were  these 
at  liberty  to  regulate  the  trade  between  state  and  state,  it  must 
be  foreseen,  that  ways  would  be  found  out,  to  load  the  articles 
of  import  and  export,  during  the  passage  through  their  jurisdic- 
tion, with  duties  which  would  fall  on  the  makers  of  the  latter, 
and  the  consumers  of  the  former.  We  may  be  assured,  by  past 
experience,  that  such  a  practice  would  be  introduced  by  future 
contrivances ;  and  both  by  that  and  a  common  knowledge  of 
human  affairs,  that  it  would  nourish  unceasing  animosities,  and 
not  improbably  terminate  in  serious  interruptions  of  the  public 
tranquillity.  To  those  who  do  not  view  the  question  through 
the  medium  of  passion  or  of  interest,  the  desire  of  the  commer- 
cial states  to  collect,  in  any  form,  an  indirect  revenue  from  their 
uncommercial  neighbours,  must  appear  not  less  impolitic  than  it 
is  unfair;  since  it  would  stimulate  the  injured  party,  by  resent- 
ment as  well  as  interest,  to  resort  to  less  convenient  channels 
for  their  foreign  trade.  But  the  mild  voice  of  reason,  pleading 
the  cause  of  an  enlarged  and  permanent  interest,  is  but  too  often 
drowned  before  public  bodies  as  well  as  individuals,  by  the 
clamours  of  an  impatient  avidity  for  immediate  and  immoderate 
gain. 

The  necessity  of  a  superintending  authority  over  the  reciprocal 
trade  of  confederated  states,  has  been  illustrated  by  other  exam- 
ples as  well  as  our  own.  In  Switzerland,  where  the  union  is  so 
very  slight,  each  canton  is  obliged  to  allow  to  merchandises,  a 
passage  through  its  jurisdiction  into  other  cantons,  without  an 
augmentation  of  the  tolls.  In  Germany,  it  is  a  law  of  the  em- 
pire, that  the  princes  and  states  shall  not  lay  tolls  or  customs  on 
bridges,  rivers,  or  passages,  without  the  consent  of  the  emperor 
and  diet;  though  it  appears  from  a  quotation  in  an  antecedent 
paper,  that  the  practice  in  this,  as  in  many  other  instances  in 
that  confederacy,  has  not  followed  the  law,  and  has  produced 


B34  THE    FEDERALIST. 

there  the  mischiefs  which  have  been  foreseen  here.  Among  the 
restraints  imposed  by  the  union  of  the  Netherlands  on  its  mem 
bers,  one  is,  that  they  shall  not  establish  imposts  disadvan- 
tageous to  their  neighbours,  without  the  general  permission. 

The  regulation  of  commerce  with  the  Indian  tribes,  is  very 
properly  unfettered  from  two  limitations  in  the  articles  of  con- 
federation, which  render  the  provision  obscure  and  contradic- 
tory. The  power  is  there  restrained  to  Indians,  not  members 
of  any  of  the  states,  and  is  not  to  violate  or  infringe  the  legisla- 
tive right  of  any  state  within  its  own  limits.  What  description 
of  Indians  are  to  be  deemed  members  of  a  state,  is  not  yet 
settled;  and  has  been  a  question  of  frequent  perplexity  and 
contention  in  the  federal  councils.  And  how  the  trade  with 
Indians,  though  not  members  of  a  state,  yet  residing  within  its 
legislative  jurisdiction,  can  be  regulated  by  an  external  author- 
ity, without  so  far  intruding  on  the  internal  rights  of  legisla- 
tion, is  absolutely  incomprehensible.  This  is  not  the  only  case, 
in  which  the  articles  of  confederation  have  inconsiderately  en- 
deavoured to  accomplish  impossibilities;  to  reconcile  a  partial 
sovereignty  in  the  union,  with  complete  sovereignty  in  the  states; 
to  subvert  a  mathematical  axiom,  by  taking  away  a  part,  and 
letting  the  whole  remain. 

All  that  need  be  remarked  on  the  power  to  coin  money,  regu- 
late the  value  thereof,  and  of  foreign  coin,  is,  that  by  providing 
for  this  last  case,  the  constitution  has  supplied  a  material  omis- 
sion in  the  articles  of  confederation.  The  authority  of  the 
existing  congress  is  restrained  to  the  regulation  of  coin  struck 
by  their  own  authority,  or  that  of  the  respective  states  It 
must  be  seen  at  once,  that  the  proposed  uniformity  in  the  value 
of  the  current  coin,  might  be  destroyed  by  subjecting  that  of 
foreign  coin  to  the  different  regulations  of  the  different  states. 

The  punishment  of  counterfeiting  the  public  securities,  as  well 
as  the  current  coin,  is  submitted  of  course  to  that  authority 
which  is  to  secure  the  value  of  both. 

The  regulation  of  weights  and  measures  is  transferred  from 


THE    FEDERALIST.  836 

the  articles  of  confederation,  and  is  founded  on  like  considera- 
tions with  the  preceding  power  of  regulating  coin. 

The  dissimilarity  in  the  rules  of  naturalization  has  long  been 
remarked  as  a  fault  in  our  system,  and  as  laying  a  foundation 
for  intricate  and  delicate  questions.  In  the  fourth  article  of  the 
confederation,  it  is  declared,  "that  the  free  inhabitants  of  each  of 
these  states,  paupers,  vagabonds,  and  fugitives  from  justice  ex- 
cepted, shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and  immunities  of  free 
citizens  in  the  several  states;  and  the  people  of  each  state  shall, 
in  every  other,  enjoy  all  the  privileges  of  trade  and  commerce," 
&c.  There  is  a  confusion  of  language  here,  which  is  remarkable. 
Why  the  terms  free  inhabitants  are  used  in  one  part  of  the  article, 
free  citizens  in  another,  and  people  in  another ;  or  what  was  meant 
by  superadding  to  "  all  privileges  and  immunities  of  free  citizens" 
— "  all  the  privileges  of  trade  and  commerce,"  cannot  easily  be 
determined.  It  seems  to  be  a  construction  scarcely  avoidable, 
however,  that  those  who  come  under  the  denomination  of /red 
inhabitants  of  a  state,  although  not  citizens  of  such  state,  are 
entitled,  in  every  other  state,  to  all  the  privileges  of  free  citizens 
of  the  latter;  that  is,  to  greater  privileges  than  they  may  be 
entitled  to  in  their  own  state :  so  that  it  may  be  in  the  power 
of  a  particular  state,  or  rather  every  state  is  laid  under  a  neces- 
sity, not  only  to  confer  the  rights  of  citizenship  in  other  states 
upon  any  whom  it  may  admit  to  such  rights  within  itself,  but 
upon  any  whom  it  may  allow  to  become  inhabitants  within  it& 
jurisdiction.  But  were  an  exposition  of  the  term  "  inhabitants" 
to  be  admitted,  which  would  confine  the  stipulated  privileges  to 
citizens  alone,  the  difficulty  is  diminished  only,  not  removed. 
The  very  improper  power  would  still  be  retained  by  each  state, 
of  naturalizing  aliens  in  every  other  state.  In  one  state,  re- 
sidence for  a  short  term  confers  all  the  rights  of  citizenship :  in 
another,  qualifications  of  greater  importance  are  required.  An 
^lien,  therefore  legally  incapacitated  for  certain  rights  in  the 
latter,  may,  by  previous  residence  only  in  the  former,  elude  his 
incapacity;    and  thus  the  law  of  one  state  be  preposterously 


336  THE    FEDERALIST. 

rendered  paramount  to  the  law  of  another,  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  other. 

We  owe  it  to  mere  casualty,  that  very  serious  embarrassments 
on  thi9  subject  have  been  hitherto  escaped.  By  the  laws  of 
several  states,  certain  descriptions  of  aliens,  who  had  rendered 
themselves  obnoxious,  were  laid  under  interdicts  inconsistent, 
not  only  with  the  rights  of  citizenship,  but  with  the  privileges 
of  residence.  "What  would  have  been  the  consequence,  if  such 
persons,  by  residence,  or  otherwise,  had  acquired  the  character 
of  citizens  under  the  laws  of  another  state,  and  then  asserted 
their  rights  as  such,  both  to  residence  and  citizenship,  within  the 
state  proscribing  them  ?  Whatever  the  legal  consequences  might 
have  been,  other  consequences  would  probably  have  resulted  of 
too  serious  a  nature,  not  to  be  provided  against.  The  new  con- 
stitution has  accordingly,  with  great  propriety,  made  provision 
against  them,  and  all  others  proceeding  from  the  defect  of  the 
confederation  on  this  head,  by  authorizing  the  general  govern 
ment  to  establish  an  uniform  rule  of  naturalization  throughout 
the  United  States. 

The  power  of  establishing  uniform  laws  of  bankruptcy,  is  so 
intimately  connected  with  the  regulation  of  commerce,  and  will 
prevent  so  many  frauds  where  the  parties  or  their  property  may 
lie,  or  be  removed  into  different  states,  that  the  expediency  of  it 
seems  not  likely  to  be  drawn  into  question. 

The  power  of  prescribing,  by  general  laws,  the  manner  in 
which  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of  each 
state,  shall  be  proved,  and  the  effect  they  shall  have  in  other 
states,  is  an  evident  and  valuable  improvement  on  the  clause 
relating  to  this  subject  in  the  articles  of  confederation.  The 
meaning  of  the  latter  is  extremely  indeterminate;  and  can  be 
of  little  importance  under  any  interpretation  whi«^h  it  will  bear. 
The  power  here  established,  may  be  rendered  a  very  convenient 
instrument  of  justice,  and  be  particularly  beneficial  on  the 
borders  of  contiguous  states,  where  the  effects  liable  co  justice 
may  be  suddenly  and  secretly  translated  in  any  stage  of  the 
process,  within  a  foreign  jurisdiction 


THE   FEDEKALIST.  8S7 

The  power  of  establishing  post-roads  must,  in  every  view,  be 
a  harmless  power;  and  may  perhaps,  by  judicious  management, 
become  productive  of  great  public  conveniency.  Nothing  which 
tends  to  facilitate  the  intercourse  between  the  states,  can  be 
deemed  unworthy  of  the  public  care. 

PUBLIUA 


aag  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


NUMBKR  XLIII. 


NEW   YORK,  JANUARY  25,  1788. 


MADISON. 


THE  SAME  VIEW  CONTINUED. 


The  fourth  class  comprises  the  following  miscellaneous  powers 

1.  A  power  to  "promote  the  progress  of  science  and  useful 
aits,  by  securing  for  a  limited  time,  to  authors  and  inventors, 
the  exclusive  right  to  their  respective  writings  and  discoveries." 

The  utility  of  this  power  will  scarcely  be  questioned.  The 
copyright  of  authors  has  been  solemnly  adjudged  in  Great 
Britain,  to  be  a  right  at  common  law.  The  right  to  useful  in- 
ventions, seems  with  equal  reason  to  belong  to  the  inventors 
The  public  good  fully  coincides  in  both  cases  with  the  claims 
of  individuals.  The  states  cannot  separately  make  effectual 
provision  for  either  of  the  cases,  and  most  of  them  have  antici 
pated  the  decision  of  this  point,  by  laws  passed  at  the  instance 
of  congress. 

2.  "  To  exercise  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever, 
over  such  district,  (not  exceeding  ten  miles  square,)  as  may,  by 
cession  of  particular  states,  and  the  acceptance  of  congress,  be- 
come the  seat  of  the  government  of  the  United  States ;  and  to 
exercise  like  authority  over  all  places  purchased  by  the  consent 
of  the  legislature  of  the  states,  in  which  the  same  shall  be,  for 
the  erection  of  forts  magazines,  arsenals,  dock-yards,  and  other 
needful  buildings." 


THE   FEIERALIST.  339 

The  indispensable  necessity  of  complete  authority  at  the  seat 
of  government,  carries  its  own  evidence  with  it.  It  is  a  power 
exercised  by  every  legislature  of  the  union,  I  might  say  of  the 
world,  by  virtue  of  its  general  supremacy.  Without  it,  not  only 
the  public  authority  might  be  insulted  and  its  proceedings  be 
interrupted  with  impunity,  but  a  dependence  of  the  members 
of  the  general  government  on  the  state  comprehending  the  seat 
of  the  government,  for  protection  in  the  exercise  of  their  duty, 
might  bring  on  the  national  councils  an  imputation  of  awe  or 
influence,  equally  dishonourable  to  the  government  and  dissatis- 
factory to  the  other  members  of  the  confederacy.  This  considera- 
tion has  the  more  weight,  as  the  gradual  accumulation  of  public 
improvements  at  the  stationary  residence  of  the  government, 
would  be  both  too  great  a  public  pledge  to  be  left  in  the  hands 
of  a  single  state,  and  would  create  so  many  obstacles  to  a 
removal  of  the  government,  as  still  further  to  abridge  its  neces- 
sary independence.  The  extent  of  this  federal  district  is  suffi- 
ciently circumscribed  to  satisfy  every  jealousy  of  an  opposite 
nature.  And  as  it  is  to  be  appropriated  to  this  use  with  the 
consent  of  the  state  ceding  it;  as  the  state  will  no  doubt  pro- 
vide in  the  compact  for  the  rights,  and  the  consent  of  the  citi- 
zens inhabiting  it;  as  the  inhabitants  will  find  sufficient  induce- 
ments of  interest,  to  become  willing  parties  to  the  cession ;  as 
they  will  have  had  their  voice  in  the  election  of  the  government, 
which  is  to  exercise  authority  over  them ;  as  a  municipal  legis- 
lature for  local  purposes,  derived  from  their  own  suffrages,  will 
of  course  be  allowed  them ;  and  as  the  authority  of  the  legisla- 
ture of  the  state,  and  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  part  of  it, 
CO  concur  in  the  cession,  will  be  derived  from  the  whole  people 
of  the  state,  in  their  adoption  of  the  constitution,  every  imagin- 
able objection  seems  to  be  obviated. 

The  necessity  of  a  like  authority  over  forts,  magazines,  &c., 
established  by  the  general  government,  is  not  less  evident.  The 
public  money  expended  on  such  places,  and  the  public  property 
deposited  in  them,  require,  that  they  should  be  exempt  from  the 
authority  of  the  particular  state.     No?*  would  it  be  proper  for 


840  THE    FEDERALIST. 

the  places  on  which  the  security  of  the  entire  union  may  depend, 
to  be  in  any  degree  dependent  on  a  particular  member  of  it. 
All  objections  and  scruples  are  here  also  obviated,  by  requiring 
the  concurrence  of  the  states  concerned  in  every  such  establish- 
ment. 

3.  "To  declare  the  punishment  of  treason,  but  no  attainder 
of  treason  shall  work  corruption  of  blood,  or  forfeiture,  except 
during  the  life  of  the  person  attainted." 

As  treason  may  be  committed  against  the  United  States,  the 
authority  of  the  United  States  ought  to  be  enabled  to  punish  it ; 
but  as  newfangled  and  artificial  treasons  have  been  the  great 
engines  by  which  violent  factions,  the  natural  offspring  of  free 
governments,  have  usually  wreaked  their  alternate  malignity 
on  each  other,  the  convention  have,  with  great  judgment,  op- 
posed a  barrier  to  this  peculiar  danger,  by  inserting  a  consti- 
tutional definition  of  the  crime,  fixing  the  proof  necessary  for 
conviction  of  it,  and  restraining  the  congress,  even  in  punishing 
it,  from  extending  the  consequences  of  guilt  beyond  the  person 
of  its  author. 

4.  "  To  admit  new  states  into  the  union ;  but  no  new  state 
shall  be  formed  or  erected  within  the  jurisdiction  of  any  other 
state ;  nor  any  state  be  formed  by  the  junction  of  two  or  more 
states,  or  parts  of  states,  without  the  consent  of  the  legislatures 
of  the  states  concerned,  as  well  as  of  the  congress." 

In  the  articles  of  confederation,  no  provision  is  found  on  this 
important  subject.  Canada  was  to  be  admitted  of  right,  on  her 
joining  in  the  measures  of  the  United  States;  and  the  other 
colonies,  by  which  were  evidently  meant,  the  other  British  colo- 
nies, at  the  discretion  of  nine  states.  The  eventual  establish- 
ment of  new  states,  seems  to  have  been  overlooked  by  the  com- 
pilers of  that  instrument.  We  have  seen  the  inconvenience  of 
this  omission,  and  the  assumption  of  power  into  which  oongress 
have  been  led  by  it.  With  great  propriety,  therefore,  has  the 
new  system  supplied  the  defect.  The  general  precaution,  that 
no  new  states  shall  be  formed,  without  the  concurrence  of  the 
federal  authority,  and  that  of  the  states  concerned,  is  consonant 


THE    FEDERALIST.  341 

Lo  the  principles  which  ought  to  govern  such  transactions.  The 
particular  precaution  against  the  erection  of  new  states,  by  the 
partition  of  a  state  without  its  consent,  quiets  the  jealousy  of 
the  larger  states;  as  that  of  the  smaller  is  quieted  by  a  like 
precaution,  against  a  junction  of  states  without  their  consent 

5.  "  To  dispose  of,  and  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations, 
respecting  the  territory  or  other  property,  belonging  to  the 
United  States,  with  a  proviso,  that  nothing  in  the  constitution 
shall  be  so  construed,  as  to  prejudice  any  claims  of  the  United 
States,  or  of  any  particular  state." 

This  is  a  power  of  very  great  importance,  and  required  by 
considerations,  similar  to  those  which  show  the  propriety  of 
the  former.  The  proviso  annexed,  is  proper  in  itself,  and  was 
probably  rendered  absolutely  necessary  by  jealousies  and  ques- 
tions concerning  the  western  territory  sufficiently  known  to 
the  public. 

6.  "  To  guaranty  to  every  state  in  the  union  a  republican 
form  of  government;  to  protect  each  of  them  against  invasion; 
and,  on  application  of  the  legislature  or  of  the  executive,  (when 
the  legislature  cannot  be  convened,)  against  domestic  violence." 

In  a  confederacy  founded  on  republican  principles,  and  com- 
posed of  republican  members,  the  superintending  government 
ought  clearly  to  possess  authority  to  defend  the  system  against 
aristocratic  or  monarchical  innovations.  The  more  intimate 
the  nature  of  such  an  union  may  be,  the  greater  interest  have 
the  members  in  the  political  institutions  of  each  other ;  and  the 
greater  right  to  insist,  that  the  forms  of  government  under 
which  the  compact  was  entered  into,  should  be  suhstantially 
maintained. 

But  a  right  implies  a  remedy;  and  where  else  could  the 
remedy  be  deposited,  than  where  it  is  deposited  by  the  con- 
stitution ?  Governments  of  dissimilar  principles  and  forms 
have  been  found  less  adapted  to  a  federal  coalition  of  any  sort, 
than  those  of  a  kindred  nature.  "  As  the  confederate  republic 
of  Germany,"  says  Montesquieu,  "consists  of  free  cities,  and 
pettv  states,  subject  to  diiferent  princes,  experience  shows  us 


342  THE   FEDERALIST. 

ihat  it  is  more  imperfect,  than  that  of  Holland  and  Switzer- 
land." "  Greece  was  undone,"  he  adds,  "  as  soon  as  the  king 
of  Maeedon  obtained  a  seat  among  the  Amphyctions."  In  the 
latter  case,  no  doubt,  the  disproportionate  force,  as  well  as  the 
monarchical  form  of  the  new  confederate,  had  its  share  of  in- 
fluence on  the  events. 

It  may  possibly  be  asked,  what  need  there  could  be  of  such  a 
precaution,  and  whether  it  may  not  become  a  pretext  for  altera- 
tions in  the  state  governments,  without  the  concurrence  of  the 
states  themselves.  These  questions  admit  of  ready  answers. 
If  the  interposition  of  the  general  government  should  not  be 
needed,  the  provision  for  such  an  event  will  be  a  harmless 
superfluity  only  in  the  constitution.  But  who  can  say,  what 
experiments  may  be  produced  by  the  caprice  of  particular 
states,  by  the  ambition  of  enterprising  leaders,  or  by  the  in- 
trigues and  influence  of  foreign  powers  ?  To  the  second  ques- 
tion it  may  be  answered,  that  if  the  general  government  should 
interpose  by  virtue  of  this  constitutional  authority,  it  will  be 
of  course  bound  to  pursue  the  authority.  But  the  authority 
extends  no  farther  than  to  a  guaranty  of  a  republican  form  of 
government,  which  supposes  a  preexisting  government  of  the 
form  which  is  to  be  guaranteed.  As  long,  therefore,  as  the 
existing  republican  forms  are  continued  by  the  states,  they  are 
guaranteed  by  the  federal  constitution.  Whenever  the  states 
may  choose  to  substitute  other  republican  forms,  they  have  a 
right  to  do  so,  and  to  claim  the  federal  guaranty  for  the  latter 
The  only  restriction  imposed  on  them  is,  that  they  shall  not 
exchange  republican  for  anti-republican  constitutions;  a  re 
striction  which,  it  is  presumed,  will  hardly  be  considered  as  a 
grievance. 

A  protection  against  invasion  is  due,  from  every  society,  to 
the  parts  composing  it.  The  latitude  of  the  expression  here 
used  seems  to  secure  each  state,  not  only  against  foreign  hos- 
tility, but  against  ambitious  or  vindictive  enterprises  of  its 
more  powerful  neighbours.     The  history,  both  of  ancient  and 


THE    FEDERALIST.  343 

modern  confederacies,  proves,  that  the  weaker  members  of  Uie 
union  ought  not  to  be  insensible  to  the  policy  of  this  article. 

Protection  against  domestic  violence  is  added  with  equal  pro- 
priety. It  has  been  remarked,  that  even  among  the  Swiss  can- 
tons, which,  properly  speaking,  are  not  under  one  government, 
provision  is  made  for  this  object:  and  the  history  of  that  league 
informs  us,  that  mutual  aid  is  frequently  claimed  and  afforded; 
and  as  well  by  the  most  democratic,  as  the  other  cantons.  A 
T-eeent  and  well-known  event  among  ourselves  has  warned  us  to 
be  prepared  for  emergencies  of  a  like  nature. 

At  first  view,  it  might  seem  not  to  square  with  the  republican 
theory,  to  suppose,  either  that  a  majority  have  not  the  right,  or 
that  a  minority  will  have  the  force,  to  subvert  a  government . 
and  consequently,  that  the  federal  interposition  can  never  bo 
i-equired,  but  when  it  would  be  improper.  But  theoretic  reason- 
ing, in  this,  as  in  most  other  cases,  must  be  qualified  by  the 
lessons  of  practice.  Why  may  not  illicit  combinations,  for  pur- 
poses of  violence,  be  formed  as  well  by  a  majority  of  a  state, 
especially  a  small  state,  as  by  a  majority  of  a  county,  or  a  dis- 
trict of  the  same  state;  and  if  the  authority  of  the  state  ought 
in  the  latter  case  to  protect  the  local  magistracy,  ought  not  the 
federal  authority  in  the  former  to  support  the  state  authority  ? 
Besides,  there  are  certain  parts  of  the  state  constitutions,  which 
are  so  interwoven  with  the  federal  constitution,  that  a  violent 
blow  cannot  be  given  to  the  one,  without  communicating  the 
wound  to  the  other.  Insurrections  in  a  state  will  rarely  induce 
a  federal  interposition,  unless  the  number  concerned  in  them 
Dear  some  proportion  to  the  friends  of  government.  It  will  be 
much  better,  that  the  violence  in  such  cases  should  be  repressed 
by  the  superintending  power,  than  that  the  majority  should  be 
left  to  maintain  their  cause  by  a  bloody  and  obstinate  contest 
The  existence  of  a  right  to  interpose,  will  generally  prevent  the 
necessity  of  exerting  it. 

Is  it  true,  that  force  and  right  are  necessarily  on  the  same 
bide  in  republican  governments  ?  May  not  the  minor  party 
possess  such  a  superiority  of  pecuniary  resources,  of  military 


d44  THE    FEDERALIST. 

talents  and  experience,  or  of  secret  succours  from  foreign  powers, 
as  will  render  it  superiour  also  in  an  appeal  to  the  sword? 
May  not  a  more  compact  and  advantageous  position  turn  the 
scale  on  the  same  side,  against  a  superiour  number  so  situated 
as  to  be  less  capable  of  a  prompt  and  collected  exertion  of  its 
strength  ?  Nothing  can  be  more  chimerical  than  to  imagine, 
that  in  a  trial  of  actual  force,  victory  may  be  calculated  by  the 
rules  which  prevail  in  a  census  of  the  inhabitants,  or  which 
determine  the  event  of  an  election  !  May  it  not  happen,  in  fine, 
that  the  minority  of  citizens  may  become  a  majority  of  persons, 
by  the  accession  of  alien  residents,  of  a  casual  concourse  of 
adventurers,  or  of  those  whom  the  constitution  of  the  state  has 
not  admitted  to  the  rights  of  suffrage  ?  I  take  no  notice  of  an 
unhappy  species  of  population  abounding  in  some  of  the  states, 
who,  during  the  calm  of  regular  government,  are  sunk  below 
the  level  of  men ;  but  who,  in  the  tempestuous  scenes  of  civil 
violence,  may  emerge  into  the  human  character,  and  give  a 
superiority  of  strength  to  any  party  with  which  they  may 
associate  themselves. 

In  cases  where  it  may  be  doubtful  on  which  side  justice  lies, 
what  better  umpires  could  be  desired  by  two  violent  factions, 
flying  to  arms  and  tearing  a  state  to  pieces,  than  the  represent- 
atives of  confederate  states,  not  heated  by  the  local  flame  ? 
To  the  impartiality  of  judges,  they  would  unite  the  affection 
of  friends.  Happy  would  it  be,  if  such  a  remedy  for  its  infir- 
mities could  be  enjoyed  by  all  free  governments ;  if  a  project 
equally  effectual,  could  be  established  for  the  universal  peace  of 
mankind ! 

Should  it  be  asked,  what  is  to  be  the  redress  for  an  insurrec- 
tion pervading  all  the  states,  and  comprising  a  superiority  of 
the  entire  force,  though  not  a  constitutional  right  ^  The  answer 
must  be,  that  such  a  case,  as  it  would  be  without  the  compass 
of  human  remedies,  so  it  is  fortunately  not  within  the  eompasB 
of  human  probability;  and  that  it  is  a  sufficient  recommenda 
tion  of  the  federal  constitution,   that  it  diminishes  the  risk 


THE    FEDERALIST.  345 

of  a  calamity,  for  which  no  possible  constitution  can  provide 
a  cure. 

Among  the  advantages  of  a  confederate  republic,  enumerated 
by  Montesquieu,  an  important  one  is,  "  that  should  a  pop  alar 
insurrection  happen  in  one  of  the  states,  the  others  are  able  to 
quell  it.  Should  abuses  creep  into  one  part,  they  are  reformed 
by  those  that  remain  sound." 

7.  "  To  consider  all  debts  contracted,  and  engagements  entered 
into,  before  the  adoption  of  this  constitution,  as  being  no  less 
valid  against  the  United  States  under  this  constitution,  than 
under  the  confederation." 

This  can  only  be  considered  as  a  declaratory  proposition  ;  and 
may  have  been  inserted,  among  other  reasons,  for  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  foreign  creditors  of  the  United  States,  who  cannot  be 
strangers  to  the  pretended  doctrine,  that  a  change  in  the  political 
form  of  civil  society,  has  the  magical  effect  of  dissolving  its 
moral  obligations. 

Among  the  lesser  criticisms  which  have  been  exercised  on  the 
constitution,  it  has  been  remarked,  that  the  validity  of  engage- 
ments ought  to  have  been  asserted  in  favour  of  the  United 
States,  as  well  as  against  them;  and  in  the  spirit  which  usually 
characterizes  little  critics,  the  omission  has  been  transformed 
and  magnified  into  a  plot  against  the  national  rights.  The 
authors  of  this  discovery  may  be  told,  what  few  others  need  be 
informed  of,  that  as  engagements  are  in  their  nature  reciprocal, 
an  assertion  of  their  validity  on  one  side,  necessarily  involves  a 
validity  on  the  other  sidej  and  that  as  the  article  is  merely 
declaratory,  the  establishment  of  the  principle  in  one  case,  is 
suflScient  for  every  case.  They  may  be  further  told,  that  every 
constitution  must  limit  its  precautions  to  dangers  that  are  not 
altogether  imaginary;  and  that  no  real  danger  can  exist  that 
the  government  would  dare,  with,  or  even  without,  this  constitu- 
tional declaration  before  it,  to  remit  the  debts  justly  due  to  the 
public,  on  the  pretext  here  condemned. 

8.  "  To  provide  for  amendments  to  be  ratified  by  three  fourths 
of  the  states,  under  two  exceptions  only." 


346  THE    FEDERALIST. 

That  useful  alterations  will  be  suggested  by  experience,  could 
not  but  be  forepeen.  It  was  requisite,  therefore,  that  a  mode  for 
introducing  them  should  be  provided.  The  mode  preferred  by 
the  convention  seems  to  be  stamped  with  every  mark  of  pro- 
priety. It  guards  equally  against  that  extreme  facility,  which 
would  render  the  constitution  too  mutable;  and  that  extreme 
difficulty,  which  might  perpetuate  its  discovered  faults.  It 
moreover  equally  enables  the  general  and  the  state  govern- 
ments to  originate  the  amendment  of  errours,  as  they  may  be 
pointed  out  by  the  experience  on  one  side,  or  on  the  other.  The 
exception  in  favour  of  the  equality  of  suffrage  in  the  senate, 
was  probably  meant  as  a  palladium  to  the  residuary  sovereignty 
of  the  states,  implied  and  secured  by  that  principle  of  represent- 
ation in  one  branch  of  the  legislature;  and  was  probably  insisted 
on  by  the  states  particularly  attached  to  that  equality.  The 
other  exception  must  have  been  admitted  on  the  same  considera- 
tions which  produced  the  privilege  defended  by  it. 

9.  "  The  ratification  of  the  conventions  of  nine  states,  shall  be 
sufficient  for  the  establishment  of  this  constitution  between  the 
states  ratifying  the  same." 

This  article  speaks  for  itself  The  express  authority  of  the 
people  alone  could  give  due  validity  to  the  constitution.  To 
have  required  the  unanimous  ratification  of  the  thirteen  states, 
would  have  subjected  the  essential  interests  of  the  whole,  to  the 
caprice  or  corruption  of  a  single  member.  It  would  have 
marked  a  want  of  foresight  in  the  convention,  which  our  own 
experience  would  have  rendered  inexcusable. 

Two  questions  of  a  very  delicate  nature  present  themselves 
on  this  occasion  :  1.  On  what  principle  the  confederation,  which 
stands  in  the  solemn  form  of  a  compact  among  the  states,  can 
be  superseded  without  the  unanimous  consent  pf  the  parties  to 
it :  2.  "What  relation  is  to  subsist  between  the  nine  or  more  states 
ratifying  the  constitution,  and  the  remaining  few  who  do  not 
become  parties  to  it  ? 

The  first  question  is  answered  at  once  by  recurring  to  the 


THE    FEDERALIST  34V 

absolute  necessity  of  the  case ;  to  the  great  principle  of  self 
preservation ;  to  the  transcendent  law  of  nature  and  of  nature's 
God,  which  declares  that  the  safety  and  happiness  of  society  are 
the  objects  at  which  all  political  institutions  aim,  and  to  which 
all  such  institutions  must  be  sacrificed.  Perhaps,  also,  an  answer 
may  be  found  without  searching  beyond  the  principles  of  the 
compact  itself.  It  has  been  heretofore  noted  among  the  defect^ 
of  the  confederation,  that  in  many  of  the  states,  it  had  received 
no  higher  sanction  than  a  mere  legislative  ratification.  The 
principle  of  reciprocality  seems  to  require,  that  its  obligation  on 
the  other  states  should  be  reduced  to  the  same  standard.  A 
compact  between  independent  sovereigns,  founded  on  acts  of 
legislative  authority,  can  pretend  to  no  higher  validity  than  a 
league  or  treaty  between  the  parties.  It  is  an  established  doc- 
trine on  the  subject  of  treaties,  that  all  the  articles  are  mutually 
conditions  of  each  other ;  that  a  breach  of  any  one  article  is  a 
breach  of  the  whole  treaty;  and  that  a  breach,  committed  by 
either  of  the  parties,  absolves  the  others,  and  authorizes  them, 
if  they  please,  to  pronounce  the  compact  violated  and  void. 
Should  it  unhappily  be  necessary  to  appeal  to  these  delicate 
truths,  for  a  justification  for  dispensing  with  the  consent  of  par- 
ticular states  to  a  dissolution  of  the  federal  pact,  will  not  the 
complaining  parties  find  it  a  diflScult  task  to  answer  the  multi- 
plied and  important  infractions,  with  which  they  may  be  con- 
fronted ?  The  time  has  been,  when  it  was  incumbent  on  u« 
all  to  veil  the  ideas  which  this  paragraph  exhibits.  The  scene 
is  now  changed,  and  with  it  the  part  which  the  same  motives 
dictate. 

The  second  question  is  not  less  delicate :  and  the  flattering 
prospect  of  its  being  merely  hypothetical,  forbids  an  over  curious 
discussion  of  it.  It  is  one  of  those  cases  which  must  be  left  to 
provide  for  itself.  In  general,  it  may  be  observed,  that  although 
no  political  relation  can  subsist  between  the  assenting  and  dis- 
senting states,  yet  the  moral  relations  will  remain  uncancelled. 
The  claims  of  justice,  both  on  one  side  and  on  the  other,  will  be 

ss 


348  THE    FEDERALIST. 

in  force,  and  must  be  fulfilled ;  the  rights  of  humanity  must  in 
all  cases  be  duly  and  mutually  respected ;  whilst  considerations 
of  a  common  interest,  and  above  all,  the  remembrance  of  the 
endearing  scenes  which  are  past,  and  the  anticipation  of  a 
speedy  triumph  over  the  obstacles  to  reunion,  will,  it  is  hoped, 
not  urge  in  vain  moderation  on  one  side,  and  prudence  on  the 
other 

PUBLIUS. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  S49 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   XLIV. 


NEW    YORK,    JANUARY  25,  1788. 


MADISON. 

THE  SAME  VIEW  CONTINUED  AND  CONCLUDED. 

A  fifth  class  of  provisions  in  favour  of  the  federal  authority, 
consists  of  the  following  restrictions  on  the  authority  of  the 
several  states. 

1.  *'  No  state  shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance  or  confedera- 
tion; grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal;  coin  money;  emit 
bills  of  credit;  make  any  thing  but  gold  and  silver  a  legal 
tender  in  payment  of  debts ;  pass  any  bill  of  attainder,  ex  post 
facto  law,  or  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts;  or  grant 
any  title  of  nobility." 

The  prohibition  against  treaties,  alliances,  and  confederations, 
makes  a  part  of  the  existing  articles  of  union ;  and,  for  reasonb 
which  need  no  explanation,  is  copied  into  the  new  constitution. 
The  prohibition  of  letters  of  marque,  is  another  part  of  the  old 
system,  but  is  somewhat  extended  in  the  new.  According  to  the 
former,  letters  of  marque  could  be  granted  by  the  states  after  a 
declaration  of  war :  according  to  the  latter,  these  licenses  must 
be  obtained,  as  well  during  the  war,  as  previous  to  its  declaration, 
from  the  government  of  the  United  States.  This  alteration  is 
fully  justified,  by  the  advantage  of  uniformity  in  all  points  which 
relate  to  foreign  powers;  and  of  immediate  responsibility  to  the 


b50  THE    FEDERALIST. 

nation  in  all  those,  for  whose  conduct  the  nation  itself  is  to  be 
responsible. 

The  right  of  coining  money,  which  is  here  taken  from  the 
states,  was  left  in  their  hands  by  the  confederation,  as  a  concur- 
rent right  with  that  of  congress,  under  an  exception  in  favour  of 
the  exclusive  right  of  congress  to  regulate  the  alloy  and  value. 
In  this  instance,  also,  the  new  provision  is  an  improvement  on 
the  old.  Whilst  the  alloy  and  value  depended  on  the  general 
authority,  a  right  of  coinage  in  the  particular  states  could  have 
no  other  effect  than  to  multiply  expensive  mints,  and  aiversify 
the  forms  and  weights  of  the  circulating  pieces.  The  latter  in- 
convenieney  defeats  one  purpose  for  which  the  power  was  origin- 
ally submitted  to  the  federal  head :  and  as  far  as  the  former 
might  prevent  an  inconvenient  remittance  of  gold  and  silver 
to  the  central  mint  for  recoinage,  the  end  can  be  as  well  attained 
by  local  mints  established  under  the  general  authority. 

The  extension  of  the  prohibition  to  bills  of  credit,  must  give 
pleasure  to  every  citizen,  in  proportion  to  his  love  of  justice, 
and  his  knowledge  of  the  true  springs  of  public  prosperitj'. 
The  loss  which  America  has  sustained  since  the  peace,  from  the 
pestilent  effects  of  paper  money  on  the  necessary  confidence 
between  man  and  man;  on  the  necessary  confidence  in  the 
public  councils;  on  the  industry  and  morals  of  the  people,  and 
on  the  character  of  republican  government,  constitutes  an  enor- 
mous debt  against  the  states,  chargeable  with  this  unadvised 
measure,  which  must  long  remain  unsatisfied;  or  rather  an  ac- 
cumulation of  guilt,  which  can  be  expiated  no  otherwise  than 
by  a  voluntary  sacrifice  on  the  altar  of  justice,  of  the  power 
which  has  been  the  instrument  of  it.  In  addition  to  these  per- 
suasive considerations,  it  may  be  observed,  that  the  same  reasonu 
which  show  the  necessity  of  denying  to  the  states  the  power  of 
regulating  coin  prove,  with  equal  force,  that  they  ought  not  to 
be  at  liberty  to  substitute  a  paper  medium,  in  the  place  of  coin. 
Had  every  state  a  right  to  regulate  the  value  of  its  coin,  there 
might  be  as  many  different  currencies  as  states ;  and  thus,  the 
intercourse  among  them  would  be  impeded :  retrospective  altera- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  '  851 

aoiis  m  its  value  might  be  made,  and  thus  the  citizens  of  othei 
states  be  injured  and  animosities  be  kindled  among  the  states 
themselves  The  subjects  of  foreign  powers  might  suffer  from 
the  same  cause,  and  hence  the  union  be  discredited  and  em- 
broiled by  the  indiscretion  of  a  single  member.  No  one  of 
these  mischiefs  is  less  incident  to  a  power  in  the  states  to 
emit  paper  money,  than  to  coin  gold  or  silver.  The  power  to 
make  any  thing  but  gold  and  silver  a  tender  in  payment  of 
debts,  is  withdrawn  from  the  states,  on  the  same  principle  with 
that  of  issuing  a  paper  currency. 

Bills  of  attainder,  ex  post  facto  laws,  and  laws  impairing  the 
obligation  of  contracts,  are  contrary  to  the  first  principles  of 
the  social  compact,  and  to  every  principle  of  sound  legislation. 
The  two  former  are  expressly  prohibited  by  the  declarations 
prefixed  to  some  of  the  state  constitutions,  and  all  of  them  are 
prohibited  by  the  spirit  and  scope  of  these  fundamental  char- 
ters. Oui'  own  experience  has  taught  us,  nevertheless,  that  ad- 
ditional fences  against  these  dangers  ought  not  to  be  omitted. 
7ery  properly,  therefore,  have  the  convention  added  this  con- 
stitutional bulwark  in  favour  of  personal  security  and  private 
rights;  and  I  am  much  deceived,  if  they  have  not,  in  so  doing, 
as  faithfully  consulted  the  genuine  sentiments,  as  the  undoubted 
interests  of  their  constituents.  The  sober  people  of  America 
are  weary  of  the  fluctuating  policy  which  has  directed  the 
public  councils.  They  have  seen  with  regret  and  with  indigna- 
tion, that  sudden  changes,  and  legislative  interferences,  in  cases 
affecting  personal  rights,  become  jobs  in  the  hands  of  enter- 
prising and  influential  speculators;  and  snares  to  the  more  in- 
dustrious and  less  informed  part  of  the  community.  They  have 
seen,  too,  that  one  legislative  interference  is  but  the  first  link  of 
a  long  chain  of  repetitions;  every  subsequent  interference  being 
naturally  produced  by  the  effects  of  the  preceding.  They  very 
rightly  infer,  therefore,  that  some  thorough  reform  is  wanting, 
which  will  banish  speculations  on  public  measures,  inspire  a 
general  prudence  and  industry,  and  give  a  regular  course  to  the 
business  of  society.     The  prohibition  with  respect  to  titles  of 


852  THE    FEDERALIST. 

nobility,  is  copied  from  the  articles  of  confederation,  ai  d  ueods 
no  comment. 

2.  "No  state  shall,  without  the  consent  of  the  congress  lay 
any  imposts  or  duties  on  imports  or  exports,  except  what  may 
be  absolutely  necessary  for  executing  its  inspection  laws,  and 
the  neat  produce  of  all  duties  and  imposts  laid  by  any  state  on 
imports  or  exports,  shall  be  for  the  use  of  the  treasury  of  the 
United  States ;  and  all  such  laws  shall  be  subject  to  the  revision 
and  control  of  the  congress.  No  state  shall,  without  the  con- 
sent of  congress,  lay  any  duty  on  tonnage,  keep  troops  or  ships 
of  war  in  time  of  peace ;  enter  into  any  agreement  or  compact 
with  another  state,  or  with  a  foreign  power,  or  engage  in  war 
unless  actually  invaded,  or  in  such  imminent  danger  as  will  not 
admit  of  delay." 

The  restraint  on  the  power  of  the  states  over  imports  and  ex- 
ports, is  enforced  by  all  the  arguments  which  prove  the  neces- 
sity of  submitting  the  regulation  of  trade  to  the  federal  councils. 
It  is  needless,  therefore,  to  remark  further  on  this  head,  than 
that  the  manner  in  which  the  restraint  is  qualified,  seems  well 
calculated  at  once  to  secure  to  the  states  a  reasonable  discretion 
in  providing  for  the  conveniency  of  their  imports  and  exports, 
and  to  the  United  States  a  reasonable  check  against  the  abuse 
of  this  discretion.  The  remaining  particulars  of  this  clause, 
fall  within  reasonings  which  are  either  so  obvious,  or  have  been 
so  fully  developed,  that  they  may  be  passed  over  without  remark. 

The  sixth  and  last  class,  consists  of  the  several  powers  and 
provisions,  by  which  eflSlcacy  is  given  to  all  the  rest. 

1.  "  Of  these  the  first  is,  the  power  to  make  all  laws  which 
shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into  execution  the 
foregoing  powers,  and  all  other  powers  vested  by  this  constitu- 
tion in  the  government  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  depart- 
ment or  officer  thereof." 

Few  parts  of  the  constitution  have  been  assailed  with  more 
intemperance  than  this ;  yet  on  a  fair  investigation  of  it,  as  has 
been  elsewhere  shown,  no  part  can  appear  more  completely 
invulnerable.     Without  the  substance  of  this  power,  the  whol<» 


THE    FEDERALIST.  353 

constitution  would  be  a  dead  letter.  Those  who  object  to  the 
article,  therefore,  as  a  part  of  the  constitution,  can  only  mean 
that  the  form  of  the  provision  is  improper,  But  have  they  con 
Bidered,  whether  a  better  form  could  have  been  substituted  ? 

There  are  four  other  possible  methods,  which  the  convention 
might  have  taken  on  this  subject.  They  might  have  copied  the 
second  article  of  the  existing  confederation,  which  would  have 
prohibited  the  exercise  of  any  power  not  expressly  delegated: 
they  might  have  attempted  a  positive  enumeration  of  the 
powers  comprehended  under  the  general  terms  "necessary  and 
proper :"  they  might  have  attempted  a  negative  enumeration  of 
them,  by  specifying  the  powers  excepted  from  the  general  defi- 
nition: they  might  have  been  altogether  silent  on  the  subject; 
leaving  these  necessary  and  proper  powers,  to  construction  and 
inference. 

Had  the  convention  taken  the  first  method  of  adopting  the 
second  article  of  confederation,  it  is  evident  that  the  new  con- 
gress would  be  continually  exposed,  as  their  predecessors  have 
been,  to  the  alternative  of  construing  the  term  "  expressly"  with 
80  much  rigour,  as  to  disarm  the  government  of  all  real  author- 
ity whatever,  or  with  so  much  latitude  as  to  destroy  altogether 
the  force  of  the  restriction.  It  would  be  easy  to  show,  if  it  were 
necessary,  that  no  important  power,  delegated  by  the  articles  of 
confederation,  has  been  or  can  be  executed  by  congress  without 
recurring  more  or  less  to  the  doctrine  of  construction  or  implica- 
tion.  As  the  powers  delegated  under  the  new  system  are  more 
extensive,  the  government  which  is  to  administer  it  would  find 
itself  still  more  distressed  with  the  alternative  of  betraying  the 
public  interest  by  doing  nothing;  or  of  violating  the  constitu- 
tion by  exercising  powers  itfdispensably  necessary  and  proper; 
but,  at  the  same  time,  not  expressly  granted. 

Had  the  convention  attempted  a  positive  enumeration  of  the 
powers  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  their  other  powers 
into  effect;  the  attempt  would  have  involved  a  complete  digest 
of  laws  on  every  subject  to  which  the  constitution  relates;  ac- 
commodated too  not  only  to  the  existing  state  of  things,  but  to 


Sb\  THE    FEDERALIST. 

all  the  possible  changes  which  futurity  may  produce:  for  ii 
every  new  application  of  a  general  power,  the  particular  powers, 
which  are  the  means  of  attaining  the  object  of  the  general  power, 
must  always  necessarily  vary  with  that  object;  and  be  often 
properly  varied  whilst  the  object  remains  the  same. 

Had  they  attempted  to  enumerate  the  particular  powers  or 
means  not  necessary  or  proper  for  carrying  the  general  powers 
into  execution,  the  task  would  have  been  no  less  chimerical;  and 
would  have  been  liable  to  this  further  objection;  that  every 
defect  in  the  enumeration,  would  have  been  equivalent  to  a 
positive  grant  of  authority.  If,  to  avoid  this  consequence,  they 
had  attempted  a  partial  enumeration  of  the  exceptions,  and 
described  the  residue  by  the  general  terms,  not  necessary  or 
proper;  it  must  have  happened  that  the  enumeration  would 
comprehend  a  few  of  the  excepted  powers  only;  that  these 
would  be  such  as  would  be  least  likely  to  be  assumed  or  tole- 
rated, because  the  enumeration  would  of  course  select  such 
as  would  be  least  necessary  or  proper,  and  that  the  unneces- 
sary and  improper  powers  included  in  the  residuum,  would 
be  less  forcibly  excepted,  than  if  no  partial  enumeration  had 
been  made. 

Had  the  constitution  been  silent  on  this  head,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  all  the  particular  powers  requisite  as  means  of  exe- 
cuting the  general  powers  would  have  resulted  to  the  govern- 
ment, by  unavoidable  implication.  !No  axiom  is  more  clearly  es- 
tablished in  law,  or  in  reason,  than  that  wherever  the  end  is 
required,  the  means  are  authorized;  wherever  a  general  power 
to  do  a  thing  is  given,  every  particular  power  necessary  for 
doing  it  is  included.  Had  this  last  method,  therefore,  been  pur- 
sued by  the  convention,  every  objection  now  urged  against  their 
plan,  would  remain  in  all  its  plausibility;  and  the  real  incon- 
veniency  would  be  incurred  of  not  removing  a  pretext  which 
may  be  seized  on  critical  occasions,  for  drawing  into  question 
the  essential  powers  of  the  union. 

If  it  be  asked,  what  is  to  be  the  consequence,  in  case  the  cor 
gress  shall  misconstrue  this  part  of  the  constitution,  and  exercise 


THE    FEDERALIST.  35fi 

powers  not  warranted  by  its  true  meaning;  I  answer  the  same 
as  if  they  should  misconstrue  or  enlarge  any  other  power  vested 
in  them;  as  if  the  general  power  had  been  reduced  to  particu- 
lars, and  any  one  of  these  were  to  be  violated ;  the  same  in  short 
as  il  the  state  legislatures  should  violate  their  respective  consti- 
tutional authorities.  In  the  first  instance,  the  success  of  the 
usurpation  will  depend  on  the  executive  and  judiciary  depart- 
ments, which  are  to  expound  and  give  effect  to  the  legislative 
acts;  and  in  the  last  resort,  a  remedy  must  be  obtained  from 
the  people,  who  can,  by  the  election  of  more  faithful  represent- 
atives, annul  the  acts  of  the  usurpers.  The  truth  is,  that  this 
ultimate  redress  may  be  more  confided  in  against  unconstitu- 
tional acts  of  the  federal,  than  of  the  state  legislatures,  for  this 
plain  reason,  that  as  every  such  act  of  the  former,  will  be  an 
invasion  of  the  rights  of  the  latter,  these  will  be  ever  ready  to 
mark  the  innovation,  to  sound  the  alarm  to  the  people,  and  to 
exert  their  local  influence  in  effecting  a  change  of  federal  repre- 
sentatives. There  being  no  such  intermediate  body  between  the 
state  legislatures  and  the  people,  interested  in  watching  the 
conduct  of  the  former,  violations  of  the  state  constitutions  are 
more  likely  to  remain  unnoticed  and  unredressed. 

2.  "  This  constitution,  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States  which 
shall  be  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  and  all  treaties  made,  or 
which  shall  be  made,  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States, 
shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  the  judges  in  every 
state  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  thing  in  the  constitution  or 
laws  of  -any  state  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding." 

The  indiscreet  zeal  of  the  adversaries  to  the  constitution,  has 
betrayed  them  into  an  attack  on  this  part  of  it  also,  without 
which  it  would  have  been  evidently  and  radically  defective.  To 
be  fully  sensible  of  this,  we  need  only  suppose  for  a  moment, 
that  the  supremacy  of  the  state  constitutions  had  been  left  com- 
plete, by  a  saving  clause  in  their  favour. 

In  the  first  place,  as  these  constitutions  invest  the  state  legis- 
latures with  absolute  sovereignty,  in  all  cases  not  excepted  by 
the  existing  articles  of  confederation,  all  the  authorities  con 


B56  THE   FEDERALIST. 

tained  in  the  proposed  constitution,  so  far  as  they  exceed  those 
enumerated  in  the  confederation,  would  have  been  annulled,  and 
the  new  congress  would  have  been  reduced  to  the  same  impotent 
condition  with  their  predecessors. 

In  the  next  place,  as  the  constitutions  of  some  of  the  states 
do  not  even  expressly  and  fully  recognise  the  existing  powers 
of  the  confederacy,  an  express  saving  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
former  would,  in  such  states,  have  brought  into  question  every 
power  contained  in  the  proposed  constitution. 

In  the  third  place,  as  the  constitutions  of  the  states  differ 
much  from  each  other,  it  might  happen  that  a  treaty  or  national 
law  of  great  and'  equal  importance  to  the  states,  would  interfere 
with  some,  and  not  with  other  constitutions,  and  would  conse- 
quently be  valid  in  some  of  the  states,  at  the  same  time  that  it 
would  have  no  effect  in  others. 

In  fine,  the  world  would  have  seen  for  the  first  time,  a  system 
of  government  founded  on  an  inversion  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  all  government ;  it  would  have  seen  the  authority  of  the 
whole  society  everywhere  subordinate  to  the  authority  of  the 
parts;  it  would  have  seen  a  monster,  in  which  the  head  was 
under  the  direction  of  the  members. 

3.  "  The  senators  and  representatives,  and  the  members  of  the 
several  state  legislatures ;  and  all  executive  and  judicial  officers, 
both  of  the  United  States  and  the  several  states,  shall  be  bound 
by  oath  or  affirmation,  to  support  this  constitution." 

It  has  been  asked,  why  it  was  thought  necessary,  that  the 
state  magistracy  should  be  bound  to  support  the  federal  consti- 
tution, and  unnecessary  that  a  like  oath  should  be  imposed  on 
the  officers  of  the  United  States,  in  favour  of  the  state  constitu- 
tions ? 

Several  reasons  might  be  assigned  for  the  distinctions.  1  con- 
tent myself  with  one,  which  is  obvious  and  conclusive.  The 
members  of  the  federal  government  will  have  no  agency  in 
carrying  the  state  constitutions  into  effect.  The  members  and 
officers  of  the  state  governments,  on  the  contrary,  will  have  an 
essential  agency  in  giving  effect  to  the  federal  constitution.    The 


THE   FEDERALIST.  357 

election  of  the  president  and  senate  will  depend,  in  all  cases, 
on  the  legislatures  of  the  several  states.  And  the  election  of  the 
house  of  representatives  will  equally  depend  on  the  same  author- 
ity in  the  first  instance;  and  will,  probably,  for  ever  De  con- 
ducted by  the  officers,  and  according  to  the  laws  of  the  states. 

4.  Among  the  provisions  for  giving  efficacy  to  the  federal 
powers,  might  be  added  those  which  belong  to  the  executive  and 
judiciary  departments :  but  as  these  are  reserved  for  particular 
examination  in  another  place,  I  pass  them  over  in  this. 

We  have  now  reviewed,  in  detail,  all  the  articles  composing 
the  sum  or  quantity  of  power,  delegated  by  the  proposed  consti- 
tution to  the  federal  government;  and  are  brought  to  this  unde- 
niable conclusion,  that  no  part  of  the  power  is  unnecessary  or 
improper,  for  accomplishing  the  necessary  objects  of  the  union. 
The  question  therefore,  whether  this  amount  of  power  shall  be 
granted  or  not,  resolves  itself  into  another  question,  whether  or 
not  a  government  commensurate  to  the  exigencies  of  the  union, 
shall  be  established ;  or,  in  other  words,  whether  the  union  itself 
shall  be  preserved. 

PuBurs. 


358  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XLV. 


NEW    YORK,   JANUARY    29,  1788. 


MADISON. 


A  FURTHER  DISCUSSION  OF    THE    SUPPOSED    DANGER   FROM    THE 
POWERS  OF  THE  UNION,  TO  THE  STATE  GOVERNMENTS. 

Having  shown,  that  no  one  of  the  powers  transferred  to  the 
federal  government  is  unnecessary  or  improper,  the  next  ques- 
tion to  be  considered  is,  whether  the  whole  mass  of  them  will 
be  dangerous  to  the  portion  of  authority  left  in  the  several 
states 

The  adversaries  to  the  plan  of  the  convention,  instead  of  con- 
sidering in  the  first  place,  what  degree  of  power  was  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the  federal  government,  have  ex- 
hausted themselves  in  a  secondary  inquiry  into  the  possible  con- 
sequences of  the  proposed  degree  of  power  to  the  governments 
of  the  particular  states.  But  if  the  union,  as  has  been  shown,  be 
essential  to  the  security  of  the  people  of  America  against  foreign 
danger;  if  it  be  essential  to  their  security  against  contentions 
and  wars  among  the  different  states;  if  it  be  essential  to  guard 
them  against  those  violent  and  oppressive  factions,'which  imbitter 
the  blessings  of  liberty,  and  against  those  military  establishments 
which  must  gradually  poison  its  very  fountain;  if,  in  a  word,  the 
union  be  essential  to  the  happiness  of  the  people  of  America,  is 
it  not  preposterous,  to  urge  as  an  objection  to  a  government,  with- 
otit  which  the  objects  of  the  union  cannot  be  attained,  thai  svnth 


THE    FEDERALIST.  359 

a,  government  may  derogate  from  the  importance  of  the  govern- 
ments of  the  individual  states  ?  Was  then  the  American  revolu- 
tion effected,  was  the  American  confederacy  formed,  was  the 
precious  blood  of  thousands  spilt,  and  the  hard-earned  substance 
of  millions  lavished,  not  that  the  people  of  America  should  enjoy 
peace,  liberty,  and  safety ;  but  that  the  governments  of  the  indi- 
vidual states,  that  particular  municipal  establishments,  might 
enjoy  a  certain  extent  of  power,  and  be  arrayed  with  certain 
dignities  and  attributes  of  sovereignty  ?  We  have  heard  of  th^ 
impious  doctrine  in  the  old  world,  that  the  people  were  made 
for  kings,  not  kings  for  the  people.  Is  the  same  doctrine  to  bo 
revived  in  the  new,  in  another  shape,  that  the  solid  happiness 
of  the  people  is  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  views  of  political  institu- 
tions of  a  different  form  ?  It  is  too  early  for  politicians  to  pre- 
sume on  our  forgetting  that  the  public  good,  the  real  welfare  of 
the  great  body  of  the  people,  is  the  supreme  object  to  be  pur- 
sued ;  and  that  no  form  of  government  whatever  has  any  other 
value,  than  as  it  may  be  fitted  for  the  attainment  of  this  object 
Were  the  plan  of  the  convention  adverse  to  the  public  happiness, 
my  voice  would  be,  Eeject  the  plan.  Were  the  union  itself  incon- 
sistent with  the  public  happiness,  it  would  be,  Abolish  the  union 
In  like  manner,  as  far  as  the  sovereignty  of  the  states  cannot 
be  reconciled  to  the  happiness  of  the  people,  the  voice  of  every 
good  citizen  must  be.  Let  the  former  be  sacrificed  to  the  latter. 
How  far  the  sacrifice  is  necessary,  has  been  shown.  How  far 
the  unsacrificed  residue  will  be  endangered,  is  the  question 
before  us. 

Several  important  considerations  have  been  touched  in  the 
course  of  these  papers,  which  discountenance  the  supposition, 
that  the  operation  of  the  federal  government  will  by  degrees 
prove  fatal  to  the  state  governments.  The  more  I  revolve  the 
subject,  the  more  fully  I  am  persuaded,  that  the  balance  is  much 
more  likely  to  be  disturbed  by  the  preponderancy  of  the  last 
than  of  the  first  scale. 

We  have  seen,  in  all  the  examples  of  ancient  and  modern 
^confederacies,   the    strongest    tendency   continually   betraying 


360      '  THE    FEDERALIST. 

itself  in  tno  members,  to  despoil  the  general  government  ol 
its  authorities,  with  a  very  ineffectual  capacity  in  the  latter  to 
defend  itself  against  the  encroachments.  Although  in  most  of 
these  examples,  the  system  has  been  so  dissimilar  from  that 
under  consideration,  as  greatly  to  weaken  any  inference  con- 
cerning the  latter,  from  the  fate  of  the  former ;  yet  as  the 
states  will  retain,  under  the  proposed  constitution,  a  very  ex- 
tensive portion  of  active  sovereignty,  the  inference  ought  not 
to  be  wholly  disregarded.  In  the  Achsean  league,  it  is  probable 
that  the  federal  head  had  a  degree  and  species  of  power,  which 
gave  it  a  considerable  likeness  to  the  government  framed  by 
the  convention.  The  Lycian  confederacy,  as  far  as  its  prin- 
ciples and  form  are  transmitted,  must  have  borne  a  still  greater 
analogy  to  it.  Yet  history  does  not  inform  us,  that  either  of 
them  ever  degenerated,  or  tended  to  degenerate,  into  one  con- 
solidated government.  On  the  contrary,  we  know  that  the  ruin 
of  one  of  them  proceeded  from  the  incapacity  of  the  federal 
authority  to  prevent  the  dissensions,  and  finally  the  disunion  of 
the  subordinate  authorities.  These  cases  are  the  more  worthy  of 
our  attention,  as  the  external  causes  by  which  the  component 
parts  were  pressed  together,  were  much  more  numerous  and 
powerful  than  in  our  case ;  and  consequently,  less  powerful  liga- 
ments within  would  be  sufficient  to  bind  the  members  to  the 
head,  and  to  each  other. 

In  the  feudal  system,  we  have  seen  a  similar  propensity  ex- 
emplified. Notwithstanding  the  want  of  proper  sympathy  in 
every  instance  between  the  local  sovereigns  and  the  people,  and 
the  sympathy  in  some  instances  between  the  general  sovereign 
and  the  latter;  it  usually  happened  that  the  local  sovereigns 
prevailed  in  the  rivalship  for  encroachments.  Had  no  external 
dangers  enforced  internal  harmony  and  subordination ;  and  par- 
ticularly, had  the  local  sovereigns  possessed  the  affections  of 
the  people,  the  great  kingdoms  in  Europe  would  at  this  time 
consist  of  as  many  independent  princes,  as  there  were  formerly 
feudatory  barons. 

The  state  governments  will  have  the  advantage  of  the  federal 


THE    FEDERALIST.  361 

government,  whether  we  compare  them  in  respect  to  the  imme- 
diate dependence  of  the  one  on  the  other;  to  the  weight  of 
personal  influence  which  each  side  will  possess;  to  the  powers 
respectively  vested  in  them;  to  the  predilection  and  probable 
support  of  the  people ;  to  the  disposition  and  faculty  of  resist- 
ing and  frustrating  the  measures  of  each  other. 

The  state  governments  may  be  regarded  as  constituent  and 
essential  parts  of  the  federal  government;  whilst  the  latter  is 
nowise  essential  to  the  operation  or  organization  of  the  former. 
Without  the  intervention  of  the  state  legislatures,  the  president 
of  the  United  States  cannot  be  elected  at  all.  They  must  in  all 
cases  have  a  great  share  in  his  appointment,  and  will,  perhaps, 
in  most  cases,  of  themselves  determine  it.  The  senate  will  be 
elected  absolutely  and  exclusively  by  the  state  legislatures. 
Even  the  house  of  representatives,  though  drawn  immediately 
from  the  people,  will  be  chosen  very  much  under  the  influence 
of  that  class  of  men,  whose  influence  over  the  people  obtains  for 
themselves  an  election  into  the  state  legislatures.  Thus,  each 
of  the  principal  branches  of  the  federal  government  will  owe  its 
existence  more  or  less  to  the  favour  of  the  state  governments, 
and  must  consequently  feel  a  dependence,  which  is  much  more 
likely  to  beget  a  disposition  too  obsequious,  than  too  overbearing 
towards  them.  On  the  other  side,  the  component  parts  of  the 
state  governments  will  in  no  instance  be  indebted  for  their  ap- 
pointment to  the  direct  agency  of  the  federal  government,  and 
very  little,  if  at  all,  to  the  local  influence  of  its  members. 

The  number  of  individuals  employed  under  the  constitution 
of  the  United  States,  will  be  much  smaller  than  the  number 
employed  under  the  particular  states.  There  will  consequently 
be  less  of  personal  influence  on  the  side  of  the  former  than  of 
the  latter.  The  members  of  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judi- 
ciary departments  of  thirteen  and  more  states ;  the  justices  of 
peace,  officers  of  militia,  ministerial  officers  of  justice,  with  all 
the  county,  corporation,  and  town  officers,  for  three  millions 
and  more  of  people,  intermixed,  and  having  particular  acquaint- 
ance with  every  class  and  circle  of  people,  must  exceed  beyond 


362  THE    FEDERALIST. 

all  proportion,  both  in  number  and  influence,  those  of  every  de- 
scription who  will  be  employed  in  the  administration  of  the 
federal  system.  Compare  the  members  of  the  three  great  de- 
partments, of  the  thirteen  states,  excluding  from  the  judiciary 
department  the  justices  of  peace,  with  the  members  of  the 
corresponding  departments  of  the  single  government  of  the 
union;  compare  the  militia  ofiicers  of  three  millions  of  people, 
with  the  military  and  marine  oflEicers  of  any  establishment 
which  is  within  the  compass  of  probability,  or,  I  may  add,  of 
possibility ;  and  in  this  view  alone,  we  may  pronounce  the 
advantage  of  the  states  to  be  decisive.  If  the  federal  govern- 
ment is  to  have  collectors  of  revenue,  the  state  governments 
will  have  theirs  also.  And  as  those  of  the  former  will  be  prin- 
cipally on  the  seacoast,  and  not  very  numerous,  whilst  those  of 
the  latter  will  be  spread  over  the  face  of  the  country,  and  will 
be  very  numerous,  the  advantage  in  this  view  also  lies  on  the 
same  side.  It  is  true  that  the  confederacy  is  to  possess,  and 
may  exercise  the  power  of  collecting  internal  as  well  as  ex- 
ternal taxes  throughout  the  states  :  but  it  is  probable  that  this 
power  will  not  be  resorted  to,  except  for  supplemental  purposes 
of  revenue ;  that  an  option  will  then  be  given  to  the  states  to 
supply  their  quotas  by  previous  collections  of  their  own;  and 
that  the  eventual  collection,  under  the  immediate  authority  of 
the  union,  will  generally  be  made  by  the  officers,  and  according 
to  the  rules  appointed  by  the  several  states.  Indeed,  it  is 
extremely  probable,  that  in  other  instances,  particularly  in  the 
organization  of  the  judicial  power,  the  officers  of  the  states 
will  be  clothed  with  the  correspondent  authority  of  the  union. 
Should  it  happen,  however,  that  separate  collectors  of  internal 
revenue  should  be  appointed  under  the  federal  government,  the 
influence  of  the  whole  number  would  not  bear  a  comparison 
with  that  of  the  multitude  of  state  officers  in  the  opposite 
scale.  Within  every  district,  to  which  a  federal  collector  would 
be  allotted,  there  would  not  be  less  than  thirty  or  forty,  or 
«ven  more  officers,  of  difierent  descriptions,  and  many  of  them 


THE    FEDERALIST.  363 

persons  of  character  and  weight,  whose  influence  would  lie  en 
the  side  of  the  state. 

The  powers  delegated  by  the  proposed  constitution  to  the 
feaeral  government,  are  few  and  defined.  Those  which  are  to 
remain  in  the  state  governments,  are  numerous  and  indefinite. 
The  formoi  will  be  exercised  principally  on  external  objects,  as 
war,  peace,  negotiation,  and  foreign  commerce;  with  which  last 
the  power  of  taxation  will,  for  the  most  part,  be  connecteu. 
The  powers  reserved  to  the  several  states  will  extend  to  all  the 
objects,  which,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  affairs,  concern  the 
lives,  liberties,  and  properties  of  the  people ;  and  the  internal 
order,  improvement,  and  prosperity  of  the  state. 

The  operations  of  the  federal  government  will  be  most  exten- 
sive and  important  in  times  of  war  and  danger ;  those  of  the 
state  governments  in  times  of  peace  and  security.  As  the 
former  periods  will  probably  bear  a  small  proportion  to  the 
latter,  the  state  governments  will  here  enjoy  another  advan- 
tage over  the  federal  government.  The  more  adequate  indeed 
the  federal  powers  may  be  rendered  to  the  national  defence, 
the  less  frequent  will  be  those  scenes  of  danger  which  might 
favour  their  ascendancy  over  the  governments  of  the  particular 
states. 

If  the  new  constitution  be  examined  with  accuracy  and  can- 
dour, it  will  be  found  that  the  change  which  it  proposes,  consistb 
much  less  in  the  addition  of  new  powers  to  the  union,  than  in 
the  invigoration  of  its  original  powers.  The  regulation  of 
commerce,  it  is  true,  is  a  new  power;  but  that  seems  to  be  an 
addition  which  few  oppose,  and  from  which  no  apprehensions 
are  entertained.  The  powers  relating  to  war  and  peace,  armies 
and  fleets,  treaties  and  finance,  with  the  other  more  consider- 
able powers,  are  all  vested  in  the  existing  congress  by  the  arti- 
cles of  confederation.  The  proposed  change  does  not  enlarge 
these  powers ;  it  only  substitutes  a  more  effectual  mode  of  ad- 
ministering them.  The  change  relating  to  taxation,  may  be 
regarded  as  the  most  important :  and  yet  the  present  congress 

have  as  complete  authority  to  require  of  the  states  indefinite 

34 


364  THE    FEDERALIST. 

supplies  of  money  for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare^ 
as  the  future  congress  will  have  to  require  them  of  individual 
citizens ;  and  the  latter  will  be  no  more  bound  than  the  states 
themselves  have  been,  to  pay  the  quotas  respectively  taxed  on 
them.  Had  the  states  complied  punctually  with  the  articles  of 
confederation,  or  could  their  compliance  have  been  enforced  by 
as  peaceable  means  as  may  be  used  with  success  towards  single 
persons,  our  past  experience  is  very  far  from  countenancing  an 
opinion,  that  the  state  governments  would  have  lost  their  con- 
stitutional powers,  and  have  gradually  undergone  an  entire  con- 
solidation. To  maintain  that  such  an  event  would  have  ensued, 
would  be  to  say  at  once,  that  the  existence  of  the  state  govern- 
ments is  incompatible  with  any  system  whatever,  that  accom- 
plisbes  the  essential  purposes  of  the  union. 

POBLIUB 


THE    FEDERALIST.  366 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  XLVI. 


NEW    YORK,    JANUARY    29,  1788 


MADISON. 


THE  SUBJECT  OF  THE  LAST  PAPER  RESUMED;  WITH  AN  EXAMI. 
NATION  OF  THE  COMPARATIVE  MEANS  OF  INFLUENCE  OF  THE 
FEDERAL   AND  STATE  GOVERNMENTS. 

Eesuminq  the  subject  of  the  last  paper,  I  proceed  to  inquire, 
whether  the  federal  government  or  the  state  governments,  will 
have  the  advantage  with  regard  to  the  predilection  and  support 
of  the  people. 

Notwithstanding  the  different  modes  in  which  they  are  ap- 
pointed, we  must  consider  both  of  them  as  substantially  de- 
pendent on  the  great  body  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
I  assume  this  position  here  as  it  respects  the  first,  reserving  the 
proofs  for  another  place.  The  federal  and  state  governments 
are  in  fact  but  different  agents  and  trustees  of  the  people,  insti- 
tuted with  different  powers,  and  designated  for  different  pur- 
poses. The  adversaries  of  the  constitution  seem  to  have  lost 
sight  of  the  people  altogether,  in  their  reasonings  on  this  sub- 
ject; and  to  have  viewed  these  different  establishments,  not 
only  as  mutual  rivals  and  enemies,  but  as  uncontrolled  by  any 
common  superiour,  in  their  efforts  to  usurp  the  authorities  of 
each  other.  These  gentlemen  must  here  be  reminded  of  their 
errour.  They  must  be  told,  that  the  ultimate  authority., 
wherever  the  derivative  may  be  found,  resides   in  the  peopltj 


366  THE   FEDERALIST. 

alone  J  and  that  it  will  not  depend  merely  oi.  the  comjara- 
tive  ambition  or  address  of  the  different  governments,  whether 
either,  or  which  of  them,  will  be  able  to  enlarge  its  sphere  of 
jurisdiction  at  the  expense  of  the  other.  Truth,  no  less  than 
decency,  requires,  that  the  event,  in  every  case,  should  be 
supposed  to  depend  on  the  sentiments  and  sanction  of  their 
common  constituents. 

Many  considerations,  besides  those  suggested  on  a  former 
occasion,  seem  to  place  it  beyond  doubt,  that  the  first  and  most 
natural  attachment  of  the  people  will  be  to  the  governments 
of  their  respective  states.  Into  the  administration  of  these,  a 
greater  number  of  individuals  will  expect  to  rise.  From  the 
gift  of  these,  a  greater  number  of  ofl&ces  and  emoluments  will 
flow.  By  the  superintending  care  of  these,  all  the  more  domestic 
and  personal  interests  of  the  people  will  be  regulated  and  pro- 
vided for.  With  the  affairs  of  these,  the  people  will  be  more 
familiarly  and  minutely  conversant:  and  with  the  members 
of  theue,  will  a  greater  proportion  of  the  peoi^le  have  the  ties 
of  personal  acquaintance  and  friendship,  and  of  family  and 
party  attachments.  On  the  side  of  these,  therefore,  the  popular 
bias  may  well  be  expected  most  strongly  to  incline. 

Experience  speaks  the  same  language  in  this  case.  The 
federal  administration,  though  hitherto  very  defective,  in  com- 
parison with  what  may  be  hoped  under  a  better  system,  had^ 
during  the  war,  and  particularly  whilst  the  independent  fund 
of  paper  emissions  was  in  credit,  an  activity  and  importance  as 
great  as  it  can  well  have,  in  any  future  circumstances  whatever. 
It  was  engaged,  too,  in  a  course  of  measures  which  had  for  their 
object  the  protection  of  every  thing  that  was  dear,  and  the 
acquisition  of  every  thing  that  could  be  desirable  to  the  people 
at  large,  it  was,  nevertheless,  invariably  found,  after  the  tran- 
sient enthusiasm  for  the  early  congresses  was  over,  that  the 
attention  and  attachment  of  the  people  were  turned  anew  to 
their  own  particular  governments  j  that  the  federal  council  was 
at  no  time  the  idol  of  popular  favour;  and  that  opposition  to 
proposed  enlargements  of  its  powers  and  importance,  was  lb« 


THE    FEDERALIST.  36* 

side  usually  taken  by  the  men,  who  wished  to  build  their 
political  consequence  on  the  prepossessions  of  their  fellow 
citizens. 

If,  therefore,  ah  has  been  elsewhere  remarked,  the  people 
should  in  future  become  more  partial  to  the  federal  than  to  the 
state  governments,  the  change  can  only  result  from  such  mani- 
fest and  irresistible  proofs  of  a  better  administration,  as  will 
overcome  all  their  antecedent  propensities.  And  in  that  case, 
the  people  ought  not  surely  to  be  precluded  from  giving  most 
of  their  confidence  where  they  may  discover  it  to  be  most  due : 
but  even  in  that  case,  the  state  governments  could  have  little  to 
apprehend,  because  it  is  only  within  a  certain  sphere,  that  the 
federal  power  can,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  advantageously 
administered. 

The  remaining  points,  on  which  I  propose  to  compare  the 
^federal  and  state  governments,  are  the  disposition  and  faculty 
they  may  respectively  possess,  to  resist  and  frustrate  the  mea- 
sures of  each  other. 

It  has  been  already  proved,  that  the  members  of  the  federal 
will  be  more  dependent  on  the  members  of  the  state  govern- 
ments, than  the  latter  will  be  on  the  former.  It  has  appeared 
also,  that  the  prepossessions  of  the  people,  on  whom  both  will 
depend,  will  be  more  on  the  side  of  the  state  governments,  than 
of  the  federal  government.  So  far  as  the  disposition  of  each, 
towards  the  other,  n)ay  be  influenced  by  these  causes,  the  state 
governments  must  clearly  have  the  advantage.  But  in  a  dis- 
tinct and  very  important  point  of  view,  the  advantage  will  lie 
on  the  same  side.  The  prepossessions,  which  the  members 
themselves  will  carry  into  the  federal  government,  will  generally 
be  favourable  to  the  states;  whilst  it  will  rarely  happen,  that 
the  members  of  the  state  governments  will  carry  into  the  public 
councils  a  bias  in  favour  of  the  general  government.  A  local 
spirit  will  infallibly  prevail  much  more  in  the  members  of  the 
congress,  than  a  national  spirit  will  prevail  in  the  legislatures 
of  the  particular  states.  Every  one  knows,  that  a  great  pro- 
portion of  the  errours  committed  by  the  state  legislatures,  pro- 


368  THE    FEDERALIST. 

ceeds  Irori  the  disposition  of  the  membei's  to  sacrifice  the  com- 
prehensive and  permanent  interests  of  the  state,  to  the  particular 
and  separate  views  of  the  counties  or  districts  in  which  they 
reside.  And  if  they  do  not  sufficiently  enlarge  their  policy,  to 
embrace  the  collective  welfare  of  their  particular  state,  how  can 
it  be  imagined,  that  they  will  make  the  aggregate  prosperity 
of  the  union,  and  the  dignity  and  respectability  of  its  govern 
ment,  the  objects  of  their  affections  and  consultations  ?  For  the 
same  reason,  that  the  members  of  the  state  legislatures  will  be 
unlikely  to  attach  themselves  sufficiently  to  national  objects,  the 
members  of  the  federal  legislature  will  be  likely  to  attach  them- 
selves too  much  to  local  objects.  The  states  will  be  to  the  latter, 
what  counties  and  towns  are  to  the  former.  Measures  will  too 
often  be  decided  according  to  their  probable  effect,  not  on  the 
national  prosperity  and  happiness,  but  on  the  prejudices,  inte- 
rests, and  pursuits  of  the  governments  and  people  of  the  indi- 
vidual states.  What  is  the  spirit  that  has  in  general  charac- 
terized the  proceedings  of  congress  ?  A  perusal  of  their  journals, 
as  well  as  the  candid  acknowledgements  of  such  as  have  had  a 
seat  in  that  assembly,  will  inform  us,  that  the  members  have  but 
too  frequently  displayed  the  character,  rather  of  partisans  of 
their  respective  states,  than  of  impartial  guardians  of  a  common 
interest ;  that  where,  on  one  occasion,  improper  sacrifices  have 
been  made  of  local  considerations  to  the  aggrandizement  of  the 
federal  government,  the  great  interests  of  the  nation  have 
suffered  on  an  hundred,  from  an  undue  attention  to  the  local 
prejudices,  interests,  and  views  of  the  particular  states.  I  mean 
not  by  these  reflections  to  insinuate,  that  the  new  federal 
government  will  not  embrace  a  more  enlarged  plan  of  policy, 
than  the  existing  government  may  have  pursued;  much  less, 
that  its  views  will  be  as  confined  as  those  of  the  state  legisla- 
tures :  but  only  that  it  will  partake  sufficiently  of  the  spirit  of 
both,  to  be  disinclined  to  invade  the  rights  of  the  individual 
states,  or  the  prerogatives  of  their  governments.  The  motive? 
CD  the  part  of  the  state  governments,  to  augment  their  preroga- 


THE   FEDERALIST.  369 

tives  by  defalcations  from  the  federal  govcrnmeut,  will  be  over- 
ruled by  no  reciprocal  predispositions  in  the  members. 

Were  it  admitted,  however,  that  the  federal  government  may 
feel  an  equal  disposition  with  the  state  governments  to  extend 
its  power  beyond  the  due  limits,  the  latter  would  still  have  the 
advantage  in  the  means  of  defeating  such  encroachments.  If 
an  act  of  a  particular  state,  though  unfriendly  to  the  national 
government,  be  generally  popular  in  that  state,  and  should  not 
too  grossly  violate  the  oaths  of  the  state  officers,  it  is  executed 
immediately,  and,  of  course,  by  means  on  the  spot,  and  depend- 
ing on  the  state  alone.  The  opposition  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment, or  the  interposition  of  federal  officers,  would  but  inflame 
the  zeal  of  all  parties  on  the  side  of  the  state  j  and  the  evil 
o.ould  not  be  prevented  or  repaired,  if  at  all,  without  the  employ- 
ment of  means  which  must  always  be  resorted  to  with  reluctance 
and  difficulty.  On  the  other  hand,  should  an  unwarrantable 
measure  of  the  federal  government  be  unpopular  in  particular 
states,  which  would  seldom  fail  to  be  the  case,  or  even  a  war- 
rantable measure  be  so,  which  may  sometimes  be  the  case,  the 
means  of  opposition  to  it  are  powerful  and  at  hand.  The  dis- 
quietude of  the  people;  their  repugnance,  and  perhaps  refusal, 
to  cooperate  with  the  officers  of  the  union ;  the  frowns  of  the 
executive  magistracy  of  the  state ;  the  embarrassments  created 
by  legislative  devices,  which  would  often  be  added  on  such  occa- 
sions, would  oppose,  in  any  state,  difficulties  not  to  be  despised; 
would  form,  in  a  large  state,  very  serious  impediments;  and 
where  the  sentiments  of  several  adjoining  states  happened  to  be 
in  unison,  would  present  obstructions  which  the  federal  govern- 
ment would  hardly  be  willing  to  encounter. 

But  ambitious  encroachments  of  the  federal  government,  on 
the  authority  of  the  state  governments,  would  not  excite  the 
opposition  of  a  single  state,  or  of  a  few  states  only.  They  would 
be  signals  of  general  alarm.  Every  government  would  espouse 
the  common  cause.  A  correspondence  would  be  opened.  Plans 
of  resistance  would  be  concerted.  One  spirit  would  animate 
and  conduct  the  whole.     The  same  combination,  in  short,  would 


370  THE   FEDERALIST. 

result  from  an  apprehension  of  the  federal,  as  was  produced  by 
the  dread  of  a  foreign  yoke;  and  unless  the  projected  innova- 
tions should  be  voluntarily  renounced,  the  same  appeal  to  a  trial 
of  force  would  be  made  in  the  one  case,  as  was  made  in  the 
other.  But  what  degree  of  madness  could  ever  drive  the  federal 
government  to  such  an  extremity?  In  the  contest  with  Great 
Britain,  one  part  of  the  empire  was  employed  against  the  other 
The  more  numerous  part  invaded  the  rights  of  the  less  numerous 
part.  The  attempt  was  unjust  and  unwise;  but  it  was  not  in 
speculation  absolutely  chimerical.  But  what  would  be  the  con- 
test, in  the  case  we  are  supposing?  Who  would  be  the  parties? 
A  few  representatives  of  the  people  would  be  opposed  to  the 
people  themselves;  or  rather  one  set  of  representatives  would 
be  contending  against  thirteen  sets  of  representatives,  with 
the  whole  body  of  their  common  constituents  on  the  side  of  the 
latter. 

The  only  refuge  left  for  those  who  prophesy  the  downfal  of 
the  state  governments,  is  the  visionary  supposition,  that  the 
federal  government  may  previously  accumulate  a  military  force 
for  the  projects  of  ambition.  The  reasonings  contained  in  these 
papers  must  have  been  employed  to  little  purpose  indeed,  if  it 
could  be  necessary  now  to  disprove  the  reality  of  this  danger. 
That  the  people  and  the  states  should,  for  a  suflScient  period  of 
time,  elect  an  uninterrupted  succession  of  men  ready  to  betray 
both ;  that  the  traitors  should,  throughout  this  period,  uniformly 
and  systematically  pursue  some  fixed  plan  for  the  extension 
of  the  military  establishment ;  that  the  governments  and  the 
people  of  the  states  should  silently  and  patiently  behold  the 
gathering  storm,  and  continue  to  supply  the  materials,  until  it 
should  be  prepared  to  burst  on  their  own  heads,  must  appear  to 
every  one  more  like  the  incoherent  dreams  of  a  delirious  jealousy, 
or  the  misjudged  exaggerations  of  a  counterfeit  zeal,  than  like 
the  sober  apprehensions  of  genuine  patriotism.  Extravagant 
as  the  supposition  is,  let  it  however  be  made.  Let  a  regular 
army,  fully  equal  to  the  resources  of  the  country,  be  formed ; 
and  let  it  be  entirely  at  the  devotion  of  the  federal  government; 


THE   FEDERALIST.  '6'{  1 

tstill  it  would  not  be  going  too  far  to  say,  that  the  state  govern- 
ments, with  the  people  on  their  side,  would  be  able  to  repel  the 
danger.  The  highest  number  to  which,  according  to  the  best 
computation,  a  standing  army  can  be  carried  in  any  country, 
does  not  exceed  one  hundredth  part  of  the  whole  number  of 
souls;  or  one  twenty-fifth  part  of  the  number  able  to  bear  arms. 
This  proportion  would  not  yield,  in  the  United  States,  an  army 
of  more  than  twenty-five  or  thirty  thousand  men.  To  these 
would  be  opposed  a  militia  amounting*  to  near  half  a  million  of 
citizens  with  arms  in  their  hands,  ofllcered  by  men  chosen  from 
among  themselves,  fighting  for  their  common  liberties,  and 
united  and  conducted  by  governments  possessing  their  affections 
and  confidence.  It  may  well  be  doubted,  whether  a  militia  thus 
circumstanced,  could  ever  be  conquered  by  such  a  proportion  of 
regular  troops.  Those,  who  are  best  acquainted  with  the  late 
successful  resistance  of  this  country  against  the  British  arms, 
will  be  most  inclined  to  deny  the  possibility  of  it.  Besides  the 
advantage  of  being  armed,  which  the  Americans  possess  over 
the  people  of  almost  every  other  nation,  the  existence  of  subor- 
dinate governments,  to  which  the  people  are  attached,  and  by 
which  the  militia  officers  are  appointed,  forms  a  barrier  against 
the  enterprises  of  ambition,  more  insurmountable  than  any 
which  a  simple  government  of  any  form  can  admit  of.  Not- 
withstanding the  military  establishments  in  the  several  king- 
doms of  Europe,  which  are  carried  as  far  as  the  public  resources 
will  bear,  the  governments  are  afraid  to  trust  the  people  with 
arms.  And  it  is  not  certain,  that  with  this  aid  alone,  they  would 
not  be  able  to  shake  off  their  yokes.  But  were  the  people  to 
possess  the  additional  advantages  of  local  governments  chosen 
by  themselves,  who  could  collect  the  national  will,  and  direct  the 
national  force,  and  of  officers  appointed  out  of  the  militia,  by 
these  governments,  and  attached  both  to  them  and  to  the  militia, 
it  may  be  affirmed  with  the  greatest  assurance,  that  the  throne 
of  every  tyranny  in  Europe  would  be  speedily  overturned  in 
epite  of  the  legions  which  surround  it.  Let  us  not  insult  the 
free  and  gallant  citizens  of  America  with  the  suspicion,  that 


•372  THE    FEDERALIST. 

they  woUid  b*  less  able  to  defend  the  rights  of  which  they  would 
be  in  actual  possession,  than  the  debased  subjects  of  arbitrary 
power  would  be  to  rescue  theirs  from  the  hands  of  their  oppres- 
sors. Let  us  rather  no  longer  insult  them  with  the  supposition, 
that  they  can  ever  reduce  themselves  to  the  necessity  of  making 
the  experiment,  by  a  blind  and  tame  submission  to  the  long 
train  of  insidious  measures  which  must  precede  and  produce  it. 

The  argument  under  the  present  head  may  be  put  into  a  very 
concise  form,  which  appears  altogether  conclusive.  Either  the 
mode  in  which  the  federal  government  is  to  be  constructed,  will 
render  it  sufficiently  dependent  on  the  people,  or  it  will  not.  On 
the  first  supposition,  it  will  be  restrained  by  that  dependence 
from  forming  schemes  obnoxious  to  their  constituents.  On  the 
other  supposition,  it  will  not  possess  the  confidence  of  the  people, 
and  its  schemes  of  usurpation  will  be  easily  defeated  by  the 
state  governments;  which  will  be  supported  by  the  people. 

On  summing  up  the  considerations  stated  in  this  and  the  last 
paper,  they  seem  to  amount  to  the  most  convincing  evidence, 
that  the  powers  proposed  to  be  lodged  in  the  federal  govern- 
ment, are  as  little  formidable  to  those  reserved  to  the  individual 
states,  as  they  are  indispensably  necessary  to  accomplish  the 
purposes  of  the  union  j  and  that  all  those  alarms  which  havo 
been  sounded,  of  a  meditated  and  consequential  annihilation  ol 
the  state  governments,  must,  on  the  most  favourable  interpreta 
tion,  be  ascribed  to  the  chimerical  fears  of  the  authors  of  them 

PUBLIUS. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  373 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   XLVII. 


NF.W  YORK,   FEBRUARY  1,   1788. 


MADISON. 


THE  MEANING  OF  THE  MAXIM,  WHICH  REQUIRES  A  SEPARATION  OP 
THE  DEPARTMENTS  OF  POWER,  EXAMINED  AND  ASCERTAINED. 

Having  reviewed  the  general  form  of  the  proposed  govern- 
ment, and  the  general  mass  of  power  allotted  to  it ;  I  proceed 
to  examine  the  particular  structure  of  this  government,  and 
the  distribution  of  this  maSS  of  power  among  its  constituent 
parts. 

One  of  the  principal  objections  inculcated  by  the  more  re- 
spectable adversaries  to  the  constitution,  is  its  supposed  vio- 
lation of  the  political  maxim,  that  the  legislative,  executive, 
and  judiciary  departments,  ought  to  be  separate  and  distinct. 
In  the  structure  of  the  federal  government,  no  regard,  it  is  said, 
seems  to  have  been  paid  to  this  essential  precaution  in  favour 
of  liberty.  The  several  departments  of  power  are  distributed 
and  blended  in  such  a  manner,  as  at  once  to  destroy  all  sym- 
metry and  beauty  of  form ;  and  to  expose  some  of  the  essential 
parts  of  the  edifice  to  the  danger  of  being  crushed  by  the  dis- 
proportionate weight  of  other  parts. 

Ko  political  truth  is  certainly  of  greater  intrinsic  value,  or  is 
•itamped  with  the  authority  of  more  enlightened  patrons  of 
liberty,  than  that  on  which  the  objection  is  founded.  The 
accumulation  of  all  powers,  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary, 


874  THE    FEDERALIST. 

in  the  same  hands,  whether  of  one,  a  few,  or  many,  and  whether 
fioveditary,  self-appointed,  or  elective,  may  justly  be  pronounced 
tlie  very  definition  of  tyranny.  Were  the  federal  constitution, 
therefore,  really  chargeable  with  this  accumulation  of  power, 
or  with  a  mixture  of  powers,  having  a  dangerous  tendency  1o 
such  an  accumulation,  no  further  arguments  would  be  neces- 
sary to  inspire  a  universal  reprobation  of  the  system.  I  per- 
suade myself,  however,  that  it  will  be  made  apparent  to  every 
one,  that  the  charge  cannot  be  supported,  and  that  the  maxim 
on  which  it  relies  has  been  totally  misconceived  and  misapplied. 
In  order  to  form  correct  ideas  on  this  important  subject,  it  will 
be  proper  to  investigate  the  sense  in  which  the  preservation  of 
liberty  requires,  that  the  three  great  departments  of  power 
should  be  separate  and  distinct. 

The  oracle  who  is  always  consulted  and  cited  on  this  subject, 
is  the  celebrated  Montesquieu.  If  he  be  not  the  author  of  this 
invaluable  precept  in  the  science  of  politics,  he  has  the  merit 
at  least  of  displaying  and  recommending  it  most  effectually  to 
the  attention  of  mankind.  Let  us  endeavour,  in  the  first  place, 
\o  ascertain  his  meaning  on  this  point. 

The  British  constitution  was  to  Montesquieu^  what  Homer 
has  been  to  the  didactic  writers  on  epic  poetry.  As  the  latter 
have  considered  the  work  of  the  immortal  bard,  as  the  perfect 
model  from  which  the  principles  and  rules  of  the  epic  art  were 
to  be  drawn,  and  by  which  all  similar  works  were  to  be  judged  : 
so  this  great  political  critic  appears  to  have  viewed  the  consti- 
tution of  England  as  the  standard,  or  to  use  his  own  expression, 
as  the  mirror  of  political  liberty :  and  to  have  delivered,  in  the 
form  of  elementary  truths,  the  several  characteristic  principles 
of  that  particular  system.  That  we  may  be  sure  then  not  to 
mistake  hid  meaning  in  this  case,  let  us  recur  to  the  source  from 
which  the  maxim  was  drawn. 

On  the  slightest  view  of  the  British  constitution,  we  must 
perceive,  that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary  depart- 
ments, are  by  no  means  totally  separate  and  distinct  from  each 
other.     The  executive  magistrate  forms  an  integral  part  of  the 


THE    FEDERALIST.  37^ 

legislative  authorit}'.  He  alone  has  the  ]irerogative  of  ru.iking 
treaties  with  foreign  sovereigns,  which,  when  made,  have,  under 
certain  limitations,  the  force  of  legislative  acts.  All  the  mem- 
bers of  the  judiciary  department  are  appointed  by  him ;  can  be 
removed  by  him  on  the  address  of  the  two  houses  of  parlia- 
ment, and  form,  when  he  pleases  to  consult  them,  one  of  his 
constitutional  councils.  One  branch  of  the  legislative  depart- 
ment, forms  also  a  great  constitutional  council  to  the  executive 
chief;  as,  on  another  hand,  it  is  the  sole  depository  of  judicial 
power  in  cases  of  impeachment,  and  is  invested  with  the  supreme 
appellate  jurisdiction  in  all  other  cases.  The  judges  again  are 
so  far  connected  with  the  legislative  department,  as  often  to 
attend  and  participate  in  its  deliberations,  though  not  admitted 
to  a  legislative  vote. 

From  these  facts,  by  which  Montesquieu  was  guided,  it  may 
clearly  be  inferred,  that  in  saying,  "  there  can  be  no  libertj', 
where  the  legislative  and  executive  powers  are  united  in  the 
same  person,  or  body  of  magistrates;"  or,  "if  the  power  of 
judging,  be  not  separated  from  the  legislative  and  executive 
powers,"  he  did  not  mean  that  these  departments  ought  to  have 
no  partial  agency  in,  or  no  control  over  the  acts  of  each  other. 
His  meaning,  as  his  own  words  import,  and  still  more  conclu- 
•lively  as  illustrated  by  the  example  in  his  eye,  can  amount  to 
no  more  than  this,  that  where  the  whole  power  of  one  depart- 
ment is  exercised  by  the  same  hands  which  possess  the  whole 
power  of  another  department,  the  fundamental  principles  of  a 
free  constitution  are  subverted.  This  would  have  been  the  case 
in  the  constitution  examined  by  him,  if  the  king,  who  is  the 
sole  executive  magistrate,  had  possessed  also  the  complete 
legislative  power,  or  the  supreme  administration  of  justice ;  or 
if  the  entire  legislative  body  had  possessed  the  supreme  judi- 
ciary, or  the  supreme  executive  authority.  This,  however,  is 
not  among  the  vices  of  that  constitution.  The  magistrate,  in 
whom  the  whole  executive  power  resides,  cannot  of  himself 
make  a  law,  though  he  can  put  a  negative  on  every  law;  nor 
adminisler  iustice  in  person,  though  he  has  the  appointment  of 


^76  THE    FEDERALIST. 

those  who  do  administer  it.  The  judges  can  exercise  no  execu- 
tive prerogative,  though  they  are  shoots  from  the  executive 
stock ;  nor  any  legislative  function,  though  they  may  be  advised 
with  by  the  legislative  councils.  The  entire  legislature  can 
perform  no  judiciary  act;  though  by  the  joint  act  of  two  of  its 
branches,  the  judges  may  be  "removed  from  their  offices;  and 
though  one  of  its  branches  is  possessed  of  the  judicial  power  in 
the  last  resort.  The  entire  legislature  again  can  exercise  no 
executive  prerogative,  though  one  of  its  branches  *  constitutes 
the  supreme  executive  magistracy;  and  another,  on  the  im- 
peachment of  a  third,  can  try  and  condemn  all  the  subordinate 
officers  in  the  executive  department. 

The  reasons  on  which  Montesquieu  grounds  his  maxim,  are 
a  further  demonstration  of  his  meaning.  "  "When  the  legislative 
and  executive  powers  are  united  in  the  same  person  or  body," 
says  he,  "  there  can  be  no  liberty,  because  apprehensions  may 
arise  lest  tJie  same  monarch  or  senate  should  enact  tyrannical 
laws,  to  execute  them  in  a  tyrannical  manner."  Again,  "  Were 
the  power  of  judging  joined  with  the  legislative,  the  life  and 
liberty  of  the  subject  would  be  exposed  to  arbitrary  control,  for 
the  judge  would  then  be  the  legislator.  Were  it  joined  to  the  exe- 
cutive power,  the  judge  might  behave  with  all  the  violence  of  a/t 
oppressor."  Some  of  these  reasons  are  more  fully  explained  in 
other  passages ;  but  briefly  stated  as  they  are  here,  they  suffi- 
ciently establish  the  meaning  which  we  have  put  on  this  cele- 
brated maxim  of  this  celebrated  author. 

If  we  look  into  the  constitutions  of  the  several  states,  we 
find,  that  notwithstanding  the  emphatical,  and,  in  some  in- 
stances, the  unqualified  terms  in  which  this  axiom  has  been  laid 
down,  there  is  not  a  single  instance  in  which  the  several  depart- 
ments of  power  have  been  kept  absolutely  separate  and  distinct 
New  Hampshire,  whose  constitution  was  the  last  formed,  seems 
to  have  been  fully  aware  of  the  impossibility  and  inexpediency 
of  avoiding  any  mixture  whatever  of  these  departments ;  and 
has  qualified  the  doctrine  by  declaring,  "  that  the  legislative, 

*  The  king. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  377 

exeontive,  and  judiciary  powers,  ought  to  be  kept  as  separate 
from,  and  independent  of  each  other,  as  the  nature  of  a  free  gov- 
ernment will  admit;  or  as  is  consistent  with  that  chain  of  connexion, 
that  binds  the  whole  fabric  of  the  constitution  in  one  indissoluble  bond 
of  unity  and  amity."  Her  constitution  accordingly  mixes  these 
departments  in  several  respects.  The  senate,  which  is  a  branch 
of  the  legislative  department,  is  also  a  judicial  tribunal  for  the 
trial  of  impeachments.  The  president,  who  is  the  head  of  the 
executive  department,  is  the  presiding  member  also  of  the 
senate ;  and,  besides  an  equal  vote  in  all  cases,  has  a  casting 
vote  in  case  of  a  tie.  The  executive  head  is  himself  eventually 
elective  every  year  by  the  legislative  department;  and  his 
council  is  every  year  chosen  by  and  from  the  members  of  the 
same  department.  Several  of  the  officers  of  state  are  also  ap- 
pointed by  the  legislature.  And  the  members  of  the  judiciary 
department  are  appointed  by  the  executive  department. 

The  constitution  of  Massachusetts  has  observed  a  sufficient, 
though  less  pointed  caution,  in  expressing  this  fundamental 
article  of  liberty.  It  declares,  "  that  the  legislative  department 
shall  never  exercise  the  executive  and  judicial  powers,  or  either 
of  them :  the  executive  shall  never  exercise  the  legislative  and 
judicial  powers,  or  either  of  them :  the  judicial  shall  never  ex- 
ercise the  legislative  and  executive  powers,  or  either  of  them." 
This  declaration  corresponds  precisely  with  the  doctrine  of 
Montesquieu,  as  it  has  been  explained,  and  is  not  in  a  single 
point  violated  by  the  plan  of  the  convention.  ■  It  goes  no  far- 
ther than  to  prohibit  any  one  of  the  entire  departments  from 
exercising  the  powers  of  another  department.  In  the  very 
constitution  to  which  it  is  prefixed,  a  partial  mixture  of  powers 
has  been  admitted.  The  executive  magistrate  has  a  qualified 
negative  on  the  legislative  body;  and  the  senate,  which  is  a 
part  of  the  legislature,  is  a  court  of  impeachment  for  members 
both  of  the  executive  and  judiciary  departments.  The  mem- 
bers of  the  judiciary  department,  again,  are  appointable  by  the 
executive  department,  and  removeable  by  the  same  authority, 
on  the  address  of  the  two  legislative  branches.     Lastly,  a  niim- 


3T8  THE    FEDERALIST. 

ber  of  the  officers  of  government  are  annually  appointed  b^ 
the  legislative. department.     As  the  appointment  to  offices,  par- 
ticularly executive  offices,  is  in  its  nature  an  executive  function, 
the  compilers  of  the  constitution  have,  in  this  last  point  at 
least,  violated  the  rule  established  by  themselves. 

I  pass  over  the  constitutions  of  Ehode  Island  and  Connecti- 
cut, because  they  were  formed  prior  to  the  revolution ;  and 
even  before  the  principle  under  examination  had  become  an 
object  of  political  attention. 

The  constitution  of  New  York  contains  no  declaration  on 
this  subject ;  but  appears  very  clearly  to  have  been  framed  with 
an  eye  to  the  danger  of  improperly  blending  the  different  de- 
partments. It  gives,  nevertheless,  to  the  executive  magistrate 
a  partial  control  over  the  legislative  department ;  and,  what  is 
more,  gives  a  like  control  to  the  judiciary  department,  and  even 
blends  the  executive  and  judiciary  departments  in  the  exercise 
of  this  control.  In  its  council  of  appointment,  members  of  the 
legislative  are  associated  with  the  executive  authority,  in  the 
appointment  of  officers,  both  executive  and  judiciary.  And  its 
court  for  the  trial  of  impeachments  and  correction  of  errours, 
is  to  consist  of  one  branch  of  the  legislature  and  the  principal 
members  of  the  judiciary  department. 

The  constitution  of  New  Jersey  has  blended  the  different 
powers  of  government  more  than  any  of  the  preceding.  The 
governour,  who  is  the  executive  magistrate,  is  appointed  by 
the  legislature;  is  chancellor  and  ordinary,  or  surrogate  of  the 
state  J  is  a  member  of  the  supreme  court  of  appeals,  and  pre- 
sident with  a  casting  vote  of  one  of  the  legislative  branches 
The  same  legislative  branch  acts  again  as  executive  council  of 
the  governour,  and  with  him  constitutes  the  court  of  appeals. 
The  members  of  the  judiciary  department  are  appointed  by  the 
legislative  department,  and  removeable  by  one  branch  of  it  vu 
the  impeachment  of  the  other. 

According  to  the  constitution  of  Pennsylvania,*  the  presj- 

*  The  constitutions  of  these  states  have  been  since  altered. 


TUE    FEDERALIST.  37i> 

dent,  who  is  head  of  the  executive  department,  is  annually 
elected  by  a  vote  in  which  the  legislative  department  predomi- 
nates. In  conjunction  with  an  executive  council,  he  appoints* 
the  members  of  the  judiciary  department,  and  forms  a  coui"t  of 
impeachment  for  trial  of  all  officers,  judiciary  as  well  as  execu- 
tive. The  judges  of  the  supreme  court,  and  justices  of  the 
peace  seem  also  to  be  removeable  by  the  legislature ;  and  the 
executive  power  of  pardoning  in  certain  cases  to  be  referred  to 
the  same  department.  The  members  of  the  executive  council 
are  made  ex  officio  justices  of  peace  throughout  the  state. 

In  Delaware,*  the  chief  executive  magistrate  is  annually 
elected  by  the  legislative  department.  The  speakers  of  the  two 
legislative  bi'anches  are  vice-pi-esidents  in  the  executive  depart- 
ment. The  executive  chief,  with  six  others,  appointed  three 
by  each  of  the  legislative  branches,  constitute  the  supreme 
court  of  appeals:  he  is  joined  with  the  legislative  department 
in  the  appointment  of  the  other  judges.  Throughout  the  states, 
it  appears  that  the  members  of  the  legislature  may  at  the  same 
time  be  justices  of  the  peace.  In  this  state,  the  members  of 
one  branch  of  it  are  ex  officio  justices  of  the  peace;  as  are 
also  the  members  of  the  executive  council.  The  principal 
officers  of  the  executive  department  are  appointed  by  the  legis- 
Uitive ;  and  one  branch  of  the  latter  forms  a  court  of  impeach- 
ments. All  officers  may  be  removed  on  address  of  the  legis- 
lature. 

Maryland  has  adopted  the  maxim  in  the  most  unqualified 
terms;  declaring  that"  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial 
powers  of  government,  ought  to  be  for  ever  separate  and  dis- 
tinct from  each  other.  Her  constitution,  notwithstanding, 
makes  the  executive  magistrate  appointable  by  the  legislative 
department ;  and  the  members  of  the  judiciary  by  the  executive 
department. 

The  language  of  Virginia  is  still  more  pointed  on  this  sub- 
ject.    Her  constitution  declares,  "that  the  legislative,  execu- 

*  The  constitutions  of  these  states  have  been  since  altered. 
S5 


380  THE   FEDERALIST. 

tive,  and  judiciary  departments,  shall  be  separate  and  distinct; 
80  that  neither  exercise  the  powers  properly  belonging  to  the 
other;  nor  shall  any  person  exercise  the  powers  of  more  than 
one  of  them  at  the  same  time;  except  that  the  justices  of 
county  courts  shall  be  eligible  to  either  house  of  assembly." 
Yet  we  find  not  only  this  express  exception,  with  respect  to  the 
members  of  the  inferiour  courts ;  but  that  the  chief  magistrate, 
with  his  executive  council,  are  appointable  by  the  legislature ; 
that  two  members  of  the  latter,  are  triennially  displaced  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  legislature ;  and  that  all  the  principal  officers, 
both  executive  and  judiciary,  are  filled  by  the  same  department. 
The  executive  prerogative  of  pardoning,  also,  is  in  one  case 
vested  in  the  legislative  department. 

The  constitution  of  North  Carolina  which  declares,  "  thai 
the  legislative,  executive,  and  supreme  judicial  powers  of  gov- 
ernment, ought  to  be  for  ever  separate  and  distinct  from  each 
other,"  refers  at  the  same  time,  to  the  legislative  department, 
the  appointment  not  only  of  the  executive  chief,  but  all  the 
principal  officers  within  both  that  and  the  judiciary  department. 

In  South  Carolina,  the  constitution  makes  the  executive 
magistracy  eligible  by  the  legislative  department.  It  gives  to 
the  latter,  also,  the  appointment  of  the  members  of  the  judi- 
ciary department,  including  even  justices  of  the  peace  and 
sheriffs;  and  the  appointment  of  officers  in  the  executive  de- 
partment, down  to  captains  in  the  army  and  navy  of  the  state. 

In  the  constitution  of  Georgia,  where  it  is  declared,  "  that 
the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary  departments  shall  be- 
separate  and  distinct,  so  that  neither  exercise  the  powers  pro- 
perly belonging  to  the  other,"  we  find  that  the  executive  de- 
partment is  to  be  filled  by  appointments  of  the  legislature; 
and  the  executive  prerogative  of  pardoning  to  be  finally  exer- 
cised by  the  same  authority.  Even  justices  of  the  peace  are  to 
be  appointed  by  the  legislature. 

In  citing  these  cases  in  which  the  legislative,  executive,  ana 
judiciary  departments,  have  not  been  kept  totally  separate  and 
distinct,  I  wish  not  to  be  regarded  as  an  advocate  for  tb  e  par 


THE   FEDERALIST.  381 

ticular  organizations  of  the  several  state  governments.  1  am 
fully  aware,  that  among  the  many  excellent  principles  whick 
they  exemplify,  they  carry  strong  marks  of  the  haste,  and  still 
stronger  of  the  inexperience,  under  which  they  were  framed. 
Tt  is  but  too  obvious,  that  in  some  instances,  the  fundamental 
principle  under  consideration,  has  been  violated  by  too  great  a 
mixture,  and  even  an  actual  consolidation  of  the  different  pow- 
*^r3j  and  that  in  no  instance  has  a  competent  provision  been 
made  for  maintaining  in  practice  the  separation  delineated  on 
paper.  AYhat  I  have  wished  to  evince  is,  that  the  charge 
brought  against  the  proposed  constitution,  of  violating  a  sacred 
maxim  of  free  government,  is  warranted  neither  by  the  real 
meaning  annexed  to  that  maxim  by  its  author,  nor  by  the 
sense  in  which  it  has  hitherto  been  understood  in  America 
This  interesting  subject  will  be  resumed  in  the  ensuing  paper. 

PUBLIUS. 


382  THE    FEDERALItol. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    XI.VIII. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY  1,  1788. 


MADISON. 


THE   SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,   WITH  A  VIEW  TO  THE  MEANS  OF 
GIVING  EFFICACY  IN  PRACTICE  TO  THAT  MAXIM. 

It  was  shown  in  the  last  paper,  that  the  political  apothegm 
there  examined,  does  not  require  that  the  legislative,  executive, 
and  judiciary  departments,  should  be  wholly  unconnected  with 
each  other.  I  shall  undertake  in  the  next  place  to  show,  tha^ 
unless  these  departments  be  so  far  connected  and  blended,  as  to 
give  to  each  a  constitutional  control  over  the  others,  the  degree 
of  separation  which  the  maxim  requires,  as  essential  to  a  free 
government,  can  never  in  practice  be  duly  maintained. 

It  is  agreed  on  all  sides,  that  the  powers  properly  belonging 
to  one  of  the  departments  ought  not  to  be  directly  and  com- 
pletely administered  by  either  of  the  other  departments.  It  is 
equally  evident,  that  neither  of  them  ought  to  possess,  directly 
or  indirectly,  an  overruling  influence  over  the  others  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  their  respective  powers.  It  will  not  be  denied, 
that  power  is  of  an  encroaching  nature,  and  that  it  ought  to  be 
effectually  restrained  from  passing  the  limits  assigned  to  it. 
After  discriminating,  therefore,  in  theory,  the  several  classes 
of  power,  as  they  may  in  their  nature  be  legislative,  executive, 
or  judiciary;  the  next,  and  most  difficult  task,  is  to  provide 
some  practical  security  for  each,  against  the  invasion  of  the 


THE    FEDERALIST.  383 

Others.  What  this  security  ought  to  be,  is  the  great  problem 
to  be  solved. 

Will  it  be  sufficient  to  mark,  with  precision,  the  boundaries 
of  these  departments,  in  the  constitution  of  the  government, 
and  to  trust  to  these  parchment  barriers  against  the  encroach- 
ing spirit  of  power  ?  This  is  the  security  which  appears  to 
have  been  principally  relied  on  b}'  the  compilers  of  most  of  the 
American  constitutions.  But  experience  assures  us,  that  the 
eflPcacy  of  the  provision  has  been  greatly  overrated;  and  that 
some  more  adequate  defence  is  indispensably  necessary  for  the 
more  feeble,  against  the  more  powerful  members  of  the  govern- 
ment. The  legislative  department  is  everywhere  extending 
the  sphere  of  its  activity,  and  drawing  all  powei-  into  its  impet- 
uous vortex. 

The  founders  of  our  republics  have  so  much  merit  for  the 
wisdom  which  they  have  displayed,  that  no  task  can  be  less 
pleasing  than  that  of  pointing  out  the  errours  into  which  they 
have  fallen.  A  respect  for  truth,  however,  obliges  us  to  re- 
mark, that  they  seem  never  for  a  moment  to  have  turned  their 
eyes  from  the  danger  to  liberty,  from  the  overgrown  and  all- 
grasping  prerogative  of  an  hereditary  magistrate,  supported 
and  fortified  by  an  hereditary  branch  of  the  legislative  autho- 
i.*ity.  They  seem  never  to  have  recollected  the  danger  from 
legislative  usurpations,  which,  by  assembling  all  power  in  the 
same  hands,  must  lead  to  the  same  tyranny  as  is  threatened  by 
executive  usurpations. 

In  a  government  where  numerous  and  extensive  prerogatives 
are  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  hereditary  monarch,  the  execu- 
tive department  is  very  justly  regarded  as  the  source  of  danger, 
and  watched  with  all  the  jealousy  which  a  zeal  for  liberty 
ought  to  inspire.  In  a  democracy,  where  a  multitude  of  people 
exercise  in  person  the  legislative  functions,  and  are  continually 
exposed,  by  their  incapacity  for  regular  deliberation  and  con- 
certed measures,  to  the  ambitious  intrigues  of  their  executive 
magistrates,  tyranny  may  well  be  apprehended  on  some  favour- 
able emergency,  to  start   up  in  the  same  quarter      But  in  a 


884  THE   FEDERALIST. 

representsvtive  republic,  where  the  executive  magistracy  is  care- 
fully limited,  both  in  the  extent  and  the  duration  of  its  power; 
and  where  the  legislative  power  is  exercised  by  an  assembly, 
which  is  inspired  by  a  supposed  influence  over  the  people,  with 
an  intrepid  confidence  in  its  own  strength ;  which  is  sufiiciently 
oumerous  to  feel  all  the  passions  which  actuate  a  multitude; 
yet  not  so  numerous  as  to  be  incapable  of  pursuing  the  objects 
of  its  passions,  by  means  which  reason  prescribes ;  it  is  against 
the  enterprising  ambition  of  this  department,  that  the  people 
ought  to  indulge  all  their  jealousy  and  exhaust  all  their  pre- 
cautions. 

The  legislative  department  derives  a  superiority  in  our  gov- 
ernments from  other  circumstances.  Its  constitutional  powers 
being  at  once  more  extensive,  and  less  susceptible  of  precise 
limits,  it  can,  with  the  greater  facility,  mask,  under  complicated 
and  indirect  measures,  the  encroachments  which  it  makes  on 
the  co-ordinate  departments.  It  is  not  unfrequently  a  question 
of  real  nicety  in  legislative  bodies,  whether  the  operation  of  a 
particular  measure  will,  or  will  not  extend  beyond  the  legisla- 
tive sphere.  On  the  other  side,  the  executive  power  being 
restrained  within  a  narrower  compass,  and  being  more  simple 
in  its  nature ;  and  the  judiciary  being  described  by  landmarks, 
still  less  uncertain,  projects  of  usurpation  by  either  of  these 
departments  would  immediately  betray  and  defeat  themselves. 
Not  is  this  all :  as  the  legislative  department  alone  has  access 
to  the  pockets  of  the  people,  and  has  in  some  constitutions  full 
discretion,  and  in  all  a  prevailing  influence  over  the  pecuniary 
rewards  of  those  who  fill  the  other  departments ;  a  dependence 
is  thus  created  in  the  latter,  which  gives  still  greater  facility  to 
encroachments  of  the  former. 

I  have  appealed  to  our  own  experience  for  the  truth  of  what 
I.  advance  on  this  subject.  Were  it  necessary  to  verify  this 
experience  by  particular  proofs,  they  might  be  multiplied  with- 
out end.  I  might  collect  vouchers  in  abundance  from  the 
records  and  archives  of  every  state  in  the  union.  But  as  a 
more  concise,  and  at  the  same  time  equally  satisfact<»ry  evi- 


THE    FEDEllALIST.  386 

dence  I  will  refer  to  the  example  of  two  states,  attested  by  two 
unexceptionable  authorities. 

The  first  example  is  that  of  Virginia,  a  state  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  has  expressly  declared  in  its  constitution,  that  the 
three  great  departments  ought  not  to  be  intermixed.  The 
authority  in  support  of  it  is  Mr.  Jefi'erson,  who,  besides  his 
other  advantages  for  remarking  the  operation  of  the  govern- 
ment, was  himself  the  chief  magistrate  of  it.  In  order  to  con- 
vey fully  the  ideas  with  which  his  experience  had  impressed 
him  on  this  subject,  it  will  be  necessary  to  quote  a  passage  of 
some  length  from  his  very  interesting  "  Notes  on  the  state  of 
Virginia,"  p.  195.  "All  the  powers  of  government,  legislative, 
executive,  and  judiciary,  result  to  the  legislative  body.  The 
concentrating  these  in  the  same  hands,  is  precisely  the  definition 
of  despotic  government.  It  will  be  no  alleviation  that  these 
powers  will  be  exercised  by  a  plurality  of  hands,  and  not  by  a 
single  one.  One  hundred  and  seventy-three  despots  would 
surely  be  as  oppressive  as  one.  Let  those  who  doubt  it,  turn 
their  eyes  on  the  republic  of  Venice.  As  little  will  it  avail  us, 
that  they  are  chosen  by  ourselves.  An  elective  despotism  was  not 
the  government  we  fought  for ;  but  one  which  should  not  only 
be  founded  on  free  principles,  but  in  which  the  powers  of 
government  should  be  so  divided  and  balanced  among  several 
bodies  of  magistracy,  as  that  no  one  could  transcend  their  legal 
limits,  without  being  effectually  checked  and  restrained  by  the 
others.  For  this  reason,  that  convention  which  passed  the 
ordinance  of  government,  laid  its  foundation  on  this  basis,  that 
the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary  departments  should  be 
separate  and  distinct,  so  that  no  person  should  exercise  the 
powers  of  more  than  one  of  them  at  the  same  time.  But  no 
harrier  was  provided  between  these  several  powers.  The  judiciary 
and  executive  members  were  left  dependent  on  the  legislative 
for  their  subsistence  in  office,  and  some  of  them  for  their  con- 
tinuance in  it.  If,  therefore,  the  legislature  assumes  executive 
and  judiciary  powers,  no  opposition  is  likely  to  be  made ;  nor, 
f  made,  can  be  effectual;  because  in  that  case,  they  may  put 


386  THE    FEDERALIST. 

their  proceedings  into  the  form  of  an  act  of  assembly,  which 
wili  render  them  obligatory  on  the  other  branches.  They  have 
accordingly,  in  many  instances  decided  rights,  which  should  have 
been  left  to  judiciary  controversy  ;  and  tJie  direction  of  the  executive, 
during  the  whole  time  of  their  session,  is  becoming  habitual  and 
familiar." 

The  other  state,  which  I  shall  take  for  an  example,  is  Penn- 
sylvania; and  the  other  anthority  the  council  of  censors  which 
assembled  in  the  years  1783  and  1784.  A  part  of  the  duty  of 
this  body,  as  marked  out  by  the  constitution,  was  "to  inquire, 
whether  the  constitution  had  been  preserved  inviolate  in  everj' 
part;  and  whether  the  legislative  and  executive  branches  of 
government  had  performed  their  duty  as  guardians  of  the 
people,  or  assumed  to  themselves,  or  exercised  other  or  greater 
powers  than  they  are  entitled  to  by  the  constitution."  In  the 
execution  of  this  trust,  the  council  were  necessarily  led  to  a 
comparison  of  both  the  legislative  and  executive  proceedings, 
with  the  constitutional  powers  of  these  departments ;  and  from 
the  facts  enumerated,  and  to  the  truth  of  most  of  which  both 
sides  in  the  council  subscribed,  it  appears,  that  the  constitution 
had  been  flagrantly  violated  by  the  legislature  in  a  variety  of 
important  instances. 

A  great  number  of  laws  had  been  passed,  violating,  without 
any  apparent  necessity,  the  rule  requiring  that  all  bills  of  a 
public  nature  shall  be  previously  printed  for  the  consideration 
of  the  people ;  although  this  is  one  of  the  precautions  chiefly 
relied  on  by  the  constitution  against  improper  acts  of  the  legis- 
lature. 

The  constitutional  trial  by  jury  had  been  violated ;  and 
powers  assumed,  which  had  not  been  delegated  by  the  con- 
stitution. 

Executive  powers  had  been  usurped. 

The  salaries  of  the  judges,  which  the  constitution  expressly 
requires  to  be  fixed,  had  been  occasionally  varied;  and  cases 
belonging  to  the  judiciary  department  frequently  drawr  within 
legislative  cognizance  and  determination. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  387 

Those  who  wish  to  see  the  several  particulars  falling  undei 
each  of  these  heads,  may  consult  the  journals  of  the  council, 
which  are  in  print.  Some  of  them,  it  will  be  found,  may  be 
imputable  to  peculiar  circumstances  connected  with  the  war : 
but  the  greater  part  of  them  may  be  considered  as  the  spon- 
taneous shoots  of  an  ill-constituted  government. 

It  appears  also,  that  the  executive  department  had  not  been 
innocent  of  frequent  breaches  of  the  constitution.  There  are 
three  observations,  however,  which  ought  to  be  made  on  this 
head :  First,  A  great  proportion  of  the  instances  were  either 
immediately  produced  by  the  necessities  of  the  war,  or  recom- 
mended by  congress,  or  the  commander  in  chief;  Second,  Ir 
most  of  the  other  instances,  they  conformed  either  to  the 
declared  or  the  known  sentiments  of  the  legislative  depart- 
ment :  Third,  The  executive  department  of  Pennsylvania  is  dis- 
tinguished from  that  of  the  other  states,  by  the  number  of 
members  composing  it.  In  this  respect,  it  has  as  much  affinity 
to  a  legislative  assembly,  as  to  an  executive  council.  And 
being  at  once  exempt  from  the  restraint  of  an  individual  re- 
sponsibility for  the  acts  of  the  body,  and  deriving  confidence 
from  mutual  example  and  joint  influence;  unauthorized  mea- 
sures would  of  course  be  more  freely  hazarded,  than  where  the 
executive  department  is  administered  by  a  single  hand,  or  by  a 
few  hands. 

The  conclusion  which  I  am  warranted  in  drawing  from  these 
observations  is,  that  a  mere  demarkation  on  parchment  of  the 
constitutional  limits  of  the  several  departments,  is  not  a  suffi- 
cient guard  against  those  encroachments  which  lead  to  a  tyran- 
nical concentration  of  all  the  powers  of  government  in  the 
same  hands. 

Publics. 


388  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST 


NUMBER  XLIX. 


FEBRUARY  5,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  WITH  THE  SAME  VIEW. 

The  author  of  the  "  Notes  on  the  state  of  Yirginia,"  quoted 
in  the  last  paper,  has  subjoined  to  that  valuable  work,  the 
draught  of  a  constitution,  which  had  been  prepared  in  order  to 
be  laid  before  a  convention  expected  to  be  called  in  1783,  by 
the  legislature,  for  the  establishment  of  a  constitution  for  that 
eommon wealth.  The  plan,  like  every  thing  from  the  same  pen, 
marks  a  turn  of  thinking  original,  comprehensive,  and  accu- 
rate; and  is  the  more  worthy  of  attention,  as  it  equally  dis- 
plays a  fervent  attachment  to  republican  government,  and  an 
enlightened  view  of  the  dangerous  propensities  against  which 
it  ought  to  be  guarded.  One  of  the  precautions  which  he  pro- 
poses, and  on  which  he  appears  ultimately  to  rely  as  a  palla- 
dium to  the  weaker  departments  of  power,  against  the  invasions 
of  the  stronger,  is  perhaps  altogether  his  own,  and  as  it  imme- 
diately relates  to  the  subject  of  our  present  inquiry,  ought  not 
to  be  overlooked. 

His  proposition  is,  "  that  whenever  any  two  of  the  three 
branches  of  government  shall  concur  in  opinion,  each  by  the 
voices  of  two  thirds  of  their  whole  number,  that  a  convention, 
is  necessary  for  altering  the  constitution,  or  correcting  breaches 
of  it,  a  convention  shall  be  called  for  the  purpose." 


TUB   FEDERALIST.  589 

As  the  people  are  the  only  legitimate  fountain  of  power,  and 
it  is  from  them  that  the  constitutional  charter,  under  which 
the  several  branches  of  government  hold  their  power,  is  de- 
rived ;  it  seems  strictly  consonant  to  the  republican  theory,  to 
recur  to  the  same  original  authority,  not  only  whenever  it  may 
be  necessary  to  enlarge,  diminish,  or  new-model  the  powers  of 
government;  but  also,  whenever  any  one  of  the  departments 
may  commit  encroachments  on  the  chartered  authorities  of  the 
others.  The  several  departments  being  perfectly  co-ordinate 
by  the  terms  of  their  common  commission,  neither  of  them,  it 
is  evident,  can  pretend  to  an  exclusive  or  superior  right  of 
settling  the  boundaries  between  their  respective  powers ;  and 
how  are  the  encroachments  of  the  stronger  to  be  prevented,  or 
the  wrongs  of  the  weaker  to  be  redressed,  without  an  appeal 
to  the  people  themselves;  who,  as  the  grantors  of  the  com- 
mission, can  alone  declare  its  true  meaning,  and  enforce  its 
observance  ? 

There  is  certainly  great  force  in  this  reasoning,  and  it  must 
be  allowed  to  prove,  that  a  constitutional  road  to  the  decision 
of  the  people,  ought  to  be  marked  out,  and  kept  open,  for  cer- 
tain great  and  extraordinary  occasions.  But  there  appear  to 
be  insuperable  objections  against  the  proposed  recurrence  to 
the  people,  as  a  provision  in  all  cases  for  keeping  the  several 
departments  of  power  within  their  constitutional  limits. 

In  the  first  place,  the  provision  does  not  reach  the  case  ol  a 
combination  of  two  of  the  departments,  against  a  third.  If 
the  legislative  authority,  which  possesses  so  many  means  of 
operating  on  the  motives  of  the  other  departments,  should  be 
able  to  gain  to  its  interest  either  of  the  others,  or  even  one 
third  of  its  members,  the  remaining  department  could  derive 
no  advantage  from  this  remedial  provision.  I  do  not  dwell, 
however,  on  this  objection,  because  it  may  be  thought  to  lie 
rather  against  the  modification  of  the  principle,  than  against 
the  principle  itself. 

In  the  next  place,  it  may  be  considered  as  an  objection  inhe- 
fflnt  in  the  principle,  that,  as  every  appeal  to  the  people  would 


890  THE    FEDERALIST. 

carry  an  implication  of  some  defect  in  the  government,  frequent 
appeals  would,  in  a  great  measure,  deprive  the  government  of 
that  veneration  which  time  bestows  on  every  thing,  and  with- 
out which  perhaps  the  wisest  and  freest  governments  would 
not  possess  the  requisite  stability.  If  it  be  true  that  all  gov- 
ernments rest  on  opinion,  it  is  no  less  true,  that  the  strength 
of  opinion  in  each  individual,  and  its  practical  influence  on  his 
conduct,  depend  much  on  the  number  which  he  supposes  to 
have  entertained  the  same  opinion.  The  reason  of  man,  like 
man  himself,  is  timid  and  cautious,  when  left  alone;  and  ac- 
quires firmness  and  confidence,  in  proportion  to  the  number 
with  which  it  is  associated.  When  the  examples,  which  fortify 
opinion,  are  ancient,  as  well  as  numerous,  they  are  known  to 
have  a  double  effect.  In  a  nation  of  philosophers,  this  con. 
sideration  ought  to  be  disregarded.  A  reverence  for  the  laws, 
would  be  sufficiently  inculcated  by  the  voice  of  an  enlightened 
reason.  But  a  nation  of  philosophers,  is  as  little  to  be  expect- 
ed, as  the  philosophical  race  of  kings  wished  for  by  Plato. 
And  in  every  other  nation,  the  most  rational  government  will 
not  find  it  a  superfluous  advantage  to  have  the  prejudices  of  the 
community  on  its  side. 

The  danger  of  disturbing  the  public  tranquillity,  by  interest- 
ing  too  strongly  the  public  passions,  is  a  still  more  serious 
objection  against  a  frequent  reference  of  constitutional  ques- 
tions, to  the  decision  of  the  whole  society.  Notwithstanding 
the  success  which  has  attended  the  revisions  of  our  established 
forms  of  government,  and  which  does  so  much  honour  to  the 
virtue  and  intelligence  of  the  people  of  America,  it  must  be 
confessed,  that  the  experiments  are  of  too  ticklish  a  nature  to 
be  unnecessarily  multiplied.  We  are  to  recollect,  that  all  the 
existing  constitutions  were  formed  in  the  midst  of  a  danger 
which  repressed  the  passions  most  unfriendly  to  order  and  c(m- 
cord ;  of  an  enthusiastic  confidence  of  the  people  in  their  patri- 
otic leaders,  which  stifled  the  ordinary  diversity  of  opinions  on 
great  national  questions ;  of  an  universal  ardour  for  new  and 
opposite  forms,  produced  by  an  universal  resentment  and  irdig 


THE    FEDERALIST.  391 

nation  against  the  ancient  government ;  and  whilst  no  spirit  of 
party,  connected  with  the  changes  to  be  made,  or  the  abuses  to 
be  reformed,  could  mingle  its  leaven  in  the  operation.  Thw 
future  situations  in  which  we  must  expect  to  be  usually  placed 
do  not  present  any  equivalent  security  against  the  danger 
which  is  apprehended. 

But  the  greatest  objection  of  all  is,  that  the  decisions  which 
would  probably  result  from  such  apjieals,  would  not  answer  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  constitutional  equilibrium  of  the 
government.  We  have  seen  that  the  tendency  of  republican 
governments  is,  to  an  aggrandizement  of  the  legislative,  at  the 
expense  of  the  other  departments.  The  appeals  to  the  people, 
therefore,  would  usually  be  made  by  the  executive  and  judiciary 
departments.  But  whether  made  by  one  side  or  the  other, 
would  each  side  enjoy  equal  advantages  on  the  trial  ?  Let  us 
view  their  different  situations.  The  members  of  the  executive 
and  judiciary  departments,  are  few  in  number,  and  can  be  per- 
sonally known  to  a  small  part  only  of  the  people.  The  latter, 
by  the  mode  of  their  appointment,  as  well  as  by  the  nature  and 
|)ermanency  of  it,  are  too  far  removed  from  the  people  to  share 
much  in  their  prepossessions.  The  former  are  generally  the 
objects  of  jealousy;  and  their  administration  is  always  liable 
to  be  discoloured  and  rendered  unpopular.  The  members  of 
the  legislative  department,  on  the  other  hand,  are  numeroub. 
They  are  distributed  and  dwell  among  the  people  at  large 
Their  connexions  of  blood,  of  friendship,  and  of  acquaintance, 
embrace  a  great  proportion  of  the  most  influential  part  of  the 
society.  The  nature  of  their  public  trust  implies  a  personal 
weight  with  the  people,  and  that  they  are  more  immediately 
the  confidential  guardians  of  their  rights  and  liberties.  With 
these  advantages,  it  can  hardly  be  supposed,  that  the  adverse 
party  would  have  an  equal  chance  for  a  favourable  issue. 

But  the  legislative  party  would  not  only  be  able  to  plead 
their  cause  most  successfully  with  the  people :  They  would 
probably  be  constituted  themselves  the  judges.  The  same  in- 
fluence which  had  gained  them  an  election  into  the  legislature, 
would  gain  them  a  seat  in  the  convention.     If  this  should  not 


392  THE   FEDERALIST. 

be  the  case  with  all,  it  would  probably  be  the  case  with  many, 
and  pretty  certainly  with  those  leading  characters,  on  whom 
everything  depends  in  such  bodies.  The  convention,  in  short, 
would  be  composed  chiefly  of  men  who  had  been,  who  actually 
were,  or  who  expected  to  be,  members  of  the  department  whose 
conduct  was  arraigned.  They  would  consequently  be  parties 
to  the  very  question  to  be  decided  by  them. 

It  might,  however,  sometimes  happen,  that  appeals  would  be 
made  under  circumstances  less  adverse  to  the  executive  and 
judiciary  departments.  The  usurpations  of  the  legislature 
might  be  so  flagrant  and  so  sudden,  as  to  admit  of  no  specious 
colouring.  A  strong  party  among  themselves  might  take  side 
with  the  other  branches.  The  executive  power  might  be  in 
the  hands  of  a  peculiar  favourite  of  the  people.  In  such  a 
posture  of  things,  the  public  decision  might  be  less  swayed  by 
prepossessions  in  favour  of  the  legislative  party.  But  still  it 
could  never  be  expected  to  turn  on  the  true  merits  of  the 
question.  It  would  inevitably  be  connected  with  the  spirit,  of 
parties  pre-existing,  or  springing  out  of  the  question  itself,  ll 
would  be  connected  with  persons  of  distinguished  character, 
and  extensive  influence  in  the  community.  It  would  be  pro- 
nounced by  the  very  men  who  had  been  agents  in,  or  opponents 
of  the  measures,  to  which  the  decision  would  relate.  The 
passions,  therefore,  not  the  reason,  of  the  public,  would  sit  in 
judgment.  But  it  is  the  reason  of  the  public  alone,  that  ought 
to  control  and  regulate  the  government.  The  passions  ought 
to  be  controled  and  regulated  by  the  government. 

We  found  in  the  last  paper,  that  mere  declarations  in  the 
written  constitution,  are  not  sufficient  to  restrain  the  several 
departments  within  their  legal  limits.  It  appears  in  this,  that 
occasional  appeals  to  the  people,  would  be  neither  a  proper, 
nor  an  effectual  provision,  for  that  purpose.  How  far  the  pro- 
visions of  a  different  nature  contained  in  the  plan  above  quoted, 
might  be  adequate,  I  do  not  examine.  Some  of  them  are 
unquestionably  founded  on  sound  political  principles,  and  all  of 
them  are  framed  with  singular  ingenuity  and  precision. 

PUBLiUS 


THE   FEDERALIST.  898 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   L. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY  5,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME    SUBJECT   CONTINUED,  WITH   THE    SAME   VIEW. 

It  may  be  contended,  perhaps,  that  instead  of  occasional 
aj)peal8  to  the  people,  which  are  liable  to  the  objections  urged 
against  them,  periodical  appeals  are  the  proper  and  adequate 
means  of  preventing  and  correcting  infractions  of  the  constitution. 

It  will  be  attended  to,  that  in  the  examination  of  these  ex- 
pedients, I  confine  myself  to  their  aptitude  for  enforcing  the 
constitution,  by  keeping  the  several  departments  of  power 
within  their  due  bounds ;  without  particularly  considering  them, 
as  provisions  for  altering  the  constitution  itself.  In  the  first 
view,  appeals  to  the  people  at  fixed  periods,  appear  to  be  nearly 
as  ineligible,  as  appeals  on  particular  occasions  as  they  emerge. 
If  the  periods  be  separated  by  short  intervals,  the  measures  to 
be  reviewed  and  rectified,  will  have  been  of  recent  date,  and 
will  be  connected  with  all  the  circumstances  which  tend  to 
vitiate  and  pervert  the  result  of  occasional  revisions.  If  the 
periods  be  distant  from  each  other,  the  same  remark  will  be 
applicable  to  all  recent  measures;  and  in  proportion  as  the 
remoteness  of  the  others  may  favour  a  dispassionate  review  of 
them,  this  advantage  is  inseparable  from  inconveniences  which 
seem  to  counterbalance  it.  In  the  first  place,  a  distant  prospect 
^f  public  censure  would  be  a  very  feeble  restraint  on  power 


■394  THE    FEDERALIST. 

from  those  excesses,  to  which  it  might  be  urged  by  the  force  of 
present  motives.  Is  it  to  be  imagined,  that  a  legislative  assem- 
bly, consisting  of  a  hundred  or  two  hundred  members,  eagerly 
bent  on  some  favourite  object,  and  breaking  through  the  re- 
straints of  the  constitution  in  pursuit  of  it,  would  be  arrested 
in  their  career,  by  considerations  drawn  from  a  censorial  re- 
vision of  their  conduct  at  the  future  distance  of  ten,  fifteen,  or 
twenty  years  ?  In  the  next  place,  the  abuses  would  often  have 
completed  their  mischievous  effects,  before  the  remedial  pro- 
vision would  be  applied.  And  in  the  last  place,  where  this 
might  not  be  the  case,  they  would  be  of  long  standing,  would 
have  taken  deep  root,  and  would  not  easily  be  extirpated. 

The  scheme  of  revising  the  constitution,  in  order  to  correct 
recent  breaches  of  it,  as  well  as  for  other  purposes,  has  been 
actually  tried  in  one  of  the  states.  One  of  the  objects  of  the 
council  of  censors,  which  met  in  Pennsylvania,  in  1783  and 
1784,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  to  inquire  "  whether  the  constitution 
had  been  violated ;  and  whether  the  legislative  and  executive 
departments  had  encroached  on  each  other."  This  important 
and  novel  experiment  in  politics,  merits,  in  several  points  of 
view,  very  particular  attention.  In  some  of  them  it  may,  per- 
haps, as  a  single  experiment,  made  under  circumstances  some- 
what peculiar,  be  thought  to  be  not  absolutely  conclusive.  But, 
as  applied  to  the  case  under  consideration,  it  involves  some 
facts  which  I  venture  to  remark,  as  a  complete  and  satisfactory 
illustration  of  the  reasoning  which  I  have  employed. 

First.  It  appears,  from  the  names  of  the  gentlemen  who  com- 
posed the  council,  that  some,  at  least,  of  its  most  active  and 
leading  members,  had  also  been  active  and  leading  characters 
in  the  parties  which  pre-existed  in  the  state. 

Second.  It  appears  that  the  same  active  and  leading  members 
of  the  council,  had  been  active  and  influential  members  of  the 
legislative  and  executive  branches,  within  the  period  to  be 
reviewed ;  and  even  patrons  or  opponents  of  the  very  measures 
to  be  thus  brought  to  the  test  of  the  constitution.  Two  of  the 
members  had  been  vice-presidents   of  the   state,  and  several 


THE    FEDERALIST.  395 

others  members  of  the  executive  council  within  the  seven  pre- 
ceding years.  One  of  them  had  been  speaker,  and  a  number 
of  others,  distinguished  members  of  the  legislative  assembly, 
within  the  same  period. 

Third.  Every  page  of  their  proceedings  witnesses  the  effect 
of  all  these  circumstances  on  the  temper  of  their  deliberations. 
Throughout  the  continuance  of  the  council,  it  was  split  into 
two  fixed  and  violent  jDarties.  The  fact  is  acknowledged  and 
lamented  by  themselves.  Had  this  not  been  the  case,  the  face 
of  their  proceedings  exhibit  a  proof  equally  satisfactory.  In 
all  questions,  however  unimportant  in  themselves,  or  uncon- 
nected with  each  other,  the  same  names  stand  invariably  con- 
trasted on  the  opposite  columns.  Every  unbiassed  observer, 
may  infer  without  danger  of  mistake,  and  at  the  same  time, 
without  meaning  to  reflect  on  either  party,  or  any  individuals 
of  either  party,  that  unfortunately  passion,  not  reason,  must 
have  presided  over  their  decisions.  When  men  exercise  their 
reason  coolly  and  freely,  on  a  variety  of  distinct  questions,  they 
inevitably  fall  into  different  opinions  on  some  of  them.  When 
they  are  governed  by  a  common  passion,  their  opinions,  if  they 
are  so  to  be  called,  will  be  the  same. 

Fourth.  It  is  at  least  problematical,  whether  the  decisions  ol 
this  body  do  not,  in  several  instances,  misconstrue  the  limits 
])rescribed  for  the  legislative  and  executive  departments,  insteaa 
of  reducing  and  limiting  them  within  their  constitutional  places. 

Fifth.  I  have  never  understood  that  the  decisions  of  the  coun- 
cil on  constitutional  questions,  whether  rightly  or  erroneously 
formed,  have  had  any  effect  in  varying  the  practice  founded  on 
legislative  constructions.  It  even  appears,  if  I  mistake  not,  thai 
in  one  instance,  the  cotemporary  legislature  denied  the  con- 
structions of  the  council,  and  actually  prevailed  in  the  contest. 

This  censorial  body,  therefore,  proves  at  the  same  time,  by  its 
researches,  the  existence  of  the  disease ;  and  by  its  example,  the 
inefficacy  of  the  remedy. 

This  conclusion  cannot  be  invalidated  by  alleging,  that  the 
state  in  which  the  experiment  was  made,  was  at  that  crisis,  and 

.H6 


396  THE   FEDERALIST. 

had  been  for  a  long  time  before,  violently  heated  and  distracted 
by  the  rage  of  party.  Is  it  to  be  presumed,  that  at  any  future 
septennial  epoch,  the  same  state  will  be  free  from  parties  ?  Is 
it  to  be  presumed  that  any  other  state,  at  the  same,  or  any 
other  given  period,  will  be  exempt  from  them  ?  Such  an  event 
ought  to  be  neither  presumed  nor  desired;  because  an  extinction 
of  parties  necessarily  implies  either  an  universal  alarm  for  the 
public  safety,  or  an  absolute  extinction  of  liberty. 

Wore  the  precaution  taken  of  excluding  from  the  assemblies 
elected  by  the  people  to  revise  the  preceding  administration  of 
the  government,  all  persons  who  should  have  been  concerned  in 
the  government  within  the  given  period,  the  difficulties  would 
not  be  obviated.  The  important  task  would  probably  devolve 
on  men,  who  with  inferior  capacities,  would  in  other  respects 
be  little  better  qualified.  Although  they  might  not  have  been 
personally  concerned  in  the  administration,  and  therefore  not 
immediately  agents  in  the  measures  to  be  examined;  they  would 
probably  have  been  involved  in  the  parties  connected  with  these 
measures,  and  have  been  elected  under  their  auspices. 

PUBLIUS 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


,•^97 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LI. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY   8,    1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  WITH  THE   SAME  VIEW,  AND  CON- 
CLUDED. 

To  what  expedient  then  shall  we  finally  resort,  for  maintain-  , 
ing  in  practice  the  necessary  partition  of  power  among  the 
several  departments,  as  laid  down  in  the  constitution  ?  The 
only  answer  that  can  be  given  is,  that  as  all  these  exterior  pro- 
visions are  found  to  be  inadequate,  the  defect  must  be  supplied, 
by  so  contriving  the  interior  structure  of  the  government,  as 
that  its  several  constituent  parts  may,  by  their  mutual  relations, 
be  the  means  of  keeping  each  other  in  their  proper  places. 
Without  presuming  to  undertake  a  full  developement  of  this 
important  idea,  I  will  hazard  a  few  general  observations,  which 
may  perhaps  place  it  in  a  clearer  light,  and  enable  us  to  form  a 
more  correct  judgment  of  the  principles  and  structure  of  the 
government  planned  by  the  convention. 

In  order  to  lay  a  due  foundation  for  that  separate  and  dis 
tinct  exercise  of  the  different  powers  of  government,  which,  to 
a  certain  extent,  is  admitted  on  all  hands  to  be  essential  to  the 
preservation  of  liberty,  it  is  evident  that  each  department 
should  have  a  will  of  its  own ;  and  consequently  should  be  so 
constituted,  that  the  members  of  each  should  have  as  little 
agency  as  possible  in  the  appointment  of  the  members  of  the 


398  THE    FEDERALIST. 

Others.  Were  this  principle  rigorously  adhered  to,  it  would 
require  that  all  the  appointments  for  the  supreme  executive, 
legislative,  and  judiciary  magistracies,  should  be  drawn  from 
the  same  fountain  of  authority,  the  people,  through  channels, 
having  no  communication  whatever  with  one  another.  Per- 
haps such  a  plan  of  constructing  the  several  departments, 
would  be  less  difficult  in  practice,  than  it  may  in  contemplation 
appear.  Some  difficulties,  however,  and  some  additional  ex 
pense,  would  attend  the  execution  of  it.  Some  deviations 
therefore,  from  the  principle  must  be  admitted.  In  the  con- 
stitution  of  the  judiciary  department  in  particular,  it  might  be 
inexpedient  to  insist  rigorously  on  the  principle ;  first,  because 
peculiar  qualifications  being  essential  in  the  members,  the 
primary  consideration  ought  to  be  to  select  that  mode  of 
choice,  which  best  secures  these  qualifications;  secondly,  be- 
cause the  permanent  tenure  by  which  the  appointments  are 
held  in  that  department,  must  soon  destroy  all  sense  of  depend- 
ence on  the  authority  conferring  them. 

It  is  equally  evident,  that  the  members  of  each  department 
should  be  as  little  dependent  as  possible  on  those  of  the  others, 
for  the  emoluments  annexed  to  their  offices.  "Were  the  execu 
tivc  magistrate,  or  the  judges,  not  independent  of  the  legisla 
ture  in  this  particular,  their  independence  in  every  other,  would 
be  merely  nominal. 

But  the  great  security  against  a  gradual  concentration  of  the 
several  powers  in  the  same  department,  consists  in  giving  to 
those  who  administer  each  department,  the  necessary  constitu- 
tional means,  and  personal  motives,  to  resist  encroachments  of 
the  others.  The  provision  for  defence  must  in  this,  as  in  all 
other  cases,  be  made  commensurate  to  the  danger  of  attack 
Ambition  must  be  made  to  counteract  ambition.  Tlie  interest 
of  the  man,  must  be  connected  with  the  constitutional  rights 
of  the  place.  It  may  be  a  reflection  on  human  nature,  that 
such  devices  should  be  necessary  to  control  the  abuses  of  gov- 
ernment. But  what  is  government  itself,  but  the  greatest  of 
all  reflections  on  human  nature  ?     If  men  were  angels,  no  gov- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  399 

criimeut  would  be  necessary.  If  ungels  were  to  govern  men, 
neither  external  nor  internal  controls  on  government  would  be 
necessary.  In  framing  a  government,  which  is  to  be  adminis 
tered  by  men  over  men,  the  great  diflBculty  lies  in  this :  You 
must  first  enable  the  government  to  control  the  governed ;  and 
in  the  next  place,  oblige  it  to  control  itself.  A  dependence  on 
the  people  is,  no  doubt,  the  primary  control  on  the  govern- 
ment ;  but  experience  has  taught  mankind  the  necessity  of 
auxiliary  precautions. 

This  policy  of  supplying  by  opposite  and  rival  interests,  the 
defect  of  better  motives,  might  be  traced  through  the  whole 
system  of  human  affairs,  private  as  well  as  public.  We  see  it 
particularly  displayed  in  all  the  subordinate  distributions  of 
power;  where  the  constant  aim  is,  to  divide  and  arrange  the 
several  offices  in  such  a  manner,  as  that  each  may  be  a  check 
on  the  other;  that  the  private  interest  of  every  individual,  may 
be  a  centinel  over  the  public  rights.  These  inventions  of  pru- 
dence cannot  be  less  requisite  in  the  distribution  of  the  supreme 
powers  of  the  state. 

But  it  is  not  possible  to  give  to  each  department  an  equal 
power  of  self-defence.  In  republican  government,  the  legisla- 
tive authority  necessarily  predominates.  The  remedy  for  thia 
inconveniency  is,  to  divide  the  legislature  into  different  branch- 
es; and  to  render  them  by  different  modes  of  election,  and 
different  principles  of  action,  as  little  connected  with  each 
ether,  as  the  nature  of  their  common  functions,  and  their  com- 
mon dependence  on  the  society,  will  admit.  It  may  even  h& 
necessary  to  guard  against  dangerous  encroachments,  by  still 
further  precautions.  As  the  weight  of  the  legislative  authority 
requires  that  it  should  be  thus  divided,  the  weakness  of  the 
executive  may  require,  on  the  other  hand,  that  it  should  be  for- 
tified. An  absolute  negative  on  the  legislature,  appears,  at  first 
view,  to  be  the  natural  defence  with  which  the  executive  magis- 
trate should  be  armed.  But  perhaps  it  would  be  neither  alto- 
gether safe,  nor  alone  sufficient.  On  ordinary  occasions,  it 
might  not  bo  exerted  with  the  requisite  firmness;  and  on  ex- 


400  THE    FEDERALIST. 

traoi dina '•y  occasions,  it  might  be  perfidiously  abused.  May 
not  this  defect  of  an  absolute  negative  be  supplied  by  some 
qualified  connexion  between  this  weaker  department,  and  the 
weaker  branch  of  the  stronger  department,  by  which  the  latter 
may  be  led  to  support  the  constitutional  rights  of  the  former, 
without  being  too  much  detached  from  the  rights  of  its  own 
department  ? 

If  the  principles  on  which  these  observations  are  founded  bo 
just,  as  I  persuade  myself  they  are,  and  they  be  applied  as  a 
criterion  to  the  several  state  constitutions,  and  to  the  federal 
constitution,  it  will  be  found,  that  if  the  latter  does  not  per- 
fectly correspond  with  them,  the  former  are  infinitely  less  able 
to  bear  such  a  test. 

There  are  moreover  two  considerations  particularly  applica- 
ble to  the  federal  system  of  America,  which  place  it  in  a  very 
interesting  point  of  view. 

First.  In  a  single  republic,  all  the  power  surrendered  by  the 
people,  is  submitted  to  the  administration  of  a  single  govern- 
ment ;  and  the  usurpations  are  guarded  against,  by  a  division 
of  the  government  into  distinct  and  separate  departments.  In 
the  compound  republic  of  America,  the  power  surrendered  by 
the  people,  is  first  divided  between  two  distinct  governments, 
and  then  the  portion  allotted  to  each  subdivided  among  distinct 
and  separate  departments.  Hence  a  double  security  arises  to 
the  rights  of  the  people.  The  different  governments,  will  con- 
trol each  other;  at  the  same  time  that  each  will  be  controled 
by  itself. 

Second.  It  is  of  great  importance  in  a  republic,  not  only  to 
guard  the  society  against  the  oppression  of  its  rulers ;  but  to 
guard  one  part  of  the  society  against  the  injustice  of  the  other 
part.  Different  interests  necessarily  exist  in  different  classes 
of  citizens.  If  a  majority  be  united  by  a  common  interest,  the 
rights  of  the  minority  will  be  insecure.  There  are  but  two 
methods  of  providing  against  this  evil :  The  one  by  creating  a 
will  in  the  community  independent  of  the  majority,  that  is,  of 
the  society  itself;  the  other  by  comprehending  in  the  «of  ety 


THE    FEDERALIST.  401 

SO  many  separate  descriptions  of  citizens,  as  will  render  an  un- 
just combination  of  a  majority  of  the  whole  very  improbable, 
if  not  impracticable.  The  first  method  prevails  in  all  govern- 
ments  possessing  an  hereditary  or  self-appointed  authority. 
This,  at  best,  is  but  a  precarious  security;  because  a  power 
independent  of  the  society,  may  as  well  espouse  tne  unjust 
views  of  the  major,  as  the  rightful  interests  of  the  minor  party, 
and  may  possibly  be  turned  against  both  parties.  The  second 
method,  will  be  exemplified  in  the  federal  republic  of  the  United 
States.  Whilst  all  authority  in  it  will  be  derived  from,  and 
dependent  on  the  society,  the  society  itself  will  be  broken  into 
so  many  parts,  interests,  and  classes  of  citizens,  that  the  rights 
of  individuals,  or  of  the  minority,  will  be  in  little  danger  from 
interested  combinations  of  the  majority.  In  a  free  government, 
the  security  for  civil  rights  must  be  the  same  as  that  for  reli- 
gious rights.  It  consists  in  the  one  case  in  the  multiplicity  of 
interests,  and  in  the  other,  in  the  multiplicity  of  sects.  The 
degree  of  security  in  both  cases  will  depend  on  the  number  of 
interests  and  sects ;  and  this  may  be  presumed  to  depend  on  the 
extent  of  country  and  number  of  people  comprehended  under 
the  same  government.  This  view  of  the  subject,  must  particu- 
larly recommend  a  proper  federal  system,  to  all  the  sincere  and 
considerate  friends  of  republican  government :  since  it  shows, 
that  in  exact  proportion,  as  the  territory  of  the  union  may  be 
formed  into  more  circumscribed  confederacies,  or  states,  oppres- 
sive combinations  of  a  majority  will  be  facilitated,  the  best 
security  under  the  republican  form,  for  the  rights  of  every  class 
of  citizens,  will  be  diminished ;  and  consequently,  the  stability 
and  independence  of  some  member  of  the  government,  the  only 
other  security  must  be  proportionably  increased.  Justice  is 
the  end  of  government.  It  is  the  end  of  civil  society.  It  ever 
lias  been,  and  ever  will  be  pursued,  until  it  be  obtained,  or 
until  liberty  be  lost  in  the  pursuit.  In  a  society,  under  the 
forms  of  which  the  stronger  faction  can  readily  unite  and  op- 
press the  weaker,  anarchy  may  as  truly  be  said  to  reign,  as  in 
a  state  of-  nature  where  the  weaker  individual  is  not  secured 


402  THE    FEDERALIST. 

against  the  violence  of  the  stronger :  And  as  in  the  latter  state 
even  the  stronger  individuals  are  prompted  by  the  uncertainty 
of  their  condition,  to  submit  to  a  government,  which  may  pro 
tect  the  weak,  as  well  as  theijiselves :  so  in  the  former  state, 
will  the  more  powerftil  factions  be  gradually  induced  by  a  like 
motive,  to  wish  for  a  government  which  will  protect  all  parties. 
the  weaker  as  well  as  the  more  powerful.  It  can  be  little 
doubted,  that  if  the  state  of  Rhode-Island  was  separated  fi*om 
the  confederacy,  and  left  to  itself,  the  insecurity  of  rights  under 
the  popular  form  of  government  within  such  narrow  limits, 
would  be  displayed  by  such  reiterated  oppressions  of  factious 
majorities,  that  some  power  altogether  independent  of  the  peo- 
ple, would  soon  be  called  for  by  the  voice  of  the  very  factions 
whose  misrule  had  proved  the  necessity  of  it.  In  the  extended 
republic  of  the  United  States,  and  among  the  great  variety  of 
interests,  parties,  and  sects,  which  it  embraces,  a  coalition  of  a 
majority  of  the  whole  society  could  seldom  take  place  upon  any 
other  principles,  than  those  of  justice  and  the  general  good : 
Whilst  there  being  thus  less  danger  to  a  minor  from  the  will  of 
the  major  party,  there  must  be  less  pretext  also,  to  provide  for 
ihe  security  of  the  former,  by  introducing  into  the  government 
a  will  not  dependent  on  the  latter :  or,  in  other  words,  a  will 
independent  of  the  society  itself.  It  is  no  less  certain  than  it 
is  important,  notwithstanding  the  contrary  opinions  which 
have  been  entertained,  that  the  larger  the  society,  provided  it 
lie  within  a  practicable  sphere,  the  more  duly  capable  it  will 
be  of  self-government.  And  happily  for  the  republican  cause, 
the  practicable  sphere  may  be  carried  to  a  very  great  extent, 
by  a  judicious  modification  and  mixture  of  the  federal  priu- 
siple 

PUBLTUS. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  40i< 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LII. 


NEW   yORK,    FEBRUARY    8,    1788. 


HAMILTON. 


CONCERNING  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES,  WITH  A  VIEW  TO 
THK  QUALIFICATIONS  OF  THE  ELECTORS  AND  ELECTED,  AND  THE 
TIME  OF  SERVICE  OF  THE  MEMBERS. 

From  the  more  general  inquiries  pursued  in  the  four  last 
papers,  I  pass  on  to  a  more  particular  examination  of  the  seve- 
ral parts  of  the  government.  I  shall  begin  with  the  house  of 
representatives. 

The  first  view  to  be  taken  of  this  part  of  the  government, 
relates  to  the  qualifications  of  the  electors,  and  the  elected. 

Those  of  the  former,  are  to  be  the  same,  with  those  of  the 
electors  of  the  most  numerous  branch  of  the  state  legislatures. 
The  definition  of  the  right  of  suffrage,  is  very  justly  regarded 
as  a  fundamental  article  of  republican  government.  It  was  in- 
cumbent on  the  convention,  therefore,  to  define  and  establish 
this  right  in  the  constitution.  To  have  left  it  open  for  the  oc- 
casional regulation  of  the  congress,  would  have  been  improper 
for  the  reason  just  mentioned.  To  have  submitted  it  to  the 
legislative  discretion  of  the  states,  would  have  been  improper 
for  the  same  reason ;  and  for  the  additional  reason,  that  it 
would  have  rendered  too  dependent  on  the  state  governments, 
that  branch  of  the  federal  government,  which  ought  to  be  de- 
pendent on  the  peoplo  alone.     To  have  reduced  the  different 


404  THE    FEDERALIST. 

qualificatinnfc  in  the  different  states  to  one  uniform  rule,  would 
probably  have  been  as  dissatisfactory  to  some  of  the  states,  as 
it  would  have  been  difficult  to  the  convention.  The  provision 
made  by  the  convention  appears,  therefore,  to  be  the  best  that 
lay  within  their  option.  It  must  be  satisfactory  to  every  state ; 
because  it  is  conformable  to  the  standard  already  established, 
or  which  may  be  established  by  the  state  itself.  It  will  be  safe 
to  the  United  States ;  because,  being  fixed  by  the  state  consti- 
tutions, it  is  not  alterable  by  the  state  governments,  and  it  can- 
not be  feared  that  the  people  of  the  states  will  alter  this  part 
of  their  constitutions,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  abridge  the  rights 
secured  to  them  by  the  federal  constitution. 

The  qualifications  of  the  elected,  being  less  carefully  and 
properly  defined,  by  the  state  constitutions,  and  being  at  the 
same  time  more  susceptible  of  uniformity,  have  been  very  pro- 
perly considered  and  regulated  by  the  convention.  A  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States,  must  be  of  the  age  of  twenty- 
five  years ;  must  have  been  seven  years  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States ;  must,  at  the  time  of  his  election,  be  an  inhabitant  of 
the  state  he  is  to  represent,  and  during  the  time  of  his  service, 
must  be  in  no  office  under  the  United  States.  Subject  to  these 
reasonable  limitations,  the  door  of  this  part  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment is  open  to  merit  of  every  description,  whether  native 
or  adoptive,  whether  young  or  old,  and  without  regard  to 
poverty  or  wealth,  or  to  any  particular  profession  of  religious 
faith. 

The  term  for  which  the  representatives  are  to  be  elected, 
falls  under  a  second  view  which  may  be  taken  of  this  branch. 
In  order  to  decide  on  the  propriety  of  this  article,  two  ques- 
tions must  be  considered ;  first,  whether  biennial  elections  will, 
in  this  case,  be  safe;  secondly,  whether  they  be  necessary  or 
useful. 

First.  As  it  is  essential  to  liberty,  that  the  governmetit  in 
general  should  have  a  common  interest  with  the  people ;  so  it 
is  particularly  essential,  that  the  branch  of  it  under  considera- 
tion should  have  an  immediate  dependence  on,  and  an  intincato 


THE    FEDERALIST.  405 

sympathy  with,  the  people.  Frequent  elections,  are  unques- 
tionably the  only  policy,  by  which  this  dependence  and  sympa- 
thy can  be  effectually  secured.  But  what  particular  degree  of 
frequency  may  be  absolutely  necessary  for  the  purpose,  does 
not  appear  to  be  susceptible  of  any  precise  calculation — and 
must  depend  on  a  variety  of  circumstances,  with  which  it  may 
be  connected.  Let  us  consult  experience,  the  guide  that  ought 
always  to  be  followed,  whenever  it  can  be  found. 

The  scheme  of  representation,  as  a  substitute  for  a  meeting 
of  the  citizens  in  person,  being  but  imperfectly  known  to 
ancient  polity;  it  is  in  more  modern  times  only  that  we  are  to 
expect  instructive  examples.  And  even  here,  in  order  to  avoid 
a  research  too  vague  and  diffusive,  it  will  be  proper  to  confine 
ourselves  to  the  few  examples  which  are  best  known,  and  which 
bear  the  greatest  analogy  to  our  particular  case.  The  first  to 
which  this  character  ought  to  be  applied,  is  the  house  of  com- 
mons in  Great  Britain.  The  history  of  this  branch  of  the  Eng- 
lish constitution,  anterior  to  the  date  of  Magna  Charta,  is  too 
obscure  to  yield  instruction.  The  very  existence  of  it,  has  been 
made  a  question  among  political  antiquaries.  The  earliest 
records  of  subsequent  date  prove,  that  parliaments  were  to  sit 
only,  every  year ;  not  that  they  were  to  be  elected  every  year. 
And  even  these  annual  sessions,  were  left  so  much  at  the  discre- 
tion of  the  monarch,  that  under  various  pretexts,  very  long  and 
dangerous  intermissions  were  often  contrived  by  royal  ambition. 
To  remedy  this  grievance,  it  was  provided  by  a  statute  in  the 
reign  of  Charles  lid,  that  the  intermissions  should  not  be  pro- 
tracted beyond  a  period  of  three  years  On  the  accession  of 
William  Illd,  when  a  revolution  took  place  in  the  government, 
the  subject  was  still  more  seriously  resumed,  and  it  was  declared 
to  be  among  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  people,  that  parlia- 
ments ought  to  be  held  frequently.  By  another  statute  which 
passed  a  few  years  later  in  the  same  reign,  the  term  "  frequent- 
ly," which  had  alluded  to  the  triennial  period  settled  in  the 
time  of  Charles  lid,  is  reduced  to  a  precise  meaning,  it  being 
express!}"  enacted,  that  a  new  parliament  shall  be  called  within 


iOO  THE    FKDERALIST. 

three  years  after  the  determination  of  the  former.  The  last 
change,  from  three  to  seven  years,  is  well  known  to  have  been 
introduced  pretty  early  in  the  present  century,  under  an  alarm 
for  the  Hanoverian  succession.  From  these  facts  it  appears, 
that  the  greatest  frequency  of  elections  which  has  been  deemed 
necessary  in  that  kingdom,  for  binding  the  representatives  to 
their  constituents,  does  not  exceed  a  triennial  return  of  them. 
And  if  we  may  argue  from  the  degree  of  liberty  retained  even 
under  septennial  elections,  and  all  the  other  vicious  ingredients 
in  the  parliamentary  constitution,  we  cannot  doubt  that  a 
reduction  of  the  period  from  seven  to.  three  years,  with  some 
other  necessary  reforms,  would  so  far  extend  the  influence  of 
the  people  over  their  representatives  as  to  satisfy  us,  that  bien- 
nial elections  under  the  federal  system,  cannot  possibly  be  dan- 
gerous to  the  requisite  dependence  of  the  house  of  representa- 
tives on  their  constituents. 

Elections  in  Ireland,  till  of  late,  were  regulated  entirely  by 
the  discretion  of  the  crown,  and  were  seldom  repeated,  except 
on  the  accession  of  a  new  prince,  or  some  other  contingent 
event.  The  parliament  which  commenced  with  George  lid, 
was  continued  throughout  his  whole  reign,  a  period  of  about 
thirty-five  years.  The  only  dependence  of  the  representative 
on  the  people,  consisted  in  the  right  of  the  latter  to  supply 
occasional  vacancies,  by  the  election  of  new  members,  and  in 
the  chance  of  some  event  which  might  produce  a  general  new 
election.  The  ability  also  of  the  Irish  parliament  to  maintain 
the  rights  of  their  constituents,  so  far  as  the  disposition  might 
exist,  was  extremely  shackled  by  the  control  of  the  crown,  over 
the  subjects  of  their  deliberation.  Of  late,  these  shackles,  if  1 
mistake  not,  have  been  broken ;  and  octennial  jDarliaments  have 
besides  been  established.  "What  effect  may  be  produced  by 
this  partial  reform,  must  be  left  to  further  experience.  The 
example  of  Ireland,  from  this  view  of  it,  can  throw  but  little 
light  on  the  subject.  As  far  as  we  can  draw  any  conclusion 
from  it,  it  must  be,  that  if  the  people  of  that  country  have  been 
able,  under  all  these  disadvantages,  to  retain  any  liberty  what- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  407 

ever,  the  advantage  of  biennial  elections  would  secure  to  them 
every  degree  of  liberty,  which  might  depend  on  a  due  con- 
nexion, between  their  representatives  and  themselves. 

Let  us  bring  our  inquiries  nearer  home.  The  example  of 
these  states,  when  British  colonies,  claims  particular  attention ; 
at  the  same  time  that  it  is  so  well  known,  as  to  require  little  to 
be  said  on  it.  The  principle  of  representation,  in  one  branch 
of  the  legislature  at  least,  was  established  in  all  of  them.  But 
the  periods  of  election  were  different.  They  varied,  from  one 
to  seven  years.  Have  we  any  reason  to  infer,  from  the  spirit 
and  conduct  of  the  representatives  of  the  people,  prior  to  the 
revolution,  that  biennial  elections  would  have  been  dangerous 
to  the  public  liberties?  The  spirit,  which  every  where  dis- 
played itself,  at  the  commencement  of  the  struggle,  and  which 
vanquished  the  obstacles  to  independence,  is  the  best  of  proof, 
that  a  sufficient  portion  of  liberty  had  been  every  where  enjoyed, 
to  inspire  both  a  sense  of  its  worth,  and  a  zeal  for  its  proper 
enlargement.  This  remark  holds  good,  as  well  with  regard  to 
the  then  colonies,  whose  elections  were  least  frequent,  as  to 
those  whose  elections  were  most  frequent.  Virginia  was  the 
colony  which  stood  first  in  resisting  the  parliamentary  usurpa- 
tions of  Great  Britain ;  it  was  the  first  also  in  espousing,  by 
public  act,  the  resolution  of  independence.  In  "Virginia,  never- 
theless, if  I  have  not  been  misinformed,  elections  under  tho 
former  government  were  septennial.  This  particular  example 
is  brought  into  view,  not  as  a  proof  of  any  peculiar  merit,  for 
the  priority  in  those  instances  was  probably  accidental ;  and 
still  less  of  any  advantage  in  septennial  elections,  for  when  com- 
pared with  a  greater  frequency,  they  are  inadmissible;  but 
merely  as  a  proof,  and  I  conceive  it  to  be  a  very  substantial 
proof,  that  the  liberties  of  the  people  can  be  in  no  danger  from 
biennial  elections. 

The  conclusion  resulting  from  these  examples,"  will  be  not  tk 
little  strengthened,  by  recollecting  three  circumstances.  The 
first  is,  that  the  federal  legislature  will  possess  a  part  only,  of 
that  supreme  legislative  authority  which  is  vested  completely 


i08  THE   FEDERALIST. 

in  the  British  parliament;  and  which,  with  a  few  exceptions, 
was  exercised  by  the  colonial  assemblies,  and  the  Irish  legis- 
lature. It  is  a  received  and  well  founded  maxim,  that,  where 
no  other  circumstances  affect  the  case,  the  greater  the  power  is, 
the  shorter  ought  to  be  its  duration ;  and,  conversely,  the 
Bmaller  the  power,  the  more  safely  may  its  duration  be  pro- 
tracted. In  the  second  place,  it  has,  on  another  occasion,  been 
shown,  that  the  federal  legislature  will  not  only  be  restrained 
by  its  dependence  on  the  people,  as  other  legislative  bodies  are; 
but  that  it  will  be  moreover  watched  and  controled  by  the 
several  collateral  legislatures,  which  other  legislative  bodies  are 
not.  And  in  the  third  place,  no  comparison  can  be  made  be- 
tween the  means  that  will  be  possessed  by  the  more  permanent 
branches  of  the  federal  government,  for  seducing,  if  they  should 
be  disposed  to  seduce,  the  house  of  representatives  from  their 
duty  to  the  people ;  and  the  means  of  influence  over  the  popular 
branch,  possessed  by  the  other  branches  of  governments  above 
cited.  "With  less  power,  therefore,  to  abuse,  the  federal  repre- 
sentatives can  be  less  tempted  on  one  side,  and  will  be  doubly 
watched  on  the  other. 

PUBLTUS. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  409 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LIII. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY  12,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


fHE   SAME   SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  WITH  A  VIEW  OF  THE   TERM  OP 
SERVICE   OF   THE    MEMBERS. 

I  SHALL  here,  perhaps,  be  reminded  of  a  current  observation, 
"  that  where  annual  elections  end,  tyranny  begins."  If  it  be 
true,  as  has  often  been  remarked,  that  sayings  which  become 
proverbial,  are  generally  founded  in  reason,  it  is  not  less  true, 
that,  when  once  established,  they  are  often  applied  to  cases  to 
which  the  reason  of  them  does  not  extend.  I  need  not  look  for 
a  proof  beyond  the  instance  before  us.  What  is  the  reason  on 
which  this  proverbial  observation  is  founded?  No  man  will 
subject  himself  to  the  ridicule  of  pretending,  that  any  natural 
connexion  subsists  between  the  sun  or  the  seasons,  and  the 
period  within  which  human  virtue  can  bear  the  temptations  of 
power.  Happily  for  mankind,  liberty  is  not,  in  this  respect, 
confined  to  any  single  point  of  time ;  but  lies  within  extremes, 
which  afford  sufficient  latitude  for  all  the  variations  that  may 
be  required  by  the  various  situations  and  circumstances  of  civil 
society. 

The  election  of  magistrates  might  be,  if  it  were  found  expe- 
dient, as  in  some  instances  it  actually  has  been,  daily,  weekly, 
or  monthly,  as  well  as  annual ;  and  if  circumstances  may  re- 
quire a  deviation  from  the  rule  on  one  side,  why  not  also  on 


410  THE    FEDERALIST* 

the  other  side  ?  Turning  our  attention  to  the  periods  esta- 
blished among  ourselves,  for  the  election  of  the  most  numerous 
branches  of  the  state  legislatures,  we  find  them  by  no  means 
coinciding  any  more  in  this  instance,  than  in  the  elections  of 
other  civil  magistrates.  In  Connecticut  and  Rhode-Island,  the 
periods  are  half-yearly.  In  the  other  states.  South  Carolina 
excepted,  they  are  annual.  In  South-Carolina,  they  are  bien- 
nial; as  is  proposed  in  the  federal  government.  Here  is  a 
difference,  as  four  to  one,  between  the  longest  and  the  shortest 
jjeriods;  and  yet  it  would  be  not  easy  to  show,  that  Connecticut 
or  Bhode-Island  is  better  governed,  or  enjoys  a  greater  share 
of  rational  liberty,  than  South-Carolina ;  or  that  either  the  one 
or  the  other  of  these  states  are  distinguished  in  these  respects, 
and  by  these  causes,  from  those  whose  elections  are  different 
from  both. 

In  searching  for  the  grounds  of  this  doctrine,  I  can  discover 
but  one,  and  that  is  wholly  inapplicable  to  our  case.  The 
important  distinction,  so  well  understood  in  America,  between 
u  constitution  established  by  the  people,  and  unalterable  bj^  the 
government;  and  a  law  established  by  the  government,  and 
alterable  by  the  government,  seems  to  have  been  little  under- 
stood, and  less  observed  in  any  other  country.  "Wherever  the 
supreme  power  of  legislation  has  resided,  has  been  supposed  to 
reside  also,  a  full  power  to  change  the  form  of  the  government. 
Even  in  Great  Britain,  where  the  principles  of  political  and 
civil  liberty  have  been  most  discussed,  and  where  we  hear  most 
of  the  rights  of  the  constitution,  it  is  maintained,  that  the 
authority  of  the  parliament  is  transcendent  and  uncontrolable. 
as  well  with  regard  to  the  constitution,  as  the  ordinary  objects 
of  legislative  provision.  They  have  accordingly,  in  several  in- 
stances, acti  .al'y  changed,  by  legislative  acts,  some  of  the  most 
fundamental  articles  of  the  government.  They  have,  in  par- 
ticular, on  several  occasions,  changed  the  period  of  election ; 
and  on  the  last  occasion,  not  only  introduced  septennial,  in 
place  of  triennial  elections;  but,  by  the  same  act,  continued 
themselves  in  place  four  years  beyond  the  term  for  which  they 


THE    FEDERALIST.  41  i 

were  elected  by  the  people.  An  attention  to  these  dangerous 
practices,  has  produced  a  very  natural  alarm  in  the  votaries  of 
free  government,  of  which  frequency  of  elections  is  the  cornei 
stone ;  and  has  led  them  to  seek  for  some  security  to  liberty, 
against  the  danger  to  which  it  is  exposed.  Where  no  consti- 
tution paramount  to  the  government,  either  existed  or  could  be 
obtained,  no  constitutional  security,  similar  to  that  established 
in  the  United  States,  was  to  be  attempted.  Some  other  security, 
therefore,  was  to  be  sought  for ;  and  what  better  security  would 
the  case  admit,  than  that  of  selecting  and  appealing  to  some 
simple  and  familiar  portion  of  time,  as  a  standard  for  measuring 
the  danger  of  innovations,  for  fixing  the  national  sentiment, 
and  for  uniting  the  patriotic  exertions  ?  The  most  simple  and 
familiar  portion  of  time,  applicable  to  the  subject,  was  that  of 
a  3'^ear;  and  hence  the  doctrine  has  been  inculcated,  by  a 
laudable  zeal  to  erect  some  barrier  against  the  gradual  innova- 
tions of  an  unlimited  government,  that  the  advance  towards 
tyranny,  was  to  be  calculated  by  the  distance  of  departure  from 
the  fixed  point  of  annual  elections.  But  what  necessity  can 
there  be  of  applying  this  expedient  to  a  government,  limited  as 
the  federal  government  will  be,  by  the  authority  of  a  para- 
mount constitution  ?  Or  who  will  pretend,  that  the  liberties  of 
the  people  of  America  will  not  be  more  secure  under  biennial 
elections,  unalterably  fixed  by  such  a  constitution,  than  those 
of  any  other  nation  would  be,  where  elections  were  annual,  or 
even  more  frequent,  but  subject  to  alterations  by  the  ordinary 
power  of  the  government. 

The  second  question  stated  is,  whether  biennial  elections  be 
necessary  or  useful  ?  The  propriety  of  answering  this  question 
in  the  affirmative,  will  appear  from  several  very  obvious  con- 
siderations. 

Xo  man  can  be  a  competent  legislator,  who  does  not  add  to 

an  upright  intention  and  a  sound  judgment,  a  certain  degree  of 

Knowledge  of  the  subjects  on  which  he  is  to  legislate.     A  part 

jf  this  knowledge  may  be  acquired  by  means  of  information, 

*hich  lie  within  the  compass  of  men  in  private,  as  well  as 

37 


412  THE    FEDERALIST. 

public  stations.  Another  part,  can  only  be  attained,  or  at  least 
thoroughly  attained,  by  actual  experience  in  the  station  which 
requires  the  use  oi'  it.  The  period  of  service  ought,  therefore, 
in  all  such  cases,  to  bear  some  proportion  to  the  extent  of 
practical  knowledge,  requisite  to  the  due  performance  of  the 
service.  The  period  of  legislative  service,  established  in  most 
of  the  states  for  the  more  numerous  branch,  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
one  year.  The  question  then  may  be  put  into  this  simple  form: 
Does  the  period  of  two  years  bear  no  greater  proportion  to  the 
knowledge  requisite  for  federal  legislation,  than  one  year  does 
to  the  knowledge  requisite  for  state  legislation?  The  very 
statement  of  the  question,  in  this  form,  suggests  the  answer 
that  ought  to  be  given  to  it. 

In  a  single  state,  the  requisite  knowledge  relates  to  the 
existing  laws,  which  are  uniform  throughout  the  state,  and 
with  which  all  the  citizens  are  more  or  less  conversant ;  and  to 
the  general  affairs  of  the  state,  which  lie  within  a  small  com- 
pass, are  not  very  diversified,  and  occupy  much  of  the  attention 
and  conversation  of  every  class  of  people.  The  great  theatre 
of  the  United  States  presents  a  very  different  scene.  The  laws 
are  so  far  from  being  uniform,  that  they  vary  in  every  state ; 
whilst  the  public  affairs  of  the  union  are  spread  throughout  a 
very  extensive  region,  and  are  extremely  diversified  by  the 
local  affairs  connected  with  them,  and  can  with  difficulty  be 
correctly  learnt  in  any  other  place,  than  in  the  central  councils, 
to  which  a  knowledge  of  them  will  be  brought  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  every  part  of  the  empire.  Yet  some  knowledge 
of  the  affairs,  and  even  of  the  laws  of  all  the  states,  ought  to 
be  possessed  by  the  members  from  each  of  the  states.  How 
can  foreign  trade  be  properly  regulated  by  uniform  laws,  with- 
out some  acquaintance  with  the  commerce,  the  ports,  the 
usages,  and  the  regulations  of  the  different  states  ?  How  can 
the  trade  between  the  different  states  be  duly  regulated,  with- 
out  some  knowledge  of  their  relative  situations  in  these,  and 
other  points?  How  can  taxes  be  judiciously  imposed,  and 
effectually  collected,  if  they  be  not  accommodated  to  the  differ- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  413 

ent  laws  and  local  circumstances  relating  to  tUese  objects  in  the 
different  states  ?  How  can  uniform  regulations  for  the  militia 
be  duly  provided,  without  a  similar  knowledge  of  some  interna* 
circumstances,  by  which  the  states  are  distinguished  from  each 
other?  These  are  the  principal  objects  of  federal  legislation, 
and  suggest  most  forcibly,  the  extensive  information  which  the 
representatives  ought  to  acquire.  The  other  inferior  objects, 
will  require  a  proportional  degree  of  information  with  regard 
to  them. 

Tt  is  true,  that  all  these  difficulties  will,  by  degrees,  be  very 
much  diminished.  The  most  laborious  task,  will  be  the  proper 
inauguration  of  the  government,  and  the  primeval  formation 
of  a  federal  code.  Improvements  on  the  first  draught,  will 
every  year  become  both  easier  and  fewer.  Past  transactions 
of  the  government,  will  be  a  ready  and  accurate  source  of  in- 
formation to  new  members.  The  affairs  of  the  union,  will 
become  more  and  more  objects  of  curiosity  and  conversation 
among  the  citizens  at  large.  And  the  increased  intercourse 
among  those  of  different  states,  will  contribute  not  a  little  to 
diffuse  a  mutual  knowledge  of  their  affairs,  as  this  again  will 
contribute  to  a  general  assimilation  of  their  manners  and  laws. 
But,  with  all  these  abatements,  the  business  of  federal  legis- 
lation must  continue  so  far  to  exceed,  both  in  novelty  and  diffi- 
culty, the  legislative  business  of  a  single  state,  as  to  justify  the 
longer  period  of  service  assigned  to  those  who  are  to  trans- 
act it. 

A  branch  of  knowledge,  which  belongs  to  the  acquirements 
of  a  federal  representative,  and  which  has  not  been  mentioned, 
is  that  of  foreign  affairs.  In  regulating  our  own  commerce,  he 
ought  to  be  not  only  acquainted  with  the  treaties  between  the 
United  States  and  other  nations,  but  also  with  the  commercial 
policy  and  laws  of  other  nations.  He  ought  not  to  be  alto- 
gether ignorant  of  the  law  of  nations ;  for  that,  as  far  it  is  a 
proper  object  of  municipal  legislation,  is  submitted  to  the 
federal  government.  And  although  the  house  of  representa- 
tives, is  not  immediately  to  participate  in  foreign  negociations 


414  THE    FEDERALIST. 

and  arrangements,  yet  from  the  necessary  connexion  between 
the  several  branches  of  public  affairs,  those  particular  subjects 
will  frequently  deserve  attention  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
legislation,  and  will  sometimes  demand  particular  legislative 
sanction  and  co-operation.  Some  portion  of  this  knowledge 
may,  no  doubt,  be  acquired  in  a  man's  closet ;  but  some  of  it 
also  can  only  be  derived  from  the  public  sources  of  informa- 
tion ;  and  all  of  it  will  be  acquired  to  best  effect,  by  a  practical 
attention  to  the  subject,  during  the  period  of  actual  service  in 
the  legislature. 

There  are  other  considerations,  of  less  importance  perhaps, 
but  which  are  not  unworthy  of  notice.  The  distance  which 
many  of  the  representatives  will  be  obliged  to  travel,  and  the 
arrangements  rendered  necessary  by  that  circumstance,  might 
be  much  more  serious  objections  with  fit  men  for  this  service, 
if  limited  to  a  single  year,  than  if  extended  to  two  years.  No 
argument  can  be  drawn  on  this  subject,  from  the  case  of  the 
delegates  to  the  existing  congress.  They  are  elected  annually, 
it  is  true;  but  their  re-election  is  considered  by  the  legislative 
assemblies  almost  as  a  matter  of  course.  The  election  of  the 
representatives  by  the  people,  would  not  be  governed  by  the 
same  principle. 

A  few  of  the  members,  as  happens  in  all  such  assemblies,  will 
possess  superior  talents ;  will,  by  frequent  re-elections,  become 
members  of  long  standing ;  will  be  thoroughly  masters  of  the 
public  business,  and  perhaps  not  unwilling  to  avail  themselves 
of  those  advantages.  The  greater  the  proportion  of  new  mem- 
bers, and  the  less  the  information  of  the  bulk  of  the  members, 
the  more  apt  will  they  be  to  fall  into  the  snares  that  may  be 
laid  for  them.  This  remark,  is  no  less  applicable  to  the  rela- 
tion, which  will  subsist  between  the  house  of  representatives 
and  the  senate. 

It  is  an  inconvenience  mingled  with  the  advantages  of  our 
frequent  elections,  even  in  single  states,  where  they  are  large, 
and  hold  but  one  legislative  session  in  the  year,  that  spurious 
elections  cannot  be  investigated  and  annulled,  in  timo  for  the 


THE    FEDERALIST.  416 

decision  to  have  its  due  effect.  If  a  return  can  be  obtained,  no 
matter  by  what  unlawful  means,  the  irregular  member,  who 
takes  his  seat  of  course,  is  sure  of  holding  it  a  sufficient  time 
to  answer  his  purposes.  Hence  a  very  pernicious  encourage- 
ment, is  given  to  the  use  of  unlawful  means,  for  obtaining  irre- 
gular returns.  Were  elections  for  the  federal  legislature  to  be 
annual,  this  practice  might  become  a  very  serious  abuse,  parti- 
cularly in  the  more  distant  states.  Each  house  is,  as  it  neces- 
sarily must  be,  the  judge  of  the  elections,  qualifications,  and 
returns  of  its  members,  and  whatever  improvements  may  be 
suggested  by  experience,  for  simplifying  and  accelerating  the 
process  in  disputed  cases,  so  great  a  portion  of  a  year  would 
unavoidably  elapse,  before  an  illegitimate  member  could  be  dis- 
possessed of  his  seat,  that  the  prospect  of  such  an  event  would 
be  little  check  to  unfair  and  illicit  means  of  obtaining  a  seat. 

All  these  considerations  taken  together,  warrant  us  in  affirm- 
ing, that  biennial  elections  will  be  as  useful  to  the  affairs  of  the 
public,  as  we  have  seen  that  they  will  be  safe  to  the  liberties  of 
the  people 

PUBLIUB. 


llfi  THB   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LIV. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY  12,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  WITH   A  VIEW  TO  THE   RATIO   Of 
REPRESENTATION. 

The  next  view  which  I  shall  take  of  the  house  of  representa- 
tives, relates  to  the  apportionment  of  its  members  among  the 
several  states,  which  is  to  be  determined  by  the  same  rule,  with 
that  of  direct  taxes. 

It  is  not  contended,  that  the  number  of  people  in  each  state, 
ought  not  to  be  the  standard  for  regulating  the  proportion  of 
those,  who  are  to  represent  the  people  of  each  state.  The 
establishment  of  the  same  rule  for  the  apportionment  of  taxes, 
will  probably  be  as  little  contested ;  though  the  rule  itself  in 
this  case,  is  by  no  means  founded  on  the  same  principle.  In  the 
former  case,  the  rule  is  understood  to  refer  to  the  personal 
rights  of  the  people,  with  which  it  has  a  natural  and  universal 
connexion.  In  the  latter,  it  has  reference  to  the  proportion  of 
wealth,  of  which  it  is  in  no  case  a  precise  measure,  and  in  ordi- 
nary cases,  a  very  unfit  one.  But  notwithstanding  the  imper- 
fection of  the  rule  as  applied  to  the  relative  wealth  and  contri- 
butions of  the  states,  it  is  evidently  the  least  exceptionable 
among  those  that  are  practicable;  and  had  too  recently  ob- 
tained the  general  sanction  of  America,  not  to  have  found  a 
ready  preference  with  the  convention. 


THE    FEDBRALIST.  417 

i^il  this  is  admitted,  it  will  perhaps  be  said :  But  does  it  follow 
from  an  admission  of  numbers  for  the  measure  of  representa- 
tion, or  of  slaves  combined  with  free  citizens,  as  a  ratio  of  tax 
ation,  tliat  slaves  ought  to  be  included  in  the  numerical  rule  of 
representation  ?  Slaves  are  considered  as  property,  not  as  per- 
sons. They  ought,  therefore,  to  be  comprehended  in  estimates 
of  taxation  which  are  founded  on  property,  and  to  be  excluded 
from  representation,  which  is  regulated  by  a  census  of  persons. 
This  is  the  objection,  as  I  understand  it,  stated  in  its  full  force. 
I  shall  be  equally  candid  in  stating  the  reasoning,  which  may 
be  offered  on  the  opposite  side. 

We  subscribe  to  the  doctrine,  might  one  of  our  southern 
brethren  observe,  that  representation  relates  more  immediately 
to  persons,  and  taxation  more  immediately  to  property;  and 
we  join  in  the  application  of  this  distinction  to  the  case  of  our 
slaves.  But  we  must  deny  the  fact,  that  slaves  are  considered 
merely  as  property,  and  in  no  respect  whatever  as  persons. 
The  true  state  of  the  case  is,  that  they  partake  of  both  these 
qualities;  being  considered  by  our  laws,  in  some  respects,  as 
persons,  and  in  other  respects,  as  property.  In  being  compelled 
to  labour  not  for  himself,  but  for  a  master ;  in  being  vendible 
by  one  master  to  another  master;  and  in  being  subject  at  all 
times  to  be  restrained  in  his  liberty,  and  chastised  in  his  body, 
by  the  capricious  will  of  his  owner,  the  slave  may  appear  to  be 
degraded  from  the  human  rank,  and  classed  with  those  irra- 
tional animals,  which  fall  under  the  legal  denomination  of  pro- 
perty. In  being  protected,  on  the  other  hand,  in  his  life  and  in 
his  limbs,  against  the  violence  of  all  others,  even  the  master  of 
his  labour  and  his  liberty  ;  and  in  being  punishable  himself  for 
all  violence  committed  against  others ;  the  slave  is  no  less  evi- 
dently regarded  by  the  law  as  a  member  of  the  society;  not  as 
a  part  of  the  irrational  creation ;  as  a  moral  person,  not  as  a 
mere  article  of  property.  The  federal  constitution,  therefore, 
decides  with  great  propriety  on  the  case  of  our  slaves,  when  it 
views  them  in  the  mixt  character  of  persons  and  of  property 
This  is  m  fact  their  true  character.    It  is  the  character  be- 


418  THE    FEDERALIST. 

fitowed  otj  them  by  the  laws  under  which  they  live ;  and  it  will 
not  be  disputed  that  these  are  the  proper  criteria  ;  because  it 
is  only  under  the  pretext,  that  the  laws  have  transformed  the 
negroes  into  subjects  of  property,  that  a  place  is  denied  to 
them  in  the  computation  of  numbers ;  and  it  is  admitted  that 
if  the  laws  were  to  restore  the  rights  which  have  been  taken 
away,  the  negroes  could  no  longer  be  refused  an  equal  share  of 
representation,  with  the  other  inhabitants. 

This  question  may  be  placed  in  another  light.  It  is  agreed 
on  all  sides,  that  numbers  are  the  best  scale  of  wealth  and 
taxation,  as  they  are  the  only  proper  scale  of  representation. 
Would  the  convention  have  been  impartial  or  consistent,  if 
they  had  rejected  the  slaves  from  the  list  of  inhabitants,  when 
the  shares  of  representation  were  to  be  calculated;  and  inserted 
them  on  the  lists  when  the  tariff  of  contributions  was  to  be 
adjusted  ?  Could  it  be  reasonably  expected,  that  the  southern 
states  would  concur  in  a  system,  which  considered  their  slaves 
in  some  degree  as  men,  when  burdens  were  to  be  imposed,  but 
refused  to  consider  them  in  the  same  light,  when  advantages 
were  to  be  conferred  ?  Might  not  some  surprise  also  be  ex- 
pressed, that  those  who  reproach  the  southern  states  with  the 
barbarous  policy  of  considering  as  property,  a  part  of  their 
human  brethren,  should  themselves  contend,  that  the  govern- 
ment to  which  all  the  states  are  to  be  parties,  ought  to  consider 
this  unfortunate  race  more  completely  in  the  unnatural  light  of 
property,  than  the  very  laws  of  which  they  complain  ? 

It  may  perhaps  be  replied,  that  slaves  are  not  included  in 
the  estimate  of  representatives  in  any  of  the  states  possessing 
them.  They  neither  vote  themselves,  nor  increase  the  votes 
of  their  masters.  Upon  what  principle  then,  ought  they  to  be 
taken  into  the  federal  estimate  of  representation  ?  In  rejecting 
them  altogether,  the  constitution^  would,  in  this  respect,  have 
followed  the  very  laws  which  have  been  appealed  to,  as  the 
proper  guide. 

This  objection  is  repelled  by  a  single  observation.  It  is  a 
fundamental  principle  of  the  proposed  constitution,  that  as  the 


THE    FEDERALIST.  41!* 

aggregate  number  of  representatives  allotted  to  the  several 
states,  is  to  be  determined  by  a  federal  rule,  founded  on  the 
aggregate  number  of  inhabitants ;  so,  the  right  of  choosing  this 
allotted  number  in  each  state,  is  to  be  exercised  by  such  part 
of  the  inhabitants,  as  the  state  itself  may  designate.  The  quali- 
fications on  which  the  right  of  suffrage  depend,  are  not  perhaps 
the  same  in  any  two  states.  In  some  of  the  states,  the  differ- 
ence is  very  material.  In  every  state,  a  certain  proportion  of 
inhabitants,  are  deprived  of  this  right  by  the  constitution  of 
the  state,  who  will  be  included  in  the  census  by  which  the 
federal  constitution  apportions  the  representatives.  In  this 
point  of  view,  the  southern  states  might  retort  the  complaint, 
by  insisting,  that  the  principle  laid  down  by  the  convention, 
required  that  no  regard  should  be  had  to  the  policy  of  particular 
states  towards  their  own  inhabitants  3  and  consequently,  that 
the  slaves,  as  well  as  inhabitants,  should  have  been  admitted  into 
the  census  according  to  their  full  number,  in  like  manner  with 
other  inhabitants,  who  by  the  policy  of  other  states,  are  not 
admitted  to  all  the  rights  of  citizens.  A  rigorous  adherence, 
however,  to  this  principle,  is  waved  by  those  who  would  be 
gainers  by  it.  All  that  they  ask  is,  that  equal  moderation  be 
shown  on  the  other  side.  Let  the  case  of  the  slaves  be  con- 
sidered, as  it  is  in  truth  a  peculiar  one.  Let  the  compromising 
expedient  of  the  constitution  be  mutually  adopted,  which  re- 
gards them  as  inhabitants,  but  as  debased  by  servitude  below 
the  equal  level  of  free  inhabitants,  which  regards  the  slave  as 
divested  of  two  fifths  of  the  man. 

After  all,  may  not  another  ground  be  taken  on  which  this 
article  of  the  constitution  will  admit  of  a  still  more  ready 
defence  ?  We  have  hitherto  riroceeded  on  the  idea,  that  repre- 
sentation related  to  persons  only,  and  not  at  all  to  property. 
But  is  it  a  just  idea?  Government  is  instituted  no  less  for  pro- 
tection of  the  property,  than  of  the  persons  of  individuals.  The 
one,  as  well  as  the  other,  therefore,  may  be  considered  as  repre- 
sented by  those  who  are  charged  with  the  government.  Upon 
this  principle  it  is,  that  in  se^'eral  of  the  states,  and  particularly 


420  THE   FEItERALIST. 

in  the  state  of  New- York,  one  branch  of  the  government  is  in- 
tended more  especially  to  be  the  guardian  of  property,  and  is 
accordingly  elected  by  that  part  of  the  society  which  is  most 
interested  in  this  object  of  government.  In  the  federal  consti- 
tution, this  policy  does  not  prevail.  The  rights  of  property, 
are  committed  into  the  same  hands,  with  the  personal  rights. 
Some  attention  ought,  therefore,  to  be  paid  to  property,  in  the 
choice  of  those  hands. 

For  another  reason,  the  votes  allowed  in  the  federal  legisla- 
ture to  the  people  of  each  state,  ought  to  bear  some  proportion 
to  the  comparative  wealth  of  the  states.  States  have  not,  like 
individuals,  an  influence  over  each  other,  arising  from  superior 
advantages  of  fortune.  If  the  law  allows  an  opulent  citizen 
but  a  single  vote  in  the  choice  of  his  representative,  the  respect 
and  consequence  which  he  derives  from  his  fortunate  situation, 
very  frequently  guide  the  votes  of  others  to  the  objects  of  his 
choice ;  and  through  this  imperceptible  channel,  the  rights  of 
property  are  conveyed  into  the  public  representation.  A  state 
possesses  no  such  influence  over  other  states.  It  is  not  probable, 
that  the  richest  state  in  the  confederacy,  will  ever  influence  the 
choice  of  a  single  representative,  in  any  other  state.  Nor  will 
the  representatives  of  the  larger  and  richer  states,  possess  any 
other  advantage  in  the  federal  legislature,  over  the  representa- 
tives of  other  states,  than  what  may  result  from  their  superior 
number  alone;  as  far,  therefore,  as  their  superior  wealth  and 
weight  may  justly  entitle  them  to  any  advantage,  it  ought  to 
be  secured  to  them  by  a  superior  share  of  representation.  The 
new  constitution  is,  in  this  respect,  materially  different  from 
the  existing  confederation,  as  well  as  from  that  of  the  United 
Netherlands,  and  other  similar  confederacies.  In  each  of  the 
latter,  the  efficacy  of  the  federal  resolutions,  depends  on  the 
subsequent  and  voluntary  resolutions  of  the  states  composing 
the  union.  Hence  the  states,  though  possessing  an  equal  vote 
:n  the  public  councils,  have  an  unequal  influence,  corresponding 
with  the  unequal  importauue  of  these  subsequent  and  voluntary 
resolutions.     Under  the  proposed  constitution,  the  federal  actf 


THE    FEDERALIST.  421 

will  lake  effect  without  the  necessary  intervention  of  the  indi- 
vidual states.  They  will  depend  merely  on  the  majority  of 
votes  in  the  federal  legislature,  and  consequently  each  vote, 
whether  proceeding  from  a  larger  or  smaller  state,  or  a  state 
more  or  less  wealthy  or  powerful,  will  have  an  equal  weight 
and  eflScacy;  in  the  same  manner  as  the  votes  individually 
given  in  a  state  legislature,  by  the  representatives  of  unequal 
counties  or  other  districts,  have  each  a  precise  equality  of  value 
and  effect ;  or  if  there  be  any  difference  in  the  case,  it  proceeds 
from  the  difference  in  the  personal  character  of  the  individual 
representative,  rather  than  from  any  regard  to  the  extent  of 
the  district  from  which  he  comes. 

Such  is  the  reasoning,  which  an  advocate  for  the  southern 
interests,  might  employ  on  this  subject :  And  although  it  may 
appear  to  be  a  little  strained  in  some  points,  yet  on  the  whole, 
I  must  confess  that  it  fully  reconciles  me  to  the  scale  of  repre- 
sentation, which  the  convention  have  established. 

In  one  respect,  the  establishment  of  a  common  measure  for 
representation  and  taxation,  will  have  a  very  salutary  effect 
As  the  accuracy  of  the  census  to  be  obtained  by  the  congress, 
will  necessarily  depend,  in  a  considerable  degree,  on  the  dispo- 
Bition,  if  not  the  co-operation  of  the  states,  it  is  of  great  im- 
portance that  the  states  should  feel  as  little  bias  as  possible,  to 
swell  or  to  reduce  the  amount  of  their  numbers.  Were  their 
share  of  representation  alone  to  be  governed  by  this  rule,  they 
would  have  an  interest  in  exaggerating  their  inhabitants. 
Were  the  rule  to  decide  their  share  of  taxation  alone,  a  con- 
trary temptation  would  prevail.  By  extending  the  rule  to  both 
objects,  the  states  will  have  opposite  interests,  which  will  con- 
trol and  balance  each  other ;  ana  produce  the  requisite  impar- 
tiality 

tfX  BLIUS. 


422  THF    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


numbe:r  lv. 


NEW    YORK,    FEBRUARY   15,   17! 


HAMILTON. 


THE    SAME    SUBJECT    CONTINUED,    IN    RELATION    TO    THE    TOTaL 
NUMBER   OF   THE   BODY. 

The  number  of  which  the  house  of  representatives  is  to  con- 
sist, forms  another,  and  a  very  interesting  point  of  view,  under 
which  this  branch  of  the  federal  legislature  may  be  contem- 
plated. Scarce  any  article  indeed  in  the  whole  constitution, 
seems  to  be  rendered  more  worthy  of  attention,  by  the  weight 
of  character,  and  the  apparent  force  of  argument,  with  which 
it  has  been  assailed. 

The  charges  exhibited  against  it  are,  first,  that  so  small  a 
number  of  representatives,  will  be  an  unsafe  depository  of  the 
public  interests  j  secondly,  that  they  will  not  possess  a  proper 
knowledge  of  the  local  circumstances  of  their  numerous  con- 
stituents; thirdly,  that  they  will  be  taken  from  that  class  of 
citizens  which  will  sympathize  least  with  the  feelings  of  the 
mass  of  the  people,  and  be  most  likely  to  aim  at  a  permanent 
elevation  of  the  few,  on  the  depression  of  the  many ;  fourthly, 
that  defective  as  the  number  will  be  in  the  first  instance,  it  will 
be  more  and  more  disproportionate,  by  the  increase  of  the 
people,  and  the  obstacles  which  will  prevent  a  correspondent 
increase  of  the  representatives. 

In   general   it  may  be  remarked   on   this   subject,  that   no 


THE    FEDERALIST.  423 

political  problem  is  less  susceptible  of  a  precise  solution,  than 
that  which  relates  to  the  number  most  convenient  for  a  repre- 
sentative legislature;  nor  is  there  any  point  on  which  the 
policy  of  the  several  states  is  more  at  variance;  whether  wo 
compare  their  legislative  assemblies  directly  with  each  other, 
or  consider  the  proportions  which  they  respectively  bear  to  the 
number  of  their  constituents.  Passing  over  the  difference  be- 
tween the  smallest  and  largest  states,  as  Delaware,  whose  most 
numerous  branch  consists  of  twenty-one  representatives,  and 
Massachusetts,  where  it  amounts  to  between  three  and  four 
hundred,  a  very  considerable  difference  is  observable,  among 
states  nearly  equal  in  population.  The  number  of  representa- 
tives in  Pennsylvania,  is  not  more  than  one  fifth  of  that,  in  the 
state  last  mentioned.  New-York,  whose  population  is  to  that 
of  South-Carolina  as  six  to  five,  has  little  more  than  one  third 
of  the  number  of  representatives.  As  great  a  disparity  pre- 
vails between  the  states  of  Georgia  and  Delaware,  or  Rhode- 
Island.  In  Pennsylvania,  the  representatives  do  not  bear  a 
greater  proportion  to  their  constituents,  than  of  one  for  every 
four  or  five  thousand.  In  Ehode-Island,  they  bear  a  proportion 
of  at  least  one  for  every  thousand.  And  according  to  the  con- 
stitution of  Georgia,  the  proportion  may  be  carried  to  one  for 
every  ten  electors;  and  must  unavoidably  far  exceed  the  pro- 
portion in  any  of  the  other  states. 

Another  general  remark  to  be  made  is,  that  the  ratio  be- 
tween the  representatives  and  the  people,  ought  not  to  be  the 
same,  where  the  latter  are  very  numerous,  as  where  they  are 
very  few.  Were  the  representatives  in  Virginia,  to  be  regu- 
lated by  the  standard  in  Ehode-Island,  they  would,  at  this  time, 
amount  to  between  four  and  five  hundred;  and  twenty  or 
thirty  years  hence,  to  a  thousand.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
ratio  of  Pennsylvania,  if  applied  to  the  state  of  Delaware, 
would  reduce  the  representative  assembly  of  the  latter  to  seven 
or  eight  members.  Nothing  can  be  more  fallacious,  than  to 
found  our  political  calculations  on  arithmetical  principles. 
SiXty  or  seventy  men,  may  be  more  properly  trusted  with  a 


124  THE    FEDERALIST. 

givon  degree  of  power,  than  six  or  seven.  But  it  does  not  fol- 
low, that  six  or  seven  hundred  would  be  proportionably  a  better 
depository.  And  if  we  carry  on  the  supposition  to  six  or  seven 
thousand,  the  whole  reasoning  ought  to  be  reversed.  The  truth 
is,  that  in  all  cases,  a  certain  number  at  least  seems  to  be  neces- 
sary, to  secure  the  benefits  of  free  consultation  and  discussion ; 
and  to  guard  against  too  easy  a  combination  for  improper  pur- 
poses :  As  on  the  other  hand,  the  number  ought  at  most  to  be 
kept  within  a  certain  limit,  in  order  to  avoid  the  confusion  and 
intemperance  of  a  multitude.  In  all  very  numerous  assemblies, 
of  whatever  characters  composed,  passion  never  fails  to  wrest 
the  sceptre  from  reason.  Had  every  Athenian  citizen  been  a 
Socrates;  every  Athenian  assembly  would  still  have  been  a 
mob. 

It  is  necessary  also  to  recollect  here,  the  observations  which 
were  applied  to  the  case  of  biennial  elections.  For  the  same 
reason  that  the  limited  powers  of  the  congress,  and  the  control 
of  the  state  legislatures,  justify  less  frequent  elections,  than  the 
public  safety  might  otherwise  require;  the  members  of  the 
congress  need  be  less  numerous,  than  if  they  possessed  the 
whole  power  of  legislation,  and  were  under  no  other,  than  the 
ordinary  restraints  of  other  legislative  bodies. 

"With  these  general  ideas  in  our  minds,  let  us  weigh  the  ob- 
jections which  have  been  stated  against  the  number  of  mem- 
bers proposed  for  the  house  of  representatives.  It  is  said,  in 
the  first  place,  that  so  small  a  number  cannot  be  safely  trusted 
with  so  much  power. 

The  number  of  which  this  branch  of  the  legislature  is  to 
consist,  at  the  outset  of  the  government,  will  be  sixty-five. 
Within  three  years  a  census  is  to  be  taken,  when  the  number 
may  be  augmented  to  one  for  every  thirty  thousand  inhabit- 
ants; and  within  every  successive  period  of  ten  years,  the 
census  is  to  be  renewed,  and  augmentations  may  continue  to 
be  made  under  the  above  limitation.  It  will  not  be  thought  an 
extravagant  conjecture,  that  the  first  census  will,  at  the  rate  of 
one  for  every  thirty  thousand,  raise  the  number  of  representa- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  42.'> 

lives  to  at  least  one  hundred.  Estimating  the  negroes  in  the 
proportion  of  three-fifths,  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted,  that  the 
population  of  the  United  States  will  by  that  time,  if  it  does  not 
already,  amount  to  three  millions.  At  the  expiration  of  twenty- 
five  years,  according  to  the  computed  rate  of  increase,  the  num- 
ber of  representatives  will  amount  to  two  hundred;  and  of  fifty 
years,  to  four  hundred.  This  is  a  number,  which  I  presume 
will  put  an  end  to  all  fears,  arising  from  the  smallness  of  the 
bod}'.  I  take  for  granted  here,  what  I  shall,  in  answering  the 
fourth  objection,  hereafter  show,  that  the  number  of  repre- 
sentatives will  be  augmented,  from  time  to  time,  in  the 
manner  provided  by  the  constitution.  On  a  contrary  suppo- 
sition, I  should  admit  the  objection  to  have  very  great  weight 
indeed. 

The  true  question  to  be  decided  then  is,  whether  the  small- 
ness of  the  number,  as  a  temporary  regulation,  be  dangerous  to 
the  public  liberty?  Whether  sixty-five  members  for  a  few 
years,  and  a  hundred,  or  two  hundred,  for  a  few  more,  be  a  safe 
depository  for  a  limited  and  well  guarded  power  of  legislating 
for  the  United  States  ?  I  must  own  that  I  could  not  give  a 
negative  answer  to  this  question,  without  first  obliterating 
every  impression  which  I  have  received,  with  regard  to  the 
present  genius  of  the  people  of  America,  the  spirit  which 
actuates  the  state  legislatures,  and  the  principles  which  are  in- 
corporated with  the  political  character  of  every  class  of  citizens. 
I  am  unable  to  conceive,  that  the  people  of  America,  in  their 
present  temper,  or  under  any  circumstances  which  can  speedily 
happen,  will  choose,  and  every  second  year  repeat  the  choice, 
of  sixty-five  or  an  hundred  men,  who  would  be  disposed  to 
form  and  pursue  a  scheme  of  tyranny  or  treachery.  I  am  un- 
able to  conceive,  that  the  state  legislatures,  which  must  feel  so 
many  motives  to  watch,  and  which  possess  so  many  means  of 
counteracting  the  federal  legislature,  would  fail  either  to  detect 
or  to  defeat,  a  conspiracy  of  the  latter,  against  the  liberties  of 
their  common  constituents.     I  am  equally  unable  to  conceive 


126  THE   FEDERALIST. 

that  there  are  at  this  time,  or  can  be  in  any  short  time  in  the 
United  States,  any  sixty-five  or  an  hundred  men,  capable  of 
recommending  themselves  to  the  choice  of  the  people  at  large, 
who  would  either  desire  or  dare,  within  the  short  space  of  two 
years,  to  betray  the  solemn  trust  committed  to  them.  What 
change  of  circumstances,  time,  and  a  fuller  population  of  oui 
country,  may  produce,  requires  a  prophetic  spirit  to  declare, 
which  makes  no  part  of  my  pretensions.  But  judging  from 
the  circumstances  now  before  us,  and  from  the  probable  state 
of  them  within  a  moderate  period  of  time,  1  must  pronounce, 
that  the  liberties  of  America  cannot  be  unsafe,  in  the  number 
of  hands  proposed  by  the  federal  constitution. 

From  what  quarter  can  the  danger  proceed  ?  Are  we  afraid 
of  foreign  gold  ?  If  foreign  gold  could  so  easily  corrupt  our 
federal  rulers,  and  enable  them  to  ensnare  and  betray  their 
constituents,  how  has  it  happened  that  we  are  at  this  time  a 
free  and  independent  nation  ?  The  congress  which  conducted 
us  through  the  revolution,  were  a  less  numerous  body  than 
their  successors  will  be ;  they  were  not  chosen  by,  nor  respon- 
sible  to,  their  fellow  citizens  at  large :  though  appointed  from 
year  to  year,  and  recallable  at  pleasure,  they  were  generally 
continued  for  three  years ;  and  prior  to  the  ratification  of  the 
federal  articles,  for  a  still  longer  term ;  they  held  their  consulta- 
tions always  under  the  veil  of  secrecy;  they  had  the  sole  trans- 
action of  our  affairs  with  foreign  nations;  through  the  whole 
course  of  the  war,  they  had  the  fate  of  their  country  more  in 
their  hands,  than  it  is  to  be  hoped  will  ever  be  the  case  with 
our  future  representatives ;  and  from  the  greatness  of  the  prize 
at  stake,  and  the  eagerness  of  the  party  which  lost  it,  it  may 
well  be  supposed,  that  the  use  of  other  means  than  force  would 
not  have  been  scrupled :  Yet  we  know  by  happy  experience, 
that  the  public  trust  was  not  betrayed;  nor  has  the  purity  of 
our  public  councils  in  this  particular  ever  suffered,  even  from 
the  whispers  of  calumny. 

Is  the  danger  apprehended  from  the  other  branches  of  tijf 


THE    FEDERALIST.  421 

federal  government?  But  where  are  the  means  to  be  found 
by  the  president  or  the  senate,  or  both  ?  Their  emoluments 
of  oflOlce,  it  is  to  be  presumed,  will  not,  and  without  a  previoua 
corruption  of  the  house  of  representatives  cannot,  more  than 
suflSce  for  very  -different  purposes :  Their  private  fortunes,  as 
they  must  all  be  American  citizens,  cannot  possibly  be  sources 
of  danger.  The  only  means  then  which  they  can  possess,  will 
be  in  the  dispensation  of  appointments.  Is  it  here  that  sus- 
picion rests  her  charge  ?  Sometimes  we  are  told,  that  this 
fund  of  corruption  is  to  be  exhausted  by  the  president,  in  sub- 
duing the  virtue  of  the  senate.  Now,  the  fidelity  of  the  other 
house  is  to  be  the  victim.  The  improbability  of  such  a  mer- 
cenary and  perfidious  combination  of  the  several  members  of 
government,  standing  on  as  different  foundations  as  republican 
principles  will  well  admit,  and  at  the  same  time  accountable  to 
the  society  over  which  they  are  placed,  ought  alone  to  quiet 
this  apprehension.  But  fortunately,  the  constitution  has  pro- 
vided a  still  further  safeguard.  The  members  of  the  congress, 
are  rendered  ineligible  to  any  civil  offices,  that  mav  be  created, 
or  of  which  the  emoluments  may  be  increased,  during  the  term 
of  their  election.  No  offices  therefore  can  be  dealt  out  to  the 
existing  membei'S,  but  such  as  may  become  vacant  by  ordinary 
casualties;  and  to  suppose  that  these  would  be  sufficient  to 
purchase  the  guardians  of  the  people,  selected  by  the  people 
themselves,  is  to  renounce  every  rule  by  which  events  ought 
to  be  calculated,  and  to  substitute  an  indiscriminate  and  un- 
bounded jealousy,  with  which  all  reasoning  must  be  vain.  The 
sincere  friends  of  liberty,  who  give  themselves  up  to  the  ex- 
t]  avagancies  of  this  passion,  are  not  aware  of  the  injury  they 
do  their  own  cause.  As  there  is  a  degree  of  depravity  in  man- 
kind, which  requires  a  certain  degree  of  circumspection  and 
distrust :  So  there  are  other  qualities  in  human  nature,  which 
justify  a  certain  portion  of  esteem  and  confidence.  Eepublican 
government,  presupposes  the  existence  of  these  qualities  in  a 
higher  degree,  than  any  other  form.     Were  the  pictures  which 

38 


428  THE    FEDERALIST. 

have  been  drawn  by  the  political  jealousy  of  some  among  us, 
faithful  likenesses  of  the  human  character,  the  inference  would 
be,  that  there  is  not  sufficient  virtue  among  men  for  self- 
government;  and  that  nothing  less  than  the  chains  of  despot- 
ism, can  restrain  them  from  destroying  and  devouring  one 
another. 

Public  a. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  429 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LVI. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY  19,  1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  SAME  POINT 

The  second  charge  against  the  house  of  representatives  is, 
that  it  will  be  too  small  to  possess  a  due  knowledge  of  the  in- 
terests of  its  constituents. 

As  this  objection  evidently  proceeds  from  a  comparison  of 
the  proposed  number  of  representatives,  with  the  great  extent 
of  the  United  States,  the  number  of  their  inhabitants,  and  the 
diversity  of  their  interests,  without  taking  into  view,  at  the 
same  time,  the  circumstances  which  will  distinguish  the  con- 
gress from  other  legislative  bodies,  the  best  answer  that  can  be 
given  to  it,  will  be  a  brief  explanation  of  these  peculiarities. 

It  is  a  sound  and  important  principle,  that  the  representative 
ought  to  be  acquainted  with  the  interests  and  circumstances  of 
his  constituents.  But  this  principle  can  extend  no  farther, 
than  to  those  circumstances  and  interests,  to  which  the  authority 
and  care  of  the  representative  relate.  An  ignorance  of  a 
variety  of  minute  and  particular  objects,  which  do  not  lie 
within  the  compass  of  legislation,  is  consistent  with  every 
attribute  necessary  to  a  due  performance  of  the  legislative 
trust.  In  determining  the  extent  of  information  required  in 
the  exercise  of  a  particular  authority,  recourse  then  must  be 
iMid  to  the  objects  within  the  purview  of  that  authority. 


430  THE   FEDERALIST. 

What  are  to  be  the  objects  of  federal  legislation  ?  Those 
which  are  of  most  importance,  and  which  seem  most  to  require 
local  knowledge,  are  commerce,  taxation,  and  the  militia. 

A  proper  regulation  of  commerce  requires  much  information, 
as  has  been  elsewhere  remarked ;  but  as  far  as  this  information 
relates  to  the  laws,  and  local  situation  of  each  individual  state, 
a  very  few  representatives  would  be  suflScient  vehicles  of  it  to 
the  federal  councils. 

Taxation  will  consist,  in  great  measure,  of  duties  which  will 
be  involved  in  the  regulation  of  commerce.  So  far  the  preced- 
ing remark  is  applicable  to  this  object.  As  far  as  it  may  consist 
of  internal  collections,  a  more  diffusive  knowledge  of  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  state  may  be  necessary.  But  will  not  this 
also  be  possessed  in  sufficient  degree  by  a  very  few  intelligent 
men,  diffusively  elected  within  the  state.  Divide  the  largest 
state  into  ten  or  twelve  districts,  and  it  will  be  found  that 
there  will  be  no  peculiar  local  interest  in  either,  which  will 
not  be  within  the  knowledge  of  the  representative  of  the 
district.  Besides  this  source  of  information,  the  laws  of  the 
state,  framed  by  representatives  from  every  part  of  it,  will  be 
almost  of  themselves  a  sufficient  guide.  In  every  state  there 
have  been  made,  and  must  continue  to  be  made,  regulations  on 
this  subject,  which  will,  in  many  cases,  leave  little  more  to  be 
done  by  the  federal  legislature,  than  to  review  the  different 
laws,  and  reduce  them  into  one  general  act.  A  skilful  individual 
in  his  closet,  with  all  the  local  codes  before  him,  might  compile 
a  law  on  some  subjects  of  taxation  for  the  whole  union,  without 
any  aid  from  oral  information ;  and  it  may  be  expected,  that 
whenever  internal  taxes  may  be  necessary,  and  particularly  in 
cases  requiring  uniformity  throughout  the  states,  the  more 
simple  objects  will  be  preferred.  To  be  fully  sensible  of  the 
facility  which  will  be  given  to  this  branch  of  federal  legislation, 
by  the  assistance  of  the  state  codes,  we  need  only  suppose  foi 
a  moment,  that  this  or  any  other  state  were  divided  into  a 
number  of  parts,  each  having  and  exercising  within  itself  a 
power  of  local  legislation.     Is  it  not  evident  that  p.  degree  of 


THE    FEDERALIST.  43J 

local  information  and  preparatory  labour,  would  be  found  m 
the  several  volumes  of  their  proceedings,  which  would  very 
much  shorten  the  labours  of  the  general  legislature,  and  render 
a  much  smaller  number  of  members  suflBcient  for  it?  The 
federal  councils  will  derive  great  advantage  from  another 
circumstance.  The  representatives  of  each  state  will  not  only 
bring  with  them  a  considerable  knowledge  of  its  laws,  and  a 
local  knowledge  of  their  respective  districts ;  but  will  probably 
in  all  eases  have  been  members,  and  may  even  at  the  very  time 
be  members  of  the  state  legislature,  where  all  the  local  infor- 
mation and  interests  of  the  state  are  assembled,  and  from 
whence  they  may  easily  be  conveyed  by  a  very  few  hands 
into  the  legislature  of  the  United  States. 

With  regard  to  the  regulation  of  the  militia,  there  are 
scarcely  any  circumstances  in  reference  to  which  local  know- 
ledge can  be  said  to  be  necessary.  The  general  face  of  the 
country,  whether  mountainous  or  level,  most  fit  for  the  opera- 
ations  of  infantry  or  cavalry,  is  almost  the  only  consideration 
of  this  nature  that  can  occur.  The  art  of  war  teaches  general 
principles  of  organization,  movement,  and  discipline,  which 
apply  universally. 

The  attentive  reader  will  discern,  that  the  reasoning  here 
used,  to  prove  the  sufficiency  of  a  moderate  number  of  repre- 
sentatives, does  not,  in  any  respect,  contradict  what  was  urged 
on  another  occasion,  with  regard  to  the  extensive  information 
which  the  representatives  ought  to  possess,  and  the  time  that 
might  be  necessary  for  acquiring  it.  This  information,  so  far 
as  it  may  relate  to  local  objects,  is  rendered  necessary  and 
difficult,  not  by  a  difference  of  laws  and  local  circumstance& 
within  a  single  state,  but  of  those  among  different  states. 
Taking  each  state  by  itself,  its  laws  are  the  same,  and  its 
interests  but  little  diversified.  A  few  men,  therefore,  will 
possess  all  the  knowledge  requisite  for  a  proper  representation 
of  them.  Were  the  interests  and  affairs  of  each  individual 
state,  perfectly  simple  and  uniform,  a  knowledge  of  them  in 
one  part,  wculd  involve  a  knowledge  of  them  in  every  other. 


482  THE    FEDERALIST. 

and  the  whole  state  might  be  competently  represented  by  a 
single  member  taken  from  any  part  of  it.  On  a  comparison 
of  the  different  states  together,  we  find  a  great  dissimilarity  in 
their  laws,  and  in  many  other  circumstances  connected  with 
the  objects  of  federal  legislation,  with  all  of  which  the  federal 
representatives  ought  to  have  some  acquaintance.  "Whilst  a 
few  representatives,  therefore,  from  each  state,  may  bring  with 
them  a  due  knowledge  of  their  own  state,  every  representative 
will  have  much  information  to  acquire  concerning  all  the  other 
states.  The  changes  of  time,  as  was  formerly  remarked,  on 
the  comparative  situation  of  the  different  states,  will  have  an 
assimilating  tendency.  The  effect  of  time  on  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  states,  taken  singly,  will  be  just  the  contrary. 
At  present,  some  of  the  states  are  little  more  than  a  society 
of  husbandmen.  Few  of  them  have  made  much  progress  in 
those  branches  of  industry,  which  give  a  variety  and  complexity 
to  the  affairs  of  a  nation.  These,  however,  will  in  all  of  them  be 
the  fruits  of  a  more  advanced  population ;  and  will  require,  on 
the  part  of  each  state,  a  fuller  representation.  The  foresight 
of  the  convention,  has  accordingly  taken  care,  that  the  progress 
of  population,  may  be  accompanied  with  a  proper  increase  of 
the  representative  branch  of  the  government. 

The  experience  of  Great  Britain,  which  presents  to  mankind 
so  many  political  lessons,  both  of  the  monitory  and  exemplary 
kind,  and  which  has  been  frequently  consulted  in  the  course  of 
these  inquiries,  corroborates  the  result  of  the  reflections  which 
we  have  just  made.  The  number  of  inhabitants  in  the  two 
kingdoms  of  England  and  Scotland,  cannot  be  stated  at  less 
than  eight  millions.  The  representatives  of  these  eight  millions 
in  the  house  of  commons,  amount  to  five  hundred  and  fifty- 
eight.  Of  this  number,  one  ninth  are  elected  by  three  hundred 
and  sixty-four  persons,  and  one  half,  by  five  thousand  seven 
hundred  and  twenty-three  persons.*  It  cannot  be  supposed 
that  the  half  thus  elected,  and  who  do  not  even  reside  among 
the  peopie  at  large,  can  add  any  thing  either  to  the  security  of 

*  Burgh's  Political  Disquisitions. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  43o 

the  people  against  the  government,  or  to  the  knowledge  of 
their  circumstances  and  interests  in  the  legislative  councils. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  notorious,  that  they  are  more  frequently 
the  representatives  and  instruments  of  the  executive  magis- 
trate, than  the  guardians  and  advocates  of  the  popular  rights. 
They  might,  therefore,  with  great  propriety,  be  considered  as 
something  more  than  a  mere  deduction  from  the  real  repre- 
sentatives of  the  nation.  We  will,  however,  consider  them  in 
this  light  alone,  and  will  not  extend  the  deduction  to  a  con 
siderable  number  of  others,  who  do  not  reside  among  their  con- 
stituents, are  very  faintly  connected  with  them,  and  have  very 
little  particular  knowledge  of  their  affairs.  With  all  these 
concessions,  two  hundred  and  seventy-nine  persons  only,  will 
be  the  depository  of  the  safety,  interest,  and  happiness,  of 
eight  millions;  that  is  to  say,  there  will  be  one  representative 
only,  to  maintain  the  rights,  and  explain  the  situation,  of 
twenty-eight  thousand  six  hundred  and  seventy  constituents,  in  an 
assembly  exposed  to  the  whole  force  of  executive  influence, 
and  extending  its  authority  to  every  object  of  legislation  within 
a  nation,  whose  affairs  are  in  the  highest  degree  diversified  and 
complicated.  Yet  it  is  very  certain,  not  only  that  a  valuable 
portion  of  freedom  has  been  preserved  under  all  these  circum- 
stances, but  that  the  defects  in  the  British  code  are  chargeable 
in  a  very  small  proportion,  on  the  ignorance  of  the  legislature 
concerning  the  circumstances  of  the  people.  Allowing  to  this 
case  the  weight  which  is  due  to  it ;  and  comparing  it  with  that 
of  the  house  of  representatives  as  above  explained,  it  seems  to 
give  the  fullest  assurance,  that  a  representative  for  every 
thirty  thoicsand  inhabitants,  will  render  the  latter  both  a  safe 
and  competent  guardian  of  the  interests  which  will  be  confided 
to  it. 

PUBLIUS. 


4S4  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER  LVII. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY  19,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED,  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  SUPPOSED 
TENDENCY  OF  THE  PLAN  OF  THE  CONVENTION  TO  ELEVATE  THE 
FEW   ABOVE   THE   MANY. 

The  third  charge  against  the  house  of  representatives  is,  that 
it  will  be  taken  from  that  class  of  citizens  which  will  have 
least  sympathy  with  the  mass  of  the  people ;  and  be  most  likely 
to  aim  at  an  ambitious  sacrifice  of  the  many,  to  the  aggrandize- 
ment of  the  few. 

Of  all  the  objections  which  have  been  framed  against  the 
federal  constitution,  this  is  perhaps  the  most  extraordinary. 
Whilst  the  objection  itself  is  levelled  against  a  pretended 
oligarchy,  the  principle  of  it  strikes  at  the  very  root  of  repub- 
lican government. 

The  aim  of  every  political  constitution  is,  or  ought  to  be, 
first,  to  obtain  for  rulers  men  who  possess  most  wisdom  to  dis- 
cern, and  most  virtue  to  pursue,  the  common  good  of  the 
society ;  and  in  the  next  place,  to  take  the  most  effectual  pre- 
cautions for  keeping  them  virtuous,  whilst  they  continue  to 
hold  their  public  trust.  The  elective  mode  of  obtaining  rulers, 
is  the  characteristic  policy  of  republican  government.  The 
means  relied  on  in  this  form  of  government  for  preventing 
their  degonej'acy,  are  numerous  and  various.   The  most  effectual 


THE   FEDERALIST.  435 

one,  is  such  a  limitation  of  the  term  of  appointments,  as  will 
maintain  a  proper  responsibility  to  the  people. 

Let  me  now  ask,  what  there  is  in  the  constitution  of  the 
house  of  representatives,  that  violates  the  principles  of  repub- 
lican government;  or  favours  the  elevation  of  the  few,  on  the 
ruins  of  the  many  ?  Let  me  ask  whether  every  circumstance 
is  not,  on  the  contrary,  strictly  conformable  to  these  princi- 
ples ;  and  scrupulously  impartial  to  the  rights  and  pretensions 
of  every  class  and  description  of  citizens  ? 

Who  are  to  be  the  electors  of  the  federal  representatives? 
Not  the  rich,  more  than  the  poor;  not  the  learned,  more  than 
the  ignorant;  not  the  haughty  heirs  of  distinguished  names, 
more  than  the  humble  sons  of  obscure  and  unpropitious  fortune. 
The  electors  are  to  be  the  great  body  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States.  They  are  to  be  the  same,  who  exercise  the 
right  in  every  state  of  electing  the  correspondent  branch  of  the 
legislature  of  the  state. 

Who  are  to  be  the  objects  of  popular  choice  ?  Every  citizen 
whose  merit  may  recommend  him  to  the  esteem  and  confidence 
of  his  country.  No  qualification  of  wealth,  of  birth,  of  reli- 
gious faith,  or  of  civil  profession,  is  permitted  to  fetter  the 
judgment,  or  disappoint  the  inclination  of  the  people. 

If  we  consider  the  situation  of  the  men  on  whom  the  free 
suffrages  of  their  fellow  citizens  may  confer  the  representati\  e 
trust,  we  shall  find  it  involving  every  security  which  can  be 
devised  or  desired  for  their  fidelity  to  their  constituents. 

In  the  first  place,  as  they  will  have  been  distinguished  by  the 
preference  of  their  fellow  citizens,  we  are  to  presume,  that  in 
general,  they  will  be  somewhat  distinguished  also,  by  those 
qualities  which  entitle  them  to  it,  and  which  promise  a  sincere 
and  scrupulous  regard  to  the  nature  of  their  engagements. 

In  the  second  place,  they  will  enter  into  the  public  service 
under  circumstances,  which  cannot  fail  to  produce  a  temporary 
affection  at  least  to  their  constituents.  There  is  in  every  breast 
a  sensibility  to  marks  of  honour,  of  favour,  of  esteem,  and  of 
confidence,  which   apart  from  all  considerations  of  interest,  is 


436  THE    FEDERALIST. 

some  pledge  for  grateful  and  benevolent  returns.  Ingratitude 
is  a  common  topic  of  declamation  against  human  nature;  and 
it  must  be  confessed,  that  instances  of  it  are  but  too  frequent 
and  flagrant,  both  in  public  and  in  private  life.  But  the  uni- 
versal and  extreme  indignation  which  it  inspires,  is  itself  a 
proof  of  the  energy  and  prevalence  of  the  contrary  sentiment. 

In  the  third  place,  those  ties  which  bind  the  representative 
to  his  constituents,  are  strengthened  by  motives  of  a  more 
selfish  nature.  His  pride  and  vanity  attach  him  to  a  form  of 
government  which  favours  his  pretensions,  and  gives  him  a 
share  in  its  honours  and  distinctions.  Whatever  hopes  or  pro- 
jects might  be  entertained  by  a  few  aspiring  characters,  it 
must  generally  happen,  that  a  great  proportion  of  the  men  de- 
riving their  advancement  from  their  influence  with  the  people, 
would  have  more  to  hope  from  a  preservation  of  their  favour, 
than  from  innovations  in  the  government  subversive  of  the 
authority  of  the  people. 

All  these  securities,  however,  would  be  found  very  insuflBcient 
without  the  restraint  of  frequent  elections.  Hence,  in  the 
fourth  place,  the  house  of  representatives  is  so  constituted,  as 
to  support  in  the  members  an  habitual  recollection  of  their  de- 
pendence on  the  people.  Before  the  sentiments  impressed  on 
their  minds  by  the  mode  of  their  elevation,  can  be  effaced  by 
the  exercise  of  power,  they  will  be  compelled  to  anticipate  the 
moment  when  their  power  is  to  cease,  when  their  exercise  of  it 
is  to  be  reviewed,  and  when  they  mudt  descend  to  the  level 
from  which  they  were  raised;  there  for  ever  to  remain,  unless 
a  faithful  discharge  of  their  trust  shall  have  established  their 
title  to  a  renewal  of  it. 

I  will  add,  as  a  fifth  circumstance  in  the  situation  of  the 
house  of  representatives,  restraining  them  from  oppressive 
measures :  that  they  can  make  no  law  which  will  not  have  its 
full  operation  on  themselves  and  their  friends,  as  well  as  on  the 
great  mass  of  the  society.  This  has  always  been  deemed  one  of 
the  strongest  bonds  by  which  human  policy  can  connect  the 
rulers  and  the  people  together.     It  creates  between  them  that 


THE   FEDERALIST.  437 

communion  of  interest,  and  sympathy  of  sentiments,  of  which 
few  governments  have  furnished  examples ;  but  without  which 
ever}'  government  degenerates  into  tyranny.  If  it  be  asked, 
what  is  to  restrain  the  house  of  representatives  from  making 
legal  discriminations  in  favour  of  themselves,  and  a  particular 
class  of  the  society  ?  I  answer,  the  genius  of  the  whole  system ; 
the  nature  of  just  and  constitutional  laws;  and,  above  all,  the 
vigilant  and  manly  spirit  which  actuates  the  people  of  America; 
a  spirit  which  nourishes  freedom,  and  in  return  is  nourished 
by  it. 

If  this  spirit  shall  ever  be  so  far  debased,  as  to  tolerate  a  law 
not  obligatory  on  the  legislature,  as  well  as  on  the  people,  the 
people  will  be  prepared  to  tolerate  any  thing  but  liberty. 

Such  will  be  the  relation  between  the  house  of  representa- 
tives and  their  constituents.  Duty,  gratitude,  interest,  ambi- 
tion itself,  are  the  cords  by  which  they  will  be  bound  to  fidelity 
and  sympathy  with  the  great  mass  of  the  people.  It  is  possible 
that  these  may  all  be  insufficient,  to  control  the  caprice  and 
wickedness  of  men.  But  are  they  not  all  that  government  will 
admit,  and  that  human  prudence  can  devise  ?  Are  they  not 
ihe  genuine,  and  the  characteristic  means,  by  which  republican 
government  provides  for  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  the  peo- 
ple ?  Are  they  not  the  identical  means  on  which  every  state 
government  in  the  union  relies  for  the  attainment  of  these 
important  ends  ?  What  then  are  we  to  understand  by  the  ob- 
jection which  this  paper  has  combatted  ?  What  are  we  to  say 
to  the  men  who  profess  the  most  flaming  zeal  for  republican 
government,  yet  boldly  impeach  the  fundamental  principle  of 
it ;  who  pretend  to  be  champions  for  the  right  and  the  capacity 
of  the  people  to  choose  their  own  rulers,  yet  maintain  that 
they  will  prefer  those  only  who  will  immediately  and  infallibly 
betray  the  trust  committed  to  them  ? 

Were  the  objection  to  be  read  by  one,  who  had  not  seen  the 
mode  prescribed  by  the  constitution  for  the  choice  of  repre- 
sentatives, he  could  suppose  nothing  less,  than  that  some  un- 
reasonable qualification  of  property  was  annexed  to  the  right 


438  THE   FEDERALIST. 

of  suffrage ;  or  that  the  right  of  eligibility  was  limited  to  per- 
sons of  particular  families  or  fortunes;  or  at  least,  that  the 
mode  prescribed  by  the  state  constitutions  was,  in  some  respect 
or  other,  very  grossly  departed  from.  We  have  seen  how  far 
such  a  supposition  would  err,  as  to  the  two  first  points.  Nor 
would  it,  in  fact,  be  less  erroneous  as  to  the  last.  The  only 
difference  discoverable  between  the  two  cases  is,  that  each 
representative  of  the  United  States  will  be  elected  by  five  or 
six  thousand  citizens ;  whilst,  in  the  individual  states,  the  elec- 
tion of  a  representative  is  left  to  about  as  many  hundred.  Will 
it  be  pretended,  that  this  difference  is  sufficient  to  justify  an 
attachment  to  the  state  governments,  and  an  abhorrence  to  the 
federal  government  ?  If  this  be  the  point  on  which  the  objec- 
tion turns,  it  deserves  to  be  examined. 

Is  it  supported  by  reason?  This  cannot  be  said,  without 
maintaining,  that  five  or  six  thousand  citizens  are  less  capable 
of  choosing  a  fit  representative,  or  more  liable  to  be  corruj)ted 
by  an  unfit  one,  than  five  or  six  hundred.  Reason,  on  the  con- 
trary, assures  us  that,  as  in  so  great  a  number,  a  fit  representa- 
tive would  be  most  likely  to  be  found ;  so  the  choice  would  be 
less  likely  to  be  diverted  from  him,  by  the  intrigues  of  the 
ambitious,  or  the  bribes  of  the  rich. 

Is  the  consequence  from  this  doctrine  admissible  ?  If  we  say 
that  five  or  six  hundred  citizens  are  as  many  as  can  jointly 
exercise  their  right  of  suffrage,  must  we  not  deprive  the  people 
of  the  immediate  choice  of  their  public  servants  in  every  in- 
stance, where  the  administration  of  the  government  does  not 
require  as  many  of  them  as  will  amount  to  one  for  that  number 
of  citizens. 

Is  the  doctrine  warranted  by  facts  ?  It  was  shown  in  the 
last  paper,  that  the  real  representation  in  the  British  house  of 
commons,  very  little  exceeds  the  proportion  of  one  for  ever^^ 
thirty  thousand  inhabitants.  Besides  a  variety  of  powerful 
causes,  not  existing  here,  and  which  favour  in  that  country, 
the  pretensions  of  rank  and  wealth,  no  person  is  eligible  as  i\ 
representa  :ive  of  a  county,  unless  he  possesses  real  estate  of 


THE    FEDERALIST.  439 

the  clear  value  of  six  hundred  pounds  sterling  per  year;  nor 
of  a  city  or  borough,  unless  he  possesses  a  like  estate  of  half  that 
annual  value.  To  this  qualification,  on  the  part  of  the  county 
representatives,  is  added  another  on  the  part  of  the  county 
electors,  which  restrains  the  right  of  suffrage  to  persons  having 
a  freehold  estate  of  the  annual  value  of  more  than  twenty 
pounds  sterling,  according  to  the  present  rate  of  money.  Not- 
withstanding these  unfavourable  circumstances,  and  notwith- 
standing some  very  unequal  laws  in  the  British  code,  it  cannot 
be  said,  that  the  representatives  of  the  nation  have  elevated 
the  few,  on  the  ruins  of  the  many. 

But  we  need  not  resort  to  foreign  experience  on  this  subject. 
Our  own  is  explicit  and  decisive.  The  districts  in  New-Hamp- 
shire, in  which  the  senators  are  chosen  immediately  by  the 
people,  are  nearly  as  large  as  will  be  necessary  for  her  repre- 
sentatives in  the  congress.  Those  of  Massachusetts  are  larger 
than  will  be  necessary  for  that  purpose.  And  those  of  New- 
York  still  more  so.  In  the  last  state,  the  members  of  assembly, 
for  the  cities  and  counties  of  New- York  and  Albany,  are  elected 
by  very  nearly  as  many  voters  as  will  be  entitled  to  a  repre- 
sentative in  the  congress,  calculating  on  the  number  of  sixty- 
five  representatives  only.  It  makes  no  difi'erence  that,  in  these 
senatorial  districts  and  counties,  a  number  of  representatives 
are  voted  for  by  each  elector  at  the  same  time.  If  the  same 
electors,  at  the  same  time,  are  capable  of  choosing  four  or  five 
representatives,  they  cannot  be  incapable  of  choosing  one. 
Pennsylvania  is  an  additional  example.  Some  of  her  counties, 
which  elect  her  state  representatives,  are  almost  as  large  as 
her  districts  will  be  by  which  her  federal  representatives  will 
be  elected.  The  city  of  Philadelphia  is  supposed  to  contain 
between  fifty  and  sixty  thousand  souls.  It  will,  therefore, 
form  nearly  two  districts  for  the  choice  of  federal  representa- 
tives. It  forms,  however,  but  one  county,  in  which  every 
elector  votes  for  each  of  its  representatives  in  the  state  legis- 
lature. And  what  may  appear  to  be  still  more  directly  to  our 
purpose,  the  whole  city  actually  elects  a  single  member  for  the 


440  THE    FEDERALIST. 

executive  council.     This  is  the  case  in  all  the  other  counties  of 
the  state. 

Are  Qot  these  facts  the  most  satisfactory  proofs  of  the  fallacy, 
which  has  been  employed  against  the  branch  of  the  federal 
government  under  consideration  ?  IJas  it  appeared  on  trial, 
that  the  senators  of  New-Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  and  New 
York ;  or  the  executive  council  of  Pennsylvania ;  or  the  mem- 
bers of  the  assembly  in  the  two  last  states,  have  betrayed  any 
peculiar  disposition  to  sacrifice  the  many  to  the  few ;  or  are  in 
any  respect  less  worthy  of  their  places,  than  the  representa- 
tives and  magistrates  appointed  in  other  states,  by  very  small 
divisions  of  the  people  ? 

But  there  are  cases  of  a  stronger  complexion,  than  any  which 
[  have  yet  quoted.  One  branch  of  the  legislature  of  Con 
uecticut  is  so  constituted,  that  each  member  of  it  is  elected  by 
the  whole  state.  So  is  the  governor  of  that  state,  of  Massa- 
chusetts, and  of  this  state,  and  the  president  of  New-Hamp- 
shire. I  leave  every  man  to  decide,  whether  the  result  of  any 
one  of  these  experiments,  can  be  said  to  countenance  a  suspicion, 
that  a  diffusive  mode  of  choosing  representatives  of  the 
people,  tends  to  elevate  traitors,  and  to  undermine  the  public 
liberty. 

PUBLIUS. 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


Ul 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LVIII. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY  22,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME   SUBJECT  CONTINUED,    IN    RELATION    TO    THE   FUTURE 
AUGMENTATION   OF   THE   MEMBERS. 

The  remaining  charge  against  the  house  of  representatives, 
which  I  am  to  examine,  is  grounded  on  a  supposition  that  the 
number  of  members  will  not  be  augmented  from  time  to  time, 
as  the  progress  of  population  may  demand. 

It  has  been  admitted  that  this  objection,  if  well  supported, 
would  have  great  weight.  The  following  observations  will 
show,  that,  like  most  other  objections  against  the  constitution, 
it  can  only  proceed  from  a  partial  view  of  the  subject;  or  from 
a  jealousy  which  discolours  and  disfigures  every  object  which  it 
beholds. 

1.  Those  who  urge  the  objection,  seem  not  to  have  recol- 
lected, that  the  federal  constitution  will  not  suffer  by  a  com- 
parison with  the  state  constitutions,  in  the  security  provided 
for  a  gradual  augmentation  of  the  number  of  representatives. 
The  number  which  is  to  prevail  in  the  first  instance,  is  declared 
to  be  temporary.  Its  duration  is  limited  to  the  short  term  of 
three  years. 

Within  every  successive  term  of  ten  years,  a  census  of  in- 
habitants is  to  be  repeated.  The  unequivocal  objects  of  these 
regulations  are,  first,  to  re-adjust,  from  time  to  time,  the  appor- 


142  THE    FEDERALIST. 

tionment  of  representatives  to  the  number  of  inhabitants; 
under  the  single  exception,  that  each  state  shall  have  one  rep- 
resentative at  least :  Secondly,  to  augment  the  number  of  rep- 
resentatives at  the  same  periods;  under  the  sole  limitation,  that 
the  whole  number  shall  not  exceed  one  for  every  thirty  thou- 
sand inhabitants.  If  we  review  the  constitutions  of  the  several 
states,  we  shall  find  that  some  of  them  contain  no  determinate 
regulations  on  this  subject;  that  others  correspond  pretty  much 
on  this  point  with  the  federal  constitution ;  and  that  the  most 
effectual  security  in  any  of  them,  is  resolvable  into  a  mero 
directory  provision. 

2.  As  far  as  experience  has  taken  place  on  this  subject,  a 
gradual  increase  of  representatives  under  the  state  consti- 
tutions, has  at  least  kept  pace  with  that  of  the  constituents: 
and  it  appears  that  the  former  have  been  as  ready  to  concur  in 
such  measures,  as  the  latter  have  been  to  call  for  them 

3.  There  is  a  peculiarity  in  the  federal  constitution,  which 
insures  a  watchful  attention  in  a  majority  both  of  the  people 
and  of  their  representatives,  to  a  constitutional  augmentatio/j 
of  the  latter  The  peculiarity  lies  in  this,  that  one  branch  of 
the  legislature  is  a  representation  of  citizens ;  the  other  of  the 
states :  In  the  former,  consequently,  the  larger  states  will  ha^e 
most  weight ;  in  the  latter,  the  advantage  will  be  in  favour  of 
the  smaller  states.  From  this  circumstance  it  may  with  cer- 
tainty be  inferred,  that  the  larger  states  will  be  strenuous 
advocates  for  increasing  the  number  and  weight  of  that  part 
of  the  legislature,  in  which  their  influence  predominates.  And 
it  80  happens,  that  four  only  of  the  largest,  will  have  a  majority 
ol  the  whole  votes  in  the  house  of  representatives.  Should  tho 
representatives  or  people,  therefore,  of  the  smaller  states, 
oppose  at  any  time  a  reasonable  addition  of  members,  a  coalition 
of  a  very  few  states  will  be  sufficient  to  over-rule  the  opposi- 
tion; a  coalition,  which,  notwithstanding  the  rivalship  and 
local  prejudices  which  might  prevent  it  on  ordinary  ocoasionb, 
would  not  fail  to  take  place,  when  not  merely  prompted  by 


THE   FEDERALTST.  443 

common  interest,  but  justified  by  equity  and  the  principles  of 
the  constitution. 

It  may  be  alleged,  perhaps,  that  the  senate  would  be 
prompted  by  like  motives  to  an  adverse  coalition ;  and  as  their 
concurrence  would  be  indispensable,  the  just  and  constitutional 
views  of  the  other  branch  might  be  defeated.  This  is  the 
difficulty  which  has  probably  created  the  most  serious  appre- 
hensions in  the  jealous  friends  of  a  numerous  representation. 
Fortunately  it  is  among  the  difficulties  which,  existing  only  in 
appearance,  vanish  on  a  close  and  accurate  inspection.  The 
following  reflections  will,  if  I  mistake  not,  be  admitted  to  be 
conclusive  and  satisfactory  on  this  point. 

Notwithstanding  the  equal  authority  which  will  subsist 
between  the  two  houses  on  all  legislative  subjects,  except  the 
originating  of  money  bills,  it  cannot  be  doubted,  that  the  house 
composed  of  the  greater  number,  when  supported  by  the  more 
powerful  states,  and  speaking  the  known  and  determined  sense 
of  a  majority  of  the  peojjle,  will  have  no  small  advantage  in  a 
question  depending  on  the  comparative  firmness  of  the  two 
houses. 

This  advantage  must  be  increased  by  the  consciousness  felt 
by  the  same  side,  of  being  supported  in  its  demands,  by  right, 
by  reason,  and  by  the  constitution ;  and  the  consciousness  on 
the  opposite  side,  of  contending  against  the  force  of  all  these 
solemn  considerations. 

It  is  farther  to  be  considered,  that  in  the  gradation  between 
the  smallest  and  largest  states,  there  are  several,  which,  though 
most  likely  in  general  to  arrange  themselves  among  the  former, 
are  too  little  removed  in  extent  and  population  from  the  latter, 
to  second  an  opposition  to  their  just  and  legitimate  pretensions. 
Hence  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  that  a  majority  of  votes,  even 
in  the  senate,  would  be  unfriendly  to  proper  augmentations  in 
the  number  of  representatives. 

It  will  not  be  looking  too  far  to  add,  that  the  senators  from 

:di  the  new  states  may  be  gained  over  to  the  just  views  of  the 

house  of  representatives,  by  an  expedient  too  obvious  to  be 

39 


444  THE   FEDERALIST. 

overlooked.  As  these  states  will,  for  a  great  length  of  time, 
advance  in  population  with  peculiar  rapidity,  they  will  be 
interested  in  frequent  re-apportionments  of  the  representatives 
to  the  number  of  inhabitants.  The  large  states,  therefore,  who 
will  prevail  in  the  house  of  representatives,  will  have  nothing 
to  do,  but  to  make  re -apportionments  and  augmentations 
mutually  conditions  of  each  other;  and  the  senators  from  all 
the  most  growing  states  will  be  bound  to  contend  for  the  latter, 
by  the  interest  which  their  states  will  feel  in  the  former. 

These  considerations  seem  to  afford  ample  security  on  this 
subject;  and  ought  alone  to  satisfy  all  the  doubts  and  fearp 
which  have  been  indulged  with  regard  to  it.  Admitting,  how 
ever,  that  they  should  all  be  insuflScient  to  subdue  the  unjust 
policy  of  the  smaller  states,  or  their  predominant  influence  in 
the  councils  of  the  senate;  a  constitutional  and  infallible 
resource  still  remains  with  the  larger  states,  by  which  they 
will  be  able  at  all  times  to  accomplish  their  just  purposes.  The 
house  of  representatives  can  not  only  refuse,  but  they  alone  can 
propose  the  supplies  requisite  for  the  support  of  government. 
They,  in  a  word,  hold  the  purse;  that  powerful  instrument  by 
which  we  behold  in  the  history  of  the  British  constitution  an 
infant  and  humble  representation  of  the  people,  gradually 
enlarging  the  sphere  of  its  activity  and  importance,  and  finally 
reducing,  as  far  as  it  seems  to  have  wished,  all  the  overgrown 
prerogatives  of  the  other  branches  of  the  government.  This 
power  over  the  purse,  may  in  fact  be  regarded  as  the  most 
complete  and  effectual  weapon,  with  which  any  constitution 
can  arm  the  immediate  representatives  of  the  people,  for 
obtaining  a  redress  of  every  grievance,  and  for  carrying  into 
effect  every  just  and  salutary  measure. 

But  will  not  the  house  of  representatives  be  as  much  inter- 
ested as  the  senate,  in  maintaining  the  government  in  its  proper 
functions,  and  will  they  not  therefore  be  unwilling  to  stake  its 
axistence  or  its  reputation  on  the  pliancy  of  the  senate  ?  Or 
If  such  a  trial  of  firmness  between  the  two  branches  were 
hazarded,  would  not  the  one  be  as  likely  first  So  yield  as  the 


THE   FEDERALIST.  445 

Other?  These  questions  will  create  no  difficulty  with  those 
who  reflect,  that  in  all  cases,  the  smaller  the  number,  and  the 
more  permanent  and  conspicuous  the  station  of  men  in  power, 
the  stronger  must  be  the  interest  which  they  will  individually 
feel  in  whatever  concerns  the  government.  Those  who  repre- 
sent the  dignity  of  their  country  in  the  eyes  of  other  nations, 
will  be  particularly  sensible  to  every  prospect  of  public  danger, 
or  of  a  dishonorable  stagnation  in  public  affairs.  To  those 
causes  we  are  to  ascribe  the  continual  triumph  of  the  British 
house  of  commons  over  the  other  branches  of  the  government, 
whenever  the  engine  of  a  money  bill  has  been  employed.  An 
absolute  inflexibility  on  the  side  of  the  latter,  although  if  could 
not  have  failed  to  involve  every  department  of  the  state  in  the 
general  confusion,  has  neither  been  apprehended  nor  experi- 
enced. The  utmost  degree  of  firmness  that  can  be  displayed 
by  the  federal  senate  or  president,  will  not  be  more  than  equal 
to  a  resistance,  in  which  they  will  be  supported  by  constitu- 
tional and  patriotic  principles. 

In  this  review  of  the  constitution  of  the  house  of  representa- 
tives, I  have  passed  over  the  circumstance  of  economy,  which, 
in  the  present  state  of  affairs,  might  have  had  some  effect  in 
lessening  the  temporary  number  of  representatives;  and  a 
disregard  of  which  would  probably  have  been  as  rich  a  theme 
of  declamation  against  the  constitution,  as  has  been  furnished 
by  the  smallness  of  the  number  proposed.  I  omit  also  any 
remarks  on  the  difficulty  which  might  be  found,  under  present 
circumstances,  in  engaging  in  the  federal  service  a  large  number 
of  such  characters  as  the  people  will  probably  elect.  One 
observation,  however,  I  must  be  permitted  to  add  on  this  sub- 
ject, as  claiming,  in  my  judgment,  a  very  serious  attention. 
It  is,  that  in  all  legislative  assemblies,  the  greater  the  number 
composing  them  may  be,  the  fewer  will  be  the  men  who  will 
ui  fact  direct  their  proceedings.  In  the  first  place,  the  more 
numerous  any  assembly  may  be,  of  whatever  characters  com- 
posed, the  greater  is  known  to  be  the  ascendancy  of  passion 
over  reason.     In  the  rext  place,  the  larger  the  number,  the 


446  THE    FEDERALIST. 

greater  will  be  the  proportion  of  members  of  limited  informa- 
tion and  of  weak  capacities.  Now  it  is  precisely  on  characters 
of  this  description,  that  the  eloquence  and  address  of  the  few 
are  known  to  act  with  all  their  force.  In  the  ancient  republics, 
where  the  whole  body  of  the  people  assembled  in  person,  a 
single  orator,  or  an  artful  statesman,  was  generally  seen  to 
rule  with  as  complete  a  sway,  as  if  a  sceptre  had  been  placed 
in  his  single  hands.  On  the  same  principle,  the  more  multitu- 
dinous a  representative  assembly  may  be  rendered,  the  more 
it  will  partake  of  the  infirmities  incident  to  collective  meetings 
of  the  people.  Ignorance  will  be  the  dupe  of  cunning;  and 
passion  the  slave  of  sophistry  and  declamation.  The  people 
can  never  err  more  than  in  supposing,  that  by  multiplying 
their  representatives  beyond  a  certain  limit,  they  strengthen 
the  barrier  against  the  government  of  a  few.  Experience  will 
for  ever  admonish  them,  that,  on  the  contrary,  after  securing  a 
sufficient  number  for  the  purposes  of  safety,  of  local  information,  and  of 
diffusive  sympathy  with  the  whole  society,  they  will  counteract  their 
own  views,  by  every  addition  to  their  representatives.  The 
countenance  of  the  government  may  become  more  democratic; 
but  the  soul  that  animates  it,  will  be  more  oligarchic.  The 
machine  will  be  enlarged,  but  the  fewer,  and  often  the  more 
secret,  will  be  the  springs  by  which  its  motions  are  directed. 

As  connected  with  the  objection  against  the  number  of  rej^re- 
sentatives,  may  properly  be  here  noticed,  that  which  has  been 
suggested  against  the  number  made  competent  for  legislative 
business.  It  has  been  said  that  more  than  a  majority  ought  to 
have  been  required  for  a  quorum,  and  in  particular  cases,  if  not 
in  all,  more  than  a  majority  of  a  quorum  for  a  decision. 

''^hat  some  advantages  might  have  resulted  from  such  a  pre- 
caution, cannot  be  denied.  It  might  have  been  an  additional 
shield  to  some  particular  interests,  and  another  obstacle  gene- 
rally to  hasty  and  partial  measures.  But  these  considerations 
are  outweighed  by  the  inconveniences  in  the  opposite  scale.  In 
all  cases  where  justice,  or  the  general  good,  might  require  new 
laws  to  be  passed,  or  active  measures  to  be  pursued,  the  fundi* 


THE    FEDERALIST.  447 

mental  principle  of  free  government  would  be  reversed.  It 
would  be  no  longer  the  majority  that  would  rule ;  the  power 
would  be  transferred  to  the  minority.  Were  the  defensive 
privilege  limited  to  particular  cases,  an  interested  minority 
might  take  advantage  of  it  to  skreen  themselves  from  equitable 
sacrifices  to  the  general  weal,  or  in  particular  emergencies  to 
extort  unreasonable  indulgences.  Lastly,  it  would  facilitate 
and  foster  the  baneful  practice  of  secessions ;  a  practice  which 
has  shown  itself,  even  in  states  where  a  majority  only  is  re- 
quired ;  a  practice  subversive  of  all  the  principles  of  order  and 
regular  government ;  a  practice  which  leads  more  directly  to 
public  convulsions,  and  the  ruin  of  popular  governments,  than 
any  other  which  has  yet  been  displayed  among  us. 

PUBLIUS 


448 


THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST 


NUMBER    I.IX. 


NEW   YORK,    FEBRUARY  22,   178a 


HAMILTON. 


CONCERNING  THE  REGULATION  OF  ELECTIONS. 

The  natural  order  of  the  subject  leads  us  to  consider,  in  this 
place,  that  provision  of  the  constitution  which  authorizes  the 
national  legislature  to  regulate,  in  the  last  resort,  the  election 
of  its  own  members. 

It  is  in  these  words :  "  The  times^  places,  and  manner  of  holding 
elections  for  senators  and  representatives,  shall  be  prescribed 
in  each  state  by  the  legislature  thereof;  but  the  congress  may, 
at  any  time,  by  law,  make  or  alter  such  regulations,  except  as  to 
places  of  choosing  senators.''*  This  provision  has  not  only 
been  declaimed  against  by  those  who  condemn  the  constitution 
in  the  gross ;  but  it  has  been  censured  by  those  who  have  ob- 
jected with  less  latitude,  and  greater  moderation;  and,  in  one 
instance,  it  has  been  thought  exceptionable  by  a  gentleman 
who  has  declared  himself  the  advocate  of  every  other  part  of 
the  system. 

I  am  greatly  mistaken,  notwithstanding,  if  there  be  any  arti- 
cle in  the  whole  plan  more  completely  defensible  th/in  this.  Its 
propriety  rests  upon  the  evidence  of  this  plain  proposition, 
that  every  government  ought  to  contain  in  itself  (he  m^ans  of  its  own 
preservation.    Every  just  reasoner  will,  at  first  sight,  approve  ar 

*  Ist  Clause,  4th  Section  of  the  1st  Article. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  44S 

adherence  to  this  rule  in  the  work  of  the  onventioa;  and  will 
disapprove  every  deviation  from  it,  which  may  not  appear  to 
have  been  dictated  by  the  necessity  of  incorporating  into  the 
work  some  particular  ingredient,  with  which  a  rigid  conformity 
to  the  rule  was  incompatible.  Even  in  this  case,  though  he 
may  acquiesce  in  the  necessity,  yet  he  will  not  cease  to  regard 
a  departure  from  so  fundamental  a  principle,  as  a  portion  of 
imperfection  in  the  system  which  may  prove  the  seed  of  future 
weakness,  and  perhaps  anarchy. 

It  will  not  be  alleged,  that  an  election  law  could  have  been 
framed  and  inserted  in  the  constitution,  which  would  have  been 
applicable  to  every  probable  change  in  the  situation  of  the 
country;  and  it  will,  therefore,  not  be  denied,  that  a  discre- 
tionary power  over  elections  ought  to  exist  somewhere.  It 
will,  I  presume,  be  as  readily  conceded,  that  there  were  only 
three  ways  in  which  this  power  could  have  been  reasonably 
organized ;  that  it  must  either  have  been  lodged  wholly  in  the 
national  legislature,  or  wholly  in  the  state  legislatures,  or  pri- 
marily in  the  latter,  and  ultimately  in  the  former.  The  last 
mode  has  with  reason  been  preferred  by  the  convention.  They 
have  submitted  the  regulation  of  elections  for  the  federal  gov- 
ernment, in  the  first  instance,  to  the  local  administrations; 
which,  in  ordinary  cases,  and  when  no  improper  views  prevail, 
may  be  both  more  convenient  and  more  satisfactory ;  but  they 
have  reserved  to  the  national  authority  a  right  to  interpose, 
whenever  extraordinary  circumstances  might  render  that  inter- 
position necessary  to  its  safety. 

Nothing  can  be  more  evident,  than  that  an  exclusive  power 
of  regulating  elections  for  the  national  government,  in  the 
hands  of  the  state  legislatures,  would  leave  the  existence  of 
the  union  entirely  at  their  mercy.  They  could  at  any  moment 
annihilate  it,  by  neglecting  to  provide  for  the  choice  of  persons 
to  administer  its  affairs.  It  is  to  little  purpose  to  say,  that  a 
neglect  or  omission  of  this  kind  would  not  be  likely  to  take 
place.  The  constitutional  possibility  of  the  thing,  without  an 
equivalent  for  the  risk,  is  an  unanswerable  objection.     Nor  has 


460  THE    FEDERALIST. 

any  eiatisfactory  reason  been  yet  assigned  for  injurring  that 
risk.  The  extravagant  surmises  of  a  distempered  jealousy. 
can  never  be  dignified  with  that  character.  If  we  are  in  a 
humour  to  presume  abuses  of  power,  it  is  as  fair  to  presume 
them  on  the  part  of  the  state  governments,  as  on  the  part  of 
the  general  government.  And  as  it  is  more  consonant  to  the 
rules  of  a  just  theory,  to  intrust  the  union  with  the  care  of  its 
own  existence,  than  to  transfer  that  care  to  any  other  hands ; 
if  abuses  of  power  are  to  be  hazarded  on  the  one  side  or  on 
the  other,  it  is  more  rational  to  hazard  them  where  the  power 
would  naturally  be  placed,  than  where  it  would  unnaturally  be 
placed. 

Suppose  an  article  had  been  introduced  into  the  constitution, 
empowering  the  United  States  to  regulate  the  elections  for  the 
particular  states,  would  any  man  have  hesitated  to  condemn  it, 
both  as  an  unwarrantable  transposition  of  power,  and  as  a  pre- 
meditated engine  for  the  destruction  of  the  state  governments  ? 
The  violation  of  principle,  in  this  case,  would  have  required  no 
comment;  and,  to  an  unbiassed  observer,  it  will  not  be  lesa 
apparent  in  the  project  of  subjecting  the  existence  of  the  na- 
tional government,  in  a  similar  respect,  to  the  pleasure  of  the 
state  governments.  An  impartial  view  of  the  matter  cannot 
fail  to  result  in  a  conviction  that  each,  as  far  as  possible,  ought 
to  depend  on  itself  for  its  own  preservation. 

As  an  objection  to  this  position,  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the 
constitution  of  the  national  senate,  would  involve  in  its  full 
extent  the  danger  which  it  is  suggested  might  flow  from  an 
exclusive  power  in  the  state  legislatures  to  regulate  the  federal 
elections.  It  may  be  alleged,  that  by  declining  the  appoint- 
ment of  senators,  they  might  at  any  time  give  a  fatal  blow  to 
the  union;  and  from  this  it  may  be  inferred,  that  as  ite  exist- 
ence would  be  thus  rendered  dependent  upon  them  in  3p 
essential  a  point,  there  can  be  no  objection  to  intrusting  them 
with  it,  in  the  particular  case  under  consideration.  The  interest 
of  each  state,  it  may  be  added,  to  maintain  its  representation 


THE    FEDERALIST.  451 

in  the  national  councils,  would  be  a  complete  security  againsi 
an  abuse  of  the  trust. 

This  argument,  though  specious,  will  not,  upon  examination 
be  found  solid.  It  is  certainly  true,  that  the  state  legislatures, 
by  forbearing  the  appointment  of  senators,  may  destroy  the 
national  government.  But  it  will  not  follow,  that  because  they 
have  the  power  to  do  this  in  one  instance,  they  ought  to  have 
it  in  every  other.  There  are  cases  in  which  the  pernicious 
tendency  of  such  a  power  may  be  far  more  decisive,  without 
any  motive  to  recommend  their  admission  into  the  system, 
equally  cogent  with  that  which  must  have  regulated  the  con- 
duct of  the  convention,  in  respect  to  the  formation  of  the 
senate.  So  far  as  that  mode  of  formation  may  expose  the 
onion  to  the  possibility  of  injury  from  the  state  legislatures,  it 
is  an  evil ;  but  it  is  an  evil,  which  could  not  have  been  avoided 
without  excluding  the  states,  in  their  political  capacities,  wholly 
from  a  place  in  the  organization  of  the  national  government. 
If  this  had  been  done,  it  would  doubtless  have  been  interpreted 
into  an  entire  dereliction  of  the  federal  principle ;  and  would 
certainly  have  deprived  the  state  governments  of  that  absolute 
safe-guard,  which  they  will  enjoy  under  this  provision.  But 
however  wise  it  may  have  been,  to  have  submitted  in  this  in- 
stance to  an  inconvenience,  for  the  attainment  of  a  necessary 
advantage  or  a  greater  good,  no  inference  can  be  drawn  from 
thence  to  favour  an  accumulation  of  the  evil,  where  no  neces- 
sity urges,  nor  any  greater  good  invites. 

It  may  also  be  easily  discerned,  that  the  national  govern- 
ment would  run  a  much  greater  risk,  from  a  power  in  the  state 
legislatures  over  the  elections  of  its  house  of  representatives, 
than  from  their  power  of  appointing  the  members  of  its  senate. 
The  senators  are  to  be  chosen  for  the  period  of  six  years ;  there 
is  to  be  a  rotation,  by  which  the  seats  of  a  third  part  of  them 
are  to  be  vacated,  and  replenished  every  two  years;  and  no 
state  is  to  be  entitled  to  more  than  two  senators :  A  quorum  of 
the  body,  is  to  consist  of  sixteen  members.  The  joint  result  of 
these  circumstances  would  be,  that  a  temporary  combination 


152  THE   FEDERALIST. 

of  «  few  states,  to  intermit  the  appointment  of  senators,  could 
neither  annul  the  existence,  nor  impair  the  activity,  of  the 
body  ?  And  it  is  not  from  a  general  and  permanent  combina- 
tion of  the  states,  that  we  can  have  any  thing  to  fear.  The 
first  might  proceed  from  sinister  designs  in, the  leading  mem- 
bers of  a  few  of  the  state  legislatures ;  the  last  would  suppose 
a  fixed  and  rooted  disaffection  in  the  great  body  of  the  people ; 
which  will  either  never  exist  at  all,  or  will,  in  all  probability, 
proceed  from  an  experience  of  the  inaptitude  of  the  general 
government  to  the  advancement  of  their  happiness ;  in  which 
event,  no  good  citizen  could  desire  its  continuance. 

But  with  regard  to  the  federal  house  of  representatives,  there 
18  intended  to  be  a  general  election  of  members  once  in  two 
years.  If  the  state  legislatures  were  to  be  invested  with  an 
exclusive  power  of  regulating  these  elections,  every  period  of 
making  them  would  be  a  delicate  crisis  in  the  national  situa- 
tion ;  which  might  issue  in  a  dissolution  of  the  union,  if  the 
leaders  of  a  few  of  the  most  important  states  should  have 
entered  into  a  previous  conspiracy  to  prevent  an  election. 

I  shall  not  deny  that  there  is  a  degree  of  weight  in  the  obser- 
vation, that  the  interest  of  each  state  to  be  represented  in  the 
federal  councils,  will  be  a  security  against  the  abuse  of  a  power 
over  its  elections  in  the  hands  of  the  state  legislatures.  But 
the  security  will  not  be  considered  as  complete,  by  those  who 
attend  to  the  force  of  an  obvious  distinction  between  the  in- 
terests of  the  people  in  the  public  ffelicity,  and  the  interest  of 
their  local  rulers  in  the  power  and  consequence  of  their  offices. 
The  people  of  America  may  be  warmly  attached  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  union,  at  times  when  the  particular  rulers  of  par- 
ticular states,  stimulated  by  the  natural  rivalship  of  power,  and 
by  the  hopes  of  personal  aggrandizement,  and  supported  by  a 
strong  faction  in  each  of  those  states,  may  be  in  a  very  oppo- 
site temper.  This  diversity  of  sentiment  between  a  majority 
of  the  people,  and  the  individuals  who  have  the  greatest  credit 
in  their  councils,  is  exemplified  in  some  of  the  states  at  the 
present  moment,  on  the  present  question.    The  scheme   of 


THE    FEDERALIST.  453 

separate  confederacies,  which  will  always  multiply  tho  chances 
of  ambition,  will  be  a  never  failing  bait  to  all  such  influential 
characters  in  the  state  administrations,  as  are  capable  of  pre- 
ferring their  own  emolument  and  advancement  to  the  public 
weal.  With  so  effectual  a  weapon  in  their  hands  as  the  ex- 
clusive power  of  regulating  elections  for  the  national  govern- 
ment, a  combination  of  a  few  such  men,  in  a  few  of  the  most 
considerable  states,  where  the  temptation  will  always  be  the 
strongest,  might  accomplish  the  destruction  of  tbe  union ;  by 
seizing  the  opportunity  of  some  casual  dissatisfaction  among 
the  people,  and  which  perhaps  they  may  themselves  have 
excited,  to  discontinue  the  choice  of  members  for  the  federal 
house  of  representatives.  It  ought  never  to  be  forgotten,  that 
a  firm  union  of  this-  country,  under  an  efficient  government, 
will  probably  be  an  increasing  object  of  jealousy  to  more  than 
one  nation  of  Europe ;  and  that  enterprises  to  subvert  it  will 
sometimes  originate  in  the  intrigues  of  foreign  powers,  and  will 
seldom  fail  to  be  patronised  and  abetted  by  some  of  them.  Its 
preservation  therefore  ought  in  no  case,  that  can  be  avoided,  to 
be  committed  to  the  guardianship  of  any  but  those,  whose 
situation  will  uniformly  beget  an  immediate  interest  in  the 
faithfu'  and  vigilant  performance  of  the  trust. 

PUBLIUB. 


454  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBBR   I  X. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY  26,    1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  SUBJECT  CONTINUED. 

"We  have  seen,  that  an  incontrolable  power  over  the  elo(  tiona 
for  the  federal  government  could  not,  without  hazard,  be  com- 
mitted to  the  state  legislatures.  Let  us  now  see  what  are  the 
dangers  on  the  other  side ;  that  is,  from  confiding  the  ultimate 
right  of  regulating  its  own  elections  to  the  union  itself.  It  is 
not  pretended,  that  this  right  would  ever  be  used  for  the  ex- 
clusion of  any  state  from  its  share  in  the  representation.  The 
interest  of  all  would,  in  this  respect  at  least,  be  the  security  of 
all.  But  it  is  alleged,  that  it  might  be  employed  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  promote  the  election  of  some  favourite  class  of 
men  in  exclusion  of  others  j  by  confining  the  places  of  election 
to  particular  districts,  and  rendering  it  impracticable  for  the 
citizens  at  large  to  partake  in  the  choice.  Of  all  chimerical 
suppositions,  this  seems  to  be  the  most  chimerical.  On  the  one 
hand,  no  rational  calculation  of  probabilities  would  lead  us  to 
imagine,  that  the  disposition,  which  a  conduct  so  violent  and 
extraordinary  would  imply,  could  ever  find  its  way  into  the 
national  councils;  and  on  the  other  land,  it  may  be  concluded 
with  certainty,  that  if  so  improper  a  spirit  should  ever  gain 
admittance  into  them,  it  would  display  itself  in  a  form  alto- 
gether different  and  far  more  decisive. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  455 

The  imprcbability  of  the  attempt,  may  be  satisfactorily  in- 
ferred from  this  single  reflection,  that  it  could  never  be  made 
without  causing  an  immediate  revolt  of  the  great  body  of  the 
people,  headed  and  directed  by  the  state  governments.  It  is 
not  diffi(iult  to  conceive,  that  this  characteristic  right  of  freedou' 
may,  in  certain  turbulent  and  factious  seasons,  be  violated  in 
respect  to  a  particular  class  of  citizens  by  a  victorious  majority; 
but  that  so  fundamental  a  privilege,  in  a  country  situated  and 
enlightened  as  this  is,  should  be  invaded  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
sjreat  mass  of  the  people,  by  the  deliberate  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment, without  occasioning  a  popular  revolution,  is  altogether 
inconceivable  and.  incredible. 

In  addition  to  this  general  reflection,  there  are  considerations 
of  a  more  precise  nature,  which  forbid  all  apprehension  on  the 
subject.  The  dissimilarity  in  the  ingredients,  -which  will  com- 
pose the  national  government,  and  still  more  in  the  manner  ir 
which  they  will  be  brought  into  action  in  its  various  branches, 
must  form  a  powerful  obstacle  to  a  concert  of  views,  in  anj" 
partial  scheme  of  elections.  There  is  suflScient  diversity  in  the 
state  of  property,  in  the  genius,  manners,  and  habits  of  the 
people  of  the  different  parts  of  the  union,  to  occasion  a  material 
diversity  of  disposition  in  their  representatives  towards  the 
different  ranks  and  conditions  in  society.  And  though  an  inti 
mate  intercourse  under  the  same  government,  will  promote  £ 
gradual  assimilation  of  temper  and  sentiment,  yet  there  are 
causes  as  well  physical  as  moral,  which  may,  in  a  greater  oi 
less  degree,  permanently  nourish  different  propensities  and  in- 
clinations in  this  particular.  But  the  circumstance  which  will 
be  likely  to  have  the  greatest  influence  in  the  matter,  will  be 
the  dissimilar  modes  of  constituting  the  several  component 
parts  of  the  government.  The  house  of  representatives  being 
to  be  elected  immediately  by  the  people;  the  senate  by  the 
state  legislatures;  the  president  by  electors  chosen  for  that 
purpose  by  the  people ;  there  would  be  little  probability  of  a 
common  interest  to  cement  these  different  branches  in  a  predi- 
lection for  any  particular  class  of  electors. 


456  THE   FEDERALIST. 

As  to  the  senate,  it  is  impossible  that  any  regulation  of  "  time 
and  manner,"  which  is  all  that  is  proposed  to  be  submitted  to 
the  national  government  in  respect  to  that  body,  can  affect  the 
spirit  which  will  direct  the  choice  of  its  members.  The  collec- 
tive sense  of  the  state  legislatures,  can  never  be  influenced  by 
extraneous  circumstances  of  that  sort :  A  consideration  which 
alone  ought  to  satisfy  us  that  the  discrimination  apprehended 
would  never  be  attempted.  For  what  inducement  could  the 
senate  have  to  concur  in  a  preference  in  which  itself  would  not 
be  included  ?  Or  to  what  purpose  would  it  be  established  in 
reference  to  one  branch  of  the  legislature,  if  it  could  not  be 
extended  to  the  other  ?  The  composition  of.  the  one  would  in 
this  case  counteract  that  of  the  other.  And  we  can  never  sup- 
pose that  it  would  embrace  the  appointments  to  the  senate, 
unless  we  can  at  the  same  time  suppose  the  voluntary  co-opera- 
tion of  the  state  legislatures.  If  we  make  the  latter  supposition, 
it  then  becomes  immaterial  where  the  power  in  question  is 
placed;  whether  in  their  hands,  or  in  those  of  the  union. 

But  what  is  to  be  the  object  of  this  capricious  partiality  in 
the  national  councils  ?  Is  it  to  be  exercised  in  a  discrimination 
between  the  different  departments  of  industry,  or  between  the 
different  kinds  of  property,  or  between  the  different  degrees  of 
property  ?  "Will  it  lean  in  favour  of  the  landed  interest,  or  the 
monied  interest,  or  the  mercantile  interest,  or  the  manufactur- 
ing interest?  Or,  to  speak  in  the  fashionable  language  of  the 
adversaries  of  the  constitution,  will  it  court  the  elevation  of 
the  "wealthy  and  the  wellborn,"  to  the  exclusion  and  debase- 
ment of  all  the  rest  of  the  society  ? 

If  this  partiality  is  to  be  exerted  in  favour  of  those,  who  are 
concerned  in  any  particular  description  of  industry  or  property, 
I  presume  it  will  readily  be  admitted,  that  the  competition  for 
it,  will  lie  between  landed  men  and  merchants.  And  I  scruple 
not  to  affirm,  that  it  is  infinitely  less  likely  that  either  of  them 
should  gain  an  ascendant  in  the  national  councils,  than  that  the 
one  or  the  other  of  them  should  predominate  in  all  the  local 
councils.    The  inference  will  be,  that  a  conduct  tending  to  give 


THE    FEDERALIST.  457 

an  undue  preference  to  either,  is  much  less  to  be  areaded  from 
the  former  than  from  the  latter. 

The  several  states  are  in  various  degrees  addicted  to  agricul- 
ture and  commerce.  In  most,  if  not  all  of  them,  the  first  in 
predominant.  In  a  few  of  them,  however,  the  latter  nearly 
divides  its  empire;  and  in  most  of  them  has  a  considerable 
share  of  influence.  In  proportion  as  either  prevails,  it  will  be 
conveyed  into  the  national  representation;  and  for  the  very 
reason,  that  this  will  be  an  emanation  from  a  greater  variety 
of  interests,  and  in  much  more  various  proportions,  than  are  to 
be  found  in  any  single  state,  it  will  be  much  less  apt  to  espouse 
either  of  them,  with  a  decided  partiality,  than  the  representation 
of  any  single  state. 

In  a  country  consisting  chiefly  of  the  cultivators  of  land, 
where  the  rules  of  an  equal  representation  obtain,  the  landed 
interest  must,  upon  the  whole,  preponderate  in  the  government. 
As  long  as  this  interest  prevails  in  most  of  the  state  legislatures, 
so  long  it  must  maintain  a  correspondent  superiority  in  the 
national  senate,  which  will  generally  be  a  faithful  copy  of  the 
majorities  of  those  assemblies.  It  cannot  therefore  be  pre- 
sumed, that  a  sacrifice  of  the  landed  to  the  mercantile  class, 
will  ever  be  a  favourite  object  of  this  branch  of  the  federal 
legislature.  In  applying  thus  particularly  to  the  senate  a 
general  observation  suggested  by  the  situation  of  the  country. 
I  am  governed  by  the  consideration,  that  the  credulous  votaries 
of  state  power  cannot,  upon  their  own  principles,  suspect  that 
the  state  legislatures  would  be  warped  from  their  duty  by  any 
external  influence.  But  as  in  reality  the  same  situation  must 
have  the  same  effect,  in  the  primitive  composition  at  least 
of  the  federal  house  of  representatives;  an  improper  biass 
towards  the  mercantile  class,  is  as  little  to  be  expected  from 
this  quarter  or  from  the  other. 

In  order  perhaps  to  give  countenance  to  the  objection  at  any 
rate,  it  may  be  asked,  is  there  not  danger  of  an  opposite  biass 
in  the  national  government,  which  may  produce  an  endeavour 
to  secure  a  monoply  of  the  federal  administration  to  the  landed 


458  THE   FEDERALIST. 

class '/  As  there  is  little  likelihood  that  the  supposition  of  such 
a  biass  will  have  any  terrors  for  those  who  would  be  immedi- 
ately injured  by  it,  a  laboured  answer  to  this  question  will  be 
dispensed  with.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  remark,  first,  that  for 
the  reasons  elsewhere  assigned,  it  is  less  likely  that  any  decided 
partiality  should  prevail  in  the  councils  of  the  union,  than  in 
those  of  any  of  its  members.  Secondly,  that  there  would  be 
no  temptation  to  violate  the  constitution  in  favor  of  the  landed 
class,  because  that  class  would,  in  the  natural  course  of  things, 
enjoy  as  great  a  preponderancy  as  itself  could  desire.  And 
thirdly,  that  men  accustomed  to  investigate  the  sources  of 
public  prosperity,  upon  a  large  scale,  must  be  too  well  con- 
vinced of  the  utility  of  commerce,  to  be  inclined  to  inflict  upon 
it  so  deep  a  wound,  as  would  be  occasioned  by  the  entire  exclu- 
sion of  those  who  would  best  understand  its  interests,  from  a 
share  in  the  management  of  them.  The  importance  of  com- 
merce in  the  view  of  revenue  alone,  must  effectually  guard  it 
against  the  enmity  of  a  body,  which  would  be  continually 
importuned  in  its  favor,  by  the  urgent  calls  of  public  necessity. 

I  the  rather  consult  brevity  in  discussing  the  probability  of  a 
preference  founded  upon  a  discrimination  between  the  different 
kinds  of  industry  and  property,  because,  as  far  as  I  understand 
the  meaning  of  the  objectors,  they  contemplate  a  discrimination 
of  another  kind.  They  appear  to  have  in  view,  as  the  objects 
of  the  preference  with  which  they  endeavour  to  alarm  us,  those 
whom  they  designate  by  the  description  of  the  "  wealthy  and 
the  well-born."  These,  it  seems,  are  to  be  exalted  to  an  odious 
pre-eminence  over  the  rest  of  their  fellow  citizens.  At  one  time, 
however,  their  elevation  is  to  be  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 
smallness  of  the  representative  body ;  at  another  time,  it  is  to 
bo  effected  by  depriving  the  people  at  large  of  the  opportunity 
of  exercising  their  right  of  suffrage  in  the  choice  of  that  body. 

But  upon  what  principle  is  the  discrimination  of  the  placch 
of  election  to  be  made,  in  order  to  answer  the  purpose  of  the 
meditated  preference  ?  Are  the  wealthy  and  the  well-born,  as 
they  are   called,  confined  to  particular   spots   in    the  several 


THE    FEDERALIST.  459 

States  ?  Have  they,  by  some  miraculous  instinct  or  foresight, 
set  apart  in  each  of  them,  a  common  place  of  residence  ?  Are 
they  only  to  be  met  with  in  the  towns  and  the  cities  ?  Or  are 
they,  on  the  contrary,  scattered  over  the  face  of  the  country, 
as  avarice  or  chance  may  have  happened  to  cast  their  own  lot, 
or  that  of  their  predecessors  ?  If  the  latter  is  the  case,  (as 
every  intelligent  man  knows  it  to  be*)  is  it  not  evident  that 
the  policy  of  confining  the  places  of  elections  to  particular 
districts,  would  be  as  subversive  of  its  own  aim,  as  it  would  be 
exceptionable  on  every  other  account  ?  The  truth  is,  that  there 
is  no  method  of  securing  to  the  rich  the  preference  appre- 
hended, but  by  prescribing  qualifications  of  property  either  for 
those  who  may  elect,  or  be  elected.  But  this  forms  no  part  of 
the  power  to  be  conferred  upon  the  national  government.  Its 
authority  would  be  expressly  restricted  to  the  regulation  of 
the  times,  the  places,  and  the  manner  of  elections.  The  qualifica- 
tions of  the  persons  who  may  choose  or  be  chosen,  as  has  been 
remarked  upon  another  occasion,  are  defined  and  fixed  in  the 
constitution ;  and  are  unalterable  by  the  legislature. 

Let  it  however  be  admitted,  for  argument  sake,  that  the  ex- 
pedient suggested  might  be  successful ;  and  let  it  at  the  same 
time  be  equally  taken  for  granted,  that  all  the  scruples  which  a 
sense  of  duty,  or  an  apprehension  of  the  danger  of  the  experi- 
ment might  inspire,  were  overcome  in  the  breasts  of  the  na- 
tional rulers;  still,  I  imagine,  it  will  hardly  be  pretended,  that 
they  could  ever  hope  to  carry  such  an  enterprise  into  execution, 
without  the  aid  of  a  military  force  sufficient  to  subdue  the 
resistance  of  the  great  body  of  the  people.  The  improbability 
of  the  existence  of  a  force  equal  to  that  object,  has  been  dis- 
cussed and  demonstrated  in  different  parts  of  these  papers ;  but 
that  the  futility  of  the  objection  under  consideration  may  ap- 
pear in  the  strongest  light,  it  shall  be  conceded  for  a  moment, 
that  such  a  force  might  exist;  and  the  national  government 
shall  be  supposed  to  be  in  the  actual  possession  of  it.  What 
will  be  the  conclusion  ?    "With  a  disposition  to  invade  the  essen- 

*  Particularly  in  the  southern  states  and  in  this  state. 
40 


460  THE    FEDERALIST. 

tial  rights  of  the  community,  and  with  the  means  of  gratifying 
that  disposition,  is  it  presumable  that  the  persons  who  were 
actuated  by  it  would  amuse  themselves  in  the  ridiculous  task 
of  fabricating  election  laws  for  securing  a  preference  to  a 
favourite  class  of  men  ?  Would  they  not  be  likely  to  prefer  a 
conduct  better  adapted  to  their  own  immediate  aggrandize- 
ment ?  Would  they  not  rather  boldly  resolve  to  perpetuate 
themselves  in  office  by  one  decisive  act  of  usurpation,  than  to 
trust  to  precarious  expedients,  which,  in  spite  of  all  the  pre- 
cautions that  might  accompany  them,  might  terminate  in  the 
dismission,  disgrace,  and  ruin  of  their  authors  ?  Would  they 
not  fear  that  citizens  not  less  tenacious  than  conscious  of  their 
rights,  would  flock  from  the  remotest  extremes  of  their  respec- 
tive states  to  the  places  of  election,  to  overthrow  their  tyrants, 
and  to  substitute  men  who  would  be  disposed  to  avenge  the 
violated  majesty  of  the  people  ?  ♦; 

•  PUBLIUB. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  461 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    I.Xl. 


NEW  YORK,   FEBRUARY  26,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME   SUBJECT   CONTINUED,  AND   CONCLUDED. 

The  more  candid  opposers  of  the  provision,  contained  in  the 
plan  of  the  convention,  respecting  elections,  when  pressed  in 
argument,  will  sometimes  concede  the  propriety  of  it;  with 
this  qualification,  however,  that  it  ought  to  have  been  accom- 
panied with  a  declaration,  that  all  elections  should  be  held  in 
the  counties  where  the  electors  reside.  This,  say  they,  was  a 
necessary  precaution  against  an  abuse  of  the  power.  A  declara- 
tion of  this  nature,  would  certainly  have  been  harmless :  So  far 
as  it  would  have  had  the  effect  of  quieting  apprehensions,  it 
might  not  have  been  undesirable.  But  it  would,  in  fact,  have 
afforded  little  or  no  additional  security  against  the  danger 
apprehended ;  and  the  want  of  it  will  never  be  considered,  by 
an  impartial  and  judicious  examiner,  as  a  serious,  still  less  as 
an  insuperable,  objection  to  the  plan.  The  different  views 
taken  of  the  subject  in  the  two  preceding  papers,  must  be  suffi- 
cient to  satisfy  all  dispassionate  and  discerning  men,  that  if  the 
public  liberty  should  ever  be  the  victim  of  the  ambition  of  the 
national  rulers,  the  power  under  examination,  at  least,  will  be 
guiltless  of  the  sacrifice. 

If  those  who  are  inclined  to  consult  their  jealousy  only, 
would  exercise  it  in  a  careful  inspection  of  the  several  state 


462  THE    FEDERALIST. 

constitutions,  they  would  find  little  less  room  for  disquietude 
and  alarm,  from  the  latitude  which  most  of  them  allow  ia 
respect  to  elections,  than  from  that  which  is  proposed  to  be 
allowed  to  the  national  government  in  the  same  respect.  A 
review  of  their  situation,  in  this  particular,  would  tend  greatly 
to  remove  any  ill  impressions  which  may  remain  in  regard  to 
this  matter.  But,  as  that  review  would  lead  into  long  and 
tedious  details,  I  shall  content  myself  with  the  single  example 
of  the  state  in  which  I  write.  The  constitution  of  New-York 
makes  no  other  provision  for  locality  of  elections,  than  that  the 
members  of  the  assembly"  shall  be  elected  in  the  counties  ;  those 
of  the  senate,  in  the  great  districts  into  which  the  state  is,  or 
may  be  divided :  these  at  present  are  four  in  number,  and  com- 
prehend each  from  two  to  six  counties.  It  may  readily  be  per- 
ceived, that  it  would  not  be  more  difficult  for  the  legislature  of 
New- York  to  defeat  the  suffrages  of  the  citizens  of  New- York, 
by  confining  elections  to  particular  places,  than  for  the  legis- 
lature of  the  United  States  to  defeat  the  suffrages  of  the  citi- 
zens of  the  union,  by  the  like  expedient.  Suppose,  for  instance, 
the  city  of  Albany  was  to  be  appointed  the  sole  place  of  election 
for  the  county  and  district  of  which  it  is  a  part,  would  not  the 
inhabitants  of  that  city  speedily  become  the  only  electors  of 
the  members  both  of  the  senate  and  assembly  for  that  county 
and  district  ?  Can  we  imagine,  that  the  electors  who  reside  in 
the  remote  subdivisions  of  the  counties  of  Albany,  Saratoga, 
Cambridge,  &c.  or  in  any  part  of  the  count}''  of  Montgomery, 
would  take  the  trouble  to  come  to  the  city  of  Albany,  to  give 
their  votes  for  members  of  the  assembly  or  senate,  sooner  than 
they  would  repair  to  the  city  of  New- York,  to  participate  in 
the  choice  of  the  members  of  the  federal  house  of  representa- 
tives ?  The  alarming  indiffert  nee  discoverable  in  the  exercise 
of  so  invaluable  a  privilege  under  the  existing  laws,  which 
afford  every  facility  to  it,  furnishes  a  ready  answer  to  this 
question.  And,  abstracted  from  any  experience  on  the  subject, 
we  can  be  at  no  loss  to  determine,  that  when  the  place  of 
election  is  at  an  inconvenient  distance  from  the  elector,  the  eftect 


THE   FEDERALIST.  463 

upon  his  conduct  will  be  the  same,  whether  that  distance  be 
twenty  miles,  or  twenty  thousand  miles.  Hence  it  must  appear, 
that  objections  to  the  particular  modification  of  the  federal 
power  of  regulating  elections,  will,  in  substance,  apply  with 
equal  force  to  the  modification  nf  the  like  power  in  the  consti- 
tution of  this  state ;  and  for  this  reason  it  will  be  impossible  to 
acquit  the  one,  and  to  condemn  the  other.  A  similar  comparison 
would  lead  to  the  same  conclusion,  in  respect  to  the  consti- 
tutions of  most  of  the  other  states. 

If  it  should  be  said,  that  defects  in  the  state  constitutions 
furnish  no  apology  for  those  which  are  to  be  found  in  the  plan 
proposed;  I  answer,  that,  as  the  former  have  never  been 
thought  chargeable  with  inattention  to  the  security  of  liberty, 
where  the  imputations  thrown  on  the  latter  can  be  shown  to  be 
applicable  to  them  also,  the  presumption  is,  that  they  are 
rather  the  cavilling  refinements  of  a  predetermined  opposition, 
*han  the  well  founded  inferences  of  a  candid  research  after 

ruth.  To  those  who  are  disposed  to  consider,  as  innocent 
omissions  in  the  state  constitutions,  what  they  regard  as  unpar- 
donable blemishes  in  the  plan  of  the  convention,  nothing  can 

)e  said;  or,  at  most,  they  can  only  be  asked  to  assign  some 
substantial  reason  why  the  representatives  of  the  people,  in  a 
single  state,  should  be  more  impregnable  to  the  lust  of  power, 
or  other  sinister  motives,  than  the  representatives  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States  ?  If  they  cannot  do  this,  they  ought,  at 
"east,  to  prove  to  us,  that  it  is  easier  to  subvert  the  liberties  of 
.hree  millions  of  people,  with  the  advantage  of  local  govern- 
nents  to  head  their  opposition,  than  of  two  hundred  thousand 
jeople  who  are  destitute  of  that  advantage.  And  in  relation 
:o  the  point  immediately  under  consideration,  they  ought  to 
.onvince  us  that  it  is  less  probable  that  a  predominant  faction, 
m  a  single  state,  should,  in  order  to  maintain  its  superiority, 
incline  to  a  preference  of  a  particular  class  of  electors,  than 
that  a  similar  spirit  should  take  possession  of  the  representatives 
of  thirteen  states,  spread  over  a  vast  region,  and  in  several 


464  THE    FEDERALIST. 

respects  dutinguishable  from  each  other  by  a  diversity  of  local 
circumstances,  prejudices,  and  interests. 

Hitherto  my  observations  have  only  aimed  at  a  vindication 
of  the  provision  in  question,  on  the  ground  of  theoretic  pro- 
priety, on  that  of  the  danger  of  placing  the  power  elsewhere, 
and  on  that  of  the  safety  of  placing  it  in  the  manner  proposed. 
But  there  remains  to  be  mentioned  a  positive  advantage,  which 
will  accrue  from  this  disposition,  and  which  could  not  as  well 
have  been  obtained  from  any  other :  I  allude  to  the  circum- 
Gtance  of  uniformity,  in  the  time  of  elections  for  the  federal 
house  of  representatives.  It  is  more  than  possible,  that  this 
uniformity  may  be  found  by  experience  to  be  of  great  import- 
ance to  the  public  welfare ;  both  as  a  security  against  the  per- 
petuation of  the  same  spirit  in  the  body,  and  as  a  cure  for  the 
diseases  of  faction.  If  each  state  may  choose  its  own  time  of 
election,  it  is  possible  there  may  be  at  least  as  many  different 
periods  as  there  are  months  in  the  year.  The  times  of  election 
in  the  several  states,  as  they  are  now  established  for  local  pur- 
poses, vary  between  extremes  as  wide  as  March  and  November. 
The  consequence  of  this  diversity  would  be,  that  there  could 
never  happen  a  total  dissolution  or  renovation  of  the  body  at 
one  time.  If  an  improper  spirit  of  any  kind  should  happen  to 
prevail  in  it,  that  spirit  would  be  apt  to  infuse  itself  into  the 
new  members,  as  they  come  forward  in  succession.  The  masb 
would  be  likely  to  remain  nearly  the  same ;  assimilating  con- 
stantly to  itself  its  gradual  accretions.  There  is  a  contagion 
m  example,  which  few  men  have  sufficient  force  of  mind  to 
resist  E  am  inclined  to  think,  that  treble  the  duration  in 
office,  with  the  condition  of  a  total  dissolution  of  the  body  at 
the  same  time,  might  be  less  formidable  to  liberty,  than  one 
third  of  that  duration  subject  to  gradual  and  successive  alter- 
ations. 

Uniformity,  in  the  time  of  elections,  seems  not  less  requisite 
for  executing  the  idea  of  a  regular  rotation  in  the  senate;  and 
for  conveniently  assembling  the  legislature  at  a  stated  period 
in  each  year. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  465 

It  may  be  asked,  why  then  could  not  a  time  have  Deen  fixed 
in  the  constitution?  As  the  most  zealous  adversaries  cf  the 
plan  of  the  convention  in  this  state,  are  in  general  not  less 
zealous  admirers  of  the  constitution  of  the  state,  the  question 
may  be  retorted,  and  it  may  be  asked,  why  was  not  a  time  foi 
the  like  purpose  fixed  in  the  constitution  of  this  state  ?  No 
better  answer  can  be  given,  than  that  it  was  a  matter  which 
might  safely  be  intrusted  to  legislative  discretion ;  and  that,  if 
a  time  had  been  appointed,  it  might,  upon  experiment,  have 
been  found  less  convenient  than  some  other  time.  The  same 
answer  may  be  given  to  the  question  put  on  the  other  side. 
And  it  may  be  added,  that  the  supposed  danger  of  a  gradual 
change  being  merely  speculative,  it  would  have  been  hardly 
advisable  upon  that  speculation  to  establish,  as  a  fundamental 
point,  what  would  deprive  several  states  of  the  convenience 
of  having  the  elections  for  their  own  governments,  and  for 
the  national  government,  at  the  same  epoch. 

PUBLIUB. 


466  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LXII. 


NEW    YORK,   FEBRUARY    29,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


ODNCERNING  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  SENATE,  WITH  REGARD 
TO  THE  QUALIFICATIONS  OF  THE  MEMBERS;  THE  MANNER  OF 
APPOINTING  THEM;  THE  EQUALITY  OF  REPRESENTATION;  THE 
NUMBER  OF  THE  SENATORS,  AND  THE  DURATION  OF  THEIR 
APPOINTMENTS. 

Having  examined  tne  constitution  of  the  house  of  representa- 
tives, and  answered  such  of  the  objections  against  it  as  seemed 
to  merit  notice,  I  enter  next  on  the  examination  of  the  senate. 

The  heads  under  which  this  member  of  the  government  may- 
be considered,  are — I.  The  qualifications  of  senators — II.  The 
appointment  of  them  by  the  state  legislatures  —  III.  The 
equality  of  representation  in  the  senate — IV.  The  number 
of  senators,  and  the  term  for  which  they  are  to  be  elected 
— y.    The  powers  vested  in  the  senate. 

I.  The  qualifications  proposed  for  senators,  as  distinguished 
from  those  of  representatives,  consist  in  a  more  advanced  age, 
and  a  longer  period  of  citizenship.  A  senator  must  be  thirty 
years  of  age  at  least;  as  a  representative  must  be  twenty-five 
And  the  former  must  have  been  a  citizen  nine  years ;  as  seven 
years  are  required  for  the  latter.  The  propriety  of  these  dis- 
tinctions, is  explained  by  the  nature  of  the  senatorial  trust; 
which,  requiring  greater  extent  of  information  and  stability  of 
character,  requires  at  the  same  lime,  that  the  senator  should 


THE    FEDERALIST.  467 

have  reached  a  period  of  life  most  likely  to  supply  these  advan- 
tages; and  which,  participating  immediately  in  transactions 
with  foreign  nations,  ought  to  be  exercised  by  none,  who  are 
not  thoroughly  weaned  from  the  prepossessions  and  habits, 
incident  to  foreign  birth  and  education.  The  term  of  nine 
years  appears  to  be  a  prudent  mediocrity  between  a  total 
exclusion  of  adopted  citizens,  whose  merit  and  talents  may 
claim  a  share  in  the  public  confidence ;  and  an  indiscriminate 
and  hasty  admission  of  them,  which  might  create  a  channel  for 
foreign  influence  on  the  national  councils. 

II.  It  is  equally  unnecessary  to  dilate  on  the  appointment  of 
senators  by  the  state  legislatures.  Among  the  various  modes 
which  might  have  been  devised  for  constituting  this  branch  of 
the  government,  that  which  has  been  proposed  by  the  conven- 
tion is  probably  the  most  congenial  with  the  public  opinion. 
It  is  recommended  by  the  double  advantage  of  favouring  a 
select  appointment,  and  of  giving  to  the  state  governments 
such  an  agency  in  the  formation  of  the  federal  government,  as 
must  secure  the  authority  of  the  former,  and  may  form  a  con- 
venient link  between  the  two  systems. 

III.  The  equality  of  representation  in  the  senate  is  another 
point,  which,  being  evidently  the  result  of  compromise  between 
the  opposite  pretensions  of  the  large  and  the  small  states,  does 
not  call  for  much  discussion.  If  indeed  it  be  right,  that  among 
a  people  thoroughly  incorporated  into  one  nation,  every  dis- 
trict ought  to  have  a  pj'oportional  share  in  the  government :  and 
that  among  independent  and  sovereign  states  bound  together 
by  a  simple  league,  the  parties,  however  unequal  in  size,  ought 
to  have  an  equal  share  in  the  common  councils,  it  does  not  ap- 
pear to  be  without  some  reason,  that  in  a  compound  republic, 
pai'taking  both  of  the  national  and  federal  character,  the  gov- 
ernmeiit  ought  to  be  founded  on  a  mixture  of  the  principles  of 
proportional  and  equal  representation.  But  it  is  superfluous  to 
try,  by  .the  standard  of  theory,  a  part  of  the  constitution  which 
IS  allowed  on  all  hands  to  be  the  result,  not  of  theory,  but  "  of 
a  spirit  of  amity,  and  that  mutual  deference  and  concession 


468  THE    FEDERALIST. 

vvhicli  i^hfe  peculiarity  of  our  political  situation  rendered  indis 
pensable."  A  common  government,  with  powers  equal  to  its 
objects,  is  called  for  by  the  voice,  and  still  more  loudly  by  the 
political  situation,  of  America.  A  government  founded  on 
principles  more  consonant  to  the  wishes  of  the  larger  states,  is 
not  likely  to  be  obtained  from  the  smaller  states.  The  only 
option  then  for  the  former,  lies  between  the  proposed  govern- 
ment, and  a  government  still  more  objectionable.  Under  this 
alternative,  the  advice  of  prudence  must  be,  to  embrace  the 
lesser  evil;  and,  instead  of  indulging  a  fruitless  anticipation 
of  the  possible  mischiefs  which  may  ensue,  to  contemplate 
rather  the  advantageous  consequences  which  may  qualify  the 
sacrifice. 

In  this  spirit  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  equal  vote  allowed 
to  each  state,  is  at  once  a  constitutional  recognition  of  the 
portion  of  sovereignty  remaining  in  the  individual  states,  and 
an  instrument  for  preserving  that  residuary  sovereignty.  So 
far  the  equality  ought  to  be  no  less  acceptable  to  the  large  than 
to  the  small  states ;  since  they  are  not  less  solicitous  to  guard 
by  every  possible  expedient  against  an  improper  consolidation 
of  the  states  into  one  simple  republic. 

Another  advantage  accruing  from  this  ingredient  in  the  con- 
stitution of  the  senate  is,  the  additional  impediment  it  must 
prove  against  improper  acts  of  legislation.  No  law  or  resolu- 
tion can  now  be  passed  without  the  concurrence,  first,  of  a 
majority  of  the  people,  and  then,  of  a  majority  of  the  states. 
It  must  be  acknowledged  that  this  complicated  check  on  legis- 
lation may,  in  some  instances,  be  injurious  as  well  as  beneficial ; 
and  that  the  peculiar  defence  which  it  involves  in  favour  of  the 
smaller  states,  would  be  more  rational,  if  any  interests  common 
to  them,  and  distinct  from  those  of  the  other  states,  would 
otherwise  be  exposed  to  peculiar  danger.  But  as  the  larger 
states  will  always  be  able,  by  their  power  over  the  supplies,  to 
defeat  unreasonable  exertions  of  this  prerogative  of  the  lesser 
states ;  and  as  the  facility  and  excess  of  law-making  seem  to  be 
the  diseases  to  which  our  governments  are  most  liable,  it  is  not 


THE    FEDERALIST.  46'9 

impossible,  that  this  part  of  the  constitution  may  bo  more  con- 
venient in  practice,  than  it  appears  to  many  in  contemplation. 

iV.  The  number  of  senators,  and  the  duration  of  their  ap- 
pointment, come  next  to  be  considered.  In  order  to  form  an 
accurate  judgment  on  both  these  points,  it  will  be  proper  to 
inquire  into  the  purposes  which  are  to  be  answered  by  the 
senate;  and,  in  order  to  ascertain  these,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
review  the  inconveniences  which  a  republic  must  suffer  fiom 
the  want  of  such  an  institution. 

First.  It  is  a  misfortune  incident  to  republican  government, 
though  in  a  less  degree  than  to  other  governments,  that  those 
who  administer  it,  may  forget  their  obligations  to  their  consti- 
tuents, and  prove  unfaithful  to  their  important  trust.  In  this 
point  of  view,  a  senate,  as  a  second  branch  of  the  legislative 
assembly,  distinct  from,  and  dividing  the  power  with,  a  first, 
must  be  in  all  cases  a  salutary  check  on  the  government.  It 
doubles  the  security  to  the  people,  by  requiring  the  concurrence 
of  two  distinct  bodies  in  schemes  of  usurpation  or  perfidy, 
where  the  ambition  or  corruption  of  one  would  otherwise  be 
sufficient.  This  is  a  precaution  founded  on  such  clear  princi- 
ples, and  now  so  well  understood  in  the  United  States,  that  it 
would  be  more  than  superfluous  to  enlarge  on  it.  I  will  barely 
remark,  that,  as  the  improbability  of  sinister  combinations  will 
be  in  proportion  to  the  dissimilarity  in  the  genius  of  the  two 
bodies,  it  must  be  politic  to  distinguish  them  from  each  other 
by  every  circumstance  which  will  consist  with  a  due  harmony 
in  all  proper  measures,  and  with  the  genuine  principles  of 
republican  government. 

Second.  The  necessity  of  a  senate  is  not  less  indicated  by  the 
propensity  of  all  single  and  numerous  assemblies,  to  yield  to 
the  impulse  of  sudden  and  violent  passions,  and  to  be  seduced 
by  factious  leaders  into  intemperate  and  pernicious  resolutions. 
Examples  on  this  subject  might  be-  cited  without  number;  and 
from  proceedings  within  the  United  States,  as  well  as  from  the 
history  of  other  nations.  But  a  position  that  will  not  be  con- 
uadicted,  need  not  be  proved.     All  that  need  be  remarked,  is, 


470  THE    FEDERALIST. 

that  a  bod}  whicli  is  to  correct  this  infirmity,  ought  itself  to 
be  free  from  it,  and  consequently  ought  to  be  less  numerous. 
It  ought  moreover  to  possess  great  firmness,  and  consequently 
ought  to  hold  its  authority  by  a  tenure  of  considerable  duration. 

Third.  Another  defect  to  be  supplied  by  a  senate,  lies  in  a 
want  of  due  acquaintance  with  the  objects  and  principles  of 
legislation.  It  is  not  possible  that  an  assembly  of  men,  called, 
for  the  most  part,  from  pursuits  of  a  private  nature,  coi  tinued 
in  appointment  for  a  short  time,  and  led  by  no  jDermanent 
motive  to  devote  the  intervals  of  public  occupation  to  a  study 
of  the  laws,  the  affairs,  and  the  comprehensive  interests  of  their 
country,  should,  if  left  wholly  to  themselves,  escape  a  variety 
of  important  errors  in  the  exercise  of  their  legislative  trust. 
It  may  be  affirmed,  on  the  best  grounds,  that  no  small  share 
of  the  present  embarrassments  of  America  is  to  bo  charged  on 
the  blunders  of  our  governments;  and  that  these  have  pro- 
ceeded from  the  heads,  rather  than  the  hearts  of  most  of  the 
authors  of  them.  What  indeed  are  all  the  repealing,  explain- 
ing, and  amending  laws,  which  fill  and  disgrace  our  voluminous 
codes,  but  so  many  monuments  of  deficient  wisdom ;  so  many 
impeachments  exhibited  by  each  succeeding,  against  each  pre- 
ceding, session ;  so  many  admonitions  to  the  people,  of  the 
value  of  those  aids,  which  may  be  expected  from  a  well  consti- 
tuted senate  ? 

A  good  government  implies  two  things ;  first,  fidelity  to  the 
object  of  government,  which  is  the  happiness  of  the  people; 
secondly,  a  knowledge  of  the  means  by  which  that  object  can 
be  best  attained.  Some  governments  are  deficient  in  both  these 
qualities  :  Most  governments  are  deficient  in  the  first.  I  scruple 
not  to  assert,  that,  in  the  American  governments,  too  little 
attention  has  been  paid  to  the  last.  The  federal  constitution 
avoids  this  error :  and  what  merits  particular  notice,  it  pro- 
vides for  the  last  in  a  mode  which  increases  the  security  fo^ 
the  first. 

Fourth.  The  mutability  in  the  public  councils,  arising  from  a 
rapid  succession  of  new  memVers,  however  qualified  they  may 


THE   FEDERALIST.  471 

l>c,  points  out,  in  tlie  strongest  manner,  the  necessity  of  some 
stable  institution  in  the  government.  Every  new  election  in 
ihe  states,  is  found  to  change  one  half  of  the  representatives 
From  this  change  of  men  must  proceed  a  change  of  opinions  j 
and  from  a  change  of  opinions,  a  change  of  measures.  But  a 
continual  change  even  of  good  measures  is  inconsistent  with 
every  rule  of  jH-udence,  and  every  prospect  of  success.  The 
remark  is  verified  in  private  life,  and  becomes  more  just  as  well 
as  more  important,  in  national  transactions. 

To  trace  the  mischievous  effects  of  a  mutable  government, 
would  fill  a  volume.  1  will  hint  a  few  only,  each  of  which  will 
oe  perceived  to  be  a  source  of  innumerable  others. 

In  the  first  place,  it  forfeits  the  respect  and  confi«Jence  of 
other  nations,  and  all  the  advantages  connected  with  national 
character.  An  individual  who  is  observed  to  be  inconstant  to 
his  plans,  or  perhaps  to  carry  on  his  affairs  without  any  plan 
at  all,  is  marked  at  once  by  all  prudent  people,  as  a  speedy 
victim  to  his  own  unsteadiness  and  folly.  His  more  friendly 
neighbours  may  pity  him,  but  all  will  decline  to  connect  their 
fortunes  with  his;  and  not  a  few  will  seize  the  opportunity  of 
making  their  fortunes  out  of  his.  One  nation  is  to  another, 
what  one  individual  is  to  another;  with  this  melancholy  dis- 
tinction perhaps,  that  the  former,  with  fewer  of  the  benevolent 
emotions  than  the  latter,  are  under  fewer  restraints  also  from 
taking  undue  advantage  of  the  indiscretions  of  each  other. 
Every  nation,  consequently,  whose  affairs  betray  a  want  of 
wisdom  and  stability,  may  calculate  on  every  loss  which  can 
be  sustained  from  the  more  systematic  policy  of  its  wisei 
neighbours.  But  the  best  instruction  on  this  subject  is  un- 
happily conveyed  to  America  by  the  example  of  her  own 
situation.  She  finds  that  she  is  held  in  no  respect  by  her 
friends ;  that  she  is  the  derision  of  her  enemies ;  and  that  she 
IS  a  prey  to  every  nation  which  has  an  interest  in  speculating 
on  her  fluctuating  councils  and  embarrassed  affairs. 

The  internal   effects   of   a  mutable   policy  are    still    more 


472  THE   FEDERALIST. 

calamitous.  It  poisons  the  blessings  of  liberty  itself.  It  will 
be  of  little  avail  to  the  people,  that  the  laws  are  made  by  men 
of  their  own  choice,  if  the  laws  be  so  voluminous  that  they 
cannot  be  read,  or  so  incoherent  that  they  cannot  be  under- 
stood :  if  they  be  repealed  or  revised  before  they  are  promulged, 
or  undergo  such  incessant  changes,  that  no  man  who  knows 
what  the  law  is  to-day,  can  guess  what  it  will  be  to-morrow. 
Law  is  defined  to  be  a  rule  of  action ;  but  how  can  that  be  a 
rule,  which  is  little  known  and  less  fixed  ? 

Another  effect  of  public  instability,  is  the  unreasonable 
advantage  it  gives  to  the  sagacious,  the  enterprising,  and  the 
monied  few,  over  the  industrious  and  uninformed  mass  of  the 
people.  Every  new  regulation  concerning  commerce  or  reve- 
nue, or  in  any  manner  affecting  the  value  of  the  different 
species  of  property,  presents  a  new  harvest  to  those  who  watch 
the  change,  and  can  trace  its  consequences ;  a  harvest,  reared 
not  by  themselves,  but  by  the  toils  and  cares  of  the  great  body 
of  their  fellow  citizens.  This  is  a  state  of  things  in  which  it 
may  be  said,  with  some  truth,  that  laws  are  made  for  the  few, 
not  for  the  rtuiny. 

In  another  point  of  view,  great  injury  results  from  an 
anstable  government.  The  want  of  confidence  in  the  public 
councils,  damps  every  useful  undertaking;  the  success  and 
profit  of  which  may  depend  on  a  continuance  of  existing 
arrangements.  What  prudent  merchant  will  hazard  his  for- 
tunes in  any  new  branch  of  commerce,  when  he  knows  not  but 
that  his  plans  may  bo  rendered  unlawful  before  they  can  be 
executed  ?  What  farmer  or  manufacturer,  will  lay  himself  out 
for  the  encouragement  given  to  any  particular  cultivation  or 
establishment,  when  he  can  have  no  assurance,  that  his  pre- 
paratory labours  and  advances  will  not  render  him  a  victim 
to  an  inconstant  government  ?  In  a  word,  no  great  improve- 
ment or  laudable  enterprise  can  go  forward,  which  requires  the 
auspices  of  a  steady  system  of  national  policy. 

But  the  most  deplorable  effect  of  all,  is  that  diminn\ion  of 


THE    FEDERALIST,  473 

attachment  and  reverence,  which  steals  into  the  hearts  of  the 
people,  towards  a  political  system  which  betrays  so  many 
marks  of  infirmity,  and  disappoints  so  many  of  their  flattering 
hopes.  No  government,  any  more  than  an  individual,  will  long 
be  respectei,  without  being  truly  respectable;  nor  be  truly 
respectable,  without  possessing  a  certain  portion  of  order  and 
Htability. 

PUBLIUS. 


474  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LXTII. 


NEW  YORK,   MARCH    7,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


A  FURTHER  VIEW  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  SENATE,  IN 
REGARD  TO  THE  DURATION  OF  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  ITS  MEM- 
BERS. 

A  FIFTH  desideratum,  illustrating  the  utility  of  a  senate,  is 
the  want  of  a  due  sense  of  national  character.  Without  a 
select  and  stable  member  of  the  government,  the  esteem  of 
foreign  powers  will  not  only  be  forfeited  by  an  unenlightened 
and  variable  policy,  proceeding  from  the  causes  already  men- 
tioned; but  the  national  councils  will  not  possess  that  sensi- 
bility to  the  opinion  of  the  world,  which  is  perhaps  not  less 
necessary  in  order  to  merit,  than  it  is  to  obtain,  its  respect  and 
confidence. 

An  attention  to  the  judgment  of  other  nations,  is  important 
to  every  government,  for  two  reasons :  The  one  is,  that,  inde- 
pendently of  the  merits  of  any  particular  plan  or  measure,  it  is 
desirable  on  various  accounts,  that  it  should  appear  to  other 
nations  as  the  offspring  of  a  wise  and  honourable  policy :  The 
second  is,  that  in  doubtful  cases,  particularly  where  the  national 
councils  may  be  warped  by  some  strong  passion,  or  momentary 
interest,  the  presumed  or  known  opinion  of  the  impartial 
world,  may  be  the  best  guide  that  can  be  followed.  What  has 
not  America  lost  with  foreign  nations  by  her  want  of  character? 


THE    FEDERALIST.  476 

And  how  many  errors  and  follies  ■would  she  not  have  avoided, 
if  the  justice  and  propriety  of  her  measures  had,  in  every  in- 
stance, been  previously  tried  by  the  light  in  which  they  would 
probably  appear  to  the  unbiassed  part  of  mankind. 

Yet  however  requisite  a  sense  of  national  character  may  be, 
it  is  evident  that  it  can  never  be  sufficiently  possessed  by  a 
numerous  and  changeable  body.  It  can  only  be  found  in  a 
number  so  small,  that  a  sensible  degree  of  the  praise  and  blame 
of  public  measures,  may  be  the  portion  of  each  individual ;  or 
in  an  assembly  so  durably  invested  with  public  trust,  that  the 
pride  and  consequence  of  its  members  may  be  sensibly  incor- 
porated with  the  reputation  and  prosperity  of  the  community. 
The  half-yearly  representatives  of  Ehode-Island,  would  pro- 
bably have  been  little  affected  in  their  deliberations  on  the 
iniquitous  measures  of  that  state,  by  arguments  drawn  from 
the  light  m  which  such  measures  would  be  viewed  by  foreign 
nations,  or  even  by  the  sister  states;  whilst  it  can  scarcely  be 
doubted,  that  if  the  concurrence  of  a  select  and  stable  body 
had  been  necessary,  a  regard  to  national  character  alone,  would 
have  prevented  the  calamities  under  which  that  misguided 
jteople  is  now  labouring. 

I  add,  as  a  sixth  defect,  the  want  in  some  important  cases  of 
a  due  responsibility  in  the  government  to  the  people,  arising 
from  that  frequency  of  elections,  which  in  other  cases  produces 
this  responsibility.  The  remark  will,  perhaps,  appear  not  only 
ucw,  but  paradoxical.  It  must  nevertheless  be  acknowledged, 
when  explained,  to  be  as  undeniable  as  it  is  important. 

Kesponsibility,  in  order  to  be  reasonable,  must  be  limited  to 
objects  within  the  power  of  the  responsible  party;  and  in  order 
to  be  effectual,  must  relate  to  operations  of  that  power,  of 
which  a  ready  and  proper  judgment  can  be  formed  by  the  con- 
ritituents.  The  objects  of  government  may  be  divided  into  two 
general  classes;  the  one  depending  on  measures,  which  have 
.singly  an  immediate  and  sensible  operation;  the  other  depend- 
ing on  a  succession  of  well  chosen  and  well  connected  measures, 
which  have  a  gradual  and  perhaps  unobserved  operation.     Th« 

41 


476  THE   FEDERALIST. 

importance  of  the  latter  description  to  the  collective  and  per- 
manent welfare  of  every  country,  needs  no  explanation.  And 
yet  it  is  evident,  that  an  assembly  elected  for  so  short  a  term 
as  to  be  unable  to  provide  more  than  one  or  tw^o  links  in  a 
chain  of  measures,  on  which  the  general  welfare  may  essen- 
tially depend,  ought  not  to  be  answerable  for  the  final  result, 
any  more  "than  a  steward  or  tenant,  engaged  for  one  year, 
could  be  justly  made  to  answer  for  plans  or  improvements, 
which  could  not  be  accomplished  in  less  than  half  a  dozen 
years.  Nor  is  it  possible  for  the  people  to  estimate  the  share 
of  influence,  which  their  annual  assemblies  may  respectively 
have  on  events  resulting  from  the  mixed  transactions  of  several 
years.  It  is  sufficiently  difficult,  at  any  rate,  to  preserve  a  per- 
sonal responsibility  in  the  members  of  a  numerous  body,  for  such 
acts  of  the  body  as  have  an  immediate,  detached,  and  palpable 
operation  on  its  constituents. 

The  proper  remedy  for  this  defect,  must  be  an  additional 
body  in  the  legislative  department,  which,  having  sufficient 
permanency  to  provide  for  such  objects  as  require  a  continued 
attention,  and  a  train  of  measures,  may  be  justly  and  effectually 
answerable  for  the  attainment  of  those  objects. 

Thus  far  I  have  considered  the  circumstances,  which  point 
out  the  necessity  of  a  well  constructed  senate,  only  as  they 
relate  to  the  representatives  of  the  people.  To  a  people  as 
little  blinded  by  prejudice,  or  corrupted  by  flattery,  as  those 
whom  I  address,  I  shall  not  scruple  to  add,  that  such  an  insti- 
tution may  be  sometimes  necessary,  as  a  defence  to  the  people 
against  their  own  temporary  errors  and  delusions.  As  the  cool 
and  deliberate  sense  of  the  community  ought,  in  all  govern- 
ments, and  actually  will,  in  all  free  governments,  ultimatel}- 
prevail  over  the  views  of  its  rulers;  so  there  are  particular 
moments  in  public  affairs,  when  the  people,  stimulated  by  some 
irregular  passion,  or  some  illicit  advantage,  or  misled  by  the 
artful  misrepresentations  of  interested  men,  may  call  for  mea- 
flures  which  they  themselves  will  afterwards  be  the  most  ready 
to  lament  and  condemn.     In  these  critical  moments,  bow  salu' 


THE   FEDERALIST.  477 

tary  will  be  the  interference  of  some  temperate  and  respectable 
body  of  citizens,  in  order  to  check  the  misguided  career,  and 
to  suspend  the  blow  meditated  by  the  people  against  them- 
selves, until  reason,  justice,  and  truth,  can  regain  their  authority 
over  the  public  mind  ?  What  bitter  anguish  would  not  the 
people  of  Athens  have  often  avoided,  if  their  government  had 
contained  so  provident  a  safeguard,  against  the  tyranny  of 
their  own  passions  ?  Popular  liberty,  might  then  have  escaped 
the  indelible  reproach,  of  decreeing  to  the  same  citizens,  the 
hemlock  on  one  day,  and  statues  on  the  next. 

It  may  be  suggested,  that  a  people  spread  over  an  extensive 
region,  cannot,  like  the  crowded  inhabitants  of  a  small  district, 
be  subject  to  the  infection  of  violent  passions;  or  to  the  danger 
of  combining  in  the  pursuit  of  unjust  measures.  I  am  far  from 
denying,  that  this  is  a  distinction  of  peculiar  importance.  1 
have,  on  the  contrary,  endeavoured  in  a  former  paper  to  show, 
that  it  is  one  of  the  principal  recommendations  of  a  confederated 
republic.  At  the  same  time,  this  advantage  ought  not  to  be 
considered,  as  superseding  the  use  of  auxiliary  precautions. 
It  may  even  be  remarked,  that  the  same  extended  situation, 
which  will  exempt  the  people  of  America  from  some  of  the 
dangers  incident  to  lesser  republics,  will  expose  them  to  the 
inconveniency  of  remaining  for  a  longer  time,  under  the 
inifluence  of  those  misrepresentations  which  the  combined 
industry  of  interested  men  may  succeed  in  distributing  among 
them. 

It  adds  no  small  weight  to  all  these  considerations,  to 
recollect,  that  history  informs  us  of  no  long-lived  republic, 
which  had  not  a  senate.  Sparta,  Eome,  and  Carthage,  are,  in 
fact,  the  only  states  to  whom  that  character  can  be  applied. 
In  each  of  the  two  first,  there  was  a  senate  for  life.  The  con- 
stitution of  the  senate  in  the  last,  is  less  known.  Circumstantial 
evidence  makes  it  probable,  that  it  was  not  different  in  this 
particular  from  the  two  others.  It  is  at  least  certain,  that  it 
had  some  quality  or  other,  which  rendered  it  an  anchor  against 
popular  fluctuations ;  and  that  a  smaller  council,  drawn  out  of 


478  THE    FEDERALIST. 

the  senate,  was  appointed  not  only  for  life,  but  filled  up  vacan- 
cies  itself.  These  examples,  though  as  unfit  for  the  imitation, 
as  they  are  repugnant  to  the  genius,  of  America,  are,  notwith- 
standing, when  compared  with  the  fugitive  and  turbulent 
existence  of  other  ancient  republics,  very  instructive  proofs 
of  the  necessity  of  some  institution,  that  will  blend  stability 
with  liberty.  I  am  not  unaware  of  the  circumstances  which 
distinguish  the  American,  from  other  popular  governments,  as 
well  ancient  as  modern ;  and  which  render  extreme  circum- 
spection necessary,  in  reasoning  from  the  one  case  to  the 
other.  But  after  allowing  due  weight  to  this  consideration,  it 
may  still  be  maintained,  that  there  are  many  points  of  simili- 
tude, which  render  these  examples  not  unworthy  of  our  atten- 
tion. Many  of  the  defects,  as  we  have  seen,  which  can  only  be 
supplied  by  a  senatorial  institution,  are  common  to  a  numerous 
assembly  frequently  elected  by  the  people,  and  to  the  people 
themselves.  There  are  others  peculiar  to  the  former,  which 
require  the  control  of  such  an  institution.  The  people  can 
never  wilfully  betray  their  own  interests :  but  they  may  possi- 
bly be  betrayed  by  their  representatives,  and  the  danger  will 
be  evidently  greater,  where  the  whole  legislative  trust  is  lodged 
in  the  hands  of  one  body  of  men,  than  where  the  concurrence 
of  separate  and  dissimilar  bodies  is  required  in  every  public  act. 
The  difference  most  relied  on,  between  the  American,  and 
other  republics,  consists  in  the  principle  of  representation, 
which  is  the  pivot  on  which  the  former  move,  and  which  is 
supposed  to  have  been  unknown  to  Iht  latter,  or  at  least  to  the 
ancient  part  of  them.  The  use  which  has  been  made  of  this 
difference,  in  reasonings  contained  in  former  papers,  will  have 
shown  that  I  am  disposed  neither  to  deny  its  existence,  nor  to 
undervalue  its  importance.  I  feel  the  less  restraint  therefore 
in  observing,  that  the  position  concerning  the  ignorance  of  the 
ancient  governments  on  the  subject  of  representation,  is  by  no 
means  precisely  true,  in  the  latitude  commonly  given  to  it 
Without  entering  into  a  disquisition   which  would   here   be 


THE    FEDERALIST.  479 

misplaced,  I  will  refer  to  a  few  known  facts  in  support  of  what 
I  advance. 

In  the  most  pure  democracies  of  Greece,  many  of  the  execu- 
tive functions  were  performed,  not  by  the  people  themselves, 
but  by  oflScers  elected  by  the  people,  and  representing  them  in 
their  executive  capacity. 

Prior  to  the  reform  of  Solon,  Athens  was  governed  by  nine 
archons,  annually  elected  by  the  people  at  large.  The  degree  of 
power  delegated  to  them,  seems  to  be  left  in  great  obscurity. 
Subsequent  to  that  period  we  find  an  assembly,  first  of  four, 
and  afterwards  of  six  hundred  members,  annually  elected  by  the 
people ;  and  partially  representing  them  in  their  legislative  capa- 
city, since  they  were  not  only  associated  with  the  people  in  the 
function  of  making  laws,  but  had  the  exclusive  right  of  origi- 
nating legislative  propositions  to  the  people.  The  senate  of 
Carthage,  also,  whatever  might  be  its  power,  or  the  duration 
of  its  appointment,  appears  to  have  been  elective  by  the  suf- 
frages of  the  people.  Similar  instances  might  be  traced  in 
Host,  if  not  all  the  popular  governments  of  antiquity. 

Lastly,  in  Sparta  we  meet  with  the  Ephori,  and  in  Eome 
with  the  Tribunes;  two  bodies,  small  indeed  in  number,  but 
annually  elected  by  the  whole  body  of  the  people,  and  considered  as 
the  representatives  of  the  people,  almost  in  their  plenipotentiary 
capacity.  The  Cosmi  of  Crete  were  also  annually  elected  by  the 
people ;  and  have  been  considered  by  some  authors  as  an  insti- 
tution analagous  to  those  of  Sparta  and  Rome,  with  this  differ- 
ence only,  that  in  the  election  of  that  representative  body,  the 
right  of  suffrage  was  communicated  to  a  part  only  of  the  people. 

From  these  facts,  to  which  many  others  might  be  added,  it  is 
clear,  that  the  principle  of  representation  was  neither  unknown 
to  the  ancients,  nor  wholly  overlooked  in  their  political  consti- 
tutions. The  true  distinction  between  these,  and  tl^e  American 
governments,  lies  in  the  total  exclusion  of  the  people  in  their  collec- 
tive capacity  from  any  share  in  the  latter,  and  not  in  the  total 
exclusion  of  the  representatives  of  the  people  from  the  administration 
of  the  former.     The  distinction,  however,  thus  qualified,  must 


480  THE    FEDERALIST. 

be  a  Iniitted  to  leave  a  most  advantageous  superiority,  in  favour 
of  tho  Uoited  States.  But  to  insure  to  this  advantage  its  full 
effect,  we  must  be  careful  not  to  separate  it  from  the  other 
advantage,  of  an  extensive  territory.  For  it  cannot  be  believed 
that  any  form  of  representative  government,  could  have  suc- 
ceeded within  the  narrow  limits  occupied  by  the  democracies 
of  Greece. 

In  answer  to  all  these  arguments,  suggested  by  reasoji,  illus- 
trated by  examples,  and  enforced  by  our  own  experience,  the 
jealous  adversary  of  the  constitution  will  probably  content 
himself  with  repeating,  that  a  senate  appointed  not  imme- 
diately by  the  people,  and  for  the  term  of  six  years,  must 
gradually  acquire  a  dangerous  pre-eminence  in  the  government, 
and  finally  transform  it  into  a  tyrannical  aristocracy. 

To  this  general  answer,  the  general  reply  ought  to  be  suffi- 
cient ;  that  liberty  may  be  endangered  by  the  abuses  of  liberty, 
as  well  as  by  the  abuses  of  power;  that  there  are  numerous 
instances  of  the  former,  as  well  as  of  the  latter ;  and  that  the 
former,  rather  than  the  latter,  is  apparently  most  to  be  appre- 
hended by  the  United  States.  But  a  more  particular  reply  may 
be  given. 

Before  such  a  revolution  can  be  effected,  the  senate,  it  is  to 
be  observed,  must  in  the  first  place,  corrupt  itself;  must  next 
corrupt  the  state  legislatures ;  must  then  corrupt  the  house  of 
representatives ;  and  must  finally  corrupt  the  people  at  large. 
It  is  evident,  that  the  senate  must  be  first  corrupted,  before  it 
can  attempt  an  establishment  of  tyranny.  Without  corrupting 
the  legislatures,  it  cannot  prosecute  the  attempt,  because  the 
periodical  change  of  members  would  otherwise  regenerate  the 
whole  body.  "Without  exerting  the  means  of  corruption  with 
equal  success  on  the  house  of  representatives,  the  opposition  of 
that  co-equal  branch  of  the  government,  would  inevitably  de- 
feat the  attempt;  and  without  corrupting  the  people  them- 
selves, a  succession  of  new  representatives  would  speedily 
restore  all  things  to  their  pristine  order.  Is  there  any  man 
who  can  seriously  persuade  himself,  that  the  proposed  senate 


THE    FEDERALIST.  481 

can,  by  any  possible  means  within  the  compass  of  human  ad- 
dress, arrive  at  the  object  of  a  lawless  ambition,  through  al) 
these  obstructions? 

If  reason  condemns  the  suspicion,  the  same  sentence  is  pro- 
nounced by  experience.  The  constitution  of  Maryland,  fur- 
nishes the  most  apposite  example.  The  senate  of  that  state  is 
elected,  as  the  federal  senate  will  be,  indirectly  by  the  people ; 
and  for  a  term  less  by  one  year  only,  than  the  federal  senate. 
It  is  distinguished,  also,  by  the  remarkable  prerogative  of  filling 
up  its  own  vacancies  within  the  term  of  its  appointment;  and, 
at  the  same  time,  is  not  under  the  control  of  any  such  rotation 
as  is  provided  for  the  federal  senate.  There  are  some  other 
lesser  distinctions,  which  would  expose  the  former  to  colourable 
objections,  that  do  not  lie  against  the  latter.  If  the  federal 
senate,  therefore,  really  contained  the  danger  which  has  been 
so  loudly  proclaimed,  some  sy«iptoms  at  least  of  a  like  danger, 
ought  by  this  time  to  have  been  betrayed  by  the  senate  of 
Maryland ;  but  no  such  symptoms  have  appeared.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  jealousies  at  first  entertained  by  men  of  the  same 
description  with  those  who  view  w*ith  terror  the  correspondent 
part  of  the  federal  constitution,  have  been  gradually  Extin- 
guished by  the  progress  of  the  experiment;  and  the  Maryland 
constitution  is  daily  deriving  from  the  salutary  operation  of 
this  part  of  it,  a  reputation  in  which  it  will  probably  not  be 
rivalled  by  that  of  any  state  in  the  union. 

But  if  any  thing  could  silence  the  jealousies  on  this  subject, 
it  ought  to  be  the  British  example.  The  senate  there,  instead 
of  being  elected  for  a  term  of  six  years,  and  of  being  uncon- 
fined  to  particular  families  or  fortunes,  is  an  hereditary  assem- 
bly- of  opulent  nobles.  The  house  of  representatives,  instead 
of  being  elected  for  two  years,  and  by  the  whole  body  of  the 
people,  is  elected  for  seven  years :  and  in  a  very  great  propor- 
tion, by  a  verj'  small  propoi'tion  of  the  people.  Here,  unques- 
tionably, ought  to  be  seen  in  full  display,  the  aristocratic 
usurpations  and  tyranny,  which  are  at  some  future  period  to  be 
exen\plified  in  the  United  States.  Unfortunately,  however,  for 
the  anti-federal  argument,  the  British  history  informs  us,  thai 


482  THE    FEDERALIST. 

this  hereditary'  assembly  has  not  even  been  able  to  defend 
itself  against  the  continual  encroachments  of  the  house  of 
representatives ;  and  that  it  no  sooner  lost  the  support  of  the 
monarch,  than  it  was  actually"  crushed  by  the  weight  of  the 
popular  branch. 

As  far  as  antiquity  can  instruct  us  on  this  subject,  its  ex- 
amples support  the  reasoning  which  we  have  employed.  In 
Sparta  the  Ephori,  the  annual  representatives  of  the  people, 
were  found  an  overmatch  for  the  senate  for  life ;  continually 
gained  on  its  authority,  and  finally  drew  all  power  into  their 
own  hands.  The  tribunes  of  Eome,  who  were  the  representa- 
tives of  the  people,  prevailed,  it  is  well  known,  in  almost  every 
contest  with  the  senate  for  life,  and  in  the  end  gained  the  most 
complete  triumph  over  it.  This  fact  is  the  more  remarkable,  as 
unanimity  was  required  in  every  act  of  the  tribunes,  even  after 
their  number  was  augmented  to  ten.  It  proves  the  irresistible 
force  possessed  by  that  branch  of  a  free  government,  which  has 
the  people  on  its  side.  To  these  examples  might  be  added  that 
of  Carthage,  whose  senate,  according  to  the  testimony  of  Poly- 
bius,  instead  of  drawing  all  power  into  its  vortex,  had,  at  the 
commtencement  of  the  second  punic  war,  lost  almost  the  whole 
of  its  original  portion. 

Besides  the  conclusive  evidence  resulting  from  this  assem- 
blage of  facts,  that  the  federal  senate  will  never  be  able  to 
transform  itself,  by  gradual  usurpations,  into  an  independent 
and  aristocratic  body;  we  are  warranted  in  believing,  that  if 
such  a  revolution  should  ever  happen  from  causes  which  the 
foresight  of  man  cannot  guard  against,  the  house  of  repre- 
sentatives with  the  people  on  their  side,  will  at  all  times  be 
able  to  bring  back  the  constitution  to  its  primitive  form  and 
principles.  Against  the  force  of  the  immediate  representatives 
of  the  people,  nothing  will  be  able  to  maintain  even  the  con- 
stitutional authority  of  the  senate,  but  such  a  display  of  enlight- 
ened policy,  and  attachment  to  the  public  good,  as  will  divide 
with  that  branch  of  the  legislature,  the  affections  and  suppori 
of  the  entire  body  of  the  people  themselves. 

PUBLIUS. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  483 


THE  FEDERALIST 


NUMBER    LXIV. 


NEW  YORK,   MARCH   7,    1788. 


JAY. 


A    FURTHER  VIEW  OF   THE   CONSTITUTION  OF   THE   SENATE,    IN 
REGARD   TO  THE   POWER   OF   MAKING   TREATIES. 

It  is  a  just,  and  not  a  new  observation,  that  enemies  to  par- 
ticular persons,  and  opponents  to  particular  measures,  seldom 
confine  their  censures  to  such  things  only  in  either,  as  are 
worthy  of  blame.  Unless  on  this  principle,  it  is  difficult  to 
explain  the  motives  of  their  conduct,  who  condemn  the  pro- 
posed constitution  in  the  aggregate,  and  treat  with  severity 
some  of  the  most  unexceptionable  articles  in  it. 

The  2d  section  gives  power  to  the  president,  "  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  senate^  to  make  treaties,  provided  two 

THIRDS    of   the    SENATORS   PRESENT   CONCUR." 

The  power  of  making  treaties  is  an  important  one,  especially 
as  it  relates  to  war,  peace,  and  commerce ;  and  it  should  not  be 
delegated  but  in  such  a  mode,  and  with  such  precautions,  as 
will  afford  the  highest  security,  that  it  will  be  exercised  by 
men  the  best  qualified  for  the  purpose,  and  in  a  manner  most 
conducive  to  the  public  good.  The  convention  appear  to  have 
been  attentive  to  both  these  points — they  have  directed  the 
president  to  be  chosen  by  select  bodies  of  electors,  to  be  deputed 
by  the  people  for  that  express  purpose;  and  they  have  com- 
mitted the  appointment  of  senators  to  the  state  legislatures 


iS4  IHB   FEDERALIST. 

This  mode  has,  in  such  cases,  vastly  the  advantage  of  elections 
by  tl.e  people  in  their  collective  capacity,  where  the  activity  of 
party  zeal,  taking  advantage  of  the  supineness,  the  ignorance, 
the  hopes,  and  fears  of  the  unwary  and  interested,  often  places 
men  in  office,  by  the  votes  of  a  small  proportion  of  the  electors. 

As  the  select  assemblies  for  choosing  the  president,  as  well  as 
the  state  legislatures  who  appoint  the  senators,  will,  in  general, 
be  composed  of  the  most  enlightened  and  respectable  citizen? 
there  is  reason  to  presume,  that  their  attention  and  their  votes 
will  be  directed  to  those  men  only  who  have  become  the  most 
distinguished  by  their  abilities  and  virtue,  and  in  whom  the 
people  perceive  just  grounds  for  confidence.  The  constitution 
manifests  very  particular  attention  to  this  object.  By  excluding 
men  under  thirty-five  from  the  first  office,  and  those  under 
thirty  from  the  second,  it  confines  the  elections  to  men  of  whom 
the  people  have  had  time  to  form  a  judgment,  and  with  respect 
to  whom  they  will  not  be  liable  to  be  deceived  by  those  brilliant 
appearances  of  genius  and  patriotism,  which,  like  transient 
meteors,  sometimes  mislead  as  well  as  dazzle.  If  the  observa- 
tion be  well  founded,  that  wise  kings  will  always  be  served  by 
able  ministers,  it  is  fair  to  argue  that,  as  an  assembly  of  select 
electors  possess,  in  a  greater  degree  than  kings,  the  means  of 
extensive  and  accurate  information  relative  to  men  and  charac- 
ters, so  will  their  appointments  bear  at  least  equal  marks  of 
discretion  and  discernment.  The  inference  which  naturally 
results  from  these  considerations  is  this,  that  the  president  and 
senators  so  chosen,  will  always  be  of  the  number  of  those  who 
best  understand  our  national  interests,  whether  considered  in 
relation  to  the  several  states  or  to  foreign  nations,  who  are 
best  able  to  promote  those  interests,  and  whose  reputation  for 
integrity  inspires  and  merits  confidence.  With  such  men  the 
power  of  making  treaties  may  be  safely  lodged. 

Although  the  absolute  necessity  of  system,  in  the  conduct  of 
any  business,  is  universally  known  and  acknowledged,  yet  the 
high  importance  of  it  in  national  affairs,  has  not  yet  become 
8nfficiently  impressed  on  the  public  mind.     They  who  wish  to 


THE    FEDERALIST.  486 

commit  the  power  under  consideration  to  a  ))opular  assembly, 
composed  of  members  constantly  coming  and  going  in  quick 
succession,  seem  not  to  recollect  that  such  a  body  must  neces- 
sarily be  inadequate  to  the  attainment  of  those  great  objects, 
which  require  to  be  steadily  contemplated  in  all  their  relations 
and  circumstances,  and  which  can  only  be  appi*oached  and 
achieved  by  measures,  which  not  only  talents,  but  also  exact 
information,  and  often  much  time,  are  necessary  to  concert  and 
to  execute.  It  was  wise,  therefore,  in  the  convention  to  pro- 
vide, not  only  that  the  power  of  making  treaties  should  be 
committed  to  able  and  honest  men,  but  also  that  they  should 
continue  in  place  a  sufficient  time  to  become  perfectly  acquainted 
with  our  national  concerns,  and  to  form  and  introduce  a  system 
for  the  management  of  them.  The  duration  prescribed,  is  such 
as  will  give  them  an  opportunity  of  greatly  extending  their 
political  information,  and  of  rendering  their  accumulating  ex- 
perience more  and  more  beneficial  to  their  country.  Nor  has 
the  convention  discovered  less  prudence  in  providing  for  the 
frequent  elections  of  senators  in  such  a  way,  as  to  obviate  the 
inconvenience  of  periodically  transferring  those  great  affairs 
entirely  to  new  men — for,  by  leaving  a  considerable  residue  of 
the  old  ones  in  place,  uniformity  and  order,  as  well  as  a  con- 
stant succession  of  official  information,  will  be  preserved. 

There  are  few  who  will  not  admit,  that  the  affairs  of  trade 
and  navigation  should  be  regulated  by  a  system  cautiously 
formed  and  steadily  pursued ;  and  that  both  our  treaties  and 
our  laws  should  correspond  with,  and  be  made  to  promote  it. 
It  is  of  much  consequence  that  this  correspondence  and  con- 
formity be  carefully  maintained,  and  they  who  assent  to  the 
truth  of  this  position,  will  see  and  confess  that  it  is  well  pro- 
vided for,  by  making  the  concurrence  of  the  senate  necessary, 
both  to  treaties  and  to  laws. 

It  seldom  happens  in  the  negociation  of  treaties,  of  whatever 
nature,  but  that  perfect  secrecy  and  immediate  dispatch  are 
sometimes  requisite.  There  are  cases  where  the  most  useful 
intelligence  ma}*  be  obtained,  if  the  persons  possessing  it  can 


i86  THE    FEDERALIST. 

be  relieved  from  apprehensions  of  discovery.  Those  apprehen- 
sions will  operate  on  those  persons,  whether  they  are  actuated 
by  mercenary  or  friendly  motives;  and  there  doubtless  are 
many  of  both  descriptions,  who  would  rely  on  the  secrecy  of 
the  president,  but  who  would  not  confide  in  that  of  the  senate, 
and  still  less  in  that  of  a  large  popular  assembly.  The  conven- 
tion have  done  well,  therefore,  in  so  disposing  of  the  power  of 
making  treaties,  that  although  the  president  must,  in  forming 
them,  act  by  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  senate,  yet  he  will 
be  able  to  manage  the  business  of  intelligence  in  such  a  manner 
as  prudence  may  suggest. 

They  who  have  turned  their  attention  to  the  aflPiairs  of  men, 
must  have  perceived  that  there  are  tides  in  them ;  tides,  very 
irregular  in  their  duration,  strength,  and  direction,  and  seldom 
found  to  run  twice  exactly  in  the  same  manner  or  measure. 
To  discern  and  to  profit  by  these  tides  in  national  affairs,  is  the 
business  of  those  who  preside  ovei  'hem;  and  they  who  have 
had  much  experience  on  this  head  inform  us,  that  there  fre- 
quently are  occasions  when  days,  nay,  even  when  hours,  are 
precious.  The  loss  of  a  battle,  the  death  of  a  prince,  the 
removal  of  a  minister,  or  other  circumstances  intervening  to 
change  the  present  posture  and  aspect  of  affairs,  may  turn  the 
most  favourable  tide  into  a  course  opposite  to  our  wishes.  As 
in  the  field,  so  in  the  cabinet,  there  are  moments  to  be  seized 
as  they  pass,  and  they  who  preside  in  either,  should  be  left  in 
capacity  to  approve  them.  So  often  and  so  essentially  have  we 
heretofore  suffered,  from  the  want  of  secrecy  and  dispatch, 
that  the  constitution  would  have  been  inexcusably  defective, 
if  no  attention  had  been  paid  to  those  objects.  The  matters 
which  in  negociations  usually  require  the  most  secrecy,  and  the 
most  dispatch,  are  those  preparatory  and  auxiliary  measures, 
which  are  no  otherways  important  in  a  national  view,  than 
as  they  tend  to  facilitate  the  attainment  of  the  main  objects. 
For  these  the  president  will  find  no  difiiculty  to  provide ;  and 
should  any  circumstance  occur,  which  requires  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  senate,  he  may  at  any  time  convene  them.   Thus 


THE    FEDERALIST.  487 

we  see,  that  the  constitution  provides  that  our  negociations  for 
treaties  shall  have  every  advantage  which  can  be  derived  from 
talents,  information,  integrit}',  and  deliberate  investigation,  on 
the  one  hand;  and  from  secrecy  and  dispatch,  on  the  other. 

But  to  this  plan,  as  to  most  others  that  have  ever  appeared, 
objections  are  contrived  and  urged. 

Some  are  displeased  with  it,  not  on  account  of  any  errors  oi 
defects  in  it,  but  because,  as  the  treaties,  when  made,  are  tc 
have  the  force  of  laws,  they  should  be  made  only  by  men 
invested  with  legislative  authority.  These  gentlemen  seem 
not  to  consider  that  the  judgments  of  our  courts,  and  the 
commissions  constitutionally  given  by  our  governor,  are  as 
valid  and  as  binding  on  all  persons  whom  they  concern,  as  the 
laws  passed  by  our  legislature.  All  constitutional  acts  of 
power,  whether  in  the  executive  or  in  the  judicial  department. 
have  as  much  legal  validity  and  obligation  as  if  they  proceeded 
from  the  legislature,  and  therefore,  whatever  name  be  given  to 
the  power  of  making  treaties,  or  however  obligatory  they  may 
be  when  made,  certain  it  is,  that  the  people  may,  with  much 
propriety,  commit  the  power  to  a  distinct  body  from  the  legis- 
lature, the  executive,  or  the  judicial.  It  surely  does  not  follow, 
that  because  they  have  given  the  power  of  making  laws  to  the 
legislature,  that  therefore  they  should  likewise  give  them  power 
to  do  every  other  act  of  sovereignty,  by  which  the  citizens  are 
to  be  bound  and  affected. 

Others,  though  content  that  treaties  should  be  made  in  the 
mode  proposed,  are  averse  to  their  being  the  supreme  law  of  the 
land.  They  insist,  and  profess  to  believe,  that  treaties,  like 
acts  of  assembly,  should  be  repealable  at  pleasure.  This  idea 
seems  to  be  new  and  peculiar  to  this  country,  but  new  errors, 
as  well  as  new  truths,  often  appear  These  gentlemen  would 
do  well  to  reflect,  that  a  treaty  is  only  another  name  for  a 
bargain;  and  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  find  a  nation  who 
would  make  any  bargain  with  us,  which  should  be  binding  on 
them  absolutely,  but  on  us  only  so  long  and  so  far  as  we  may 
think  proper  to  be  bound  by  it.     They  who  make  laws,  may 


i88  THE    FEDERALIST. 

without  doubt,  amend  or  repeal  them,  and  it  will  not  be  dis- 
puted that  they  who  make  treaties,  may  alter  or  cancel  them; 
but  still  let  us  not  forget,  that  treaties  are  made  not  by  one 
only  of  the  contracting  parties,  but  by  both ;  and  consequently, 
that  as  the  consent  of  both  was  essential  to  their  formation  at 
first,  so  must  it  ever  afterwards  be  to  alter  or  cancel  them. 
The  proposed  constitution,  therefore,  has  not  in  the  least 
extended  the  obligation  of  treaties.  They  are  just  as  binding, 
and  just  as  far  beyond  the  lawful  reach  of  legislative  acts  now, 
as  they  will  be  at  any  future  period,  or  under  any  form  of 
government. 

However  useful  jealousy  may  be  in  republics,  yet  when,  like 
bile  in  the  natural,  it  abounds  too  much  in  the  body  politic; 
the  eyes  of  both  become  very  liable  to  be  deceived,  by  the 
delusive  appearances  which  that  malady  casts  on  surrounding 
objects.  From  this  cause,  probably,  proceed  the  fears  and 
apprehensions  of  some,  that  the  president  and  senate  may  make 
treaties  without  an  equal  eye  to  the  interests  of  all  the  states. 
Others  suspect,  that  the  two-thirds  will  oppress  the  remaining 
third,  and  ask,  whether  those  gentlemen  are  made  sufficiently 
responsible  for  their  conduct;  whether,  if  they  act  corruptly, 
they  can  be  punished?  and  if  they  make  disadvantageous 
treaties,  how  are  we  to  get  rid  of  those  treaties  ? 

As  all  the  states  are  equally  represented  in  the  senate,  and 
by  men  the  most  able  and  the  most  willing  to  promote  the 
interest  of  their  constituents,  they  will  all  have  an  equal  degree 
of  influence  in  that  body,  especially  while  they  continue  to  be 
careful  in  appointing  proper  persons,  and  to  insist  on  their 
punctual  attendance.  In  proportion  as  the  United  States  assume 
a  national  form,  and  a  national  character,  so  will  the  good  of 
the  whole  be  more  and  more  an  object  of  attention;  and  the 
government  must  be  a  weak  one  indeed,  if  it  should  forget, 
that  the  good  of  the  whole  can  only  be  promoted,  by  advancing 
the  good  of  each  of  the  parts  or  members  which  compose  the 
whole.  It  will  not  be  in  the  power  of  the  president  ar  d  senate 
to  make  any  treaties,  by  which  they,  and  their  families  and 


THE   FEDERALIST.  489 

estates,  will  not  be  equally  bound  and  affected  with  the  rest  of 
the  community  3  and  having  no  private  interest  distinct  from 
that  of  the  nation,  they  will  be  under  no  temptations  to  neglect 
the  latter. 

As  to  corruption,  the  case  is  not  supposeable.  He  must  either 
have  been  very  unfortunate  in  his  intercourse  with  the  world, 
or  possess  a  heart  very  susceptible  of  such  impressions,  who 
can  think  it  probable,  that  the  president  and  two-thirds  of  the 
senate,  will  ever  be  capable  of  such  unworthy  conduct.  The 
idea  is  too  gross,  and  too  invidious  to  be  entertained.  But  if 
such  a  case  should  ever  happen,  the  treaty  so  obtained  from  ue 
would,  like  all  other  fraudulent  contracts,  be  null  and  void  by 
the  law  of  nations. 

With  respect  to  their  responsibility,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive 
how  it  could  be  increased.  Every  consideration  that  can  in- 
fluence the  human  mind,  such  as  honour,  oaths,  reputation, 
conscience,  the  love  of  country,  family  affections  and  attach- 
ments, afford  security  for  their  fidelity.  In  short,  as  the  con- 
stitution has  taken  the  utmost  care  that  they  shall  be  men  of 
talents  and  integrity,  we  have  reason  to  be  persuaded,  that  the 
treaties  they  make  will  be  as  advantageous  as,  all  circumstances 
considered,  could  be  made ;  and  so  far  as  the  fear  of  punishment 
and  disgrace  can  operate,  that  motive  to  good  behaviour  is 
amply  afforded  by  the  article  or  the  subject  of  impeachments. 

PUBLIUS 


490  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LXV. 


NEW   YORK,    MARCH    7,    1788. 


HAMILTON. 


A  FURTHER  VIEW  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  SENATE,  IN 
RELATION  TO  ITS  CAPACITY,  AS  A  COURT  FOR  THE  TRIAL  OF 
IMPEACHMENTS. 

The  remaiuing  powers  which  the  plan  of  the  convention 
allots  to  the  senate,  in  a  distinct  capacity,  are  comprised  in 
their  participation  with  the  executive  in  the  appointment  to 
offices,  and  in  their  judicial  character  as  a  court  for  the  trial 
of  impeachments.  As  in  the  business  of  appointments,  the 
executive  will  be  the  principal  agent,  the  provisions  relating 
to  it,  will  most  properly  be  discussed  in  the  examination  of 
tnat  department.  We  will  therefore  conclude  this  head,  with 
a  view  of  the  judicial  character  of  the  senate. 

A  well  constituted  court  for  the  trial  of  impeachments,  is  an 
object  not  more  to  be  desired,  than  difficult  to  be  obtained  in  a 
government  wholly  elective.  The  subjects  of  its  jurisdiction  are 
those  offences  which  proceed  from  the  misconduct  of  public  men, 
or  in  other  words,  from  the  abuse  or  violation  of  some  public 
trust.  They  are  of  a  nature  which  may  with  peculiar  propriety 
be  denominated  political,  as  they  relate  chiefly  to  injuries  done 
immediately  to  the  society  itself.  The  prosecution  of  them, 
for  this  reason,  will  seldom  fail  to  agitate  the  passions  of  the 
whole  community,  and  to  divide  it  into  parties,  more  or  less 


THE   FEDERALIST.  491 

friendly,  or  inimical,  to  the  accused.  In  many  eases,  it  will 
connect  itself  with  the  pre-existing  factions,  and  will  enlist  all 
their  animosities,  partialities,  influence,  and  interest  on  one 
side,  or  on  the  other;  and  in  such  cases  there  will  always  be 
the  greatest  danger,  that  the  decision  will  be  regulated  more 
by  the  comparative  strength  of  parties,  than  by  the  real 
demonstrations  of  innocence  or  guilt. 

The  delicacy  and  magnitude  of  a  trust,  which  so  deeply 
concerns  the  political  reputation  and  existence  of  every  man 
engaged  in  the  administration  of  public  afliairs,  speak  for 
themselves.  The  difliculty  of  placing  it  rightly  in  a  govern- 
ment resting  entirely  on  the  basis  of  periodical  elections,  will 
as  readily  be  perceived,  When  it  is  considered  that  the  most 
conspicuous  characters  in  it  will,  from  that  circumstance,  be 
too  often  the  leaders,  or  the  tools  of  the  most  cunning  or  the 
most  numerous  faction;  and  on  this  account,  can  hardly  be 
expected  to  possess  the  requisite  neutrality  towards  those 
whose  conduct  may  be  the  subject  of  scrutiny. 

The  convention,  it  appears,  thought  the  senate  the  most  fit 
depository  of  this  important  trust.  Those  who  can  best  dis- 
cern the  intrinsic  diflBlculty  of  the  thing,  will  be  least  hasty  iu 
condemning  that  opinion ;  and  will  be  most  inclined  to  allow 
due  weight  to  the  arguments,  which  may  be  supposed  to  have 
produced  it. 

"What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  true  spirit  of  the  institution 
itself  1*  Is  it  not  designed  as  a  method  of  national  inquest 
into  the  conduct  of  public  men  ?  If  this  be  the  design  of  it, 
who  can  so  properly  be  the  inquisitors  for  the  nation,  as  the 
representatives  of  the  nation  themselves  ?  It  is  not  disputed 
that  the  power  of  originating  the  inquiry,  or  in  other  words, 
of  preferring  the  impeachment,  ought  to  be  lodged  in  the  hands 
of  one  branch  of  the  legislative  body;  will  not  the  reasons 
which  indicate  the  propriety  of  this  arrangement,  strongly 
plead  for  an  admission  of  the  other  branch  of  that  body  to  a 
share  of  the  inquiry  ?  The  model,  from  which  the  idea  of  this 
institution  has  been  borrowed,  pointed  out  that  course  to  the 

42 


492  THE    FEDERALIST. 

uonvention.  In  Great  Britain,  it  is  the  province  of  the  house 
of  commons  to  prefer  the  impeachment ;  and  of  the  house  of 
lords  to  decide  upon  it.  Several  of  the  state  constitutions  have 
followed  the  example.  As  well  the  latter,  as  the  former,  seem 
to  have  regarded  the  practice  of  impeachments,  as  a  bridle  in 
the  hands  of  the  legislative  body,  upon  the  executive  servants 
of  the  government.  Is  not  this  the  true  light  in  which  it 
ought  to  be  regarded  ? 

Where  else,  than  in  the  senate,  could  have  been  found  a 
tribunal  suflficiently  dignified,  or  sufiiciently  independent? 
"What  other  body  would  be  likely  to  feel  confidence  enough  in  its 
own  situation,  to  preserve  unawed  and  uninfluenced,  the  neces- 
sary impartiality  between  an  individual  accused,  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people,  his  accusers  ? 

Could  the  supreme  court  have  been  relied  upon  as  answering 
this  description  ?  It  is  much  to  be  doubted  whether  the  mem- 
bers of  that  tribunal  would,  at  all  times,  be  endowed,  with  so 
eminent  a  portion  of  fortitude,  as  would  be  called  for  in  the 
execution  of  so  difficult  a  task;  and  it  is  still  more  to  be 
doubted,  whether  they  would  possess  the  degree  of  credit  and 
authority,  which  might,  on  certain  occasions,  be  indispensable 
towards  reconciling  the  people  to  a  decision  that  should  happen 
to  clash  with  an  accusation,  brought  by  their  immediate  repre- 
sentatives. A  deficiency  in  the  first,  would  be  fatal  to  the 
iaccused ;  in  the  last,  dangerous  to  the  public  tranquillity.  The 
hazard  in  both  these  respects  could  only  be  avoided,  if  at  all, 
by  rendering  that  tribunal  more  numerous  than  would  consist 
with  a  reasonable  attention  to  economy.  The  necessity  of  a 
numerous  court  for  the  trial  of  impeachments,  is  equally  dictated 
by  the  nature  of  the  proceeding.  This  can  never  be  tied  down 
by  such  strict  rules,  either  in  the  delineation  of  the  offence  by 
the  prosecutors,  or  in  the  construction  of  it  by  the  judges,  as 
in  common  cases  serve  to  limit  the  discretion  of  courts  in 
favour  of  personal  security.  There  will  be  no  jury  tf  stand 
between  the  judges,  who  are  to  pronounce  the  sentence  of  the 
law,  and  the  party  who  is  to  receive  or  suffer  it.     The  awful 


THE    FEDERALIST.  493 

discretion,  which  a  court  of  impeachments  must  necessarily 
have,  to  doom  to  honour  or  to  infamy  the  most  confidential  and 
the  most  distinguished  characters  of  the  community,  forbids  the 
commitment  of  the  trust  to  a  small  number  of  persons. 

These  considerations  seem  alone  sufficient  to  authorize  a  con- 
clusion, that  the  supreme  court  would  have  been  an  improper 
substitute  for  the  senate,  as  a  court  of  impeachments.  There 
remains  a  further  consideration,  which  will  not  a  little 
strengthen  this  conclusion.  It  is  this :  the  punishment,  which 
may  be  the  consequence  of  conviction  upon  impeachment,  is 
not  to  terminate  the  chastisement  of  the  offender.  After  having 
been  sentenced  to  a  perpetual  ostracism  from  the  esteem  and 
confidence,  and  honours  and  emoluments  of  his  country,  he  will 
still  be  liable  to  prosecution  and  punishment  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  law.  "Would  it  be  proper  that  the  persons,  who  had 
disposed  of  his  fame,  and  his  most  valuable  rights  as  a  citizen 
in  one  trial,  should  in  another  trial,  for  the  same  offence,  be 
also  the  disposers  of  his  life  and  his  fortune  ?  Would  there  not 
be  the  greatest  reason  to  apprehend,  that  error,  in  the  first 
sentence,  would  be  the  parent  of  error  in  the  second  sentence  ? 
That  the  strong  biass  of  one  decision,  would  bo  apt  to  overrule 
the  influence  of  any  new  lights,  which  might  be  brought  to 
vary  the  complexion  of  another  decision  ?  Those  who  know 
any  thing  of  human  nature,  will  not  hestitate  to  answer  these 
questions  in  the  affirmative ;  and  will  be  at  no  loss  to  perceive, 
that  by  making  the  same  persons  judges  in  both  cases,  those 
who  might  happen  to  be  the  objects  of  prosecution  would,  in  a 
great  measure,  be  deprived  of  the  double  security  intended 
them  by  a  double  trial.  The  loss  of  life  and  estate,  would  often 
be  virtually  included  in  a  sentence,  which,  in  its  terms,  im- 
ported nothing  more  than  dismission  from  a  present,  and  dis- 
qualification for  a  future  office.  It  may  be  said,  that  the  inter- 
vention of  a  jury,  in  the  second  instance,  would  obviate  the 
danger.  But  juries  are  frequently  influenced  by  the  opiniouH 
of  judges.  They  are  sometimes  induced  to  find  special  verdicts, 
which  refer  the  main   question   to  the  decision  of  the  court 


4&4  THE    FEDERALIST. 

Who  would  be  willing  to  stake  his  life  and  his  estate  upon  the 
verdict  of  a  jury,  acting  under  the  auspices  of  judges,  who  had 
predetermined  his  guilt  ? 

Would  it  have  been  an  improvement  of  the  plan,  to  have 
united  the  supi-eme  court  with  the  senate,  in  the  formation  of 
the  court  of  impeachments  ?  This  union  would  certainly  have 
been  attended  with  several  advantages;  but  would  they  not 
have  been  overbalanced  by  the  signal  disadvantage  already 
stated,  arising  from  the  agency  of  the  same  judges  in  the  double 
prosecution  to  which  the  offender  would  be  liable?  To  a  cer- 
tain extent,  the  benefits  of  that  union  will  be  obtained  from 
making  the  chief  justice  of  the  supreme  court,  the  president  of 
the  court  of  impeachments,  as  is  proposed  to  be  done  in  the 
plan  of  the  convention ;  while  the  inconveniences  of  an  entire 
incorporation  of  the  former  into  the  latter,  will  be  substantially 
avoided.  This  was  perhaps  the  prudent  mean.  I  forbear  to 
remark  upon  the  additional  pretext  for  clamour  against  the 
judiciary,  which  so  considerable  an  augmentation  of  its  autho- 
rity would  have  afforded. 

"Would  it  have  been  desirable  to  have  composed  the  court  for 
the  trial  of  impeachments  of  persons  wholly  distinct  from  the 
other  departments  of  the  government  ?  There  are  weighty 
arguments,  as  well  against,  as  in  favour  of  such  a  plan.  To 
some  minds,  it  will  not  appear  a  trivial  objection,  that  it  would 
tend  to  increase  the  complexity  of  the  political  machine,  and 
to  add  a  new  spring  to  the  government,  the  utility  of  which 
would  at  best  be  questionable.  But  an  objection,  which  will 
not  be  thought  by  any  unworthy  of  attention,  is  this :  a  court 
formed  upon  such  a  plan,  would  either  be  attended  with  heavy 
expense,  or  might  in  practice  be  subject  to  a  variety  of  casual- 
ties and  inconveniences.  It  must  either  consist  of  permanent 
officers,  stationary  at  the  seat  of  government,  and  of  course 
entitled  to  fixed  and  regular  stipends,  or  of  certain  officers  of 
the  state  governments,  to  be  called  upon  whenever  an  impeach- 
ment was  actually  depending.  It  will  not  be  easy  to  imagine 
any  third  mode  materially  different,  which  could  rationally  be 


THE   FEDERALIST.  495 

proposed.  As  the  court,  for  reasons  already  given,  ought  to  bo 
numerous ;  the  first  scheme  will  be  reprobated  by  every  man, 
who  can  compare  the  extent  of  the  public  wants,  with  the 
means  of  supplying  them;  the  second  will  be  espoused  with 
caution  by  those,  who  will  seriously  consider  the  difficulty  of 
collecting  men  dispersed  over  the  whole  union  j  the  injury  to 
the  innocent,  from  the  procrastinated  determination  of  the 
charges  which  might  be  brought  against  them;  the  advantage 
to  the  guilty,  from  the  opportunities  which  delay  would  afford 
for  intrigue  and  corruption,  and  in  some  cases  the  detriment  to 
the  state,  from  the  prolonged  inaction  of  men,  whose  firm  and 
faithful  execution  of  their  duty,  might  have  exposed  them  to 
the  persecution  of  an  intemperate  or  designing  majority  in  the 
house  of  representatives.  Though  this  latter  supposition  may 
seem  harsh,  and  might  not  be  likely  often  to  be  verified;  yet  it 
ought  not  to  be  forgotten,  that  the  demon  of  faction  will,  at 
certain  seasons,  extend  his  sceptre  over  all  numerous  bodies 
of  men. 

But  though  one  or  the  other  of  the  substitutes  which  have 
been  examined,  or  some  other  that  might  be  devised,  should,  in 
this  respect,  be  thought  preferable  to  the  plan,  reported  by  the 
convention,  it  will  not  follow  that  the  constitution  ought  for 
this  reason  to  be  rejected.  If  mankind  were  to  resolve  to  agree 
in  no  institution  of  government,  until  every  part  of  it  had  been 
adjusted  to  the  most  exact  standard  of  perfection,  society  would 
soon  become  a  general  scene  of  anarchy,  and  the  world  a  desert. 
Where  is  the  standard  of  perfection  to  be  found  ?  Who  will 
undertake  to  unite  the  discordant  opinions  of  a  whole  commu- 
nity, in  the  same  judgment  of  it;  and  to  prevail  upon  one  con- 
ceited projector  to  renounce  his  infallible  criterion,  for  the  fallible 
criterion  of  his  more  conceited  neighbour  f  To  answer  the  purpose 
of  the  adversaries  of  the  constitution,  they  ought  to  prove  not 
merely,  that  particular  provisions  in  it  are  not  the  best,  which 
might  have  been  imagined;  but  that  the  plan  upon  the  whole, 
is  bad  and  pernicious 

PUBLIUS.     . 


496  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    T.XVI. 


NEW  YORK,   MARCH  11,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME   SUBJECT   CONTINUED. 

A  REVIEW  of  the  principal  objections  that  have  ajpea/ed 
against  the  proposed  court  for  the  trial  of  impeachments,  will 
not  improbably  eradicate  the  remains  of  any  unfavourable  im- 
pressions which  may  still  exist,  in  regard  to  this  matter. 

The  first  of  these  objections  is,  that  the  provision  in  question 
confounds  legislative  and  judiciary  authorities  in  the  same 
body,  in  violation  of  that  important  and  well-established  maxim, 
which  requires  a  separation  between  the  different  departments 
of  power.  The  true  meaning  of  this  maxim  has  been  discussed 
and  ascertained  in  another  place,  and  has  been  shown  to  be 
entirely  compatible  with  a  partial  intermixture  of  those  depart- 
ments for  special  purposes,  preserving  them,  in  the  main,  dis- 
tinct and  unconnected.  This  partial  intermixture  is  even,  in 
some  cases,  not  only  proper,  but  necessary  to  the  mutual 
defence  of  the  several  members  of  the  government,  against 
each  other.  An  absolute  or  qualified  negative  in  the  executive, 
upon  the  acts  of  the  legislative  body,  is  admitted  by  the  ablest 
adepts  in  political  science,  to  be  an  indispensable  barrier  against 
the  encroachments  of  the  latter  upon  the  former.  And  it  may, 
perhaps,  with  not  less  reason,  be  contended,  that  the  powers 
relating  to  impeachments  are,  as  before  intimated,  an  essential 


•       THE    FEDEKALIST.  497 

check  in  the  hands  of  that  body,  upon  the  encroachments  of 
the  executive.  The  division  of  them  between  the  two  branches 
of  the  legislature ;  assigning  to  one  the  right  of  accusing,  lo 
the  other  the  right  of  judging;  avoids  the  inconvenience  ol 
making  the  same  persons  both  accusers  and  judges :  and  guards 
against  the  danger  of  persecution,  from  the  prevaleucy  of  a 
factious  spirit  in  either  of  those  branches.  As  the  concurrence 
of  two-thirds  of  the  senate  will  be  requisite  to  a  condemnation, 
the  security  to  innocence,  from  this  additional  circumstance, 
will  be  as  complete  as  itself  can  desire. 

It  is  curious  to  observe  with  what  vehemence  this  part  of 
the  plan  is  assailed,  on  the  principle  here  taken  notice  of,  by 
men  who  profess  to  admire,  without  exception,  the  constitution 
of  this  state ;  while  that  very  constitution  makes  the  senate, 
together  with  the  chancellor  and  judges  of  the  supreme  coTirt, 
not  only  a  court  of  impeachments,  but  the  highest  judicatory 
in  the  state  in  all  causes,  civil  and  criminal.  The  proportion, 
in  point  of  numbers,  of  the  chancellor  and  judges  to  the  sen- 
ators, is  so  inconsiderable,  that  the  judiciary  authority  of  New- 
York,  in  the  last  resort  may,  with  truth,  be  said  to  reside  in 
its  senate.  If  the  plan  of  the  convention  be,  in  this  respect, 
chargeable  with  a  departure  from  the  celebrated  maxim  which 
has  been  so  often  mentioned,  and  seems  to  be  so  little  under- 
stood, how  much  more  culpable  must  be  the  constitution  of 
New-York  ?  * 

A  second  objection  to  the  senate,  as  a  court  of  impeachments 
is,  that  it  contributes  to  an  undue  accumulation  of  power  in 
that  body,  tending  to  give  to  the  government  a  countenance 
too  aristocratic.  The  senate,  it  is  observed,  is  to  have  concur- 
rent authority  with  the  executive  in  the  formation  of  treaties, 
and  in  the  appointment  to  offices :  If,  say  the  objectors,  to  these 
prerogatives  is  added  that  of  determining  in  all  cases  of  im- 
peachment, it  will  give  a  decided  predominancy  to  senatorial 

*  In  that  of  New-Jersey,  also,  the  final  judiciary  authority  is  in  a  branch 
of  the  legislature.  In  New-Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Pennsylvania,  and 
South-Carolina,  one  branch  of  the  legislature  is  the  court  for  the  trial  of 
'uipeachments. 


498  THE    FEDERALIST.       ' 

influence.  To  an  objection  so  little  precise  in  itself,  it  is  not 
easy  to  find  a  very  precise  answer.  Where  is  the  measure  or 
criterion  to  which  we  can  appeal,  for  estimating  what  will  give 
the  senate  too  much,  too  little,  or  barely  the  proper  degree  of 
influence  ?  Will  it  not  be  more  safe,  as  well  as  more  simple,  to 
dismiss  such  vague  and  uncertain  calculations,  to  examine  each 
power  by  itself,  and  to  decide  on  general  principles,  where  it 
may  be  deposited  with  most  advantage,  and  least  inconve- 
nience ? 

If  we  take  this  course,  it  will  lead  to  a  more  intelligible,  if 
not  to  a  more  certain  result.  The  disposition  of  the  power  of 
making  treaties,  which  has  obtained  in  the  plan  of  the  conven- 
tion, will  then,  if  I  mistake  not,  appear  to  be  fully  justified  by 
the  considerations  stated  in  a  former  number,  and  by  others 
which  will  occur  under  the  next  head  of  our  inquiries.  The 
expediency  of  the  junction  of  the  senate  with  the  executive,  in 
the  power  of  appointing  to  offices,  will,  I  trust,  be  placed  in  a 
light  not  less  satisfactory,  in  the  disquisitions  under  the  same 
head.  And  I  flatter  myself  the  observations  in  my  last  paper, 
must  have  gone  no  inconsiderable  way  towards  proving,  that  it 
was  not  easy,  if  practicable,  to  find  a  more  fit  receptacle  for  the 
power  of  determining  impeachments,  than  that  which  has  been 
chosen.  If  this  be  truly  the  case,  the  hypothetical  danger  of 
the  too  great  weight  of  the  senate,  ought  to  be  discarded  from 
our  reasonings. 

But  this  hypothesis,  such  as  it  is,  has  already  been  refuted  in 
the  remarks  applied  to  the  duration  of  office  prescribed  for  the 
senators.  It  was  by  them  shown,  as  well  on  the  credit  of  his- 
torical examples,  as  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that  the  most 
popular  branch  of  every  government,  partaking  of  the  repub- 
lican genius,  by  being  generally  the  favourite  of  the  people, 
will  be  as  generally  a  full  match,  if  not  an  overmatch,  for  every 
other  member  of  the  government. 

But,  independent  of  this  most  active  and  operative  principle ; 
to  secure  the  equilibrium  of  the  national  house  of  representa- 
tives, the  plan  of  the  convention  has  provided  in  its  favour 


THE   FEDERALIST.  49?^ 

several  important  counterpoises  to  the  additional  authorities  ta 
be  conferred  upon  the  senate.  The  exclusive  privilege  of  origi- 
nating money  bills,  will  belong  to  the  house  of  representatives. 
The  same  house  will  possess  the  sole  right  of  instituting  im- 
peachments: Is  not  this  a  complete  counterbalance  to  that  of 
determining  them  ? — The  same  house  will  be  the  umpire  in  all 
elections  of  the  president,  which  do  not  unite  the  suffrages  of 
a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  electors;  a  case  which  it 
cannot  be  doubted  will  sometimes,  if  not  frequently,  happen 
The  constant  possibility  of  the  thing,  must  be  a  fruitful  source 
of  influence  to  that  body.  The  more  it  is  contemplated,  the 
more  important  will  appear  this  ultimate,  though  contingent 
power,  of  deciding  the  competitions  of  the  most  illustrious 
citizens  of  the  union,  for  the  first  office  in  it.  It  would  not 
perhaps  be  rash  to  predict,  that  as  a  mean  of  influence,  it  will 
be  found  to  outweigh  all  the  peculiar  attributes  of  the  senate. 

A  third  objection  to  the  senate  as  a  court  of  impeachments, 
is  drawn  from  the  agency  they  are  to  have  in  the  appointments 
to  office.  It  is  imagined  that  they  would  be  too  indulgent 
judges  of  the  conduct  of  men,  in  whose  official  creation  they 
had  participated.  The  principle  of  this  objection  would  con- 
demn a  practice,  which  is  to  be  seen  in  all  the  state  gov- 
ernments, if  not  in  all  the  governments  with  which  we  are 
acquainted :  I  mean  that  of  rendering  those,  who  hold  offices 
during  pleasure,  dependent  on  the  pleasure  of  those  who 
appoint  them.  With  equal  plausibility  might  it  be  alleged  in 
this  case,  that  the  favouritism  of  the  latter,  would  always  be 
an  asylum  for  the  misbehaviour  of  the  former.  But  that 
practice,  in  contradiction  to  this  principle,  proceeds  upon  the 
presumption,  that  the  responsibility  of  those  who  appoint,  for 
the  fitness  and  competency  of  the  persons,  on  whom  they 
bestow  their  choice,  and  the  interest  they  have  in  the  respect- 
nble  and  prosperous  administration  of  affairs,  will  inspire  a 
sufficient  disposition,  to  dismiss  from  a  share  in  it,  all  such  who, 
by  their  conduct,  may  have  proved  themselves  unworthy  of  the 
ronfidence  reposed   in  them.     Though  facts  may  not  always 


500  THE    FEDERALIST. 

correspond  -with  this  presumption,  yet  if  it  be  in  the  main  just, 
it  must  destroy  the  supposition,  that  the  senate,  who  will 
merely  sanction  the  choice  of  the  executive,  should  feel  a  bias, 
towards  the  objects  of  that  choice,  strong  enough  to  blind  them 
to  the  evidences  of  guilt  so  extraordinary,  as  to  have  induced 
the  representatives  of  the  nation  to  become  its  accusers. 

If  any  further  argument  were  necessary  to  evince  the  im- 
probability of  such  a  bias,  it  might  be  found  in  the  nature  of 
the  agency  of  the  senate,  in  the  business  of  appointments. 

It  will  be  the  office  of  the  president  to  nominate,  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  senate  to  appoint.  There  will 
of  course  be  no  exertion  of  choice,  on  the  part  of  the  senate. 
They  may  defeat  one  choice  of  the  executive,  and  oblige  him 
to  make  another ;  but  they  cannot  themselves  choose — they  can 
only  ratify  or  reject  the  choice  he  may  have  made.  They 
might  even  entertain  a  preference  to  some  other  person,  at  the 
very  moment  they  were  assenting  to  the  one  proposed;  because 
there  might  be  no  positive  ground  of  opposition  to  him ;  and 
they  could  not  be  sure,  if  they  withheld  their  assent,  that  the 
subsequent  nomination  would  fall  upon  their  own  favourite,  or 
upon  any  other  person  in  their  estimation  more  meritorious 
than  the  one  rejected.  Thus  it  could  hardly  happen,  that  the 
majority  of  the  senate  would  feel  any  other  complacency 
towards  the  object  of  an  appointment,  than  such  as  the 
appearances  of  merit  might  inspire,  and  proofs  of  the  want 
of  it  destroy. 

A  fourth  objection  to  the  senate,  in  the  capacity  of  a  court 
of  impeachments,  is  derived  from  their  union  with  the  executive 
in  the  power  of  making  treaties.  This,  it  has  been  said,  would 
constitute  the  senators  their  own  judges,  in  every  case  of  a 
corrupt  or  perfidious  execution  of  that  trust.  After  having 
combined  with  the  executive  in  betraying  the  interests  of  the 
nation  in  a  ruinous  treaty,  what  prospect,  it  is  asked,  would 
there  be  of  their  being  made  to  suffer  the  punishment  they 
would  deserve,  when  they  were  themselves  to  decide  upon  the 


THE    FEDERALIST.  60l 

accusation  brought  against  them  for  the  treachery  of  which 
they  had  been  guilty  ? 

This  objection  has  been  circulated  with  more  earnestness 
and  with  a  greater  show  of  reason,  than  any  other  which  has 
appeared  against  this  part  of  the  plan  ;  and  yet  I  am  deceived 
if  it  does  not  rest  upon  an  erroneous  foundation. 

The  security  essentially  intended  by  the  constitution  against 
corruption  and  treachery  in  the  formation  of  treaties,  is  to  be 
sought  for  in  the  numbers  and  characters  of  those  who  are  to 
make  them.  The  joint  agency  of  the  chief  magistrate  of  the 
union,  and  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  a  body  selected  by 
the  collective  wisdom  of  the  legislatures  of  the  several  states, 
is  designed  to  be  the  pledge  for  the  fidelity  of  the  national 
councils  in  this  particular.  The  convention  might  with  pro- 
priety have  meditated  the  punishment  of  the  executive,  for  a 
deviation  from  the  instructions  of  the  senate,  or  a  want  of  in- 
tegrity in  the  conduct  of  the  negociatioos  committed  to  him : 
They  might  also  have  had  in  view  the  punishment  of  a  few 
leading  individuals  in  the  senate,  who  should  have  prostituted 
their  influence  in  that  body,  as  the  mercenary  instruments  of 
foreign  corruption :  But  they  could  not  with  more  or  with 
equal  propriety  have  contemplated  the  impeachment  and 
punishment  of  two-thirds  of  the  senate,  consenting  to  an  im- 
proper treaty,  than  of  a  majority  of  that  or  of  the  other  branch 
of  the  national  legislature,  consenting  to  a  pernicious  or  uncon- 
stitutional law :  a  principle  which  I  believe  has  never  been 
admitted  into  any  government.  How,  in  fact,  could  a  majority 
of  the  house  of  representatives  impeach  themselves?  Not 
better,  it  is  evident,  than  two-thirds  of  the  senate  might  try 
themselves.  And  yet  what  reason  is  there,  that  a  majority  of 
the  house  of  representatives,  sacrificing  the  interests  of  the 
society,  by  an  unjust  and  tyrannical  act  of  legislation,  should 
escape  with  impunity,  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  senate,  sac- 
rificing the  same  interests  in  an  injurious  treaty  with  a  foreign 
power?  The  truth  is,  that  in  all  such  cases,  it  is  essential  to 
the  freedom,  and  to  the  necessary  independence  of  the  deliber- 


502  THE    FEDERALIST. 

ations  of  the  body,  that  the  members  of  it  should  be  exempt 
from  punishment  for  acts  done  in  a  collective  capacity;  and 
the  security  to  the  society  must  depend  on  the  care  which  is 
taken  to  confide  the  trust  to  proper  hands,  to  make  it  their 
interest  to  execute  it  with  fidelity,  and  to  make  it  as  difficult  as 
possible  for  them  to  combine  in  any  interest  opposite  to  that  of 
the  public  good. 

So  far  as  might  concern  the  misbehaviour  of  the  executive 
in  perverting  the  instructions,  or  contravening  the  views  of  the 
senate,  we  need  not  be  apprehensive  of  the  want  of  a  disposition 
in  that  body  to  punish  the  abuse  of  their  confidence,  or  to  vin- 
dicate their  own  authority.  "We  may  thus  far  count  upon  their 
pride,  if  not  upon  their  virtue.  And  so  far  even  as  might  con- 
cern the  corruption  of  leading  members,  by  whose  arts  and 
influence  the  majority  may  have  been  inveigled  into  measures 
odious  to  the  community;  if  the  proofs  of  that  corruption 
should  be  satisfactory^  the  usual  propensity  of  human  nature 
will  warrant  us  in  concluding,  that  there  would  be  commonly 
no  defect  of  inclination  in  the  body,  to  divert  the  public  resent- 
ment from  themselves,  by  a  ready  sacrifice  of  the  authors  of 
their  mismanagement  and  disgrace. 

PUBLIUS, 


THE    FEDERALIST.  503 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    I.XVII. 


NEW  YORK,   MARCH    11,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


CONCERNING  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  PRESIDENT:  A  GROSS  AT 
TEMPT  TO  MISREPRESENT  THIS  PART  OF  THE  PLAN  DETECTED. 

The  constitution  of  the  executive  department  of  the  proposed 
government,  next  claims  our  attention. 

There  is  hardly  any  part  of  the  system,  the  arrangement  of 
which  could  have  been  attended  with  greater  difficulty;  and 
there  is  perhaps  none,  which  has  been  inveighed  against  with 
less  candour,  or  criticised  with  less  judgment. 

Here  the  writers  against  the  constitution,  seem  to  have  taken 
pains  to  signalize  their  talent  of  misrepresentation.  Calcu- 
luting  upon  the  aversion  of  the  people  to  monarchy,  they  have 
endeavoured  to  enlist  all  their  jealousies  and  apjirehensions  in 
opposition  to  the  intended  president  of  the  United  States  j  not 
merely  as  the  embryo,  but  as  the  full  grown  progeny  of  that 
detested  parent.  To  establish  the  pretended  affinity,  they  have 
not  scrupled  to  draw  resources  even  from  the  regions  of  fiction. 
The  authorities  of  a  magistrate,  in  a  few  instances  greater,  in 
some  instances  less,  than  those  of  a  governor  of  New-York, 
have  been  magnified  into  more  than  royal  prerogatives.  He 
has  been  decorated  with  attributes,  superior  in  dignity  and 
splendour  to  those  of  a  king  of  Great  Britain.  He  has  been 
shoT^n  to  us  with  a  diadem  sparkling  on  his  brow,  and  the 


504  THE    FEDERALIST. 

imperial  purple  flowing  in  his  train.  He  has  been  seated  on  a 
throne  surrounded  with  minions  and  mistresses;  giving  au- 
dience to  the  envoys  of  foreign  potentates,  in  all  the  superci- 
lious pomp  of  majesty.  The  images  of  Asiatic  despotism  and 
voluptuousness,  have  not  been  wanting  to  ci'own  the  exag- 
gerated scene.  We  have  been  taught  to  tremble  at  the  terrific 
visages  of  murdering  janisaries;  and  to  blush  at  the  unveiled 
mysteries  of  a  future  seraglio. 

Attempts  extravagant  as  these  to  disfigure,  or  rather  to  meta- 
morphose the  object,  render  it  necessary  to  take  an  accurate 
view  of  its  real  nature  and  form  j  in  order  to  ascertain  its  true 
aspect  and  genuine  appearance,  to  unmask  the  disingenuity, 
and  to  expose  the  fallacy  of  the  counterfeit  resemblances  which 
have  been  so  insidiously,  as  well  as  industriously,  propagated. 

In  the  execution  of  this  task,  there  is  no  man  who  would  not 
find  it  an  arduous  effort  either  to  behold  with  moderation,  or  to 
treat  with  seriousness,  the  devices  not  less  weak  than  wicked, 
which  have  been  contrived  to  pervert  the  public  opinion  in 
relation  to  the  subject.  They  so  far  exceed  the  usual,  though 
unjustifiable,  licences  of  party-artifice,  that  even  in  a  disposi 
tion  the  most  candid  and  tolerant,  they  must  force  the  senti- 
ments which  favour  an  indulgent  construction  of  the  conduct 
of  political  adversaries  to  give  place  to  a  voluntary  and  unre- 
served indignation.  It  is  impossible  not  to  bestow  the  imputa- 
tion of  deliberate  imposture  and  deception  upon  the  gross 
pretence  of  a  similitude  between  a  king  of  Great  Britain,  and 
a  magistrate  of  the  character  marked  out  for  that  of  the  presi 
dent  of  the  United  States.  It  is  still  more  impossible  to  with- 
hold that  imputation,  from  the  rash  and  barefaced  expedients 
which  have  been  employed  to  give  success  to  the  attempted 
imposition. 

In  one  instance,  which  I  cite  as  a  sample  of  tne  general  spirit, 
the  temerity  has  proceeded  so  far  as  to  ascribe  to  the  president 
of  the  United  States  a  power,  which  by  the  instrument  re- 
ported, is  p-iyressly  allotted  to  the  exe'^'tives  of  the  individual 


THE    FEDERALIST.  506 

States.     T  mean    the  power  of  filling  casual  vacancies  in  the 
senate. 

This  bold  experiment  upon  the  discernment  of  his  country- 
men, has  been  hazarded  by  the  writer  who  (whatever  may  be 
his  real  merit)  has  had  no  inconsiderable  share  in  the  applauses 
of  his  party;*  and  who,  upon  this  false  and  unfounded  sugges- 
tion, has  built  a  series  of  observations  equally  false  and  un- 
founded. Let  him  now  be  confronted  with  the  evidence  of  the 
fact;  and  let  him,  if  he  be  able,  justify  or  extenuate  the  shame- 
ful outrage  he  has  offered  to  the  dictates  of  truth,  and  to  the 
rules  of  fair  dealing. 

The  second  clause  of  the  second  section  of  the  second  article, 
empowers  the  president  of  the  United  States  "  to  nominate,  and 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  senate  to  appoint 
ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and  consuls,  judges  of  the 
supreme  court,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  United  States,  whose 
appointments  are  not  in  the  constitution  otherwise  provided  fofy       -.  f^J^*^ 
and  which  shall  he  established  by  law.'*     Immediately  after  \,}x\^^f^jtA'^^\^'^ 
clause  follows  another  in  these  words :  "  The  president  shall  ^^Tly^\S^ 
have  power  to  fill  up  all  vacancie's  thsiX  may  happen  during  the  ''*^'^'^\^^j^' 
recess  of  the  senate,  by  granting  commissions  which  shall  expire 
at  the  end  of  their  next  session."     It  is  from  this  last  provision, 
that  the  pretended  power  of  the  president  to  fill  vacancies  in 
the  senate  has  been  deduced.     A  slight  attention  to  the  con- 
nexion of  the  clauses,  and  to  the  obvious  meaning  of  the  terms, 
will  satisfy  us,  that  the  deduction  is  not  even  colourable. 

The  first  of  these  two  clauses,  it  is  clear,  only  provides  a 
mode  for  appointing  such  officers,  "  whose  appointments  are 
not  otherwise  provided  for  in  the  constitution,  and  which  shall  be 
established  by  law ;"  of  course  it  cannot  extend  to  the  appoint- 
ment  of  senators;  whose  appointments  are  otherwise  provided 
for  in  the  constitution ,f  and  who  are  established  by  the  constitu- 
tion, and  will  not  require  a  future  establishment  by  law.  This 
position  will  hardly  be  contested. 

Tne  last  of  these  two  clauses,  it  is  equally  clear,  cannot  be 
*  See  Cato,  No.  5.  t  Article  1.  Sec.  3.  Clause  1. 


■606  THE    FEDERALIST. 

understood  to  comprehend  the  power  of  filling  vacancies  in  the 
senate,  for  the  following  reasons :  First.  The  relation  in  which 
that  clause  stands  to  the  other,  which  declares  the  general 
mode  of  appointing  ofl&cers  of  the  United  States,  denotes  it  to 
be  nothing  more  than  a  supplement  to  the  other;  for  the  pur- 
pose of  establishing  an  auxiliary  method  of  appointment,  in 
cases  to  which  the  general  method  was  inadequate.  The 
•ordinary  power  of  appointment  is  confided  to  the  president 
and  senate  jointly,  and  can  therefore  only  be  exercised  during 
the  session  of  the  senate :  but,  as  it  would  have  been  improper 
to  oblige  this  body  to  be  continually  in  session  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  officers ;  and  as  vacancies  might  happen  in  their  recess, 
which  it  might  be  necessary  for  the  public  service  to  fill  without 
■delay,  the  succeeding  clause  is  evidently  intended  to  authorize 
the  president,  singly,  to  make  temporary  appointments  "during 
the  recess  of  the  senate,  by  granting  commissions  which  should 
•expire  at  the  end  of  their  next  session."  Second.  If  this  clause 
is  to  be  considered  as  supplementary  to  the  one  which  precedes, 
the  vacancies  of  which  it  speaks  must  be  construed  to  relate  to 
the  "officers"  described  in  the  preceding  one;  and  this,  we 
have  seen,  excludes  from  its  description  the  members  of  the 
senate.  Third.  The  time  within  which  the  power  is  to  operate, 
"  during  the  recess  of  the  senate,"  and  the  duration  of  the 
appointments,  "  to  the  end  of  the  next  session  "  of  that  body, 
conspire  to  elucidate  the  sense  of  the  provision,  which,  if  it  had 
been  intended  to  comprehend  senators,  would  naturally  have 
referred  the  temporary  power  of  filling  vacancies  to  the  recess 
of  the  state  legislatures,  who  are  to  make  the  permanent 
appointments,  and  not  to  the  recess  of  the  national  senate, 
who  are  to  have  no  concern  in  those  appointments;  and  would 
have  extended  the  duration  in  office  of  the  temporary  senators 
to  the  next  session  of  the  legislature  of  the  state,  in  whose 
representation  the  vacancies  had  happened,  instead  of  making 
it  to  expire  at  the  end  of  the  ensuing  session  of  the  national 
senate.  The  circumstances  of  the  body  authorized  to  make 
the  permanent  appointments,  would,  of  course,  have  governed 
the  modification  of  a  power  which  related  to  tlie  temporary 


THE   FEDERALIST.  SOT 

appointments;  and,  as  the  national  senate  is  the  body,  whose 
situation  is  alone  contemplated  in  the  clause  upon  which  the 
suggestion  under  examination  has  been  founded,  the  vacancies 
to  which  it  alludes  can  only  be  deemed  to  respect  those  officers, 
in  whose  appointment  that  body  has  a  concurrent  agency  with 
the  president.  But,  lastly,  the  first  and  second  clauses  of  the 
third  section  of  the  first  article,  obviate  all  possibility  of  doubt. 
The  former  provides,  that  ''  the  senate  of  the  United  States 
shall  be  composed  of  two  senators  from  each  state,  chosen  by 
the  legislature  thereof  for  six  years ; "  and  the  latter  directs,  that 
"  if  vacancies  in  that  body  should  happen  by  resignation  or 
otherwise,  during  the  recess  of  the  legislature  of  any  state,  the 
executive  thereof  may  make  temporary  appointments  until 
the  neoct  meeting  of  the  legislature,  which  shall  then  fill  such 
vacancies."  Here  is  an  express  power  given,  in  clear  and 
unambiguous  terms,  to  the  state  executives,  to  fill  the  casual 
vacancies  in  the  senate,  by  temporary  appointments;  which 
not  only  invalidates  the  supposition,  that  the  clause  before 
considered,  could  have  been  intended  to  confer  that  power 
upon  the  president  of  the  United  States ;  but  proves,  that  thia 
supposition,  destitute  as  it  is  even  of  the  merit  of  plausibility, 
must  have  originated  in  an  intention  to  deceive  the  people, 
too  palpable  to  be  obscured  by  sophistry,  too  atrocious  to  be 
palliated  by  hypocrisy. 

I  have  taken  the  pains  to  select  this  instance  of  misrepre- 
sentation, and  to  place  it  in  a  clear  and  strong  light,  as  an 
unequivocal  proof  of  the  unwarrantable  arts,  which  are  prac- 
tised, to  prevent  a  fair  and  impartial  judgment  of  the  real 
merits  of  the  plan  submitted  to  the  consideration  of  the  people. 
Nor  have  I  scrupled  in  so  fiagrant  a  case,  to  indulge  a  severity 
^f  animadversion,  little  congenial  with  the  general  spirit  of 
these  papers.  I  hesitate  not  to  submit  it  to  the  decision  of  any 
tandid  and  honest  adversary  of  the  proposed  government, 
whether  language  can  furnish  epithets  of  too  much  asperity, 
for  so  shameless  and  so  prostitute  an  attempt  to  impose  on  the 
citizens  of  America. 

43  PUBLIUS. 


508  THE   FEDERALIST. 


rHE  FEDERALIST 


NUMBER   LXVIII. 


NEW  YORK,   MARCH   14,    1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  VIEW  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE   PRESIDENT   CONTINUED, 
IN  RELATION   TO   THE   MODE   OF   APPOINTMENT. 

The  mode  of  appointment  of  the  chief  magistrate  ot  tne 
United  States,  is  almost  the  only  part  of  the  system,  of  any 
consequence,  which  has  escaped  without  severe  censure,  or 
which  has  received  the  slightest  mark  of  approbation  from  its 
opponents.  The  most  plausible  of  these,  who  has  appeared  in 
print,  has  even  deigned  to  admit,  that  the  election  of  the  presi- 
dent is  pretty  well  guarded.*  I  venture  somewhat  further,  and 
hesitate  not  to  affirm,  that  if  the  manner  of  it  be  not  perfect, 
it  is  at  least  excellent.  It  unites  in  an  eminent  degree  all  the 
advantages,  the  union  of  which  was  to  be  wished  for. 

It  was  desirable,  that  the  sense  of  the  people  should  operate 
in  the  choice  of  the  person  to  whom  so  important  a  trust  wa» 
to  be  confided.  This  end  will  be  answered  by  committing  the 
right  of  making  it,  not  to  any  pre-established  body,  but  to  men, 
chosen  by  the  people  for  the  special  purpose,  and  at  the  par- 
ticular conjuncture. 

It  was  equally  desirarble,  that  the  immediate  election  should 
be  made  by  men  most  capable  of  analizing  the  qualities  adapted 
to  the  station,  and  acting  under  circumstances  favourable  to 

*  Vide  Federal  Farmer. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  609 

deliberation,  and  to  a  judicious  combination  of  all  the  rpasona 
and  inducements  that  were  proper  to  govern  their  choice.  A 
small  number  of  persons,  selected  by  their  fellow  citizens  from 
the  general  mass,  will  be  most  likely  to  possess  the  information 
and  discernment  requisite  to  so  complicated  an  investigation. 

It  was  also  peculiarly  desirable,  to  afford  as  little  opportunity 
as  possible  to  tumult  and  disorder.  This  evil  was  not  least  to 
oe  dreaded  in  the  election  of  a  magistrate,  who  was  to  have  so 
important  an  agency  in  the  administration  of  the  government. 
But  the  precautions  which  have  been  so  happily  concerted  in 
the  system  under  consideration,  promise  an  effectual  security 
against  this  mischief.  The  choice  of  several,  to  form  an  inter- 
mediate body  of  electors,  will  be  much  less  apt  to  convulse  the 
community,  with  any  extraordinary  or  violent  movements, 
than  the  choice  of  one,  who  was  himself  to  be  the  final  object 
of  the  public  wishes.  And  as  the  electors,  chosen  in  each  state, 
are  to  assemble  and  vote  in  the  state,  in  which  they  are  chosen, 
this  detached  and  divided  situation  will  expose  them  much  less 
to  heats  and  ferments,  that  might  be  communicated  from  them 
to  the  people,  than  if  they  were  all  to  be  convened  at  one  time, 
in  one  place. 

Nothing  was  more  to  be  desired,  than  that  every  practicable 
obstacle  should  be  opposed  to  cabal,  intrigue,  and  corruption. 
These  most  deadly  adversaries  of  republican  government,  might 
naturally  have  been  expected  to  make  their  approaches  from 
more  than  one  quarter,  but  chiefly  from  the  desire  in  foreign 
powers  to  gain  an  improper  ascendant  in  our  councils.  How 
could  they  better  gratify  this,  than  by  raising  a  creature  of 
their  own  to  the  chief  magistracy  of  the  union  ?  But  the  con- 
vention have  guarded  against  all  danger  of  this  sort,  with  the 
most  provident  and  judicious  attention.  They  have  not  made 
the  appointment  of  the  president  to  depend  on  pre-existing 
bodies  of  men,  who  might  be  tampered  with  beforehand  to 
prostitute  their  votes ;  but  they  have  referred  it  in  the  first  in- 
stance to  an  immediate  act  of  the  people  of  America,  to  be 
exerted  in  the  choice  of  persons  for  the  temporary  and  sole 


610  THE   FEDERALIST. 

parpose  of  making  the  appointment.  And  they  have  excluded 
from  eligibility  to  this  trust,  all  those  who  from  situation  might 
be  suspected  of  too  great  devotion  to  the  president  in  office. 
No  senator,  representative,  or  other  person  holding  a  place  of 
trust  or  profit  under  the  United  States,  can  be  of  the  number 
of  the  electors.  Thus,  without  corrupting  the  body  of  the 
people,  the  immediate  agents  in  the  election  will  at  least  enter 
upon  the  task,  free  from  any  sinister  bias.  Their  transient 
existence,  and  their  detached  situation,  already  noticed,  afford 
a  satisfactory  prospect  of  their  continuing  so,  to  the  conclusion 
of  it.  The  business  of  corruption,  when  it  is  to  embrace  so 
considerable  a  number  of  men,  requires  time,  as  well  as  means, 
Nor  would  it  be  found  easy  suddenly  to  embark  them,  dis- 
persed, as  they  would  be  over  thirteen  states,  in  any  combina- 
tions founded  upon  motives  which,  though  they  could  not 
properly  be  denominated  corrupt,  might  yet  be  of  a  nature  to 
mislead  them  from  their  duty. 

Another,  and  no  less  important,  desideratum  was,  that  the 
executive  should  be  independent  for  his  continuance  in  office, 
on  all,  but  the  people  themselves.  He  might  otherwise  be 
tempted  to  sacrifice  his  duty  to  his  complaisance  for  those 
whose  favour  was  necessary  to  the  duration  of  his  official  con- 
sequence. This  advantage  will  also  be  secured,  by  making  his 
re-election  to  depend  on  a  special  body  of  representatives, 
deputed  by  the  society  for  the  single  purpose  of  making  the 
important  choice. 

All  these  advantages  will  be  happily  combined  in  the  plan 
devised  by  the  convention,  which  is,  that  each-  state  shall 
choose  a  number  of  persons  as  electors,  equal  to  the  number  of 
senators  and  representatives  of  such  state  in  the  national 
government,  who  shall  assemble  within  the  state,  and  vote  for 
some  fit  person  as  president.  Their  votes,  thus  given,  are  to 
be  transmitted  to  the  seat  of  the  national  government ;  and  the 
person  who  may  happen  to  have  a  majority  of  the  whole 
number  of  votes,  will  be  the  president.     But  as  a  majoriiy  of 


THE    FEDERALIST.  5H 

the  votes  might  not  always  happen  to  centre  in  one  man,  and 
as  it  might  be  unsafe  to  permit  less  than  a  majority  to  be  con 
elusive,  it  is  provided,  that,  in  such  a  contingency,  the  house 
of  representatives  shall  select  out  of  the  candidates,  who  shall 
have  the  five  highest  numbers  of  votes,  the  man  who,  in  their 
opinion,  may  be  best  qualified  for  the  office. 

This  process  of  election  affords  a  moi-al  certainty,  that  the 
office  of  pi'esident  will  seldom  fall  to  the  lot  of  any  man  who 
is  not  in  an  eminent  degree  endowed  with  the  requisite  qualifi- 
cations. Talents  for  low  intrigue,  and  the  little  arts  of  popu- 
larity, may  alone  suffice  to  elevate  a  man  to  the  first  honours 
of  a  single  state;  but  it  will  require  other  talents,  and  a  differ- 
ent kind  of  merit,  to  establish  him  in  the  esteem  and  confidence 
of  the  whole  union,  or  of  so  considerable  a  portion  of  it.  as 
would  be  necessary  to  make  him  a  successful  candidate  for  the 
aistinguished  office  of  president  of  the  United  State's.  It  will 
not  be  too  strong  to  say,  that  there  will  be  a  constant  proba- 
bility of  seeing  the  station  filled  by  characters  pre-eminent  for 
ability  and  virtue.  And  this  will  be  thought  no  inconsiderable 
recommendation  of  the  constitution,  by  those  who  are  able  to 
estimate  the  share  which  the  executive  in  every  government 
must  necessarily  have  in  its  good  or  ill  administration.  Though 
we  cannot  acquiesce  in  the  political  heresy  of  the  poet,  who 

Bays: 

"  For  forms  of  government,  let  fools  contest  — 
That  which  is  best  administered,  is  best," 

—  yet  we  may  safely  pronounce,  that  the  true  test  of  a  good 
government  is,  its  aptitude  and  tendency  to  produce  a  good 
administration. 

The  vice-president  is  to  be  chosen  in  the  same  manner  with 
the  president;  with  this  difference,  that  the  senate  is  to  do,  in 
respect  to  the  former,  what  is  to  be  done  by  the  house  of  repre- 
sentatives, in  respect  to  the  latter. 

The  appointment  of  an  extraordinary  person,  as  vice-presi- 
dent, has  been  objected  to  as  superfluous,  if  not  mischievous. 
It  has  been  alleged,  that  it  would  have  been  preferable  to  have 


bVz  THE   FEDERALIST. 

autliorized  the  senate  to  elect  out  of  their  own  body  an  officer, 
answering  to  that  description.  But  two  considerations  seem 
to  justify  the  ideas  of  the  convention  in  this  respect.  One  is, 
that  to  secure  at  all  times  the  possibility  of  a  definitive  reso- 
lution of  the  body,  it  is  necessary  that  the  president  should 
have  only  a  casting  vote.  And  to  take  the  senator  of  any  state 
from  his  seat  as  senator,  to  place  him  in  that  of  president  of 
the  senate,  would  be  to  exchange,  in  regard  to  the  state  from 
which  he  came,  a  constant  for  a  contingent  vote.  The  other 
consideration  is,  that,  as  the  vice-president  may  occasionally 
become  a  substitute  for  the  president,  in  the  supremo  executive 
magistracy,  all  the  reasons  which  recommend  the  mode  of 
election  prescribed  for  the  one,  apply  with  great,  if  not  with 
equal,  force  to  the  manner  of  appointing  the  other.  It  is  re- 
markable, that,  in  this,  as  in  most  other  instances,  the  objection 
which  is  made,  would  lie  against  the  constitution  of  this  state. 
We  have  a  lieutenant-governor,  chosen  by  the  people  at  large, 
who  presides  in  the  senate,  and  is  the  constitutional  substitute 
for  the  governor  in  casualties  similar  to  those,  which  would 
authorize  the  vice-president  to  exercise  the  authorities,  and 
discharge  the  duties  of  the  president. 

PUBLIUS. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  513 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LXIX. 


NEW  YORK,   MARCH  14,  1788 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  VIEW  CONTINUED,  WITH  A  COMPARISON  BETWEEN  THE 
PRESIDENT  AND  THE  KING  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN,  ON  THE  ONIS 
HAND,    AND   THE   GOVERNOR   OF   NEW- YORK,    ON   THE   OTHER. 

I  PROCEED  now  to  trace  the  real  characters  of  the  proposed 
executive,  as  they  are  marked  out  in  the  plan  of  the  conven- 
tion. This  will  serve  to  place  in  a  strong  light  the  unfairness 
of  the  representations  which  have  been  made  in  regard  to  it. 

The  first  thing  which  strikes  our  attention  is,  that  the  execu- 
tive authority,  with  few  exceptions,  is  to  be  vested  in  a  single 
magistrate.  This  will  scarcely,  however,  be  considered  as  a 
point  upon  which  any  comparison  can  be  grounded;  for  if,  in 
this  particular,  there  be  a  resemblance  to  the  king  of  Great 
Britain,  there  is  not  less  a  resemblance  to  the  Grand  Seignor, 
to  the  Khan  of  Tartary,  to  the  man  of  the  seven  mountains,  or 
to  the  governor  of  New- York. 

That  magistrate  is  to  be  elected  for  four  years ;  and  is  to  be 
•e-eligible  as  often  as  the  people  of  the  United  States  shall 
think  him  worthy  of  their  confidence.  In  these  circumstances, 
there  is  a  total  dissimilitude  between  him  and  a  king  of  Great 
Britain;  who  is  an  hereditary  monarch,  possessing  the  crown  as 
a  patrimony  descendible  to  his  heirs  for  ever:  but  there  is  a 
close  analogy  between  him  and  a  governor  of  New-York,  who 


51-1  THE    FEDERALIST. 

is  elected  for  three  years,  and  is  re-eligible  without  limitation 
or  intermission.  If  we  consider  how  much  less  time  would  be 
requisite  for  establishing  a  dangerous  influence  in  a  single 
state,  than  for  establishing  a  like  influence  throughout  the 
United  States,  we  must  conclude,  that  a  duration  oi  four  years 
for  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  union,  is  a  degree  of  permanency 
far  less  to  be  dreaded  in  that  oflfice,  than  a  duration  of  three 
years  for  a  correspondent  ofiice  in  a  single  state. 

The  president  of  the  United  States  would  be  liable  to  be  im- 
peached, tried,  and,  upon  conviction  of  treason,  bribery,  or 
other  high  crimes  or  misdemeanors,  removed  from  office;  and 
would  afterwards  be  liable  to  prosecution  and  punishment  in 
the  ordinary  course  of  law.  The  person  of  the  king  of  Great 
Britain,  is  sacred  and  inviolable :  There  is  no  constitutional 
tribunal  to  which  he  is  amenable ;  no  punishment  to  which  he 
can  be  subjected,  without  involving  the  crisis  of  a  national 
revolution.  In  this  delicate  and  important  circumstance  of 
personal  responsibility,  the  president  of  confederated  America 
would  stand  upon  no  better  ground  than  a  governor  of  New- 
York,  and  upon  worse  ground  than  the  governors  of  Virginia 
and  Delaware. 

The  president  of  the  United  States  is  to  have  power  to  return 
a  bill,  which  shall  have  passed  the  two  branches  of  the  legisla- 
ture, for  re-consideration;  and  the  bill,  so  returned,  is  not  to 
become  a  law,  unless,  upon  that  re-consideration,  it  be  approved 
by  two-thirds  of  both  houses.  The  king  of  Great  Britain,  on 
his  part,  has  an  absolute  negative  upon  the  acts  of  the  two 
houses  of  parliament.  The  disuse  of  that  power  for  a  consider- 
able time  past,  does  not  affect  the  reality  of  its  existence;  and 
is  to  be  ascribed  wholly  to  the  crown's  having  found  the  means 
of  substituting  influence  to  authority,  or  the  art  of  gaining  a 
majority  in  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  houses,  to  the  necessity 
of  exerting  a  prerogative  which  could  seldom  be  exerted  with- 
out hazarding  some  degree  of  national  agitation.  The  qualified 
negative  of  .the  president,  differs  widely  from  this  absolute 
negative  of  the  British  sovereign;  and  tallies  exactly  with  the 


THE    FEDERALIST.  616 

revisionary  authority  of  the  eouucil  of  revision  of  this  8t.ate, 
of  which  the  governor  is  a  constituent  part.  In  this  respect, 
the  power  of  the  president  would  exceed  that  of  the  governor 
of  New- York ;  because  the  former  would  possess  singly,  what 
the  latter  shares  with  the  chancellor  and  judges :  But  it  would 
be  precisely  the  same  with  that  of  the  governor  of  Massachu- 
setts, whose  constitution,  as  to  this  article,  seems  to  have  been 
the  original  from  which  the  convention  have  copied. 

The  president  is  to  be  the  "  commander  in  chief  of  the  army 
and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  militia  of  the  several 
states,  when  called  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States. 
He  is  to  have  power  to  grant  reprieves  and  pardons  for  offences 
against  the  United  States,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment;  to 
recommend  to  the  consideration  of  congress  such  measures  as 
he  shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient;  to  convene,  on  extra- 
ordinary occasions,  both  houses  of  the  legislature,  or  either  of 
them,  and  in  case  of  disagreement  between  them  with  respect  to 
the  time  of  adjournment,  to  adjourn  them  to  such  time  as  he  shall 
think  proper;  to  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed; 
and  to  commission  all  oflScers  of  the  United  States."  In  most 
of  these  particulars,  the  power  of  the  president  will  resemble 
equally  that  of  the  king  of  Great  Britain,  and  of  the  governor 
of  New- York.  The  most  material  points  of  difference  are 
these : — Mrst.  The  president  will  have  only  the  occasional  com- 
mand of  such  part  of  the  militia  of  the  nation,  as  hji  legislative 
provision  may  be  called  into  the  actual  service  of  the  union. 
The  king  of  Great  Britain  and  the  governor  of  New- York, 
have  at  all  times  the  entire  command  of  all  the  militia  within 
their  several  jurisdictions.  In  this  article,  therefore,  the  power 
of  the  president,  would  be  inferior  to  that  of  either  the  mon- 
arch, or  the  governor.  Second.  The  president  is  to  be  com- 
mander in  chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States. 
In  this  respect  his  authority  would  be  nominally  the  same  with 
that  of  the  king  of  Great  Britain,  but  in  substance  much  in- 
ferior to  it.  It  would  amount  to  nothing  more  than  the  supreme 
command  and  direction  of  the  military  and  naval  forces,  as 


516  THE   FEDERALIST. 

first  general  and  admiral  of  the  confederacy;  while  that  of  the 
British  king  extends  to  the  declaring  of  war,  and  to  the  raising 
and  regulating  of  fleets  and  armies;  all  which,  by  the  constitu- 
tion under  consideration,  would  appertain  to  the  legislature.* 
The  governor  of  New-York,  on  the  other  hand,  is  by  the  con- 
stitution of  the  state  vested  only  with  the  command  of  its 
militia  and  navy.  But  the  constitutions  of  several  of  the 
states,  expressly  declare  their  governors  to  be  commanders  in 
chief,  as  well  of  the  army  as  navy;  and  it  may  well  be  a  ques- 
tion, whether  those  of  New-Hampshire  and  Massachusetts,  in 
particular,  do  not,  in  this  instance,  confer  larger  powers  upon 
their  respective  governors,  than  could  be  claimed  by  a  president 
of  the  United  States.  Third.  The  power  of  the  president,  in 
respect  to  pardons,  would  extend  to  all  cases,  except  those  of 
impeaehTnent.  The  governor  of  New-York  may  pardon  in  all 
cases,  even  in  those  of  impeachment,  except  for  treason  and 
murder.  Is  not  the  power  of  the  governor  in  this  article,  on  a 
calculation  of  political  consequences,  greater  than  that  of  the 
president  ?  All  conspiracies  and  plots  against  the  government, 
which  have  not  been  matured  into  actual  treason,  may  be 
screened  from  punishment  of  every  kind,  by  the  interposition 
of  the  prerogative  of  pardoning.  If  a  governor  of  New- York, 
therefore,  should  be  at  the  head  of  any  such  conspiracy,  until 
the  design  had  been  ripened  into  actual  hostility,  he  could 
insure  his  accomplices  and  adherents  an  entire  impunity.  A 
president  of  the  union,  on  the  other  hand,  though  he  may  even 
pardon  treason,  when  prosecuted  in  the  ordinary  course  of  law, 

*  A  writer  in  a  Pennsylvania  paper,  under  the  signature  of  Tamont,  has 
asserted,  that  the  king  of  Great  Britain  owes  his  prerogatives,  as  commander 
in  chief,  to  an  annual  mutiny  bill.  The  truth  is,  on  the  contrary,  that  his 
prerogative,  in  this  respect,  is  immemorial,  and  was  only  disputed,  "contrary 
to  all  reason  and  precedent,"  as  Blackstone,  vol.  1.  page  262.  expresses  it,  by 
the  long  parliament  of  Charles  First;  but  by  the  statute  the  18th  of  Charles 
Second,  chap.  6.  it  was  declared  to  be  in  the  king  alone,  for  that  the  sole 
supreme  government  and  command  of  the  militia  within  his  majesty's  realms 
and  dominions,  and  of  all  forces  by  sea  and  land,  and  of  all  forts  and  places 
of  strength,  ever  was  and  is  the  undoubted  right  of  his  majesty  anrt  his  royal 
predecessors  kings  and  queens  of  England,  and  that  both  or  either  house  of 
parliament  cannot  nor  ought  to  pretend  to  the  same. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  517 

could  shelter  no  offender,  in  any  degree,  from  the  effects  of 
impeachment  and  conviction.  Would  not  the  prospect  of  a 
total  indemnity  for  all  the  preliminary  steps,  be  a  greater 
temptation  to  undertake,  and  persevere  in  an  enterprise  against 
the  public  liberty,  than  the  mere  prospect  of  an  exemption 
from  death  and  confiscation,  if  the  final  execution  of  the  de- 
sign, upon  an  actual  appeal  to  arms,  should  miscarry  ?  "Would 
this  last  expectation  have  any  influence  at  all,  when  the  proba- 
bility was  computed,  that  the  person  who  was  to  afford  that 
exemption  might  himself  be  involved  in  the  consequences  of 
the  measure ;  and  might  be  incapacitated  by  his  agency  in  it, 
from  affording  the  desired  impunity  ?  The  better  to  judge  of 
this  matter,  it  will  be  necessary  to  recollect  that,  by  the  pro- 
posed constitution,  the  offence  of  treason  is  limited  "  to  levying 
war  upon  the  United  States,  and  adhering  to  their  enemies, 
giving  them  aid  and  comfort ;"  and  that  by  the  laws  of  New- 
York,  it  is  confined  within  similar  bounds.  Fourth.  The  presi- 
dent can  only  adjourn  the  national  legislature,  in  a  single  case 
of  disagreement  about  the  time  of  adjournment.  The  British 
monarch  may  prorogue,  or  even  dissolve  the  parliament.  The 
governor  of  New-York  may  also  prorogue  the  legislature  of 
this  state  for  a  limited  time ;  a  prerogative  which,  in  certain 
situations,  may  be  employed  to  very  important  purposes. 

The  president  is  to  have  power,  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  senate,  to  make  treaties,  proyided  two-thirds  of  the 
senators  present  concur.  The  king  of  Great  Britain  is  the 
sole  and  absolute  representative  of  the  nation,  in  all  foreign 
transactions.  He  can  of  his  own  accord  make  treaties  of  peace, 
commerce,  alliance,  and  of  every  other  description.  It  has  been 
insinuated,  that  his  authority  in  this  respect  is  not  conclusive, 
and  that  his  conventions  with  foreign  powers  are  subject  to  the 
revision,  and  stand  in  need  of  the  ratification  of  parliament. 
But  I  believe  this  doctrine  was  never  heard  of,  till  it  was 
broached  upon  the  present  occasion.  Every  jurist*  of  that 
kingaom,  and  every  other  man  acquainted  with  its  conttitution. 

*  Vide  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  vol.  1.  pa£e  257 


618  THE    FEDERALIST. 

knows,  as  an  established  fact,  that  the  prerogative  of  making 
treaties  exists  in  the  crown  in  its  utmost  plenitude ;  and  that 
the  compacts  entered  into  by  the  royal  authority,  have  the 
most  complete  legal  validity  and  perfection,  independent  of  any 
other  sanction.  The  parliament,  it  is  true,  is  sometimes  seen 
employing  itself  in  altering  the  existing  laws  to  conform  them 
to  the  stipulations  in  a  new  treaty ;  and  this  may  have  possibly 
given  birth  to  the  imagination,  that  its  co-operation  was  neces- 
sary to  the  obligatory  efficacy  of  the  treaty.  But  this  parlia- 
mentary interposition,  proceeds  from  a  different  cause;  from 
the  necessity  of  adjusting  a  most  artificial  and  intricate  system 
of  revenue  and  commercial  laws,  to  the  changes  made  in  them 
by  the  operation  of  the  treaty ;  and  of  adapting  new  provisions 
and  precautions,  to  the  new  state  of  things,  to  keep  the  machine 
from  running  into  disorder.  In  this  respect,  therefore,  there  is 
no  comparison  between  the  intended  power  of  the  president, 
and  the  actual  power  of  the  British  sovereign.  The  one  can 
perform  alone,  what  the  other  can  only  do  with  the  concurrence 
of  a  branch  of  the  legislature.  It  must  be  admitted,  that,  in 
this  instance,  the  power  of  the  federal  executive  would  exceed 
that  of  any  state  executive.  But  this  arises  naturally  from  the 
exclusive  possession  by  the  union,  of  that  part  of  the  sovereign 
power  which  relates  to  treaties.  If  the  confederacy  were  to  be 
dissolved,  it  would  become  a  question,  whether  the  executives 
of  the  several  states  were  not  solely  invested  with  that  delicate 
and  important  prerogative. 

The  president  is  also  to  be  authorized  to  receive  ambassadors, 
and  other  public  ministers.  This,  though  it  has  been  a  rich 
theme  of  declamation,  is  more  a  matter  of  dignity  than  of 
authority.  It  is  a  circumstance  which  will  be  without  conse- 
quence in  the  administration  of  the  government;  and  it  was 
far  more  convenient  that  it  should  be  arranged  in  this  manner, 
than  that  there  should  be  a  necessity  of  convening  the  legisla- 
ture, or  one  of  its  branches,  upon  every  arrival  of  a  foreign 
minister ;  though  it  were  merely  to  take  the  place  of  a  departed 
predecessor. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  519 

The  president  is  to  nominate,  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
0/  the  senate,  to  appoint  ambassadors  and  other  public  ministers, 
judges  of  the  supreme  court,  and  in  general  all  officers  of  thfl 
United  States  established  by  law,  and  whose  appointments  are 
not  otherwise  provided  for  by  the  constitution.  The  king  of 
Great  Britain,  is  emphatically  and  truly  stiled,  the  fountain  of 
honour.  He  not  only 'appoints  to  all  offices,  but  can  create 
offices.  He  can  confer  titles  of  nobility  at  pleasure;  and  has 
the  disposal  of  an  immense  number  of  church  preferments. 
There  is  evidently  a  great  inferiority  in  the  power  of  the 
president  in  this  particular,  to  that  of  the  British  king;  nor 
is  it  equal  to  that  of  the  governor  of  New- York,  if  we  are  to 
interpret  the  meaning  of  the  constitution  of  the  state  by  the 
practice  which  has  obtained  under  it.  The  power  of  appoint- 
ment is  with  us  lodged  in  a  council,  composed  of  the  governor 
and  four  members  of  the  senate,  chosen  by  the  assembly.  The 
governor  claims,  and  has  frequently  exercised  the  right  of  nomi- 
nation, and  is  entitled  to  a  casting  vote  in  the  appointment.  If 
he  really  has  the  right  of  nominating,  his  authority  is  in  this 
respect  equal  to  that  of  the  president,  and  exceeds  it  in  the 
article  of  the  casting  vote.  In  the  national  government,  if  the 
senate  should  be  divided,  no  appointment  could  be  made :  In 
the  government  of  New-York,  if  the  council  should  be  divided, 
the  governor  can  turn  the  scale  and  confirm  his  own  nomina- 
tion.* If  we  compare  the  publicity  which  must  necessarily 
attend  the  mode  of  appointment  by  the  president  and  an  entire 
branch  of  the  national  legislature,  with  the  privacy  in  the  mode 
of  appointment  by  the  governor  of  New- York,  closetted  in  a 
secret  apartment  with  at  most  four,  and  frequently  with  only 
two  persons;  and  if  we  at  the  same  time  consider  how  much 
m.ore  easy  it  must  be  to  influence  the  small  number  of  which  a 

*  Candor  however  demands  an  acknowledgement,  that  I  do  not  think  the 
claim  of  the  governor  to  a  right  of  nomination  well  founded.  Yet  it  is  always 
justifiable  to  reason  from  the  practice  of  a  government,  till  its  propriety  has 
been  constitutionally  questioned.  And  independent  of  this  claim,  when  we 
lake  into  view  the  other  considerations,  and  pursue  them  through  all  theii 
.onsequences,  we  shall  be  inclined  to  draw  much  thft  same  conclusion. 


520  THE    FEDERALIST. 

council  of  appointment  consists,  than  the  considerable  number 
of  which  the  national  senate  would  consist,  we  cannot  hesitate 
Vo  pronounce,  that  the  power  of  the  chief  magistrate  of  this 
Atate,  in  the  disposition  of  offices  must,  in  practice,  be  greatly 
superior  to  that  of  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  union. 

Hence  it  appears,  that,  except  as  to  the  concurrent  authority 
of  the  president  in  the  article  of  treaties,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  determine  whether  that  magistrate  would,  in  the  aggregate, 
possess  more  or  less  power  than  the  governor  of  New- York 
And  it  appears  yet  more  unequivocally,  that  there  is  no  pre- 
tence for  the  parallel  which  has  been  attempted  between  him 
and  the  king  of  Great  Britain.  But  to  render  the  contrast,  in 
this  respect,  still  more  striking,  it  may  be  of  use  to  throw  the 
principal  circumstances  of  dissimilitude  into  a  closer  groupe. 

The  president  of  the  United  States,  would  be  an  officer 
elected  by  the  people  for  four  years.  The  king  of  Great  Britain, 
is  a  perpetual  and  hereditary  prince.  The  one  would  be  amen- 
able to  personal  punishment  and  disgrace :  The  person  of  the 
other  is  sacred  and  inviolable.  The  one  would  have  a  qualified 
negative  upon  the  acts  of  the  legislative  body :  The  other  has 
an  absolute  negative.  The  one  would  have  a  right  to  command 
the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  nation :  The  other,  in 
addition  to  this  right,  possesses  that  of  declaring  war,  and  of 
raising  and  regulating  fleets  and  armies  by  his  own  authority. 
The  one  would  have  a  concurrent  power  with  a  branch  of  the 
legislature  in  the  formation  of  treaties :  The  other  is  the  sole 
possessor  of  the  power  of  making  treaties.  The  one  would  have 
a  like  concurrent  authority  in  appointing  to  offices:  The  other 
is  the  sole  author  of  all  appointments.  The  one  can  confer  no 
privileges  whatever:  The  other  can  make  denizens  of  aliens, 
noblemen  of  commoners;  can  erect  corporations  with  all  the 
rights  incident  to  corporate  bodies.  The  one  can  prescribe  no 
rules  concerning  the  commerce  or  currency  of  the  nation :  The 
other  is  in  several  respects  the  arbiter  of  commerce,  and  in  this 
capacity  can  establish  markets  and  fairs,  can  regulate  weights 
and  measures,  can  lay  embargoes  for  a  limited  time,  can  coin 


THE   FEDERALIST.  621 

money,  can  authorize  or  prohibit  the  circulation  of  foreign  coin 
The  one  has  no  particle  of  spiritual  jurisdiction:  The  other  is 
the  supreme  head  and  governor  of  the  national  church  I — What 
answer  shall  we  give  to  those  who  would  persuade  us,  that 
things  so  unlike  resemble  each  other? — The  same  that  ought 
to  be  given  to  those  who  tell  us,  that  a  government,  the  whole 
power  of  which  would  be  in  the  hands  of  the  elective  and 
period  ical  servants  of  the  people,  is  an  aristocracy,  a  monarchy, 
and  a  despotism. 

PUBUUS. 


&22  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LXX. 


NEW   YORK,   MARCH  18,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  VIEW  CONTINUED,  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  UNITY  OF  THE 
EXECUTIVE,  AND  WITH  AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  PROJECT  OF 
AN  EXECUTIVE  COUNCIL. 

Theiie  is  an  idea,  which  is  not  without  its  advocates,  that  a 
vigorous  executive  is  inconsistent  with  the  genius  of  republicau 
government.  The  enlightened  well-wishers  to  this  species  of 
government  must  at  least  hope,  that  the  supposition  is  destitute 
of  foundation;  since  they  can  never  admit  its  truth,  without, 
at  the  same  time,  admitting  the  condemnation  of  their  own 
principles.  Energy  in  the  executive,  is  a  leading  character  in 
the  definition  of  good  government.  It  is  essential  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  community  against  foreign  attacks :  It  is  n-ot 
less  essential  to  the  steady  administration  of  the  laws,  to  the 
protection  of  property  against  those  irregular  and  high-handed 
combinations,  which  sometimes  interrupt  the  ordinary  course 
of  justice,  to  the  security  of  liberty  against  the  enterprises  and 
assaults  of  ambition,  of  faction,  and  of  anarchy.  Every  man, 
the  least  conversant  in  Eoman  story,  knows  how  often  that 
republic  was  obliged  to  take  refuge  in  the  absolute  power  of  a 
single  man,  under  the  formidable  title  of  dictator,  as  well 
against  the  intrigues  of  ambitious  individuals,  who  aspired  to 
the  tyranny,  and  the  seditions  of  whole  classes  of  the  commu- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  523 

nity,  whose  conduct  threatened  the  existence  of  all  government, 
as  against  the  invasions  of  external  enemies,  who  menaced  the 
conquest  and  destruction  of  Eome. 

There  can  be  no  need,  however,  to  multiply  arguments  or 
examples  on  this  head.  A  feeble  executive,  implies  a  feeble 
execution  of  the  government.  A  feeble  execution,  is  but 
another  phrase  for  a  bad  execution :  and  a  government  ill 
executed,  whatever  it  may  be  in  theory,  must  be,  in  practice, 
a  bad  government. 

Taking  it  for  granted,  therefore,  that  all  men  of  sense  will 
agree  in  the  necessity  of  an  energetic  executive,  it  will  only 
remain  to  inquire,  what  are  the  ingredients  which  constitute 
this  energy  ?  How  far  can  they  be  combined  with  those  other 
ingredients,  which  constitute  safety  in  the  republican  sense  ? 
And  how  far  does  this  combination  characterize  the  plan  which 
has  been  reported  by  the  convention  ? 

The  ingredients  which  constitute  energy  in  the  executive 
are,  unity ;  duration ;  an  adequate  provision  for  its  support ; 
competent  powers. 

The  ingredients  which  constitute  safety  in  the  republican 
sense  are,  a  due  dependence  on  the  people ;  a  due  responsibility. 

Those  politicians  and  statesmen,  who  have  been  the  most 
celebrated  for  the  soundness  of  their  principles,  and  for  the 
justness  of  their  views,  have  declared  in  favour  of  a  single 
executive,  and  a  numerous  legislature.  They  have,  with  great 
propriety,  considered  energy  as  the  most  necessary  qualification 
of  the  former,  and  have  regarded  this  as  most  applicable  to 
power  in  a  single  hand ;  while  they  have,  with  equal  propriety, 
considered  the  latter  as  best  adapted  to  deliberation  and  wis- 
dom, and  best  calculated  to  conciliate  the  confidence  of  the 
people,  and  to  secure  their  privileges  and  interests. 

That  unity  is  conducive  to  energy,  will  not  be  disputed. 
Decision,  activity,  secrecy,  and  dispatch,  will  generally  charac- 
terize the  proceedings  of  one  man,  in  a  much  more  eminent 
degree  than  the  proceedings  of  any  greater  number;  and  in 

44 


524  THE    FEDERALIST. 

proportion  as  the  number  is  incrousod,  these  qualities  will  be 
diminished. 

This  unity  may  be  destroyed  in  two  ways ;  either  by  vesting 
the  power  in  two  or  more  magistrates,  of  equal  dignity  and 
authority;  or  by  vesting  it  ostensibly  in  one  man,  subject,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  to  the  control  and  co-operation  of  others,  in 
the  capacity  of  counsellors  to  him.  Of  the  first,  the  two  con- 
suls of  Eome  may  serve  as  an  example;  of  the  last,  we  shall 
find  examples  in  the  constitutions  of  several  of  the  states. 
New-York  and  New-Jersey,  if  I  recollect  right,  are  the  only 
states,  which  have  intrusted  the  executive  authority  wholly  to 
eiiigle  men.*  Both  these  methods  of  destroying  the  unity  of 
the  executive  have  their  partizans;  but  the  votaries  of  an 
executive  council  are  the  most  numerous.  They  are  both  liable, 
if  not  to  equal,  to  similar  objections,  and  may  in  most  lights  bo 
examined  in  conjunction. 

The  experience  of  other  nations  will  afford  little  instruction 
on  this  head.  As  far,  however,  as  it  teaches  any  thing,  it 
teaches  us  not  to  be  enamoured  of  plurality  in  the  executive. 
We  have  seen  that  the  Achseans,  on  an  experiment  of  two 
praetors,  were  induced  to  abolish  one.  The  Koman  history 
records  many  instances  of  mischiefs  to  the  republic  from  the 
dissentions  between  the  consuls,  and  between  the  military  tri- 
bunes, who  were  at  times  substituted  to  the  consuls.  But  it 
gives  us  no  specimens  of  any  peculiar  advantages  derived  to 
the  state,  from  the  plurality  of  those  magistrates.  That  the 
dissentions  between  them  were  not  more  frequent  or  more 
fatal,  is  matter  of  astonishment;  until  we  advert  to  the  sin- 
gular position  in  which  the  republic  was  almost  continually 
placed,  and  to  the  prudent  policy  pointed  out  by  the  eircum- 
Btances  of  the  state,  and  pursued  by  the  consuls,  of  making  a 
division  of  the  government  between  them.  The  patricians, 
engaged  in  a  perpetual  struggle  with  the  plebeians,  for  the  pre- 

*  New-York  has  no  council  except  for  the  single  purpose  of  appointing  to 
offices ;  New-Jersey  has  a  council,  whom  the  governor  may  consult.  But  I 
think,  from  the  terms  of  the  constitution,  their  resolutions  do  Pot  biwl  him. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  525 

•ervation  of  their  ancient  authorities  and  dignities;  the  con- 
suls, whc  were  generally  chosen  out  of  the  former  body,  were 
commonly  united  by  the  personal  interest  they  had  in  the 
defence  of  the  privileges  of  their  order.  In  addition  to  this 
motive  of  union,  after  the  arms  of  the  republic  had  consider- 
ably expanded  the  bounds  of  its  empire,  it  became  an  estab- 
lished custom  with  the  consuls  to  divide  the  administration 
between  themselves  by  lot;  one  of  them  remaining  at  Rome  to 
govern  the  city  and  its  environs;  the  other  taking  the  com- 
mand in  the  more  distant  provinces.  This  expedient  must,  no 
doubt,  have  had  great  influence  in  preventing  those  collisions 
and  rivalships  which  might  otherwise  have  embroiled  the 
republic. 

But  quitting  the  dim  light  of  historical  research,  and  attach- 
ing ourselves  purely  to  the  dictates  of  reason  and  good  sense, 
we  shall  discover  much  greater  cause  to  reject,  than  to  approve, 
the  idea  of  plurality  in  the  executive,  under  any  modification 
whatever. 

Wherever  two  or  more  persons  are  engaged  in  any  common 
enterprise  or  pursuit,  there  is  always  danger  of  difference  of 
opinion.  If  it  be  a  public  trust  or  office,  in  which  they  are 
cloathed  with  equal  dignity  and  authority,  there  is  peculiar 
danger  of  personal  emulation  and  even  animosity.  From 
either,  and  especially  from  all  these  causes,  the  most  bitter 
disscntions  are  apt  to  spring.  Whenever  these  happen,  they 
lessen  the  respectability,  weaken  the  authority,  and  distract 
the  plans  and  operations  of  those  whom  they  divide.  If  they 
Hhould  unfortunately  assail  the  supreme  executive  magistracy 
of  a  country,  consisting  of  a  plurality  of  persons,  they  might 
impede  or  frustrate  the  most  important  measures  of  the  govern- 
ment, in  the  most  critical  emergencies  of  the  state.  And  what 
is  still  worse,  they  might  split  the  community  into  violent  and 
irreconcilable  factions,  adhering  differently  to  the  different  indi- 
viduals who  composed  the  magistracy. 

Men  often  oppose  a  thing,  merely  because  they  have  had  no 
agency  in  planning  it,  or  because  it  may  have  been  planned  by 


526  THE    FEDERALIST. 

those  whom  they  dislike.  But  if  they  have  been  consulted, 
and  have  happened  to  disapprove,  opposition  then  becomes,  in 
their  estimation,  an  indispensable  duty  of  self-love.  They  seem 
to  think  themselves  bound  in  honour,  and  by  all  the  motives 
of  personal  infallibility,  to  defeat  the  success  of  what  has  been 
resolved  upon,  contrary  to  their  sentiments.  Men  of  upright 
and  benevolent  tempers,  have  too  many  opportunities  of  ro 
marking  with  horror,  to  what  desperate  lengths  this  disposition 
is  sometimes  carried,  and  how  often  the  great  interests  of 
society  are  sacrificed  to  the  vanity,  to  the  conceit,  and  to  the 
obstinacy  of  individuals,  who  have  credit  enough  to  make  their 
passions  and  their  caprices  interesting  to  mankind.  Perhaps 
the  question  now  before  the  public,  may,  in  its  consequences, 
aiford  melancholy  proofs  of  the  effects  of  this  despicable  frailty, 
or  rather  detestable  vice  in  the  human  character. 

Upon  the  principles  of  a  free  government,  inconveniences 
from  the  source  just  mentioned,  must  necessarily  be  submitted 
to  in  the  formation  of  the  legislature ;  but  it  is  unnecessary, 
and  therefore  unwise,  to  introduce  them  into  the  constitution 
of  the  executive.  It  is  here,  too,  that  they  may  be  most  per- 
nicious. In  the  legislature,  promptitude  of  decision  is  oftener 
an  evil  than  a  benefit.  The  differences  of  opinion,  and  the 
jarrings  of  parties  in  that  department  of  the  government, 
though  they  may  sometimes  obstruct  salutary  plans,  yet  often 
promote  deliberation  and  circumspection ;  and  serve  to  check 
excesses  in  the  majority.  When  a  resolution  too  is  once  taken, 
the  opposition  must  be  at  an  end.  That  resolution  is  a  law, 
and  resistance  to  it  punishable.  But  no  favourable  circum- 
stances palliate,  or  atone  for  the  disadvantages  of  dissention  in 
the  executive  department.  Here  they  are  pure  and  unmixed. 
There  is  no  point  at  which  they  cease  to  operate.  They  serve 
to  embarrass  and  weaken  the  execution  of  the  plan  or  measure 
to  which  they  relate,  from  the  first  step  to  the  final  conclusion 
of  it.  They  constantly  counteract  those  qualities  in  the  execu- 
tive, which  are  the  most  necessary  ingredients  in  its  compo- 
sition— vigour  and  expedition;  and  this  without  any  counter- 


THE   FEDERALIST.  527 

balancing  good.  In  the  conduct  of  war,  in  which  the  energy 
of  the  executive  is  the  bulwark  of  the  national  security,  every 
thing  would  be  to  be  apprehended  from  its  plurality. 

It  must  be  confessed,  that  these  observations  apply  with 
principal  weight  to  the  first  case  supposed,  that  is,  to  a  plurality 
of  magistrates  of  equal  dignity  and  authority  j  a  scheme,  the 
advocates  for  which  are  not  likely  to  form  a  numerous  sect  : 
But  they  apply,  though  not  with  equal,  yet  with  considerable 
weight,  to  the  project  of  a  council,  whose  concurrence  is  made 
constitutionally  necessary  to  the  operations  of  the  ostensible 
executive.  An  artful  cabal  in  that  council,  would  be  able  to 
distract  and  to  enervate  the  whole  system  of  administration. 
If  no  such  cabal  should  exist,  the  mere  diversity  of  views  and 
opinions,  would  alone  be  sufficient  to  tincture  the  exercise  of 
the  executive  authority  with  a  spirit  of  habitual  feebleness  and 
dilatoriness. 

But  one  of  the  weightiest  objections  to  a  plurality  in  the 
executive,  and  which  lies  as  much  against  the  last  as  the  first 
plan,  is,  that  it  tends  to  conceal  faults,  and  destroy  responsi- 
bility. Responsibility  is  of  two  kinds,  to  censure  and  to  pun- 
ishment. The  first  is  the  most  important  of  the  two ;  especially 
in  an  elective  office.  Men  in  public  trust,  will  much  oftener  act 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  render  them  unworthy  of  being  any 
longer  trusted,  than  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  them 
obnoxious  to  legal  punishment.  But  the  multiplication  of  the 
executive  adds  to  the  difficulty  of  detection  in  either  case.  It 
often  becomes  impossible,  amidst  mutual  accusations,  to  deter- 
mine on  whom  the  blame  or  the  punishment  of  a  pernicious 
measure,  or  series  of  pernicious  measures,  ought  really  to  fall. 
It  is  shifted  from  one  to  another  with  so  much  dexterity,  and 
under  such  plausible  apjDearances,  that  the  public  opinion  is  left 
in  suspense  about  the  real  author.  The  circumstances  which 
may  have  led  to  any  national  miscarriage  or  misfortune,  are 
Bometimes  so  complicated,  that  where  there  are  a  number  of 
actors  who  may  have  had  different  degrees  and  kinds  of  agency, 
iliough  we  may  clearly  see  upon  the  whole  that  there  has  been 


528  THE    FEDERALIST. 

mismanagement,  yet  it  may  be  impracticable  to  pronounce,  to 
whose  account  the  evil  which  *uay  have  been  incurred  is  truly 
chargeable. 

"  I  was  overruled  by  my  council.  The  council  were  so  divided 
in  their  opinions,  that  it  was  impossible  to  obtain  any  better 
resolution  on  the  point."  These  and  similar  pretexts  are  con- 
stantly at  hand,  whether  true  or  false.  And  who  is  there  that 
will  either  take  the  trouble,  or  incur  the  odium,  of  a  strict 
scrutiny  into  the  secret  springs  of  the  transaction  ?  Should 
there  be  found  a  citizen  zealous  enough  to  undertake  the 
unpromising  task,  if  there  happen  to  be  a  collusion  between 
the  parties  concerned,  how  easy  is  it  to  cloath  the  circumstances 
with  80  much  ambiguity,  as  to  render  it  uncertain  what  was  the 
precise  conduct  of  any  of  those  parties  ? 

In  the  single  instance  in  which  the  governor  of  this  state  is 
coupled  with  a  council,  that  is,  in  the  appointment  to  offices, 
we  have  seen  the  mischiefs  of  it  in  the  view  now  under  con- 
sideration. Scandalous  appointments  to  important  offices  have 
been  made.  Some  cases  indeed  have  been  so  flagrant,  that  all 
PARTIES  have  agreed  in  the  impropriety  of  the  thing.  "When 
inquiry  has  been  made,  the  blame  has  been  laid  by  the  governor 
on  the  members  of  the  council;  who  on  their  part  have  charged 
it  upon  his  nomination :  while  the  people  remain  altogether  at 
a  loss  to  determine  by  whose  influence  their  interests  have  been 
committed  to  hands  so  manifestly  improper.  In  tenderness  to 
individuals,  I  forbear  to  descend  to  particulars. 

It  is  evident  from  these  considerations,  that  the  plurality  of 
the  executive,  tends  to  deprive  the  people  of  the  two  greatest 
securities  they  can  have  for  the  faithful  exercise  of  any  dele- 
gated power.  First.  The  restraints  of  public  opinion,  which 
lose  their  efficacy  as  well  on  account  of  the  division  of  the 
censure  attendant  on  bad  measures  among  a  number,  as  on 
account  of  the  uncertainty  on  whom  it  ought  to  fall;  and 
secondly,  the  opportunity  of  discovering  with  facility  and  clear- 
ness the  misconduct  of  the  persons  they  trust,  in  order  either 


THE    FEDERALIST.  529 

to  their  removal  from  office,  or  to  their  actual  puiixsnmeut.  in 
cases  which  admit  of  it. 

In  England,  the  king  is  a  perpetual  magistrate ;  ana  it  is  a 
maxim  which  has  obtained  for  the  sake  of  the  public  peace, 
that  he  is  unaccountable  for  his  administration,  and  his  person 
sacred  Nothing,  therefore,  can  bo  wiser  in  that  kingdom,  than 
to  annex  to  the  king  a  constitutional  council,  who  ma}''  be 
responsible  to  the  nation  for  the  advice  they  give.  Without 
Ais,  there  would  be  no  responsibility  whatever  in  the  executive 
department,  an  idea  inadmissible  in  a  free  government.  But 
even  there,  the  king  is  not  bound  by  the  resolutions  of  his 
council,  though  they  are  answerable  for  the  advice  they  give. 
He  is  the  absolute  master  of  his  own  conduct  in  the  exercise 
of  his  office ;  and  may  observe  or  disregard  the  counsel  given 
to  him  at  his  sole  discretion. 

But  in  a  republic,  where  every  magistrate  ought  to  be  per- 
sonally responsible  for  his  behaviour  in  office,  the  reason  which 
in  the  British  constitution  dictates  the  pi'opriety  of  a  council, 
not  only  ceases  to  apply,  but  turns  against  the  institution.  In 
the  monarchy  of  Great  Britain,  it  furnishes  a  substitute  for 
the  prohibited  responsibility  of  the  chief  magistrate;  which 
serves  in  some  degree  as  a  hostage  to  the  national  justice  for 
his  good  behaviour.  In  the  American  republic  it  would  s5rve 
to  destroy,  or  would  greatly  diminish  the  intended  and  neces- 
sary responsibility  of  the  chief  magistrate  himself. 

The  idea  of  a  council  to  the  executive,  which  has  so  generally 
obtained  in  the  state  constitutions,  has  been  derived  from  that 
maxim  of  republican  jealousy  which  considers  power  as  safer 
in  the  hands  of  a  number  of  men  than  of  a  single  man.  If  the 
maxim  should  be  admitted  to  be  applicable  to  the  case,  I  should 
contend,  that  the  advantage  on  that  side  would  not  counter- 
balance the  numerous  disadvantages  on  the  opposite  side.  But 
I  do  not  think  the  rule  at  all  applicable  to  the  executive  power. 
[  clearly  concur  in  opinion  in  this  particular  with  a  writer  whom 
the  celebrated  Junius  pronounces  to  be  "  deep,  solid,  and  in- 
genious," that  "the  executive  power  is  more  easily  confined 


630  THE   FEDERALIST. 

when  it  is  one  : "  *  That  it  is  far  more  safe  there  should  be  a 
single  object  for  the  jealousy  and  watchfulness  of  the  people  j 
in  a  word,  that  all  multiplication  of  the  executive,  is  rather 
dangerous  than  friendly  to  liberty. 

A  little  consideration  will  satisfy  us,  that  the  species  of  secu- 
rity sought  for  in  the  multiplication  of  the  executive,  is  unat- 
tainable. Numbers  must  be  so  great  as  to  render  combination 
difficult;  or  they  are  rather  a  source  of  danger  than  of  security. 
The  united  credit  and  influence  of  several  individuals,  must  be 
more  formidable  to  liberty,  than  the  credit  and  influence  of 
either  of  them  separately.  When  power,  therefore,  is  placed 
in  the  hands  of  so  small  a  number  of  men,  as  to  admit  of  their 
interests  and  views  being  easily  combined  in  a  common  enter- 
prise, by  an  artful  leader,  it  becomes  more  liable  to  abuse,  and 
more  dangerous  when  abused,  than  if  it  be  lodged  in  the  hands 
of  one  man;  who,  from  the  very  circumstance  of  his  being 
alone,  will  be  more  narrowly  watched  and  more  readily  sus- 
pected, and  who  cannot  unite  so  great  a  mass  of  influence  as 
when  he  is  associated  with  others.  The  decemvirs  of  Borne, 
whose  name  denotes  their  number,f  were  more  to  be  dreaded 
in  their  usurpation  than  any  one  of  them  would  have  been. 
No  person  would  think  of  proposing  an  executive  much  more 
nuriierous  than  that  body ;  from  six,  to  a  dozen,  have  been  sug- 
gested for  the  number  of  the  council.  The  extreme  of  these 
numbers,  is  not  too  great  for  an  easy  combination ;  and  from 
such  a  combination  America  would  have  more  to  fear,  than 
from  the  ambition  of  any  single  individual.  A  council  to  a 
magistrate,  who  is  himself  responsible  for  what  he  does,  are 
generally  nothing  better  than  a  clog  upon  his  good  intentions ; 
are  often  the  instruments  and  accomplices  of  his  bad,  and  are 
almost  always  a  cloak  to  his  faults. 

I  forbear  to  dwell  upon  the  subject  of  expense ;  though  it  be 
evident  that  if  the  council  should  be  numerous  enough  to  an- 
swer the  principal  end,  aimed  at  by  the  institution,  the  salaries 
of  the  members,  who  must  be  drawn  from  their  homes  to  reside 
*  De  Lolme.  +  Ten. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  531 

at  the  seat  of  government,  would  form  an  item  in  the  catalogue 
of  public  expenditures,  too  serious  to  be  incurred  for  an  object 
of  equivocal  utility. 

I  will  only  add,  that  prior  to  the  appearance  of  the  constitu- 
tion, I  rarely  met  with  an  intelligent  man  from  any  of  the 
states,  who  did  not  admit  as  the  result  of  experience,  that  the 
unity  of  the  executive  of  this  state  was  one  of  the  best  of  the 
distinguishing  features  of  our  constitution. 

PUBLIUS. 


532  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LXXI. 


NEW  YORK,  MARCH  21,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME  VIEW  CONTINUED,    IN    REGARD   TO   THE  DURATION  OP 

THE   OFFICE. 

Duration  in  office,  has  been  mentioned  as  the  second  requi- 
site to  the  energy  of  the  executive  authority.  This  has  relatioii 
to  two  objects :  To  the  personal  firmness  of  the  chief  magis- 
trate, in  the  employment  of  his  constitutional  powers ;  and  to 
the  stability  of  the  system  of  administration,  which  may  have 
been  adopted  under  his  auspices.  With  regard  to  the  first,  it 
must  be  evident,  that  the  longer  the  duration  in  office,  the 
greater  will  be  the  probability  of  obtaining  so  important  an 
advantage.  It  is  a  general  principle  of  human  nature,  that  a 
man  will  be  interested  in  whatever  he  possesses,  in  proportion 
to  the  firmness  or  precariousness  of  the  tenure  by  which  he 
holds  it;  will  be  less  attached  to  what  he  holds  by  a  momentary 
or  uncertain  title,  than  to  what  he  enjoys  by  a  title  durable  or 
certain;  and,  of  course,  will  be  willing  to  risk  more  for  the 
sake  of  the  one,  than  of  the  other.  This  remark  is  not  less 
applicable  to  a  political  privilege,  or  honour,  or  trust,  than  to 
any  article  of  ordinary  property.  Tlie  Inference  from  it  is, 
that  a  man  acting  in  the  capacity  of  chief  magistrate,  under  a 
consciousness  that,  in  a  very  short  time,  he  must  lay  down  his 
office,  will  be  apt  to  feel  himself  too  little  interested  in  it,  to 


THE    FEDERALIST.  688 

aazard  any  material  censure  or  perplexity,  from  the  independent 
exertion  of  his  powers,  or  from  encountering  the  ill-humours, 
however  transient,  which  may  happen  to  prevail,  either  in  a 
considerable  part  of  the  society  itself,  or  even  in  a  predominant 
faction  in  the  legislative  body.  If  the  case  should  only  be,  that 
he  might  lay  it  down,  unless  continued  by  a  new  choice ;  and  if 
lie  should  be  desirous  of  being  continued,  his  wishes,  conspiring 
with  his  fears,  would  tend  still  more  powerfully  to  corrupt  his 
integrity,  or  debase  his  fortitude.  In  either  case,  feebleness  and 
irresolution  must  be  the  characteristics  of  the  station. 

There  are  some,  who  would  be  inclined  to  regard  the  servile 
pliancy  of  the  executive,  to  a  prevailing  current,  either  in  the 
community,  or  in  the  legislature,  as  its  best  recommendation. 
But  such  men  entertain  very  crude  notions,  as  well  of  the  pur- 
poses for  which  government  was  instituted,  as  of  the  true 
means  by  which  the  public  happiness  may  be  promoted.  The 
republican  principle  demands,  that  the  deliberate  sense  of  the 
community  should  govern  the  conduct  of  those  to  whom  they 
intrust  the  management  of  their  affairs;  but  it  does  not  require 
an  unqualified  complaisance  to  every  sudden  breeze  of  passion, 
or  to  every  transient  impulse  which  the  people  may  receive 
from  the  arts  of  men,  who  flatter  their  prejudices  to  betray 
their  interests.  It  is  a  just  obsei'vation,  that  the  people  com- 
monly intend  the  public  good.  This  often  applies  to  their  very 
errors.  But  their  good  sense  would  despise  the  adulator  who 
should  pretend,  that  they  always  reason  right  about  the  means 
of  promoting  it.  They  know,  from  experience,  that  they  some- 
times err ;  and  the  wonder  is,  that  they  so  seldom  err  as  they 
do,  beset,  as  they  continually  are,  by  the  wiles  of  parasites  and 
sycophants;  by  the  snares  of  the  ambitious,  the  avaricious,  the 
desperate ;  by  the  artifices  of  men  who  possess  their  confidence 
more  than  they  deserve  it ;  and  of  those  who  seek  to  possess, 
rather  than  to  deserve  it.  When  occasions  present  themselves, 
in  which  the  interests  of  the  people  are  at  variance  with  their 
inclinations,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  persons  whom  they  have 
appointed,  to  be  the  guardians  of  those  interests;  to  withstand 


534  THE   FEDERALIST. 

the  temporary  delusion,  in  order  to  give  them  time  and  oppor- 
tunity  for  more  cool  and  sedate  reflection.  Instances  might  be 
cited,  in  which  a  conduct  of  this  kind  has  saved  the  people  from 
very  fatal  consequences  of  their  own  mistakes,  and  has  pro- 
cured lasting  monuments  of  their  gratitude  to  the  men  who 
had  courage  and  magnanimity  enough  to  serve  them  at  the 
peril  of  their  displeasure. 

But  however  inclined  we  might  be,  to  insist  upon  an  un- 
bounded complaisance  in  the  executive  to  the  inclinations  of 
the  people,  we  can,  with  no  propriety,  contend  for  a  like  com- 
plaisance to  the  humours  of  the  legislature.  The  latter  may 
sometimes  stand  in  opposition  to  the  former;  and  at  other 
times  the  people  may  be  entirely  neutral.  In  either  supposi- 
tion, it  is  certainly  desirable,  that  the  executive  should  be  in 
a  situation  to  dare  to  act  his  own  opinion  with  vigour  and 
decision. 

The  same  rule  which  teaches  the  propriety  of  a  partition  be- 
tween the  various  branches  of  power,  teaches,  likewise,  that 
this  partition  ought  to  be  so  contrived  as  to  render  the  one 
independent  of  the  other.  To  what  purpose  separate  the  exe- 
cutive or  the  judiciary  from  the  legislative,  if  both  the  execu- 
tive and  the  judiciary  are  so  constituted  as  to  be  at  the  absolute 
devotion  of  the  legislative  ?  Such  a  separation  must  be  merely 
nominal,  and  incapable  of  producing  the  ends  for  which  it  was 
established.  It  is  one  thing  to  be  subordinate  to  the  laws, 
another  to  be  dependent  on  the  legislative  body.  The  first 
comports  with,  the  last  violates,  the  fundamental  principles  of 
good  government;  and  whatever  may  be  the  forms  of  the  con- 
stitution, unites  all  power  in  the  same  hands.  The  tendency 
of  the  legislative  authority  to  absorb  every  other,  has  been 
fully  displayed  and  illustrated  by  examples  in  some  preceding 
numbers.  In  governments  purely  republican,  this  tendency  is 
almost  irresistible.  The  representatives  of  the  people,  in  a 
popular  assembly,  seem  sometimes  to  fancy,  that  they  are  the 
people  themselves,  and  betray  strong  symptoms  of  impatience 
and  disgust  at  the  least  sign  of  opposition  from  any  other 


THE    FEDERALIST.  686 

quarter,  as  if  the  exercise  of  its  rights,  by  either  the  executivo 
f»r  judiciary,  were  a  breach  of  their  privilege,  and  an  outrage 
10  their  dignity.  They  often  appear  disposed  to  exert  an 
imperious  control  over  the  other  departments;  and,  as  they 
<!ommonly  have  the  people  on  their  side,  they  always  act  with 
dueh  momentum,  as  to  make  it  very  difficult  for  the  other 
members  of  the  government  to  maintain  the  balance  of  the 
constitution. 

It  may  perhaps  be  asked,  how  the  shortness  of  the  duration 
in  office  can  affect  the  independence  of  the  executive  on  the 
legislature,  unless  the  one  were  possessed  of  the  power  of 
appointing  or  displacing  the  other?  One  answer  to  this  in- 
quiry may  be  drawn  from  the  principle  already  mentioned, 
that  is,  from  the  slender  interest  a  man  is  apt  to  take  in  a 
short-lived  advantage,  and  the  little  inducement  it  affords  him 
to  expose  himself,  on  account  of  it,  to  any  considerable  incon- 
venience or  hazard.  Another  answer,  perhaps  more  obvious, 
though  not  more  conclusive,  will  result  from  the  circumstance 
of  the  influence  of  the  legislative  body  over  the  people ;  which 
might  be  employed  to  prevent  the  re-election  of  a  man  who,  by 
an  upright  resistance  to  any  sinister  project  of  that  body, 
should  have  made  himself  obnoxious  to  its  resentment. 

It  may  be  asked  also,  whether  a  duration  of  four  years  would 
answer  the  end  proposed  ?  and  if  it  would  not,  whether  a  less 
period,  which  would  at  least  be,  recommended  by  greater  secu- 
rity against  ambitious  designs,  would  not,  for  that  reason,  be 
preferable  to  a  longer  period,  which  was,  at  the  same  time,  too 
short  for  the  purpose  of  inspiring  the  desired  firmness  and 
independence  of  the  magistrate  ? 

It  cannot  be  affirmed,  that  a  duration  of  four  years,  or  any 
other  limited  duration,  would  completely  answer  the  end  pro- 
posed; but  it  would  contribute  towards  it  in  a  degree  which 
would  have  a  material  influence  upon  the  spirit  and  character 
of  the  government.  Between  the  commencement  and  termi- 
nation of  such  a  period,  there  would  always  be  a  considerable 


536  THE    FEDERALIST. 

interval,  in  which  the  prospect  of  an  annihilation  would  be 
sufficiently  remote,  not  to  have  an  improper  effect  upon  the 
conduct  of  a  man  endued  with  a  tolerable  portion  of  fortitude ; 
and  in  which  he  might  reasonably  promise  himself,  that  there 
would  be  time  enough  before  it  arrived,  to  make  the  commu- 
nity sensible  of  the  propriety  of  the  measures  he  might  incline 
to  pursue.  Though  it  be  probable  that,  as  he  approached  the 
moment  when  the  public  were,  by  a  new  election,  to  signify 
their  sense  of  his  conduct,  his  confidence,  and  with  it  his  firm- 
ness, would  decline;  yet  both  the  one  and  the  other  would 
derive  support  from  the  opportunities  which  his  previous  con- 
tinuance in  the  station  had  afforded  him,  of  establishing  him- 
self in  the  esteem  and  good  will  of  his  constituents.  He  might 
then,  with  prudence,  hazard  the  incurring  of  reproach,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  proofs  he  had  given  of  his  wisdom  and  integrity, 
and  to  the  title  he  had  acquired  to  the  respect  and  attachment 
of  his  fellow  citizens.  As,  on  the  one  hand,  a  duration  of  four 
years  will  contribute  to  the  firmness  of  the  executive  in  a  suf- 
ficient degree  to  render  it  a  very  valuable  ingredient  in  the 
composition;  so,  on  the  other,  it  is  not  long  enough  to  justify 
any  alarm  for  the  public  liberty.  If  a  British  house  of  com- 
mons, from  the  most  feeble  beginnings,  from  the  mere  power  of 
assenting  or  disagreeing  to  the  imposition  of  a  new  tax,  have,  by 
rapid  strides,  reduced  the  prerogatives  of  the  crown,  and  the 
privileges  of  the  nobility,  within  the  limits  they  conceived  to 
be  compatible  with  the  principles  of  a  free  government ;  while 
they  raised  themselves  to  the  rank  and  consequence  of  a  co- 
equal branch  of  the  legislature;  if  they  have  been  able,  in  one 
instance,  to  abolish  both  the  royalty  and  the  aristocracy,  and 
to  overturn  all  the  ancient  establishments,  as  well  in  the 
church  as  state;  if  they  have  been  able,  on  a  recent  occasion, 
to  make  the  monarch  tremble  at  the  prospect  of  an  innovation  * 

*  This  was  the  case  with  respect  to  Mr.  Fox's  India  bill,  which  was  carried 
in  the  house  of  commons,  and  rejected  in  the  house  of  lords,  to  the  entire 
satisfaction,  %8  it  is  said,  of  the  people. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  687 

attempted  by  them;  what  would  be  to  be  feared  from  an 
elective  magistrate  of  four  years  duration,  with  the  confined 
authorities  of  a  president  of  the  United  States  ?  What  but  that 
he  might  be  unequal  to  the  task  which  the  constitution  assigns 
him  ?  I  shall  only  add,  that  if  his  duration  be  such  as  to  leave 
a  doubt  of  his  firmness,  that  doubt  is  inconsistent  with  a 
jealousy  of  his  encroachments. 

PUBLIUS 


538  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LXXII. 


NEW  YORK,  MARCH   21,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME  VIEW  CONTINUED,  IN   REGARD  TO  THE  RE-ELIGIBILITT 
OF   THE   PRESIDENT. 

The  administration  of  government,  in  its  largest  sense, 
comprehends  all  the  operations  of  the  body  politic,  whether 
legislative,  executive,  or  judiciary;  but  in  its  most  usual,  and 
perhaps  in  its  most  precise  signification,  it  is  limited  to  execu- 
tive details,  and  falls  peculiarly  within  the  province  of  the 
executive  department.  The  actual  conduct  of  foreign  nego- 
ciations,  the  preparatory  plans  of  finance,  the  application  and 
disbursement  of  the  public  monies,  in  conformity  to  the  general 
appropriations  of  the  legislature,  the  arrangement  of  the  army 
and  navy,  the  direction  of  the  operations  of  war;  these,  and 
other  matters  of  a  like  nature,  constitute  what  seems  to  be 
most  properly  understood  by  the  administration  of  government. 
The  persons,  therefore,  to  whose  immediate  management  these 
different  matters  are  committed,  ought  to  be  considered  as  the 
assistants  or  deputies  of  the  chief  magistrate;  and,  on  this 
account,  they  ought  to  derive  their  offices  from  his  appoint- 
ment, at  least  from  his  nomination,  and  to  be  subject  to  his 
superintendence.  This  view  of  the  thing  will  at  once  suggest 
to  us  the  intimate  connexion  between  the  duration  of  the 
executive  magistrate  in  office,  and  the  stability  of  the  system 


THE    FEDERALIST.  589 

ol  administration.  To  undo  what  has  been  done  by  a  prede- 
cessor, is  very  often  considered  by  a  successor,  as  the  best 
proof  he  can  give  of  his  own  capacity  and  desert  j  and,  ii* 
addition  to  this  propensity,  where  the  alteration  has  been  the 
result  of  public  choice,  the  person  substituted  is  warranted  in 
supposing,  that  the  dismission  of  his  predecessor  has  proceeded 
from  a  dislike  to  his  measures,  and  that  the  less  he  resembles 
him,  the  more  he  will  recommend  himself  to  the  favour  of  his 
constituents.  These  considerations,  and  the  influence  of  per- 
sonal confidences  and  attachments,  would  be  likelj^  to  induce 
every  new  president  to  promote  a  change  of  men  to  fill  the  sub- 
ordinate stations;  and  these  causes  together,  could  not  fail  to 
occasion  a  disgraceful  and  ruinous  mutability  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  government. 

With  a  positive  duration  of  considerable  extent,  I  connect 
the  circumstance  of  re-eligibility.  The  first  is  necessary,  to 
give  the  officer  himself  the  inclination,  and  the  resolution  to 
act  his  part  well,  and  to  the  community  time  and  leisure  to 
observe  the  tendency  of  his  measures,  and  thence  to  form  an 
experimental  estimate  of  their  merits.  The  last  is  necessary 
to  enable  the  people,  when  they  see  reason  to  approve  of  his 
conduct,  to  continue  him  in  the  station,  in  order  to  prolong  the 
utility  of  his  talents  and  virtues,  and  to  secure  to  the  govern- 
ment, the  advantage  of  permanency  in  a  wise  system  of  adminis- 
tration. 

Nothing  appears  more  plausible  at  first  sight,  nor  more  ill 
founded  upon  close  inspection,  than  a  scheme  which,  in  relation 
to  the  present  point,  has  had  some  respectable  advocates  —  1 
mean  that  of  continuing  the  chief  magistrate  in  office  for  a 
certain  time,  and  then  excluding  him  from  it,  either  for  a 
limited  period  or  for  ever  after.  This  exclusion,  whether  tem- 
porary or  perpetual,  would  have  nearly  the  same  effects ;  and 
these  effects  would  be  for  the  most  part  rather  pernicious  than 
salutary. 

One  ill  effect  of  the  exclusion  would  be.  a  diminution  of  the 
inducements  to  good  behaviour.   There  are  few  men  who  would 

45 


540  THE   FEDERALIST. 

not  feel  much  less  zeal  in  the  discharge  of  a  duty,  when  they 
were  conscious  that  the  advantage  of  the  station,  with  which 
it  was  connected,  must  be  relinquished  at  a  determinate  period, 
than  when  they  were  permitted  to  entertain  a  hope  of  obtaining 
by  meriting  a  continuance  of  them.  This  position  will  not  be 
disputed,  so  long  as  it  is  admitted,  that  the  desire  of  reward  is 
one  of  the  strongest  incentives  of  human  conduct;  or  that  the 
best  security  for  the  fidelity  of  mankind,  is  to  make  interest 
coincide  with  duty.  Even  the  love  of  fame,  the  ruling  passion 
of  the  noblest  minds,  which  would  prompt  a  man  to  plan  and 
undertake  extensive  and  arduous  enterprises  for  the  public 
benefit,  requiring  considerable  time  to  mature  and  perfect  them, 
if  he  could  flatter  himself  with  the  prospect  of  being  allowed 
to  finish  what  he  had  begun,  would,  on  the  contrary,  deter  him 
from  the  undertaking,  when  he  foresaw  that  he  must  quit  the 
scene  before  he  could  accomplish  the  work,  and  must  commit 
that,  together  with  his  own  reputation,  to  hands  which  might 
be  unequal  or  unfriendly  to  the  task.  The  most  to  be  expected 
from  the  generality  of  men,  in  such  a  situation,  is  the  negative 
merit  of  not  doing  harm,  instead  of  the  positive  merit  of  doing 
good. 

Another  ill  effect  of  the  exclusion,  would  be  the  temptation 
to  sordid  views,  to  peculation,  and  in  some  instances,  to  usurpa- 
tion. An  avaricious  man,  who  might  happen  to  fill  the  ofiice, 
looking  forward  to  a  time  when  he  must  at  all  events  yield  up 
the  advantages  he  enjoyed,  would  feel  a  propensity,  not  easy  to 
be  resisted  by  such  a  man,  to  make  the  best  use  of  his  opportu- 
nities, while  they  lasted;  and  might  not  scruple  to  have  recourse 
to  the  most  corrupt  expedients  to  make  the  harvest  as  abundant 
as  it  was  transitory ;  though  the  same  person  probably,  with  a 
different  prospect  before  him,  might  content  himself  with  the 
regular  emoluments  of  his  station,  and  might  even  be  unwilling 
to  risk  the  consequences  of  an  abuse  of  his  opportunities.  His 
avarice  might  be  a  guard  upon  his  avarice.  Add  to  this,  that 
the  same  man  might  be  vain  or  ambitious  as  well  as  avaricious 
And  if  he  could  expect  to  prolong  his  honours  by  his  ^ood  con 


THE   FEDERALIST.  541 

duct,  he  miglit  hesitate  to  sacrifice  his  appetite  for  them,  lo  his 
appetite  for  gain.  But  with  the  prospect  before  him  of  approach- 
ing an  inevitable  annihilation,  his  avarice  would  be  likely  to  get 
the  victory  over  his  caution,  his  vanity,  or  his  ambition. 

An  ambitious  man  too,  finding  himself  seated  on  the  summit 
of  his  country's  honours,  looking  forward  to  the  time  at  which 
he  must  descend  from  the  exalted  emii  ence  for  ever,  and  reflect- 
ing that  no  exertion  of  merit  on  his  part  could  save  him  from 
the  unwelcome  reverse,  would  be  much  more  violently  tempted 
to  embrace  a  favourable  conjuncture  for  attempting  the  pro- 
longation of  his  power,  at  every  personal  hazard,  than  if  he 
had  the  probability  of  answering  the  same  end  by  doing  his 
duty. 

Would  it  promote  the  peace  of  the  community,  or  the  stability 
of  the  government,  to  have  half  a  dozen  men  who  had  had 
credit  enough  to  raise  themselves  to  the  seat  of  the  supreme 
magistracy,  wandering  among  the  people  like  discontented 
ghosts,  and  sighing  for  a  place,  which  they  were  destined  never 
more  to  possess  ? 

A  third  ill  effect  of  the  exclusion  would  be,  the  depriving  the 
community  of  the  advantage  of  the  experience  gained  by  the 
chief  magistrate  in  the  exercise  of  his  office.  That  experience 
IS  the  parent  of  wisdom,  is  an  adage,  the  truth  of  which  is 
recognized  by  the  wisest  as  well  as  the  simplest  of  mankind 
What  more  desirable  or  more  essential  than  this  quality  in  the 
governors  of  nations  ?  Where  more  desirable  or  more  essential, 
than  in  the  first  magistrate  of  a  nation  ?  Can  it  be  wise  to  put 
this  desirable  and  essential  quality  under  the  ban  of  the  con- 
stitution; and  to  declare  that  the  moment  it  is  acquired,  its 
possessor  shall  be  compelled  to  abandon  the  station  in  which  it 
was  acquired,  and  to  whi:;h  it  is  adapted  ?  This,  nevertheless, 
is  the  precise  import  of  all  those  regulations  which  exclude 
men  from  serving  their  country,  by  the  choice  of  their  fellow 
citizens,  after  they  have,  by  a  course  of  service,  fitted  them« 
selves  for  doing  it  with  a  greater  degree  of  utility. 


542  THE    FEDERALIST. 

A  fourth  ill  effect  of  the  exclusion  would  be,  tl  e  banishing 
men  from  stations  in  which,  in  certain  emergencies  of  the  state, 
their  presence  might  be  of  the  greatest  moment  to  the  jjublic 
interest  or  safety.  There  is  no  nation  which  has  not,  at  one 
period  or  another,  experienced  an  absolute  necessity  of  the 
services  of  particular  men,  in  particular  situations,  perhaps  it 
would  not  be  too  strong  to  say,  to  the  preservation  of  its 
political  existence.  How  unwise,  therefore,  must  be  every 
8uch  self-denying  ordinance,  as  serves  to  prohibit  a  nation 
from  making  use  of  its  own  citizens,  in  the  manner  best  suited 
to  its  exigencies  and  circumstances !  Without  supposing  the 
personal  essentiality  of  the  man,  it  is  evident  that  a  change 
of  the  chief  magistrate,  at  the  breaking  out  of  a  war,  or  any 
similar  crisis,  for  another  even  of  equal  merit,  would  at  all 
times  be  detrimental  to  the  community;  inasmuch  as  it  would 
substitute  inexperience  to  experience,  and  would  tend  t3 
unhinge  and  set  afloat  the  already  settled  train  of  the  admin- 
istration. 

A  fifth  ill  effect  of  the  exclusion  would  be,  that  it  would 
operate  as  a  constitutional  interdiction  of  stability  in  the 
administration.  By  inducing  the  necessity  of  a  change  of  men, 
in  the  first  office  in  the  nation,  it  would  necessarily  lead  to  a 
mutability  of  measures.  It  is  not  generally  to  be  expected, 
that  men  will  vary ;  and  measures  remain  uniform.  The  con- 
trary is  the  usual  course  of  thin^^s.  And  we  need  not  be  appre- 
hensive that  there  will  be  too  much  stability,  while  there  is 
even  the  option  of  changing;  nor  need  we  desire  to  prohibit 
the  people  from  continuing  their  confidence  where  they  think 
it  may  be  safely  placed,  and  where,  by  constancy  on  their  part, 
they  may  obviate  the  fatal  inconveniences  of  fluctuating  cour 
cils  and  a  variable  policy. 

These  are  some  of  the  disadvantages,  which  would  flow  from 
the  principle  of  exclusion.  They  apply  most  forcibly  to  the 
scheme  of  a  perpetual  exclusion ;  but  when  we  consider,  that 
even  a  partial  one  would  always  render  the  re-admission  of  the 


THE   FEDERALIST.  543 

person  a  remote  and  precarious  object,  the  observations  which 
have  been  made  will  apply  nearly  as  fully  to  one  case  as  to  the 
other. 

What  are  the  advantages  promised  to  counterbalance  the 
evils  ?  They  are  represented  to  be  :  1st.  Greater  independence 
in  the  magistrate :  2d.  Greater  security  to  the  people.  Unless 
the  exclusion  be  perpetual,  there  will  be  no  pretence  to  infer 
the  first  advantage.  But  even  in  that  case,  may  he  have  no 
object  beyond  his  present  station  to  which  he  may  sacrifice  his 
independence  ?  May  he  have  no  connexions,  no  friends,  for 
whom  he  may  sacrifice  it  ?  May  he  not  be  less  willing,  by  a 
firm  conduct,  to  make  personal  enemies,  when  he  acts  under 
the  impression,  that  a  time  is  fast  approaching,  on  the  arrival 
of  which  he  not  only  may,  but  must  be  exposed  to  their  resent- 
ments, upon  an  equal,  perhaps  upon  an  inferior  footing  ?  It 
is  not  an  easy  point  to  determine,  whether  his  independence 
would  be  most  promoted  or  impaired  by  such  an  arrangement. 

As  to  the  second  supposed  advantage,  there  is  still  greater 
reason  to  entertain  doubts  concerning  it,  especially  if  the  ex- 
clusion were  to  be  perpetual.  In  this  case,  as  already  inti- 
mated, a  man  of  irregular  ambition,  of  whom  alone  there  could 
be  reason  in  any  case  to  entertain  apprehensions,  would,  with 
infinite  reluctance,  yield  to  the  necessity  of  taking  his  leave 
for  ever  of  a  post,  in  which  his  passion  for  power  and  pre- 
eminence had  acquired  the  force  of  habit.  And  if  he  had  been 
fortunate  or  adroit  enough  to  conciliate  the  good  will  of  the 
people,  he  might  induce  them  to  consider  as  a  very  odious  and 
unjustifiable  restraint  upon  themselves,  a  provision  which  was 
calculated  to  debar  them  of  the  right  of  giving  a  fresh  proof 
of  their  attachment  to  a  favourite.  There  may  be  conceived 
nircumstances  in  which  this  disgust  of  the  people,  seconding 
the  thwarted  ambition  of  such  a  favourite,  might  occasion 
greater  danger  to  liberty,  than  could  ever  reasonably  be  dreaded 
from  the  possibility  of  a  perpetuation  in  office,  by  the  volun- 
tary sufi^rages  of  the  community,  exercising  a  constitutional 
privilege. 


544  THE    FEDERALIST. 

There  is  an  excess  of  refinement  in  the  idea  of  disabling  the 
people  to  continue  in  oflSce  men  who  had  entitled  themselves, 
in  their  opinion,  to  approbation  and  confidence;  the  advantages 
of  which  are  at  best  speculative  and  equivocal,  and  are  over- 
balanced by  disadvantages  far  more  certain  and  decisive. 

PUBLIUS. 


THE   IfEDERALIST.  64.? 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LXXIII. 


NEW  YORK,   MARCH  21,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE    SAME   yiEW   CONTINUED,    IN    RELATION    TO    THE    PROVISION 
CONCERNING  SUPPORT,    AND   THE   POWER   OF   THE   NEGATIVE. 

The  third  ingredient  towards  constituting  the  vigour  of  the 
executive  authority,  is  an  adequate  provision  for  its  support. 
It  is  evident  that,  without  proper  attention  to  this  article,  the 
separation  of  the  executive  from  the  legislative  department, 
would  be  merely  nominal  and  nugatory.  The  legislature,  with 
a  discretionary  power  over  the  salary  and  emoluments  of  the 
chief  magistrate,  could  render  him  as  obsequious  to  their  will, 
as  they  might  think  proper  to  make  him.  They  might,  in 
most  cases,  either  reduce  him  by  famine,  or  tempt  him  by 
largesses,  to  surrender  at  discretion  his  judgment  to  their 
inclinations.  These  expressions,  taken  in  all  the  latitude  of 
the  terms,  would  no  doubt  convey  more  than  is  intended 
There  are  men  who  could  neither  be  distressed,  nor  won,  into  a 
sacrifice  of  their  duty ;  but  this  stern  virtue  is  the  growth  of 
few  soils :  And  in  the  main  it  will  be  found,  that  a  power  over 
a  man's  support,  is  a  power  over  his  will.  If  it  were  necessary 
to  confirm  so  plain  a  truth  by  facts,  examples  would  not  be 
wanting,  even  in  this  country,  of  the  intimidation  or  seduction 


54G  THE    FEDERALIST. 

of  the  executive  by  the  terrors,  or  allurements,  of  the  pecuniary 
arrangements  of  the  legislative  body. 

It  is  not  easy,  therefore,  to  commend  too  highly  the  judicious 
attention  which  has  been  paid  to  this  subject  in  the  proposed 
constitution.  It  is  there  provided,  that  "  The  president  of  the. 
United  States  shall  at  stated  times  receive  for  his  service  a. 
compensation,  which  shall  neither  he  increased  nor  diminished^  during 
the  period  for  which  he  shall  have  been  elected,  and  he  shall  not  re- 
ceive within  that  period  any  other  emolument  from  the  United 
States,  or  any  of  them."  It  is  impossible  to  imagine  any  pro- 
vision which  would  have  been  more  eligible  than  this.  The 
legislature,  on  the  appointment  of  a  president,  is  once  for  all 
to  declare  what  shall  be  the  compensation  for  his  services 
during  the  time  for  which  he  shall  have  been  elected.  This 
done,  they  will  have  no  power  to  alter  it  either  by  increase  or 
diminution,  till  a  new  period  of  service  by  a  new  election  com- 
mences. They  can  neither  weaken  his  fortitude  by  operating 
upon  his  necessities,  nor  corrupt  his  integrity  by  appealing  to 
his  avarice.  Neither  the  union,  nor  any  of  its  members,  will 
be  at  liberty  to  give,  nor  will  he  be  at  liberty  to  receive,  any 
other  emolument,  than  that  which  may  have  been  determined 
by  the  first  act.  He  can  of  course  have  no  pecuniary  induce- 
ment to  renounce  or  desert  the  independence  intended  for  him 
by  the  constitution. 

The  last  of  the  requisites  to  energy,  which  have  been  enume* 
rated,  is  competent  powers.  Let  us  proceed  to  consider  those 
which  are  proposed  to  be  vested  in  the  president  of  the  United 
States. 

The  first  thing  that  oflfers  itself  to  our  observation,  is  the 
qualified  negative  of  the  president  upon  the  acts  or  resolutioiib 
of  the  two  houses  of  the  legislature ;  or,  in  other  words,  his 
power  of  returning  all  bills  with  objections,  which  will  have 
the  effect  of  preventing  their  becoming  laws,  unless  they  should 
afterwards  be  ratified  by  two-thirds  of  each  of  the  component 
members  of  the  legislative  body. 

The  propensity  of  the  legislative  department  to  intrude  upon 


THE   FEDERALIST.  547 

tne  rights,  and  to  absorb  the  powers,  of  the  other  departments, 
has  been  already  more  than  once  suggested ;  the  insufficiency 
of  a  mei'e  parchment  delineation  of  the  boundaries  of  each, 
has  also  been  remarked  upon ;  and  the  necessity  of  furnishing 
each  with  constitutional  arms  for  its  own  defence,  has  been 
inferred  and  proved.  From  these  clear  and  indubitable  princi- 
ples results  the  propriety  of  a  negative,  either  absolute  or 
qualified,  in  the  executive,  upon  the  acts  of  the  legislative 
branches.  "Without  the  one  or  the  other,  the  former  would  be 
absolutely  unable  to  defend  himself  against  the  depredations 
of  the  latter.  He  might  gradually  be  stripped  of  his  authori- 
ties by  successive  resolutions,  or  annihilated  by  a  single  vote. 
And  in  the  one  mode  or  the  other,  the  legislative  and  executive 
powers  might  speedily  come  to  be  blended  in  the  same  hands. 
If  even  no  propensity  had  ever  discovered  itself  in  the  legisla- 
tive body,  to  invade  the  rights  of  the  executive,  the  rules  of 
just  reasoning  and  theoretic  propriety  would  of  themselves 
teach  us,  that  the  one  ought  not  to  be  left  at  the  mercy  of  the 
other,  but  ought  to  possess  a  constitutional  and  effectual  power 
of  self-defence. 

But  the  power  in  question  has  a  further  use.  It  not  only 
serves  as  a  shield  to  the  executive,  but  it  furnishes  an  addi- 
tional security  against  the  enaction  of  improper  laws.  It 
establishes  a  salutary  check  upon  the  legislative  body,  calcu- 
lated to  guard  the  community  against  the  effects  of  faction, 
precipitancy,  or  of  any  impulse  unfriendly  to  the  public  good, 
which  may  happen  to  influence  a  majority  of  that  body. 

The  propriety  of  a  negative  has,  upon  some  occasions,  been 
combatted  by  an  observation,  that  it  was  not  to  be  presumed  a 
single  man  would  possess  more  virtue  or  wisdom  than  a  number 
of  men;  and  that,  unless  this  presumption  should  be  enter- 
tained, it  would  be  improper  to  give  the  executive  magistrate 
any  species  of  control  over  the  legislative  body. 

But  this  observation,  when  examined,  will  appear  rather 
specious  than  solid.  The  propriety  of  the  thing  does  not  turn 
flpon  the  supposition  of  superior  wisdom  or  virtue  in  the  exenu- 


548  THE   FEDERALIST. 

tive;  but  upon  the  supposition,  that  the  legislative  will  not  be 
infallibli^;  that  the  love  of  power  may  sometimes  betray  it 
into  a  disposition  to  encroach  upon  the  rights  of  the  other 
members  of  the  government;  that  a  spirit  of  faction  may 
sometimes  pervert  its  deliberations;  that  impressions  of  the 
moment  may  sometimes  hurry  it  into  measures  which  itself,  on 
mature  reflection,  would  condemn.  The  primary  inducement 
to  conferring  the  power  in  question  upon  the  executive,  is  to 
enable  him  to  defend  himself;  the  secondary,  is  to  increase  the 
chances  in  favour  of  the  community  against  the  passing  of  bad 
laws,  through  haste,  inadvertence,  or  design.  The  oftener  a 
measure  is  brought  under  examination,  the  greater  the  diver- 
sity in  the  situations  of  those  who  are  to  examine  it,  the  less 
must  be  the  danger  of  those  errors  which  flow  from  want  of 
due  deliberation,  or  of  those  misteps  which  proceed  from  the 
contagion  of  some  common  passion  or  interest.  It  is  far  less 
probable,  that  culpable  views  of  any  kind  should  infect  all  the 
parts  of  the  government  at  the  same  moment,  and  in  relation 
to  the  same  object,  than  that  they  should  by  turns  govern  and 
mislead  every  one  of  them. 

It  may  perhaps  be  said,  that  the  power  of  preventing  bad  laws 
includes  that  of  preventing  good  ones;  and  may  be  used  to  the 
one  purj^ose  as  well  as  to  the  other.  But  this  objection  will 
have  little  weight  with  those  who  can  properly  estimate  the 
mischiefs  of  that  inconstancy  and  mutability  in  the  laws,  which 
form  the  greatest  blemish  in  the  character  and  genius  of  our 
governments.  They  will  consider  every  institution  calculated 
to  restrain  the  excess  of  law-making,  and  to  keep  things  in  the 
same  state  in  which  they  may  happen  to  be  at  any  given  period, 
as  much  more  likely  to  do  good  than  harm;  because  it  is  favour- 
able to  greater  stability  in  the  system  of  legislation.  The  injury 
which  may  possibly  be  done  by  defeating  a  few  good  laws,  will 
be  amply  compensated  by  the  advantage  of  preventing  a  num- 
ber of  bad  ones. 

Nor  is  this  all.  The  superior  weight  and  influence  of  the 
legislative  body  in  a  free  government,  and  the  hazard  to  the 


THE   FEDERALIST. 


d49 


executive  in  a  trial  of  strength  with  that  body,  aflfbrd  a  satis- 
factory security,  that  the  negative  would  generally  be  employed 
with  great  caution;  and  that,  in  its  exercise,  there  would  oftener 
be  room  for  a  charge  of  timidity  than  of  rashness.  A  king  of 
Great  Britain,  with  all  his  train  of  sovereign  attributes,  and 
with  all  the  influence  he  draws  from  u  thousand  sources,  would, 
at  this  day,  hesitate  to  put  a  negative  upon  the  joint  resolutions 
of  the  two  houses  of  parliament.  He  would  not  fail  to  exert 
the  utmost  resources  of  that  influence  to  strangle  a  measure 
disagreeable  to  him,  in  its  progress  to  the  throne,  to  avoid 
being  reduced  to  the  dilemma  of  permitting  it  to  take  effect, 
or  of  risking  the  displeasure  of  the  nation,  by  an  opposition  to 
the  sense  of  the  legislative  body.  Nor  is  it  probable,  that  he 
would  ultimately  venture  to  exert  his  prerogative,  but  in  a  case 
of  manifest  propriety,  or  extreme  necessity.  All  well-informed 
men  in  that  kingdom  will  accede  to  the  justness  of  this  remark. 
A  very  considerable  period  has  elapsed  since  the  negative  of 
the  crown  has  been  exercised. 

If  a  magistrate,  so  powerful,  and  so  well  fortified,  as  a  British 
monarch,  would  have  scruples  about  the  exercise  of  the  power 
under  consideration,  how  much  greater  caution  may  be  reason- 
ably expected  in  a  president  of  the  United  States,  cloathed,  for 
the  short  period  of  four  years,  with  the  executive  authority  of 
a  government  wholly  and  purely  republican  ? 

It  is  evident,  that  there  would  bo  greater  danger  of  his  not 
using  his  power  when  necessary,  than  of  his  using  it  too  often, 
or  too  much.  An  argument,  indeed,  against  its  expediency,  has 
been  drawn  from  this  very  source.  It  has  been  represented,  on 
this  account,  as  a  power  odious  in  appearance,  useless  in  prac- 
tice. But  it  will  not  follow,  that  because  it  might  rarely,  it 
would  never  be  exercised.  In  the  case  for  which  it  is  chiefly 
designed,  that  of  an  immediate  attack  upon  the  constitutional 
rights  of  the  executive,  or  in  a  case  in  which  the  public  good 
was  evidently  and  palpably  sacrificed,  a  man  of  tolerable  firm- 
ness would  avail  himself  of  his  constitutional  means  of  defence, 
and  would  listen  to  the  admonitions  of  duty  and  responsibility. 


550  THE    FEDERALIST. 

In  l.ho  former  supposition,  his  fortitude  would  be  stiinulatfad  by 
his  immediate  interest  in  the  power  of  his  office ;  in  the  latter, 
by  the  probability  of  the  sanction  of  his  constituents;  who, 
though  they  would  naturally  incline  to  the  legislative  body 
in  a  doubtful  case,  would  hardly  suffer  their  partiality  to  delude 
them  in  a  very  plain  one.  I  speak  now  with  an  eye  to  a  magis- 
trate possessing  only  a  common  share  of  firmness.  There  are 
men  who,  under  any  circumstances,  will  have  the  courage  to 
do  their  duty  at  every  hazard. 

But  the  convention  have  pursued  a  mean  in  this  business, 
which  will  both  facilitate  the  exercise  of  the  power  vested 
in  this  respect  in  the  executive  magistrate,  and  make  its 
efficacy  to  depend  on  the  sense  of  a  considerable  part  of 
the  legislative  body.  Instead  of  an  absolute,  it  is  proposed 
to  give  the  executive  the  qualified  negative,  already  described. 
This  is  a  power  which  would  be  much  more  readily  exercised 
than  the  other.  A  man  who  might  be  afraid  to  defeat  a  law 
by  his  single  veto,  might  not  scruple  to  return  it  for  re-con- 
sideration; subject  to  being  finally  rejected,  only  in  the  event 
of  more  than  one-third  of  each  house,  concurring  in  the  suf- 
ficiency of  his  objections.  He  would  be  encouraged  by  the 
reflection,  that  if  his  opposition  should  prevail,  it  would  embark 
in  it  a  very  respectable  proportion  of  the  legislative  body, 
whose  influence  would  be  united  with  his  in  supporting  the 
propriety  of  his  conduct  in  the  public  opinion.  A  direct  and 
categorical  negative  has  something  in  the  appearance  of  it  more 
harsh,  and  more  apt  to  irritate,  than  the  mere  suggestion  of 
argumentative  objections  to  be  approved  or  disapproved,  by 
those  to  whom  they  are  addressed.  In  proportion  as  it  would 
be  less  apt  to  offend,  it  would  be  more  apt  to  be  exercised;  and 
for  this  very  reason  it  may  in  practice  be  found  more  effectual. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  it  will  not  often  happen,  that  improper 
views  will  govern  so  large  a  proportion  as  two-thirds  of  both 
branches  of  the  legislature  at  the  same  time ;  and  this  too  in 
defiance  of  the  counterpoising  weight  of  the  executive.  It  is 
at  any  rate  far  less  probable,  thai  this  should  be  the  case,  than 


THE   FEDERALIST.  551 

<hat  such  views  should  taint  the  resolutions  and  conduct  of  a 
bare  majority.  A  power  of  this  nature  in  the  executive,  ;vill 
often  have  a  silent  and  unperceived,  though  forcible,  operation. 
When  men,  engaged  in  unjustifiable  pursuits,  are  aware,  tha» 
obstructions  may  come  from  a  quarter  which  they  cannot 
control,  they  will  often  be  restrained  by  the  bare  apprehen- 
sion of  opposition,  from  doing  what  they  would  with  eager 
ness  rush  into,  if  no  such  external  impediments  were  to  be 
feared. 

This  qualified  negative,  as  has  been  elsewhere  remarked,  is 
in  this  state  vested  in  a  council,  consisting  of  the  governor, 
with  the  chancellor  and  judges  of  the  supreme  court,  or  any 
two  of  them.  It  has  been  freely  employed  upon  a  variety  of 
occasions,  and  frequently  with  success.  And  its  utility  has 
become  so  apparent,  the  persons  who,  in  compiling  the  con- 
stitution, were  its  violent  opposers,  have  from  experience 
become  its  declared  admirers.* 

I  have  in  another  place  remarked,  that  the  convention,  in  the 
formation  of  this  part  of  their  plan,  had  departed  from  the 
model  of  the  constitution  of  this  state,  in  favour  of  that  of 
Massachupotts.  Two  strong  reasons  may  be  imagined  for  this 
preference.  One,  that  the  judges,  who  are  to  be  the  interpre- 
ters of  tho  law,  might  receive  an  improper  bias,  from  having 
given  a  previous  opinion  in  their  revisionary  capacity.  The 
other,  that  by  being  often  associated  with  the  executive,  they 
might  be  induced  to  embark  too  far  in  the  political  views  of 
that  magistrate,  and  thus  a  dangerous  combination  might  by 
degrees  be  cemented  between  the  executive  and  judiciary  de- 
partments. It  is  impossible  to  keep  the  judges  too  distinct 
from  every  other  avocation  than  that  of  expounding  the  laws. 
It  is  peculiarly  dangerous  to  place  them  in  a  situation  to  be 
either  corrupted  or  influenced  by  the  executive. 

PUBLIUS. 

*  Mr.  Abraham  Yates,  a  warm  opponent  of  the  plan  of  the  conyention,  is 
of  this  number. 


552  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMIBER   LXXIV. 


NEW  YORK,  MARCH  25,  1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  SAME  VIEW  CONTINUED,  IN    RELATION   TO   THE   COMMAND   OF 
THE  NATIONAL  FORCES,  AND  THE  POWER  OF  PARDONING. 

The  president  of  the  United  States,  is  to  be  commander  "  in 
chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
militia  of  the  several  states  when  called  into  the  actual  service  of 
the  United  States."  The  propriety  of  this  provision  is  so  evi- 
dent, and  it  is,  at  the  same  time,  so  consonant  to  the  precedents 
of  the  state  constitutions  in  general,  that  little  need  be  said  to 
explain  or  enforce  it.  Even  those  of  them  which  have,  in  other 
respects,  coupled  the  chief  magistrate  with  a  council,  have  for 
the  most  part  concentrated  the  military  authority  in  him  alone. 
Of  all  the  cares  or  concerns  of  government,  the  direction  of 
war  most  peculiarly  demands  those  qualities  which  distinguish 
the  exercise  of  power  by  a  single  hand.  The  direction  of  war, 
implies  the  direction  of  the  common  strength :  and  the  power 
of  directing  and  employing  the  common  strength,  forms  an 
usual  and  essential  part  in  the  definition  of  the  executive 
authority. 

"  The  president  may  require  the  opinion,  in  writing,  of  the 
principal  officer  in  each  of  the  executive  departments,  upon  any 
subject  relating  to  the  dutien  of  their  respective  offices."     This 


THE    FEDERALIST.  553 

I  consider  as  a  mere  redundancy  in  the  plan  j  as  the  right  for 
which  it  provides  would  result  of  itself  from  the  office. 

He  is  also  authorized  "  to  grant  reprieves  and  pardons  for 
offences  against  the  United  States,  except  in  cases  of  impeach- 
ment." Humanity  and  good  policy  conspire  to  dictate,  that 
the  benign  prerogative  of  pardoning,  should  be  as  little  as 
possible  fettered  or  embarrassed.  The  criminal  code  of  every 
country  partakes  so  much  of  necessary  severity,  that  without 
an  easy  access  to  exceptions  in  favour  of  unfortunate  guilt, 
justice  would  wear  a  countenance  too  sanguinary  and  cruel. 
As  the  sense  of  responsibility  is  always  strongest,  in  proportion 
as  it  is  undivided,  it  may  be  inferred,  that  a  single  man  would 
be  most  ready  to  attend  to  the  force  of  those  motives,  which 
might  plead  for  a  mitigation  of  the  rigour  of  the  law,  and  least 
apt  to  yield  to  considerations,  which  were  calculated  to  shelter 
a  fit  object  of  its  vengeance.  The  reflection  that  the  fate  of  a 
fellow  creature  depended  on  his  sole  fiat,  would  naturally  inspire 
scrupulousness  and  caution :  The  dread  of  being  accused  of 
weakness  or  connivance,  would  beget  equal  circumspection, 
though  of  a  different  kind.  On  the  other  hand,  as  men  gener- 
ally derive  confidence  from  their  number,  they  might  often 
encourage  each  other  in  an  act  of  obduracy,  and  might  be  less 
sensible  to  the  apprehension  of  censure  for  an  injudicious  or 
affected  clemency.  On  these  accounts,  one  man  appears  to  be 
a  more  eligible  dispenser  of  the  mercy  of  the  government  than 
a  body  of  men. 

The  expediency  of  vesting  the  power  of  pardoning  in  the 
president  has,  if  I  mistake  not,  been  only  contested  in  relation 
to  the  crime  of  treason.  This,  it  has  been  urged,  ought  to 
have  depended  upon  the  assent  of  one,  or  both  of  the  branches 
of  the  legislative  body.  I  shall  not  deny  that  there  are  strong 
reasons  to  be  assigned  for  requiring  in  this  particular  the  con- 
currence of  that  body,  or  of  a  part  of  it.  As  treason  is  a  crime 
levelled  at  the  immediate  being  of  the  society,  when  the  laws 
have  once  ascertained  the  guilt  of  the  offender,  there  seems  a 


654  THK    FEDERALIST. 

fitness  in  referring  the  expediency  of  an  act  of  mercy  towards 
biin  to  the  judgment  of  the  legislature.  And  this  ought  the 
rather  to  be  the  case,  as  the  supposition  of  the  connivance  of 
tne  chief  magistrate  ought  not  to  be  entirely  excluded.  But 
there  are  also  strong  objections  to  such  a  plan.  It  is  not  to  be 
doubted  that  a  single  man  of  prudence  and  good  sense,  is 
better  fitted,  in  delicate  conjunctures,  to  balance  the  motives 
which  may  plead  for  and  against  the  remission  of  the  punish- 
ment, than  any  numerous  body  whatever.  It  deserves  par- 
ticular attention,  that  treason  will  often  be  connected  with 
seditions,  which  embrace  a  large  proportion  of  the  community ; 
as  lately  happened  in  Massachusetts.  In  every  such  case,  we 
might  expect  to  see  the  representation  of  the  people  tainted 
with  the  same  spirit  which  had  given  birth  to  the  offence. 
And  when  parties  were  pretty  equally  poised,  the  secret  sym- 
pathy of  the  friends  and  favourers  of  the  condemned,  availing 
itself  of  the  good  nature  and  weakness  of  others,  might  fre- 
quently bestow  impunity  where  the  terror  of  an  example  was 
necessary.  On  the  other  hand,  when  the  sedition  had  pro- 
ceeded from  causes  which  had  inflamed  the  resentments  of  the 
major  party,  they  might  often  be  found  obstinate  and  inex- 
orable, when  policy  demanded  a  conduct  of  forbearance  and 
clemency.  But  the  principal  argument  for  reposing  the  power 
of  pardoning  in  this  case  in  the  chief  magistrate,  is  this :  In 
seasons  of  insurrection  or  rebellion,  there  are  often  critical 
moments,  when  a  well-timed  offer  of  pardon  to  the  insurgents 
or  rebels  may  restore  the  tranquillity  of  the  commonwealth ; 
and  which,  if  suffered  to  pass  unimproved,  it  may  never  be 
possible  afterwards  to  recall.  The  dilatory  process  of  con- 
vening the  legislature,  or  one  of  its  branches,  for  the  purpose 
of  obtaining  its  sanction,  would  frequently  be  the  occasion  of 
letting  slip  the  golden  opportunity.  The  loss  of  a  week,  a  day, 
an  hour,  may  sometimes  be  fatal.  If  it  should  be  observed 
that  a  discretionary  power,  with  a  ■view  to  such  contingencies, 
might  be  occasionally  conferred  upon  the  president;  it  may  be 


THE    FEDERALIST,  665 

answered  in  the  first  place,  that  it  is  questionable  whether,  ia 
a  limited  constitution,  that  power  could  be  delegated  by  law ; 
and  in  the  second  place,  that  it  would  generally  be  impolitic 
before-hand  to  take  any  step  which  might  hold  out  the  pros- 
pect of  impunity.  A  proceeding  of  this  kind,  out  of  the  usual 
course,  would  be  likely  to  be  construed  into  an  argument  of 
timidity  or  of  weakness,  and  would  have  a  tendency  to  em- 
bolden guilt. 

PUBLIUS 


16 


55d  THE  FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LXXV. 


NEW  YORK,   MARCH   28,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME  VIEW  CONTINUED,   IN  RELATION  TO   THE   POWER  OP 
MAKINU    TREATIES. 

The  president  is  to  have  power,  *'  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  senate,  to  make  treaties,  provided  two-thirds  of 
the  senators  present  concur." 

Though  this  provision  has  been  assailed  on  different  grounds, 
with  no  small  degree  of  vehem»Qce,  I  scruple  not  to  declare  my 
tlrm  persuasion,  that  it  is  one  of  the  best  digested  and  most 
anexceptionable  parts  of  the  plan.  One  ground  of  objection 
is,  the  trite  topic  of  the  intermixture  of  powers;  some  con- 
tending, that  the  president  ought  alone  to  possess  the  preroga- 
tive of  making  treaties;  others,  that  it  ought  to  have  been 
exclusively  deposited  in  the  senate.  Another  source  of  objec- 
tion, is  derived  from  the  small  number  of  persons  by  whom  a 
treaty  may  be  made :  Of  those  who  espouse  this  objection,  a 
part  are  of  opinion,  that  the  house  of  representatives  ought  to 
have  been  associated"  in  the  business,  while  another  part  seem 
to  think  that  nothing  more  was  necessary  than  to  have  substi- 
tuted two-thirds  of  all  the  members  of  the  senate,  to  two-thirds 
of  the  members  present.  As  I  flatter  myself  the  observations 
made  in  a  preceding  number,  upon  this  part  of  the  plan,  must 
have  sufficed  to  place  it,  to  a  discerning  eye,  in  a  very  favour. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  557 

able  light,  I  shall  here  content  myself  with  oflEeriiig  only  some 
supplementary  remarks,  principally  with  a  view  to  the  objec- 
tions which  have  been  just  stated. 

With  regard  to  the  intermixture  of  powers,  I  shall  rely  upon 
the  explanations  heretofore  given,  of  the  true  sense  of  the 
rule  upon  which  that  objection  is  founded;  and  shall  take  it 
for  granted,  as  an  inference  from  them,  that  the  union  of  the 
executive  with  the  senate,  in  the  article  of  treaties,  is  no 
infringement  of  that  rule.  I  venture  to  add,  that  the  parti- 
cular nature  of  the  power  of  making  treaties,  indicates  a  pecu- 
liar propriety  in  that  union.  Though  several  writers  on  the 
subject  of  government  place  that  power  in  the  class  of  execu- 
tive authorities,  yet  this  is  evidently  an  arbitrary  disposition : 
For  if  we  attend  carefully  to  its  operation,  it  will  be  found  to 
partake  more  of  the  legislative  than  of  the  executive  character, 
though  it  does  not  seem  strictly  to  fall  within  the  definition  of 
either.  The  essence  of  the  legislative  authority  is  to  enact 
laws,  or,  in  other  words,  to  prescribe  rules  for  the  regulation 
of  the  society;  while  the  execution  of  the  laws,  and  the  em- 
ployment of  the  common  strength,  either  for  this  purpose,  or 
for  the  common  defence,  seem  to  comprise  all  the  functions  of 
the  executive  magistrate.  The  power  of  making  treaties  is, 
plainly  neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  It  relates  neither  to  the 
execution  of  the  subsisting  laws,  nor  to  the  enaction  of  new 
ones;  and  still  less  to  an  exertion  of  the  common  strength. 
Its  objects  are,  contracts  with  foreign  nations,  which  have 
the  force  of  law,  but  derive  it  from  the  obligations  of  good 
faith.  They  are  not  rules  prescribed  by  the  sovereign  to  the 
subject,  but  agreements  between  sovereign  and  sovereign.  The 
power  in  question  seems,  therefore,  to  form  a  distinct  depart- 
ment, and  to  belong,  properly,  neither  to  the  legislative  nor  to 
the  executive.  The  qualities  elsewhere  detailed,  as  indispensa- 
ble in  the  management  of  foreign  negociations,  point  out  the 
executive  as  the  most  fit  agent  in  those  transactions ;  while  the 
vasi  importance  of  the  trust,  and  the  operation  of  treaties  as 


558  THE    FEDERALIST. 

laws,  pieud  strongly  for  the  participation  of  the  whole,  or  a 
portion,  of  the  legislative  body  in  the  office  of  making  thorn. 

However  proper  or  safe  it  may  be  in  governments,  where  the 
executive  magistrate  is  an  hereditary  monarch,  to  commit  to 
him  the  entire  power  of  making  treaties,  it  would  be  utterly 
unsafe  and  improper  to  intrust  that  power  to  an  elective  magis- 
trate of  four  years  duration.  It  has  been  remarked,  upon 
another  occasion,  and  the  remark  is  unquestionably  just,  that 
an  hereditary  monarch,  though  often  the  oppressor  of  his  peo- 
ple, has  personally  too  much  at  stake  in  the  government,  to  be 
in  any  material  danger  of  being  corrupted  by  foreign  powers : 
But  that  a  man  raised  from  the  station  of  a  private  citizen  to 
the  rank  of  chief  magistrate,  possessed  of  but  a  moderate  or 
slender  fortune,  and  looking  forward  to  a  period  not  very 
remote,  when  he  may  probably  be  obliged  to  return  to  the  sta- 
tion from  which  he  was  taken,  might  sometimes  be  under 
temptations  to  sacrifice  duty  to  interest,  which  it  would  require 
superlative  virtue  to  withstand.  An  avaricious  man  might  be 
tempted  to  betray  the  interests  of  the  state  for  the  acquisition 
of  wealth.  An  ambitious  man  might  make  his  own  aggran- 
dizement, by  the  aid  of  a  foreign  power,  the  price  of  his 
treachery  to  his  constituents.  The  history  of  human  conduct 
does  not  warrant  that  exalted  opinion  of  human  virtue,  which 
would  make  it  wise  in  a  nation  to  commit  interests  of  so  deli- 
cate and  momentous  a  kind,  as  those  which  concern  its  inter- 
course with  the  rest  of  the  world,  to  the  sole  disposal  of  a 
magistrate  created  and  circumstanced  as  would  be  a  president 
of  the  United  States. 

To  have  intrusted  the  power  of  making  treaties  to  the  senate 
alone,  would  have  been  to  relinquish  the  benefits  of  the  consti- 
tutional agency  of  the  president  in  the  conduct  of  foreign 
negociations.  It  is  true,  that  the  senate  would,  in  that  case, 
have  the  option  of  employing  him  in  this  capacity;  but  they 
would  also  have  the  option  of  letting  it  alone ;  and  pique  or 
cabal  might  induce  the  latter  rather  than  the  former.  BesideB 
this,  the  ministerial  servant  of  the  senate,  could  not  be  (jxpected 


THE    FEDERALIST.  559 

to  enjoy  the  confidence  and  respect  of  foreign  powers  in  the 
same  extent  with  the  constitutional  representative  of  the  na- 
tion ;  and,  of  course,  would  not  be  able  to  act  with  an  equal 
degree  of  weight  or  eflScacy.  While  the  Union  would,  from 
this  cause,  lose  a  considerable  advantage  in  the  management 
of  its  external  concerns,  the  people  would  lose  the  additional 
security  which  would  result  from  the  co-operation  of  the  exe- 
cutive. Though  it  would  be  imprudent  to  confide  in  him  solely 
so  important  a  trust ;  yet  it  cannot  be  doubted,  that  his  parti- 
cipation would  materially  add  to  the  safety  of  the  society.  It 
must  indeed  be  clear,  to  a  demonstration,  that  the  joint  posses- 
sion of  the  power  in  question,  by  the  president  and  senate, 
would  afford  a  greater  prospect  of  security,  than  the  separate 
possession  of  it  by  either  of  them.  And  whoever  has  maturely 
weighed  the  circumstances  which  must  concur  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  president,  will  be  satisfied,  that  the  office  will  always 
bid  fair  to  be  filled  by  men  of  such  characters,  as  to  render 
their  concurrence,  in  the  formation  of  treaties,  peculiarly  de- 
sirable, as  well  on  the  score  of  wisdom,  as  on  that  of  integrity. 
The  remarks  made  in  a  former  number,  will  apply  with  con- 
clusive force  against  the  admission  of  the  house  of  representa- 
tives to  a  share  in  the  formation  of  treaties.  The  fluctuating, 
and  taking  its  future  increase  into  the  account,  the  multi- 
tudinous composition  of  that  body,  forbid  us  to  expect  in  it 
those  qualities  which  are  essential  to  the  proper  execution  of 
such  a  trust.  Accurate  and  comprehensive  knowledge  of 
foreign  politics ;  a  steady  and  systematic  adherence  to  the  same 
views;  a  nice  and  uniform  sensibility  to  national  character; 
decision,  secrecy,  and  dispatch;  are  incompatible  with  the  genius 
of  a  body  so  variable  and  so  numerous.  The  very  complication 
of  the  business,  by  introducing  a  necessity  of  the  concurrence 
of  so  many  different  bodies,  would  of  itself  afford  a  solid 
objection.  The  greater  frequency  of  the  calls  upon  the  house 
of  representatives,  and  the  greater  length  of  time  which  it 
would  often  be  necessary  to  keep  them  together  when  con- 
rened,  to  obtain  their  sanction  in  the  progressive  stages  of  a 


5C0  THE    FEDERALIST. 

treatj ,  would  be  a  source  of  so  great  inconvenience  and  ex* 
pense,  as  alone  ought  to  condemn  the  project. 

The  only  objection  which  remains  to  be  can  rassed,  is  that 
which  would  substitute  the  proportion  of  two-thirds  of  all  the 
members  composing  the  senatorial  body,  to  that  of  two-thirds 
of  the  members  present.  It  has  been  shown,  under  the  second 
head  of  our  inquiries,  that  all  provisions  which  require  more 
than  the  majority  of  any  body  to  its  resolutions,  have  a  direct 
tendency  to  embarrass  the  operations  of  the  government,  and 
an  indirect  one  to  subject  the  sense  of  the  majority  to  that  of 
the  minority.  This  consideration  seems  sufficient  to  determine 
our  opinion,  that  the  convention  have  gone  as  far  in  the 
endeavour  to  secure  the  advantage  of  numbers  in  the  formation 
of  treaties,  as  could  have  been  reconciled  either  with  the 
activity  of  the  public  councils,  or  with  a  reasonable  regard  to 
the  major  sense  of  the  community.  If  two-thirds  of  the  whole 
number  of  members  had  been  required,  it  would,  in  many  cases, 
from  the  non-attendance  of  a  part,  amount  in  practice  to  a 
necessity  of  unanimity.  And  the  history  of  every  political 
establishment  in  which  this  principle  has  prevailed,  is  a  history 
of  impotence,  perplexity,  and  disorder.  Proofs  of  this  position 
might  be  adduced  from  the  examples  of  the  Roman  tribune- 
phip,  the  Polish  diet,  and  the  states  general  of  the  Netherlands; 
did  not  an  example  at  home,  render  foreign  precedents  un- 
necessary. 

To  require  a  fixed  proportion  of  the  whole  body,  would  not, 
in  all  probability,  contribute  to  the  advantages  of  a  numerous 
agency,  better  than  merely  to  require  a  proportion  of  the 
attending  members.  The  former,  by  increasing  the  difficulty 
of  resolutions  disagreeable  to  the  minority,  diminishes  the 
motives  to  punctual  attendance.  The  latter,  by  making  the 
capacity  of  the  body  to  depend  on  a  proportion  which  may  be 
varied  by  the  absence  or  presence  of  a  single  member,  has  the 
contrary  effect.  And  as,  by  promoting  punctuality,  it  tends  to 
keep  the  body  complete,  there  is  great  likelihood,  that  its  reso- 
lutions would  generally  be  dictated  by  as  great  a  number  in 


THE   FEDERALIST.  661 

this  ease,  as  in  the  other;  while  there  would  be  muoh  fewer 
occasions  of  delay.  It  ought  not  to  be  forgotten,  that  under 
the  existing  confederation,  two  members  may,  and  usually  do, 
represent  a  state ;  whence  it  happens  that  congress,  who  now 
are  solely  invested  with  all  the  powers  of  the  union,  rarely  con- 
sists of  a  greater  number  of  persons  than  would  compose  tho 
intended  senate.  If  we  add  to  this,  that  as  the  members  vote 
by  states,  and  that  where  there  is  only  a  single  member  present 
from  a  state,  his  vote  is  lost,  it  will  justify  a  supposition  that 
the  active  voices  in  the  senate,  where  the  members  are  to  vote 
individually,  would  rarely  fall  short  in  number  of  the  active 
voices  in  the  existing  congress.  When,  in  addition  to  these 
considerations,  we  take  into  view  the  co-operation  of  the  presi- 
dent, we  shall  not  hesitate  to  infer,  that  the  people  of  America 
would  have  greater  security  against  an  improper  use  of  the 
power  of  making  treaties,  under  the  new  constitution,  than 
they  now  enjoy  under  the  confederation  And  when  we  pro- 
ceed still  one  step  further,  and  look  forward  to  the  probable 
augmentation  of  the  senate,  by  the  erection  of  new  states,  we 
shall  not  only  perceive  ample  ground  of  confidence  in  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  numbers,  to  whose  agency  that  power  will  be  in- 
trusted ;  but  we  shall  probably  be  led  to  conclude,  that  a  body 
more  numerous  than  the  senate  is  likely  to  become,  would  b« 
very  little  fit  for  the  proper  discharge  of  the  trust. 

PUBLIUS 


r)62  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LXXVI. 


NEW  YORK,   APRIL   1,    1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE   SAME  VIEW  CONTINUED,  IN  RELATION   TO  THE  APPOINTMENT 
OF  THE  OFFICERS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT. 

The  president  is  "  to  nominate,  and  by  and  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  senate,  to  appoint  ambassadors,  other  public 
ministers  and  consuls,  judges  of  the  supreme  court,  and  all 
other  officers  of  the  United  States,  whose  appointments  are  not 
otherwise  provided  for  in  the  constitution.  But  the  congress 
may  by  law  vest  the  appointment  of  such  inferior  officers  as 
they  think  proper,  in  the  president  alone,  or  in  the  courts  of 
law,  or  in  the  heads  of  departments.  The  president  shall  have 
power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies  which  may  happen  during  the  recess 
of  the  senate,  by  granting  commissions  which  shall  eocpire  at  the 
end  of  their  next  session." 

It  has  been  observed  in  a  former  paper,  that  "  the  true  test 
of  a  good  government,  is  its  aptitude  and  tendency  to  produce 
a  good  administration."  If  the  justness  of  this  observation  be 
admitted,  the  mode  of  appointing  the  officers  of  the  United 
States  contained  in  the  foregoing  clauses,  must,  when  examined, 
be  allowed  to  be  entitled  to  particular  commendation.  It  is 
not  easy  to  conceive  a  plan  better  calculated  to  promote  a  judi- 
cious choice  of  men  for  filling  the  offices  of  the  union ;  and  it 


THB    FEDERALIST.  568 

will  not  need  proof,  that  on  this  point  must  essentially  depend 
the  character  of  its  administration. 

It  will  be  agreed  on  all  hands,  that  the  power  of  appoint- 
ment, in  ordinary  cases,  can  be  properly  modified  only  in  one 
of  three  ways.  It  ought  either  to  be  vested  in  a  single  man ; 
or  ir  a  select  assembly  of  a  moderate  number ;  or  in  a  single 
man  with  the  concurrence  of  such  an  assembly.  The  exercise 
of  it  by  the  people  at  large,  will  be  readily  admitted  to  be  im- 
practicable; since,  waving  every  other  consideration,  it  would 
leave  them  little  time  to  do  any  thing  else.  When,  therefore, 
mention  is  made  in  the  subsequent  reasonings,  of  an  assembly 
or  body  of  men,  what  is  said  must  be  understood  to  relate  to  a 
select  body  or  assembly,  of  the  description  already  given.  The 
people  collectively,  from  their  number  and  from  their  dispersed 
situation,  cannot  be  regulated  in  their  movements  by  that  sys- 
tematic spirit  of  cabal  and  intrigue,  which  will  be  urged  as  the 
chief  objections  to  reposing  the  power  in  question  in  a  body 
of  men. 

Those  who  have  themselves  reflected  upon  the  subject,  or 
who  have  attended  to  the  observations  made  in  other  parts  of 
these  papers,  in  relation  to  the  appointment  of  the  president, 
will,  I  presume,  agree  to  the  j)Osition,  that  there  would  always 
be  great  probability  of  having  the  place  supplied  by  a  man  of 
abilities,  at  least  respectable.  Premising  this,  I  proceed  to  lay 
it  down  as  a  rule,  that  one  man  of  discernment  is  better  fitted 
to  analize  and  estimate  the  peculiar  qualities  adapted  to  parti- 
cular offices,  than  a  body  of  men  of  equal,  or  perhaps  even  of 
superior  discernment. 

The  sole  and  undivided  responsibility  of  one  man,  will  natu- 
rally beget  a  livelier  sense  of  duty,  and  a  more  exact  regard 
to  reputation.  He  will,  on  this  account,  feel  himself  under 
stronger  obligations,  and  more  interested  to  investigate  with 
care  the  qualities  requisite  to  the  stations  to  be  filled,  and  to 
prefer  with  impartialit}-  the  persons  who  may  have  the  fairest 
pretensions  to  them.  He  will  have  fewer  personal  attachments 
\,o  gratify,  than  a  body  of  men  who  may  each  be  supposed  to 


564  THE   FEDERALIST. 

have  an  equal  number,  and  will  be  so  much  the  less  liable  to  be 
misled  by  the  sentiments  of  friendship  and  of  affection.  There 
is  nothing  so  apt  to  agitate  the  passions  of  mankind  as  personal 
considerations,  whether  they  relate  to  ourselves  or  to  others, 
wto  are  to  be  the  objects  of  our  choice  or  preference.  Hence, 
in  every  exercise  of  the  power  of  appointing  to  oflSces  by  an 
assembly  of  men,  we  must  expect  to  see  a  full  display  of  all 
the  private  and  party  likings  and  dislikes,  partialities  and  anti- 
pathies, attachments  and  animosities,  which  are  felt  by  those 
who  compose  the  assembly.  The  choice  which  may  at  any 
time  happen  to  be  made  under  such  circumstances,  will  of 
course  be  the  result  either  of  a  victory  gained  by  one  party 
over  the  other,  or  of  a  compromise  between  the  parties.  In 
either  case,  the  intrinsic  merit  of  the  candidate  will  be  too 
often  out  of  sight.  In  the  first,  the  qualifications  best  adapted 
to  uniting  the  suffrages  of  the  party,  will  be  more  considered 
than  those  which  fit  the  person  for  the  station.  In  the  last,  the 
coalition  will  commonly  turn  upon  some  interested  equivalent, 
"  Give  us  the  man  we  wish  for  this  office,  and  you  shall  have 
the  one  you  wish  for  that."  This  will  be  the  usual  condition 
of  the  bargain.  And  it  will  rarely  happen  that  the  advance- 
ment of  the  public  service,  will  be  the  primary  object  either  of 
party  victories,  or  of  party  negociations. 

The  truth  of  the  principles  here  advanced,  seems  to  have 
been  felt  by  the  most  intelligent  of  those  who  have  found  fault 
with  the  provision  made,  in  this  respect,  by  the  convention. 
They  contend,  that  the  president  ought  solely  to  have  been 
authorized  to  make  the  appointments  under  the  federal  govern- 
ment. But  it  is  easy  to  show,  that  every  advantage  to  be  ex- 
pected from  such  an  arrangement  would,  in  substance,  be 
derived  from  the  power  of  nomination,  which  is  proposed  to  be 
conferred  upon  him ;  while  several  disadvantages  which  might 
attend  the  absolute  power  of  appointment  in  the  hands  of  that 
officer  would  be  avoided.  In  the  act  of  nomination,  his  judg- 
ment alone  would  be  exercised;  and  as  it  would  be  his  sole 
duty  to  point  out  the  man,  who  with  the  approbation  of  the 


TUB   FEDERALIST.  565 

senate  should  fill  an  office,  his  responsibility  would  be  as  com- 
plete as  if  he  were  to  make  the  final  appointment.  There  can, 
in  this  view,  be  no  diflference  between  nominating  ana  appoint- 
ing. The  same  motives  which  would  influence  a  proper  dis- 
charge of  his  duty  in  one  case,  would  exist  in  the  other.  And 
as  no  man  could  be  appointed  but  upon  his  previous  nomina- 
tion, every  man  who  might  be  appointed  would  be.  in  fact,  his 
choice. 

But  his  nomination  may  be  overruled  :  This  it  certainly  may ; 
yet  it  can  only  be  to  make  place  for  another  nomination  by 
himself.  The  person  ultimately  appointed,  must  be  the  object 
of  his  preference,  though  perhaps  not  in  the  first  degree.  It  is 
also  not  probable,  that  his  nomination  would  often  be  overruled 
The  senate  could  not  be  tempted,  by  the  preference  they  might 
feel  to  another,  to  reject  the  one  proposed;  because  they  could 
not  assure  themselves,  that  the  person  they  might  wish  would 
be  brought  forward  by  a  second  or  by  any  subsequent  nomina- 
tion. They  could  not  even  be  certain,  that  a  future  nomination 
would  present  a  candidate  in  any  degree  more  acceptable  to 
them :  And  as  their  dissent  might  cast  a  kind  of  stigma  upon 
the  individual  rejected;  and  might  have  the  appearance  of  a 
reflection  upon  the  judgment  of  the  chief  magistrate;  it  is  not 
likely  that  their  sanction  would  often  be  refused,  where  there 
were  not  special  and  strong  reasons  for  the  refusal. 

To  what  purpose  then  require  the  co-operation  of  the  senate? 
I  answer,  that  the  necessity  of  their  concurrence  would  have  a 
powerful,  though  in  general  a  silent,  operation.  It  would  be 
an  excellent  check  upon  a  spirit  of  favouritism  in  the  president, 
and  would  tend  greatly  to  prevent  the  appointment  of  unfit 
characters  from  state  prejudice,  from  family  connexion,  from 
personal  attachment,  or  from  a  view  to  popularity.  In  addition 
to  this,  it  would  be  an  efficacious  source  of  stability  in  the 
administration. 

It  will  readily  be  comprehended,  that  a  man  who  had  him- 
self the  sole  disposition  of  offices,  would  be  governed  much 
more  by  his  private  inclinations  and  interests,  than  when  he 


666  THE    FEDERALIST. 

was  bound  to  submit  the  propriety  of  his  choice  to  the  dis- 
cuss* on  and  determination  of  a  diiferent  and  independent  body; 
and  that  body  an  entire  branch  of  the  legislature.  The  possi- 
bility of  rejection,  would  be  a  strong  motive  to  care  in  pro- 
posing. The  danger  to  his  own  reputation,  and,  in  the  case  of 
an  elective  magistrate,  to  his  political  existence,  from  betray- 
ing a  spirit  of  favouritism,  or  an  unbecoming  pursuit  of  popu- 
larity, to  the  observation  of  a  body  whose  opinion  would  have 
great  weight  in  forming  that  of  the  public,  could  not  fail  to 
operate  as  a  barrier  to  the  one  and  to  the  other.  He  would  be 
both  ashamed  and  afraid  to  bring  forward,  for  the  most  dis- 
tinguished or  lucrative  stations,  candidates  who  had  no  other 
merit  than  that  of  coming  from  the  same  state  to  which  he 
particularly  belonged,  or  of  being,  in  some  way  or  other,  per- 
sonally allied  to  him,  or  of  possessing  the  necessary  insignifi- 
cance and  pliancy  to  render  them  the  obsequious  instruments 
of  his  pleasure. 

To  this  reasoning  it  has  been  objected,  that  the  president,  by 
the  influence  of  the  power  of  nomination,  may  secure  the  com- 
plaisance of  the  senate  to  his  views.  The  supposition  of  uni- 
versal venality  in  human  nature,  is  little  less  an  error  in  political 
reasoning,  than  that  of  universal  rectitude.  The  institution  of 
delegated  power  implies,  that  there  is  a  portion  of  virtue  and 
honour  among  mankind,  which  may  be  a  reasonable  foundation 
of  confidence  ;  and  experience  justifies  the  theory.  It  has  been 
found  to  exist  in  the  most  corrupt  periods  of  the  most  corrupt 
governments.  The  venality  of  the  British  house  of  commons 
has  been  long  a  topic  of  accusation  against  that  body,  in  the 
country  to  which  they  belong,  as  well  as  in  this ;  and  it  cannot 
be  doubted,  that  the  charge  is,  to  a  considerable  extent,  well 
founded.  But  it  is  as  little  to  be  doubted,  that  there  is  always 
a  large  proportion  of  the  body,  which  consists  of  independent 
and  public  spirited  men,  who  have  an  influential  weight  in  the 
councils  of  the  nation.  Hence  it  is,  (the  present  reign  not  ex- 
cepted) that  the  sense  of  that  body  is  often  seen  to  control  the 
inclinations  of  the  monarch,  both  with  regard  to  men  and  to 


THE    FEDERALIST.  IGl 

measures.  Though  it  might  therefore  be  allowable  to  suppose, 
that  the  executive  might  occasionally  influence  some  individuals 
in  the  senate,  yet  the  supposition,  that  he  could  in  general  pur- 
chase the  integrity  of  the  whole  body,  would  be  forced  and 
improbable.  A  man  disposed  to  view  human  nature  as  it  is, 
without  either  flattering  its  virtues,  or  exaggerating  its  vices, 
will  see  suflScient  ground  of  confidence  in  the  probity  of  the 
senate,  to  rest  satisfied,  not  only  that  it  will  be  impracticable 
to  the  executive  to  corrupt  or  seduce  a  majority  of  its  members, 
but  that  the  necessity  of  its  co-operation,  in  the  business  of 
appointments,  will  be  a  considerable  and  salutary  restraint 
upon  the  conduct  of  that  magistrate.  Nor  is  the  integrity  of 
the  senate  the  only  reliance.  The  constitution  has  provided 
some  important  guards  against  the  danger  of  executive  in- 
fluence upon  the  legislative  body :  It  declares,  "  that  no  senator 
or  representative  shall,  during  the  time  for  which  he  was  elected, 
be  appointed  to  any  civil  ofiice  under  the  United  States,  which 
shall  have  been  created,  or  the  emoluments  whereof  shall  have 
been  increased  during  such  time ;  and  no  person  holding  any 
office  under  the  United  States,  shall  be  a  member  of  either 
house  during  his  continuance  in  office." 

PUBLIUS. 


568  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST 


NUMBER    LXXVII. 


NEW   YORK,   APRIL  4,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


THE  VIEW  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  CONCLUDED; 
WITH  A  FURTHER  CONSIDERATION  OF  THE  POWER  OF  APPOINT- 
MENT, AND  A  CONCISE  EXAMINATION  OF  HIS  REMAINING  POWERS 

It  has  been  mentioned  as  one  of  the  advantages  to  be  ex- 
pected from  the  co-operation  of  the  senate,  in  the  business  of 
appointments,  that  it  would  contribute  to  the  stability  of  the 
administration.  The  consent  of  that  body  would  be  necessary 
to  displace  as  well  as  to  appoint.*  A  change  of  the  chief  magis- 
trate, therefore,  would  not  occasion  so  violent  or  so  general  a 
revolution  in  the  oflicers  of  the  government  as  might  be  ex- 
pected, if  he  were  the  sole  disposer  of  offices.  "Where  a  man, 
in  any  station,  had  given  satisfactory  evidence  of  his  fitness  for 
it,  a  new  president  would  be  restrained  from  attempting  a 
change  in  favour  of  a  person  more  agreeable  to  him,  by  the 
apprehension  that  the  discountenance  of  the  senate  might  frus- 
trate the  attempt,  and  bring  some  degree  of  discredit  upon 
himself.  Those  who  can  bes^  estimate  the  value  of  a  steady 
administration,  will  be  most  disposed  to  prize  a  provision,  which 
connects  the  official  existence  of  public  men  with  the  approba- 

*  This  construction  has  since  been  rejected  by  the  legislature ;  and  it  is 
now  settled  in  practice,  that  the  power  of  displacing  belongs  exclusively  to 
the  president 


THE    FEDERALIST.  569 

tion  or  disapprobation  of  that  body,  which,  from  the  greater 
permanency  of  its  own  composition,  will,  in  all  probability,  be 
less  subject  to  inconstancy  than  any  other  member  of  the  gov- 
ernment. 

To  this  union  of  the  senate  with  the  president,  in  the  article 
of  appointments,  it  has  in  some  cases  been  objected,  that  it 
would  serve  to  give  the  president  an  undue  influence  over  the 
senate;  and  in  others,  that  it  would  have  an  opposite  tendency; 
a  strong  proof  that  neither  suggestion  is  true. 

To  state  the  first  in  its  proper  form,  is  to  refute  it.  It 
amounts  to  this — the  president  would  have  an  improper  influence 
over  the  senate ;  because  the  senate  would  have  the  power  of 
restraining  him.  This  is  an  absurdity  in  terms.  It  cannot 
admit  of  a  doubt,  that  the  entire  power  of  appointment  would 
enable  him  much  more  effectually  to  establish  a  dangerous 
empire  over  that  body,  than  a  mere  power  of  nomination  sub- 
ject to  their  control. 

Let  us  take  a  view  of  the  converse  of  the  proposition,  "  The 
senate  would  influence  the  executive."  As  I  have  had  occasion 
to  remark  in  several  other  instances,  the  indistinctness  of  the 
objection  forbids  a  precise  answer.  In  what  manner  is  this 
influence  to  be  exerted?  In  relation  to  what  objects?  The 
power  of  influencing  a  person,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  here 
used,  must  imply  a  power  of  conferring  a  benefit  upon  him. 
How  could  the  senate  confer  a  benefit  upon  the  president  by 
the  manner  of  employing  their  right  of  negative  upon  his 
nominations  ?  If  it  be  said  they  might  sometimes  gratify  him 
by  an  acquiescence  in  a  favourite  choice,  when  public  motives 
might  dictate  a  different  conduct ;  I  answer,  that  the  instances 
in  which  the  president  could  be  personally  interested  in  the 
result,  would  be  too  few  to  admit  of  his  being  materially  af- 
fected by  the  compliances  of  the  senate.  Besides  this,  it  is 
evident,  that  the  power  which  can  originate  the  disposition  of 
honours  and  emoluments,  is  more  likely  to  attract  than  to  be 
attracted  by  the  power  which  can  merely  obstruct  their  course. 
If  by  influencing  the  president  be  meant  restraining  him,  this  is 


670  THE   FEDERALIST. 

precisely  what  must  have  been  intended.  And  it  has  been 
BhovTQ  that  the  restraint  would  be  salutary,  at  the  same  time 
that  it  would  not  be  such  as  to  destroy  a  single  advantage  to 
be  looked  for  from  the  uncontroled  agency  of  that  magistrate. 
The  right  of  nomination  would  produce  all  the  good,  without 
the  ill. 

Upon  a  comparison  of  the  plan  for  the  appointment  of  the 
officers  of  the  proposed  government,  with  that  which  is  estab- 
lished by  the  constitution  of  this  state,  a  decided  preference 
must  be  given  to  the  former.  In  that  plan,  the  power  of  nomi- 
nation is  unequivocally  vested  in  the  executive.  And  as  there 
would  be  a  necessity  for  submitting  each  nomination  to  the 
judgment  of  an  entire  branch  of  the  legislature,  the  circum- 
Btances  attending  an  appointment,  from  the  mode  of  conduct- 
ing it,  would  naturally  become  matters  of  notoriety ;  and  the 
public  could  be  at  no  loss  to  determine  what  part  had  been  per- 
formed by  the  different  actors.  The  blame  of  a  bad  nomination 
would  fall  upon  the  president  singly  and  absolutely.  The  cen- 
sure of  rejecting  a  good  one,  would  lie  entirely  at  the  door  of 
the  senate;  aggravated  by  the  consideration  of  their  having 
counteracted  the  good  intentions  of  the  executive.  If  an  ill 
appointment  should  be  made,  the  executive  for  nominating,  and 
the  senate  for  approving,  would  participate,  though  in  different 
degrees,  in  the  opprobrium  and  disgrace. 

The  reverse  of  all  this,  characterizes  the  manner  of  appoint- 
ment in  this  state.  The  council  of  appointment  consists  of 
from  three  to  five  persons,  of  whom  the  governor  is  always 
one.  This  small  body,  shut  up  in  a  private  apartment,  impene- 
trable to  the  public  eye,  proceed  to  the  execution  of  the  trust 
committed  to  them.  It  is  known,  that  the  governor  claims  the 
right  of  nomination,  upon  the  strength  of  some  ambiguous  ex- 
pressions in  the  constitution;  but  it  is  not  known  to  what 
extent,  or  in  what  manner  he  exercises  it ;  nor  upon  what  occa- 
sions he  is  contradicted  or  opposed.  The  censure  of  a  bad  ap- 
pointment, on  account  of  the  uncertainty  of  its  author,  and  for 
want  of  a  determinate  object,  has  neither  poign<»ncy  nor  dura- 


THE   FEDERALIST.  571 

tion.  And  while  an  unbounded  field  for  cabal  and  intrigue  lies 
open,  all  idea  of  responsibility  is  lost.  The  most  that  the  pub- 
lic can  know,  is,  that  the  governor  claims  the  right  of  nomina- 
tion:  That  two,  out  of  the  considerable  number  of  four  men, 
can  often  be  managed  without  much  diflSculty :  That  if  some 
of  the  members  of  a  particular  council  should  happen  to  be  of 
an  uncomplying  character,  it  is  frequently  not  impossible  to 
get  rid  of  their  opposition,  by  regulating  the  times  of  meeting 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  render  their  attendance  inconvenient : 
And  that,  from  whatever  cause  it  may  proceed,  a  great  number 
of  very  improper  appointments  are  from  time  to  time  made. 
Whether  a  governor  of  this  state  avails  himself  of  the  ascend- 
ant he  must  necessarily  have,  in  this  delicate  and  important 
part  of  the  administration,  to  prefer  to  offices  men  who  are  best 
qualified  for  them;  or  whether  he  prostitutes  that  advantage 
to  the  advancement  of  persons,  whose  chief  merit  is  their  im- 
plicit devotion  to  his  will,  and  to  the  support  of  a  despicable 
and  dangerous  system  of  personal  influence,  are  questions 
which,  unfortunately  for  the  community,  can  only  be  the  sub- 
jects of  speculation  and  conjecture. 

Every  mere  council  of  appointment,  however  constituted, 
will  be  a  conclave,  in  which  cabal  and  intrigue  will  have  their 
full  scope.  Their  number,  without  an  unwarrantable  increase 
of  expense,  cannot  be  large  enough  to  preclude  a  facility  of 
combination.  And  as  each  member  will  have  his  friends  and 
connexions  to  provide  for,  the  desire  of  mutual  gratification 
will  beget  a  scandalous  bartering  of  votes  and  bargaining  for 
places.  The  private  attachments  of  one  man  might  easily  be 
satisfied;  but  to  satisfy  the  private  attachments  of  a  dozen,  or 
of  twenty  men,  would  occasion  a  monopoly  of  all  the  principal 
employments  of  the  government,  in  a  few  families,  and  would 
lead  more  directly  to  an  aristocracy  or  an  oligarchy,  than  any 
measure  that  could  be  contrived.  If  to  avoid  an  accumulation 
of  offices,  there  was  to  be  a  frequent  change  in  the  persons  who 
were  to  compose  the  council,  this  would  involve  the  mischiefs 
of  a  mutable  administration  in  their  full  extent.   Such  a  council 

47 


672  THE    FEDERALIST. 

would  also  be  more  liable  to  executive  influence  than  the  seaate, 
because  they  would  be  fewer  in  number,  and  would  act  less 
immediately  under  the  public  inspection.  Such  a  council,  in 
fine,  as  a  substitute  for  the  plan  of  the  convention,  would  be 
productive  of  an  increase  of  expense,  a  multiplication  of  the 
evils  which  spring  from  favouritism  and  intrigue  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  public  honours,  a  decrease  of  stability  in  the 
administration  of  the  government,  and  a  diminution  of  the 
security  against  an  undue  influence  of  the  executive.  And 
yet  such  a  council  has  been  warmly  contended  for,  as  an 
essential  amendment  in  the  proposed  constitution. 

I  could  not  with  propriety  conclude  my  observations  on  the 
subject  of  appointments,  without  taking  notice  of  a  scheme, 
for  which  there  has  appeared  some,  though  but  few  advocates ; 
I  mean  that  of  uniting  the  house  of  representatives  in  the 
power  of  making  them.  I  shall,  however,  do  little  more  than 
mention  it,  as  I  cannot  imagine  that  it  is  likely  to  gain  the 
countenance  of  any  considerable  part  of  the  community.  A 
body  so  fluctuating,  and  at  the  same  time  so  numerous,  can 
never  be  deemed  proper  for  the  exercise  of  that  power.  Its 
unfitness  will  appear  manifest  to  all,  when  it  is  recollected  that 
in  half  a  century  it  may  consist  of  three  or  four  hundred  per- 
sons. All  the  advantages  of  the  stability,  both  of  the  executive 
and  of  the  senate,  would  be  defeated  by  this  union ;  and  infinite 
delays  and  embarrassments  would  be  occasioned.  The  example 
of  most  of  the  states  in  their  local  constitutions,  encourages  ua 
to  reprobate  the  idea. 

The  only  remaining  powers  of  the  executive,  are  compre- 
hended in  giving  information  to  congress  of  the  state  of  the 
union ;  in  recommending  to  their  consideration  such  measures 
as  he  shall  judge  expedient;  in  convening  them,  or  either 
branch,  upon  extraordinary  occasions ;  in  adjourning  them 
when  they  cannot  themselves  agree  upon  the  time  of  adjourn- 
ment; in  receiving  ambassadors  and  other  public  ministers; 
in  faithfully  executing  the  laws;  and  in  comraissiotung  al) 
the  officers  of  the  United  States. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  573 

Except  some  cavils  about  the  power  of  convening  either  house 
of  the  legislature,  and  that  of  receiving  ambassadors,  no  objeC' 
tion  has  been  made  to  this  class  of  authorities;  nor  could  they 
possibly  admit  of  any.  It  required  indeed  an  insatiable  avidity 
for  censure,  to  invent  exceptions  to  the  parts  which  have  been 
assailed.  In  regard  to  the  power  of  convening  either  house  of 
the  legislature,  I  shall  barely  remark,  that  in  respect  to  the 
senate  at  least,  we  can  readily  discover  a  good  reason  foi  it. 
As  this  body  has  a  concurrent  power  with  the  executive  in  the 
article  of  treaties,  it  might  often  be  necessary  to  call  it  to- 
gether with  a  view  to  this  object,  when  it  would  be  unnecessary 
and  improper  to  convene  the  house  of  representatives.  As  to 
the  reception  of  ambassadors,  what  I  have  said  in  a  formei 
paper  will  furnish  a  sufficient  answer. 

We  have  now  completed  a  survey  of  the  structure  and 
powers  of  the  executive  department,  which  I  have  endeavoured 
to  show,  combines,  as  far  as  republican  principles  will  admit, 
all  the  requisites  to  energy.  The  remaining  inquiry  is — Does 
it  also  combine  the  requisites  to  safety  in  the  republican  sense 
— a  due  dependence  on  the  people — a  due  responsibility  ?  The 
answer  to  this  question  has  been  anticipated  in  the  investiga- 
tion of  its  other  characteristics,  and  is  satisfactorily  deducible 
from  these  circumstances,  the  election  of  the  president  once  in 
four  years  by  persons  immediately  chosen  by  the  people  for 
that  purpose;  his  liability,  at  all  times,  to  impeachment,  trial, 
dismission  from  office,  incapacity  to  serve  in  any  other,  and  to 
the  forfeiture  of  life  and  estate  by  subsequent  prosecution  in 
the  common  course  of  law.  But  these  precautions,  great  aa 
they  are,  are  not  the  only  ones  which  the  plan  of  the  conven- 
tion has  provided  in  favour  of  the  public  security.  In  the 
only  instances  in  which  the  abuse  of  the  executive  authority 
was  materially  to  be  feared,  the  chief  magistrate  ot  the  United 
States  would,  by  that  plan,  be  subjected  to  the  control  of  a 
branch  of  the  legislative  body.  What  more  can  an  enlightened 
and  reasonable  people  desire  ? 

PUBLIUS. 


.')74  THE   FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LXXVIII. 


NEW    YORK,    JUNE    17,  20,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


A  VIEW  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  JUDICIAL  DEPARTMENT,  IS 
RELATION   TO   THE    TENURE   OF   GOOD   BEHAVIOUR. 

We  proceed  now  to  an  examination  of  the  judiciary  depart- 
ment of  the  proposed  government. 

In  unfolding  the  defects  of  the  existing  confederation,  the 
utility  and  necessity  of  a  federal  judicature  have  been  clearly 
pointed  out.  It  is  the  less  necessary  to  recapitulate  the  con- 
siderations there  urged ;  as  the  propriety  of  the  institution  in 
the  abstract  is  not  disputed :  The  only  questions  which  have 
been  raised  being  relative  to  the  manner  of  constituting  it,  and 
to  its  extent.  To  these  points,  therefore,  our  observations  shall 
be  confined. 

The  manner  of  constituting  it  seems  to  embrace  these  several 
objects  :  Ist.  The  mode  of  appointing  the  judges :  2d.  The  tenure 
by  which  they  are  to  hold  their  places :  3d.  The  partition  of 
the  judiciary  authority  between  different  courts,  and  their 
relations  to  each  other. 

First.  As  to  the  mode  of  appointing  the  judges :  This  is  the 
same  with  that  of  appointing  the  oflScers  of  the  union  in 
general,  and  has  been  so  fully  discussed  in  the  two  last  num- 
bers, that  nothing  can  be  said  here  which  would  not  be  useless 
repetition. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  575 

Second.  As  to  the  tenure  by  which  the  judges  are  to  hold 
ineir  places :  This  chiefly  concerns  their  duration  in  oflSce ;  the 
provisions  for  their  support;  the  precautions  for  their  responsi- 
bility. 

According  to  the  plan  of  the  convention,  all  the  judges  who 
may  be  appointed  by  the  United  States  are  to  hold  their  offices 
during  good  behaviour;  which  is  conformable  to  the  most  approved 
of  the  state  constitutions — among  the  rest,  to  that  of  this  state. 
Its  propriety  having  been  drawn  into  question  by  the  adver- 
saries of  that  plan,  is  no  light  symptom  of  the  rage  for  ob- 
jection, which  disorders  their  imaginations  and  judgments. 
The  standard  of  good  behaviour  for  the  continuance  in  office 
of  the  judicial  magistracy,  is  certainly  one  of  the  most  valuable 
of  the  modern  improvements  in  the  practice  of  government. 
In  a  monarchy,  it  is  an  excellent  barrier  to  the  despotism  of 
the  prince :  in  a  republic,  it  is  a  no  less  excellent  barrier  to  the 
encroachments  and  oppressions  of  the  representative  body. 
And  it  is  the  best  expedient  which  can  be  devised  in  any 
government,  to  secure  a  steady,  upright,  and  impartial  adminis- 
tration of  the  laws. 

"Whoever  attentively  considers  the  different  departments  of 
power  must  perceive,  that,  in  a  government  in  which  they  are 
separated  from  each  other,  the  judiciary,  from  the  nature  of  its 
functions,  will  always  be  the  least  dangerous  to  the  political 
rights  of  the  constitution ;  because  it  will  be  least  in  a  capacity 
to  annoy  or  injure  them.  The  executive  not  only  dispenses 
the  honours,  but  holds  the  sword  of  the  community :  The  legis- 
lature not  only  commands  the  purse,  but  prescribes  the  rules 
by  which  the  duties  and  rights  of  every  citizen  are  to  be  regu- 
lated :  The  judicary,  on  the  contrary,  has  no  influence  over 
either  the  sword  or  the  purse;  no  direction  either  of  the  strength 
or  of  the  wealth  of  the  society ;  and  can  take  no  active  reso- 
lution whatever.  It  may  truly  be  said  to  have  neither  force 
nor  WILL,  but  merely  judgment;  and  must  ultimately  depend 
upon  the  aid  of  the  ex*'Outive  arm  for  the  efficacious  exercise 
even  of  this  faculty. 


d7€  THE    FEDERALIST. 

This  simple  view  of  the  matter  suggests  several  important 
consequences :  it  proves  incontestibly,  that,  the  judiciary  is 
beyond  comparison,  the  weakest  of  the  three  departments  of 
power,*  that  it  can  never  attack  with  success  either  of  the 
other  two ;  and  that  all  possible  care  is  requisite  to  enable  it  to 
defend  itself  against  their  attacks.  It  equally  proves,  that, 
though  individual  oppression  may  now  and  then  proceed  from 
the  courts  of  justice,  the  general  liberty  of  the  people  can  never 
be  endangered  from  that  quarter:  I  mean  so  long  as  the 
judiciary  remains  truly  distinct  from  both  the  legislature  and 
executive.  For  I  agree,  that  "  there  is  no  liberty,  if  the  power 
of  judging  be  not  separated  from  the  legislative  and  executive 
powers."  f  It  proves,  in  the  last  place,  that  as  liberty  can 
have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  judiciary  alone,  but  would  have 
every  thing  to  fear  from  its  union  with  either  of  the  other  de- 
partments ;  that,  as  all  the  effects  of  such  an  union  must  ensue 
from  a  dependence  of  the  former  on  the  latter,  notwithstanding 
a  nominal  and  apparent  separation;  that  as,  from  the  natural 
feebleness  of  the  judiciary,  it  is  in  continual  jeojDardy  of  being 
overpowered,  awed  or  influenced  by  its  co-ordinate  branches; 
that,  as  nothing  can  contribute  so  much  to  its  firmness  and 
independence  as  permanency  in  office,  this  quality  may  there 
fore  -be  justly  regarded  as  an  indispensable  ingredient  in  its 
constitution;  and,  in  a  great  measure,  as  the  citadel  of  the 
public  justice  and  the  public  security. 

The  complete  independence  of  the  courts  of  justice  is  pecu- 
liarly essential  in  a  limited  constitution.  By  a  limited  constitu- 
tion, I  understand  one  which  contains  certain  specified  excep- 
tions to  the  legislative  authority ;  such,  for  instance,  as  that  it 
shall  pass  no  bills  of  attainder,  no  ex  post  facto  laws,  and  the 
like.  Limitations  of  this  kind  can  be  preserved  in  practice 
no  other  way  than  through  the  medium  of  the  courts  of  justice; 
whose  duty  it  must  be  to  declare  all  acts  contrary  to  the  mani- 

*  Montesquieu,  speaking  of  them,  says,  '*  of  the  three  powers  above  men* 
tioned,  the  judioiaet  is  next  to  nothing."     Spirit  of  Laws,  vol.  1.  pagf  186. 
f  Idem,  page  181. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  577 

fest  tenor  of  tho  constitution  void.  "Without  this,  all  the  reser- 
vations of  particular  rights  or  privileges  would  amount  to 
nothing. 

Some  perplexity  respecting  the  right  of  the  courts  to  pro- 
nounce legislative  acts  void,  because  contrary  to  the  constitu- 
tion, has  arisen  from  an  imagination  that  the  doctrine  would 
imply  a  superiority  of  the  judiciary  to  the  legislative  power. 
It  is  urged  that  the  authority  which  can  declare  the  acts  of 
another  void,  must  necessarily  be  superior  to  the  one  whose 
acts  may  be  declared  void.  As  this  doclrrine  is  of  great  import- 
ance in  all  the  American  constitutions,  a  brief  discussion  of  the 
grounds  on  which  it  rests  cannot  be  unacceptable. 

There  is  no  position  which  depends  on  clearer  principles, 
than  that  every  act  of  a  delegated  authority,  contrary  to  the 
tenor  of  the  commission  under  which  it  is  exercised,  is  void. 
No  legislative  act,  therefore,  contrary  to  the  constitution,  can 
be  valid.  To  deny  this,  would  be  to  affirm,  that  the  deputy  is 
greater  than  his  principal;  that  the  servant  is  above  his  master; 
that  the  representatives  of  the  people  are  superior  to  the  people 
themselves ;  that  men,  acting  by  virtue  of  powers,  may  do  not 
onlj'^  what  their  powers  do  not  authorize,  but  what  they  forbid. 

If  it  be  said  that  the  legislative  body  are  themselves  the  con- 
stitutional judges  of  their  own  powers,  and  that  the  construction 
they  put  upon  them  is  conclusive  upon  the  other  departments, 
it  may  be  answered,  that  this  cannot  be  the  natural  presump- 
tion, where  it  is  not  to  be  collected  from  any  particular  pro- 
visions in  the  constitution.  It  is  not  otherwise  to  be  supposed, 
that  the  constitution  could  intend  to  enable  the  representatives 
of  the  people  to  substitute  their  will  to  that  of  their  constitu- 
ents. It  is  far  more  rational  to  suppose,  that  the  courts  were 
designed  to  be  an  intermediate  body  between  the  people  and 
the  legislature,  in  order,  among  other  things,  to  keep  the  latter 
within  the  limits  assigned  to  their  authority.  The  interpreta- 
tion of  the  laws  is  the  proper  and  peculiar  province  of  the 
courts.  A  constitution  is,  in  fact,  and  must  be,  regarded  by  the 
judges  as  a  fundamental  law.   It  must  therefore  belong  to  them 


678  THE    FEDERALIST. 

to  uscertain  its  meaning,  as  well  as  the  meaning  of  any  par- 
ticular act  proceeding  from  the  legislative  body.  If  there 
should  happen  to  be  an  irreconcilable  variance  between  the 
two,  that  which  has  the  superior  obligation  and  validity  ought, 
of  course,  to  be  preferred;  in  other  words,  the  constitution 
ought  to  be  preferred  to  the  statute,  the  intention  of  the  people 
to  the  intention  of  their  agents. 

Nor  does  the  conclusion  by  any  means  suppose  a  superiority 
of  the  judicial  to  the  legislative  power.  It  only  supposes  that 
the  power  of  the  peopie  is  superior  to  both ;  and  that  where 
the  will  of  the  legislature  declared  in  its  statutes,  stands  in 
opposition  to  that  of  the  people  declared  in  the  constitution, 
the  judges  ought  to  be  governed  by  the  latter,  rather  than  the 
former.  They  ought  to  regulate  their  decisions  by  the  funda- 
mental laws,  rather  than  by  those  which  are  not  fundamental. 

This  exercise  of  judicial  discretion,  in  determining  between 
two  contradictory  laws,  is  exemplified  in  a  familiar  instance. 
It  not  uncommonly  happens,  that  there  are  two  statutes  exist- 
ing at  one  time,  clashing  in  whole  or  in  part  with  each  other, 
and  neither  of  them  containing  any  repealing  clause  or  expres- 
sion. In  such  a  case,  it  is  the  province  of  the  courts  to  liquidate 
and  fix  their  meaning  and  operation  :  So  far  as  they  can,  by  any 
fair  construction  be  reconciled  to  each  other,  reason  and  law 
conspire  to  dictate  that  this  should  be  done :  Where  this  is 
impracticable,  it  becomes  a  matter  of  necessity  to  give  effect 
to  one,  in  exclusion  of  the  other.  The  rule  which  has  obtained 
in  the  courts  for  determining  their  relative  validity  is,  that  the 
last  in  order  of  time  shall  be  preferred  to  the  first.  But  this  is 
a  mere  rule  of  construction,  not  derived  from  any  positive  law, 
but  from  the  nature  and  reason  of  the  thing.  It  is  a  rule  not 
enjoined  upon  the  courts  by  legislative  provision,  but  adopted 
by  themselves,  as  consonant  to  truth  and  propriety,  for  the 
direction  of  their  conduct  as  interpreters  of  the  law.  They 
thought  it  reasonable,  that  between  the  interfering  acts  of  an 
eqital  authority,  that  which  was  the  last  indication  of  its  will 
should  have  the  preference. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  51 B 

But  in  regard  to  the  interfering  acts  of  a  superior  and 
subordinate  authority,  of  an  original  and  derivative  power, 
the  nature  and  reason  of  the  thing  indicate  the  converse  of 
that  rule  as  proper  to  be  followed.  They  teach  us,  that  the 
prior  act  of  a  superior,  ought  to  be  preferred  to  the  subsequent 
act  of  an  inferior  and  subordinate  authority ;  and  that,  accord- 
ingly, whenever  a  particular  statute  contravenes  the  constitu- 
tion, it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  judicial  tribunals  to  adhere  to 
the  latter,  and  disregard  the  former. 

It  can  be  of  no  weight  to  say,  that  the  courts,  on  the  pretence 
of  a  repugnancy,  may  substitute  their  own  pleasure  to  the 
constitutional  intentions  of  the  legislature.  This  might  as  well 
happen  in  the  case  of  two  contradictory  statutes;  or  it  might 
as  well  happen  in  every  adjudication  upon  any  single  statute. 
The  courts  must  declare  the  sense  of  the  law;  and  if  they 
should  be  disposed  to  exercise  will  instead  of  judgment,  the 
consequence  would  equally  be  the  substitution  of  their  pleasure 
to  that  of  the  legislative  body.  The  observation,  if  it  proved 
any  thing,  would  prove  that  there  ought  to  be  no  judges  dis- 
tinct from  that  body. 

If  then  the  courts  of  justice  are  to  be  considered  as  the 
bulwarks  of  a  limited  constitution,  against  legislative  encroach- 
ments, this  consideration  will  afford  a  strong  argument  for  the 
permanent  tenure  of  judicial  oflSces,  since  nothing  will  con- 
tribute so  much  as  this  to  that  independent  spirit  in  the  judges, 
which  must  be  essential  to  the  faithful  performance  of  so  ardu- 
ous a  duty. 

This  independence  of  the  judges  is  equally  requisite  to  guara 
the  constitution  and  the  rights  of  individuals,  from  the  effects 
of  those  ill  humours  which  the  arts  of  designing  men,  or  the 
influence  of  particular  conjunctures,  sometimes  disseminate 
among  the  people  themselves,  and  which,  though  they  speedily 
give  place  to  better  information,  and  more  deliberate  reflection, 
have  a  tendency,  in  the  mean  time,  to  occasion  dangerous  inno- 
vations in  the  government,  and  serious  oppressions  of  the  minor 
party  in  t  le  community.     Though  I  trust  the  friends  of  the 


580  THE   FEDERALIST. 

proposed  constitution  will  never  concur  with  its  enemies,*  m 
questioning  that  fundamental  principle  of  republ  can  govern- 
ment, which  admits  the  right  of  the  people  to  alter  or  abolish 
the  established  constitution  whenever  they  find  it  inconsistent 
with  their  happiness;  yet  it  is  not  to  be  inferred  from  this 
principle,  that  the  representatives  of  the  peojjle,  whenever  a 
momentary  inclination  happens  to  lay  hold  of  a  majority  of 
their  constituents  incompatible  with  the  provisions  in  the 
existing  constitution,  would,  on  that  account,  be  justifiable  in 
a  violation  of  those  provisions ;  or  that  the  courts  would  be 
under  a  greater  obligation  to  connive  at  infractions  in  this 
shape,  than  when  they  had  proceeded  wholly  from  the  cabals 
of  the  representative  body.  Until  the  people  have,  by  some 
solemn  and  authoritative  act,  annulled  or  changed  the  estab- 
lished form,  it  is  binding  upon  themselves  collectively,  as  well 
as  individually;  and  no  presumption,  or  even  knowledge  of 
their  sentiments,  can  warrant  their  representatives  in  a  depart- 
ure from  it,  prior  to  such  an  act.  But  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  it 
would  require  an  uncommon  portion  of  fortitude  in  the  judges 
to  do  their  duty  as  faithful  guardians  of  the  constitution,  where 
legislative  invasions  of  it  had  been  instigated  by  the  major 
voice  of  the  community. 

But  it  is  not  with  a  view  to  infractions  of  the  constitution 
only,  that  the  independence  of  the  judges  may  be  an  essential 
safe-guard  against  the  effects  of  occasional  ill  humours  in  the 
society.  These  sometimes  extend  no  farther  than  to  the  injury 
of  the  private  rights  of  particular  classes  of  citizens,  by  unjust 
and  partial  laws.  Here  also  the  firmness  of  the  judicial  magis- 
tracy is  of  vast  importance  in  mitigating  the  severity,  and  con- 
fining the  operation  of  such  laws.  It  not  only  serves  to  mode- 
rate the  immediate  mischiefs  of  those  which  may  have  been 
passed,  but  it  operates  as  a  check  upon  the  legislative  body  in 
passing  them ;  who,  perceiving  that  obstacles  to  the  success  of 
an  iniquitous  intention  are  to  be  expected  from  the  scruples  of 

*  Vide  Protest  of  the  minority  of  the  convention  of  Pennsylvania,  Martin's 
speech,  &c. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  58l 

the  courts,  are  in  a  manner  compelled  by  the  very  mttives  of 
the  injustice  they  meditate,  to  qualify  their  artempts.  This  is 
a  circumstance  calculated  to  have  more  influence  upon  the  cha- 
racter of  our  governments,  than  but  few  may  imagine.  The 
benefits  of  the  integrity  and  moderation  of  the  judiciary  have 
already  been  felt  in  more  states  than  one ;  and  though  they 
may  have  displeased  those  whose  sinister  expectations  they 
may  have  disappointed,  they  must  have  commanded  the  esteem 
and  applause  of  all  the  virtuous  and  disinterested.  Considerate 
men,  of  every  description,  ought  to  prize  whatever  will  tend  to 
beget  or  fortify  that  temper  in  the  courts ;  as  no  man  can  be 
sure  that  he  may  not  be  to-morrow  the  victim  of  a  spirit  of 
injustice,  by  which  he  may  be  a  gainer  to-day.  And  every  man 
must  now  feel,  that  the  inevitable  tendency  of  such  a  spirit  is 
to  sap  the  foundations  of  public  and  private  confidence,  and  to 
introduce  in  its  stead  universal  distrust  and  distress. 

That  inflexible  and  uniform  adherence  to  the  rights  of  the 
constitution,  and  of  individuals,  which  we  perceive  to  be  indis- 
pensable in  the  courts  of  justice,  can  certainly  not  be  expected 
from  judges  who  hold  their  offices  by  a  temporary  commission. 
Periodical  appointments,  however  regulated,  or  by  whomsoever 
made,  would,  in  some  way  or  other,  be  fatal  to  their  necessary 
independence.  If  the  power  of  making  them  was  committed 
either  to  the  executive  or  legislature,  there  would  be  danger  of 
an  improper  complaisance  to  the  branch  which  possessed  it :  if 
to  both,  there  would  be  an  unwillingness  to  hazard  the  displea- 
sure of  either;  if  to  the  people,  or  to  persons  chosen  by  them 
for  the  special  purpose,  there  would  be  too  great  a  disposition 
to  consult  popularity,  to  justify  a  reliance  that  nothing  would 
be  consulted  but  the  constitution  and  the  laws. 

There  is  yet  a  further  and  a  weighty  reason  for  the  perma- 
nency of  judicial  offices;  which  is  deducible  from  the  nature  of 
the  qualifications  they  require.  It  has  been  frequently  re- 
marked, with  great  propriety,  that  a  voluminous  code  of  laws 
is  one  of  the  inconveniences  necessarily  connected  with  the  ad 
-antages  of  a  free  government.     To  avoid  an  arbitrary  discre 


{)82  THE    FEDERALIST. 

tion  in  the  courts,  it  is  indispensable  that  thej  should  be  bound 
down  by  strict  rules  and  precedents,  which  serve  to  define  and 
point  out  their  duty  in  every  particular  case  that  comes  before 
them;  and  it  will  readily  be  conceived,  from  the  variety  of 
controversies  which  grow  out  of  the  folly  and  wickedness  of 
mankind,  that  the  records  of  those  precedents  must  unavoid- 
ably swell  to  a  very  considerable  bulk,  and  must  demand  long 
and  laborious  study  to  acquire  a  competent  knowledge  of  them. 
Hence  it  is,  that  there  can  be  but  few  men  in  the  society,  who 
will  have  sufficient  skill  in  the  laws  to  qualify  them  for  the 
stations  of  judges.  And  making  the  proper  deductions  for  the 
ordinary  depravity  of  human  natui'e,  the  number  must  be  stil) 
smaller,  of  those  who  unite  the  requisite  integrity  with  the 
requisite  knowledge.  These  considerations  apprize  us,  that  the 
government  can  have  no  great  option  between  fit  characters; 
and  that  a  temporary  duration  in  office,  which  would  naturally 
discourage  such  characters  from  quitting  a  lucrative  line  of 
practice  to  accept  a  seat  on  the  bench,  would  have  a  tendency 
to  throw  the  administration  of  justice  into  hands  less  able,  and 
less  well  qualified,  to  conduct  it  with  utility  and  dignity.  In 
the  present  circumstances  of  this  country,  and'  in  those  in 
which  it  is  likely  to  be  for  a  long  time  to  come,  the  disadvan- 
tages  on  this  score  would  be  greater  than  they  may  at  first 
sight  appear ;  but  it  must  be  confessed,  that  they  are  far  infe- 
rior to  those  which  present  themselves  under  the  other  aspects 
of  the  subject. 

Upon  the  whole,  there  can  be  no  room  to  doubt,  that  the  con 
vention  acted  wisely  in  copying  from  the  models  of  those  con- 
stitutions with  have  established  good  behaviour  as  the  tenure  of 
judicial  offices,  in  point  of  duration ;  and  that,  so  far  from  being 
blameable  on  this  account,  their  plan  would  have  been  inex- 
cusably defective,  if  it  had  wanted  this  important  feature  of 
good  government.  The  experience  of  Great  Britain  affords  ai» 
illistrious  comment  on  the  excellence  of  the  institution. 

PuBLrus 


THE   FEDERALIST.  688 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LXXIX. 


NEW   YORK,   JUNE   24,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


i  FURTHER  VIEW  OF  THE  JUDICIAL  DEPARTMENT,  IN  RELATION 
TO  THE  PROVISIONS  FOR  THE  SUPPORT  AND  RESPONSIBILITY  OF 
THE  JUDGES. 

Next  to  permanency  in  office,  nothing  can  contribute  more 
to  the  independence  of  the  judges,  than  a  fixed  provision  for 
their  support.  The  remark  made  in  relation  to  the  president, 
is  equally  applicable  here.  In  the  general  course  of  human 
nature,  a  power  over  a  man's  subsistence  amounts  to  a  power  over  his 
will.  And  we  can  never  hope  to  see  realized  in  practice  the 
complete  separation  of  the  judicial  from  the  legislative  power, 
in  any  system,  which  leaves  the  former  dependent  for  pecuniary 
resource  on  the  occasional  grants  of  the  latter.  The  enlight- 
ened friends  to  good  government,  in  every  state,  have  seen 
cause  to  lament  the' want  of  precise  and  explicit  precautions  in 
the  state  constitutions  on  this  head.  Some  of  these  indeed 
have  declared  th&t  permaneiit*  salaries  should  be  established  for 
the  judges;  but  the  experiment  has  in  some  instances  shown, 
that  such  expressions  are  not  sufficiently  definite  to  preclude 
legislative  evasions.  Something  still  more  positive  and  unequi- 
vocal has  been  evinced  to  be  requisite.  The  plan  of  the  con- 
vention accordingly  has  provided,  that  the  judges  of  the  United 

*  Vide  Constitution  of  Massachusetts,  Chap.  2.  Sect   1.  Art.  13, 


584  THE    FEDERALIST. 

States  "  shall  at  stated  times  receive  for  their  services  a  conipen- 
nation,  which  shall  not  be  diminished  during  their  continuance 
in  office." 

This,  all  circumstances  considered,  is  the  most  eligible  provi- 
sion that  could  have  been  devised.  It  will  readily  be  under- 
stood, that  the  fluctuations  in  the  value  of  money,  and  in  the 
state  of  society,  rendered  a  fixed  rate  of  compensation  in  the 
constitution  inadmissible.  "What  might  be  extravagant  to-day, 
might  in  half  a  century  become  penurious  and  inadequate.  It 
was  therefore  necessary  to  leave  it  to  the  discretion  of  the 
legislature  to  vary  its  provisions  in  conformity  to  the  variation? 
in  circumstances ;  yet  under  such  restrictions  as  to  put  it  out 
of  the  power  of  that  body  to  change  the  condition  of  the  indi- 
vidual for  the  worse.  A  man  may  then  be  sure  of  the  ground 
upon  which  he  stands,  and  can  never  be  deterred  from  his  duty 
by  the  apprehension  of  being  placed  in  a  less  eligible  situation. 
The  clause  which  has  been  quoted  combines  both  advantages. 
The  salaries  of  judicial  offices  may  from  time  to  time  be  altered, 
as  occasion  shall  require,  yet  so  as  never  to  lessen  the  allowance 
with  which  any  particular  judge  comes  into  office,  in  respect  to 
him.  It  will  be  observed  that  a  difference  has  been  made  by 
the  convention  between  the  compensation  of  the  president  and 
of  the  judges.  That  of  the  former  can  neither  be  increased  nor 
diminished.  That  of  the  latter  can  only  not  be  diminished. 
This  probably  arose  from  the  difference  in  the  duration  of  the 
respective  offices.  As  the  president  is  to  be  elected  for  no  more 
than  four  years,  it  can  rarely  happen  that  an  adequate  salary, 
fixed  at  the  commencement  of  that  period,  will  not  continue  to 
be  such  to  its  end.  But  with  regard  to  the  judges,  who  if  they 
behave  properly,  will  be  secured  in  their  places  for  life,  it  may 
well  happen,  especially  in  the  early  stages  of  the  government, 
that  a  stipend,  which  would  be  very  sufficient  at  their  first 
appointment,  would  become  too  small  in  the  progress  of  their 
service. 

This  provision  for  the  support  of  the  judges  bears  every 
mark  of  prudence  and  efficacy;  and  it  may  be  safely  affirmed 


THE    FEDERALIST.  585 

that,  together  with  the  permanent  tenure  of  their  offices,  it 
affords  a  better  prospect  of  their  independence  than  is  discover- 
able in  the  constitutions  of  any  of  the  states,  in  regard  to  their 
own  judges. 

The  precautions  for  their  responsibility,  are  comprised  in  the 
article  respecting  impeachments.  They  are  liable  to  be  im- 
peached for  mal-conduct  by  the  house  of  representatives,  and 
tried  by  the  senate,  and  if  convicted,  may  be  dismissed  from 
office  and  disqualified  for  holding  any  other.  This  is  the  only 
provision  on  the  point,  which  is  consistent  with  the  necessary 
independence  of  the  judicial  character,  and  is  the  only  one 
which  we  find  in  our  own  constitution  in  respect  to  our  own 
judges. 

The  want  of  a  provision  for  removing  the  judges  on  account 
of  inability,  has  been  a  subject  of  complaint.  But  all  con- 
siderate men  will  be  sensible  that  such  a  provision  would  either 
not  be  practised  upon,  or  would  be  more  liable  to  abuse,  than 
calculated  to  answer  any  good  purpose.  The  mensuration  of 
the  faculties  of  the  mind  has,  I  believe,  no  place  in  the  cata- 
logue of  known  arts.  An  attempt  to  fix  the  boundary  between 
the  regions  of  ability  and  inability,  would  much  oftener  give 
-scope  to  personal  and  party  attachments  and  enmities,  than 
advance  the  interests  of  justice,  or  the  public  good.  The  result, 
except  in  the  case  of  insanity,  must  for  the  most  part  be  arbi- 
trary; and  insanity,  without  any  formal  or  express  provision, 
may  be  safely  pronounced  to  be  a  virtual  disqualification. 

The  constitution  of  New- York,  to  avoid  investigations  that 
must  forever  be  vague  and  dangerous,  has  taken  a  particular 
age  as  the  criterion  of  inability.  No  man  can  be  a  judge  beyond 
sixty.  I  believe  there  are  few  at  present  who  do  not  disap- 
prove of  this  provision.  There  is  no  station,  in  relation  to 
which,  it  is  less  proper  than  to  that  of  a  judge.  The  deliber- 
ating and  comparing  faculties  generally  preserve  their  strength 
much  beyond  that  period,  in  men  who  survive  it;  and  when,  in 
addition  to  this  circumstance,  we  consider  how  few  there  are 
who  outlive   the   season   of  intellectual  vigour,  and  how  im- 


586  THE    FEDERALIST. 

probable  it  is  that  any  considerable  proportion  of  the  bench, 
whether  more  or  less  numerous,  should  be  in  such  a  situation 
at  the  same  time,  we  shall  be  ready  to  conclude  that  limitations 
of  this  sort  have  little  to  recommend  them.  In  a  republic, 
where  fortunes  are  not  affluent,  and  pensions  not  expedient, 
the  dismission  of  men  from  stations  in  which  they  have  served 
their  country  long  and  usefully,  on  which  they  depend  for  sub- 
sistence, and  from  which  it  will  be  too  late  to  resort  to  any 
other  occupation  for  a  livelihood,  ought  to  have  some  better 
apology  to  humanity,  than  is  to  be  found  in  the  imaginary 
danger  of  a  superannuated  bench. 

PUBIilUS. 


THB   FEDERALIST.  587 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LXXX. 


NEW  YORK,  JUNE  27  AND  JULY  1,  1788. 


HAMILTON. 

A  FURTHER  VIEW   OF    THE   JUDICIAL    DEPARTMENT,  IN    RELATIOM 
TO   THE   EXTENT  OF  ITS  POWERS. 

To  judge  with  accuracy  of  the  due  extent  of  the  federal 
judicature,  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider,  in  the  first  place, 
what  are  its  proper  objects. 

It  seems  scarcely  to  admit  of  controversy,  that  the  judiciary 
authority  of  the  union  ought  to  extend  to  these  several  descrip- 
tions of  cases.  1st.  To  all  those  which  arise  out  of  the  laws 
of  the  United  States,  passed  in  pursuance  of  their  just  and 
constitutional  powers  of  legislation;  2d.  To  all  those  which 
concern  the  execution  of  the  provisions  expressly  contained 
in  the  articles  of  union  j  3d.  To  all  those  in  which  the  United 
States  are  a  party ;  4th.  To  all  those  which  involve  the  peace 
of  the  CONFEDERACY,  whether  they  relate  to  the  intercourse 
between  the  United  States  and  foreign  nations,  or  to  that 
between  the  States  themselves  j  5th.  To  all  those  which 
originate  on  the  high  seas,  and  are  of  admiralty  or  maritime 
jurisdiction;  and  lastly,  to  all  those  in  which  the  state  tribu- 
nals cannot  be  supposed  to  be  impartial  and  unbiassed. 

The  first  point  depends  upon  this  obvious  consideration,  that 

ihere  ought  always  to  be  a  constitutional  method  of  giving 

oflicacy  to  constitutional  provisions.    What,  for  instance,  would 

48 


588  THE   FEDERALIST. 

avail  restrictions  on  the  authority  of  the  state  legislatures, 
without  some  constitutional  mode  of  enforcing  the  observance 
of  them  ?  The  states,  by  the  plan  of  the  convention,  are  pro- 
hibited from  doing  a  variety  of  things;  some  of  which  are 
incompatible  with  the  interests  of  the  union,  others,  with  the 
principles  of  good  government.  The  imposition  of  duties  on 
imported  articles,  and  the  emission  of  paper  money,  are  speci- 
mens of  each  kind.  No  man  of  sense  will  believe  that  such 
prohibitions  would  be  scrupulously  regarded,  without  some 
eflFectual  power  in  the  government  to  restrain  or  correct  the 
infractions  of  them.  This  power  must  either  be  a  direct 
negative  on  the  state  laws,  or  an  authority  in  the  federal 
courts,  to  over-rule  such  as  might  be  in  manifest  contravention 
of  the  articles  of  union.  There  is  no  third  course  that  1  can 
imagine.  The  latter  appears  to  have  been  thought  by  the 
convention  preferable  to  the  former,  and  I  presume  will  be 
most  agreeable  to  the  states. 

As  to  the  second  point,  it  is  impossible,  by  any  argument  oi 
comment,  to  make  it  clearer  than  it  is  in  itself.  If  there  are 
such  things  as  political  axioms,  the  propriety  of  the  judicial 
power  of  a  government  being  co-extensive  with  its  legislative, 
may  be  ranked  among  the  number.  The  mere  necessity  of 
uniformity  in  the  interpretation  of  the  national  laws,  decides 
the  question.  Thirteen  independent  courts  of  final  jurisdiction 
over  the  same  causes,  arising  upon  the  same  laws,  is  a  hydra  in 
government,  from  which  nothing  but  contradiction  and  confu- 
sion can  proceed. 

Still  less  need  be  said  in  regard  to  the  third  point.  Contro- 
versies between  the  nation  and  its  members  or  citizens,  can 
only  be  properly  referred  to  the  national  tribunals.  Any  other 
plan  would  be  contrary  to  reason,  to  precedent,  and  to  decorum. 

The  fourth  point  rests  on  this  plain  proposition,  that  the 
peace  of  the  whole,  ought  not  to  be  left  at  the  disposal  of  a 
PART.  The  union  will  undoubtedly  be  answerable  to  foreign 
powers  for  the  conduct  of  its  members.  And  the  responsibility 
for  an  injury,  ought  ever  to  be  accompanied  with  the  faculty 


THE   FEDERALIST.  589 

of  preventing  it.  As  the  denial  or  perversion  of  justice  by  the 
sentences  of  courts,  is  with  reason  classed  among  the  jusi 
causes  of  war,  it  will  follow,  that  the  federal  judiciary  ought 
to  have  cognizance  of  all  causes  in  which  the  citizens  of  other 
countries  are  concerned.  This  is  not  less  essential  to  the  pre- 
servation of  the  public  faith,  than  to  the  security  of  the  public 
tranquillity.  A  distinction  may  perhaps  be  imagined,  between 
cases  arising  upon  treaties  and  the  laws  of  nations,  and  those 
which  may  stand  merely*  on  the  footing  of  the  municipal  law. 
The  former  kind  may  be  supposed  proper  for  the  federal  juris- 
diction, the  latter  for  that  of  the  states.  But  it  is  at  least 
problematical,  whether  an  unjust  sentence  against  a  foreigner, 
where  the  subject  of  controversy  was  wholly  relative  to  the 
lex  loci,  would  not,  if  unredressed,  be  an  aggression  upon  his 
sovereign,  as  well  as  one  which  violated  the  stipulations  of  a 
treaty,  or  the  general  law  of  nations.  And  a  still  greater 
objection  to  the  distinction  would  result  from  the  immense 
difficulty,  if  not  impossibility,  of  a  practical  discrimination 
between  the  cases  of  one  complexion  and  those  of  the  other. 
So  great  a  proportion  of  the  controversies  in  which  foreigners 
are  parties,  involve  national  questions,  that  it  is  by  far  most 
safe,  and  most  expedient,  to  refer  all  those  in  which  they  are 
concerned  to  the  national  tribunals. 

The  power  of  determining  causes  between  two  states,  between 
one  state  and  the  citizens  of  another,  and  between  the  citizens 
of  different  states,  is  perhaps  not  less  essential  to  the  peace  of 
the  union,  than  that  which  has  been  just  examined.  History 
gives  us  a  horrid  picture  of  the  dissentions  and  private  wars 
which  distracted  and  desolated  Germany,  prior  to  the  insti- 
tution of  the  IMPERIAL  CHAMBER  by  Maximilian,  towards  the 
close  of  the  fifteenth  century :  and  informs  us,  at  the  same  time, 
of  the  vast  influence  of  that  institution,  in  appeasing  the  dis- 
orders, and  establishing  the  tranquillity  of  the  empire.  This 
was  a  court  invested  with  authority  to  decide  finally  all  differ- 
ences among  the  members  of  the  Germanic  body. 

A  method  of  terminating   territorial  disputes   between  the 


690  THE    FEDERALIST. 

States,  under  the  authority  of  the  federal  head,  was  not  unat- 
tended to,  even  in  the  imperfect  system  by  which  they  have 
been  hitherto  held  together.  But  there  are  other  sources, 
besides  interfering  claims  of  boundary,  from  which  bickerings 
and  animosities  may  spring  up  among  the  members  of  the 
union.  To  some  of  these  we  have  been  witnesses  in  the  course 
of  our  past  experience.  It  will  readily  be  conjectured,  that  I 
allude  to  the  fraudulent  laws  which  have  been  passed  in  too 
many  of  the  states.  And  though  the  proposed  constitution 
establishes  particular  guards  against  the  repetition  of  those 
instances,  which  have  heretofore  made  their  appearance,  yet  it 
is  warrantable  to  apprehend,  that  the  spirit  which  produced 
them,  will  assume  new  shapes  that  could  not  be  foreseen,  nor 
specifically  provided  against.  Whatever  practices  may  have  a 
tendency  to  disturb  the  harmony  of  the  states,  are  projier 
objects  of  federal  superintendence  and  control. 

It  may  be  esteemed  the  basis  of  the  union,  that  "  the  citizens 
of  each  state  shall  be  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  and  immu- 
nities of  citizens  of  the  several  states."  And  if  it  be  a  just 
principle,  that  every  government  ought  to  possess  the  means  of 
executing  its  own  provisions,  by  its  own  authority,  it  will  follow,  that 
in  order  to  the  inviolable  maintenance  of  that  equality  of 
privileges  and  immunities,  to  which  the  citizens  of  the  union 
will  be  entitled,  the  national  judiciary  ought  to  preside  in  all 
cases,  in  which  one  state  or  its  citizens  are  opposed  to  another 
state  or  its  citizens.  To  secure  the  full  effect  of  so  fundamental 
a  provision  against  alh  evasion  and  subterfuge,  it  is  necessary 
that  its  construction  should  be  committed  to  that  tribunal, 
which,  having  no  local  attachments,  will  be  likely  to  be  im- 
partial, between  the  different  states  and  their  citizens,  and 
which,  owing  its  official  existence  to  the  union,  will  never  be 
likely  to  feel  any  bias  inauspicious  to  the  principles  on  which  it 
is  founded. 

The  fifth  point  will  demand  little  animadversion.  The  most 
bigotted  idolizers  of  state  authority,  have  not  thus  far  shown 
a  disposition  to  deny  the  national  judiciary  the  cognizance  of 


THE    FEDERALIST.  "  59J 

iiijiritime  causes.  These  so  generally  depend  on  the  laws  of 
nations,  and  so  commonly  affect  the  rights  of  foreigners,  that 
they  fall  within  the  considerations  which  are  relative  to  the 
public  peace.  The  most  important  part  of  them  are,  by  the 
present  confederation,  submitted  to  federal  jurisdiction. 

The  reasonableness  of  the  agency  of  the  national  courts,  in 
cases  in  which  the  state  tribunals  cannot  be  supposed  to  be 
impartial,  speaks  for  itself.  No  man  ought  certainly  to  be  a 
judge  in  his  own  cause,  or  in  any  cause,  in  respect  to  which  he 
has  the  least  interest  or  bias.  This  principle  has  no  inconsid- 
erable weight  in  designating  the  federal  courts,  as  the  proper 
tribunals  for  the  determination  of  controversies  between  differ- 
ent states  and  their  citizens.  And  it  ought  to  have  the  same 
operation,  in  regard  to  some  cases,  between  the  citizens  of  the 
same  state.  Claims  .to  land  under  grants  of  different  states, 
founded  upon  adverse  pretensions  of  boundary,  are  of  this 
description.  The  courts  of  neither  of  the  granting  states  could 
be  expected  to  be  unbiassed.  The  laws  may  have  even  pre- 
judged the  question,  and  tied  the  courts  down  to  decisions  in 
favour  of  the  grants  of  the  state  to  which  they  belonged.  And 
where  this  had  not  been  done,  it  would  be  natural  that  the 
judges,  as  men,  should  feel  a  strong  predilection  to  the  claims 
of  their  own  government. 

Having  thus  laid  down  and  discussed  the  principles  which 
ought  to  regulate  the  constitution  of  the  federal  judiciary,  we 
will  proceed  to  test,  by  these  principles,  the  particular  powers 
of  which,  according  to  the  plan  of  the  convention,  it  is  to  be 
composed.  It  is  to  comprehend  "  all  cases  in  law  and  equity 
arising  under  the  constitution,  the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
and  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  under  their  authority; 
to  all  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and 
consuls;  to  all  cases  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdiction; 
to  controversies  to  which  the  United  States  shall  be  a  party ; 
to  controversies  between  two  or  more  states;  "between  a  state 
and  citizens  of  another  state;  between  citizens  of  different 
states;    betweer   citizens   of   the   same   state,  claiming   lands 


692  THE   FEDERALIST. 

under  grants  of  different  states;  and  betwt-en  a  state  or  the 
citizens  thereof,  and  foreign  states,  citizens  and  subjects."  This 
constitutes  the  entire  mass  of  the  judicial  authority  of  the 
union.     Let  us  now  review  it  in  detail.     It  is  then  to  extend, 

First.  To  all  cases  in  law  and  equity,  arising  under  the  constitu- 
tion and  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  This  corresponds  with  the 
two  first  classes  of  causes,  which  have  been  enumerated,  as 
proper  for  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States.  It  has  been 
asked,  what  is  meant  by  *'  cases  arising  under  the  constitution," 
in  contra-distinction  from  those  "  arising  under  the  laws  of  the 
United  States?"  The  difference  has  been  already  explained. 
All  the  restrictions  upon  the  authority  of  the  state  legislatures 
furnish  examples.  Thej^  are  not,  for  instance,  to  emit  papei 
money;  but  the  interdiction  results  from  the  constitution,  and 
will  have  no  connexion  with  any  law  of  the  United  States. 
Should  paper  money,  notwithstanding,  be  emitted,  the  contro- 
versies concerning  it  would  be  cases  arising  under  the  constitu- 
tion, and  not  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  in  the  ordi- 
nary signification  of  the  terms.  This  may  serve  as  a  sample 
of  the  whole. 

It  has  also  been  asked,  what  need  of  the  word  ''equity?" 
What  equitable  causes  can  grow  out  of  the  constitution  and 
laws  of  the  United  States?  There  is  hardly  a  subject  of  litiga- 
tion, between  individuals,  which  may  not  involve  those  ingre- 
dients of  fraud,  accident,  trust,  or  hardship,  which  would  render 
the  matter  an  object  of  equitable,  rather  than  of  legal  jurisdic- 
tion, as  the  distinction  is  known  and  established  in  several  of 
the  states.  It  is  the  peculiar  province,  for  instance,  of  a  court 
of  equity  to  relieve  against  what  are  called  hard  bargains : 
These  are  contracts,  in  which,  though  there  may  have  been  no 
direct  fraud  or  deceit,  sufficient  to  invalidate  them  in  a  court  of 
law ;  yet  there  may  have  been  some  undue  and  unconscionable 
advantage  taken  of  the  necessities  or  misfortunes  of  ono  of  the 
parties,  which  a  court  of  equity  would  not  tolerate.  In  such 
cases,  where  foreigners  were  concerned  on  either  side,  it  would 
be  impossible  for  the  federal  judicatories  to  do  justice  tvitbout 


THE    FEDERALIST.  593 

an  equitable,  as  well  as  a  legal  jurisdiction.  Agreements  to 
convey  lands  claimed  under  the  grants  of  different  states,  may 
afford  another  example  of  the  necessity  of  an  equitable  juris- 
diction in  the  federal  courts.  This  reasoning  may  not  be  so 
palpable  in  those  states  where  the  formal  and  technical  distinc- 
tion between  law  and  equity  is  not  maintained,  as  in  this  state, 
where  it  is  exemplified  by  every  day's  practice. 

The  judiciary  authority  of  the  union  is  to  extend  — 

Second.  To  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  under  the 
authority  of  the  United  States,  and  to  all  cases  affecting  am- 
bassadors, other  public  ministers  and  consuls.  These  belong  to 
the  fourth  class  of  the  enumerated  cases,  as  they  have  an  evi- 
dent connexion  with  the  preservation  of  the  national  peace. 

Third.  To  cases  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdiction. 
These  form,  altogether,  the  fifth  of  the  enumerated  classes  of 
causes,  proper  for  the  cognizance  of  the  national  courts. 

Fourth.  To  controversies  to  which  the  United  States  shall  be 
a  party.     These  constitute  the  third  of  those  classes. 

Fifth.  To  controversies  between  two  or  more  states ;  between 
a  state  and  citizens  of  another  state ;  between  citizens  of  differ- 
ent states.  These  belong  to  the  fourth  of  those  classes,  and 
partake,  in  some  measure,  of  the  nature  of  the  last. 

Sixth.  To  cases  between  the  citizens  of  the  same  state,  claim- 
ing lands  under  grants  of  different  states.  These  fall  within  the 
last  class,  and  are  the  only  instances  in  which  the  proposed  consti- 
tution  directly  contemplates  the  cognizance  of  disputes  between  the 
citizens  of  the  same  state. 

Seventh.  To  cases  between  a  state  and  the  citizens  thereof, 
and  foreign  states,  citizens  or  subjects.  These  have  been  already 
explained  to  belong  to  the  fourth  of  the  enumerated  classes; 
and  have  been  shown  to  be,  in  a  peculiar  manner,  the  proper 
subjectb  of  the  national  judicature. 

From  this  review  of  the  particular  powers  of  the  federal 
judiciary,  as  marked  out  in  the  constitution,  it  appears,  that 
they  are  all  conformable  to' the  principles  which  ought  to  have 
governed  the  structure  of  that  department,  and  which  were 


5iV4  THE    FEDERALIST. 

necessary  to  the  perfection  of  the  system.  If  some  partial  in- 
conveniences should  appear  to  be  connected  with  the  incorpo- 
ration of  any  of  them  into  the  plan,  it  ought  to  be  recollected, 
that  the  national  legislature  will  have  ample  authority  to  make 
such  exceptions,  and  to  prescribe  such  regulations,  as  will  be 
calculated  to  obviate  or  remove  these  inconveniences.  The 
possibility  of  particular  mischiefs  can  never  be  viewed,  by  a 
well-informed  mind,  as  a  solid  objection  to  a  principle  which  is 
calculated  to  avoid  general  mischiefs,  and  to  obtain  general 
advanta^'es 

PUBLIUS. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  595 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LXXXI. 


NEW   YORK,  JULY  4,  8,  1788. 


HAMILTON. 


A   FURTHER  VIEW   OF   THE   JUDICIAL   DEPARTMENT,    IN   RELATIOH 
TO  THE   DISTRIBUTION   OF   ITS    AUTHORITY. 

Let  us  now  return  to  the  partition  of  the  judiciary  authority 
between  different  courts,  and  their  relations  to  each  other. 

"  The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  is  to  be  vested  in 
one  supreme  court,  and  in  such  inferior  courts  as  the  congress 
may  from  time  to  time  ordain  and  establish."*  That  there 
ought  to  be  one  court  of  supreme  and  final  jurisdiction,  is  a 
proposition  which  is  not  likely  to  be  contested.  The  reasons 
for  it  have  been  assigned  in  another  place,  and  are  too  obvious 
to  need  repetition.  The  only  question  that  seems  to  have  been 
raised  concerning  it,  is,  whether  it  ought  to  be  a  distinct  body, 
or  a  branch  of  the  legislature.  The  same  contradiction  is  ob- 
servable in  regard  to  this  matter,  which  has  been  remarked  in 
several  other  cases.  The  very  men  who  object  to  the  senate  as 
a  court  of  impeachments,  on  the  ground  of  an  improper  inter- 
mixture of  powei's,  are  advocates,  by  implication  at  least,  for 
the  propriety  of  vesting  the  ultimate  decision  of  all  causes,  in 
the  whole,  or  in  a  part  of  the  legislative  body. 

The  arguments,  or  rather  suggestions,  upon  which  this  charge 
Is  founded,  are  to  this  effect :  "  The  authority  of  the  supreme 
*  Arfiole  3.  Sect.  1. 


59b  THE    FEDERALIST. 

court  of  tho  United  States,  which  is  to  be  a  separate  and  inde- 
pendent body,  will  be  superior  to  that  of  the  legislature.  The 
power  of  construing  the  laws  according  to  the  spirit  of  the  con- 
stitution, will  enable  that  court  to  mould  them  into  whatever 
shape  it  may  think  proper;  especially  as  its  decisions  will  not 
be  in  any  manner  subject  to  the  revision  or  correction  of  the 
legislative  body.  This  is  as  unprecedented  as  it  is  dangerous. 
In  Britain,  the  judicial  power  in  the  last  resort,  resides  in  the 
house  of  lords,  which  is  a  branch  of  the  legislature;  and  this 
part  of  the  British  Government  has  been  imitated  in  the  state 
constitutions  in  general.  The  parliament  of  Great  Britain, 
and  the  legislatures  of  the  several  states,  can  at  any  time 
rectify  by  law,  the  exceptionable  decisions  of  their  respective 
courts.  But  the  errors  and  usurpations  of  the  supreme  court 
of  the  United  States,  will  be  uncontrolable  and  remediless." 
This,  upon  examination,  will  be  found  to  be  altogether  made  up 
of  false  reasoning  upon  misconceived  fact. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  not  a  syllable  in  the  plan,  which 
directly  empowers  the  national  courts  to  construe  the  laws 
according  to  the  spirit  of  the  constitution,  or  which  gives  them 
any  greater  latitude  in  this  respect,  than  may  be  claimed  by 
the  courts  of  every  state.  I  admit,  however,  that  the  constitu- 
tion ought  to  be  the  standard  of  construction  for  the  laws,  and 
that  wherever  there  is  an  evident  opposition,  the  laws  ought  to 
give  place  to  the  constitution.  But  this  doctrine  is  not  deduci- 
ble  from  any  circumstance  peculiar  to  the  plan  of  the  conven- 
tion; but  from  the  general  theory  of  a  limited  constitution; 
and  as  far  as  it  is  true,  is  equally  applicable  to  most,  if  not  to 
all  the  state  governments.  There  can  be  no  objection,  there- 
fore, on  this  account,  to  the  federal  judicature,  which  will  not 
lie  against  the  local  judicatures  in  general,  and  which  will  not 
serve  to  condemn  every  constitution  that  attempts  to  set  bounds 
to  legislative  discretion. 

But  perhaps  the  force  of  the  objection  may  be  thought  to 
consist  in  the  particular  organization  of  the  supreme  court;  in 
its  being  composed  of  a  distinct  body  of  magistrates,  instead 


THE    FEDERALIST.  59T 

of  being  one  of  the  branches  of  the  legislature,  as  ir  the  gov- 
ernment of  Great  Britain  and  in  that  of  this  state.  To  insist 
upon  this  point,  the  authors  of  the  objection  must  renounce  the 
meaning  they  have  laboured  to  annex  to  the  celebrated  maxim, 
requiring  a  separation  of  the  departments  of  power.  It  shall, 
nevertheless,  be  conceded  to  them,  agreeably  to  the  interpreta- 
tion given  to  that  maxim  in  the  course  of  these  papers,  that  it 
is  not  violated  by  vesting  the  ultimate  power  of  judging  in  a 
paH  of  the  legislative  body.  But  though  this  be  not  an  abso- 
lute violation  of  that  excellent  rule;  yet  it  verges  so  nearly 
upon  it,  as  on  this  account  alone,  to  be  less  eligible  than  the 
mode  preferred  by  the  convention.  From  a  body  which  had 
had  even  a  partial  agency  in  passing  bad  laws,  we  could  rarely 
expect  a  disposition  to  temper  and  moderate  them  in  the  appli- 
cation. The  same  spirit  which  had  operated  in  making  them, 
would  be  too  apt  to  influence  their  construction :  Still  less  could 
•T,  be  expected,  that  men  who  had  infringed  the  constitution,  in 
the  character  of  legislators,  would  be  disposed  to  repair  tho 
breach  in  that  of  judges.  Nor  is  this  all :  Every  reason  which 
recommends  the  tenure  of  good  behaviour  for  judicial  oflSces, 
militates  against  placing  the  judiciary  power,  in  the  last  resort, 
in  a  body  composed  of  men  chosen  for  a  limited  period.  There 
is  an  absurdity  in  referring  the  determination  of  causes,  in  the 
first  instance,  to  judges  of  permanent  standing;  in  the  last,  to 
tliose  of  a  temporary  and  mutable  constitution.  And  there  is 
a  still  greater  absurdity  in  subjecting  the  decisions  of  men 
selected  for  their  knowledge  of  the  laws,  acquired  by  long  and 
laborious  study,  to  the  revision  and  control  of  men  who,  for 
want  of  the  same  advantage,  cannot  but  be  deficient  in  that 
knowledge.  The  members  of  the  legislature,  will  rarely  be 
chosen  with  a  view  to  those  qualifications  which  fit  men  for  the 
stations  of  judges ;  and  as,  on  this  account,  there  will  be  great 
reason  to  apprehend  all  the  ill  cons  jquences  of  defective  infor- 
mation ;  so,  on  account  of  the  natural  propensity  of  such  bodies 
to  party  divisions,  there  will  be  no  less  reason  to  fear,  that  the 
jtL'siilential  breath  of  faction  may  poison  the  fountains  of  jus- 


598  THE    FEDERALIST. 

tice.  The  habit  of  being  continually  marshalled  on  oppoBii© 
sides,  will  be  too  apt  to  stifle  the  voice  both  of  law  and  of 
equity. 

These  considerations  teach  us  to  applaud  the  wisdom  of  those 
states  who  have  committed  the  judicial  power,  in  the  last 
resort,  not  to  a  part  of  tl^e  legislature,  but  to  distinct  and  in- 
dependent bodies  of  men.  Contrary  to  the  supposition  of  those 
who  have  represented  the  plan  of  the  convention,  in  this  re- 
spect, as  novel  and  unprecedented,  it  is  but  a  copy  of  the  con- 
stitutions of  New-Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Pennsylvania, 
Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North-Carolina,  South-Carolina, 
and  Georgia  j  and  the  preference  which  has  been  given  to  these 
models  is  highly  to  be  commended. 

It  is  not  true,  in  the  second  place,  that  the  parliament  of 
Great  Britain,  or  the  legislatures  of  the  particular  states,  can 
rectify  the  exceptionable  decisions  of  their  respective  courts, 
in  any  other  sense  than  might  be  done  by  a  future  legislature 
of  the  United  States.  The  theory  neither  of  the  British  nor 
the  state  constitutions,  authorizes  the  revisal  of  a  judicial 
sentence  by  a  legislative  act.  Nor  is  there  any  thing  in  the 
proposed  constitution,  more  than  in  either  of  them  by  which  it 
is  forbidden.  In  the  former,  as  in  the  latter,  the  imjjropriety 
of  the  thing,  on  the  general  principles  of  law  and  reason,  is  the 
sole  obstacle.  A  legislature,  without  exceeding  its  province, 
cannot  reverse  a  determination  once  made,  in  a  particular  case ; 
though  it  may  prescribe  a  new  rule  for  future  cases.  This  is 
the  principle,  and  it  applies,  in  all  its  consequences,  exactly  in 
the  same  manner  and  extent,  to  the  state  governments,  as  to 
the  national  government  now  under  consideration.  Not  the 
least  difference  can  be  pointed  out  in  any  view  of  the  8ubje(?t. 

It  may  in  the  last  place  be  observed,  that  the  supposed  danger 
of  judiciary  encroachments  on  the  legislative  authority,  which 
has  been  upon  many  occasions  reiterated,  is,  in  reality,  a 
phantom.  Particular  misconstructions  and  contraventions  of 
the  will  of  the  legislature,  may  now  and  then  happen;  but  they 
can  never  be  so  extensive  as  to  amount  to  an  inconvenience,  or 


•  THE   FEDERALIST.  599 

in  any  sensible  degree  to  aflFect  the  order  of  Ihe  political  system. 
This  may  be  inferred  with  certainty  from  the  general  nature 
of  the  judicial  power;  from  the  objects  to  which  it  relates; 
from  the  manner  in  which  it  is  exercised ;  from  its  comparative 
weakness;  and  from  its  total  incapacity  to  support  its  usurpa- 
tions by  force.  And  the  inference  is  g^'eatly  fortified  by  the 
consideration  of  the  important  constitutional  check,  which  the 
power  of  instituting  impeachments  in  one  part  of  the  legislative 
body,  and  of  determining  upon  them  in  the  other,  would  give 
to  that  body  upon  the  members  of  the  judicial  department. 
This  is  alone  a  complete  security.  There  never  can  be  danger 
that  the  judges,  by  a  series  of  deliberate  usurpations  on  the 
authority  of  the  legislature,  would  hazard  the  united  resent- 
ment of  the  body  intrusted  with  it,  while  this  body  was  pos- 
sessed of  the  means  of  punishing  their  presumption,  by  de- 
grading them  from  their  stations.  While  this  ought  to  remove 
all  apprehensions  on  the  subject,  it  affords,  at  the  same  time,  a 
cogent  argument  for  constituting  the  senate  a  court  for  the 
trial  of  impeachments. 

Having  now  examined,  and  I  trust  removed,  the  objections 
10  the  distinct  and  independent  organization  of  the  supreme 
<'Ourt ;  I  proceed  to  consider  the  propriety  of  the  power  of  con 
fitituting  inferior  courts,*  and  the  relations  which  will  subsist 
between  these  and  the  former. 

The  power  of  constituting  inferior  courts,  is  evidently  calcu- 
lated to  obviate  the  necessity  of  having  recourse  to  the  supreme 
court  in  every  case  of  federal  cognizance.  It  is  intended  to 
enable  the  national  government  to  institute  or  authorize  in  each 
state  or  district  of  the  United  States,  a  tribunal  competent  to 
*he  determination  of  matters  of  national  jurisdiction  within  its 
limits. 

*  This  power  has  been  absurdly  represented  as  intended  to  abolish  all  the 
county  courts  in  the  several  states,  which  are  commonly  called  inferior  courts 
But  the  expressions  of  the  constitution  are  to  constitute  "  tribunals  infebior 
TO  THE  SDPEEMK  couET,"  and  the  evident  design  of  the  provision  is,  to  enable 
thfc  institution  of  local  courts,  subordinate  to  the  supreme,  either  in  states  ot 
larger  districts.  It  is  ridiculaus  to  imagine,  that  county  courts  were  in  con-  ' 
lemplation. 


600  THE    FEDEKALIST.    • 

Bill  why,  it  is  asked,  might  not  the  same  purpose  have  been 
accomplished  by  the  instrumentality  of  the  state  courts  ?  This 
admits  of  different  answers.  Though  the  fitness  and  compe- 
tency of  these  courts  should  be  allowed  in  the  utmost  latitude : 
yet  the  substance  of  the  power  in  question,  may  still  be  re- 
garded as  a  necessary  part  of  the  plan,  if  it  were  only  to 
authorize  the  national  legislature  to  commit  to  them  the  cogni- 
zance of  causes  arising  out  of  the  national  constitution.  To 
confer  upon'  the  existing  courts  of  the  several  states  the  power 
of  determining  such  causes,  would  perhaps  be  as  much  "  to  con- 
stitute tribunals,"  as  to  create  new  courts  with  the  like  power 
But  ought  not  a  more  direct  and  explicit  provision  to  have 
been  made  in  favour  of  the  state  courts  ?  There  are,  in  my 
opinion,  substantial  reasons  against  such  a  provision:  The  most 
discerning  cannot  foresee  how  far  the  prevalency  of  a  local 
spirit  may  be  found  to  disqualify  the  local  tribunals  for  the 
jurisdiction  of  national  causes ;  whilst  every  man  may  discover, 
that  courts  constituted  like  those  of  some  of  the  states,  would 
be  improper  channels  of  the  judicial  authority  of  the  union. 
State  judges,  holding  their  offices  during  pleasure,  or  from  year 
to  year,  will  be  too  little  independent  to  be  relied  upon  for  an 
inflexible  execution  of  the  national  laws.  And  if  there  was  a 
necessity  for  confiding  to  them  the  original  cognizance  of 
causes  arising  under  those  laws,  there  would  be  a  correspondent 
necessity  for  leaving  the  door  of  appeal  as  wide  as  possible. 
In  proportion  to  the  grounds  of  confidence  in,  or  distrust  of 
the  subordinate  tribunals,  ought  to  be  the  facility  or  difficulty 
of  appeals.  And  well  satisfied  as  I  am  of  the  propriety  of  the 
appellate  jurisdiction,  in  the  several  classes  of  causes  to  which 
it  is  extended  by  the  plan  of  the  convention,  I  should  consider 
every  thing  calculated  to  give,  in  practice,  an  unrestrained  course 
to  appeals,  as  a  source  of  public  and  private  inconvenience. 

I  am  not  sure  but  that  it  will  be  found  highly  expedient  and 

aeeful,  to  divide  the  United  States  into  four  or  five,  or  half  a 

dozen  districts ;  and  to  institute  a  federal  court  in  each  district, 

*in  lieu  of  one  in  every  state.     The  judges  of  these  courts  may 


THE    FEDERALIST.  •  601 

hold  circuits  for  the  trial  of  causes  in  the  several  parts  of  tho 
respective  districts.  Justice  through  them  may  be  adminis- 
tered with  ease  and  dispatch;  and  appeals  maybe  safely  cir 
cumscribed  within  a  narrow  compass.  This  plan  appears  to 
me  at  present  the  most  eligible  of  any  that  could  be  adopted, 
and  in  order  to  it,  it  is  necessary  that  the  power  of  constituting 
inferior  courts  should  exist  in  the  full  extent  in  which  it  is 
seen  in  the  proposed  constitution. 

These  reasons  seem  sufficient  to  satisfy  a  candid  mind,  that 
the  want  of  such  a  power  would  have  been  a  great  defect  in 
the  plan.  Let  us  now  examine  in  what  manner  the  judicial 
authority  is  to  be  distributed  between  the  supreme  and  the 
inferior  courts  of  the  union. 

The  supreme  court  is  to  be  invested  with  original  jurisdictior 
only  "  in  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers 
and  consuls,  and  those  in  which  a  state  shall  be  a  party." 
Public  ministers  of  every  class,  are  the  immediate  representa- 
tives of  their  sovereigns.  All  questions  in  which  they  are  con 
cerned,  are  so  directly  connected  with  the  public  peace,  that  a» 
well  for  the  preservation  of  this,  as  out  of  respect  to  the 
sovereignties  they  represent,  it  is  both  expedient  and  proper, 
that  such  questions  should  be  submitted  in  the  first  instance  to 
the  highest  judicatory  of  the  nation.  Though  consuls  have  not 
in  strictness  a  diplomatic  character,  yet  as  they  are  the  public 
agents  of  the  nations  to  which  they  belong,  the  same  observa- 
tion is  in  a  great  measure  applicable  to  them.  In  cases  in  which 
a  state  might  happen  to  be  a  party,  it  would  ill  suit  its  dignity 
to  be  turned  over  to  an  inferior  tribunal. 

Though  it  may  rather  be  a  digression  from  the  immediaie 
subject  of  this  paper,  I  shall  take  occasion  to  mention  here  a 
supposition  which  has  excited  some  alarm  upon  very  mistaken 
grounds :  It  has  been  suggested  that  an  assignment  of  the 
public  securities  of  one  state  to  the  citizens  of  another,  would 
enable  them  to  prosecute  that  state  in  the  federal  courts  for  the 
amount  of  those  securities.  A  suggestion,  which  the  following 
considerations  prove  to  be  without  foundation. 


602  •  THE   FEDERALIST. 

It  is  inherent  in  the  nature  of  sovereignty,  not  to  be  amen- 
able to  the  suit  of  an  individual  without  its  consent.  This  is  the 
general  sense,  and  the  general  practice  of  mankind;  and  the 
exemption,  as  one  of  the  attributes  of  sovereignty,  is  now 
enjoyed  by  the  government  of  every  state  in  the  union.  Un- 
less, therefore,  there  is  a  surrender  of  this  immunity  in  the 
plan  of  the  convention,  it  will  remain  with  the  states,  and  the 
danger  intimated  must  be  merely  ideal.  The  circumstances 
which  are  necessary  to  produce  an  alienation  of  state  sove- 
reignty, were  discussed  in  considering  the  article  of  taxation, 
and  need  not  be  repeated  here.  A  recurrence  to  the  principles 
there  established  will  satisfy  us,  that  there  is  no  colour  to  pre- 
tend that  the  state  governments  would,  by  the  adoption  of  that 
plan,  be  divested  of  the  privilege  of  paying  their  own  debts  in 
their  own  way,  free  from  every  constraint  but  that  which  flows 
from  the  obligations  of  good  faith.  The  contracts  between  a 
nation  and  individuals,  are  only  binding  on  the  conscience  of 
the  sovereign,  and  have  no  pretension  to  a  compulsive  force. 
They  confer  no  right  of  action,  independent  of  the  sovereign 
will.  To  what  purpose  would  it  be  to  authorize  suits  against 
states  for  the  debts  they  owe  ?  How  could  recoveries  be  en- 
forced ?  It  is  evident  that  it  could  not  be  done,  without  waging 
war  against  the  contracting  state :  and  to  ascribe  to  the  federal 
courts,  by  mere  implication,  and  in  destruction  of  a  pre-exist- 
ing right  of  the  state  governments,  a  power  which  would 
involve  such  a  consequence,  would  be  altogether  forced  and 
unwarrantable. 

Let  us  resume  the  train  of  our  observations ;  we  have  seen 
that  the  original  jurisdiction  of  the  supreme  court  would  be 
confined  to  two  classes  of  causes,  and  those  of  a  nature  rarely 
to  occur.  In  all  other  cases  of  federal  cognizance,  the  original 
Jurisdiction  would  appertain  to  the  inferior  tribunals,  and  the 
supreme  court  would  have  nothing  more  than  an  appellate 
jurisdiction,  "with  such  exceptions^  and  under  such  regulations^ 
as  the  congress  shall  make." 

The  propriety  of  this  appellate  jurisdiction  has  been  scarcely 


THE    FEDERALIST.  603 

called  in  question  in  regard  to  matters  of  law;  bnt  the  clamours 
have  been  loud  against  it  as  applied  to  matters  of  fact.  Some 
•well-intentioned  men  in  this  state,  deriving  their  notions  from 
the  language  and  forms  which  obtain  in  our  courts,  have  been 
induced  to  consider  it  as  an  implied  supersedure  of  the  trial  by 
jury,  in  favour  of  the  civil  law  mode  of  trial,  which  prevails  in 
our  courts  of  admiralty,  probates,  and  chancery.  A  technical 
sense  has  been  affixed  to  the  term  "  appellate,"  which  in  our 
law  parlance,  is  commonly  used  in  reference  to  appeals  in  the 
course  of  the  civil  law.  But  if  I  am  not  misinformed,  the 
same  meaning  would  not  be  given  to  it  in  any  part  of  New- 
England.  There  an  appeal  from  one  jury  to  another,  is  familial 
both  in  language  and  practice,  and  is  even  a  matter  of  course, 
until  there  have  been  two  verdicts  on  one  side.  The  word 
"  appellate,"  therefore,  will  not  be  understood  in  the  same 
sense  in  New -England,  as  in  New -York,  which  shows  the 
impropriety  of  a  technical  interpretation  derived  from  the 
jurisprudence  of  a  particular  state.  The  expression  taken 
in  the  abstract,  denotes  nothing  more  than  the  power  of  one 
tribunal  to  review  the  proceedings  of  another,  either  as  to  the 
law  or  fact,  or  both.  The  mode  of  doing  it  may  depend  on 
ancient  custom  or  legislative  provision ;  in  a  new  government 
it  must  depend  on  the  latter,  and  may  be  with  or  without  the 
aid  of  a  jury,  as  may  be  judged  advisable.  If,  therefore,  the 
re-examination  of  a  fact,  once  determined  by  a  jury,  should  in 
any  case  be  admitted  under  the  proposed  constitution,  it  may 
be  so  regulated  as  to  be  done  by  a  second  jury,  either  by 
remanding  the  cause  to  the  court  below  for  a  second  trial 
of  the  fact,  or  by  directing  an  issue  immediately  out  of  the 
supreme  court. 

But  it  does  not  follow,  that  the  re-examination  of  a  fact  once 
ascertained  by  a  jury,  will  be  permitted  in  the  supreme  court. 
Why  may  it  not  be  said,  with  the  strictest  propriety,  when  a 
writ  of  error  is  brought  from  an  inferior  to  a  superior  court 
of  law  in  this  state,  that  the  latter  has  jurisdiction  *  of  the 

*  This  word  is  a  compound  of  Jcs  and  dictio  juris,  dictio,  or  a  speaking  or 
♦jronouncing  of  the  law. 


604  THE   FEDERALIST. 

fact,  as  well  as  the  law  ?  It  is  true  it  cannot  institute  a  new 
inquiry  concerning  the  fact,  but  it  takes  cognizance  of  it  as  it 
appears  upon  the  record,  and  pronounces  the  law  arising  upon 
it.  This  is  jurisdiction  of  both  fact  and  law,  nor  is  it  even 
possible  to  separate  them.  Though  the  common  law  courts  of 
this  state  ascertain  disputed  facts  by  a  jury,  yet  they  unques- 
tionably have  jurisdiction  of  both  fact  and  law;  and  accord- 
ingly, when  the  former  is  agreed  in  the  pleadings,  they  have 
no  recourse  to  a  jury,  but  proceed  at  once  to  judgment.  1 
contend,  therefore,  on  this  ground,  that  the  expressions,  "  appel- 
late jurisdiction,  both  as  to  law  and  fact,"  do  not  necessarily 
imply  a  re-examination  in  the  supreme  court  of  facts  decided 
by  juries  in  the  inferior  courts. 

The  following  train  of  ideas  may  well  be  imagined  to  liave 
influenced  the  convention,  in  relation  to  this  particular  pro- 
vision. The  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  supreme  court,  it 
may  have  been  argued,  will  extend  to  causes  determinable  in 
different  modes,  some  in  the  course  of  the  common  law,  others 
in  the  course  of  the  civil  law.  In  the  former,  the  revision  of 
the  law  only  will  be,  generally  speaking,  the  proper  province 
of  the  supreme  court;  in  the  latter,  the  re-examination  of  the 
fact  is  agreeable  to  usage,  and  in  some  cases,  of  which  prize 
causes  are  an  example,  might  be  essential  to  the  preservation 
of  the  public  peace.  It  is  therefore  necessary,  that  the  appellate 
jurisdiction  should,  in  certain  cases,  extend  in  the  broadest 
sense  to  matters  of  fact.  It  will  not  answer  to  make  an 
express  exception  of  cases  which  shall  have  been  originally 
tried  by  a  jury,  because  in  the  courts  of  some  of  the  states, 
all  causes  are  tried  in  this  mode ;  *  and  such  an  exception  would 
preclude  the  revision  of  matters  of  fact,  as  well  where  it  mignt 
be  proper,  as  where  it  might  be  improper.  To  avoid  all  incon- 
veniences, it  will  be  safest  to  declare  generally,  that  the  supreme 
court  shall  possess  appellate  jurisdiction,  both  as  to  law  and 

*  I  hold,  that  the  states  will  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  with  the  subordi- 
nate federal  judicatories,  in  many  cases  of  federal  cognizance,  as  will  be 
explained  in  my  next  paper. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  605 

fad,  an  i  that  this  jurisdiction  shall  be  subject  to  sueti  sxceptions 
and  regulations  as  the  national  legislature  may  prescribe.  This 
will  enable  the  government  to  modify  it  in  such  a  manner  as 
will  best  answer  the  ends  of  public  justice  and  security. 

This  view  of  the  matter,  at  any  rate,  puts  it  out  of  all  doubt, 
that  the  supposed  abolition  of  the  trial  by  jury,  by  the  operation 
of  this  provision,  is  fallacious  and  untrue.  The  legislature  of 
the  United  States  would  certainly  have  full  power  to  provide, 
that  in  appeals  to  the  supreme  court  there  should  be  no  re- 
examination of  facts,  where  they  had  been  tried  in  the  original 
causes  by  juries.  This  would  certainly  be  an  authorized  excep- 
tion ;  but  if,  for  the  reason  already  intimated,  it  should  be 
thought  too  extensive,  it  might  be  qualified  with  a  limitation 
to  such  causes  only  as  are  determinable  at  common  law  in  that 
mode  of  trial. 

The  amount  of  the  observations  hitherto  made  on  the  autho- 
rity of  the  judicial  department  is  this :  That  it  has  been  care- 
fully restricted  to  those  causes  which  are  manifestly  proper  for 
the  cognizance  of  the  national  judicature;  that,  in  the  partition 
of  this  authority,  a  very  small  portion  of  original  jurisdiction 
has  been  reserved  to  the  supreme  court,  and  the  rest  consigned 
to  the  subordinate  tribunals ;  that  the  supreme  court  will  pos- 
sess an  appellate  jurisdiction,  both  as  to  law  and  fact,  in  all  the 
cases  referred  to  them,  but  subject  to  any  exceptions  and  regula-^ 
tions  which  may  be  thought  advisable ;  that  this  appellate  juris- 
diction does,  in  no  case,  abolish  the  trial  by  jury ;  and  that  an 
ordinary  degree  of  prudence  and  integrity  in  the  national  coun- 
cils, will  insure  us  solid  advantages  from  the  establishment  of 
the  proposed  judiciary,  without  exposing  us  to  any  of  the  incon* 
7enienc3s  which  have  been  predicted  from  that  source. 


iU}litti>lht 


($06  THE    FEDERALIST. 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LXXXII. 


NEW    YORK,   JULY    11,   1783, 


HAMILTON. 


A  FURTHER  VIEW  OF  THE   JUDICIAL   DEPARTMENT,   IN  REFERENOB 
TO  SOME   MISCELLANEOUS  QUESTIONS. 

The  erection  of  a  new  government,  whatever  care  or  wisdom 
may  distinguish  the  work,  cannot  fail  to  originate  questions  of 
intricacy  and  nicety;  and  these  may,  in  a  particular  manner, 
be  expected  to  flow  from  the  establishment  of  a  constitution 
founded  upon  the  total  or  partial  incorporation  of  a  number  of 
distinct  sovereignties.  Time  only  can  mature  and  perfect  so 
compound  a  system,  liquidate  the  meaning  of  all  the  parts, 
and  adjust  them  to  each  other  in  a  harmonious  and  consistent 

WHOLE. 

Such  questions  accordingly  have  arisen  upon  the  plan  pro- 
posed by  the  convention,  and  particularly  concerning  the 
judiciary  department.  The  principal  of  these  respect  the 
situation  of  the  state  courts,  in  regard  to  those  causes  which 
are  to  be  submitted  to  federal  jurisdiction.  Is  this  to  be  ex- 
clusive, or  are  those  courts  to  possess  a  concurrent  jurisdiction  ? 
If  the  latter,  in  what  relation  will  they  stand  to  the  national 
tribunals?  These  are  inquiries  which  we  meet  with  in  the 
mouths  of  men  of  sense,  and  which  are  sertainly  entitled  to 
attention. 


THE   FEDERALIBT.  607 

The  principles  established  in  a  former  paper*  teaoh  us.  that 
the  states  will  retain  all  pre-existing  authorities,  which  may  not 
be  exclusively  delegated  to  the  federal  head ;  and  that  this  ex- 
clusive delegation  can  only  exist  in  one  of  three  cases ;  where 
an  exclusive  authority  is,  in  express  terms,  granted  to  the 
union ;  or  where  a  particular  authority  is  granted  to  the  union, 
and  the  exercise  of  a  like  authority  is  prohibited  to  the  states ; 
or,  where  an  authority  is  granted  to  the  union,  with  which  a 
similar  authority  in  the  states  would  be  utterly  incompatible. 
Though  these  principles  may  not  apply  with  the  same  force  to 
the  judiciary,  as  to  the  legislative  power;  yet  I  am  inclined  to 
think,  that  they  are  in  the  main,  just  with  respect  to  the 
former,  as  well  as  the  latter.  And  under  this  impression  I  shtdl 
lay  it  down  as  a  rule,  that  the  state  courts  will  retain  the  juris- 
diction they  now  have,  unless  it  appears  to  be  taken  away  in 
one  of  the  enumerated  modes. 

The  only  thing  in  the  proposed  constitution,  which  wears 
the  appearance  of  confining  the  causes  of  federal  cognizance,  to 
the  federal  courts,  is  contained  in  this  passage  :  "  The  judicial 
POWER  of  the  United  States  shall  be  vested  in  one  supreme  court, 
and  in  such  inferior  courts  as  the  congress  shall  from  time  to 
time  ordain  and  establish."  This  might  either  be  construed  to 
signify,  that  the  supreme  and  subordinate  courts  of  the  union 
should  alone  have  the  power  of  deciding  those  causes,  to  which 
their  authority  is  to  extend ;  or  simply  to  denote,  that  the 
organs  of  the  national  judiciary  should  be  one  supreme  court, 
and  as  many  subordinate  courts,  as  congress  should  think 
proper  to  appoint;  in  other  words,  that  the  United  States 
should  exercise  the  judicial  power  with  which  they  are  to  be 
invested,  through  one  supreme  tribunal,  and  a  certain  number 
of  inferior  ones,  to  be  instituted  by  them.  The  first  excludes, 
the  last  admits,  the  concurrent  jurisdiction  of  the  state  tribu- 
nals :  And  as  the  first  would  amount  to  an  alienation  of  state 
power  by  implication,  the  last  appears  to  me  the  most  defensible 
construction. 

«  Nc   XXXII. 


608  THE    FEDERALIST. 

But  thin  doctrine  of  concurrent  jurisdiction,  is  only  clearly 
applicable  to  those  descriptions  of  causes,  of  which  the  state 
courts  have  previous  cognizance.  It  is  not  equally  evident  in 
relation  to  cases  which  may  grow  out  of,  and  be  peculiar  to,  the 
constitution  to  be  established:  For  not  to  allow  the  state  courts 
a  right  of  jurisdiction  in  such  cases,  can  hardly  be  considered 
as  the  abridgement  of  a  pre-existing  authority.  I  mean  not 
therefore  to  contend,  that  the  United  States,  in  the  course  of 
legislation  upon  the  objects  intrusted  to  their  direction,  may 
not  commit  the  decision  of  causes  arising  upon  a  particular 
regulation,  to  the  federal  courts  solely,  if  such  a  measure  should 
be  deemed  expedient;  but  I  hold  that  the  state  courts  will  be 
divested  of  no  part  of  their  primitive  jurisdiction,  further  than 
may  relate  to  an  appeal;  and  I  am  even  of  opinion,  that  in 
every  case  in  which  they  were  not  expressly  excluded  by  the 
future  acts  of  the  national  legislature,  they  will  of  course  take 
cognizance  of  the  causes  to  which  those  acts  may  give  birth. 
This  I  infer  from  the  nature  of  judiciary  power,  and  from  the 
general  genius  of  the  system.  The  judiciary  power  of  every 
government  looks  beyond  its  own  local  or  municipal  laws,  and 
in  .civil  cases,  lays  hold  of  all  subjects  of  litigation  between 
parties  within  its  jurisdiction,  though  the  causes  of  dispute  are 
relative  to  the  laws  of  the  most  distant  part  of  the  globe. 
Those  of  Japan,  not  less  than  of  New- York,  may  furnish  the 
objects  of  legal  discussion  to  our  courts.  When  in  addition  to 
this  we  consider  the  state  governments  and  the  national  gov- 
ernments,  as  they  truly  are,  in  the  light  of  kindred  systems, 
and  as  parts  of  one  whole,  the  inference  seems  to  be  conclusive, 
that  the  state  courts  would  have  a  concurrent  jurisdiction  in 
all  cases  arising  under  the  laws  of  the  union,  where  it  was  not 
expressly  prohibited. 

Here  another  question  occurs;  what  relation  would  subsist 
between  the  national  and  state  courts  in  these  instances  of  con- 
current jurisdiction  ?  I  answer,  that  an  appeal  would  certainly 
lie  from  the  latter,  to  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States. 
The  constitution  in  direct  terms,  gives  an  appellate  jurisdiction 


THE    FEDERALIST.  609 

to  the  supreme  court  in  all  the  enumerated  cases  oi  federal 
cognizance,  in  which  it  is  not  to  have  an  original  one ;  without 
a  single  expression  to  confine  its  operation  to  the  inferior  fede • 
ral  courts.  The  objects  of  appeal,  not  the  tribunals  from  which 
it  is  to  be  made,  are  alone  contemplated.  From  this  circum- 
stance, and  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  it  ought  to  be  con- 
strued to  extend  to  the  state  tribunals.  Either  this  must  be 
the  case,  or  the  local  coui'ts  must  be  excluded  from  a  concurrent 
jurisdiction  in  matters  of  national  concern,  else  the  judiciary 
authority  of  the  union  may  be  eluded  at  the  pleasure  of  every 
plaintiff  or  prosecutor.  Neither  of  these  consequences  ought, 
without  evident  necessity,  to  be  involved ;  the  latter  would  be 
entirely  inadmissible,  as  it  would  defeat  some  of  the  most  im 
portant  and  avowed  purposes  of  the  proposed  government,  and 
would  essentially  embarrass  its  measures.  JSTor  do  I  perceive 
any  foundation  for  such  a  supposition.  Agreeably  to  the  re- 
mark already  made,  the  national  and  state  systems  are  to  be 
regarded  as  one  whole.  The  courts  of  the  latter  will  of  course 
be  natural  auxiliaries  to  the  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  union, 
and  an  appeal  from  them  will  as  naturally  lie  to  that  tribunal, 
which  is  destined  to  unite  and  assimilate  the  principles  of 
national  justice  and  the  rules  of  national  decision.  The  evident 
aim  of  the  plan  of  the  convention  is,  that  all  the  causes  of  the 
specified  classes  shall,  for  weighty  public  reasons,  receive  their 
original  or  final  determination  in  the  courts  of  the  union.  To 
confine,  therefore,  the  general  expressions  which  give  appellate 
jurisdiction  to  the  supreme  court,  to  appeals  from  the  subordi- 
nate federal  courts,  instead  of  allowing  their  extension  to  the 
state  courts,  would  be  to  abridge  the  latitude  of  the  terms,  in 
subversion  of  the  intent,  contraiy  to  every  sound  rule  of  inter- 
pretation. 

But  could  an  appeal  be  made  to  lie  from  the  state  courts,  to 
the  subordinate  federal  judicatories  ?  This  is  another  of  the 
questions  which  have  been  raised,  and  of  greater  difficulty  than 
the  former.  The  following  considerations  countenance  the 
affirmative      The  plan  of  the   convention,  in  the  first  place. 


(510  THE   FEDERALIST. 

authorizes  the  national  legislature  "  to  constitute  tribunals 
inferior  to  the  supreme  court."  *  It  declares  in  the  next  place, 
that  "  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall  be  vested  in 
one  supreme  court,  and  in  such  inferior  courts  as  congress  shall 
ordain  and  establish;"  and  it  then  proceeds  to  enumerate  the 
cases,  to  which  this  judicial  power  shall  extend.  It  afterwards 
divides  the  jurisdiction  of  the  supreme  court  into  original  ana 
appellate,  but  gives  no  definition  of  that  of  the  subordinate 
courts.  The  only  outlines  described  for  them  are,  that  they 
shall  be  "  inferior  to  the  supreme  court,"  and  that  they  shall  not 
exceed  the  specified  limits  of  the  federal  judiciary.  Whether 
their  authority  shall  be  original  or  appellate,  or  both,  is  not 
declared.  All  this  seems  to  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the 
legislature.  And  this  being  the  case,  I  perceive  at  present  no 
impediment  to  the  establishment  of  an  appeal  from  the  state 
courts,  to  the  subordinate  national  tribunals ;  and  many  advan- 
tages attending  the  power  of  doing  it  may  be  imagined.  It 
would  diminish  the  motives  to  the  multiplication  of  federal 
courts,  and  would  admit  of  arrangements  calculated  to  contract 
the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  supreme  court.  The  state 
tribunals,  may  then  be  left  with  a  more  entire  charge  of  federal 
causes;  and  appeals  in  most  cases  in  which  they  may  be 
deemed  proper,  instead  of  being  carried  to  the  supreme  court, 
may  be  made  to  lie  from  the  state  courts,  to  district  courts  of 
the  union. 

PUBLIUS. 
*  Section  8th,  Article  Ist 


THE   FEDERALIST.  611 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER   LXXXIII. 


NEW    YORK,  JULY    15,   18,  22,  26,   1788. 


HAMILTON. 


A   FURTHER  VIEW   OP   THE   JUDICIAL   DEPARTMENT,    IN  RELAllON 
TO  THE   TRIAL  BY  JURY. 

The  objection  to  the  plan  of  the  convention,  which  has  met 
with  most  success  in  this  state,  is  relative  to  tlie  want  of  a  con- 
gtitutional  provision  for  the  trial  by  jury  in  civil  cases.  The  dis- 
ingenuous form  in  which  this  objection  is  usually  stated,  has 
been  repeatedly  adverted  to  and  exposed ;  but  continues  to  be 
pursued  in  all  the  conversations  and  writings  of  the  opponents 
•f  the  plan.  The  mere  silence  of  the  constitution  in  regard  to 
ami  causes,  is  represented  as  an  abolition  of  the  trial  by  jury; 
and  the  declamations  to  which  it  has  afforded  a  pretext,  are 
artfully  calculated  to  induce  a  persuasion  that  this  pretended 
abolition  is  complete  and  universal;  extending  not  only  to 
every  species  of  civil,  but  even  to  criminal  causes.  To  argue 
with  respect  to  the  latter,  would  be  as  vain  and  fruitless,  as  to 
attempt  to  demonstrate  any  of  those  propositions  which,  by 
their  own  internal  evidence,  force  conviction  when  expressed 
ID  language  adapted  to  convey  their  meaning. 

With  regard  to  civil  causes,  subtleties  almost  too  contempti- 
ble for  refutation,  have  been  employed  to  countenance  the 
Burmise  that  a  thing,  which  is  only  not  provided  for,  is  entirely 
abolished.     Every  mao    ^f  discernment  must  at   once  perceive 


812  THE   IfiDERALIST. 

the  /ride  difference  between  silence  and  ibolition.  But  as  the 
inventors  of  this  fallacy  have  attempted  to  support  it  by  cer- 
tain legal  maxims  of  interpretation,  which  they  have  perverted 
from  their  true  meaning,  it  may  not  be  wholly  useless  to  ex- 
plore the  ground  they  have  taken. 

The  maxims  on  which  they  rely  are  of  this  nature,  "  a  speci- 
fication of  particulars,  is  an  exclusion  of  generals ; "  or,  "  the 
expression  of  one  thing,  is  the  exclusion  of  another."  Hence, 
say  they,  as  the  constitution  has  established  the  trial  by  jury 
in  criminal  cases,  and  is  silent  in  respect  to  civil,  this  silence 
is  an  implied  prohibition  of  trial  by  jury,  in  regard  to  the 
latter. 

The  rules  of  legal  intepretation,  are  rules  of  common  sense, 
adopted  by  the  courts  in  the  construction  of  the  laws.  The 
true  test,  therefore,  of  a  just  application  of  them,  is  its  con- 
formity to  the  source  from  which  they  are  derived.  This  being 
the  case,  let  me  ask  if  it  is  consistent  with  common  sense  to 
suppose,  that  a  provision  obliging  the  legislative  power  to 
commit  the  trial  of  criminal  causes  to  juries,  is  a  privation 
of  its  right  to  authorize  or  permit  that  mode  of  trial  in  other 
cases  ?  Is  it  natural  to  suppose,  that  a  command  to  do  one 
thing,  is  a  prohibition  to  the  doing  of  another,  which  there 
was  a  previous  power  to  do,  and  which  is  not  incompatible 
with  the  thing  commanded  to  be  done  ?  If  such  a  supposition 
would  be  unnatural  and  unreasonable,  it  cannot  be  rational  to 
maintain,  that  an  injunction  of  the  trial  by  jury,  in  certain 
cases,  is  an  interdiction  of  it  in  others. 

A  power  to  constitute  courts,  is  a  power  to  prescribe  the 
mode  of  trial;  and  consequently,  if  nothing  was  said  in  the 
constitution  on  the  subject  of  juries,  the  legislature  would  be 
it  liberty  either  to  adopt  that  institution,  or  to  let  it  alone. 
This  discretion,  in  regard  to  criminal  causes,  is  abridged  by 
an  express  injunction ;  but  it  is  left  at  large  in  relation  to  civil 
causes,  for  the  very  reason  that  there  is  a  total  silence  on  the 
subject.  The  specification  of  an  obligation  to  try  all  criminal 
f^auses  in  a  particular  mode,  excludes  indeed  the  obligation  o^ 


THE    FEDERALIST.  613 

employing  the  same  mode  in  civil  causes,  tut  does  not  abridge 
the  power  of  the  legislature  to  appoint  that  mode,  if  it  should 
be  thought  proper.  The  pretence,  therefore,  that  the  national 
legislature  would  not  be  at  liberty  to  submit  all  the  civil  causes 
of  federal  cognizance  to  the  determination  of  juries,  is  a  pre- 
tence destitute  of  all  foundation. 

From  these  observations,  this  conclusion  results,  that  the 
trial  by  jury  in  civil  cases  would  not  be  abolished,  and  that  the 
use  attempted  to  be  made  of  the  maxims  which  have  been 
quoted,  is  contrary  to  reason,  and  therefore  inadmissible.  Even 
if  these  maxims  had  a  precise  technical  sense,  corresponding 
with  the  ideas  of  those  who  employ  them  upon  the  present 
occasion,  which,  however,  is  not  the  case,  they  would  still  be 
inapplicable  to  a  constitution  of  government.  In  relation  to 
such  a  subject,  the  natural  and  obvious  sense  of  its  provisions, 
apart  from  any  technical  rules,  is  the  true  criterion  of  con- 
struction. 

Having  now  seen  that  the  maxims  relied  upon  will  not  bear 
the  use  made  of  them,  let  us  endeavour  to  ascertain  their  proper 
application.  This  will  be  best  done  by  examples.  The  plan  of 
the  convention  declares,  that  the  power  of  congress,  or  in  other 
M^ords  of  the  national  legislature,  shall  extend  to  certain  enume- 
rated cases.  This  specification  of  particulars  evidently  excludes 
all  pretension  to  a  general  legislative  authority;  because  an 
affirmative  grant  of  special  powers  would  be  absurd  as  weU  as 
useless,  if  a  general  authority  was  intended. 

In  like  manner,  the  authority  of  the  federal  judicatures,  is 
declared  by  the  constitution  to  comprehend  certain  cases  par- 
ticularly specified.  The  expression  of  those  cases,  marks  the 
precise  limits  beyond  which  the  federal  courts  cannot  extend 
their  jurisdiction;  because  the  objects  of  their  cognizance  being 
enumerated,  the  specification  would  be  nugatory,  if  it  did  not 
exclude  all  ideas  of  more  extensive  authority. 

These  examples  are  sufficient  to  elucidate  the  maxims  which 
have  been  mentioned,  and  to  designate  the  manner  in  which 
they  should  be  used. 


014  THE    FEDERALIST. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  must  appear  unquestionably 
true,  that  trial  by  jury  is  in  no  case  abolished  by  the  proposed 
constitution;  and  it  is  equally  true,  that  in  those  controversies 
between  individuals  in  which  the  great  body  of  the  people  are 
likely  to  be  interested,  that  institution  will  remain  precisely  in 
the  situation  in  which  it  is  placed  by  the  state  constitutions. 
The  foundation  of  this  assertion  is,  that  the  national  judiciary 
will  have  no  cognizance  of  them,  and  of  course  they  will  remain 
determinable  as  heretofore  by  the  state  courts  only,  and  in  the 
manner  which  the  state  constitutions  and  laws  prescribe.  Al' 
land  causes,  except  where  claims  under  the  grants  of  different 
states  come  into  question,  and  all  other  controversies  between 
the  citizens  of  the  same  state,  unless  where  they  depend  upon 
positive  violations  of  the  articles  of  union,  by  acts  of  the  state 
legislatures,  will  belong  exclusively  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
state  tribunals.  Add  to  this,  that  admiralty  causes,  and  almost 
all  those  which  are  of  equity  jurisdiction,  are  determinable 
under  our  own  government  without  the  intervention  of  a  jury, 
and  the  inference  from  the  whole  will  be,  that  this  institution, 
as  it  exists  with  us  at  present,  cannot  possibly  be  affected,  to 
any  great  extent,  by  the  proposed  alteration  in  our  system  of 
government. 

The  friends  and  adversaries  of  the  plan  of  the  convention, 
if  they  agree  in  nothing  else,  concur  at  least  in  the  value  they 
set  upon  the  trial  by  jury:  Or  if  there  is  any  difference  between 
them,  it  consists  in  this;  the  former  regard  it  as  a  valuable 
safeguard  to  liberty,  the  latter  represent  it  as  the  very  palladium 
of  free  government.  For  my  own  part,  the  more  the  operation 
of  the  institution  has  fallen  under  my  observation,  the  more 
reason  I  have  discovered  for  holding  it  in  high  estimation ;  and 
it  would  be  altogether  superfluous  to  examine  to  what  extent 
it  deserves  to  be  esteemed  useful  or  essential  in  a  representative 
republic,  or  how  much  more  merit  it  may  be  entitled  to,  as  a 
defence  against  the  oppressions  of  an  hereditary  monarch,  than 
as  a  barrier  to  the  tyranny  of  popular  magistrates  in  a  popular 
government.     Discussions  of  this  kind  would  be  more  curious 


THE    FEDERALIST.  615 

than  beneficial,  as  all  are  satisfied  of  the  utility  of  the  instiiu- 
tion.  and  of  its  friendly  aspect  to  liberty.  But  I  must  acknow- 
ledge, that  I  cannot  readily  discern  the  inseparable  connexiox; 
between  the  existence  of  liberty,  and  the  trial  by  jury  in  civil 
cases.  Arbitrary  impeachments,  arbitrary  methods  of  prose- 
cuting pretended  offences,  arbitrary  punishments  upon  arbitrary 
convictions,  have  ever  appeared  to  me  the  great  engines  of 
judicial  despotism;  and  all  these  have  relation  to  criminal 
proceedings.  The  trial  by  jury  in  criminal  cases,  aided  by  the 
habeas  corpus  act,  seems  therefore  to  be  alone  concerned  in  the 
question.  And  both  of  these  are  provided  for,  in  the  moat 
ample  manner,  in  the  plan  of  the  convention. 

It  has  been  observed,  that  trial  by  jury  is  a  safeguard  against 
an  oppressive  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation.  This  obser- 
vation deserves  to  be  canvassed. 

It  is  evident  that  it  can  have  no  influence  upon  the  legislature, 
in  regard  to  the  amount  of  the  taxes  to  be  laid,  to  the  objects  upon 
which  they  are  to  be  imposed,  or  to  the  rule  by  which  they  are 
to  be  apportioned.  If  it  can  have  any  influence,  therefore,  it 
must  be  upon  the  mode  of  collection,  and  the  conduct  of  the 
oflScers  intrusted  with  the  execution  of  the  revenue  laws. 

As  to  the  mode  of  collection  in  this  state,  under  our  own 
consiitution,  the  trial  by  jury  is  in  most  cases  out  of  use.  The 
taxes  are  usually  levied  by  the  more  summary  proceeding  ol 
distress  and  sale,  as  in  cases  of  rent.  And  it  is  acknowledged 
on  all  hands,  that  this  is  essential  to  the  eflScacy  of  the  revenue 
laws.  The  dilatory  course  of  a  trial  at  law  to  recover  the  taxes 
imposed  on  individuals,  would  neither  suit  the  exigencies  of  the 
public,  nor  promote  the  convenience  of  the  citizens.  It  would 
often  occasion  an  accumulation  of  costs,  more  burthensome  than 
the  original  sum  of  the  tax  to  be  levied. 

And  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  officers  of  the  revenue,  the  pro- 
vision in  favour  of  trial  by  jury  in  criminal  cases,  will  allord 
the  desired  security.  Wilful  abuses  of  a  public  authority,  to 
the  oppression  of  the  subject,  and  every  species  of  official  ex- 
tortion, are  offences  against  the  government;  for  which,  the 


>J16  THE   FEDEHALIST. 

persons  who  commit  them,  may  be  indicted  and  punished  ac- 
cording to  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 

The  excellence  of  the  trial  by  jury  in  civil  cases,  appears  to 
depend  on  circnmstances  foreign  to  the  preservation  of  liberty. 
The  strongest  argument  in  its  favour  is,  that  it  is  a  security 
against  corruption.  As  there  is  always  more  time,  and  better 
opportunity,  to  tamper  with  a  standing  body  of  magistrateu. 
than  with  a  jury  summoned  for  the  occasion,  there  is  room  to 
suppose,  that  a  corrupt  influence  would  more  easily  find  its  waj 
to  the  former  than  to  the  latter.  The  force  of  this  considera- 
tion is,  however,  diminished  by  others.  The  sheriff,  who  is  the 
summoner  of  ordinary  juries,  and  the  clerks  of  courts  who 
have  the  nomination  of  special  juries,  are  themselves  standing 
officers,  and  acting  individually,  may  be  supposed  more  accessi- 
ble to  the  touch  of  corruption  than  the  judges,  who  are  a  collec- 
tive body.  It  is  not  difficult  to  see,  that  it  would  be  in  the 
power  of  those  officers  to  select  jurors,  who  would  serve  the 
purpose  of  the  party,  as  well  as  a  corrupted  bench.  In  the 
next  place,  it  may  fairly  be  supposed,  that  there  would  ha  less 
difficulty  in  gaining  some  of  the  jurors  promiscuously  taken 
from  the  public  mass,  than  in  gaining  men  who  had  been  chosen 
by  the  government  for  their  probity  and  good  character.  But 
making  every  deduction  for  these  considerations,  the  trial  by 
jury  must  still  be  a  valuable  check  upon  corruption.  It  greatly 
multiplies  the  impediments  to  its  success.  As  matters  now 
stand,  it  would  be  necessary  to  corrupt  both  court  and  jury ; 
for  where  the  jury  have  gone  evidently  wrong,  the  court  will 
generally  grant  a  new  trial,  and  it  would  be  in  most  cases  of 
little  use  to  practise  upon  the  jury,  unless  the  court  could  be 
likewise  gained.  Here  then  is  a  double  security;  and  it  will 
readily  be  perceived,  that  this  complicated  agency  tends  to 
preserve  the  purity  of  both  institutions  By  increasing  the 
obstacles  to  success,  it  discourages  attempts  to  seduce  the 
integrity  of  either.  The  temptations  to  prostitution,  which 
the  judges  might  have  to  surmount,  must  certainly  be  much 
fewer,  while  the  co-operation  of  a  jury  is  necessary,  than  they 


THE    FEDERALIST.  617 

might  be,  if  they  had  themselves  the  exclusive  determination 
of  all  causes. 

Notwithstanding,  therefore,  the  doubts  I  have  expressed,  as 
to  the  essentiality  of  trial  by  jury  in  civil  suits  to  liberty,  I 
admit  that  it  is  in  most  cases,  under  proper  regulations,  an 
excellent  method  of  determining  questions  of  property ;  and 
that  on  this  account  alone,  it  would  be  entitled  to  a  consti- 
tutional provision  in  its  favour,  if  it  were  possible  to  fix  with 
accuracy  the  limits  within  which  it  ought  to  be  comprehended. 
This,  however,  is  in  its  own  nature  an  affair  of  much  difficulty ; 
and  men  not  blinded  by  enthusiasm,  must  be  sensible,  that  in 
a  federal  government,  which  is  a  composition  of  societies  whose 
ideas  and  institutions  in  relation  to  the  matter,  materially  vary 
from  each  other,  the  difficulty  must  be  not  a  little  augmented. 
For  my  own  part,  at  every  new  view  I  take  of  the  subject,  I 
become  more  convinced  of  the  reality  of  the  obstacles,  which 
we  are  authoritatively  informed,  prevented  the  insertion  of  a 
provision  on  this  head  in  the  plan  of  the  convention. 

The  great  difference  between  the  limits  of  the  jury  trial  in 
different  states,  is  not  generally  understood.  And  as  it  must 
have  considerable  influence  on  the  sentence  we  ought  to  pass 
upon  the  omission  complained  of,  in  regard  to  this  point,  an 
explanation  of  it  is  necessary.  In  this  state,  our  judicial  estab- 
lishments resemble  more  nearly,  than  in  any  other,  those  of 
Great  Britain.  We  have  courts  of  common  law,  courts  of  pro- 
bates (analogous  in  certain  matters  to  the  spiritual  courts  in 
England)  a  court  of  admiralty,  and  a  court  of  chancery.  In 
the  courts  of  common  law  only,  the  trial  by  jury  prevails,  and 
this  with  some  exceptions.  In  all  the  others,  a  single  judge 
presides,  and  proceeds  in  general  either  according  to  the  course 
ol  the  canon  or  civil  law,  without  the  aid  of  a  jury.*  In  New- 
Jersey  there  is  a  court  of  chancery  which  proceeds  like  ours, 
but  neither  courts  of  admiralty,  nor  of  probates,  in  the  sense 

*  It  has  been  erroneously  insinuated,  with  regard  to  the  court  of  chancery, 
that  this  court  generally  tries  disputed  facts  by  a  jury.  The  truth  is,  that 
references  to  a  jury  in  that  court  rarely  happen,  and  are  in  no  case  necessarj 
Out  where  the  validity  of  a  devise  of  land  comes  into  question. 


618  THE    FEDERALIST. 

in  which  these  last  are  established  with  us.  In  that  state,  the 
courts  of  common  law  have  the  cognizance  of  those  causes, 
which  with  us  are  determinable  in  the  courts  of  admiralty  and 
of  probates,  and  of  course  the  jury  trial  is  more  extensive  in 
New-Jersey,  than  in  New- York.  In  Pennsylvania,  this  is  per- 
haps still  more  the  case,  for  there  is  no  court  of  chancery  in 
that  state,  and  its  common  law  courts  have  equity  jurisdiction. 
It  has  a  court  of  admiralty,  but  none  of  probates,  at  least  on 
the  plan  of  ours.  Delaware  has  in  these  respects  imitated 
Pennsylvania.  Maryland  approaches  more  nearly  to  New 
York,  as  does  also  Virginia,  except  that  the  latter  has  a  plu- 
rality of  chancellors.  North-Carolina  bears  most  affinity  to 
Pennsylvania ;  South-Carolina  to  Virginia.  I  believe  however, 
that  in  some  of  those  states  which  have  distinct  courts  of  admi- 
ralty, the  causes  depending  in  them  are  triable  by  juries.  In 
Georgia  there  are  none  but  common  law  courts,  and  an  appeal 
of  course  lies  from  the  verdict  of  one  jury  to  another,  which  is 
called  a  special  jury,  and  for  which  a  particular  mode  of  ap- 
pointment is  marked  out.  In  Connecticut  they  have  no  distinct 
courts,  either  of  chancery  or  of  admiralty,  and  their  courts  of 
probates  have  no  jurisdiction  of  causes.  Their  common  law 
courts  have  admiralty,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  equity  juris- 
diction. In  cases  of  importance,  their  general  assembly  is  the 
only  court  of  chancery.  In  Connecticut,  therefore,  the  trial  by 
jury  extends  in  practice  further  than  in  any  other  state  yet 
mentioned.  Ehode-Island  is,  I  believe,  in  this  particular,  pretty 
much  in  the  situation  of  Connecticut.  Massachusetts  and  New- 
Hampshire,  in  regard  to  the  blending  of  law,  equity,  and  admi- 
ralty jurisdictions,  are  in  a  similar  predicament.  In  the  four 
eastern  states,  the  trial  by  jury  not  only  stands  upon  a  broader 
foundation  than  in  the  other  states,  but  it  is  attended  with  a 
peculiarity  unknown,  in  its  full  extent,  to  any  of  them.  There 
is  an  appeal  of  course  from  one  jury  to  another,  till  there  have 
been  two  verdicts  out  of  three  on  one  side. 

From  this  sketch  it  appears,  that  there  is  a  material  diversity 
as  well  in  the  modification  as  in  thd  extent  of  the  institution  of 


THE   FEDERALIST.  619 

trial  by  jury  in  civil  cases  in  the  several  states;  and  from  this 
fact,  these  obvious  reflections  flow.  First,  that  no  general  rule 
could  have  been  fixed  upon  by  the  convention  which  would 
have  corresponded  with  the  circumstances  of  all  the  states; 
and  secondly,  that  more,  or  at  least  as  much  might  have  been 
hazarded,  by  taking  the  system  of  any  one  state  for  a  standard, 
as  by  omitting  a  provision  altogether,  and  leaving  the  matter 
as  has  been  done  to  legislative  regulation. 

The  propositions  which  have  been  made  for  supplying  the 
omission,  have  rather  served  to  illustrate,  than  to  obviate  the 
diflSculty  of  the  thing.  The  minority  of  Pennsylvania  have 
proposed  this  mode  of  expression  for  the  purpose,  "  trial  by 
jury  shall  be  as  heretofore;"  and  this  I  maintain  would  be  inap- 
plicable and  indeterminate.  The  United  States,  in  their  collec- 
tive capacity,  are  the  object  to  which  all  general  provisions  in 
the  constitution  must  be  understood  to  refer.  Now,  it  is  evi- 
dent, that  though  trial  by  jury,  with  various  limitations,  is 
known  in  each  state  individually,  yet  in  the  United  States,  as 
such,  it  is,  strictly  speaking,  unknown;  because  the  present 
federal  government  has  no  judiciary  power  whatever;  and  con- 
sequently there  is  no  antecedent  establishment,  to  which  the 
term  heretofore  could  properly  relate.  It  would  therefore  be 
destitute  of  precise  meaning,  and  inoperative  from  its  uncer- 
tainty. 

As  )n  the  one  hand,  the  form  of  the  provision  would  not 
fulfil  the  intent  of  its  proposers;  so  on  the  other,  if  I  appre- 
hend that  intent  rightly,  it  would  be  in  itself  inexpedient.  I 
presume  it  to  be,  that  causes  in  the  federal  courts  should  be 
tried  by  jury,  if  in  the  state  where  the  courts  sat,  that  mode  of 
trial  would  obtain  in  a  similar  case  in  the  state  courts — that  is 
to  say,  admiralty  causes  should  be  tried  in  Connecticut  by  a 
jury,  in  New- York  without  one.  The  capricious  operation  of 
so  dissimilar  a  method  of  trial  in  the  same  cases,  under  the 
same  government,  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  indispose  every  well 
regulated  judgment  towards  it.     Whether  the  cause  should  be 

.50 


620  THE    FEDERALIST. 

tried  with,  or  without  a  jury,  would  depend,  in  a  great  number 
of  cases,  on  the  accidental  situation  of  the  court  and  parties. 

But  this  is  not,  in  my  estimation,  the  greatest  objection.  1 
feel  a  deep  and  deliberate  conviction,  that  there  are  many  cases 
in  which  the  trial  by  jury  is  an  ineligible  one.  I  think  it  so 
particularly,  in  suits  which  concern  the  public  peace  with 
foreign  nations;  that  is  in  most  cases  where  the  question  turna 
wholly  on  the  laws  of  nations.  Of  this  nature,  among  others, 
are  all  prize  causes.  Juries  cannot  be  supposed  competent  to 
investigations,  that  require  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  laws 
and  usages  of  nations ;  and  they  will  sometimes  be  under  the 
influence  of  impressions  which  will  not  suffer  them  to  pay 
8uflS.cient  regard  to  those  considerations  of  public  policy,  which 
ought  to  guide  their  inquiries.  There  would  of  course  be 
always  danger,  that  the  rights  of  other  nations  might  be  in- 
fringed by  their  decisions,  so  as  to  afford  occasions  of  reprisal 
and  war.  Though  the  true  province  of  juries  be  to  determine 
matters  of  fact,  yet  in  most  cases,  legal  consequences  are  com- 
plicated with  fact  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  render  a  separation 
impracticable. 

It  will  add  great  weight  to  this  remark,  in  relation  to  prize 
causes,  to  mention,  that  the  method  of  determining  them  has 
been  thought  worthy  of  particular  regulation  in  various  treaties 
between  different  powers  of  Europe,  and  that,  pursuant  to  such 
treaties,  they  are  determinable  in  Great  Britain  in  the  last 
resort  before  the  king  himself  in  his  privy  council,  where  the 
fact  as  well  as  the  law,  undergoes  a  re-examination.  This 
alone  demonstrates  the  impolicy  of  inserting  a  fundamental 
provision  in  the  constitution  which  would  make  the  state 
systems  a  standard  for  the  national  government  in  the  article 
under  consideration,  and  the  danger  of  incumbering  the  goveru- 
ment  with  any  constitutional  provisions,  the  propriety  of  which 
is  not  indisputable. 

My  convictions  are  equally  strong,  that  great  ad'«antage8 
result  from  the  separation  of  the  equity  from  the  law  juris- 
diction; and  that  the  causes  which  belong  to  the  former,  would 


THE    FEDERALIST.  621 

De  improperly  committed  to  juries.  The  great  ana  primary 
use  of  a  court  of  equity,  is  to  give  relief  in  extraordinary  cases, 
which  are  exceptions*  to  general  rules.  To  unite  the  jurisdiction 
of  such  cases,  with  the  ordinary  jurisdiction,  must  have  a 
tendency  to  unsettle  the  general  rules,  and  to  subject  every 
case  that  arises  to  a  special  determination :  "While  a  separation 
between  the  jurisdictions,  has  the  contrary  effect  of  rendering 
one  a  sentinel  over  the  other,  and  of  keeping  each  within  the 
expedient  limits.  Besides  this,  the  circumstances  that  consti- 
tute cases  proper  for  courts  of  equity,  are  in  many  instances  so 
nice  and  intricate,  that  they  are  incompatible  with  the  genius 
of  trials  by  jury.  They  require  often  such  long  and  critical 
investigation,  as  would  be  impracticable  to  men  called  occasion- 
ally from  their  occupations,  and  obliged  to  decide  before  they 
were  permitted  to  return  to  them.  The  simplicity  and  expe- 
dition which  form  the  distinguishing  characters  of  this  mode 
of  trial  require,  that  the  matter  to  be  decided  should  be  re- 
duced to  some  single  and  obvious  point;  while  the  litigations 
usual  in  chancery,  frequently  comprehend  a  long  train  of  minute 
and  independent  particulars. 

It  is  true,  that  the  separation  of  the  equity  from  the  legal 
jurisdiction,  is  peculiar  to  the  English  system  of  jurisprudence; 
the  model  which  has  been  followed  in  several  of  the  states. 
But  it  is  equally  true,  that  the  trial  by  jury  has  been  unknown 
in  every  instance  in  which  they  have  been  united.  And  the 
separation  is  essential  to  the  preservation  of  that  institution 
in  its  pristine  purity.  The  nature  of  a  court  of  equity  will 
readily  permit  the  extension  of  its  jurisdiction  to  matters  of 
law,  but  it  is  not  a  little  to  be  suspected,  that  the  attempt  to 
extend  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  law  to  matters  of 
equity,  will  not  only  be  unproductive  of  the  advantages  which 
may  be  derived  from  courts  of  chancery,  on  the  plan  upon 
which  they  are  established  in  this  state,  but  will  tend  gradually 

*  It  is  true  that  the  principles  by  which  that  relief  is  governed  are  now 
reduced  t^  a  regular  system;  but  it  is  not  the  less  true  that  they  are  in  the 
main  applicable  to  spbcial  circums nances,  which  form  exceptions  to  general 
rules 


622  THE    FEDERALIST. 

to  change  the  nature  of  the  courts  of  law,  and  to  undermine 
the  trial  by  jury,  by  introducing  questions  too  complicated  for 
a  decision  in  that  mode. 

These  appear  to  be  conclusive  reasons  against  incorporating 
the  systems  of  all  the  states,  in  the  formation  of  the  national 
judiciary;  according  to  what  may  be  conjectured  to  have  been 
the  intent  of  the  Pennsylvania  minority.  Let  us  now  examine 
how  far  the  proposition  of  Massachusetts  is  calculated  to  remedy 
the  supposed  defect. 

It  is  in  this  form:  "  In  civil  actions  between  citizens  of  differ- 
ent states,  every  issue  of  fact,  arising  in  actions  at  common  law, 
may  be  tried  by  a  jury,  if  the  parties,  or  either  of  them,  request 
it." 

This,  at  best,  is  a  proposition  confined  to  one  description  of 
causes ;  and  the  inference  is  fair  either  that  the  Massachusetts 
convention  considered  that  as  the  only  class  of  federal  causes, 
in  which  the  trial  by  jury  would  be  proper;  or  that,  if  desirous 
of  a  more  extensive  provision,  they  found  it  impracticable  to 
devise  one  which  would  properly  answer  the  end.  If  the  first, 
the  omission  of  a  regulation  respecting  so  partial  an  object,  can 
never  be  considered  as  a  material  imperfection  in  the  system. 
If  the  last,  it  affords  a  strong  corroboration  of  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  the  thing. 

But  this  is  not  all :  If  we  advert  to  the  observations  already 
made  respecting  the  courts  that  subsist  in  the  several  states  of 
the  union,  and  the  different  powers  exercised  by  them,  it  will 
appear,  that  there  are  no  expressions  more  vague  and  indeter- 
minate than  those  which  have  been  emploj'ed  to  characterize 
that  species  of  causes  which  it  is  intended  shall  be  entitled  to  a 
trial  by  jury.  In  this  state,  the  boundaries  between  actions  at 
common  law  and  actions  of  equitable  jurisdiction,  are  ascer- 
tained in  conformity  to  the  rules  which  prevail  in  England 
upon  that  subject.  In  many  of  the  other  states,  the  boundaries 
are  less  precise.  In  some  of  them,  every  cause  is  to  be  tried  in  a 
court  of  common  law,  and  upon  that  foundation  every  action  may 
be  considered  as  an  action  at  common  law,  to  be  determinoa 


THE   FEDERALIST.  623 

by  a  jury,  if  the  parties,  or  either  of  them,  choose  it.  Hence 
the  same  irregularity  and  confusion  would  be  introduced  by  a 
compliance  with  this  proposition,  that  I  have  already  noticed 
ds  resulting  from  the  regulation  proposed  by  the  Pennsylvania 
minority.  In  one  state  a  cause  would  receive  its  determination 
from  a  jury,  if  the  parties,  or  either  of  them,  requested  it;  but 
in  another  state,  a  cause  exactly  similar  to  the  other,  must  be 
decided  without  the  intervention  of  a  jury,  because  the  state 
tribunals  varied  as  to  common  law  jurisdiction. 

It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  the  Massachusetts  proposition 
cannot  operate  as  a  general  regulation,  until  some  uniform 
plan,  with  respect  to  the  limits  of  common  law  and  equitable 
jurisdictions,  shall  be  adopted  by  the  different  states.  To 
devise  a  plan  of  that  kind,  is  a  task  arduous  in  itself,  and 
which  it  would  require  much  time  and  reflection  to  mature. 
It  would  be  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  suggest 
any  general  regulation  that  would  be  acceptable  to  all  the 
states  in  the  union,  or  that  would  perfectly  quadrate  with  the 
several  state  institutions. 

It  may  be  asked,  why  could  not  a  reference  have  been  made 
to  the  constitution  of  this  state,  taking  that,  which  is  allowed 
by  me  to  be  a  good  one,  as  a  standard  for  the  United  States  ? 
I  answer,  that  it  is  not  very  probable  the  other  states  should 
entertain  the  same  opinion  of  our  institutions  which  we  do 
ourselves.  It  is  natural  to  suppose  that  they  are  more  attached 
to  their  own,  and  that  each  would  struggle  for  the  preference. 
If  the  plan  of  taking  one  state  as  a  model  for  the  whole  had 
been  thought  of  in  the  convention,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that 
the  adoption  of  it  in  that  body,  would  have  been  rendered  diffi- 
cult by  the  predilection  of  each  representation  in  favour  of  its 
own  government ;  and  it  must  be  uncertain  which  of  the  states 
would  have  been  taken  as  the  model.  It  has  been  shown,  that 
many  of  them  would  be  improper  ones.  And  I  leave  it  to  con- 
jecture whether,  under  all  circumstances,  it  is  most  likely  that 
N^ew-Y(  rk,  or  some  other  state,  would   have  been  preferred 


624  THE    FEDERALIST. 

But  admit  that  a  judicious  selection  could  have  been  effected  in 
the  con^rention,  still  there  would  have  been  great  danger  of 
jealousy  and  disgust  in  the  other  states,  at  the  partiality  which 
had  been  shown  to  the  institutions  of  one.  The  enemies  of  the 
plan  would  have  been  furnished  with  a  fine  pretext,  for  raising 
a  host  of  local  prejudices  against  it,  which  perhaps  might  have 
hazarded,  in  no  inconsiderable  degree,  its  final  establishment. 

To  avoid  the  embarrassments  of  a  definition  of  the  cases 
which  the  trial  by  jury  ought  to  embrace,  it  is  sometimes 
suggested  by  men  of  enthusiastic  tempers,  that  a  provision 
might  have  been  inserted  for  establishing  it  in  all  cases  what- 
soever. For  this,  I  believe  no  precedent  is  to  be  found  in  any 
member  of  the  union ;  and  the  considerations  which  have  been 
stated  in  discussing  the  proposition  of  the  minority  of  Penn- 
sylvania, must  satisfy  every  sober  mind,  that  the  establishment 
of  the  trial  by  jury  in  all  cases,  would  have  been  an  unpardon- 
able error  in  the  plan. 

In  short,  the  more  it  is  considered,  the  more  arduous  will 
appear  the  task  of  fashioning  a  provision  in  such  a  form,  as  not 
to  express  too  little  to  answer  the  purpose,  or  too  much  to  be 
advisable ;  or  which  might  not  have  opened  other  sources  of 
opposition,  to  the  great  and  essential  object,  of  introducing  a 
firm  national  government. 

I  cannot  but  persuade  myself  on  the  other  hand,  that  the 
different  lights  in  which  the  subject  has  been  placed  in  the 
course  of  these  observations,  will  go  far  towards  removing  in 
candid  minds,  the  apprehensions  they  may  have  entertained  on 
the  point.  They  have  tended  to  show,  that  the  security  of 
liberty  is  materially  concerned  only  in  the  trial  by  jury  in 
criminal  cases,  which  is  provided  for  in  the  most  ample  manner 
in  the  plan  of  the  convention ;  that  even  in  far  the  greatest 
proportion  of  civil  cases,  those  in  which  the  great  body  of  the 
community  is  interested,  that  mode  of  trial  will  remain  in  full 
force,  as  established  in  the  state  constitutions,  untouched  and 
unaffected  by  the  plan  of  the  convention  :  That  it  is  in  no  mse 


THE   FEDERALIST.  626 

abolished  *  by  that  plan ;  and  that  there  are  great,  if  not  in- 
surmountable difficulties  in  the  way  of  making  any  precise  and 
proper  provision  for  it,  in  a  constitution  for  the  United  States. 

The  best  judges  of  the  matter  will  be  the  least  anxious  for  a 
constitutional  establishment  of  the  trial  by  jury  in  civil  cases, 
and  will  be  the  most  ready  to  admit,  that  the  changes  which 
are  continually  happening  in  the  affairs  of  society,  may  render 
a  different  mode  of  determining  questions  of  property,  prefer- 
able in  many  eases,  in  which  that  mode  of  trial  now  prevails. 
For  my  own  part,  I  acknowledge  myself  to  be  convinced  that, 
even  in  this  state,  it  might  be  advantageously  extended  to 
some  cases  to  which  it  does  not  at  present  apply,  and  might  as 
advantageously  be  abridged  in  others.  It  is  conceded  by  all 
reasonable  men,  that  it  ought  not  to  obtain  in  all  cases.  The 
examples  of  innovations  which  contract  its  ancient  limits,  as 
well  in  these  states  as  in  Great  Britain,  afford  a  strong  pre- 
sumption that  its  former  extent  has  been  found  inconvenient ; 
and  give  room  to  suppose  that  future  experience  may  discover 
the  propriety  and  utility  of  other  exceptions.  1  suspect  it  tc 
be  impossible  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  to  fix  the  salutary 
point  at  which  the  operation  of  the  institution  ought  to  stop  j 
^nd  this  is  with  me  a  strong  argument  for  leaving  the  mattei 
to  the  discretion  of  the  legislature. 

This  is  now  clearly  understood  to  be  the  case  in  Great  Britain 
and  it  is  equally  so  in  the  state  of  Connecticut;  and  yet  it  may 
be  safely  affirmed,  that  more  numerous  encroachments  have 
been  made  upon  the  trial  by  jury  in  this  state  since  the  revolu- 
tion, though  provided  for  by  a  positive  article  of  our  constitu- 
tion, than  has  happened  in  the  same  time  either  in  Connecticut 
or  Great  Britain.  It  may  be  added,  that  these  encroachments 
have  generally  originated  with  the  men  who  endeavour  to 
persuade  the  people  they  are  the  warmest  defenders  of  popular 
liberty,  but  who  have  rarely  suffered  constitutional  obstacles 

*  Vide  No.  LXXXI.  in  which  the  supposition  of  its  being  abolished  by  the 
appellate  jurisdiction  in  matters  of  fact  being  vested  in  the  supreme  court,  is 
examined  and  refuted. 


626  THE    FEDERALIST. 

to  arrest  them  in  a  favourite  career.  The  truth  is,  that  the 
general  genius  of  a  government  is  all  that  can  be  substantially 
relied  upon  for  permanent  effects.  Particular  provisions,  though 
not  altogether  useless,  have  far  less  virtue  and  eflScacy  than  are 
commonly  ascribed  to  them ;  and  the  want  of  them,  will  never 
be  with  men  of  sound  discernment,  a  decisive  objection  to  any 
plan  which  exhibits  the  leading  characters  of  a  good  govern- 
ment. 

It  certainly  sounds  not  a  little  harsh  and  extraordinary  to 
affirm,  that  there  is  no  security  for  liberty  in  a  constitution 
which  expressly  establishes  the  trial  by  jury  in  criminal  cases, 
because  it  does  not  do  it  in  civil  also ;  while  it  is  a  notorious 
fact  that  Connecticut,  which  has  been  always  regarded  as  the 
most  popular  state  in  the  union,  can  boast  of  no  constitutional 
provision  for  either. 

PUBLIUS. 


THE  FEDERALIST.  627 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    I>XXXIV. 


NEW  YORK,   JULY  29  AND   AUGUST  8,  12,  178&. 


HAMILTON. 


CONCERNING  SEVERAL  MISCELLANEOUS  OBJECTIONS. 

In  the  course  of  the  foregoing  review  of  the  constitution,  I 
have  endeavoured  to  answer  most  of  the  objections  which  have 
appeared  against  it.  There  remain,  however,  a  few  which  either 
did  not  fall  naturally  under  any  particular  head,  or  were  for- 
gotten in  their  proper  places.  These  shall  now  be  discussed : 
but  as  the  subject  has  been  drawn  into  great  length,  I  shall  so 
far  consult  brevity,  as  to  comprise  all  my  observations  on  these 
miscellaneous  points  in  a  single  paper. 

The  most  considerable  of  the  remaining  objections  is,  that 
tne  plan  of  the  convention  contains  no  bill  of  rights.  Among 
other  answers  given  to  this,  it  has  been  upon  different  occasions 
remarked,  that  the  constitutions  of  several  of  the  states  are  in 
a  similar  predicament.  I  add,  that  New- York  is  of  the  number. 
And  yet  the  persons  who  in  this  state  oppose  the  new  system, 
while  they  profess  an  unlimited  admiration  for  our  particular 
constitution,  are  among  the  most  intemperate  partizans  of  a 
bill  of  rights.  To  justify  their  zeal  in  this  matter,  they  allege 
two  tnings :  one  is,  that  though  the  constitution  of  New-York 
has  no  bill  of  rights  prefixed  to  it,  yet  it  contains,  in  the  body 
of  it,  various  provisions  in  favour  of  particular  privileges  and 
rights,  which,  in  substance,  amount  to  the  same  thing;   the 


628  THE    FKDERALIST. 

other  is,  that  the  constitution  adopts,  in  their  full  extent,  the 
common  and  statute  law  of  Great  Britain,  by  which  many 
other  rights,  not  expressed,  are  equally  secured. 

To  the  first  I  answer,  that  the  constitution  offered  by  the 
convention  contains,  as  well  as  the  constitution  of  this  state,  a 
number  of  such  provisions. 

Independent  of  those  which  relate  to  the  structure  of  the 
government,  we  find  the  following :  Article  I.  section  3.  clause  7. 
"  Judgment  in  cases  of  impeachment  shall  not  extend  further 
than  to  removal  from  office,  and  disqualification  to  hold  and 
enjoy  any  office  of  honour,  trust,  or  profit  under  the  United 
States;  but  the  party  convicted  shall,  nevertheless,  be  liable 
and  subject  to  indictment,  trial,  judgment,  and  punishment, 
according  to  law."  Section  9.  of  the  same  article,  clause  2. 
"  The  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  sus- 
pended, unless  when  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion  the  public 
safety  may  require  it."  Clause  3.  "  No  bill  of  attainder  or 
ex  post  facto  law  shall  be  passed."  Clause  7.  "No  title  of 
nobility  shall  be  granted  by  the  United  States ;  and  no  person 
holding  any  office  of  profit  or  trust  under  them,  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  the  congress,  accept  of  any  present,  emolument, 
office,  or  title,  of  any  kind  whatever,  from  any  king,  prince,  or 
foreign  state."  Article  III.  section  2.  clause  3.  "  The  trial  of 
all  crimes,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment,  shall  be  by  jury  j 
and  such  trial  shall  be  held  in  the  state  where  the  said  crimes 
shall  have  been  committed;  but  when  not  committed  within 
any  state,  the  trial  shall  be  at  such  place  or  places  as  the  con- 
gress may  by  law  have  directed "  Section  3.  of  the  same 
article,  "  Treason  against  the  United  States  shall  consist  only 
in  levying  war  against  them,  or  in  adhering  to  their  enemies, 
giving  them  aid  and  comfort.  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of 
treason,  unless  on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same 
overt  act,  or  on  confession  in  open  court."  And  clause  3.  of 
the  same  section,  "  The  congress  shall  have  power  to  declare 
the  punishment  of  treason ;  but  no  attainder  of  treason  shall 


THE   FEDERALIST.  629 

work  corruption  of  blood,  or  forfeiture,  except  during  the  life 
of  the  person  attainted." 

It  may  well  be  a  question,  whether  these  are  not,  upon  tho 
whole,  of  equal  importance  with  any  which  are  to  be  found  in 
the  constitution  of  this  state.  The  establishment  of  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus,  the  prohibition  of  ex  post  facto  laws,  and  of 
TITLES  OF  NOBILITY,  to  wMch  we  have  no  corresponding  provision'^ 
in  our  constitution,  are  perhaps  greater  securities  to  liberty  than 
any  it  contains.  The  creation  of  crimes  after  the  commission 
of  the  fact,  or,  in  other  words,  the  subjecting  of  men  to  punish- 
ment for  things  which,  when  they  were  done,  were  breaches  of 
no  law ;  and  the  practice  of  arbitrary  imprisonments  have  been, 
in  all  ages,  the  favourite  and  most  formidable  instruments  of 
tyranny.  The  observations  of  the  judicious  Blackstone,*  in 
reference  to  the  latter,  are  well  worthy  of  recital :  "  To  bereave 
a  man  of  life  (says  he)  or  by  violence  to  confiscate  his  estate, 
without  accusation  or  trial,  would  be  so  gross  and  notorious  an 
act  of  despotism,  as  must  at  once  convey  the  alarm  of  tyranny 
throughout  the  whole  nation ;  but  confinement  of  the  person, 
by  secretly  hurrying  him  to  jail,  where  his  sufferings  are 
unknown  or  forgotten,  is  a  less  public,  a  less  striking,  and  there- 
fore a  more  dangerous  engine  of  arbitrary  government."  And  as 
51  remedy  for  this  fatal  evil,  he  is  every  where  peculiarly 
emphatical  in  his  encomiums  on  the  habeas  corpus  act,  which  in 
one  place  he  calls  "  the  bulwark  of  the  British  constitution."  f 

Nothing  need  be  said  to  illustrate  the  importance  of  the  pro- 
hibition of  titles  of  nobility.  This  may  truly  be  denominated 
the  corner  stone  of  republican  government;  for  so  long  as  they 
are  excluded,  there  can  never  be  serious  danger  that  the  govern- 
ment will  be  any  other  than  that  of  the  people. 

To  the  second,  that  is,  to  the  pretended  establishment  of  the 
common  and  statute  law  by  the  constitution,  I  answer,  that 
they  are  expressly  made  subject  "to  such  alterations  and  pro- 
visions as  the  legislature  shall  from  time  to  time  make  concern- 

*  Vide  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  voL  1,  p.  136. 
f  Idem,  vol.  4,  page  438. 


680  THE    FEDERALIST. 

ing  the  same."  They  are  therefore  at  any  moment  liable  to 
repeal  by  the  ordinary  legislative  power,  and  of  course  have 
no  constitutional  sanction.  The  onlj'^  use  of  the  declaration 
was  to  recognize  the  ancient  law,  and  to  remove  doubts  which 
might  have  been  occasioned  by  the  revolution.  This  conse- 
quently can  be  considered  as  no  part  of  a  declaration  of  rights ; 
which  under  our  constitutions  must  be  intended  to  limit  the 
power  of  the  government  itself. 

It  has  been  several  times  truly  remarked,  that  bills  of  rights 
are,  in  their  origin,  stipulations  between  kings  and  their  sub- 
jects, abridgements  of  prerogative  in  favour  of  privilege, 
reservations  of  rights  not  surrendered  to  the  prince.  Such 
was  MAGNA  CHARTA,  obtained  by  the  Barons,  sword  in  hand, 
from  king  John.  Such  were  the  subsequent  confirmations  of 
that  charter  by  succeeding  princes.  Such  was  the  petition  of 
right  assented  to  by  Charles  the  First,  in  the  beginning  of  his 
reign.  Such  also,  was  the  declaration  of  right  presented  by 
the  lords  and  commons  to  the  prince  of  Orange  in  1688,  and 
afterwards  thrown  into  the  form  of  an  act  of  parliament,  called 
the  bill  of  rights.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  according  lo 
their  primitive  signification,  they  have  no  application  to  consti- 
tutions professedly  founded  upon  the  power  of  the  people,  and 
executed  by  their  immediate  representatives  and  servants. 
Here,  in  strictness,  the  people  surrender  nothing;  and  as  they 
retain  every  thing,  they  have  no  need  of  particular  reserva- 
tions. "  We  the  people  of  the  United  States,  to  secure  the 
blessings  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  our  posterity,  do  ordain 
and  establish  this  constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America:" 
This  is  a  better  recognition  of  popular  rights,  than  volumes  of 
those  aphorisms,  which  make  the  principal  figure  in  several  of 
our  state  bills  of  rights,  and  which  would  sound  much  better 
in  a  treatise  of  ethics,  than  in  a  constitution  of  government 

But  a  minute  detail  of  particular  rights,  is  certainly  far  less 
applicable  to  a  constitution  like  that  under  consideration,  which 
is  merely  intended  to  regulate  the  general  political  interests  of 
the  nation,  than  to  one  which  has  the  regulation  of  every  spe- 


THE    FEDERALIST.  631 

cies  of  personal  and  private  concerns.  If  therefore  the  loud 
clamours  against  the  plan  of  the  convention,  on  this  score,  are 
well  founded,  no  epithets  of  reprobation  will  be  too  strong  for 
the  constitution  of  this  state.  But  the  truth  is,  that  both  ol 
them  contain  all  which,  in  relation  to  their  objects,  is  reason- 
ably to  be  desired. 

I  go  further,  and  aflEirm,  that  bills  of  rights,  in  the  sense  and 
to  the  extent  they  are  contended  for,  are  not  only  unnecessary 
in  the  proposed  constitution,  but  would  even  be  dangeroup 
They  would  contain  various  exceptions  to  powers  not  granted , 
and  on  this  very  account,  would  afford  a  colourable  pretext  to 
claim  more  than  were  granted.  For  why  declare  that  things 
shall  not  be  done,  which  there  is  no  power  to  do  ?  Why,  for 
instance,  should  it  be  said,  that  the  liberty  of  the  press  shall 
not  be  restrained,  when  no  power  is  given  by  which  restrictions 
may  be  imposed  ?  I  will  not  contend  that  such  a  provision 
would  confer  a  regulating  power;  but  it  is  evident  that  it 
would  furnish,  to  men  disposed  to  usurp,  a  plausible  pretence 
for  claiming  that  power.  The}'  might  urge  with  a  semblance 
of  reason,  that  the  constitution  ought  not  to  be  charged  with 
the  absurdity  of  providing  against  the  abuse  of  an  authority, 
which  was  not  given,  and  that  the  provision  against  restraining 
the  liberty  of  the  press  afforded  a  clear  implication,  that  a  right 
to  prescribe  proper  regulations  concerning  it,  was  intended  to 
be  vested  in  the  national  government.  This  may  serve  as  a 
specimen  of  the  numerous  handles  which  would  be  given  to  the 
doctrine  of  constructive  powers,  by  the  indulgence  of  an  inju- 
dicious zeal  for  bills  of  rights. 

On  the  subject  of  the  liberty  of  the  press,  as  much  has  been 
said,  I  cannot  forbear  adding  a  remark  or  two :  In  the  first 
place,  I  observe  that  there  is  not  a  syllable  concerning  it  in  the 
constitution  of  this  state ;  in  the  next,  I  contend  that  whatever 
has  been  said  about  it  in  that  of  any  other  state,  amounts  to 
nothing.  What  signifies  a  declaration,  that  "  the  liberty  of  the 
press  shall  be  inviolably  preserved?"  What  is  the  liberty  of  the 
press  ?     Who  can  give  it  any  definition  which  would  not  leave 


632  THE    FEDERALIST. 

tbe  utmost  latitude  for  evasion  ?  I  hold  it  to  be  impracticable; 
and  from  this  I  infer,  that  its  security,  whatever  l&ne  d'^clara- 
tions  may  be  inserted  in  any  constitution  respecting  it,  must 
altogether  depend  on  public  opinion,  and  on  the  general  spirit 
of  the  people  and  of  the  government.*  And  here,  after  all,  as 
intimated  upon  another  occasion,  must  we  seek  for  the  only 
solid  basis  of  all  our  rights. 

There  remains  but  one  other  view  of  this  matter  to  conclude 
the  point.  The  truth  is,  after  all  the  declamation  we  have 
heard,  that  the  constitution  is  itself,  in  every  rational  sense, 
and  to  every  useful  purpose,  a  bill  of  rights.  The  several 
bills  of  rights,  in  Great  Britain,  form  its  constitution,  and  con- 
versely the  constitution  of  each  state  is  its  bill  of  rights.  In 
like  manner  the  proposed  constitution,  if  adopted,  will  be  the 
bill  of  rights  of  the  union.  Is  it  one  object  of  a  bill  of  rights 
to  declare  and  specify  the  political  privileges  of  the  citizens  in 
the  structure  and  administration  of  the  government  ?  This  is 
done  in  the  most  ample  and  precise  manner  in  the  plan  of  the 
convention ;  comprehending  various  precautions  for  the  public 
security,  which  are  not  to  be  found  in  any  of  the  state  consti- 
tutions. Is  another  object  of  a  bill  of  rights  to  define  certain 
immunities  and  modes  of  proceeding,  which  are  relative  to  per- 

*  To  show  that  there  is  a  power  in  the  constitution,  by  which  the  liberty 
of  the  press  may  be  affected,  recourse  has  been  had  to  the  power  of  taxation. 
It  is  said,  that  duties  may  be  laid  upon  publications  so  high  as  to  amount  to 
a  prohibition.  I  know  not  by  what  logic  it  could  be  maintained,  that  the 
declarations  in  the  state  constitutions,  in  favour  of  the  freedom  of  the  press, 
would  be  a  constitutional  impediment  to  the  imposition  of  duties  upon  publi- 
cations by  the  state  legislatures.  It  cannot  certainly  be  pretended  that  any 
degree  of  duties,  however  low,  would  be  an  abridgement  of  the  liberty  of  th» 
press.  We  know  that  newspapers  are  taxed  in  Great  Britain,  and  yet  it  is 
notorious  that  the  press  no  where  enjoys  greater  liberty  than  in  that  country. 
And  if  duties  of  any  kind  may  be  laid  without  a  violation  of  that  liberty,  it 
is  evident  that  the  extent  must  depend  on  legislative  discretion,  regulated  by 
public  opinion ;  so  that  after  all,  general  declarations  respecting  the  liberty 
of  the  press,  will  give  it  no  greater  security  than  it  will  have  withoiit  them. 
The  same  invasions  of  it  may  be  effected  under  the  state  constitutions  wL  icb 
contain  those  declarations  through  the  means  of  taxation,  as  under  the  pro 
posed  constitution,  which  has  nothing  of  the  kind.  It  would  be  quite  as 
significant  to  declare,  that  government  ought  to  be  free,  that  taxes  ought  not 
to  be  excessive,  &c.  as  that  the  liberty  of  the  press  ought  not  to  be  res'irained 


THE    FEDERALIST.  635 

sonal  and  private  concerns?  This  we  have  seen  has  also  been 
attended  to,  in  a  variety  of  cases,  in  the  same  plan.  Adverting 
therefore  to  the  substantial  meaning  of  a  bill  of  rights,  it  lo 
absurd  to  allege  that  it  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  work  of  the 
convention.  It  may  be  said  that  it  does  not  go  far  enough, 
though  it  will  not  be  easy  to  make  this  appear ;  but  it  can  with 
no  propriety  be  contended  that  there  is  no  such  thing.  It  cer- 
tainly must  be  immaterial  what  mode  is  observed  as  to  the 
order  of  declaring  the  rights  of  the  citizens,  if  they  are  pro- 
vided for  in  any  part  of  the  instrument  which  establishes  the 
government.  "Whence  it  must  be  apparent  that  much  of  what 
has  been  said  on  this  subject  rests  merely  on  verbal  and  nomi- 
nal distinctions,  entirely  foreign  to  the  substance  of  the  thing. 

Another  objection,  which,  from  the  frequency  of  its  repeti- 
tion, may  be  presumed  to  be  relied  on,  is  of  this  nature :  It  is 
improper  (say  the  objectors)  to  confer  such  large  powers,  as  are 
proposed,  upon  the  national  government :  because  the  seat  of 
that  government  must  of  necessity  be  too  remote  from  many 
of  the  states  to  admit  of  a  proper  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the 
constituent,  of  the  conduct  of  the  representative  body.  This 
argument,  if  it  proves  any  thing,  proves  that  there  ought  to  be 
no  general  government  whatever.  For  the  powers  which  it 
seems  to  be  agreed  on  all  hands,  ought  to  be  vested  in  the 
union,  cannot  be  safely  intrusted  to  a  body  which  is  not  under 
every  requisite  control.  But  there  are  satisfactory  reasons  to 
show,  that  the  objection  is,  in  reality,  not  well  founded.  There 
is  in  most  of  the  arguments  which  relate  to  distance,  a  palpable 
illusion  of  the  imagination.  What  are  the  sources  of  informa- 
tion, by  which  the  people  in  any  distant  county  must  regulate 
their  judgment  of  the  conduct  of  their  representatives  in  the 
state  legislature  ?  Of  personal  observation  they  can  have  no 
benefit.  This  is  confined  to  the  citizens  on  the  spot.  They 
must  therefore  depend  on  the  information  of  intelligent  men, 
in  whom  they  confide :  and  how  must  these  men  obtain  their 
information  ?  Evidently  from  the  complexion  jf  public  mea- 
sures, from  the  public  prints,  from  correspondences  with  their 


534  THE    FEDERALIST, 

representatives,  and  with  other  persons  who  reside  at  the  place 
^f  their  deliberations. 

It  is  equally  evident  that  the  like  sources  of  information 
would  be  open  to  the  people,  in  relation  to  the  conduct  of  their 
representatives  in  the  general  government;  and  the  impedi- 
ments to  a  prompt  communication  which  distance  may  be 
supposed  to  create,  will  be  overbalanced  by  the  effects  of  the 
vigilance  of  the  state  governments.  The  executive  and  legis- 
lative bodies  of  each  state  will  be  so  many  sentinels  over  the 
persons  employed  in  every  dej)artment  of  the  national  admin- 
istration ;  and  as  it  will  be  in  their  power  to  adopt  and  pursue 
a  regular  and  effectual  system  of  intelligence,  they  can  never 
be  at  a  loss  to  know  the  behaviour  of  those  who  represent  their 
constituents  in  the  national  councils,  and  can  readily  communi- 
cate the  same  knowledge  to  the  people.  Their  disposition  to 
apprize  the  community  of  whatever  may  prejudice  its  interests 
from  another  quarter,  may  be  relied  upon,  if  it  were  only  from 
the  rivalship  of  power.  And  we  may  conclude  with  the  fullest 
assurance,  that  the  people,  through  that  channel,  will  be  better 
informed  of  the  conduct  of  their  national  representatives,  than 
they  can  be  by  any  means  they  now  possess,  of  that  of  their 
state  representatives. 

It  ought  also  to  be  remembered,  that  the  citizens  who  inhabit 
the  country  at  and  near  the  seat  of  government  will,  in  all 
questions  that  affect  the  general  liberty  and  prosperity,  have 
the  same  interest  with  those  who  are  at  a  distance;  and  that 
they  will  stand  ready  to  sound  the  alarm  when  necessary,  and 
to  point  out  the  actors  in  any  pernicious  project.  The  public 
papers  will  be  expeditious  messengers  of  intelligence  to  the 
most  remote  inhabitants  of  the  union. 

Among  the  many  curious  objections  which  have  appeared 
against  the  proposed  constitution,  the  most  extraordinary  and 
the  least  colourable  is  derived  from  the  want  of  some  provision 
respecting  the  debts  due  to  the  United  States.  This  has  been 
represented  as  a  tacit  relinquishment  of  those  debts,  and  as  a 
wicked  contrivance  to  screen  public  defaulters.     The  newspa- 


rilE   FEDERALIST.  68f 

pers  have  teemed  with  the  most  inflammatory  railings  on  this 
head;  yet  there  is  nothing  clearer  than  that  the  suggestion  is 
entirely  void  of  foundation,  the  offspring  of  extreme  ignorance 
or  extreme  dishonesty.  In  addition  to  the  remarks  I  have 
made  upon  the  subject  in  another  place,  I  shall  only  observe, 
that  as  it  is  a  plain  dictate  of  common  sense,  so  it  is  also  an 
established  doctrine  of  political  law,  that  ^^States  neither  lose  any 
of  their  rights,  nor  are  discharged  from  any  of  their  obligations,  by  a 
change  in  the  form  of  their  civil  government."  * 

The  last  objection  of  any  consequence  at  present  recollected, 
turns  upon  the  article  of  expense.  If  it  were  even  true,  that 
the  adoption  of  the  proposed  government  would  occasion  a 
considerable  increase  of  expense,  it  would  be  an  objection  that 
ought  to  have  no  weight  against  the  plan.  The  great  bulk  of 
the  citizens  of  Amei-ica,  are  with  reason  convinced  that  union 
is  the  basis  of  their  political  happiness.  Men  of  sense  of  all 
parties  now,  with  few  exceptions,  agree  that  it  cannot  be  pre- 
served under  the  present  system,  nor  without  radical  altera- 
tions; that  new  and  extensive  powers  ought  to  be  granted  to 
the  national  head,  and  that  these  require  a  different  organiza- 
tion of  the  federal  government;  a  single  body  being  an  unsafe 
depository  of  such  ample  authorities.  In  conceding  all  this, 
the  question  of  expense  is  given  up;  for  it  is  impossible,  with 
any  degree  of  safety,  to  narrow  the  foundation  upon  which 
the  system  is  to  stand.  The  two  branches  of  the  legislature 
are,  in  the  first  instance,  to  consist  of  only  sixty-five  persons; 
the  same  number  of  which  congress,  under  the  existing  con 
federation,  may  be  composed.  It  is  true  that  this  number  is 
intended  to  be  increased;  but  this  is  to  keep  pace  with  the 
progress  of  the  population  and  resources  of  the  country.  It  is 
evident,  that  a  less  number  would,  even  in  the  first  instance, 
have  been  unsafe;  and  that  a  continuance  of  the  present  num- 
ber would,  in  a  more  advanced  stage  of  population,  be  a  v^ry 
.nadequate  representation  of  the  people. 

♦  Vide   Rutherford's  Institutes,  vol.  2.  book  11.  chap.  i.  sect.  xlr.  an^  xy. 
—  Vide  also  Grotius,  book  11.  chap.  ix.  sect.  viii.  and  iz. 

51 


636  THE   FEDERALIST. 

Whence  is  the  dreaded  augmentation  of  expense  to  spring  ? 
One  source  indicated,  is  the  multiplication  of  offices  under  the 
new  government.     Let  us  examine  this  a  little. 

It  is  evident  that  the  principal  departments  of  the  adminis- 
tration under  the  present  government,  are  the  same  which  will 
be  required  under  the  new.  There  are  now  a  secretary  at  war, 
a  secretary  for  foreign  affairs,  a  secretary  for  domestic  affairs, 
a  board  of  treasury  consisting  of  three  persons,  a  treasurer, 
assistants,  clerks,  &c.  These  offices  are  indispensable  under 
any  system,  and  will  suffice  under  the  new,  as  well  as  the  old. 
As  to  ambassadors  and  other  ministers  and  agents  in  foreign 
countries,  the  proposed  constitution  can  make  no  other  differ- 
ence, than  to  render  their  characters,  where  they  reside,  more 
respectable,  and  their  services  more  useful.  As  to  persons 
to  be  employed  in  the  collection  of  the  revenues,  it  is  unques- 
tionably true  that  these  will  form  a  very  considerable  addition 
to  the  number  of  federal  officers;  but  it  will  not  follow,  that 
this  will  occasion  an  increase  of  public  expense.  It  will  be  in 
most  cases  nothing  more  than  an  exchange  of  state  for  national 
officers.  In  the  collection  of  all  duties,  for  instance,  the  persons 
employed  will  be  wholly  of  the  latter  description.  The  states 
individually,  will  stand  in  no  need  of  any  for  this  purpose. 
What  difference  can  it  make  in  point  of  expense,  to  pay  officers 
of  the  customs  appointed  by  the  state,  or  by  the  United  States? 

Where  then  are  we  to  seek  for  those  additional  articles  of 
expense,  which  are  to  swell  the  account  to  the  enormous  size 
that  has  been  represented  ?  The  chief  item  which  occurs  to 
me,  respects  the  support  of  the  judges  of  the  United  States. 
I  do  not  add  the  president,  because  there  is  now  a  president 
of  congress,  whose  expenses  may  not  be  far,  if  any  thing,  short 
of  those  which  will  be  incurred  on  account  of  the  president  of 
the  United  States.  The  support  of  the  judges  will  clearly  be 
an  extra  expense,  but  to  what  extent  will  depend  on  the  par- 
ticular plan  which  may  be  adopted  in  regard  to  this  matter. 
But  upon  no  reasonable  plan  can  it  amount  to  a  sum  which 
will  be  an  object  of  matei'ial  consequence. 


THE   FEDERALIST.  637 

Let  us  now  see  what  there  is  to  counterbalance  any  exvra 
expense  that  may  attend  the  establishment  of  the  proposed 
f.overnment.  The  first  thing  which  presents  itself  is,  that  a 
great  part  of  the  business,  that  now  keeps  congress  sitting 
through  the  year,  will  be  transacted  by  the  president.  Even 
the  management  of  foreign  negociations  will  naturally  devolve 
upon  him,  according  to  general  principles  concerted  with  the 
senate,  and  subject  to  their  final  concurrence.  Hence  it  is 
evident,  that  a  portion  of  the  year  will  suffice  for  the  session 
of  both  the  senate  and  the  house  of  representatives :  We  may 
suppose  about  a  fourth  for  the  latter,  and  a  third,  or  perhaps 
half,  for  the  former.  The  extra  business  of  treaties  and  appoint- 
ments may  give  this  extra  occupation  to  the  senate.  From 
this  circumstance  we  may  infer,  that  until  the  house  of  repre- 
sentatives shall  be  increased  greatly  beyond  its  present  number, 
there  will  be  a  considerable  saving  of  expense  from  the  differ- 
ence between  the  constant  session  of  the  present,  and  the 
temporary  session  of  the  future  congress. 

But  there  is  another  circumstance,  of  great  importance  in 
the  view  of  economy.  The  business  of  the  United  States  has 
hitherto  occupied  the  state  legislatures,  as  well  as  congress. 
The  latter  has  made  requisitions  which  the  former  have  had  to 
provide  for.  It  has  thence  happened,  that  the  sessions  of  the 
state  legislatures  have  been  protracted  greatly  beyond  what 
was  necessary  for  the  execution  of  the  mere  local  business 
More  than  half  their  time  has  been  frequently  employed  in 
matters  which  related  to  the  United  States.  Now  the  members- 
who  compose  the  legislatures  of  the  several  states  amount  ta 
two  thousand  and  upwards;  which  number  has  hitherto  per- 
formed what,  under  the  new  system,  will  be  done  in  the  first 
instance  by  sixty-five  persons,  and  probably  at  no  future  period 
by  above  a  fourth  or  a  fifth  of  that  number.  The  congress 
under  the  proposed  government  will  do  all  the  business  of  the 
United  States  themselves,  without  the  intervention  of  the  state 
legislatures,  who  thenceforth  will  have  only  to  attend  to  the 
affairs  of  their  particular  states,  and  will  not  have  to  sit  in  any 


Coft  THE    FEDERALIST. 

jjroportion  as  long  as  they  have  heretofore  done.  This  differ- 
ence, in  the  time  of  the  sessions  of  the  state  legislatures,  will 
be  clear  gain,  and  will  alone  form  an  article  of  saving,  which 
may  be  regarded  as  an  equivalent  for  any  additional  objects  of 
expense  that  may  be  occasioned  by  the  adoption  of  the  new 
system. 

The  result  from  these  observations  is,  that  the  sources  of 
additional  expense  from  the  establishment  of  the  proposed  con- 
stitution are  much  fewer  than  may  have  been  imagined ;  that 
they  are  counterbalanced  by  considerable  objects  of  saving j 
and  that,  while  it  is  questionable  on  which  side  the  scale  will 
preponderate,  it  is  certain  that  a  government  less  expensive 
would  be  incompetent  to  the  purposes  of  the  union. 

POBLHIH. 


THE  FEDERALIST.  630 


rii 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


NUMBER    LXXXV. 


NEW  YORK,   AUGUST  15,  178a 


HAMILTON. 


CONCLUSION. 


According  to  the  formal  division  of  the  subject  of  these 
papers,  announced  in  my  first  number,  there  would  appear  still 
to  remain  for  discussion  two  points  —  "  the  analogy  of  the  pro- 
posed government  to  your  own  state  constitution,"  and  "  the 
additional  security  which  its  adoption  will  afford  to  republican 
government,  to  liberty,  and  to  property."  But  these  heads 
have  been  so  fully  anticipated,  and  so  completely  exhausted  in 
the  progress  of  the  work,  that  it  would  now  scarcely  be  pos- 
sible to  do  any  thing  more  than  repeat,  in  a  more  dilated  form, 
what  has  been  already  said ;  which  the  advanced  stage  of  the 
question,  and  the  time  already  spent  upon  it,  conspire  to  forbid. 

It  is  remarkable,  that  the  resemblance  of  the  plan  of  the  con- 
vention to  the  act  which  organizes  the  government  of  this  state 
holds,  not  less  with  regard  to  many  of  the  supposed  defects, 
than  to  the  real  excellencies  of  the  former.  Among  the  pre- 
tended defects,  are  the  re-eligibility  of  the  executive ;  the  want 
of  a  council;  the  omission  of  a  formal  bill  of  rights;  the 
omission  of  a  provision  respecting  the  liberty  of  the  press : 
These,  and  several  others,  which  have  been  noted  in  the  course 
of  our  inquiries,  are  as  much  chargeable  on  the  existing  con- 
stitution of  this  state,  as  on  the  one  proposed  for  the  Union : 


040  THE    FEDERALIST. 

and  a  man  must  have  slender  pretensions  to  consistency,  who 
can  rail  at  the  latter  for  imperfections  which  he  finds  no  diffi- 
culty in  excusing  in  the  former.  Nor  indeed  can  there  be  a 
better  proof  of  the  insincerity  and  affectation  of  some  of  the 
zealous  adversaries  of  the  plan  of  the  convention,  who  profess 
to  be  devoted  admirers  of  the  government  of  this  state,  than 
the  fury  w4th  which  they  have  attacked  that  plan,  for  matters 
in  regard  to  which  our  own  constitution  is  equally,  or  perhaps 
more  vulnerable. 

The  additional  securities  to  republican  government,  to  liberty, 
and  to  property,  to  be  derived  from  the  adoption  of  the  plan, 
consist  chiefly  in  the  restraints  which  the  presei'vation  of  the 
union  will  impose  upon  local  factions  and  insurrections,  and 
upon  the  ambition  of  powerful  individuals  in  single  states,  who 
might  acquire  credit  and  influence  enough,  from  leaders  and 
favourites,  to  become  the  despots  of  the  people ;  in  the  diminu- 
tion of  the  opportunities  to  foreign  intrigue,  which  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  confederacy  would  invite  and  facilitate;  in  the 
prevention  of  extensive  military  establishments,  which  could 
not  fail  to  grow  out  of  wars  between  the  states  in  a  disunited 
situation;  in  the  express  guarantee  of  a  republican  form  of 
government  to  each;  in  the  absolute  and  universal  exclusion 
of  titles  of  nobility;  and  in  the  precautions  against  the  repeti- 
tion of  those  practices  on  the  part  of  the  state  governments, 
which  have  undermined  the  foundations  of  property  and  credit; 
have  planted  mutual  distrust  in  the  breasts  of  all  classes  of 
citizens;  and  have  occasioned  an  almost  universal  prostration 
of  morals. 

Thus  have  1,  fellow  citizens,  executed  the  task  I  had  assigned 
to  myself;  with  what  success  your  conduct  must  determine.  I 
trust,  at  least,  you  will  admit,  that  I  have  not  failed  in  the 
assurance  I  gave  you  respecting  the  spirit  with  which  my 
endeavours  should  be  conducted.  1  have  addressed  myself 
purely  to  your  judgments,  and  have  studiously  avoided  those 
asperities  which  are  too  apt  to  disgrace  political  disputants  of 
all  parties,  and  which  have  been  not  a  little  provoked  by  the 


THE   FEDERALIST.  641 

language  ana  conduct  of  the  opponents  of  the  constitution. 
The  charge  of  a  conspiracy  against  the  liberties  of  the  people, 
which  has  been  indiscriminately  brought  against  the  advocates 
of  the  plan,  has  something  in  it  too  wanton  and  too  malignant 
not  to  excite  the  indignation  of  every  man  who  feels  in  his  own 
bosom  a  refutation  of  the  calumny.  The  perpetual  changes 
which  have  been  rung  upon  the  wealthy,  the  well-born,  and  the 
great,  are  such  as  to  inspire  the  disgust  of  all  sensible  men. 
And  the  unwarrantable  concealments  and  misrepresentations, 
which  have  been  in  various  ways  practised  to  keep  the  truth 
from  the  public  eye,  are  of  a  nature  to  demand  the  reprobation 
of  all  honest  men.  It  is  possible  that  these  circumstances  may 
have  occasionally  betrayed  me  into  intemperances  of  expression 
which  I  did  not  intend :  It  is  certain  that  I  have  frequently 
felt  a  struggle  between  sensibility  and  moderation ;  and  if  the 
former  has  in  some  instances  prevailed,  it  must  be  my  excuse, 
that  it  has  been  neither  often  nor  much. 

Let  T18  now  pause,  and  ask  ourselves  whether,  in  the  course 
of  these  papers,  the  proposed  constitution  has  not  been  satis- 
factorily vindicated  from  the  aspersions  thrown  upon  it ;  and 
whether  it  has  not  been  shown  to  be  worthy  of  the  j)ublic  ap- 
probation, and  necessary  to  the  public  safety  and  prosperity. 
Every  man  is  bound  to  answer  these  questions  to  himself, 
according  to  the  best  of  his  conscience  and  understanding,  and 
to  act  agreeably  to  the  genuine  and  sober  dictates  of  his  judg- 
ment. This  is  a  duty  from  which  nothing  can  give  him  a  dis- 
pensation. It  is  one  that  he  is  called  upon,  nay,  constrained 
by  all  the  obligations  that  form  the  bands  of  society,  to  dis- 
charge sincerely  and  honestly.  No  partial  motive,  no  parti- 
cular interest,  no  pride  of  opinion,  no  temporary  passion  or 
prejudice,  will  justify  to  himself,  to  his  country,  to  his  posterity, 
an  improper  election  of  the  part  he  is  to  act.  Let  him  beware 
of  an  obstinate  adherence  to  party :  Let  him  reflect,  that  the 
object  upon  which  he  is  to  decide  is  not  a  particular  interest  of 
the  community,  but  the  very  existence  of  the  nation  :   And  let 


642  THE   FEDERALIST. 

iim  reinein')er,  that  a  majority  of  America  has  already  given 
its  sanction  to  the  plan  which  he  is  to  approve  or  reject. 

I  shall  not  dissemble,  that  I  feel  an  entire  confidence  in  the 
arguments  which  recommend  the  proposed  system  to  your 
adoption;  and  that  I  am  unable  to  discern  any  real  force  in 
those  by  which  it  has  been  assailed.  I  am  persuaded,  that  it 
is  the  best  which  our  political  situation,  habits,  and  opinions 
will  admit,  and  superior  to  any  the  revolution  has  produced. 

Concessions  on  the  part  of  the  friends  of  the  plan,  that  it 
has  not  a  claim  to  absolute  perfection,  have  afforded  matter  of 
no  small  triumph  to  its  enemies.  Why,  say  they,  should  we 
adopt  an  imperfect  thing?  Why  not  amend  it,  and  make  it 
perfect  before  it  is  irrevocably  established?  This  may  be 
plausible,  but  it  is  plausible  only.  In  the  first  place  I  remark, 
that  the  extent  of  these  concessions  has  been  greatly  exag- 
gerated. They  have  been  stated  as  amounting  to  an  admission, 
that  the  plan  is  radically  defective ;  and  that,  without  material 
alterations,  the  rights  and  the  interests  of  the  community 
cannot  be  safely  confided  to  it.  This,  as  far  as  I  have  under 
stood  the  meaning  of  those  who  make  the  concessions,  is  an 
entire  perversion  of  their  sense.  No  advocate  of  the  measure 
can  be  found,  who  will  not  declare  as  his  sentiment,  that  the 
system,  though  it  may  not  be  perfect  in  every  part,  is,  upon  the 
whole,  a  good  one ;  is  the  best  that  the  present  views  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  country  will  permit;  and  is  such  an  one  as 
promises  every  species  of  security  which  a  reasonable  peoplo 
oan  desire. 

I  answer  in  the  next  place,  that  I  should  esteem  it  the 
extreme  of  imprudence  to  prolong  the  precarious  state  of  our 
national  affairs,  and  to  expose  the  union  to  the  jeopardy  of 
successive  experiments,  in  the  chimerical  pursuit  of  a  perfect 
plan.  I  never  expect  to  see  a  perfect  work  from  imperfect 
man.  The  result  of  the  deliberations  of  all  collective  bodies, 
must  necessarily  be  a  compound  as  well  of  the  errors  ana 
prejudices,  as  of  the  good  sense  and  wisdom  of  the  individuals 
Ot    whom    they   are   composed.     Tlie   compacts  which    are   to 


THE    FEDERALIST.  G4<; 

embrace  thirteen  distinct  states,  in  a  common  bond  of  amitj 
and  union,  must  as  necessarily  be  a  compromise  of  as  man} 
dissimilar  interests  and  inclinations.  13io^  can  perfectioi 
spring  from   such   materials? 

The  reasons  assigned  in  an  excellent  little  pamphlet  lately 
published  in  this  city,*  unanswerably  show  the  utter  improba- 
bility of  assembling  a  new  convention,  under  circumstances  in 
any  degree  so  favourable  to  a  happy  issue,  as  those  in  which 
the  late  convention  met,  deliberated,  and  concluded.  I  will 
not  repeat  the  arguments  there  used,  as  I  presume  the  pro- 
duction itself  has  had  an  extensive  circulation.  It  is  certainly 
well  worth  the  perusal  of  every  friend  to  his  country.  There 
is  however  one  point  of  light  in  which  the  subject  of  amend- 
ments still  remains  to  be  considered;  and  in  which  it  has  not 
yet  been  exhibited.  1  cannot  resolve  to  conclude,  without  first 
taking  a  survey  of  it  in  this  aspect. 

It  appears  to  me  susceptible  of  complete  demonstration,  that 
it  will  be  far  more  easy  to  obtain  subsequent  than  previous 
amendments  to  the  constitution.  The  moment  an  alteration 
is  made  in  the  present  plan,  it  becomes,  to  the  purpose  of 
adoption,  a  new  one,  and  must  undergo  a  new  decision  of  each 
state.  To  its  complete  establishment  throughout  the  union,  it 
will  therefore  require  the  concurrence  of  thirteen  states.  If, 
on  the  contrary,  the  constitution  should  once  be  ratified  by  all 
the  states  as  it  stands,  alterations  in  it  may  at  any  time  be 
effected  by  nine  states.  In  this  view  alone  the  chances  are  as 
thirteen  to  nine  f  in  favour  of  subsequent  amendments,  rather 
than  of  the  original  adoption  of  an  entire  system. 

This  is  not  all.  Every  constitution  for  the  United  States 
must  inevitably  consist  of  a  great  variety  of  particulars,  in 
which  thirteen  independent  states  are  to  be  accomodated  in 
their  interests  or  opinions  of  interest.  We  may  of  course 
expect  to  see,  in  any  body  of  men  charged  with  its  original 

*  Entitled  "An  Address  to  the  people  of  the  state  of  New-York." 
f  It  may  rather  be  said  ten,  for  though  two-thirds  may  set  on  foot  the 
measure,  three-fiurths  must  ratify. 


644  THE    FEDERALIST. 

formation,  very  different  combinations  of  the  parts  upon  dif- 
ferent points.  Many  of  those  who  form  the  majority  on  one 
question,  may  become  the  minority  on  a  second,  and  an  associa- 
tion dissimilar  to  either,  may  constitute  the  majority  on  a  third. 
Hence  the  necessity  of  moulding  and  arranging  all  the  particu- 
lars which  are  to  compose  the  whole,  in  such  a  manner,  as  to 
satisfy  all  the  parties  to  the  compact;  and  hence  also  an 
immense  multiplication  of  diflSculties  and  casualties  in  obtain- 
ing the  collective  assent  to  a  final  act.  The  degree  of  that 
multiplication  must  evidently  be  in  a  ratio  to  the  number  of 
particulars  and  the  number  of  parties. 

But  every  amendment  to  the  constitution,  if  once  established, 
would  be  a  single  proposition,  and  might  be  brought  forward 
singly.  There  would  then  be  no  necessity  for  management  or 
compromise,  in  relation  to  any  other  point;  no  giving  nor 
taking.  The  will  of  the  requisite  numbei,  would  at  once  bring 
the  matter  to  a  decisive  issue.  And  consequently  whenever 
nine,*  or  rather  ten  states,  were  united  in  the  desire  of  a  par- 
ticular amendment,  that  amendment  must  infallibly  prevail 
There  can,  therefore,  be  no  comparison  between  the  facility  of 
effecting  an  amendment,  and  that  of  establishing  in  the  first 
instance  a  complete  constitution. 

In  opposition  to  the  probability  of  subsequent  amendments 
it  has  been  urged,  that  the  persons  delegated  to  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  national  government,  will  always  be  disinclined 
to  yield  up  any  portion  of  the  authority  of  which  they  were 
once  possessed.  For  my  own  part,  I  acknowledge  a  thorough 
conviction  that  any  amendments  which  may,  upon  mature  con- 
sideration, be  thought  useful,  will  be  applicable  to  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  government,  not  to  the  mass  of  its  powers ;  and  on 
this  account  alone,  I  think  there  is  no  weight  in  the  observa- 
tion just  stated.  I  also  think  there  is  little  force  in  it  on 
another  account.  The  intrinsic  difficulty  of  governing  jhir- 
TEEN  STATES,  independent  of  calculations  upon  an  ordinary 
degree  of  public  spirit  and  integrity,  will,  in  my  opirien,  con- 

*  See  note  in  the  preceding  page. 


THE    FEDERALIST.  645 

stantly  impose  on  the  national  rulers,  the  necessity  of  a  spirit  of 
accommodation  to  the  reasonable  expectations  of  their  con- 
stituents. But  there  is  yet  a  further  consideration,  which 
proves  beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt,  that  the  observation  is 
futile.  It  is  this,  that  the  national  rulers,  whenever  nine  states 
concur,  will  have  no  option  upon  the  subject.  B}"  the  fifth 
article  of  the  plan  the  congress  will  be  obliged,  "on  the  applica- 
tion of  the  legislatures  of  two-thirds  of  the  states,  (which  at 
present  amount  to  nine)  to  call  a  convention  for  proposing 
amendments,  which  shall  be  valid  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  as 
part  of  the  constitution,  when  ratified  by  the  legislatures  of 
three-fourths  of  the  states,  or  by  conventions  in  three-fourths 
thereof"  The  words  of  this  article  are  peremptory.  The  con- 
gress "  shall  call  a  convention."  Nothing  in  this  particular  is 
left  to  discretion.  Of  consequence  all  the  declamation  about 
the  disinclination  to  a  change,  vanishes  in  air.  Nor,  however 
difficult  it  may  be  supposed  to  unite  two-thirds,  or  three-fourths 
of  the  state  legislatures,  in  amendments  which  may  affect  local 
interests,  can  there  be  any  room  to  apjirehend  any  such  diffi- 
culty in  a  union  on  points  which  are  merely  relative  to  the 
general  liberty  or  security  of  the  people.  We  may  safely  rely 
on  the  disposition  of  the  state  legislatures  to  erect  barriers 
against  the  encroachments  of  the  national  authority. 

If  the  foregoing  argument  be  a  fallacy,  certain  it  is  that  I  ani 
myself  deceived  by  it;  for  it  is,  in  my  conception,  one  of  those 
rare  instances  in  which  a  political  truth  can  be  brought  to  the 
test  of  mathematical  demonstration.  Those  who  see  the  matter 
in  the  same  light,  however  zealous  they  may  be  for  amend- 
ments, must  agree  in  the  propriety  of  a  previous  adoption,  as 
the  most  direct  road  to  their  object. 

The  zeal  for  attempts  to  amend,  prior  to  the  establishmeni 
of  the  constitution,  must  abate  in  every  man,  who  is  ready  to 
accede  to  the  truth  of  the  following  observations  of  a  writer, 
equally  solid  and  ingenious :  "  To  balance  a  large  state  or 
society  (says  he)  whether  monarchical  or  republican,  on  general 
laws.  i«  a  work  of  so  great  difficulty,  that  no  human  genius, 


646  THE    FEDERALIST. 

however  comprehensive,  is  able  by  the  mere  dint  of  reason  and 
reflectLon,  to  effect  it.  The  judgments  of  many  must  unite  in 
the  work :  Experience  must  guide  their  labour :  Time  must 
bring  it  to  perfection  :  And  the  feeling  of  inconveniences  must 
correct  the  mistakes  which  they  inevitably  fall  into,  in  their  first 
trials  and  experiments."*  These  judicious  reflections  contain 
a  lesson  of  moderation  to  all  the  sincere  lovers  of  the  union, 
and  ought  to  put  them  upon  their  guard  against  hazarding 
anarchy,  civil  war,  a  perpetual  alienation  of  the  states  from 
each  other,  and  perhaps  the  military  despotism  of  a  victorious 
demagogue,  in  the  pursuit  of  what  they  are  not  likely  to  obtain, 
but  from  time  and  experience.  It  may  be  in  me  a  defect  of 
political  fortitude,  but  I  acknowledge  that  I  cannot  entertain 
an  equal  tranquillity  with  those  who  affect  to  treat  the  dangers 
of  a  longer  continuance  in  our  present  situation  as  imaginary. 
A  NATION  without  a  national  government,  is  an  awful  spec- 
tacle. The  establishment  of  a  constitution,  in  time  of  profound 
peace,  by  the  voluntary  consent  of  a  whole  people,  is  a  prodigy, 
to  the  completion  of  which  I  look  forward  with  trembling 
anxiety.  In  so  arduous  an  enterprise,  I  can  reconcile  it  to  no 
rules  of  prudence  to  let  go  the  hold  we  now  have,  upon  seven 
out  of  the  thirteen  states;  and  after  having  passed  over  so  con- 
siderable a  part  of  the  ground,  to  re-commence  the  course.  1 
dread  the  more  the  consequences  of  new  attempts,  because  1 
KNOW  that  powerful  individuals,  in  this  and  in  other  states, 
are  enemies  to  a  general  national  government  in  every  possible 
shape. 

PuBLlUft 
*  Hune's  Essays,  vol.  1,  page  128. — The  rije  of  arts  and  sciences. 


COLLATED    TEXTS. 


The  Text  in  tlie  copies  as  revised  and  corrected  by  Hamilton  and  Madi- 
son collated  with  a  reprint,  purporting  to  be  from  the  Essays  as  printed 
wlien  first  issued,  in  the  Gazettes.  The  first  quoted  passages  are  from  the 
revised  copies,  being  substitutes  for  the  quoted  passages  in  the  Heprint. 

No.  I.  Page  49.  For ;  Alter  full  experience— after  an  unequivocal  experience.  For ;  exittiug 
Federal  Government— «tt?*««<in(7  FederalGovernment.  For;  to  decide  by  their  conduct  and  ex- 
ample—br  their  conduct  and  example  to  decide.  For;  period,  aera.  For;  this  idea  by  adding, 
willadd.  For;  will  heighten,  to  heighten.  Page  50.  Yor;  uninfluenced  by  con-tiderativna for' 
eign  to  the  public  good — unperplexed  and  unbiassed  by  considerations  not  connected  with  the 
public  good.  For ;  but  tins  is  more  ardently  to  be  xcished  for — but  this  is  a  thing  more  ardently 
to  be  wished.  Far  \  extraneous— foreign.  For;  I  am  aware — I  am  m>«W  aware.  For;  "into  inter- 
ested or  ambitious  views,  merely  because  their  situations  might  subject  them  to  suspicion."'  sen- 
tence transposed.  For;  xchicti  has  already  sfuncn  ilse/f  or  that  may — which  has  made  its  ap- 
pearance, or  may.  For;  would  always  furnish — would  furnish.  For;  however  well  persiuided'oj 
being  in  the  right — to  those,  who  are  ever  so  much  persuaded  of  their  being  in  the  right,  in  any 
controversy  PageSl.  For ;  are  nctwatfrf — are  inflitenced.  For;  Aj)d  yet  just  as  these  sentiments 
must  appear  to  candid  men — And  yet  however  just  tJtese  sentiments  tcill  be  allowed  to  be. 
For;  fond  of  power — fond  oidexpotic  jwwer.  Page  52.  For  ;  appearances — appearanc/".  For; 
it  has  been  my  aim.  Fellow  Citizens,  tc  put  yon— /Aat)«  had  ati  eye,  my  Fellow  Citizens,  10 
putting  you.  Page  5-3.  For ;  claim  to  attention — claim  to  your  attention,  For ;  its  open 
avowa\— an  open  avoical  of  it.  tor;  of  the  Constitution — of  the  neic  Constitution.  For;  Jt 
may  tlierefore  be  essential  to  examine  particuliirly— It  will,  therefore  be  of  use  to  begin  by 
examining  the.  For;  This  shall  accordingly  be  done — This  shall  accordingly  constitute  the 
subject  of  my  next  address. 

No.  II.  Page  64.  For;  When  the  people  of  America  reflect  that  the  question  now  submit- 
ted to  their  determination,  is  one  of  the  most  important  that  has  engaged,  or  can  well  engage 
their  attention,  the  propriety  of  tbeir  taking  a  very  comprehensive,  as  well  as  a  very  serious 
view  iif  it,  must  be  evident — When  the  people  of  America  reflect  that  they  are  now  called  upon 
to  decide  :i  question,  which  in  its  consequences  must  prove  one  of  the  most  important  that 
ever  ensa-'ed  their  attention,  the  propriety  of  their  taking  a  very  comprehensive,  as  well  as  a 
very  serious  view  of  it,  will  be  evident  For;  th<in  that,  or  that.  Pj^e  56.  For;  many  oi 
them — many  of  their  citizens.  For;  tried  the  souls  of  men— tried  the  minds  and  hearts  of 
men.  Page  57.  For;  passion— passions.  For;  But  as  has  been  already  remarked — But 
this  (as  was  remarked  in  the  foregoing  number  of  this  paper.)  For;  from  the  undue 
— or  the  undue.  For;  the  great  majority  reasoned — the  great  m^ority  of  the  people  reas- 
oned. Page  5S.  For;  such  measures  only — only  such  measures — omitted — after,  great  and 
weighty  reasons — which  I  shall  endeavor  to  develop  and  explain  in  some  ensuing  papers. 

N<).  III.  Page  60.  For;  any  erroneous — an  erroneous.  For;  as  against  dangers  arising 
from  domestic  causes— as  from  dangers  of  the  like  kiwi  arising  from  domestic  causes.  Page  61. 
For ;  or  hm.v  happen— or  will  happen.  For ;  ha.s  the  additional  circumstance,  has  in  addition, 
the  circumstance  omitted  after,  '•  distinct  confederacies"— for  this  opinion  various  reasons  may 
be  assigned.  For;  When  once — 5ec«itM«  when  once.  For  ;  town  or  county— town  or  country. 
"■•ge  62.  For;  to  M«  o<^r  nations— to  other  nations.  For;  to  ournelves-tn  us.  For;  Under 
Che  national — Because,  under  the  national.  For;  The  prospect — Because  the  prospect.  Foi 
temi)tatioius—u-mptatiim.  For;  If  even — Because  even  if.  Page  63.  For;  such  violences— 
Because  such  violences.  For;  occasioned — caused.  For  ;  produced — occasioned.  For;  irri- 
ttttio»i«— irritation.  For ;  in  a  capacity  to  act  untA  circumspection — in  capacity  to  act  advisedly. 
No.  IV.  Page  65.  For;  proposed  Confederacies — proposed  little  Confederacies.  Page  66. 
For;  not  sanctioned — not  sanctified.  For;  Tnost  prevalent — more  prevalent  For;  see  t^«M 
flourish  in  our  hands— see  it  flourish.  Page  67.  For ;  like  considerations — such  like  considerA- 
lions.     Page  63.    For;  will,  in  a  manner— will,  as  it  wore.     For;  and  if  we  are  wise,  the  tia.e 

647 


S-l^  COLLATED   TEXTS. 

may  o  'ine — an'l  the  time  may  como,  if  we  are  wise.  Page  69.  For ;  which  of  the  a«gociate»— 
which  of  them.    For;  combining— and  combininst.    For;  f/«i«  to  provoke — tA<z7i  provoke. 

No.  V.  Page  73.  For;  not  very  far  distant — not  very  distant  For;  reasons — reasoa 
Paee  V4.  For;  in  which  we  should  be  formidable  only  to  each  other — formidable  only  to  each 
Other.  For;  those  persons — those  Gentleman.  For;*and  tohich  would — and  xcouut.  For; 
would  have  to  regulate  its  commerce  with  foreigners — would  have  its  commerce  with  foreigners 
to  regulate.     Page  75     For;  character — characters. 

No.  VI.  Page  76.  For;  this  tcorifc — this  Paper.  Sentenc  oesinnine:  "If  thes"  States  shonld 
either  be  wholly  disunited,"  transposed.  Page  79.  For;  We  mtiy  ask — /«  it  nut,  we  may  ask. 
For;  aconisi</o« — acquisition*.  For;  and  that  they  are  of  course  liable— and  are  of  coarse 
liable.  Page  bO.  For;  a.d  <?«;«  to— and  to.  For;  /A</<  haug.hty—iA/»  haughty.  For;  Yet  few 
nations  have  been  more — Few  nations,  nevertheless,  have  been  more.  Omitted  on  Page  SI. 
and  sometimes  fven  the  more  culpable  desire  of  sharins  in  the  commerce  of  ■•ther  nations.  wHb- 
out  their  consent.  The  last  war  but  two  between  Britain  and  Spain  sprang  from  the  attempts  of 
the  English  merchants,  to  prosecute  an  illicit  trade  with  Ihe  Spanish  main.  These  unjustifiable 
practices  on  their  part,  produced  severities  on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards,  towards  the  subjects  ol 
Great  Britain  which  were  not  more  justifiable;  because  they  exceeded  the  bounds  of  a  just  retal- 
iation, and  were  chargeable  with  inhumanity  and  crueltv.  Many  of  the  English  who  were  taken 
on  the  Spanish  coasts,  were  sent  to  dig  in  the  mines  of  Potosi;  and  by  the  usual  progress  of  a 
spirit  of  resentment,  the  innocent  were  after  a  while  confounded  with  the  guilty  in  indiscriminate 
punishment.  The  complaints  of  the  merchants  kindled  a  violent  flame  throughout  the  nation, 
whi<-h  -Mion  after  broke  out  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  was  communicated  from  that  body 
to  the  Ministry.  Letters  of  reprisal  were  granted  and  a  war  ensued;  which  in  its  consequence* 
overthrew  all  the  alliances  that  but  twenty  years  before  had  been  formed  with  sanguine  exiiecia- 
tions  of  the  most  beneficial  fruits.    For;  and  th«  evils— aru2  eviU.    Page  S2.    For;  Cokfxdkr- 

ATE — CoNyKDBRATIVB. 

No.  VIL  Page  88.  For;  the  States  could  have— could  the  States  have.  For;  difference — 
differencM.  Page  84.  For;  by  the  treaty  of  peace — in  the  treaty  of  peace.  For;  the  ^^^ 
which  have  made  cesHotis — the  States  which  made  the  cessiim.  Page  So.  For;  th«  lands — the 
land.  For ;  another— and  the  other.  Page  8S.  For ;  would  be  exposed — would  be  hazarded. 
For;  in  the  e.vperiment — upon  experiment.  For;  Their  refusal  would  afford  to  the  com- 
plaining States  a  pretext  for  withholding— Their  refusal  would  be  too  plausible  a  pretest  to  the 
complaining;  St.ites  to  withhold.     Note  \n  reprint  omitted  to  Page  S9. 

No.  VIII.  Pace  92.  For;  establishment — establishments.  For;  thence — tlierefore.  In  note; 
rational  precaution — natural  precaution.  For;  7%j»  inference,  from  the  very  fo'tn  of  the 
proposition  is  at  l^etst  problematiail  and  uncertain- Their  existence,  however,  from  the  very 
lerrM  nf  the  proposition  is,  at  mont  problematical  and  uncertain.  Page  92  For;  they  would  be 
obliged — they  would  be  n«<5«««t7oteo.  Page  93.  For;  be  likely — be  the  more  likely.  For;  cf«- 
ducedjrom  speeuiaUve — drawn  Jrom  supposed  or  specaiativ'e.  For;  by  way  of  objection — by 
way  of  objection  to  this.  Page  9.3.  For;  which  by  its  situation  is  seldom  exposed  to  invasions 
— seldom  eaoposed  by  Us  situation  to  internal  invasions.  Page  94,  For;  Forbids  competition 
w!th  the  natural  strength — renders  the  natural  strength  of  the  community  an  overmatcn  for  it. 
For;  though  it  may — may.  For;  will  be  utterly  incompetent  to  the  purpose  of  enforcing — 
but  it  will  be  unable  to  enforce.  Next  sentence  transposed.  For;  his  services — their  services. 
Omitted;  There  has  been,  for  a  long  time  past  little  room  for  the  operation  of  the  other  Ciusea, 
which  have  been  enumerated  as  the  consequences  of  internal  war.  Sote  omitted.  Page  95. 
A^o^e  omitted.  For;  1/  Britain  had, — If  om-  the  contrary.  Britain  had  For;  at  this  day  i- 
— &«  at  this  day.  For ;  W«  kingdom — <Aat  kingdom.  For;  nor  futile — or  futile.  For;  on  its  va»t 
Importance — ««  (iA<!  importance  of  this  interesting  idea.  Page  96.  For;  that  now  flit — thatflil. 
For ;   would  then  quickly— would  quickly.     For ;  prospects— forms. 

No  IX.  Page  97.  For;  kept  perpettialfy  vibrating— kept  in  a  state  of  perpetual  vibration. 
Page  93.  iox;  error— errors.  For;  friends o/"libfrty — friends /o  liberty.  Page  99.  For;  re- 
c«tc«  his  ideas — <a^  hi.s  ideas.  Note  to  page  lOO.  PuWius  omitted.  Page  lOL  For;  to  pro- 
duo* — to  muke.    Page  103.    Vot;  wriler—vivilian. 

No.  X.  Page  105.     For  ;s  less  folly— less  folly.     Page  107.      For ;  of  government — of  the 

fovernment.     Page  109.    For  ;y/r)»n  the  mischiefs  of  faction— /or  the  mischiefs  of  faction.     Page 
11.    For :  Does  tAts  advantage — Does  {A«  advanta^. 

No.  XI.  Pase  113,  For;  look  forward  with  painful  solicitude— look  forward  to  what  this 
country  is  capable  of  becoming  with  painful  solicitude.  Page  114.  For ;  this  would  answer  then 
the — ^for,  answer  the.  For;  the  wings  on — the  wings  by  which.  For;  we  may  in  a  variety  of 
ways  counteract — we  may  counteract  a  policy  so  unfriendly  to  our  prosperity  in  a  variety  of 
ways.  For;  importance  to  any  t/in«(y^«cf«riw£^  nation  of  the  markets  of — importance  of  the 
markets  of  For;  to  remain  in  this  dispositlVin — to  remain  so,  to  any  manfacturing  nation. 
Page  115.  For:  to  G-reat  Britain — Britain.  Page  116.  For;  a  flourishing — an<J  a  flourishing. 
Page  117.  For ;  the  ZrtA-€« — the  Western  Lak&s.  Page  US.*  For;  and  the  conduciveress  of 
that  species  of  commerce  to  the  prosperity  of  a  navy,  are  points  too  manifest  to  require  a  par- 
ticular elucidation— does  not  require  a  particular  elucidation,  no  more  than  the  conducivene.<8 
of  that  species  of  commerce  to  tne  prosperity  of  a  navy.  Page  119.  For;  newspaper  discus- 
sion—i  newspaper  discussion. 

No.  XII.  Page  121.  For  ;  A  prosperous  commerce—the  prosperity  of  commerce.  For;  all 
the  channels — the  channels.  For;  to  the  entire  satisfkction — to  the  satisfaction.  Page  128k 
For ;  iZ/.v  brook — <U  brook.  For:  be  the  best— )i«  best  Page  124.  For;  be  driven — be  n«c«««i- 
tated.  For ;  dealers  in  contraband — contraband  trade.  Page  124.  For ;  this  proves — this 
shows.  For ;  and  shows— SiUd  pUicts.  Page  125.  For ;  to  expose — to  huzttrd.  For;  .stationed 
and  employed,  might — BtMioned  at  the  entrances  oj our  ports.  For;  an  adjoining  State— a 
neighboring  State.    For ;  in  Britain  the  proportion  is  still  preater— in  Britain  they  exceed  this 

?roportlon.*     Aote  omitted.     If  my  memory  be  right  they  amount  to  twenty  ynr  cent.    Page 
36.    For;  according  to  the  ratio — Upon  a  ratio.   For;  niay,  at  a  low  conopntatfon  be  oc^inMted 
at- may  be  estimated  at.    For ;  health  of  society — health  of  the  societr.    For ;  (i<  t/Us  t«ry  or 


COLLATED  TEXTS.  649 

ftcfo — nit  these  Dpi ritn.  VnT;  revenite — revenues.  For;  as  before  ramarkei— as  A<7s6«#»  Defor« 
remarked.  For;  populius— popular.  For;  In  some  moUe — iu  some  mode  or  other.  I'age  127. 
For;  of  citizens — at  (A«  citizens. 

No.  XIII.  Paee  128.  If  the  States  be  united -ar«  nnited.  For;  another  conjecture — an- 
other suppffniiion. 

No.  XIV.  Page  131.  For;  errour — error.  Page '32.  For;  mint  &«  confined — uiU  be 
confined.     Page  185.     For;«/'/'«ur — error.    For;*o#«ft»i — vcene. 

No.  XV.  Page  139  For ;  which  is  neWi^r  controverted,  nur  doubted— which  is  not  either 
controverted  o/' doubted.  For;  in  the  opinion — in  Uiii  anUiment  at  \ea&t.  For ;  of  the  reality 
e/ man  J/ of  those  defects— of  the  reality  of  tbos«  defects.  For;  people— nation.  Page  141. 
For:  the  veri/ elemcntfi — thejirst  jirincipUs.  For;  otw/iom—ul' which.  Page  142.  For;  ii 
Government — (iovernmeut.  Page  143.  For;  still  adhere— still  itiW  adhere.  For;  their  observ- 
ance— <^«  observai ;ce.  Page  144.  For;  wAicA  disposes— JAiif  disposes.  Page  145.  For;  of  mitn 
— ot  human  nutiire. 

No.  XVI.  Page  14S.  "For \hetvie6n  different  ■pa.rts—hettceen  parts.  For;  ia  fhe  general- 
to  the  common.  Page  149.  For;  to  the  majority  that  happeued  to  prevail  in  the  national  coun 
cil  for  the  exercise  cf  factious  views,  of  partiality,  and  of  oppression— for  the  exercise  of  faction* 
views,  ot  partiality,  and  of  oppres-sion,  in  the  majority  that  happened  to  prevail  in  the  national 
nouncil.    Page  150.    For;  attributed — which  is  attributed.    For :  the  other — the  other  half. 

No  XVI f.  Page  153.  For;  be  urged— be  ij*e2ct«e  urged.  Page  154.  For ;  to  e.\ercise  </t«w« 
— exercise  those  powers.  Page  155.  For;  to  impres.s  upon — to  impres*in^  upon.  Page  157. 
For ;  itfpoxitories — DepoHts. 

No.  XVIII.  Page.  158.  For;  from  the  best  transmitted  accounts — from  the  best  accounts 
trannmitted.  Page  159.  For;  Xhv  weakest— \]\q  tceok-er.  Page  160.  For;  had  in  fact  become 
— had  become,  iu  fact.  For:  who  secretly — who  }uid  secretly.  Page  161.  For;  that  the 
monuments  which  remain  of  this  curious  political  fabric  are  so  imperfect— that  such  imperfect 
monunu'nts  remain  of  this  curious  political  fabric     Page  163.     For;  01eome?i«« — Cleomeji*. 

No.  XIX.  Page  167.  For;  revenues- revenue.  For;  farther- fitrther.  Page  170.  For; 
sprung— sprang.     Page  171.     For;  (/«  the  head— «t  the  head. 

No.  XX.  Page  173.  For;  a«  hereditary— a  hereditary.  For;  Af«  independent— <Ai^  inde- 
pendent. For;  nudience — nudiences.  Pjige  176.  Fur;  in  some  mfiinitre — in  some  degree. 
For ;  operation — tendency  of  these  vices.     Paae  177.     For ;  in  the  place — in  place. 

No.  XXI.  Parens.  For;  which  depict— which  Aace  depicted.  For;  the  existing  CoxxteA 
eration — the  subsisting  Confederation.  For;  no  power — no  pow«rs.  For;  constitutional 
in«</nji— constitutional  mode.  Page  179.  For;  The  want  of  such  a  right  involves  no  doubt  a 
etriking  absurdity — There  is,  doubtless,  a  striking  absurdity  in  supposing  that  a  right  of  this 
kind  does  not  exist.  For ;  supposing  that  deflciencv— of  embracing  that  supposition.  For :  con- 
siderations of  utility — consideration  of  utility,  fage  ISO.  For*  directed  against — tereled 
against.  Page  Isl.  For;  produce  and  co7istitute  national  wealth — produce  constitutionai 
wealth.  For;  the  contra cie(/  terntorj/  ot  that  lepuhWc— t/iat  contracted  district.  For;  l/iose 
kingdoms — the  three  last  mentioned  countries.  For;  no  man  acquainted — no  man  who  i3 
acquainted.  Page  1S2.  For;  which  distributed— which  distributes.  Page  183.  For;  are 
considered — tuue  been  considered.  For;  an  Herculean— a  Herculean.  For;  the  thing — 
things. 

No.  XXII  Page  184.  For;  of  the  e-xisting  federal  system  enumerated  in  the  last  number 
—already  enumerated  \n  the  existing  Federal  system.  Page  184.  For;  conceding  on  their 
part  privileges  of  importance— by  which  they  conceded  privileges  of  any  importance  to  tliem. 
Pago  187.  For;  ever  will  be  able — will  ever  be  able.  For;  Considering  how  peculiarly 
the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  smaller  states  depend  on  Union— The  smaller  States,  con- 
sidering how  peeuliarly  their  safety  and  welfare  depend  on  Union.  Page  188.  For;  Veto— 
Vote.  Page  1S9.  For •,/oriwiate— happy.  Page  189.  For;  that  which  It  is  necessarv  to  do— 
the  doing  what  may  be  necessary.  Page  190.  For;  t/uit  the  interest- tAe  interest.  I'or;  and 
his  intrigues — atia  intrigues.  For;  corrupt  a  smaller — corrupt  a  smaller  number.  For; 
minds  'actuated  by — minds  animated  and  guided  by.  Page  191.  For;  disclosed— delin- 
eated. For ;  the  A"w// parties— ?Ae  parties.  Far;  one  'tribunal— one  court  Page  192.  For; 
an  uniform — ((uniform.  For;  decision— juriiidiction.  For;  xhoiUd  happen— ?ra.s  to  happen. 
For;  from  the  deference  with  which  men  in  office  naturally  look  up  to  that  authority  to  which 
they  owe  their  oflicial  existence— nothing  is  more  natural  to  men  ia  oflice  than  to  look  with  pe- 
culiar deference  towards  that  authority.  For;  of  which  thtse  uie  composed — of  which  tt 
is  composed  For;  a  conniderable  xmrt—a,  great  part  For;  who  are  either  free  from  erro- 
neous prepossessions  or  can  divest  thematlves  of  them — who  can  divest  themselves  of  the  pre- 
possessions of  preconceived  opinions.    Page  193.    For;  of  Union— of  the  Union. 

No.  XXIII.  Page  196.  For;  a«d  the  correspondent — or  the  correspondent.  For;  open  to 
discus.'ion — open  for  discussion.  Page  197.  For ;  those  uhich  may  be  committed— tAi  objects 
committed.  Page  19S.  For;  achieved— ac-omplished.  For;  in  respect  to— ax  to  all.  Page 
199.  For;  intrusted  viixh — ti  tutted  -vith.  For;  would  have  given  a  better  impression  of  their 
candour  if  they  had  confined  themselves  to  showing — ought  to  have  confined  themselves  to 
showing.  For;  National  concerns — National  interests  Page  200.  For ;  t«  susceptible  of— can 
6«  susceptible  of.  For:  If  we  embrace  as  the  standard  of  our  political  creed  the  tenets  of 
til  8<.' — If  we  embrace  the  tenets  of  those  who  oppose  the  adoption  of  the  proposed  Constitu- 
tion, as  the  standard  of  our  political  creed. 

No.  XXIV.  Page  201.  i'or;  which  is  that  proneT— which,  if  I  understand  ii  right,  is  </*/«, 
that  proper.  Pige  2o2.  For;  against  military  e-itablishmenis— against  the  keeping  np  of  troops. 
Note.  I'aire  203.  For;  other  Slates,  and  their  Constitutions — other  States,  e.rcept  the  foregoing, 
and  their  Constitutions.  For;  pronouncing  these  clamours  to  be  the — regarding  thest 
clamors  as  the.  Pago  204.  For;  obscured— entangled.  For;  establishments  would  be  im- 
proper—e>tabllshments  in  time  of  peace,  wonhi  be  improper.  Page  205.  For;  only  be  to 
guard  ag.iinst — vn/y  he  against.  For;  The  militia,  in  times  of  profound  peace,  would  not 
long — The  militia  would  nut  long,  etc.,  in  times  of  profound  peace. 


650  COLLATED   TEXTS. 

No.  XXV.  Page  207.  For ;  provided  by  the— provided/or,  by  the.  Page  208.  For;  II /Vow 
the  resources — Ifth^  resources.  For;  least  likelv  to  be  so — least  likely  to  be  jealous.  Page  209. 
For ;  There  are  other  ■eietos — There  are  other  ligfiU.  Page  210.  For  ;  The  utility  of  a  pro- 
vision  of  this  kind  can  only  be  Ttndicated  on  the  hypoOieSia  of  a  probability,  at  least^Tha 
aupposed  utility  of  a  provision  of  this  kind  can  only  \)eifimnded  on  the  auppost'i  probability  or 
•t least  For;  would  at  all  times  be — would  be  at  all  times.  Page  212.  For;  now  unequal  are 
parchment  provisions — how  unequal  parchment  provisions  are. 

No.  XX VL  Page  218.  For ;  hardly  to  hate  been  expected— hardlv  to  be  expected.  For ; 
they  tcUel]/ fudged — wisely  judging.  Page  214.  For;  nation  from  rc^icA — nation  from  toAom. 
Page  216.  For;  Without  ths  consent  of  the  Legislature  (in  italics)  instead  of  capitals.  For; 
numitory— cautionary.  For;  the  actual—the  necessities.  Page  218  For;  transmitted  through 
— transmitted  oZongr  through.  For;  parted  with— puTted-wiHi  oiU  of  their  otonJumds.  For; 
From  the  votes — from  the  acts.     Page  219.     For;  principle— principles. 

No.  XXVIL  Page  220.  For;  and  their  obedience  to — and  obedieTice  to.  Page  221.  For; 
the  principal  of  which  are — the  principal  of  which  r«a«oji»are.  For;  u?io  are  select — which  are 
select  For;  more  coOTpreA€n*ii;«  information— more  «a!t«n«ire  information.  For;  public  ^e^i- 
berations — public  councils.  For;  xcill  occur  to  fortify  that  probability — to  fortify  that  probabil- 
ity will  occur.  For;  a  more  critical  eye — a  more  critic  eye.  Page  222.  For;  equal  to 
— a  mate))  for.  For;  I  will  in  the  first  place — I  will,  ?n.  <Ai«  place.  For;  will  have  but  a 
transient  in&\xence — inll  generally  have  but  little  la&uenoe.  Page  22-3.  For;  than  tA«  species 
— than  that  species.  For;  will  perceive,  that  if  its  powers  are  administered  with  a  common 
share  of  prudence  there  is  good  ground — will  perceive,  that  is  there  good  ground  to  calculate 
upon  a  regular  and  peaceable  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  Union,  if  its  powers  are  administered 
with  a  common  share  of  prudence. 

No.  XXVm.  Page  226.  For;  under  the  necessity  of— be  necessitated  to.  For;  will  some> 
times  «H«f — will  sometimes  ar7'«e.  Page  226.  For;  suppressing — repressing.  Page  227.  For; 
or  as  many  unconnected  governments  as  there  are  states— or  even  if  there  should  be  an  entire 
separation  of  the  state?.  For;  and  after  all  <A«  only — and  after  all,  only.  For':  an  infinitely— 
infinitely.    Page  229.    For :  foreign  enemy — foreign  power. 

No.  XXIX.  Page  280.  According  to  Reprint,  No.  85.  Page  281.  For;  to  this  plan— to  Ou 
plan  of  the  Convention,  For;  in  the  same  body  ought,  as  far  as  possible  to  take  away  the  in- 
dacement  and  the  pretext — in  the  bodv  to  whose  care  the  protection  of  the  State  is  committed, 
ought,  etc  For;  for  requiring  the  aid  of  the  posse  coiOTATirs — for  calling  out  the  possk  com- 
TAITTS.  Page  232.  For;  extraordinary  manner — this  manner.  For;  Federal  Legislature  on 
the  subject — Federal  Legislature  from  this  State  on  the  subject.  For;  nor  a  week  nor  even  a 
month — <w  even  a  week.  Page  233  For;  short  of  a  million  of  pounds — short  of  the  whole  ex- 
pense of  the  civil  establishments  of  all  the  States.  For;  moderate  size — moderate  etetent.  Page 
285.  For;  irritated  at  being  required  to  undertake — irritated  by  being  culled  upon  to  under- 
take. For ;  and  «iai«  them — and  to  make  them.  Page  236.  For;  violences — violence.  (Lofit 
paragraph  in  Reprint  omitted  in  Pa;e  286.) 

No.  XXX.  Pase  237.  For;  supply  o/' /erew we — supply  o/' it  Page  289.  For;  abundantly 
— amply.  Page  240.  For;  an  invincible — invincible.  Page  241.  For;  import  duties — impost 
duties.  Page  242.  For;  creating  by  its  oicn  authority  new  funds  from,  new  objects — creating 
new  funds  upon  new  objects  of  taxation,  by  its  men  authority.  For;  to  see  thehalcyon  scenes 
of  the  poetic  orfabuloua  age  realized  in  America — to  see  realized  in  America,  etc 

No.  XXXL  Page  248.  For;  are  such  direct— are  yet  such  direct  Page  246.  For;  to  es- 
cape from  the  apparitions  which  itself  has  raised — to  extricate  itself  from  the  perplexities 
into  which  it  Ktu  to  rashly  adventured.  Page  247.  For;  nature  and  extent — nature  or 
extent 

No.  XXXII.  Page  249.  For;  consequences  to  the  State  Governments  which  seem  to  be  ap- 
prehended—consequences  which  seem  to  be  apprehended  to  the  State  Governments.  Page  251. 
¥oT\is  deduoidl^ls  to  be  deduced.  Page  252.  For;  why  was  it  not  left — why  not  leave 
it.  For;  that  a  further- that  thus  a  further.  For;  State  system — State  systems.  Page  253. 
For;  Is  not  only  a — is  not  a. 

No.  XXXIII.  Page  254.  For;  The  residue  of  the  argument  asninst  the  provisions  of  the 
Constitution  in  respect  to  taxation  is  ingrafted  upon  the  following  clauses.  (This  paragraph 
omitted  in  Reprint)  For;  first  Article  authorizes — the  first  Article  of  the  plan  under  considera- 
tion authorizes.  For;  sources— source.  Page  255.  For;  a  test  of  the  true  nature — a  test  by 
which  to  judge  of  tha  true  nature.  Page  256.  For ;  if  there  6e — if  there  w.  Page  257.  For; 
the  Ck)n8titntlon— its  Constiturion.  Page  268.  For;  abrogating— for  abrogating.  For;  of  a 
power — of  power.    Page  268.    For;  of  state— of  the  State. 

No.  XXXIV.  Page  269.  For;  to  develope— to  advert.  Page  260.  For;  TEiBtrriA- Tributa. 
Page  260.  For;  pinocle— ■atmoat  lieiglU.  Page  261.  For;  If  we  must  be  obliged  to  exceed 
this  point— If^  on  the  contrary,  we  ought  to  exceed  this  point.  Page  262.  For;  would  already 
—would  so  soon.  For;  would  be  to  calculate— m  to  calculate.  For;  which  relate — which 
are  relative.  For;  Judiciary— JudiciaL  Page  268.  For;  But  let  xxs  take  a  view — But  let  us 
advert,  For;  expenditura — expenditure*.  For;  &  million  of  dollars — two  hundred  thousand 
pounds.  For ;  If  it  cannot  be  denied  to  be  a  just  principle,  that  in  fhiining  a  constitution  of  gov- 
ernment for  a  nation,  we  ought— In  framing  a  Government  for  posterity  as  well  as  ourselves,  we 
ought  Page  264.  For;  our  attention — Ifthisprinciplebea  Just  one,  our  attention.  For;  one  mil- 
lion of  dollars — two  hundred  thousand  pounds.  Page  264.  For;  twenMeth  of  its— twentieth  part. 

No.  XXXV.  Page  266.  For;  that  this  can  never  be  the  case — that  they  can  never  be  carried 
to  too  great  a  length.  For;  serve  tn  beget— would  beget.  Page  267.  For;  m.ost  natural — more 
natural.  Page  268.  For;  and  from  a  greater  disproportion  between  her  population  and  1  erritory 
is  less  likely  than  some  other  states  speedily  to  become  in  any  considerable  denee — and  is  not 
likely  speedilv  to  be,  to  any  great  extent  'Patre  268.  For;  might  beget — wowd  beget.  Page 
869.  For;  habits  o/' life — habits  in  life.  Page  270.  For ;  M<nMU»(2«  of  acres— mi^Uona  of  acres. 
Page  271.    For;  among    between.    For;  community — eoeiety. 

No.  XXXVI.  Page  275.    For;  law— laws.    Page  277.    For;  thould  be  judged  be/orehmttt 


COLLATED  TEXTS.  66) 

up»n,  mature  considercitic-n^  or  should  he  discovered  on  eenperiment — shotdd  be  disoovered 
For ;  may  forbear— may  then  forbear.  Page  277.  For ;  the  first  is,  that  the  actual  exerciso  ol 
the  power,  may  be  found  both  convenient  and  necessary — the  first  is,  that  the  exercise  of  that 
power,  if  convenient,  will  bo  preferable,  because  it  will  be  more  effectual.  Page  279.  For;  ii 
oy  the  authority  of  the  Federal  government  then  it  will  not  remain  to  be  done — if  to  be  dons 
by  the  autliority  of  the  Federal  government,  it  will  not  be  to  be  done. 

No  XXXVlI.  Page  2S4.  For;  this  foundation— thi»_/Zr«<  foundation.  For;  dangers— dan- 
ger. Page  285.  For ;  energy  <j/ Government— energy  m  Government.  Page  286.  For;  the 
statute  law — <t7Ki  the  statute  law.  Page  2S7.  For ;  conceived — co/ww/eret/.  Page  289.  For; 
degradfnf/ — degrad«u. 

No.  XXXVIII.  Page  296.    For;  scarcetij— scarce. 

No.  XXXIX.  Page  808.  For ;  explicit  pToyisioa—constitutiorKtl  provision.  Page  806. 
For ;  is  by  (he  adversaries  of  the  plan  of  the  Co7iventioii.,  supposed  to  consist  in  this — is  supposed 
to  consist  in  this.  For ;  But,  the  operation  of  the  Government  on  the  people  in  their  individual 
capacities,  in  its  ordinary  and  most  essential  proceedings,  will,  on  the  whole,  in  the  sense  of  its 
opponents,  designate  it  in  this  relation,  a  National  Government — So  far  the  National  counten- 
ance of  the  Government  on  this  side,  seems  to  be  disfigured  by  a  few  Federal  features.  But 
this  blemish  is  perhaps  unavoidable  in  any  plan,  and  the  operation  of  the  Government  on  the 
People,  in  their  individual  capacities,  in  its  ordinary  and  most  esftential  proceedings,  may.  on  the 
whole,  designate  it,  in  this  relation,  a  i^'atiotial  Government.  Page  808.  For;  therefore,  even 
when  tested  by  the  rules  laid  down  by  its  antagonists,  is  in  strictness — therefore  is,  in  strictness. 

No.  XL.  Page  314.  For  ;  confirmation  of  all  the  <S<f/fe«— confirmation  of  the  Legislatures 
of  all  the  States.    For;  to  be  confirmed- to  be  confirmed  by  the  People. 

No.  XLI.  Page  819.  For ;  field  o/ rhetoric— field  /or  rhetoric.  Page  320.  For;  war 
—  War.  I'or;  means  and  danger— and  the  danger.  Page  821.  For;  mistress — the  mistress. 
Page  824.  For ;  //'  they  have — and  if  they  have.  Page  325.  For ;  may  be  almost — 7na>/  almost 
be.    For;  objects — object. 

No.  XLII.  Page  8.31.    For;  no  further— no  further. 

No.  XLIII.  Page  847.    For;  founded  on  acts — founded  on  ordinary  acts. 

No.  XLIV.  Page  852.  For;  tieat  produce— 7ie<  produce.  Page  352.  Omitted  in  Reprint 
after,  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  department  or  officer  thereof.  For;  yet 
on  a  fair  investigation  of  it  us  luts  been  elsewhere  shown,  no  part  can  appear — yet  on  a  fair  inves- 
tigation of  it,  no  part  can  appear.     Page  356.     For;  distinc«u*««— distinc^ioJi. 

No.  XLV.  Paare  362.     For;  would  not  bear  a  comparison — would  not  be  a  comparison. 

No.  XLVI.  Page  865.  For;  instituted  with  different  itotrern— constituted  with  different 
nowers.  Page  367.  For;  a«d  faculty— and  <A<s  faculty.  For;  members  of  <A6  Congress — mem- 
bers of  Congress. 

No.  XLVII.  Page  880.  For;  prerogative  of  pardoning— prerogative  oi pardon,  ditto — 
below. 

No.  XLVIII.  Page  384  Omitted  after,  multiplied  without  end.  1  might  find  a  witnest 
in  every  citizen  who  has  shared  in,  or  been  attentive  to,  the  course  of  public  administrations. 

No.  XLIX.  Page  892.    For;  parties  pree.visting — preexisting  parties. 

No.  L.  Page  400.  For;  which  place  it  in— which  place  that  system  in.  Page  402.  For; 
powerful  factions  be  gradually— powerful  factions  or  parties  be  gradually.  For;  within  &prae- 
ticti>>le  sphere — within  a  practical  sphere. 

No.  LI.  Page  404.  For;  «Si*6^«ci  to  these— t7>id«r  these.  Page  405.  For;  being  but  im- 
perfectly— being  at  most  but  very.  Page  406.  For ;  with  some  other— with  the  other.  Page 
407.    For;  proof— proofs. 

No.  LIII.  Page  409.  For ;  the  ca««— the  m«^«ce.  Page  412.  For;  other />oin<«— other 
respects.  Page  413— For ;  some  internal— majiy  internaL  Page  414.  For ;  particular  subjects— 
particular  6ra»icA««.     Page  415.     For;  liberties— liberty. 

No.  HV.  Page  416.  For;  among— to.  Page  417.  For ;  will  of  Aw  cmwe) — vrill  of  another. 
Page  418.    For  ;   disputed — denied. 

No.  LVI.  Page  430.  For;  be  su^cient-he  very  sufllcient.  For;  into—in.  Page  481. 
For ;  With  regard  to  the  regulation  ot  the  militia,  there  are  scarcely  any  circumstances  in  refer- 
ence to  which  local  knowledge  can  be  said  to  be  necessary.  The  general  face  of  the  country, 
whether  mountainous  or  level,  most  fit  for  the  operations  of  infantry  or  cavalry,  is  almost  the 
only  consideration  of  this  nature  that  can  occur.  The  art  of  war  teaches  general  principles  of 
organization,  movement,  aud  discipline,  which  apply  universally— The  observations  made  on  the 
subject  of  taxation,  apply  with  greater  force  to  the  case  of  the  militia.  For,  however  different 
the  rules  of  discipline  may  be  in  different  States,  they  are  the  same  throughout  each  particular 
State;  and  depend  on  cirQumstances  which  can  differ  but  little  in  different  parts  of  the  same 
State.     Page  432.     For ;  tendency— e feet. 

No.  LVII.  Page  485.  For;  sons  of  o6«Ciir«  and  unpropitlous  fortune — sons  of  obscurity  and 
nnpropitious  fortune.  Page  436.  For ;<;i«ir  favor— Ww  favor.  Page  437.  For;  men— man. 
Page  4.38.    For ;  \v\indp-ed — hundreds.    Page  488.     For;  unless  he  pos«e«««s— unless  he  ;jo«se.s«. 

No.  LVI II.  Page  441.  For;  which  it  beholds— which  is  beheld.  Page  443.  For;  the 
greater  number — the  greater  number  of  members. 

No.  LIX.  Page  449.  For;  regard  a  departure — ^regard  and  regret  a  departure.  For; 
h'lvebeen  iipplicahle — have  been  alicays  applicable.  For;  organized — modified  aud  uit- 
posed.  Page  451.  For;  -without  any  motive  to  recommend  their  admission  into  tho 
system,  equally  cogent  with  that  which  must  have  regulated  the  conduct  of  the  convention.  In 
respect  to  the  formation  of  the  Senate — without  any  motive  equally  cogent  with  that  which 
must  hsve  regulated  the  conduct  of  the  Convention  in  respect  to  the  formation  of  the  Senate, 
to  recommend  their  admission  into  the  system. 

No.  LX.  Page  454.     For;   incontroUable — uncontrollable.      For ;  what  ar<i  the  drtn(7«r»— 

'vhatwould  be  th«  danger.    For;  and  on  the  other /j'/^jrf- and  on  the  other.    Page  455.     Fof 

itssimilation  of  temper    and  sentiment — in  some   of  tliese   respects.    For;  victorious  m^or 

Ity— victorious  and  overbearing.    Page    457.    For ;  tli^  jlrst— agriculture.    For ;  the  latter- 

62 


652  COLLATED   TEXTS. 

eominerce.  For ;  But 'Ji  in  reality — For ;  m  reality.  But  or — ax.  for;  lehichmny  product 
an  endeavor — dispose  to  eudeator.  Page  459.  For;  and  the  cities — or  cities.  For  anoW^r 
occai^ion — other  occasions. 

No.  LXI.  Page  461.  For;  The  more  candid  opposers  of  the  provision,  contained  in  tha 
plan  of  the  Convention  respecting  Elections  when  pressed  in  argument  will  sometimes  con 
cede  the  propriety  of  it;  with  this  qualification,  however.  th:it  it  ought  to  have  been  accom- 
panied with  a  declaration,  that  all  elections  should  be  held  in  the  counties  where  the  electors 
"eiide — The  more  candid  opposers  of  the  provision  respecting  electionn,  contained  in  the  plan 
of  the  Coiivention,  when  pressed  iu  argument,  will  sonntimes  concede  the  propriety  of  that 
provision;  with  this  qualification,  however,  that  it  ought  to  have  been  accompanied  with  a 
declaration,  that  all  elections.-  should  be  hud  in  the  counties  where  the  electors  resided.  Page 
462.  For;  that  which  is  proposed— tAe  latitude  which  is  proposed.  For;  counties — countu. 
Page  4''4.     For;  which  will  «ccrH«— which  will  result. 

No.  LXII.  Page  466.  For;  under— into.  Page  467.  For;  merit — merits.  Page  469. 
For ;  the  Senate— a  Senate.  Page 470.  For ;  in  the  American  Governments— in  American  Gov- 
ernments. 

No.  LXIII.  Page  475.  For;  The  remark — TOis  remark.  Page  476.  For;  plnns—plnces. 
For;  di^fficult  at  any  rate  to  preserve — difficult  to  preserve.  Page  478.  For;  their  Representa- 
tives— the  Representatives  of  the  people.  Page  479.  V or;  them — the:  People.  Page  480.  For; 
t?ie  Legislatures— lh%  State 'La^s,\vi,t\XTii&.     Page  4S2.     For;  This  fact — The  iact. 

No.  LXIV.  Page  4»4.  For ;  the  Sections— the  Electors.  Piige  486.  For ;  The  matters— 
Those  matters.  For;  the  main  objects— the  objects  of  the  negotiation.  Page  4S7.  For;  late 
— laws.  Page  488.  For ;  Hint  the  tico  thirds — that  two-thirds.  Page  489.  For ;  But  if  such  a 
case  should  ever  happen — But  in  such  a  case,  if  it  should  ever  happen. 

No.  LXV.  Page  495.  For ;  should  in  this  respect  be  thought  preferable  to  the  plan— should 
be  thought  preferable  to  the  plan  in  this  respect 

No.  LXVI.  Page  496.  For;  with  ?io<  less  re.iaon— with  no  less  reason.  Page  497.  For; 
that  of  determining — that  of  deciding.  Page  498.  For;  for  estimating — for  determining. 
For;  danger — dread.  For;  of  office — in  office.  Page  499.  For;  i  hey  have — they  will  have; 
For;  may  have  proved— «A"M  have  proved.  Page  500.  For;  argument — arguments.  For; 
the  chofce  he  niay  have  made — the  choice  o/tlie  President.  Page  5ul.  For  ;  <(  greatrr  show — 
with  greater  show. 

No.  LXVII.  Page  503.  For ;  the  arrangement  of  which  could  have  been  attended  with 
greater  difficulty — which  could  have  been  attended  with  greater  difficulty  in  the  arrangement 
of  it  than  this.  Page 504.  For;  attempts  extravagant — attempts  '•o  extravagant.  For;  in 
order  to  ascertain — in  order  as  well  to  ascertain.  Page  506.  For ;  is  confided— is  confined. 
Page  507.  For;  the  plan — the  Constitution.  For;  to  indulge  a  severity— to  alloxo  myseifin 
a  severity. 

No.  LXVIII.  Page  509.  For;  so  complicated  an  investigation,  such  complicated  investi- 
gations. Omitted — as  the  President  of  the  United  States..  For;  on  preexisting — on  any 
preexisting.  Page  510.  For ;  already  noticed — already  taken  notice  of.  For ;  that  each 
Stal« — the /'copia  of  each  State.    Page  511.    For;  TAji  process — TA  6  process.    For;  o/a — inn. 

No.  LXIX.  Page  514.  For ;  is  nut  to  become  a  law  unless— is  to  become  a  law  if.  Page 
Sl6  (in  note.)    For ;  prerogatives — prerogative. 

No.  LXX.  Page  523.  For;  are,  unity,  duration,  an  adequate  provision  for  its  support: 
competent  powers — are,  first,  unity ;  secondly  duration  ;  thirdly,  an  adequate  provision  for  its 
support;  fourthly,  competent  powers.  Page  524.  Vor;  from  the  plurality— from  the  circum- 
stance of  the  plurality.  Page  o26.  For ;  embroiled  the  .ff«pu6Mc— embroiledthe  peace  of  the  Re- 
public Vor ;  into  vioient~\T\to  the  most  \\o\ent.  Page  527.  For;  wien— man.  Yot  ;  as  to  rendet 
them — aa  to  render  him.  Page  528.  Sot  \  a  collusion — collusion.  For;  so  manifestly  impro- 
pei — so  unqualified. 

No.  LXXI.  Page  582.  For;  the  Chief  Magistrate— the  Executive  Magistrate.  For;  title 
durable  OT  certain — (/Mra6Z«  or  c«rfaii»  title.  Page  535.  For;  already  wieniionerf— already  ri»- 
marked.  Yor;  circumstance— cim>,ideration.  Page  586.  For;  «»t  annihilation — annihilation. 
For  ;  H«  might,  then,  with  prudence,  hazard— hazard  with  safety — For ;  it  is  not  long  enough 
— not  enough. 

No.  LXXII.  Page  588.  For ;  the  thing— the  subject.  Page  589.  For ;  to  undo— to  reverse 
and  ando.  For;  to  give  the  officer — to  give  to  the  officer.  Page  540.  For;  make  irterest— 
make  tA«2r  interest.  For;  advantages— em,oluments.  For;  use  of  his  opportunities  while  they 
lasted— use  of  the  opportunity  he  enjoyed  while  it  lasted.  For;  emoluments— perquisites 
Page  541.  F  or;  finding  himself— ^when  he  found  himself.  For;  looking— when  he  looked.  For; 
refiecting — reeled.  (Omitted — nich  a  man.  in  such  a  situation.)  Page  542.  For;  By  in- 
ducing the  necessity  of— By  necessitating  a  change.  For;  partial  one — partial  exclusion.  Page 
548.    Vox ;  the  evils — these  disadvantages.    Yor;  especially  it— If 

LXXIII.  Page  546.  For;  i«  competent— are  competent.  Yor;  ichii:hwillh»,ye— to  have  th* 
effsct.  Page  547.  For ;  Aas  been  alrettdy  more  than  once  suggested- -has  been  already  suggested 
and  repeate'i.  For;  or  wisdom — and  wisdom.  Page  548.  For;  the  secondary — the  secondary  one. 
Page  549.  For ;  and  that  in  its  exercise  there  would  oftencr  be  room  for  acharge  of  timidity  than 
of  rashness — and  there  would  oftener  be  room  for  a  charge  of  timidity  than  of  rashness  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  it.  For;  it  might  rarely,  it  would  never  be  exercised — it  might  be  rarely  exercised,  it 
would  never  be  exercised.  Page  650.  For;  plain  otie — plain  case.  For;  absolute — absolute 
negative.  For ;  in  defiance — in  spite.  Page  561.  For  ;  were  its  violent  oppostrs  -were  violent 
opposers  of  it.  For;  One,  that  the, — One  i«  that  the.  For;  capacity — capacities.  For;  the 
other — the  othpr  is. 

No.  LXX IV.  Page  552.  For;  so  evident — so  evident  in  itself .  Page  553.  For;  number- 
numbers.  For;  the  apprehension  of  censure — the  apprehension  of  suspicion  or  censure.  Page 
654.  For ;  poised — matched.  For ;  the  condemned — the  condemned  person.  For ;  its  sanction 
—Its  sanction  to  the  measure. 

No.  LXXV.     Page  566.     For    prerogative— power.     Page  557.   For ;  heretofoi'i,  ffte«i'—al 


COLLATED   TEXTS.  658 

raofiy  i/tfien  in  nVief  plaeen.  Foi ;  either — either  of  them.  Paare  558.  Kor ,  duty  to  inter  e«t— 
\i»  duty  to  his  interest.  Paee  559.  For ;  same  extetit — same  degree.  For ;  number,  will  <tpply 
— number,  which  has  been  ijlhid-'fi  to  in  anoOier  part  of  this  pa  pet ,  Page  560.  For;  Th« 
former,  by  increasinff  the  d  fflculty  of  resolutions  disagreeable  to  the  minority-  the  former  by 
making  a  determinate  number,  at  all  times  requisite  to  a  resolation.  Page  561.  For;  than  the 
Senate  is  likely — ihiin  th*  Senate  wouhl  he  likely. 

No.  LXXVI.  Page  5\J3.  For;  can  be pr^rperly  modified  only — ought  to  be  modified  in 
cne  of  three  ways.  For;  since  waivinjt— >'«  waiving.  Page  564.  Omitted;  \  single  well- 
directed  man,  by  a  single  understanding,  cannot  be  distracted  and  warped  by  that  diversity  of 
views,  feelings,  and  interests,  which  frequently  distract  and  warp  the  resolutions  of  a  collective 
body.  Page  56.5.  For;  upon — on.  For;  Sut  his  nomination  may  be  overruled:  This  it  cer- 
tainly may  ;  yet  it  can  only  be — But  might  not  his  nomination  be  overruled?  I  grant  it  might, 
yet  this  could  only  be  to  make  place  for  another  nomination  by  himself.  For;  to  prevent — to 
preventing.  Page  666.  For;  than  that  of  universal  rectitude — than  the  supposition  of  uni- 
versol  rectitnd?. 

No.  LXXVlI.  Page  669.  For;  been  objected — been  suggested.  Page  669.  For;  Besides 
this  it  is  evident  that  the  Power — The  Power.  Page  570.  For;  all  the  good  without  the  ill- 
all  the  good  of  that  of  appointment,  and  would  in  a  great  measure  avoid  its  evils.  Page  573. 
For;  been  a««ai7«rf— been  excepted  to.  Pot;  the  election— from  the  election.  For;  his  liability 
ftt  all  times  to  impeachment — and  from  bis  being  at  all  times,  liable  to  impeachment.  For ; 
What  more  can  an  enlightened  and  reasonable  people  desire — What  more  could  be  desired  by 
an  enlightened  and  reasonable  people. 

No.  LXXVIIL  Page  575.  For;  all  the  Judges — all  Judges.  For;  among  the  rest— and 
among  the  rest.  For ;  arm  for— arm  eren  for.  Page  576.  For ;  It  proves — And  it  proves. 
For;  that  ua  nothing— arwi  that  as  nothing.  Page  577.  For;  the  right — the  rights.  For; 
the  grounds — the  ground.  For;  It  must  therefore  belong — It  therefore  belongs  to  them. 
Page  578.  For;  in  other — or  in  other.  For:  Nor  does  <A«— ^Nor  does  this.  Page  680.  For; 
of  an  iniquitous— of  iniquitous.  Page  5S1.  For;  muy  imagine— may  be  aware  ot  Page  583 
For;  of  Judicial — of  their  Judicial. 

No.  LXXX  Page  587.  For;  djw- proper.  Page  589.  For;  the  gentences  of  Courts,  is 
with  reason— the  sentences  of  Courts,  as  well  as  in  any  other  manner,  is  with  reason.  For;  the 
controversies— the  ctises.  Page  590.  For ;  are  other  sources-are  »K»ny  other  sources.  For;  o/ 
the  States— between  the  States.  Page  692.  For;  ea!rtwi/>;««— examples  of  it.  For;  under  tho 
Constitution — upon  the  Constitution.  Page  594.  For;  to  a -principle — to  a  general  prin- 
ciple. 

No.  LXXXI.  Page  696.  For;  is  to  be  vested— Is  (by  the  plan  of  the  Convention)  to  be 
vested.  For;  are  advocates — advocate.  For;  of  the  Supreme  Court — of  the  proposed  Supreme 
Court  Page  596.  For;  the  plan  which — the  plan  under  consideration  which.  Page  597.  For; 
too  apt  to  influence  their  construction — too  apt  in  interpreting  them.  Page  698.  For :  these 
models — those  models.  For;  In  the  former  as  in  the  latter— In  the  former,  as  weW  as  in  the 
latter.  Page  600.  For;  these  Courts— those  Courts.  For;  To  confer  upon  the  existing  Courts 
of  the  several  States,  the  power  of  determining  such  causes — To  confer  the  power  of  determin- 
ing such  cau.ses  upon  the  existing  Courts  of  the  several  States.  Page  600.  For;  confiding  to 
them— confiding  the  original  cognisance  of  causes  arising  under  those  laws  to  them.  For; 
Courts  may  hold  circuits — with  the  aid  of  the  State  Judges,  may  hold  circuics.  Page  603.  For; 
a  particulfir — tiny  particular. 

No.  LXXXII.  Page  606.  For;  Time  only  can— 'Tis  time  only  that  can.  Page  607.  For; 
the  m^st  defensible  construction — the  most  natural  and  the  most  defensible  construction. 
Page  609.     For;  wAitA  give  appellate -yipingr  appellate. 

No.  LXXXIII.  Page  611.  For;  In  this  State, is  relative— in  this  State,  and  perhaps  in  several 
of  the  other  States,  is  that  relative  to.  For;  would  be— would  Aoic^r^r  be.  Page  612.  Omitted; 
trial  by  jury  in  all  such  cases.  For;  but  it  is  left  at  large  in  relation  to  civil  causes,  fur  the  very 
reason  that  there  is  a  tot;il  silence  on  the  subject— but  it  is  of  course  left  at  large  in  relation  to 
civil  causes,  there  being  a  total  silence  on  this  head.  Page  613.  For;  to  appoint— to  exercise. 
For;  is  contrary  to  reason  and  therefore  inadmissible — ^is  contrary  to  reason  and  common  sense, 
and  therefore  iiiailniiiisible.  For;  their  proper  application— their  proper  use  and  true  meaning. 
For;  the  «u<Aori/y  of  the  Federal  .Judicatures — the  Judicial  authority  ot    Page  618.   Omitted 

Earagraph  commencing,  But  that  there  miy  be  no  possibility.  Page  614.  For ;  From  what  has 
een  said — From  these  observations.  Omitted ;  after  State  Constitutions ;  and  will  be  In  no 
degree  altered  or  influenced  by  the  adoption  of  the  plan  under 'ionsideration.  Page  616.  For; 
the  desired  security — the  iiectirity  aimed  at  Page  617.  For;  civil  »Mite— civil  ca*««.  For:  to 
fix  with  accuracy  the  limits — to  fix  the  limits.  For;  l!A*  ilifflcnlty-  -that  A\f&cn\ty.  Page  619. 
For;  inapplicable  and  indeterminate — senseless  and  nugatory.  For;  strictly  speaking  xxn- 
known — idtogether  unknown.  For ;  there  is  no  antecedent  establishment — there  is  no  proper 
antecedent  or  previous  establishment.  Page  620.  For;  in  suits — incases.  Pasro  621.  For; 
while  a  separation  between  the  jurisdictions — while  a  separation  of  the  one  from  the  other. 
For;  critical— deliberate  and  critiail.  For;  the  model— which  is  the  model.  Page  623. 
For;  the  State  tribunals — the  State  Judicatories.  For;  Massachusetts,  proposition  cannot — 
Massachusett.s  proposition,  upon  this  subject,  can  not  For:  that  they  are  more  attached — that 
they  are  hitlierto  more  attached.     Paze  624.     For;  in  full  force — in  its  full  force. 

No.  LXXXI V.  Page  627.  For ;  I  have  endeavored  to  answer — I  have  taken  notice  of.  and 
endeavored  to  answer.  For ;  There  remain  however — There  however  remain.  Page  627.  For : 
And  yet  the  pemons  who  in  this  State  oppose — And  yet  the  oppoxers  of  the  new  system.  In  thin 
State.  Page  628.  For;  the  Constitution  o./ff /•«■(/ by — proposed  by.  Page  629.  For ;  to  liberty 
than  any  ii  contains — to  liberty  and  republicanism  "than  any  It  contains.  Page  630.  For;  must 
be  intended  to  limit  the  power — must  be  intended  as  limitations  of  the  power.  Page  630.  For : 
This  is — Bere  is.  For ;  than  to  one — than  to  a  Constitution.  Page  631.  For ;  that  a  right  to 
prescrlbs — that  a  power  to  prescribe.  Page  6.32.  In  like  manner,  the  proposed  Constitution— 
A]i4  the  Droposed  Constitution,  if  adopted.     Page  6S3.    For;  provided  for— found  In.    For; 


654  COLLATED   TEXTS. 

Another  objection  which  from  the  frequency  of  its  repetition — Another  objection,  whi.ih  hM 
been  made,  and  which,  from  the  frequency  of  its  repetition.  For ;  may  be  presumed  to  oe 
relied  on — it  la  to  be  presumed  is  relied  on.  Page  63-3.  For ;  in  any  distant  county— in 
Montgomery  county.  Page  636.  For ;  is  given  up— must  be  given  up.  Page  636.  Oiiiitte*^ 
after  United  States.  There  is  no  good  reason  to  suppose  that  either  the  number  or  the  salaries 
■;f  the  latter  will  be  greater  than  those  of  the  former.  Page  637.  For ;  It  has  t/ience  happened 
ifence  it  has  happened.     For ;  the  mere  local  business — the  mere  local  business  o/the  States. 

No.  LXXX V.  Page  639.  For :  and  so  completely  exhausted— and  exhausted.  Page  640. 
For ;  the  Convention— the  Convention  among  us.  For ;  Government  of  this  State— Govern- 
ment under  which  they  live.  For;  upon  local — on  local.  For;  upon  the  ambition — on  the 
ambition.  Page  641.  For;  are  such— have  been  each.  For;  are  of  a  nature — have  been  of  a 
nature.  Page  642.  For  assailed — opposed.  For ;  This  may  be  plausible,  but  it  is  plausible 
only — This  may  he  plawiible  enough,  but  it  Is  only  p\a,asib\ti.  Page  64;3.  For;  It  is  certainly 
iDell  wortlir—well  worthy.  For;  complete — absolute.  For;  Constitution  should. — Consiitv^ 
tiim  proposed  should.  Page  6i4.  For;  prveail — take  place.'For;  force— weight.  Page  645.  For-, 
left  to  discretion— \e&  to  the  discretion  of  that  body.  For;  be  a  fallacy-is  a  fallacy.  For; 
their  oion  object  Page  646.  For;  is  an  awful  spectacle — is,  In  my  view,  an  awful  spectacle. 
For ;  In  so  sriuoiu  an  enterprise.  I  can  reconcile  it — I  can  reconcile  it  to  no  rules  of 
prndenoe. 


PHILO   PUBLIUS.  655 


PHJLO  PUBLIUS. 


NUMBER  I. 


NEW   YORK,   OCTOBER  27,   1787. 


DUER. 


In  the  first  number  of  the  Federalist,  which  appeared  in  the 
Independent  Journal  of  Saturday,  the  interest  of  certain  OflScers, 
under  the  State  establishments,  to  oppose  an  increase  of  Federal 
authority,  is  mentioned  as  a  principal  source  of  the  opposition 
to  be  expected  to  the  new  Constitution.  The  same  idea  has 
appeared  in  other  publications,  but  has  not  hitherto  been  suffi- 
ciently explained.  To  ascertain  its  justness  and  extent,  would, 
no  doubt,  be  satisfactory  to  the  public;  and  might  serve  to 
obviate  misapprehensions. 

A  very  natural  enquiry  presents  itself  on  the  subject : — 

How  happens  it,  that  the  interest  of  the  Officers  of  a  state 
should  be  different  from  that  of  its  Citizens  ?  I  shall  attempt 
an  answer  to  this  question. 

The  powers  requisite  to  constitute  Sovereignty,  must  be  dele- 
gated by  every  people  for  their  own  protection  and  security. 
The  people  of  each  State  have  already  delegated  these  powers; 
which  are  now  lodged;  partly  in  the  Particular  Government, 
and  partly  in  the  General  Government.  It  is  not  necessary 
that  they  should  grant  greater  or  new  ones.  The  only  question 
with  them  is,  in  what  manner  the  powers  already  granted  shall 
be  distributed ;  into  what  receptacles ;  and  in  what  proportions 
If  thev  are  represented  in  both,  it  will  be  immaterial  to  th«m 


656  PHILO    PUBLIUS. 

BO  far  as  concerns  their  individual  authority,  independence  or 
liberty,  whether  the  principal  share  be  deposited  in  tne  whole 
body,  or  in  the  distinct  members.  The  re-partition,  or  division, 
is  a  mere  question  of  expediency ;  for  by  whatever  scale  it  be 
made,  their  personal  rights  will  remain  the  same.  If  it  be 
their  interest  to  be  united,  it  will  be  their  interest  to  bestow  as 
large  a  portion  upon  the  Union  as  may  be  required  to  render 
it  solid  and  effectual;  and  if  experience  has  shown,  that  the 
portion  heretofore  conferred  is  inadequate  to  the  object,  it  will 
be  their  interest  to  take  away  a  part  of  that  which  has  beer 
left  in  the  State  reservoirs,  to  add  it  to  the  common  stock. 

But  such  a  transfer  of  power,  from  the  individual  members 
to  the  Union,  however  it  may  promote  the  advantages  of  the 
citizens  at  large,  may  subtract  not  a  little  from  the  importance, 
and,  what  is  with  most  men  less  easily  submitted  to,  from  the 
emolument  of  those,  who  hold  a  certain  description  of  oflSces 
under  the  State  establishments.  These  have  one  interest  as 
Citizens,  and  another  as  Officers.  In  the  latter  capacity,  they 
are  interested  in  the  Power  and  Profit  of  their  offices,  and 
will  naturally  be  unwilling  to  put  either  in  jeopardy.  Thai 
men  love  power  is  no  new  discovery;  that  they  are  commonly 
attached  to  good  salaries  does  not  need  elaborate  proof;  that 
they  should  be  afraid  of  what  threatens  them  with  a  loss  of 
either,  is  but  a  plain  inference  from  plain  facts.  A  diminution 
of  State  authority  is  of  course,  a  diminution  of  the  Power  of 
those  who  are  invested  with  the  administration  of  that  authority; 
and,  in  all  probability,  will  in  many  instances  produce  an 
eventual  decrease  of  salary.  In  some  cases  it  may  annihilate 
the  offices  themselves.  But,  while  these  persons  may  have  to 
repine  at  the  loss  of  official  importance  or  pecuniary  emolument, 
the  private  citizen  may  feel  himself  exalted  to  a  more  elevated 
rank.  He  may  pride  himself  in  the  character  of  a  citizen  of 
America,  as  more  dignified  than  that  of  a  citizen  of  any  single 
State.  He  may  greet  himself  with  the  appellation  of  an 
American  as  more  honourable  than  that  of  a  New  Yorker,  a 
Pennsylvacian,  or  a  Virginian, 


PHILO    PUBLIUS.  057 

From  the  preceding  remarks,  the  distinction  alluded  to,  be- 
tween the  private  citizen  and  the  citizen  in  office  will,  1  pre- 
sume, be  sufficiently  apparent.  But  it  will  be  proper  to  observe, 
that  its  influence  does  not  reach  near  so  far  as  might  at  first 
sight  be  imagined.  The  offices  that  would  be  affected  by  the 
proposed  change,  though  of  considerable  importance  are  not 
numerous.  Most  of  the  departments  of  the  State  Governments 
will  remain  untouched,  to  flow  in  their  accustomed  channels. 
This  observation  was  necessary  to  pre^nt  invidious  suspiciona 
from  lighting  where  they  would  not  be  applicable 


658  PHILO    PUBLIUS. 


PHILO  PUBLIUS. 


NUMBER    II. 


NEW    YORK,    NOVEMBER    15,    178: 


DUER. 


The  government  of  Athens  was  a  democracy.  The  people, 
as  is  usual  in  all  democratical  governments,  were  constantly 
alarmed  at  the  spectre  of  aristocracy  ;  and  it  was  common  in 
that  republic  as  it  is  in  the  republics  of  America  to  pay  court 
to  them  by  encouraging  their  jealousies,  and  gratifying  their 
prejudices.  Pericles,  to  ingratiate  himself  with  the  citizens  of 
Athens,  whose  favour  was  necessary  to  his  ambition,  was  a 
principal  agent  in  mutilating  the  privileges  and  the  power  of 
the  court  of  Areopagus;  an  institution  acknowledged  by  all 
historians  to  have  been  a  main  pillar  of  the  State.  The  pre- 
tence was  that  it  promoted  the  power  of  the  aristocracy. 

The  same  man  undermined  the  constitution  of  his  country 
to  ACQUIRE  popularity — squandered  the  treasures  of  his  coun- 
try to  purchase  popularity — and  to  avoid  being  accountable  to 
his  country  precipitated  it  into  a  war  which  ended  in  its  de- 
struction. Pericles  was,  nevertheless  a  man  endowed  with 
many  amiable  and  shining  qualities,  and,  except  in  a  few  in- 
stances, was  always  the  fai  orite  of  the  people. 


PHILO   PUBLIU3.  659 


PHILO  PUBLIUS. 


NUMBER    III. 


NOVEMBER    28,    1787. 


DUER. 


PuBLius  has  shown  us  in  a  clear  light  the  utility,  it  might  be 
eaid,  the  necessity  of  Union  to  the  formation  and  support  of  a 
navy.  There  is  one  point  of  view  however  on  which  he  has 
left  the  subject  untouched — the  tendency  of  this  circumstance 
to  the  preservation  of  liberty. 

Will  force  be  necessary  to  repell  foreign  attacks,  or  to  guard 
the  national  rights  against  the  ambition  of  particular  mem- 
bers ?  A  navy  will  be  a  much  safer  as  well  as  a  more  effectual 
engine  for  either  purpose.  If  we  have  a  respectable  fleet  there 
will  be  the  less  call  on  any  account  for  an  army.  This  idea  is 
too  plain  to  need  enlargement.  Thus  the  salutary  guardian- 
ship of  the  Union  appears  on  all  sides  to  be  the  palladium  of 
American  liberty. 


INDEX  TO  THE  FEDERALIST; 


kcnMA.s  LsAQiTB  1  147.  161. 164,  291,  S60. 

Icu^ANs;  They  abandoned  the  experiment  of 
piaral  prtetors,  524. 

Aobicpltuee:  Its  interestA  Interwoven  with 
those  of  commerce,  121. 

Amendments:  Oblization  under  the  ConsUta* 
tion.  concerning  them,  345. 

Ambrioan  Systkm:  Idea  of  one,  120. 121. 

Amphictyonic  Council,  16s,  160,  291. 

Annapolis  :  Extract  from  the  recommenda- 
tion of  the  meeting  at,  In  September  1T86, 
809. 

A.VSZ,  Qfbkn  :  Extracts  from  her  letter  to  the 
Scutch  Parliament,  71,  72.  Appeals  to  the 
People;  Dangers  and  inconveniences  at- 
teruiing  them,  339,  390  ;  Objections  to  their 
being  perio<lically  made,  S'iS,  395. 

Aspasia.  77. 

Assemblies  :  Objections  to  numerooa,  423,  446. 
(5m  •'  House  of  Representatives.")  After 
a  number  of  Representatives  sufficient  for 
the  purposes  of  safely,  of  local  information, 
and  of  diffusive  sympathy  with  the  whole 
society,  is  8ecure<l,  any  addition  to  them  is 
injurious,  446. 

Athens  :  Archons  of,  479. 

AxTAiNDKR,  Bills  of :  Provision  of  the  Consti- 
tution concerning  them,  851. 

Bankruptct:  (S««  "Constitution.")  Provision 
of  the  Constitution  concerning  it,  836. 

Bills  of  Credit  :  Provision  of  tne  Constitu- 
tion concerning  them.  349. 

Bills  op  Riobts  :  In  their  origin,  stipulations 
between  kings  and  subject^,  627. 

Cambbat.  League  of,  80. 

Carthage,  Senate  of.  477. 

Cato  :  An  opponent  of  the  Cunstitation,  cited, 
505. 

Coalition  :  The  word  used  in  a  good  sense,  44-:*. 

Commbrcb:  (See  "  Confederation."  *•  Union,") 
Examination  of  the  opinion  that  its  tend- 
ency is  pacific  78, 81 :  A  source  of  contention 
between  the  separate  !>tates,  and  would  be 
among  separate  confederacies  of  them,  86; 
Policy  of  prohibitory  regulations  in  regard 
to  it,  on  the  part  of  the  XJ.  States,  114,  115; 
Intimacy  between  its  interests  and  those 
of  agriculture,  121 ;  Power  under  the  Con- 
stitution of  regulating  it,  332. 

CoNFXDEBAOiBS  :  Inexpediency  of  dividing  the 


Union  into  three  or  fout  -leparate  Con> 
federacies.  69,  77;  Pre  cable  jumber  of  sep- 
arate Confederacies,  in  the  event  of  dis- 
union, 128,  180;  Tendency  of  Confederaoie* 
rather  to  anarchy  among  the  members  thiui 
to  tyranny  in  the  head,  153, 178. 

Confederacy,  of  the  States :  Alleged  charac- 
teristic distinction  between  it  and  consoli- 
dation, 101. 

Confxderate  Republic  :  Defined,  101;  Tend- 
ency of  the  Federal  principle  to  mod- 
eration in  Government,  162.  (Sm  "Mon- 
tesquieu," "Constitution,"  "  Republic') 

CoNFEDKBATiojc,  The:  Its  insufliciency  to  the 
preservation  of  the  Union,  139  ;  Picture  of 
the  public  distress  under  it,  139,  140 ;  Its 
great  and  radical  vice,  legislation  for  com- 
munities instead  of  persons,  141.  {See  197); 
Difierence  between  a  league  and  a  govern- 
ment. 142,  143;  Want  of  a  sanction  to  its 
laws,  178 ;  State  contributions  by  quotas, 
a  fundamental  error  in  it.  180 ;  Want  of  a 
power  to  regulate  commerce,  another  de- 
fect in  it,  184, 186 ;  The  nugatory  power  ol 
raising  armies,  another,  1S6;  The  right  of 
equal  sufiVage  among  the  States,  another 
187:  Anti-republican  character  of  the  re 
quisition,  in  certain  cases,  of  a  vote  exceed 
ing  a  majority.  18S;  Want  of  a  Judiciary 
power,  a  crowning  defect  of  the  Confedera- 
tion. 191 ;  The  organization  of  Congress, 
another ;  Perilous  tendency  of  a  single  legis- 
lative house.  192;  Want  of  popular  con- 
sent to  it,  another  defect  in  it,  198;  It  ac- 
knowledges the  necessity  of  strength  in 
the  Federal  power,  193;  Impracticable 
character  of  certain  provisions  under  it, 
298. 299 ;  Necessary  usurpations  of  Congress 
under  it,  29S,  299 ;  Answer  to  the  question, 
on  what  principle  is  it  to  be  superseded, 
without  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  par- 
ties to  it,  846. 

Congress:  (iSee  "Constitution,''  "States," 
••  Public  Debt,")  Extracts  from  the  recom- 
niendatorv  Act  of  Consress,  in  February, 
1787,  309,  310;  Power  of;  under  the  Feder- 
al Constitution,  over  a  District  of  Terri- 
tory, not  exceeding  ten  miles  square,  888; 
Its  power  concerning  territory,  iSms.,  belon«- 
ing  to  the  United  Sutea,  841. 


*  The  editor  Uke*  pleunre  in  adcnowledginit  that  he  U  indebted  to  the  klndnee*  of  P.  H.  Kendall,  Eeq.,  a  leading 
member  of  th*  Wa>bl  \zton  Bar,  and  formerly  a  t>iatr!ct  Attorney  of  the  United  State*  for  permiaaion  to  nae  thi*  Index 
prepareu  oy  him  for  a  ^1rmer  edition  of  thia  work.     It  ia  very  alightly  modified.    Fab.  1864 


CoMsttmoin:  Provision  in  her  Constitution 
concerning  elections,  410  ;  One  branch  of 
her  Legislatnre  so  constituted,  that  each 
member  of  it  is  elected  by  the  whole 
State,  440  ;  Has  no  constitutional  provision 
for  jury  trial,  in  either  criminal  or  civil 
cases,  626. 

I'Jcksolidaticn:  The  plan  of  the  Union  aims 
only  at  a  partial  consolidatiofl,  249 ;  Desire 
of  the  States  to  guard  against  improper 
consolidation  of  themselves  into  one  simple 
republic,  467. 

C-OH8TIT0TION    OF    THE    UNITED    StATKS  :    {See 

"Union,"  "  Confederation,"  "Standing  ar- 
mies," "  States,"  "  House  of  Eepresenta- 
tives,"  "  Slaves,")  ;  Its  economy,  128, 
180 ;  Answer  to  an  objection  drawn  from 
the  extent  of  the  Country,  181 ;  Its  guar- 
anty to  the  States  of  a  republican  form 
of  Government,  179,  180 ;  Necessity  for 
strength  in  the  Federal  Government,  196, 
200 ;  Wisdom  of  the  provision  in  the  Con- 
stitution concerning  the  military  force, 
201,  216,  217,  218,  267,  822;  Answer  to  the 
objection,  That  it  cannot  operate  without 
the  aid  of  a  military  force  to  execute  its 
laws,  220,  229 ;  Reason  why  the  execution 
of  it  will  probably  be  popular,  228;  Laws 
under  it,  as  to  the  enumerated  and  legiti- 
mate objects  of  its  jurisdiction,  will  be 
the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  223,  224; 
Number  and  inconsistency  of  the  objec- 
tions to  it,  295,  297;  Most  of  the  capital 
objections  to  it  lie  with  tenfold  weight 
against  the  confederation,  295,  298;  Its 
conformity  to  republican  principles,  801, 
304 ;  Analogy  between  the  mode  of  ap- 
pointments under  it,  and  under  the  State 
Gf)vernment8,  803,  804 ;  Neither  a  National 
nor  a  Federal  Constitution,  but  a  composi- 
tion of  both,  304,  808 ;  General  view  of  the 
powers  wliich  it  proposes  to  vest  in  the 
Union,  818;  The  power  of  declaring  war, 
319;  The  power  ol  providing  a  Navy,  824; 
The  power  of  making  Treaties,  &c,  829 ; 
The  power  of  definingand  punishing  offen- 
ces on  the  high  seas,  830;  h-ohibition  of 
the  importation  of  slaves  after  1808,  881 ; 
Power  of  regulating  commerce,  832 ;  Pow- 
ers to  coin  money,  to  punish  counterfeiters 
and  to  regulate  weights  and  measures, 
834 ;  Power  to  establish  a  uniform  mode  of 
naturalization,  835,  886;  Power  to  estab- 
lish uniform  laws  of  bankruptcy,  886; 
Power  concerning  pnblic  acts,  records,  <fec., 
&c.,  838;  Power  of  establishing  post  roads, 
836;  Power  of  granting  copyrights,  838; 
Power  to  exercise  exclusive  legi.ilation 
over  a  District  not  exceeding  ten  miles 
square,  if  ceded  to  the  United  States,  83S  : 
Power  concerning  treason,  840  ;  Power  of 
admitting  new  States,  840;  Power  con- 
cerning territory,  &o.,  belonging  to  the 
United  States,  341 ;  Obligation  to  guaranty 
a  republican  form  of  government  to  every 
State  of  the  Union,  841,  844;  Obligation 
concerning  public  debts  prior  to  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution,  845 ;  Provision 
concerning  amendments,  345;  Provision 
concerning  the  ratification  by  nine  States, 
346 ;  Question,  what  relation  is  to  exist  be- 
tween the  nine  or  more  ratifying  States, 
and  the  not-ratifying  States,  846 ;  Disabili- 
ties of  the  States  created  by  the  Coastitu- 
tlon,  849,  852 ;  Power  given  by  it  to  C'on- 
gress,  to  make    all    laws   necessary  and 

S roper  for  executiuglts  enumerated  powers, 
i2 :    Four    other   possible    alternatives, 
which  the  Constitution  might  have  adopt- 


ed, 853,  354 ;  Provision,  that  the  Constlta 
tion.  Laws  and  Treaties  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the 
land,  355;  Oath,  Ac,  of  otticers,  &&,  to  sup- 
port the  Constitution,  856 ;  Consists  much 
less  in  the  addition  of  new  powers  to  the 
Union,  than  in  the  invigoration  of  its  orig- 
inal powers,  363 ;  Its  provisions  concerning 
the  proper  degree  of  separation  between 
the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary 
powers,  373,  885 ;  Peculiar  division  under 
it,  of  the  power  surrendered  by  the  people, 
400;  Its  mode  of  protecting  the  minority 
from  usurpations  by  the  majority,  401 ; 
Three  characteristics  of  the  Federal  Legis- 
lature, 407 ;  Answer  to  the  objection  that 
it  contains  no  Bill  of  Rights,  627,  632 ;  In 
the  sense,  and  to  the  extent  contended  for. 
Bills  of  Rights  are  unnecessary  and  would 
be  dangerous  to  the  Constitution,  631 ; 
Omission  of  a  provision  concerning  the 
liberty  of  the  press  defended,  631;  The 
Constitution  itself  is  a  Bill  of  Rights,  632 ; 
Answer  to  an  objection  to  the  Constitution, 
founded  on  the  remoteness  of  the  seat  of 
Government  from  many  of  the  States,  633, 
684;  Answer  to  the  objection,  that  it  wants 
a  provision  concerning  debts  due  to  the 
United  States,  634,  635 ;  Answer  to  the  ob- 
jection as  to  expense,  635. 

Construction,  Two  rules  of,  310,  311. 

Contracts:  Laws  in  violation  of  private  con- 
tracts, a  source  of  collision  between  the 
separate  States  or  Confederacies,  89 ;  Pro- 
vision of  the  Constitution  concerning 
them,  351. 

Convention  at  Philadelphia  in  1787,  56, 
57,  58;  The  difficulties  it  must  have  expe- 
rienced in  the  formation  of  a  j)roper  plan, 
282,  300;  One  difficulty,  that  of  combining 
the  requisite  degree  of  stability  and  energy 
in  government,  with  the  inviolable  atten- 
tion due  to  liberty  and  the  republican 
form,  284;  Another,  making  the  partition 
between  the  authority  of  the  General  Gov- 
ernment and  that  of  the  State  Govern- 
ments, 285;  Its  authority  to  propose  a 
mixed  Constitution,  307,  314;  Its  duties 
under  existing  circumstances,  314,  815;  Its 
plan,  only  recommendatory,  817;  One  par- 
ticular in  which  it  has  departed  fi-om  the 
tenor  of  its  commission,  813.  314. 

Conventions,  for  correcting  breaches  of  a  Con- 
stitution, 888;  Dangers  and  inconveniences 
of  frequent  appeals  to  the  people,  390,  391. 

Copt  Eights:  Power  of  the  Constitution  con- 
cerning them,  3.38. 

Crete,  Cosmi  of,  479. 

Delaware:  (See  "States.")  Provision  in  het 
constitution  concerning  the  separation  cl 
the  legislative,  executive  and  judiciary 
powers,  879 ;  Number  of  Representatives 
in  the  more  numerous  branch  of  her  Legis- 
lature, 428. 

Dbmooraoy  :  A  pure  one  deflnod,  109 ;  Its  dis- 
advantages, 109. 

Departments  of  Power:  (See  "States," 
under  their  several  titles.)  Meaning  of  the 
maxim  which  requires  a  sejiaration  of 
them,  873,  881 ;  Principles  of  the  British 
Constitution  on  this  subject,  37l,  875 ;  Pro 
visions  of  the  State  Constitutions  concern- 
ing it,  876,  381 ;  The  partition  among  them 
to  oe  maintained,  not  by  exterior  provis- 
ions,  but  by  the  interior  structure  of  the 
Government,  397. 

District:  Kxclusive  le^slatlon  of  Congreiw 
over  one,  not  exceeding  ten  miles  square, 
8:^8. 


iii 


BooifOMT :  "  The  money  saved  from  one  object 
may  be  usefully  applied  to  another,"  128. 

Elections:  Frequence  of  them  In  the  choice 
of  the  Senate  would  be  inconsistent  with 
a  due  responsibility  in  the  Government  to 
the  people,  474,  4T6. 

Europe:  Her  arrogant  pretensions,  119,120. 

Faction  :  Defined.  105;  Its  latent  cause  in- 
herent in  human  nature,  106;  The  various 
and  unequal  distribution  of  property  the 
most  common  and  durable  source  of  it, 
106,  107. 

Federal  Farmer:  An  opponent  of  the  Con- 
stitution, 503. 

Feudal  Ststem  :  Account  of  it,  156,  360. 

FiBHBRiES,  The:  117. 

Fox.  Charles  Jamks:  His  India  Bill,  536. 

Geometry:  Why  its  priuciples  are  received 
without  difficulty,  244;  Incomprehensibil- 
ity of  one  of  thein,  244. 

Gborgla  :  Provision  in  her  constitution,  con- 
cerninf;  the  separation  of  the  legislative, 
executive,  and  jadiciary  powers,  8S0; 
Number  of  Eeprerientatives  in  the  more 
numerous  branch  of  her  legislature,  423. 

Gebmakic  Empire  :  Its  origin,  constitution, 
and  disadvantages,  165,  169. 

Gold  and  Silvrr:  Principle  on  which  the 
States  are  inhibited  to  make  anything  else 
a  tender  in  payment  of  debts.  350,  861. 

Government:  {Sie«  "Minorities,")  A  Govern- 
ment, the  constitution  of  which  renders  it 
unfit  to  be  entrusted  with  all  the  powers 
which  a  free  people  ought  to  delegate  to 
any  government,  would  be  an  unsafe  and 
improper  depository  of  the  National  Inter- 
ests, 19?i,  199 ;  The  danger  of  fettering  it 
with  restrictions  which  cannot  be  observed, 
211:  Examples  among  the  States  of  im- 
practicable restrictions.  211,212;  Remark- 
iible  feature  of  every  Government  reported 
by  ancient  history  w^hich  was  established 
by  deliberation  and  consent.  291 ;  Tlie  reason 
of  it,  292;  Oucht  to  control  the  passions, 
and  to  be  controlled  bv  the  reason  of  the 
public  893 ;  The  greate'st  of  all  reflections 
on  human  nature,  39S;  Wise  icings  will  al- 
ways be  served  by  able  ministers,  4S4 ;  The 
true  test  of  a  good  government,  is  its  apti- 
tude and  tendency  to  produce  a  good  ad- 
ministratinn,  511 ;  Definition  of  a  limited 
constitution,  576 :  The  general  genius  of  a 
government  is  all  that  can  be  substantially 
relied  on  for  permanent  effects,  626. 

Great  Bkitain:  (5e«  "Standing  Armies,")  Her 
Government,  302 ;  The  House  of  Commons, 
405,  406,  482,  438,  439 :  The  House  of  Lords, 
481,  4S2 ;  Why  the  king's  power  of  an  ab- 
solute negative  on  bills  has  been  long  dis- 
used. 514;  Constitution  of  Great  Britain, 
concerning  a  separation  of  the  departments 
of  power,  374,  875. 

Grotics  :  Cited,  635. 

High  Skas  :  The  power  under  the  ConstitnUon 
of  defining  and  punishing  offences  on 
them,  330. 

Holland  :  Not  a  Republic,  301.  802. 

HocsB  OF  Representatives  :  {S^«  "Constitu- 
tion," "Treaties.")  Qualifications  of  the 
electors  and  the  elected.  403.  404;  Term  of 
a  member's  service,  404,  409,  415;  Bien- 
nial elections  defended,  410.  415 ;  Argu- 
ment in  their  favor  derived  from  the  time 
they  afford  a  Representative  for  acquiring 
the  requisite  information,  411. 413,  422 ;  The 
ratio  of  Representation,  416,  421:  Its  pro- 
posed number  of  members  defended,  422, 
483 ;  Provision  of  the  Constitution  concern- 
ing the  ineligibility  «f  its  members  under 


certain  circumstances,  to  civil  offices,  427; 
Imputed  tendency  of  the  plan  for  the  House 
of  Representatives,  to  elevate  the  few  above 
the  many,  434;  Provision  for  the  future 
augmentation  of  its  members  considered. 
441 ;  Economy  consulted  by  the  provision 
for  its  temporary  number,  445 ;  Dangers  oi 
a  multitudinous  representative  assembly. 
446;  Maxim  as  to  the  proper  number  bl 
representatives,  445.  446;  AVhy  more  thao 
a  majority  ought  not  to  be  required  for  a 
quorum,  446,447;  Provision  for  regulating 
elections  to  it,  448,465;  Less  likely  tha» 
local  legislatures  to  be  partial  to  particular 
interests.  456,  457;  Advant-ige  of  uniform- 
ity in  the  time  of  elections,  464;  Why  it 
ought  to  have  no  power  in  the  formation 
of  treaties,  559 ;  Why  it  ought  to  have  no 
power  in  the  appointment  of  Federal  of- 
ficers, 572. 

Human  Naturk  :  Its  fair  side,  427,  428;  A 
power  over  •  man's  support  is  a  power  over 
his  will,  549. 

Hume,  Datid  :  Citation  from  his  essays,  645, 
646. 

Impeachments:  (See  "Senate,"  "Judiciary,' 
"States."  under  their  several  titles.) 

Indians  :  Difiiculties  concerning  them  when 
residing  within  a  State,  SS4. 

Innovation  :  Its  dangers  exaggerated,  some  of 
its  beneficial  results,  1:}6,  136,  1^7. 

Ireland:  Elections  in.  406. 

Jkfferson,  Thomas:  Cited  to  show  the  evils 
in  the  Constitution  of  Virginia,  arising  from 
the  want  of  a  barrier  between  the  legisla- 
tive, executive,  and  judiciary  powers,  3S5 
3S6;  His  draft  of  a  Constitution  cited,  8SS. 
His  idea  of  a  convention  for  correctinj 
breaches  of  it,  888 ;  Defects  of  this  plan, 
3S9— 31(2. 

Jenkinson.  Cbarles:  Hisremarksintroductory 
to  his  bill  for  regulating  the  commerce  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
185. 

Judiciary  :  (See  "Jury  Trial,'')  Objections  to 
constituting  the  Supreme  Court  a  tribunal, 
either  singly  or  jointly  with  the  Senate,  for 
trying  impeachments,  492,  495;  Mode  ol 
appointing  ttie  Judges.  574 ;  Their  tenurs 
of  office  during  good  behaviour,  575,  582 ; 
The  weakest  of  the  three  departments  ol 
power,  575;  Vindication  of  its  power  U. 
pronounce  legislative  acts  void,  because 
contrary  to  the  Constitution,  577,  579 ;  The 
independence  of  the  Judges  essential,  and 
why  ?  579,  5S3 ;  Peculiar  advantages  of  the 
provision  in  the  Constitution  for  their  sup- 
port, 5S3,  5S4;  PrecautioiM  for  their  respon 
sibility,  585;  Omission  of  a  provision  foi 
removing  them  on  account  of  inability, 
defended,  5S5;  Six  classes  of  cases,  to 
which  the  judici.il  power  of  the  Federal 
Government  ought  to  extend,  5S7,  591 ; 
These  classes  of  cases  compared  with  the 
particular  fiowers,  591.  given  by  the  Con- 
stitution to  the  judiciary,  591,  592:  Distri 
bntion  of  authority  in  the  Jud  cial  Depart- 
ment. 595,  605;  Statement  of  objections  to 
the  Supreme  Court  having  undivided 
power  of  final  jurisdiction,  595,  596;  These 
objections  answered,  596,  599 ;  The  power 
in  Congress  of  constituting  inferior  courts 
considered,  599 ;  Why  the  objects  of  these 
courts  would  not  be  accomplished  by  the 
Instrumentality  of  the  State  Courts,  600 ; 
The  original  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme 
Court  confined  to  two  classes  of  causes, 
601,  602;  Whether  the  Supreme  Court 
ought  to  have  appellate  Jurisdiction  as  to 


IV 


matters  of  fact,  602,  605;  Such  jarlsdiction 
does  not  abolish  trial  by  jury,  605;  Sum- 
marv  view  of  the  authority  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  605;  Whether  the'State  Courts  are 
to  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  In  regard  to 
causes  submitted  to  the  Federal  jurisdiction, 
606,  608 ;  In  Instances  of  concurrent  juris- 
diction brtwcen  the  natiimal  and  state 
courts  an  appeal  would  lie  from  the  state 
courts  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  60S;  Whether  an  appeal  would  lie 
from  the  state  conrts  to  subordinate  Federal 
judicatories,  609,  610. 

fcRiSDicTioN :  Literal  meaning  of  the  word 
noticed.  608.     Nate. 

Jury  Trial:  Answer  to  the  objection  that  the 
constitution  contains  no  provision  for  the 
trial  by  jury  in  civil  cases,  611,  626;  In  no 
case  abolished  by  the  constitution.  614; 
Examination  of  the  remark  that  trial  by 
jury  is  a  safeguard  against  an  oppressive 
exercise  of  Che  power  of  taxation,  615  ; 
The  strongest  argument  in  its  favor,  in 
civil  cases,  is.  that  it  is  a  security  against 
corruption,  616,  617;  Difference  between 
the  limits  of  the  jury  trial  in  the  different 
states  of  the  lTniori,'617,  618;  Ineligible  in 
many  case?,  618,  619;  Proposition  concern- 
ing it  made  by  the  minority  of  Pennsyl- 
vsnia,  619 ;  Proposition  ft-om  Massachusetts, 
622. 

Legislation  :  Evils  of  a  mutable,  470,  471,  472, 
473. 

Legislature  :  Danger  of  its  usurpations  in  a 
Representative  Republic,  382,  387,  891. 

Louis  XIV :  Anecdote  of,  64. 

Lyoian  Conpedbraot:  102,  147,860. 

Ltcurous,   291. 

Mably,  Abbe  de :  His  remark  concerning  a 
Confederate  Republic,  82:  His  remark  on 
the  tendency  of  the  Achsean  league  to  mod- 
eration in  Government,  162. 

Maintbnon,  Madame  de  :  78. 

MARLBOROuGn.  John,  Duke  of:  80;  Sarah, 
Duchess  of,  78. 

Maryland  :  Provision  In  her  constitution  con- 
cerning the  separation  of  the  legislative, 
executive,  and  judiciary  power,  879;  con- 
cernina  her  Senate,  481. 

Massachusetts:  Insurrections  and  rebellions 
in  Massa'hnsetts,  82, 179, 180;  Provision  in 
her  constitution  concerning  the  separation 
of  the  legislative,  executive  and  judiciary 
powers,  377;  Number  of  Representatives 
In  the  more  numerous  branch  of  her  Le- 
gislature, 423 ;  Size  of  her  senatorial  dis- 
tricts compared  with  that  of  the  districts 
proposed  by  the  convention,  489;  Provision 
concerning  impeachments,  497.  Note.  Pro- 
position from  in  regard  to  jury  trial,  622. 

Maxims:  Certain  maxims  in  Geometry, ethics, 
and  politics,  carrying  internal  evidence,  244. 

Military  Foroe :  (See  "  Constitution,"  "  Stand- 
ing armies.") 

Militia:  its  disadvantages  and  merits,  210, 
311 ;  Power  of  regulating  It,  280,  286. 

Minorities:  Two  modes  of  protecting  them 
from  usurpations  by  majorities,  400,  401, 
4^2;  To  give  a  minority  a  negative  upon  a 
majority  which  Is  always  the  case  where 
more  than  a  majority  is  requisite  to  a  de- 
cision, is.  In  Its  tendency,  to  subject  the 
sense  of  the  greater  number  to  that  of  the 
lesser.  188. 

Minos,  291. 

Mississippi:  Navigation  of  the,  117. 

Money  :  Power  under  the  constitution  of  coin- 
ing It,  884^  850. 

MoNTBSQDiiiT :    Refutation  of   the  erroneons 


opinion  that  he  considered  the  republican 
polity  unsuited  to  a  large  extent  of  coun- 
try, and  his  praise  of  a  confederate  renub- 
lic,  99,  100,  lUl,  345;  True  extent  of  his 
doctrine,  requiring  a  separation  of  the 
legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary  powers, 
874.  376;  His  remarks  concerning  the  judi- 
ciary. 576.     Not". 

Naturalization  :  Provision  of  the  constitu 
tion  concerning  It,  335,  886. 

Navigation  of  the  lakes,  117. 

Navy  :  Practicabilitv  of  creating  a  Federal 
navy.  115,  116;  "its  advantages,  117,  11-8; 
The  Southern  States,  the  nursery  of  wood; 
and  the  Northern  of  men  for  ships,  118; 
Importance  of  establishing  a  navy  as  early 
as  po.ssible,  206;  Power  in  tlie  Federal 
Constitution  of  erecting  one.  824,  325. 

Negative   on    bills:  (See  "Great   Britain," 
4  "  President") 

Netherlands:  Their  government,  172;  An 
evil  attending  the  constitution  of  the  States 
General,  560. 

N£;w  Hampshire  :  Provision  in  her  constitu- 
tion concerning  the  separation  of  the  legis- 
lative, executive,  and  judici.iry  powers,  376, 
377;  The  size  of  her  senatorial  districts, 
compared  with  the  size  of  the  districts  pro- 
posed by  the  convention,  439,  440;  Provis- 
ion concerning  impeacliment,  497.     Note. 

New  Jersey:  Provision  in  her  constitution 
concerning  the  separation  of  the  legislative, 
executive,  and  judiciary  powers, -378;  Her 
provisions  concerning  the  unity  of  the  exe- 
cutive and  a  council  of  appointment,  624. 

New  York:  Her  controversy  with  the  district 
of  Vermont,  85;  Alleged  excellence  of  her 
constitution,  216;  Prevision  in  her  consti- 
tution  concerning  the  separation  of  the  le- 
gislative, executive,  and  judiciary  powers, 
378;  Number  of  Kepresentatives  In  the 
more  numerous  branch  of  her  legislature, 
423;  Size  of  her  senatorial  districts  com 
pared  with  that  of  the  district*  proposed 
by  the  convention,  439;  Her  o-nstitntion 
makes  no  provision  concerning  laelor^Iity 
of  elections,  462 ;  Provision  cor  '.erning  itri- 
peachments,  497;  Provision  concerning  the 
unity  of  her  executive,  524  and  Note ; 
Where,  by  her  constitution,  the  qualified 
power  of  negativing  bills,  is  vested.  561 ; 
Provision  of  her  constitution  prohibiting 
any  person  more  than  sixty  years  old  from 
being  a  judge,  585,  586. 

North  Cakolina  :  Revolt  of  a  part  of.  Sis; 
Provision  in  her  constitution  concerning  a 
separation  of  the  legislative,  executive,  and 
Jnillciary  powers,  380. 

Ndma:  291. 

Pennsylvania  :  Disturbances  in,  85  ;  Provis- 
ion in  her  constitution  concerning  the  sep 
aration  of  the  legislative,  executive,  and 
ludiciary  powers,  378,  379.  386,  387;  Num- 
ber of  Representatives  in  the  more  nu- 
merous branch  of  her  legislature.  423;  Pro- 
vision concerning  Impeachments,  497. 
Note;  Proposition  from  the  minority  ol, 
concerning  jury  trial,  619. 

Pericles:  Examples  of  the  Injury  resultina 
to  his  country  from  his  personal  motives 
of  action,  77. 

Poland:  Her  government,  169,170,302;  An 
evil  of  the  Polish  Diet,  560. 

Political  Economy:  There  Is  no  commoi. 
measure  of  national  wealth,  and  why,  181, 
182. 

Post-Roads  :  Provision  of  the  Constltntioi 
concerning  them,  387. 

President  or  tbe  United  States  :  EzuKar- 


•tiOD  noticed  of  the  authority  vested  in 
him  by  the  Constitntion,  303, 304 ;  The 
power  of  filling  casual  vacancies  in  the 
Senate  falsely  :tscrlbecl  to  him,  50o,  506,  5oT ; 
Why  thu  power  of  filling,  during  the  recess 
of  the  Senate,  vacancies  in  Federal  offices, 
is  confided  to  him,  506,  507;  Peculiar  eligi- 
bilitv  of  the  mode  provided  for  his  appoint- 
ment 508,610;  Why  the  »ttice  of^  Presi- 
dent will  seldom  fall  to  the  lot  of  any  man 
not  qualified  in  any  degree  to  fill  it,  51 1 ; 
His  constitution  compared  with  that  of  the 
King  of  Great  Britain,  and  witn  that  of  the 
Governor  of  New  York,  613,  515;  His 
qualified  negative  on  bills.  514,  515,  516;  A 
Miield  to  the  executive,  547 ;  An  addition- 
si  security  against  the  enacting  of  improp- 
er laws,  547 ;  The  power  likely  to  be  ejier- 
olsed  only  with  great  caution,  549;  Practice 
in  Great  Britain,  549 :  Cases  for  which, 
chiefly,  it  was  designed,  549  ;  Where  vest- 
ed by  the  constitution  of  New  York,  561 ; 
Befiitation  of  the  doctrine  that  a  vigorous 
executive  is  inconsistent  with  the  genius 
of  a  republican  government,  522;"  The 
unity  of  the  executive  defended,  523;  Ob- 
jections to  a  plural  executive,  523,  525; 
Objections  to  an  executive  council,  523, 
580;  The  responsibility  of  the  President, 
necessary,  529  ;  The  term  of  fonr  years  for 
his  office  defended,  532,  535,537;  His  re- 
eligibility  defended,  58S,  543,  544;  Danger 
of  instability  in  the  system  of  administra- 
tion, 539 ;  Danger,  particularly,  from  fre- 
quent periodica!  changes  of  subordinate 
officers,  539;  Evils  to  be  apprehended  from 
the  perpetual  or  temporary  ineligibility  of 
the  I'resident,  after  serving  one  term,  589, 
542 ;  Fallacy  of  the  advantages  expected 
to  arise  from  it,  543,  544 ;  The  provision  in 
the  Ck)nstitution  for  the  compensation  of 
the  Presideit.  545,  546 ;  His  power  as 
Commander  in-Chief  of  the  army  and 
navy,  552 ;  His  power  of  requiring  the 
opinions  in  writing  of  the  heads  of  the  ex- 
ecutive departments,  552 ;  His  power  of 
pardoning,  653,  554 ;  Answer  to  the  objec- 
tion against  his  having  the  sole  power  of 
pardon  in  cases  of  treason,  554;  His  power 
in  relation  to  treaties,  656,  559,  561 ;  His 
powerin  regard  to  the  appointment  of  Fed- 
eral officers]  562,  566 ;  Less  apt  than  a  nu- 
merous assembly  of  men,  to  consult  per- 
sonal or  party  feelings  in  appointments, 
663,  564 ;  The  cooperation  of  the  Senate,  a 
check  on  a  spirit  of  favoritism  in  the  Pres- 
ident, 565;  His  power  in  regard  to  the  re- 
moval of  officers,  568;  The  constitution  of 
the  President  combines  the  requisites  to 
public  snfetv,  673. 

Pans:  The  liberty  of  the,  681,  682;  Tax  on 
newspapers  in  Great  Britain,  632,  Note. 

Public  Acts  :  Records,  &c..  Provision  of  the 
Constitution  concerning  them,  536. 

PiTBUc  Dkbt:  Would  be  a  cause  of  collision 
between  the  separate  States  or  Confedera- 
cies, 87;  Obligation  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment concerning  public  debts,  prior  to  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution,  345. 

PtJBUc  Lands  :  A  fruitful  source  of  contro- 
versy, 83,  86. 

Ebmo V ALs  or  Federal  Ofpiokbs  :  (Se«  **  Presi- 
dent") 

Bkfresentation  :  The  principle  of  it,  said  to 
be  an  invention  of  modern  Enrope,  132, 
405,  479 ;  Idea  of  an  actual  representation 
of  all  classes  of  the  people  by  persons  of 
each  class,  vi  nonary,  269,  270 ;    Distinction 


between  the  principle  o  le presentation 
among  the  ancients,  and  in  the  United 
States,  479. 

BapuBLic:  Defined,  109.  (See  "Confederate 
Republic,")  Its  advantages,  109,  110. 112; 
Error  of  the  ojiiiiion  that  it  is  unsuitable 
to  a  laree  district  of  country,  132,  133; 
Natural  limits  of  one,  131  132 :  One  of  its 
weak  sides,  the  inlets  which  it  aflVyrds  to 
foreign  corruption,  1S9,  190:  Defined  or 
described,  301,  302;  Inapplicability  of  the 
title  to  certain  governments  which  have 
received  it,  301,  302;  Obligation  of  the 
Federal  Government  to  guarantee  to  every 
State  a  republican  form  of  government, 
841. 

Rhode  Island  :  Provision  in  her  constitution 
concerning  elections,  410 ;  Number  of  rep- 
resentatives in  the  more  numerous  braneh 
of  her  legislature,  428 ;  Iniquitous  meas- 
ures of,  475. 

Rome  :  Senate  of,  477  ;  Tribunes  of,  479,  4b2 ; 
Evils  arising  from  her  having  plural  consuls 
and  tribunes,  524,  560. 

Romulus,  291. 

RuTHERFORTH,  Dr.  Thoiias.  cited,  6.35.    Nute. 

Senatf. :  (6'«e  "  Elections,"  "Judiciary.'")  Will 
generally  be  composed  with  peculiar  care 
and  Judgment,  and  why  ?  2)J1 ;  Its  consti- 
tution. 466,  502;  Qualifications  of  Senators. 
466,  467;  Appointment  of  Senators  by  tiie 
State  Legislatures,  467 ;  Equality  of  repre- 
sentations in  the  Senate,  467,  46S;  Number 
of  Senators  and  duration  of  their  appoint- 
ment, 469;  Its  power  in  regard  to  making 
treaties,  4S3,  4»9 ;  Provision  for  the  bien- 
nial succession  of  one  third  of  new  Sena- 
tors, 484,  485;  Viewed  as  a  court  of  im- 
peachment, 490,  602;  the  objection  which 
would  substitute  the  proportion  of  two- 
thirds  of  all  the  members  composing  the 
Senate,  to  that  of  two-thirds  of  the  mem- 
bers prw'-rU  considered.  560, 661;  Its  cooper- 
ation with  the  President  in  appointments,  a 
check  on  favoritism,  565,  566;  Answer  to 
the  objection  that  the  President,  by  the  in- 
fluence of  the  power  of  nomination,  may 
secure  the  complaisance  of  the  Senate  to 
his  views,  566,  667,  56S.  569 ;  Its  consent 
would  be  necessary  to  displace  as  well  as 
to  appiiint  officers,  568. 

Sebvius  Tullius,  291. 

Shat"s  Rebellion,  78. 

Ship  Building:  The  wood  of  the  Southeru 
States  preferable  for  it,  118. 

Slaves  :  The  importation  of  them  after  the 
year  1808,  prohibited,  381 ;  Possess  the 
mixed  character  of  persons  and  prope  'ty, 
417.  418;  Defence  of  the  provision  of  the 
Constitution  combining  them  with  ree 
citizens  as  a  ratio  of  taxation,  416,  421. 

Socrates.  424. 

Solon,  291. 

South  Carolina  :  Provision  in  her  constitn«  Ion 
concerning  the  separation  of  the  legisla- 
tive, executive,  and  judiciary  powers.  380; 
Provision  concerning  elections,  410;  Num- 
ber of  Kepresentatives  in  the  more  nnme- 
rous  branch  of  her  legislature,  428 ;  Pro- 
vision concerning  impeachments,  497, 
Sote. 

Sparta:  Her  Senate,  477;  HerEphori,479.4&2. 

Stakdino  Armies:  (5««  "  Constitution.")  One 
advantage  uf  them  in  Europe,  90,91 ;  Would 
be  an  inevitable  result  of  the  dissolution 
of  the  Confederacy,  92,  95 ;  Their  fatal  ef- 
fects  on  liberty,  91,  92.  Ste  pp.  820,  821 ; 
Why  they  did  not  spring  np  In  the  Oreciar 


INDEX. 


Eepublics,  93  ,  Nor  to  any  considerable  ex- 
tent in  Great  Britain,  94,  8-21, 322, 328 :  Wis- 
doDQ  of  the  provision  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution in  this  particular,  202,  206,  216,217 
218,  322;  Why  it  is  better  for  an  army  to 
be  in  the  hands  of  the  Federal  Government 
than  of  the  State  Governments,  208 ;  Silence 
tn  regard  to  them  in  the  constitutions  of  all 
the  states  except  two,  202,  203,  211,  213; 
Provision  concerning  them,  In  the  English 
Bill  of  Rights  framed  at  the  Revolution  in 
1688,  214,  215;  Highest  proportion  of  a 
standing  army  to  the  population  of  a  coun- 
try S.71. 

States:  {Ste  "Constitution,"  "Taxation," 
"Union,")  Advantages  of  an  unrestrained 
Intercourse  between  them,  121,122;  The 
consequences  of  the  doctrine  that  the  In- 
terposition of  the  States  ought  to  be  re- 
quired to  give  eflfect  to  a  measure  of  the 
Union,  151,  152,  153:  Easier  for  the  state 
governments  to  encroach  on  the  National 
Government  than  for  the  latter  to  encroach 
on  the  former,  154,  247,  358,  364;  The  state 
governments  will  in  all  possible  contingen- 
cies afford  complete  security  against  all  in- 
vasions of  public  liberty  "by  the  national 
authority,  228,  860,  372;  Power  of  Congress 
to  admit  new  states  into  the  Union,  340; 
Obligation  of  Congress  to  guaranty  a  re- 
publican form  of  government  to  every 
state,  341,  342,  843,  344;  Provision  of  the 
Constitution  concerning  its  ratification  by 
nine  states,  346 ;  Why  the  state  magistracy 
should  be  bound  to  support  the  Federal 
Constitution,  356;  Discussion  of  the  sup- 
posed danger  from  the  powers  of  the  Union 
to  the  state  governments,  358,  872;  exam- 
ination of  the  comparative  means  of  influ- 
ence of  the  federal  and  state  governments, 
867,  872;  Provisions  in  the  constitutions  of 
the  several  states  concerning  the  separation 
of  the  legislatiTe,  executive,  and  judiciary 
powers,  376,  381 ;  Provisions,  etc.,  concern- 
ing elections,  424;  Provisions,  etc.,  con- 
cerning the  size  of  electoral  districts,  489, 
440 ;  As  fair  to  presume  abuses  of  power  by 
the  state  governments  as  by  the  federal 
government,  450 ;  "  Portion  of  sovereignty 
remaining  In  the  individual  states,"  recog- 
nized by  the  Constitution,  467,  4(fe ;  Pro- 
visions of  the  constitutions  of  the  several 
states  concerningimpeachments,  497,  I^ote  ; 
New  York  and  New  Jersey  the  only  states 
which  have  entrusted  the  executive  author- 
ity wholly  to  single  men,  524 ;  Difference 
between  the  limits  of  the  jury  trialln  the 
different  states,  617.  618. 

Bw£DBN :  Corruption  the  cause  of  the  sadden 
despotism  of  Gustavus  III.,  191. 

Swiss  Cantons  :    Their  Government,  170, 171. 

Tazbs  :  Indirect  taxes,  the  most  expedient 
source  of  revenue  in  the  United  States,  128, 
182,  183;  Suggestion  of  a  tax  on  ardent 
spiriUs  126;  Taxation,  237.281;  Incompe- 
tency of  the  Turkish  Sovereign  to  impose 
•a  new  tax,  288;  Intention,  and  practical  de- 
fects of  the  old  confederation  in  regard  to 
taxation,  288,  289;  Distinction  between  in- 
ternal and  external  taxes.  239 ;  Inadequacy 
of  requisitions  on  the  States,  240,  241 ;  Ad- 
VHUt^es  of  vesting  the  power  of  taxation 
in  the  Federal  Government,  as  It  regards 
borrowing,  242 ;  Positions  manifesting  the 
necessity  of  so  vesting  the  power,  245 ;  Ob- 
jections. 246,  2^:  DanKor  of  so  vesting  the 


power  denied,  249 :  Except  as  to  impotti 
and  exports,  tho  United  States  and  the  sev- 
eral states  have  concurrent  powers  of  tax- 
ation, 251 ;  No  repugnaucy  between  those 
concurrent  powers,  252 ;  the  necessity  of 
them,  252, 253, 256,  265 ;  Dangers  of  restrict- 
ing the  Federal  power  to  laying  duties  on 
imposts,  266;  Effect  of  exorbitant  duties, 
266,  267;  Answer  to  objections  to  the  pow- 
er of  internal  taxation  in  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment, derived  from  the  alleged  want  of 
a  sufHcient  knowledge  of  local  circum- 
stances, and  from  a  supposed  interference 
between  the  revenue  laws  of  the  Union 
and  those  of  the  particular  States,  274; 
Suggestion  of  double  taxation  answered, 
278,  279 ;  Evils  of  poll  taxes  admitted,  but 
the  propriety  of  vesting  in  the  Federal 
Government  the  power  of  imposing  them, 
asserted,  279,  280  ;  Provision  of  the  Con- 
stitution concerning  taxation,  852. 

Theseus,  291. 

Titles  of  Nobility:  The  prohibition  of  them 
the  corner  stone  of  Republican  Govern- 
ment, 629. 

Tkkason  :  Power  under  the  Constitution  con- 
cerning it,  340;  Why  the  power  of  pardon- 
ing in  cases  of  treason  is  properly  vested  in 
the  President  solely,  253,  254. 

Treaties  :  Power  under  the  Constitution  con- 
cerning them,  349 ;  Why  they  ought  to  be 
the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  487;  Power 
of  the  President  in  regard  to  them,  666, 
561 ;  Why  the  House  of  Representatives 
ought  to  have  no  power  in  forming  them, 
659;  Why  two-thirds  of  the  Senators  pres- 
ent are  preferable  to  two-thirds  of  the 
whole  Senate  as  a  co-ordinate  power  with 
the  President,  in  regard  to  treaties,  560. 

TuLLtrs  HosTiLins,  291. 

Union:  (See  "Confederacies,"  "Constitution,") 
Ita  importance,  54;  Its  capacity  to  call  into 
service  the  best  talents  of  the  country,  61 ; 
A  bulwark  against  foreign  force  and  influ- 
ence, 66,  74 ;  Its  capacity  to  prevent  wars, 
61,  62,  65,  69 ;  A  saleguard  against  domestic 
insurrections  and  wars,  76,  90,  97,  112 ;  A 
safeguard  against  standing  armies  as  conse- 
quent on  domestic  Insurrections  and  wars, 
90,  95 ;  Its  utility  In  respect  to  commerce 
and  a  Navy,  118, 121 ;  Its  utility  in  respect 
to  revenue,  121,  180 ;  Principal  purposes 
to  be  answered  by  It,  195 ;  If  founded  on 
considerations  of  public  happiness,  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  States,  if  irreconcileable  to 
it,  should  be  sacrificed,  359. 

United  States  :  Their  actual  dimensions,  138. 

Venice  :  Not  a  Republic,  802. 

Vice-President,  511,  512. 

Virginia:  (See  "Jefferson.  Thomas,")  Pro. 
vision  In  her  Constitution  concerning  the 
separation  of  the  legislative,  executive, 
and  judiciary  powers,  879,  S&i,  885;  Wes 
the  colony  which  stood  first  in  resisting 
the  parliamentary  usurpations  of  Great 
Britain,  407 ;  Was  the  first  to  espouse  by  a 
public  act  the  resolution  of  independence, 
407 ;  Elections  under  her  former  Govern- 
ment, 407. 

West  India  Trade,  115, 116. 

WoLSEV,  Cardinal,  77,  7a 

Wyoming,  lands  of:  Dispute  between  Con- 
necticut and  Pennsylvania  concernlaj 
them.  85 

Za  LEU  008.  291. 


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